Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10010 August 1, 1916

CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.

Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.

ARAULLO, J.:

On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality of
Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively.
Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had
declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be
declared the winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw. From this
judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. For the
purposes of the appeal, the plaintiff filed his complaint and prayed this court to render judgment
ordering the defendant to abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing
cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both sums of
wager being held for safe-keeping by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the
costs of both instances against the defendant.

The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to dismiss
with the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to costs. The defendant
excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the same court on November 8th of
the same year, on the plaintiff's motion, ordering the provincial treasurer of Albay and, if
necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of the same province, to release the deposit of
P160 and return it to its owner, the plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come
before us on appeal by means of the proper bill of exceptions.

The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment appealed from ere
that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules
governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not know where to find the
law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights to the
plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.

The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case
submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a
certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not
knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the
court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an
excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law
would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that
the customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles
of law.

Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are reversed and
to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence they came for due trial
and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO
CORDERO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused
individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge
allowed any discretion in imposingeither the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?

The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner, 1 involve the
perpetration of acts so bizarre and devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all
civilized men:

On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza
wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and
left hand protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of
Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.

When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen
clad only in a light colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the
left side of the face, the left chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with
her head bashed in.

On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy
report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry
Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the
crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 94-138071, reads:

That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with one alias "LANDO" and
other persons whose true names, identifies and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their
superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with the use of force and
violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse,
covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of
wood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a
minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said
occasion the said ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused
her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
 Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198
Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of
1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao,"
also of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a.
"Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of
Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 11, 1994, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of

Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR," JEOFREY
and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who have already been
charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense
under Criminal Case No. 94-138071, and helping one another,
with treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and
nocturnity and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence,
that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab,
and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby warehouse,
covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a
thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7)
years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said
occasion the said accused together with their confederates
ABUNDIO LAGARTO y PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which
were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge.

Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already
dead, (allegedly shot by police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able
to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12, 1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio
Lagunday was dropped from the Information.

After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court
rendered a decision2 on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and
Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide
and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetuawith all the accessories
provided for by law." 3 Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on
February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in
that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the
original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same
for lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portion reads:

The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and
Cordero have complied with the legal requirements for the perfection of an
appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this Court cannot take cognizance
of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.

WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of
Appeal filed by both herein accused is hereby reiterated.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of
these cases, together with the notices of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme
Court, in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
 SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's
determination of guilt and its conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate
time on appeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of events to those cold facts
antecedent to the instant case relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e.,
whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under
Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

We find for petitioner.

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the
guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within
which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," 4 resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, 5 or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.

In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the
defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which
respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its
provisions.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:

Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation.

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane,
the penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason

or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the

penalty shall be death. . . . 6

Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is
not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape
with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion — depending on the
existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed — to impose the penalty of
either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is
not one of these three instances. The law plainly and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by
reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The
provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a
penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.

We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his
religious convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty
to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety
of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific
and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death
penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. In People vs. Limaco 7 we held that:

[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a
decisive factor in arriving at a conclusion and determination of a case or the
penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error, then we are
constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the guidance
of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else, layman
or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a
number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally
wrong or unwise or ineffective. However,as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary
is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply
them. And for the guidance of the members of the judiciary we feel it incumbent
upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law
as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or
department concerned, its amendment, modification, or repeal, still, as long as
said law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the law-
making body. 8

Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose
"the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." 9 This is not a case
of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the
appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so
doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is

hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon
private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents
in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic
review by this Court of the decision imposing the death penalty.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

NARVASA, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I
draw up this separate opinion merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to
the appeal taken by the accused from the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent
Judge. It will be recalled that respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution — praying that his decision sentencing both accused to
suffer reclusion perpetua be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" — for the reason
that since the accused had already "complied with the legal requirements for the perfection of
an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It was precisely that refusal that
prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of certiorari at bar.

It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the
court rendering the judgment; and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal.
This proposition considered, and following respondent Judge's reasoning, this Court's directive
for the remand of the case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death
upon private respondents," might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial
Court to act in cases over which it had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.

The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because
rendered "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts found to have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The
judgment being void, the appeal attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial
Court may not be deemed to have thereby lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said
that it is being required by this Court to act in cases over which it has already lost jurisdiction.
There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it and its modification of the
judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.

REGALADO, J., concurring:

I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a
quo impose the correct penalty of death as provided by law and consequent to its findings of
guilt on the part of private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which explicates my
conformity with the procedure adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary
were it not for the contrary observations that the petition herein should either have been
dismissed or consolidated with the criminal case elevated on appeal by private respondents.

Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court
does not impress me as being concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is
before us in the case at bar is an original civil action invoking the extraordinary writ
of certiorari for the imposition of the correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty
respondent judge refused to comply with in grave abuse of his judicial discretion. 1 On the other
hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to be consolidated is an appellate recourse
wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of guilt and the absolution of
private respondents.

Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special
civil action are entirely different from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment
desired in the appealed criminal case. The basic rule in consolidation of cases in civil
procedure 2 requires, among others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common
question of law or fact. This is essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal
procedure 3 which contemplates charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming
part of a series of offenses of similar character.

Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or
criminal actions, and not a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of
the latter situation is specially underscored where the resolution of the controversy in the special
civil action is a pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These considerations apply to
both the trial courts in the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the
implementation of revisory power.

The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of
respondent judge — erroneous because he imposed the wrong penalty — corrected on that
score in the first instance. After such correction shall have been effected, then the appeal from
his judgment shall proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or
innocence of appellants. The corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended
judgment containing the proper penalty shall be the basis for the review as to whether
appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that ultimate penalty. To have
the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the appellate proceeding
strikes me as an aberrant procedure. While it does not exactly square with the figurative posture
of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the same absurdity of both the horse and
the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.

It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the
appellate review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the
basis therefor, with this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake. This time the cart
precedes the horse. True, an appeal throws the judgment a quo open for review and the Court
may raise the penalty to the appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes,
what is there to prevent appellants from withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the
arguments that, instead of the acquittal or reduced penalty aspired for, the ultimate denouement
would be the death sentence?

Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw
his appeal in the appellate court. 4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the
appellee's brief in this Court is permitted. 5Assuming that the Court denies the withdrawal of the
appeal in order that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment of the
case on the merits, 6 why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject
to such contingencies — with the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of
alternative theories in two sets of pleadings by both parties — when with the decisive sweep of
the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and the real areas of contention are laid bare?

Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of
error from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the
mistake in the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence being substituted therefor, as
undeniably it should be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic
review. That provision calling for automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7 serves
equally the interests of both the defense and the prosecution through protective features
established by case law.

Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty
of death and he thereafter withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall
nonetheless proceed, albeit without the benefit of briefs or arguments from the accused. 8 The
automatic review of the case shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an
exception to the provisions of Section 8, Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be
waived. 10 The aforementioned beneficial effects are not provided for and may not be availed of
by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.

The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to
procedural due process on appeal, and safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the
corresponding penal sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the Court in this case
subserves the ends of these fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal
before this Court. Thus, the instant petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal
brings the case wide open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would be
precipitate and might be so perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.

With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the
petition, it should at the very least be consolidated with the appealed case.

Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

Davide, Jr., J. concurs.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I
draw up this separate opinion merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to
the appeal taken by the accused from the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent
Judge. It will be recalled that respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution — praying that his decision sentencing both accused to
suffer reclusion perpetua be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" — for the reason
that since the accused had already "complied with the legal requirements for the perfection of
an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It was precisely that refusal that
prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of certiorari at bar.

It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the
court rendering the judgment; and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal.
This proposition considered, and following respondent Judge's reasoning, this Court's directive
for the remand of the case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death
upon private respondents," might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial
Court to act in cases over which it had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.

The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because
rendered "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts found to have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The
judgment being void, the appeal attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial
Court may not be deemed to have thereby lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said
that it is being required by this Court to act in cases over which it has already lost jurisdiction.
There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it and its modification of the
judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.

REGALADO, J., concurring:

I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a
quo impose the correct penalty of death as provided by law and consequent to its findings of
guilt on the part of private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which explicates my
conformity with the procedure adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary
were it not for the contrary observations that the petition herein should either have been
dismissed or consolidated with the criminal case elevated on appeal by private respondents.

Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court
does not impress me as being concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is
before us in the case at bar is an original civil action invoking the extraordinary writ
of certiorari for the imposition of the correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty
respondent judge refused to comply with in grave abuse of his judicial discretion. 1 On the other
hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to be consolidated is an appellate recourse
wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of guilt and the absolution of
private respondents.

Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special
civil action are entirely different from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment
desired in the appealed criminal case. The basic rule in consolidation of cases in civil
procedure 2 requires, among others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common
question of law or fact. This is essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal
procedure 3 which contemplates charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming
part of a series of offenses of similar character.

Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or
criminal actions, and not a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of
the latter situation is specially underscored where the resolution of the controversy in the special
civil action is a pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These considerations apply to
both the trial courts in the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the
implementation of revisory power.

The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of
respondent judge — erroneous because he imposed the wrong penalty — corrected on that
score in the first instance. After such correction shall have been effected, then the appeal from
his judgment shall proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or
innocence of appellants. The corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended
judgment containing the proper penalty shall be the basis for the review as to whether
appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that ultimate penalty. To have
the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the appellate proceeding
strikes me as an aberrant procedure. While it does not exactly square with the figurative posture
of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the same absurdity of both the horse and
the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.

It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the
appellate review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the
basis therefor, with this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake. This time the cart
precedes the horse. True, an appeal throws the judgment a quo open for review and the Court
may raise the penalty to the appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes,
what is there to prevent appellants from withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the
arguments that, instead of the acquittal or reduced penalty aspired for, the ultimate denouement
would be the death sentence?

Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw
his appeal in the appellate court. 4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the
appellee's brief in this Court is permitted. 5Assuming that the Court denies the withdrawal of the
appeal in order that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment of the
case on the merits, 6 why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject
to such contingencies — with the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of
alternative theories in two sets of pleadings by both parties — when with the decisive sweep of
the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and the real areas of contention are laid bare?

Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of
error from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the
mistake in the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence being substituted therefor, as
undeniably it should be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic
review. That provision calling for automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7 serves
equally the interests of both the defense and the prosecution through protective features
established by case law.

Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty
of death and he thereafter withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall
nonetheless proceed, albeit without the benefit of briefs or arguments from the accused. 8 The
automatic review of the case shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an
exception to the provisions of Section 8, Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be
waived. 10 The aforementioned beneficial effects are not provided for and may not be availed of
by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.

The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to
procedural due process on appeal, and safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the
corresponding penal sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the Court in this case
subserves the ends of these fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal
before this Court. Thus, the instant petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal
brings the case wide open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would be
precipitate and might be so perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.

With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the
petition, it should at the very least be consolidated with the appealed case.

Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

Davide, Jr., J. concurs.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-
appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and
laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its
advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station
where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer
Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by
the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the
next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle
and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with
batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be
qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the
qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners
will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their
respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-
prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the
national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed
can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be
made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for
second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four
participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing,
having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
pertinent provisions of which read as follows:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the

following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the
Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the
Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of
Posts:
 Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining
to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or

company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of
any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise
for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct
any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person,
depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped
upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed by or
addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or
company.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer
service.—The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person
or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of
any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise
for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any
postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company
or to the agent of any such person or company, whether such agent is acting as an
individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or
telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31,
1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to
justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the
purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its
counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,
stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest
was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion
217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned
by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails
for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted,
"a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief
against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its
'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to
allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After
issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules
marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent
has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether
the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the
proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in
seriatim.

1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the
applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to
any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction
or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now
section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to
established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to
wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino
vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R.
No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein
states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases
thereof upon the foregoing crucible.

As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of
significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of
some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means,
and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its
products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal
Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof — particularly
thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee
laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible
difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it
was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However,
likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the
Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly
declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the
applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their
respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its
position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this
impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed
contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its
representatives."

Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's
insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge
thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly
spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other,
concerning a real — not a mere theoretical — question or issue. The contenders are as real as
their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of
views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To
the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law
he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the
contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders
are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their
differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of
the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires
are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" — which admittedly does not confer a
cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in
the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox
West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a
given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for
declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption
that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be
divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible.
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case
here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or
interpretation as any other.

Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand
can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to
a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed.
Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has
taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate
resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety — nay, the
necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper,
animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing
the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited
in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it
has been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot
obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the
Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the
contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually
threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may
attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a
self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous
censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one
equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order
to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) — which, in the instant case,
is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties
under a law — we can see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility
or prematurity in our intervention.

The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand
down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a
declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound.
But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the
Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also
of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings
that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not
without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held
that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis
vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo,
Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.

In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical
terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-
mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise
deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue
posed in this appeal.

Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc.
vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal
authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that —

While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this
jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do
with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends
to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift
exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.
(Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194
U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker
[1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction
Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too
obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant
himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of
consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in
the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms —

In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous
distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from
the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a
prize.

Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in
which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus —

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to
buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the
hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from — to —, and win valuable prizes . .
. ." .

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought,
any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A
prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is
available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction,
"look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and
pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra,
p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a
gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex
products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the
privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product
or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant,
it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of
value.1awphîl.nèt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would
naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be
encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry
blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the
proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137
Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance,
and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the
distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that
matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set
the matter at rest:

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does
receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing;
does not supply the element of consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex.
Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with
under the Postal Law.

But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money,
or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally
prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue
of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to
achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling
that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series
1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for
want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not
essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed contest — wanting in consideration
as we have found it to be — is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit
words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the
term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market
value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S.,
850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with
Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs.
Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs.
State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot
embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed
within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think
that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings
there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of
the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs.
States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E.,
88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698,
114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that,
like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite
elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113
Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.,
2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S.,
1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga.
App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is
explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some
cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used
interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of
consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing
Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra).
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every
case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with
the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle
of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although
only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature
of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration,
so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to
the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud
orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for
disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As
applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized
necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals
(Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that
something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that
where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can
hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held —

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not
resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or
indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or
stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words
and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).

we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are
persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have
heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the
contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the
appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar
and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista
and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14,
1968 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the
judgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.

On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging
Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13,
1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years
and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro.

In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal
possession of firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court
but already forwarded to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person
in authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by
the Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the
Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.

On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of
assault upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of
firearm, sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the
Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.

Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as
involving only one question of law.

Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his
appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas.
He claims that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to
possess firearms. He alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs.
Mapa 2 which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption
for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating
to firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to
the case at bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.

The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11,
1961" includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23,
1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm ... for use in connection with the performance of
your duties." Under the rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang, 3the appointment of a
civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even
to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of
the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. 4

At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension
for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965,
the Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal
system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new
doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not
adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on
the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in
the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative that the
punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. 5

Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as
secret agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle,
but as well at the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession
of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to
firearm licenses.1äwphï1.ñët

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted.
Costs de oficio.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.