G.R. No.

180269 Febr u a r y 20, 2013

JOSE Z. CA SILANG, SR., substituted by his heirs, namely: FELICIDAD CUD lAMA T VDA. DE CASILANG, JOSE C. CASILANG, JR.,
RICA RDO C. CASILANG, MARIA LOURDES C. CASILANG, CHRISTOPHER C. CASILANG, BEN C. CASILANG, DANTE C.
CA SILANG, GREGORIO C. CASILANG, HERALD C. CASILANG; and FELICIDAD Z. CASILANG, MARCELINA Z. CASILANG,
JA CINTA Z. CASILANG, BONIFACIO Z. CASILANG, LEONORA Z. CASILANG, and FLORA Z. CASILANG, Petitioners,
v s.
ROSA RIO Z. CASILANG-DIZON, MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG, RODOLFO A. CASILANG, and ATTY. ALICIA B.
FA BIA, in her capacity as Cl erk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pangasinan and/or her duly authorized
r epresentative, Respondents.

D EC IS I O N

REYES, J.:

Befor e us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G.R. CV No. 79619, which reversed and set aside
t h e Decision 2 dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D.

A ntecedent Facts

T h e late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca Zacarias (Francisca) had eight (8) children, namely: Felicidad Casilang (F elicidad ), Ir eneo
Ca silang (Ireneo), Marcelina Casilang (Marcelina), Jacinta Casilang (Jacinta), Bonifacio Casilang (Bonifacio), Leonora Casilang (Leonora), Jose Casilang
(Jose) and Flora Casilang (Flora). Liborio died intestate on October 11, 1982 at the age of 83, followed not long after by his wife Francisca on De cem ber
2 5 , 1 982. Their son Bonifacio also died in 1986, survived by his child Bernabe Casilang (Bernabe), while son Ireneo died on June 11, 1992, survived by his
fou r (4) children, namely: Mario Casilang (Mario), Angelo Casilang (Angelo), Rosario Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo Casilang (Rodolfo), h ere in
r espondents.

T h e estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of three (3) parcels of land located in Barangay Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan, namely: (1 ) Lot No.
4 676, with an area of 4,164 square meters; (2) Lot No. 4704, containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No. 4618, with 897 sq m.

On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan a com plaint for unlawful detainer, d ocketed as
Civ il Case No. 847, to evict her uncle, petitioner Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot No. 4618 was owned by her father Ireneo, as evidenced
by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555 issued in 1994 under her father’s name. On April 3, 1997, the respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicia l P artit ion
w ith Quitclaim 3 whereby they adjudicated Lot No. 4618 t o themselves. In the same instrument, respondents Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo renounced their
r espective shares in Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario.

In h is Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the "lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual possession" of the said lot, and that h e a cqu ired
t h e same "through intestate succession from his late father."4 For some reason, however, he and his lawyer, who was from the Public Attorney ’ s O ffice,
fa iled t o appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference, and Jose was declared in default; thus, the adverse judgment against him.5

On February 18, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment finding Rosario to be the owner of Lot No. 4618, and ordering Jose to remove his house, va cate L ot
No. 4618, and pay Rosario ₱5 00.00 in monthly rentals from the filing of the complaint until she was place d in pos ses s ion , plu s a t t or ney ’ s f e es of
₱5 ,000.00, litigation expenses and costs. On March 23, 1998, the MTC issued a writ of execution; and on August 28, 1998, a Writ of Dem olit ion 6 was
issued.

On June 2, 1 998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of Liborio and Francisca, 7 filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complain t, 8 d ocket ed a s
Civ il Case No. 98-02371-D for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages" against the r es pon dent s . On J u ne 1 0 ,
1 998, the petitioners moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or t emporary restraining order, which the RTC however denied on J u ne
2 3, 1998.

A m ong the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by Ireneo’s children ov er Lot No. 4618, as well as T D
No. 5 55, and by necessary implication its derivatives, TD No. 15177 (for the lot) and TD No. 15176 (for the house), both of which were issued in 1 998 in
t h e name of Rosario Casilang-Dizon.9

T h e petitioners alleged in their complaint that all eight (8) children of Liborio entered into a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to wh ich J ose wa s
a llotted Lot No. 4618 as his share; that Ireneo never claimed ownership of Lot No. 4 61 8, n or t ook p oss es sion of i t , becau se h is sh a re w as t he
sou thwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 4676, containing an area of 1,308 sq m, 10 of which he took exclusive possession during his lifetim e; t h at J ose has
a lways resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he built his family’s semi-concrete house just a few steps away from his parents’ old bamboo hu t;
t hat he took in and cared for his aged parents in his house until their deaths in 1982; that one of his children has also built a house on the lot. 11 Jose, said
t o be the most educated of the Casilang siblings, worked as an insurance agent.12 The complete disposition of the intes t at e e st at e of L ibor io p er t h e
pa rties’ verbal partition appears as follows:

1 . Lot No. 4676, with 4,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 534 in Liborio’s name,13 was verbally partition ed a m on g Ma rcelin a (2 36 s q m ),
Leon ora (1,965 sq m), Flora (655 sq m), and Ireneo, represented by his children, the herein respon dents-defendants (1 ,308 sq m), as shown in
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated January 8, 1998, subsequently ex ecu ted by a ll t h e Ca si lang s iblin gs a nd t he ir
r epresentatives.

2 . Lot No. 4704, with 1,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 276 in Liborio’s name,14 was divided among Jacinta and Bonifacio, who died in 1 986
a n d is now represented by his son Bernabe; and
 3 . Lot No. 4618, containing 897 sq m, declared since 1994 under TD No. 555 in Ireneo’s name, 15 is now the subject of the controver sy below .
Jose insists that he succeeded to it per verbal partition, and that he and his family have always occupied the same peacefully , adv ers ely an d
ex clusively even while their parents were alive. 16

For her part, Rosario alleged in her answer with counterclaim,17 which she filed on September 15, 1 998, that:

a ) She is the actual and lawful owner of Lot No. 4618 with an area of 897 square meters, having acquired the same by way of a Dee d of Ex t ra
ju dicial Partition with Quitclaim dated 3 April 1997 which was duly executed among herein Appellant ROSARIO and her br ot h ers , n amely ,
MA RIO, ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG;

b) Her ownership over subject property could be traced back t o her late father IR[E]NEO which th e la t ter in her it ed by way of in tes t a t e
su ccession from his deceased father LIBORIO sometime in 1992; that the residential house described in herein Appellee JOSE’s com plain t i s
a n illegal structure built by him in 1997 without her (ROSARIO’s) knowledge and consent; that in fact, an ejectmen t s u it w as f iled a g ain st
A ppellee JOSE with the Municipal Trial Court in Calasiao, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 847;

c) The subject lot is never a portion of Appellee JOSE’s share from the intestate of his deceased father, LIBORIO; that on the contrary, the lot is
h is deceased brother IR[E]NEO’s share from the late LIBORIO’s intestate estate; that in fact, the property has long been d eclared in the n am e
of t h e late IRENEO as shown by Tax Declaration No. 555 long before his children ROSARIO DIZON, MARIO, ANGELO a nd R ODOL FO, a ll
su rnamed CASILANG, executed the Deed of Partition dated 18 February 1998; that Appellee JOSE had actually consumed his shares which he
in herited from his late father, and after a series of sales and dispositions of the same made by him, he now wants to take Appellants’ property;

d) A ppellee JOSE is never the rightful owner of the lot in question and has not shown any convincing proof of his supposed ownership; that the
im provements introduced by him, specifically the structures he cited are the subject of a Writ of Dem olition dated 28 August 1998 pursuant to
t h e Order dated 17 August 1998 of the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan;

e) No protestation or objection was ever made by Appellee JOSE in Civil Case No. 847 ( Unlawful Detainer case) where he was the defenda nt ;
t hat the truth was that his possession of the subject property was upon the tolerance and benevolence of his late brother IRENEO du ring t he
la tter’s lifetime and that Appellant ROSARIO;

f) T he RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff would just be doing her job if she and her deputies would implem ent t he writ of
ex ecution/demolition issued by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan since it is its ministerial duty to do so;

g ) The Appellees have no cause of action; not having shown in their com plaint the basis, the reason and the very core of their claim a s t o why
t h e questioned document should be nullified. 18 (Citation om itted)

In t heir reply 19 to Rosario’s aforesaid answer, the petitioners asserted that the MTC committed a grave error in failing to consider a m at eria l fa ct -t ha t
Jose had long been in prior possession under a claim of title which he obtained by partition.

A t the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the parties entered into the following stipulations:

1 . That the late LIBORIO is the father of FELICIDAD, MARCELINA, JUANITA, LEONORA, FLORA and IRENEO, all surnamed CASILANG;

2 . That the late LIBORIO died in 1982; That the late LIBORIO and his family resided on Lot [No.] 4618 up t o his death in 1982; That the house
of t h e late LIBORIO is located on Lot [No.] 4618;

3 . That Plaintiff JOSE used to reside on the lot in question because there was a case for ejectment filed against him;

4 . That the house which was demolished is the family house of the late LIBORIO and FRANCISCA ZACARIAS with the qualification that it was
g iv en t o the defendants;

5 . That the action involves members of the same family; and

6 . That no earnest efforts were made prior t o the institution of the case in court.20

Ru ling of the RTC

A fter a full trial on the merits, the RTC in its Decision 21 dated April 21, 2003 decreed as follows:

W HEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:

1 . Declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1 997 null and void;

2 . Declaring plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject Lot No. 4618 and as such, entitled t o t he p ea ce ful
possession of the same;

3 . Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00 and litigation ex p ens es in t h e
a m ount of ₱5 ,000.00, and t o pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 22

T h e RTC affirmed Jose’s ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618 by virtue of the oral partition of the estate of Liborio by all the siblings. In the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim 23 dated January 8, 1998, subsequent ly ex ecut ed by a ll t h e e ight (8 ) Ca si lang s iblin gs a nd t he ir l ega l
r epresentatives―with Ireneo represented by his four (4) children, and Bonifacio by his son Bernabe―petitioners Jose, Felicidad, Jacinta a nd Ber na be,
a cknowledged that they had “already received their respective shares of inheritance in advance,"24 and therefore, renounced their claims ov er Lot No.
4 676 in favor of co-heirs Marcelina, Leonora, Flora and Ireneo, as follows:

W e hereby RENOUNCED, WAIVED AND QUITCLAIM, all our rights, interests and participations ov er the WHOLE parcel of land [Lot No. 4676], left by
t h e late, LIBORIO CASILANG, in favor of our coheirs, namely: MARCELINA Z. CASILANG-PARAYNO, LEONORA Z. CASILANG-SARMIENTO, FLORA
Z. CASILANG, MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG, ROSARIO A. CASILANGDIZON AND RODOLFO A. CASILANG. 25

T hus, Jose expressly renounced his share in Lot No. 4676, which has an area of 4,164 sq m, because he had already received in advance his share in h is
fa ther’s estate, Lot No. 4618 with 897 sq m:

T o t he mind of the court, Jose Casilang could have not [sic] renounced and waived his rights and interests ov er Lot [No.] 4676 if h e b eliev e s t h at Lot
[No.] 4618 is not his, while the other lot, Lot [No.] 470[4], was divided between sister Jacinta Casilang and brother Bonifacio Casilang[,] Sr ., who wa s
r epresented by his son. In the same [way] as testified to by plaintiffs Felicidad Casilang and Jacinta Casilang, they sig ned t h e De ed of Ex tr ajudicial
Pa rtition with Quitclaim wherein they waived and renounced their rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676 because they hav e a lr eady r ece iv ed t h eir
sh are, which is Lot [No.] 470[4]. 26

T h e RTC found baseless the claim of Rosario that Lot No. 4618 was an inheritance of her father Ir eneo c on sid ering t ha t a t a x d ecla rat ion i s not
con clusive proof of ownership. The RTC even noted that the tax declaration of Ireneo started only in 1994, although he h ad been dead since 1992. "Su ch
being the case, the heirs of Ir[e]neo Casilang has [sic] no basis in adjudicating unto themselves Lot No. 4618 and partitioning the same by executing t h e
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim."27

A ppeal to the CA

Un deterred, Rosario appealed t o the CA averring that: (1) the lower court erred in declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partit ion wit h Qu it claim da ted
A pril 3, 1997 as null and void; and (2) the lower court erred in declaring Jose as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject Lot No. 4618.28

In t he now assailed decision, the CA reversed the RTC by relying mainly on the factual findings and conclusions of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847, viz:

Per the records, the above described property was subject of Civil Case No. 847 decided by the MTC of Calasiao, F irst J u dicia l R eg ion , Pr ov in ce of
Pa ngasinan which rendered a judgment, supra, in favor of Appellant ROSARIO ordering herein Appellee JOSE and all persons claim ing r igh ts u nder
h im to vacate the land of Appellant ROSARIO. It was found by the MTC that the latter is the owner of the subject parcel of land locat ed a t T ali baew,
Ca lasiao, Pangasinan; that the former owner of the land is the late IRENEO (who died on 11 June 1992), father of App ellant R O SAR IO; t h at Ex tr a
Ju dicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed by and among the heirs of the late IRENEO; that MAURO [sic], ANGELO and RODOLFO, all su rn amed
CA SILANG waived and quitclaimed their respective shares ov er the subject property in favor of Appellant ROSARIO; that Appellee JOSE was allowed by
t h e late IRENEO during his lifetime to occupy a portion of the land without a contract of lease and no rentals being paid by the former; t hat A ppellan t
ROSARIO allowed Appellee JOSE to continue occupying the land after the Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed. 29

Mor eover, noting that the decision in Civil Case No. 847 in favor of Rosario was issued on February 18, 1998 while the petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case
No. 98-02371-D was filed on June 2, 1998, the CA concluded that the latter case was a mere afterthought:

If t h e latter has really a strong and valid reason to question the validity of the Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with Quit claim, supra, he could have don e
it soon after the said Deed was executed on 3 April 1997. However, curiously enough, it was only when the MTC ordered his eviction fr om t he s u bject
pr operty that he decided to file the instant case against the Appellants. 30

Pet ition for Review in the Supreme Court

Now in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners maintain that:

IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY [OF] THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND QUITCLAIM DATED APRIL 3, 1997, THE H ONORABL E
COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY VIOLATED THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR. AS DIRECT COMPULSORY HEIR. 31

Ou r Ruling and Di scussions

T h ere is merit in the petition.

In ferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defenda nt in a n e j ect ment s u i t, bu t on l y t o
r esolve the i ssue of possession; its determination is not conclusive on the issue of own ership.

It is w ell to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action f or r ecov ery of p oss es sion a n d/or
ow nership of the land. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory act ion (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory
a ction (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion inte rd ictal) t og eth er
w ith forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real proper ty . A s ide f r om t he s um m ary act ion of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action t o r ecov er ow ner shi p
w hich also includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. 32
Un der Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Summary Procedure governs the two forms of ejectment suit, the pu r pose bein g t o pr ov ide a n
ex peditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property. They are not processes t o determine the actual title t o an estate.
If a t all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only t o resolve the issue of posses s ion
a n d its determination on the ownership issue is not conclusive. 33 As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule 70:

Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.―When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
r esolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only t o determine the issue of possession.

It is a propos, then, t o note that in contrast to Civil Case No. 847, which is an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 98 -02371-D is for "Annulment of Documents,
Ownership and Peaceful Possession;" it is an accion reinvindicatoria, or action to r ecov er ow n ersh ip, w hich n eces sa rily in clud es r ecov ery of
possession 34 as an incident thereof. Jose asserts his ownership over Lot No. 4618 under a partition agreement with his co-heirs, and seeks t o in v alidat e
Ir eneo’s "claim" ov er Lot No. 4618 and to declare TD No. 555 void, and consequently, to annul the Deed of Ex tr ajud icial P a rt iti on a nd Qu itcla im
ex ecuted by Ir eneo’s heirs.

It i s imperative to review the CA’s factual conclusions since they are entirely contrary to those of the RTC, they have no c i tat ion of
specific supporting evidence, and are premised on the supposed absence of evidence, particularly on the parties’ verbal pa rti ti on ,
but are directly contradicted by the evidence on record.

It m ust be noted that the factual findings of the MTC, which the CA adopted without question, were obtained through Summary Pr ocedur e a nd w ere
ba sed solely on the com plaint and affidavits of Rosario, after Jose had been declared in default. But since a full trial was had in Civil Case No. 98-02371 -
D, t he CA should have pointed out the specific errors and weaknesses in the RTC’s factual conclusions before it could rule that Jose was unable to present
"a ny evidentiary support" t o establish his title, and that his continued possession of Lot No. 4618 was by mere t olerance of Rosario. At m ost , h owev er ,
t h e CA only opined that it was conjectural for the RTC to conclude, that Jose had already received his inheritance when he renounced his share in Lot No.
4 676. It then ruled that the RTC erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847-that Jose’s possession over subject property w as
by mere tolerance. Said the appellate court:

Giv en the claim of the Appellee that Lot [No.] 4618 was orally given/assigned t o h im by h is d eceas ed f a ther L IBOR IO, or t h at h is c laim wa s
corroborated by his sisters (his co-plaintiffs-Appellees), or that their claim is indubitably tied up with the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quit cla im
ov er Lot No. 4676, still We cannot fully agree with the pronouncement of the court a quo that Appellee JOSE could not have renounced and w aiv ed hi s
r ights and interest over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his. Wanting any evidentiary support, We find this stance as c on jectur al
being unsubstantiated by law or convincing evidence. At the most and taking the factual or l egal circumstances as shown by the records, We hold that the
court a quo erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847 ruling that herein Appellee JOSE’s possession ov er subject pr oper ty
w as by mere t olerance. Based as it is on mere tolerance, Appellee JOSE’s possession therefore could not, in any way, ripen into ownership. 35 ( Cita tion s
om itted)

By relying solely on the MTC’s findings, the CA completely ignored the testimonial, documentary and circumstantial ev idence of the petitioners, obtained
by the RTC after a full trial on the merits. More importantly, the CA did not point to any evidence of Rosario that Ireneo had inherited Lot No. 4618 from
Liborio. All it did was adopt the findings of the MTC.

T h e Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and unless the case falls under any of the well-defined exceptions, the Supreme Court will not delve once m or e
in to the findings of facts. In Sps. Sta. Maria v. CA,36 this Court stated:

Set tled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of C ou rt i s l im it ed t o
r ev iewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are g rou n ded en t irely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or im possible; (3 ) when t her e i s g r ave abu se of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5 ) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making i t s f in dings
t h e Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee ; (7 ) w hen
t h e findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they a re ba s ed;
(9 ) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the res pon dent ; a n d (1 0 ) when t he
fin dings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 37 (Citation om itted)

In t he instant case, the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are starkly contrasting. Moreover, we find that the CA decision falls under exceptions (7 ),
(8 ) and (10) above, which warrants another review of its factual findings.

T h e evidence supporting Rosario’s claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 4618 is the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim, w hich s h e ex ecute d
w ith her brothers Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo. There is no question that by itself, the said document would have fully conveyed t o Rosario whatever rights
h er brothers might have in Lot No. 4618. But what needs to be established first is w hether or not Ireneo did in fact own Lot No. 4618 through succession,
a s Rosario claims. And here now lies the very crux of the controversy.

A r eview of the parties’ evidence shows that they entered into an oral partition, giving Lot No. 4618 t o Jose as his s h ar e, w h ereas
Rosa rio presented no proof whatsoever that her father inherited Lot No. 4618 from his father Liborio.

Rosa rio’s only proof of Ireneo’s ownership is TD No. 555, issued in his name, but she did not bother to explain why it was dated 1 994, alth oug h Ir e neo
died on June 11, 1 992. Liborio’s ownership of Lot No. 4618 is admitted by all the parties, but it must be asked whether in hi s lifetime Liborio did in fa ct
t ransmit it to Ireneo, and if not, whether it was conveyed to him by Liborio’s heirs. It is imperative for Rosario to have pr esented proof of this transfer t o
Ir eneo, in such a form as would have vested ownership in him. We fin d, instead, a preponderance of contrary evidence.

1 . In his testimony, Jose claimed that his parents’ bamboo house in Lot No. 4618 disintegrated from wear and t ear; so he took them in t o h is
sem i-concrete house in the same lot, which was just a few steps away, and he cared for them until they died; shortly before Liborio’s death, and
in the presence of all his siblings, his father Liborio assigned Lot No. 4618 to him as his inheritance; his house was demoli sh ed in 1 998 a s a
r esult of the ejectment case filed against him; but his family continued to live thereat after reconstructing the house; Ireneo and his family d id
n ot live in Lot No. 4618; although Jose’s job as an insurance agent t ook him around Pangasinan, he always came hom e t o his fa m ily in h is
 h ouse in Lot No. 4618, which he used as his permanent address; only Lot No. 4676 was included in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partit io n da t ed
Ja nuary 8, 1998 because Lot No. 4618 had already been distributed to Jose, and Lot No. 4704 had alrea dy b een as s ign ed t o J a cin ta a nd
Bon ifacio as their share in their father’s estate. 38

2 . Jose’s t estimony was corroborated by petitioners Felicidad, 39 Jacinta,40 Leonora,41 and Flora,42 who all confirmed that their brother Jose has
a lways resided in Lot No. 4618 from his childhood up to the present, that he took their aged parents into his house after their bam boo h ou s e
w as destroyed, and he attended to their needs until they died in 1982. The sisters were also one in saying that their f a th er L ibor i o v er bally
w illed Lot No. 4618 to Jose as his share in his estate, and that their actual partition affirmed their father’s dispositions. Jacinta cla im e d t hat
sh e and Bonifacio have since taken possession of Lot No. 4704 pursuant t o their partition, and have also declared their respective portions f or
t ax purposes.43 Flora corroborated Jacinta on their taking possession of Lot No. 4704, as well as that Jose built his house on Lot No. 4618 n ext
t o h is parents and they came to live with him in their old age. Flora affirmed that Exhibit "F" correctly reflects their verbal partition of Lot N o.
4 676, and that she was fully in accord with it. She added that Felicidad and Marcelina had since constructed their own houses on the portion s
of Lot No. 4676 assigned t o them. 44Felicidad mentioned that in their partition, Ir eneo was given a portion of Lot No. 4676, while Lot No. 470 4
w as divided between Jacinta and Bonifacio, and Jose alone got Lot No. 4618. Leonora confirmed that they were all present when their f a t he r
m ade his above dispositions of his estate.

3 . Benjamin Lorenzo, a long-time neighbor of the Casilangs testified that Jose’s house stands on Lot No. 4618 and Ireneo did not live with hi s
fam ily on the said lot but was a tenant in another farm som e distance away. 45

4 . For her part, Rosario merely asserted that her father Ireneo succeeded to Lot No. 4618 from Liborio, as shown in TD No. 555 (Exhibit "1 ") ;
t hat she and her brothers extra-judicially settled Ireneo’s estate, and that they each waived their shares in her favor; and, t ha t s h e h as been
pay ing taxes on Lot No. 4618. Rosario admitted, however, that Jose has lived in the lot since he was a child, and he has reconstructed his house
t h ereon after its court-ordered demolition.46 But Rosario on cross-examination backtracked by claiming that it wa s h er f a t her Ir en eo a nd
g randfather Liborio who built the old house in Lot No. 4618, where Ireneo resided until his death; he even planted variou s fr uit t r ees . Y et ,
t h ere is no mention whatsoever to this effect by any of the witnesses. Rosario also contradicted herself when she denied that Jose l iv ed t her e
because his job as insurance agent took him away often and yet admitted that Jose’s house stands ther e, which he reconstructed a ft er it wa s
or dered demolished by the MTC. Inexplicably, Rosario disclaimed knowledge of Ireneo’s share in Lot No. 4676, although she was a signatory ,
a long with her brothers and all the petitioners, in the deed of partition of the said lot, whereby she got 1 ,308 sq m. Rosario also admitted t ha t
t axes were paid on the lot only beginning in 1997, not before. 47

5 . Benjamin Dizon, husband of Rosario, t estified that Rosario was losing appetite and sleep because of the case filed by Jose; that Ireneo d ied
in another farm; that Ireneo had a house in Lot No. 4618 but Jose took ov er the house after he died in 1992. 48 Respondent Angelo, br ot her of
Rosa rio, claimed that when he was 13 or 14 years old, he heard his grandfather t ell his father Ireneo that he would inherit L ot N o. 4 618 . On
cr oss-examination, Angelo insisted that his father had always lived with his family in his grandfather’s house in Lot No. 4618, that Jose did not
liv e there but was given another lot, although he could not say which lot it was; he admitted that his grandmother lived w it h J ose w hen sh e
died, and Ireneo’s share was in Lot No. 4676. 49

6 . On rebuttal, Jose recounted that after his four children were married, Ireneo lived as a tenant in another farm; that during a period of illness
h e lived in Manila for some time, and later resided in Cagayan with his two married sons; and lastly on his return, worked as a t ena nt of t he
Ma n ingding family for about 1 0 years in Calasiao, staying in a hut one kilometer away. Jose also claimed that Ireneo had asked L ibor io f or a
por tion of Lot No. 4676, a lot which is bigger than Lot No. 4618 by several hundreds of square meters. 50

7 . On sur-rebuttal, Rosario claimed that her grandparents, father and mother lived in Lot No. 4618 when she was a child until she married and
left in 1 976; that her uncle Jose asked permission from Liborio t o be allowed to stay there with his family. She admitt ed t ha t J os e bu ilt hi s
h ouse in 1985, three years after Liborio died, but as if t o correct herself, she also claimed that Jose built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in
Lot No. 4618. (Contrarily, her aunt Leonora t estified that Jose built his house in Lot No. 4618 while their parents were alive.) 5 1 Mor eov er , i f
su ch was the case, Rosario did not explain why she filed Civil Case No. 847, if she thought her uncle built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in
Lot No. 4618.52 Rosario also claimed that Ireneo always came home in the evenings t o his father Liborio’s house from the Maningd ing f a rm ,
w hich he tenanted for 10 years, but obviously, by then Liborio’s house had long been gone. Again, confusedly, Rosario denied that she knew of
h er father’s share in Lot No. 4676.

Fr om the testimonies of the parties, we are convinced that the conclusion of the RTC is well-supported that there was indeed a verbal pa r t ition am on g
t h e heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each of his eight children received his or her share of his estate, and that Jose’s s hare was Lot No. 4618.

T h e parties’ verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by their taking possession of their respective shares.

T h e validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In Vda. de Espina v. Abaya,53 this Court declared that an oral partition is valid:

A nent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. "An agreement of partition m ay be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement
for the partition of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has n o op e ra ti on in t his kin d of
a greements, for partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which b elon g t o t h e co -
ow ners."54

In Maestrado v. CA,55 the Supreme Court upheld the partition after it found that it conformed to the alleged oral partition of the heirs, and that the or al
pa rtition was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the heirs subsequently.56 In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot,57 the Supreme Court elaborated
on t he validity of parol partition:

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce [sic] oral partition w hen it has been com plet ely or
pa rtly performed.

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will [in] proper cases, where the parol p a r tit ion
h a s actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off t o
ea ch, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involv in g
a n oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, t hat
equ ity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenan t
in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as t o which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were ex er cis ed.
A nd a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between
ea ch other t o hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the pa r tit ion by t a kin g p oss es sion in
sev eralty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part p erf orm a nce i s n eces sa ry , t o t ake a pa rol
pa rtition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in com m on , a n d a pa rt
per formance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed t o by the parties. 58

Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well borne out by the records. It is also consistent with the claimed verbal partition wit h
h is siblings, and fully corroborated by his sisters Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified that they each had taken possession of their
ow n shares and built their houses thereon.

A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right. 59 Moreover, under Article 5 41
of t h e Civil Code, one who possesses in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title, and h e ca nnot be
obliged to show or prove it. Similarly, Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that actual possession under a cla im of ow n ersh ip r ai ses a d ispu ta ble
pr esumption of ownership. Thus, actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the pr oper ty in a ccor dan ce w it h a n a lleg ed
pa rtition are considered strong proof of an oral partition 60 which the Court will not hesitate t o uphold.

T a x declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.

It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not conclusive evidence of ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership, 61 bu t
w hen coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they can be the basis of claim of ownership through prescription.62 In the absence of actual,
pu blic and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. 63 We have seen that there is no proof that Libor io,
or t he Casilang siblings conveyed Lot No. 4618 to Ireneo. There is also no proof that Ireneo himself declared Lot No. 4618 for tax purposes, and even if he
or h is heirs did, this is not enough basis to claim ownership over the subject property. The Court notes that TO No. 555 was is su ed on ly in 1 994, t wo
y ears after Ir eneo's death. Rosario even admitted that she began paying taxes only in 1 997. 64 More impmiantly, Ir eneo never claimed Lot N o. 4 61 8 nor
t ook possession of it in the concept of owner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 1 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619 i s
h ereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41 in Civil Cas e N o.
9 8-02371-D is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No.171555 A pr il 17, 2013

EV ANGELINE RIVERA-CALINGASAN and E. RICAL ENTERPRISES, Petitioners,

v s.
WILFREDO RIVERA, substituted by MA. LYDIA S. RlVERA, FREIDA LEAH S. RIVERA and WILFREDO S. RIVERA,
.JR., Respondents.

D EC IS I O N

BRION, J.:

W e r esolve the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by petitioners Evangeline Rivera-Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises, 2 assailing the Februa ry 1 0 ,
2 006 decision 3 of the Court of Appeals ( CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90717. The CA decision affirmed with modification the April 6, 2005 Decision 4 a nd t he
Ju ly 8, 2005 order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 2003-0982.

T h e Factual Antecedents

Du r ing their lifetime, respondent Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several parcels of land in Lipa City , Batangas, two of which w ere
cov ered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T -22290 and T -30557.6On July 29, 1982, Loreto died, leaving Wilfredo a nd t h eir t wo d a ught er s,
Ev angeline and Brigida Liza, as her surviving heirs. 7

A bout eleven (11) years later, or on March 29, 1993, Loreto’s heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her one-half sh a re of t h e con jug al e st a te,
a djudicating all the properties in favor of Ev angeline and Brigida Liza; Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a reservation of his usufructuary
r ights during his lifetime.8 On September 23, 1993, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, Batangas cancelled TCT Nos. T-22290 and T -3 05 5 7 a nd i s sued
T CT Nos. T-87494 and T -87495 in the names of Ev angeline and Brigida Liza, with an annotation of Wilfredo’s usufructuary rights. 9

A lm ost a decade later, or on March 13, 2003, 10 Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City a complaint for forcible en t ry
a gainst the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. 0019-03.

W ilfredo claimed that he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land located along C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas, c ov ered by
T CT Nos. T-87494 and T -87495, with a building used for his furniture business. Taking advantage of his absence due to his hos pit al con finem en t in
September 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. took possession and caused the renovation of the building on the property. In December 2002, the
pet itioners and Star Honda, Inc., with the aid of armed men, barred him from entering the property. 11

Bot h the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily renounced his usufructuary r igh ts in a pet it ion f or ca n ce llat ion of
u sufructuary rights dated March 4, 1 996,12 and that another action between the same parties is pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 (an act ion
for the annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo), docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0773.

T h e MTCC Ruling

In it s December 2, 2003 decision, 13 the MTCC dismissed the complaint. It f ou nd n o ev iden ce of W ilfr edo’s pr ior p os s ess ion a n d su bs equ ent
dispossession of the property. It noted that Wilfredo admitted that both E. Rical Enterprises and Star Honda, Inc. occupied t he property th rou gh leas e
con tracts from Ev angeline and her husband Ferdinand.

W ilfredo appealed t o the RTC.

T h e RTC Ruling

In it s November 30, 2004 decision,14 the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s findings. It held that Wilfredo lacked a cause of action to evict th e p et iti on ers an d
St ar Honda, Inc. since Evangeline is the registered owner of the property and Wilfredo had voluntarily renounced his usufruct uary rights.

W ilfredo sought reconsideration of the RTC’s decision and, in due course, attained this objective; the RTC set aside its origina l decis ion a n d en ter ed
a n other, which ordered the eviction of the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc.

In it s April 6, 2005 decision,15 the RTC held that Wilfredo’s renunciation of his usufructuary rights could not be the basis of the compla int ’s d ism issa l
sin ce it is the subject of litigation pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13. The RTC found that t he MT CC ov erlooke d t he ev i dence pr ov in g
W ilfredo’s prior possession and subsequent dispossession of the property, namely: (a) Ev angeline’s judicial admission of "J . Be len St reet , R osa rio,
Ba tangas" as her residence since May 2002; (b) the Lipa City Prosecutor’s findings, in a criminal case f or qu al ified t res pas s t o dwell ing, t h at t he
pet itioners are not residents of the property; (c) the affidavit of Ricky Briones, Barangay Captain of Barangay 9, Lipa City where the property is loca te d,
a t testing to Wilfredo’s prior possession and the petitioners’ entry to the property during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement; a nd (d) the petit ion er s, w ith
t h e aid of armed men, destroyed the padlock of the building on the property. The RTC ordered the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. to pay ₱620,000 .0 0
a s r easonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property, and ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

T h e petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. filed separate motions for reconsideration.

In it s July 8, 2005 order,16 the RTC modified its April 6, 2005 decision by absolving Star Honda, Inc. from any liability. It found no evid ence t ha t Sta r
Hon da, Inc. participated in the dispossession.
T h e pet it ion er s t h en filed a Ru le 4 2 pet it ion for r ev iew w it h t h e CA .

T h e CA Ruling

In it s February 10, 2006 decision, 17 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s findings, noting that: (a) Evangeline’s admission of "J . Belen St reet ,
Rosa rio, Batangas" as her residence (a place different and distinct from the property) rendered improbable her claim of possession and occupation; a nd
(b) Ev angeline’s entry to the property (on the pretext of repairing the building) during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement had been done without Wilfredo’s
pr ior consent and was done through strategy and stealth. The CA, however, deleted the award of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees since the RT C d ecisi on
did not contain any discussion or justification for the award.

T h e petitioners then filed the present petition.

W ilfredo died on December 27, 2006 and has been substituted by his second wife, Ma. Lydia S. Rivera, and their children, Freida L eah S . R iv er a a nd
W ilfredo S. Rivera, Jr. (respondents). 18

T h e Petition

T h e petitioners submit that the CA erred in equating possession with residence since possession in forcible entry ca se s m ea ns phy sica l pos se ss ion
w ithout qualification as to the nature of possession, i.e., whether residing or not in a particular place. They contend that the pronouncements of the R T C
of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773, in the March 11, 2003 order, 19 that they have been "occupy ing t h e pr em ise s s in ce 1 997" 2 0 a n d
W ilfredo’s own admission that he padlocked the doors of the building contradict Wilfredo’s claim of prior possession.

T h e Case for the Respondents

T h e respondents counter that the petitioners mistakenly relied on the statements of the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 9 9 -0 7 73 on t h e
pet itioners’ occupation since 1997; such statements had been rendered in an interlocutory order, and should not prevail over Ev angeline’s admis sion in
h er answer of "Poblacion, Rosario, Batangas"21 as her residence, compared to Wilfredo’s admission in his complaint of "C.M. Recto Avenue, L ipa C ity ,
Ba tangas" as his residence, the exact address of the disputed property. 22

T h e Issue

T h e case presents to us the issue of who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior physical possession of the property.

Ou r Ruling

T h e petition lacks merit.

Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto.

"Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or
t h e right t o possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is en t it led t o t he phy sical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property i s
qu estionable."23 Thus, "an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property." 24

In deed, possession in ejectment cases "m eans nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the s en se con t em pla te d in civ il
law."25 In a forcible entry case, "prior physical possession is the primary consideration."26 "A party who can prove prior pos s ess ion ca n r ecov er su ch
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in t im e, h e h as t h e
security that entitles him t o remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him." 27 "The party in peaceable, qu iet pos se ss ion
sh all not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror."28

T h e respondents have proven prior physical possession of the property.

In t his case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the property and that the petitioners deprived h im of s u ch pos ses s ion by
m eans of force, strategy and stealth.

T h e CA did not err in equating residence with physical possession since residence is a manifestation of p oss es si on a nd occupa tion . W i lfre do h a d
con sistently alleged that he resided on "C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas," the location of the property, whereas Ev angeline has always a dm it t ed
t hat she has been a resident of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas." The petitioners failed t o prov e that they have occupied the property t h rou g h s om e
ot h er person, even if they have declared their residence in another area.

W e note that in another proceeding, a criminal com plaint for qualified trespass to dwelling, the Lipa City Prosecutor also observed that the p et it ioner s
did not reside on or occupy the property on December 16, 2002,29 about three (3) months before Wilfredo filed the complaint for forcible entry on March
1 3, 2003. The petitioners also alleged therein that they are residents of "J. Belen St., Rosario, Batangas" and not "No. 30 C.M. Recto Ave., Lipa City."30

Fu rthermore, the petitioners failed to rebut the affidavit of Barangay Captain Briones attesting to Wilfredo’s pr ior p oss es si on a nd t he pet it ion er s’
u nlawful entry to the property during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement. 31
T h e petitioners’ claim of physical possession cannot find support in the March 11, 2003 order 32 of the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 9 9 -
0 773 stating that the petitioners "have been occupying the premises since 1997." W e note that the order was a mere interlocutory or der on W ilfr edo’s
m otion for the issuance of a cease and desist order. An interlocutory order does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions a nd
det ermining their rights and liabilities against each other. "It is basically provisional in its application."33 It is the nature of an interlocutory order tha t it
is su bject to modification or reversal that the result of further proceedings may warrant. Thus, the RTC’s pronouncement on the petitioners’ occupat ion
"sin ce 1 997" is not res judicata on the issue of actual physical possession.

In sum, we find no reversible error in the decision appealed from and, therefore, affirm it.

W ilfredo’s death did not render moot the forcible entry case.

T h e death of Wilfredo introduces a seeming complication into the case and on the disposition we shall make. To go back t o bas ics, the petition befor e us
inv olves the recovery of possession of real property and is a real action that is not extinguished by the death of a party. T he judgment in a n e jectm ent
ca se is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is enforceable by
or a gainst the heirs of the deceased.1âwphi1 This judgment entitles the winning party to: (a) the restitution of the premises, (b) the s um ju st ly due a s
a rrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, and (c) attorney’s fees and costs.

T h e com plicating factor in the case is the nature and basis of Wilfredo’s possession; he was holding the property as usufruct uary, although this right to de
ju re possession was also disputed before his death, hand in hand with the de facto possession that is subject of the present case. Without need, howev er,
of a ny further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since death extinguish es a usu fr uct un der
A rticle 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possess ion of t he pr oper ty
ev en if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution.

T hus, what actually survives under the circumstances is the award of damages, by way of com pensation, that the RTC originally awarded and which t he
CA and this Court affirmed. This award was computed as of the time of the RTC decision (or roughly about a year before Wilfredo’s death) but w ill now
h ave to take into account the compensation due for the period between the RTC decision and Wilfredo’s death. The computation is a matter of execution
t hat is for the RTC, as court of origin, to undertake. The heirs of Wilfredo shall succeed to the computed t otal award under t he r ules of s u cces s ion , a
m atter that is not within the authority of this Court to determine at this point.

W HEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal and accordingly AFFIRM the February 10, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP N o. 907 17
w ith the MODIFICATION that, with the termination, upon his death, of respondent Wilfredo Rivera’s usufructory ov er the disput ed property, the i ssu e
of r estitution of possession has been rendered moot and academic; on the other hand, the monetary award of ₱620,000.00, as reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the property up to the time of the Regional Trial Court decision on April 6, 2005, survives and accrues to the esta te of t h e
deceased respondent Wilfredo Rivera, to be distributed t o his heirs pursuant t o the applicable law on succession. Additional compensation accrues a nd
sh all be added to the compensation from the t ime of the Regional Trial Court decision up to respondent Wilfredo Rivera’s death. F or pur poses of t he
com putation of this additional amount and for the execution of the total amount due under this Decision, we hereby remand the cas e t o t h e R eg iona l
T r ial Court, as court of origin, for appropriate action. Costs against petitioners Ev angeline Rivera-Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises.

SO ORDERED.