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The ABB Guide to

Safety Critical Systems and International Standard IEC 61508

1 Concept
IEC 61508 Safety Lifecycle Overview of
ABB provides a total life cycle safety capability aligned to the IEC 61508 Safety 2 Overall Scope Definition Lifecycle Phases
Lifecycle. We are the best-placed leading international company to be able to advise
you on all phases from Concept (1) to Decommissioning (16), including the Hazard and Pre-Design Phases 1-5
Risk Analysis which is necessary to determine the overall safety requirements of any 3 Hazard Risk Analysis
plant or process. In addition, ABB offers a comprehensive selection of instrumentation End User / Operator
and other equipment required to implement fully safety compliant plant, whether as
4 Overall Safety Requirements Set the SIL target
stand alone products or in fully integrated packages. These are supported by our
installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance and other services.
5 Safety Requirements Allocation Design and Installation
Phases 6-13
(Engineering /
Overall Planning 9 Safety Related 10 Safety Related 11 External Risk Equipment Supplier)
Systems: Systems: Reduction
6 Overall Operation 7 Overall 8 Overall Installation E / E / PES Other Facilities
& Maintenance Validation & Commissioning Technology Design the architecture /
Planning Planning Planning Provide the integrity
Realisation Realisation Realisation
information

Overall Installation
12 & Commissioning Operation Phases 14-16
(End User / Operator)
13 Overall Safety Validation
Operate & Test to
14 Overall Operation & Maintenance 15 Overall Modification & Retrofit Verify Target SIL
= Design SIL = Operation.
Manage maintenance
16 Decommissioning Lifecycle repeats and modifications

Pre-Design Phases 1 – 5 (End User / Operator)

Setting the SIL Target
Safety Integrity Levels Typical Methodology

Safety Average Probability of % Reliability • Hazard studies and HAZOPs • Build event chain
Integrity Level Failure on Demand (PFDavg)
1 0.1 to 0.01 90% to 99% Hazard & Risk Analysis • Evaluate possible
consequences
• Estimate demand rates
• Define protection required
2 0.01 to 0.001 99% to 99.9% • Establish tolerable • Specify required Safety
3 0.001 to 0.0001 99.9% to 99.99% frequencies vs ALARP Integrity Level
4 0.0001 to 0.00001 99.99% to 99.999%

SIL Determination Methodologies Introducing Risk Reduction and Risk Targets

Identify
Risk W3 W2 W1 Potential Residual Residual Process
CA X1
Graphs a --- --- Hazardous risk risk risk
Starting point X2 Operations Events Assess
for risk reduction PA 1 a --- On-going Risk
PB
Review
CB
estimation FA X3
FB PA 2 1 a
CC PB X4
FA
FB PA
3 2 1
X5
CD FA
PB Necessary risk reduction
Generalized arrangement
FB PA
4 3 2
(in practical implementations
the arrangement is specific PB X6
to the applications to be b 4 3 Actual risk reduction
Design Compare
covered by the risk graph)

C = Consequence parameter
---= No safety requirements
a = No special safety requirements Safety Overall with
F = Exposure time parameter Risk reduction
P = Probability of avoiding the hazardous event
W = In the absence of the SIF under consideration
b = A single SIF is not sufficient
1, 2, 3, 4 = Safety integrity level
Instrumented
Function
Lifecycle Criteria
Risk reduction
from other
Risk reduction
from other
non-SIS
from SIS layer protection
prevention /
Layer of Protection Analysis layers
mitigation layers
# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
PROTECTION LAYERS
Impact Severity Initiating Initiation General BPCS Alarms, Additional IPL Inter- SIF Mitigated Notes Risk reduction achieved by all protection layers
event level cause likelihood process F.14.5 etc. mitigation, additional mediate integrity event
description
F.3
F.4
F.14.1
F.5
F.14.2
F.6
F.14.3
design
F.14.4
F.14.6 restricted mitigation
access F.8 dikes,
event
likelihood
level
F.11
likelihood
F.12
Assess SIL Assess
F.14.1 F.14.7 pressure
relief
F.10
F.14.9
F.14.10 F.14.10 for Instrumented Required
F.9
F.14.8 Risk Reduction Risk Reduction
1 Fire from S Loss of 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 PRV 01 10-7 10-2 10-9 High Allocate
distillation
column
cooling
water
pressure
causes Risk For Safety Lifecycle and Hazard Analysis
rupture column
rupture Reduction to
2 Fire from
distillation
S Steam
control
0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 PRV 01 10-6 10-2 10-8 Same
as
Technologies advice, please call 01642 372000.
column loop above
rupture failure

N
For details of relevant ABB
Instrumentation, Systems and Equipment,
Fault Tree OVERPRESSURIZATION
0.1/year please call 0870 600 6122.
Analysis
EXTERNAL EVENTS BPCS FUNCTION
(fire) FAILS

BPCS SENSOR VALVE

Legend

OR
Demand more from your instrumentation.
FAILS FAILS STUCK
Basic event

Transfer gate
Demand more from your source.

www.abb.co.uk/instrumentation ABB Limited, Howard Road, St Neots, Cambridgeshire, PE19 8EU, UK. Tel: 0870 600 6122 WP/SIL Issue 1 (09.03)