[G.R. No. 138855. October 29, 2002] Ruling: Yes.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court on
1. LAMBERTO CASALLA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
MILAGROS S. ESTEVANES, respondents.
Facts: This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision and the resolution of
the Court of Appeals in denying petitioners appeal as well as motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. The facts show that petitioner Lamberto Casalla
issued two (2) Bank of Commerce checks in payment of the obligation of his wife,
TERESITA CASALLA, to private respondent MILAGROS SANTOS-ESTEVANES, in
order to avert a court litigation. The two (2) checks, however, were dishonored by
the drawee bank for reason of insufficiency of funds. Subsequently, private
respondent filed two (2) criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22).
MTC: On September 22, 1994, the MTC of Pasig City rendered a decision convicting
the accused of the crime charged on two (2) counts.
RTC: Petitioner interposed an appeal to the RTC of Pasig City, which was raffled to
Branch 261 thereof presided upon by public respondent judge, which rendered its
decision dated January 18, 1995 affirming the judgment of the lower court with the
modification that appropriate subsidiary imprisonment be imposed on the accused
in case of insolvency. On February 8, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on account of
the absence of a notice of hearing and because the issues raised therein have already
been passed upon in its decision. On February 22, 1995, petitioner filed a second
motion for reconsideration. On February 24, 1995, private respondent filed with the
RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Opposition thereto was filed by
petitioner. The RTC denied petitioners second motion for reconsideration and
granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. A writ of execution was
issued by the court directing public respondent Deputy Sheriff Jose R. Santos to
cause the execution of the judgment.
CA: Petitioner interposed an appeal via a petition for review with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The appellate court
promulgated its decision denying the appeal for lack of merit. The CA held that the
petition before it did not contain a statement of material dates showing the
timeliness of the petition. It also maintained that the petition was filed out of time,
because the motion to reconsider the decision of the trial court did not contain a
notice of hearing. Hence, being a mere scrap of paper, it did not interrupt the period
for filing the petition before the appellate court, and the period had lapsed before
the petition was filed. It also ruled that petitioners second motion was not only a
prohibited pleading but it was also filed out of time.
Issue: Whether the requirement of a notice of hearing applies to the motion for
reconsideration filed before the Regional Trial Court, as said court was acting only in
its appellate jurisdiction.
February 1, 1995. From that date, he had 15 days, or until February 16, 1995, to file
a motion for reconsideration. On February 8, 1995, petitioner did file a motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts decision. The motion, however, lacked a notice of
hearing. The Court ruled that the requirements laid down in the Rules of Court, that
the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the
time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously
complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such the motion is a useless
piece of paper that will not toll the running of the prescriptive period. Under the
present rules, the notice of hearing is expressly made a requirement. In the instant
case, it is undisputed that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court did not contain any notice of hearing. This defect was not cured
by the filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which is prohibited under the
rules. The Rules of Court apply to all courts, except as otherwise provided by the
Supreme Court. Regional Trial Courts are not precluded from conducting hearings
on matters on which the parties need to be heard, even in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction. Additionally, to assail the RTCs issuance of a writ of execution,
petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the Court of Appeals. This
was improper. What it should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Rules, no appeal may be taken from
an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration and an order of
execution. Instead, where the judgment or final order may not be appealed, the
appropriate recourse is a special civil action under Rule 65.
[G.R. No. 180291. July 27, 2010]
2. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA,
in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners,
vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA
Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the
petition for certiorari of GSIS assailing the Civil Service Commissions Resolution No.
062177. Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager
of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents for Grave Misconduct
and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules
of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials,
committed as follows: That respondent wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of
the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for
Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS
premises; that some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the
GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was
barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat from appearing as counsel for Atty.
Molina pursuant to R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
GSIS IU: Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo,
issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to
explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be
administratively dealt with. Respondents submitted a letter-explanation to Atty.
Barbo, denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained
that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after
learning that their former union president was there. Aside from some of them
wanting to show their support, they were interested in that hearing as it might also
affect them. Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled
pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate
supervisor about it. These letters were not under oath. PGM Garcia then filed the
above-mentioned formal charges, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again
directed to submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from
receipt thereof. None was filed. PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded
decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the
penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
CSC: On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of
the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and
reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied
their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty
of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead, their acts can be
considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally
guaranteed right. PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. CA: Thus, PGM
Garcia went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure. The CA upheld the CSC. Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is
now before us via this Petition for Review presenting the following:
Issue: Whether failure of petitioners to file answers shall make the allegations in the
formal charges deemed admitted pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: The Court finds no merit in the petition. Section 4 of the Rules of Court
provides that the rules can be applied in a suppletory character. Suppletory is
defined as supplying deficiencies. It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court
will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule.
There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of
failure to file the required answer. The failure of a respondent to file an answer
merely translates to a waiver of his right to file an answer. There is nothing in the
rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done away with the
burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.
What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may render judgment as may be warranted
by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution. Even granting that Rules of
Court finds application in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain
averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among
them are immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out
in the complaint. Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not
mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and
correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor
of the petitioners. The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts.
It did not show respondents unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their
work. It also failed to show that their purpose was to demand a force concession.
Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs
Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.
[G.R. No. L-45543 May 17, 1939]
3. SURIGAO MINE EXPLORATION CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs. C. HARRIS, SURIGAO-MAINIT MINING SYNDICATE, SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED
MINING CO., INC., OTTO WEBER, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS: The original complaint in this case was filed in the CFI of Surigao in which
the plaintiff, a domestic private corporation domiciled in Cebu, sought a judicial
pronouncement. The theory of the plaintiff, under the complaint, is that it is the
owner by purchase of the aforesaid placer claims and that the lode claims
complained of were staked and located by the defendants on plaintiff's placer claims
after the latter had been validly and duly staked and located by the plaintiff or its
grantors and predecessors in interest. The defendants demurred to the complaint on
the grounds (1) that there was a misjoinder of parties in that Otto Weber had been
included as defendant; (2) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, because it merely alleged that the plaintiff was the
owner by purchase of the placer claims named therein; and (3) that the complaint
was ambiguous and unintelligible. CFI entered an order finding merit in the third
ground of the demurrer and requiring the plaintiff to amend its complaint so as to
contain a detailed description of its placer claims. On January 13, 1936 an amended
complaint was filed to which another demurrer was interposed.In the order of The
CFI overruled the demurrer and required the defendants to file their answer within
the reglementary period. The plaintiff filed, on June 11, 1936, a third amended
complaint in which, additional to the original defendants, thirty-two other
individual's were included as parties defendant. In this third amended complaint the
placer claims alleged to be owned by the plaintiff were reduced to eleven, and the
relief prayed for was about the same as that asked in the original complaint,
although the amount sought to be recovered as damages was increased to P49,000.
The defendants, other than Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate, Surigao Consolidated
Mining Co., Inc., and Otto Weber, filed an answer, which was amended on September
10, 1936, containing a general denial, setting up five special defenses and praying
that the location of the alleged placer claims described in paragraph 4 of the third
amended complaint and of any placer claim which might be shown in the trial to
have been located by the plaintiff or its predecessors in interest illegally and in fraud
of the government, be declared null and void and that the registration of said claims
in the office of the mining recorder of Surigao be ordered cancelled. On August 24,
1936 the defendants Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate, Surigao Consolidated Mining
Co., Inc., and Otto Weber filed an answer containing a general denial, five special
defenses and a counterclaim in the sum of P40,000 and praying the Court of First
Instance of Surigao:
(a) to declare the nullity of the registration in the office of the mining recorder of G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
Surigao of the placer claims specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the third amended
4. HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON,
complaint and to order the cancellation of said registration; (b) to declare the
CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA,
defendants the lawful owners and possessors of the of the lode claims enumerated
PETITIONERS, vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E.
in paragraph 6 of the third amended complaint; (c) to restrain the plaintiff and its
YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
agents, employees and laborers from interfering with the ownership, possession and
enjoyment of the defendants of their lode claims; and (d) to sentence the plaintiff to Facts: Petitioner, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for
pay to the defendants the sum of P40,000 as damages. Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against
respondent Gaudioso Ypon. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon
In the course of the adduction of plaintiff's evidence in the Court of First Instance of
died intestate and childless, leaving behind several lots. Claiming to be the sole heir
Surigao, Exhibits O and O-1 to O-9 were presented. With the exception of Exhibit O-
of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
7, all of said exhibits are deeds of sale in favor of the plaintiff covering, among
cancellation of the certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his
others, the placer claims here in question and bear dates posterior to October 24,
name, to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and
1935, the date of the filing of the original complaint. Exhibit 0-7 is a deed of sale
successors-in-interest. Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno.
executed by Pablo S. Atillo in favor of Maximo Borromeo on January 23, 1935. A
Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause
perusal of this Exhibit O-7 in connection with Exhibit O-9 reveals the fact that the
of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the
mining claims conveyed by Maximo Borromeo to the plaintiff under said Exhibit O-9,
case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that RTC
dated December 21, 1935, were the same claims acquired by Maximo Borromeo
issued the assailed order, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of
under Exhibit O-7. Whereupon, before the plaintiff could close its evidence, the
action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established
defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that, when the
their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance
action was commenced, plaintiff's right of action had not yet accrued, since, under
of letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered
its own Exhibits O and O-1 to O-9, the plaintiff did not become the owner of the
as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for
claims in dispute until after the original complaint was filed in the Court of First
reconsideration which was, however, denied due to the counsel’s failure to state the
Instance of Surigao on October 24, 1935. The CFI dismissed the complaint.
date on which his MCLE Certificate of Compliance was issued. Aggrieved, petitioners,
Issue: Whether the action of plaintiff has cause of action. who were among the plaintiffs, sought direct recourse to the Court through the
instant petition under Rule 45.
Ruling: No. This case must be decided on the premise that the deeds of sale in favor
of the appellant were executed after the filing of the original complaint. Subject to Issue: Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject
certain qualifications, and except as otherwise provided by law, an action complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
commenced before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and
Ruling: Yes. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by
should be dismissed, provided an objection on this ground is properly and
the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a
seasonably interposed. The fact that the cause of action accrues after the action is
sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct,
commenced and while it is pending is of no moment. In the present case, timely
the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations
objection was made by counsel for the appellees upon discovery of the immaturity
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
of the action as a result of the presentation by plaintiff-appellant of certain exhibits.
not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
Primarily, the right to amend a pleading is not an absolute and unconditional right. It
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
is to be allowed in furtherance of justice under a sound judicial discretion. This
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same,
judicial discretion, upon the other hand, is of course not without any restriction. The
prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null
cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not
and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be
be allowed by an amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no existence
cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
when the action was commenced. As soon as an action is brought and the complaint
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the
is filed, the proceedings thus initiated are not subject to the arbitrary control of the
determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding
parties or of the court, but must be dealt with in accordance with recognized rules of
special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title
pleading and practice. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action
and reconveyance, from granting the same. The determination of who are the
at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the
decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such
acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental
purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession,
complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not
as in this case.
permissible. The order appealed from is affirmed, without prejudice.
It must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which
should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special
proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of
any legal effect. The petition is DENIED without prejudice to any subsequent
proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
concomitant therewith.
G.R. No. 162956. April 10, 2008
5. FAUSTINO REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., vs. PETER B.
ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter DEBORAH ANN C.
ENRIQUEZ, and SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ,
Facts: According to petitioners they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-
owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera. Petitioners executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes involving a portion
of the subject parcel of land. The petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale over the
same property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, the TCT was cancelled and
new TCTs were issued in the name of the heirs. Respondents Peter B. Enriquez for
himself and on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez, on the other
hand, alleges that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife
Patricia Seguera Cabrera owned undivided pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of
land. They further allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters
Graciana, who died single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter
and mother of respondent Deborah Ann who succeeded their parents rights and
took possession of the subject parcel of land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her
share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole owner of the one-half
share of the subject parcel of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed
on to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann. Petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann sold
200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Fernandez, also their
co-respondents in the case at bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession
of the said area in the subject parcel of land.
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they
discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by
Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the
subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated
July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m.
belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso,
Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in
the name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and
Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia
Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent
and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the
aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise prayed for the
repartition and resubdivision of the subject property.
RTC: It dismissed the case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were
actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since
they cannot demand the partition of the real property without first being declared
as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case,
but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose. The Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to proceed with the
hearing of the case. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners
was similarly denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary
civil action to nullify subject documents.
Ruling: Yes. An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A
special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact. The Rules of Court provide that only a
real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court. A real
party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered a real
interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. The
purpose of the rule is to protect persons against undue and unnecessary litigation.
Thus, a plaintiff’s right to institute an ordinary civil action should be based on his
own right to the relief sought. In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose
name a property was registered sue to recover the said property through the
institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and
partition, or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or
documents related thereto, this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of
heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is within the
exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding.
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the
Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates
of Title, etc., a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted
by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-
owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the
documents the respondents sought to annul. The respondents herein, except for
their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in
the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have
themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the
trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a
case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration
of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations
therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir
of one of the registered co-owners of the property. The petition is GRANTED.
[G.R. No. 174806. August 11, 2010]
6. SOLOIL, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the exportation of copra,
crude coconut oil, and other coconut products. Respondent is a government owned
and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree No. 232, mandated to
promote the rapid development of the coconut and palm oil industry in the country.
The OGCC sent by registered mail a final demand letter addressed to Soloil for the
payment of the latters overdue fees to PCA for the domestic sale of coconut products.
Soloil still did not pay the fees. PCA filed in the RTC a complaint alleging that Soloil
refused to pay the PCA fees. Soloil raised the defense that PCAs demand for the
payment of PCA fees based on domestic sales had no factual basis as Soloil never
engaged in the domestic sale of coconut products. The case was set for pre-trial.
However, for failure of the parties to settle the case amicably, pre-trial was
terminated. Trial on the merits ensued. PCA presented its lone witness, Trade
Control Examiner Victoria Evangelista. Evangelista testified that she was in charge of
monitoring Soloils export sales transactions and that she was the one who prepared
Soloils Summary of Outstanding PCA Fee Obligations. On the other hand, Soloil
presented its sole witness, Assistant Vice-President for Trading and Administration
Fernando Uy. Uy testified that Soloil had no record of any domestic sale of coconut
products. On cross-examination, Uy admitted Soloil purchased copra in the course of
its business of exporting coconut products. RTC ruled PCA failed to prove that the
claimed amount of unpaid PCA fees was from Soloils domestic sale of coconut
products. The RTC held that only the amount from Soloils domestic sale of coconut
products. PCA appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that Soloil was liable to pay
PCA fees on its purchases of copra for both domestic and export sale of coconut
products. CA held that PCA fees attached upon purchase of copra by copra exporters.
It pointed out that there was no distinction whether the purchase was for domestic
or for export sale of coconut products. It granted PCAs appeal.
Issue: Whether the complaint, alleging non-payment of PCA fees due on Soloils
domestic sale of coconut products, sufficiently stated a cause of action when
evidence adduced during trial consisted of Soloils export sale of coconut products.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner argue the fact that the complaint alleged non-payment of
PCA fees on Soloils domestic sale of coconut products while the attached annexes
showing Soloils unpaid PCA fees did not indicate whether the amounts due were
from domestic or from export sale of coconut products. Soloil maintains it never had
any domestic sale of coconut products as its sales were all for export. Soloil argues
that the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action. The
complaint in this case, paragraph 4 in particular, contained the following averments:
4. To defray its operating expenses plaintiff is authorized under P.D. 1854 to
impose and collect a fee of three centavos for every kilo of copra or its
equivalent in copra terms of other coconut products delivered to and/or purchased
by copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators, and other end-users of coconut
products. This fee is otherwise known as PCA fee.
This portion of the complaint together with the attached annexes showing Soloils
unpaid PCA fees sufficiently constituted a cause of action in this case, namely: (1)
under P.D. 1854, PCA has a right to collect PCA fees; (2) Soloil, as a copra exporter, is
legally bound to pay PCA fees; and (3) Soloils non-payment of PCA fees is in violation
of PCAs right to collect the same. In determining whether a complaint states a cause
of action, the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes,
motions, and the evidence on record. The focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity,
of the material allegations. Moreover, the complaint does not have to establish facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at
the trial on the merits of the case. The fact that the complaint specifically mentioned
assessed PCA fees due on Soloils domestic sale of coconut products did not preclude
a cause of action for PCA fees due on Soloils export sale of coconut products. PCA
sufficiently alleged on paragraph 4 of the complaint that PCA fees attached upon
purchase of copra by copra exporters, such as Soloil, whether for domestic or for
export sale of coconut products. Under P.D. 1854, PCA fees automatically attach upon
purchase of copra by copra exporters, such as Soloil in this case. The law does not
distinguish whether the purchase of copra is for domestic or for export sale of
coconut products. When the law does not distinguish, neither should we. However,
the law expressly requires that the PCA fees shall be paid by said copra exporters for
copra purchased by copra exporters. Soloil, as a copra exporter, cannot evade its
legal obligation to pay PCA fees on the lame pretext that it never engaged in
domestic sale of coconut products or worse, that the complaint for collection of PCA
fees failed to state a cause of action.
[ G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015 ]
7. NORLINDA S. MARILAG, VS. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, RESPONDENT.
Facts: Rafael Martinez, respondent's father, obtained from petitioner a loan in the
amount of P160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest of five percent (5%),
payable within a period of six (6) months. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land. Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon maturity
and despite repeated demands, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC. Rafael failed to file his answer
and, upon petitioner's motion, was declared in default. After an ex parte
presentation of petitioner's evidence, RTC issued a Decision in the foreclosure case,
declaring the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be usurious and reducing the same
to 12% per annum. Accordingly, it ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the amount of
P229,200.00, consisting of the principal of P160,000.00 and accrued interest of
P59,200.00. Records do not show that this Decision had already attained finality.
Meanwhile, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to petitioner which was
pegged at P689,000.00. After making a total payment of P400,000.00, he executed a
promissory note, binding himself to pay the amount of P289,000.00, "representing
the balance of the agreed financial obligation of [his] father to petitioner. After
learning of the Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount covered by the
subject PN despite demands, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for sum of
money and damages before the court a quo.
Respondent filed his answer, contending that petitioner has no cause of action
against him. He averred that he has fully settled Rafael's obligation and that he
committed a mistake in paying more than the amount due under the loan as
adjudged by the RTC-Imus in the judicial foreclosure case which, thus, warranted the
return of the excess payment. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of the complaint,
and interposed a compulsory counterclaim for the release of the mortgage, the
return of the excess payment, and the payment of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The Court A Quo's Ruling: It denied recovery on the subject PN. It found that the
consideration for its execution was Rafael's indebtedness to petitioner, the
extinguishment of which necessarily results in the consequent extinguishment of the
cause therefor. Considering that the RTC-Imus had adjudged Rafael liable to
petitioner only for the amount of P229,200.00, for which a total of P400,000.00 had
already been paid, the court a quo found no valid or compelling reason to allow
petitioner to recover further on the subject PN. There being an excess payment of
P171,000.00, it declared that a quasi-contract (in the concept of solutio indebiti)
exists between the parties and, accordingly, directed petitioner to return the said
amount to respondent. However, the court a quo granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, and recalled and set aside its Decision. It declared that the causes of
action in the collection and foreclosure cases are distinct, and respondent's failure to
comply with his obligation under the subject PN justifies petitioner to seek judicial
relief. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
CA: It recalled and set aside the court a quo's Decision. It held that the doctrine of
res judicata finds application in the instant case, considering that both the judicial
foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the non-payment of
Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate mortgage
and the primary consideration for the execution of the subject PN. Since res judicata
only requires substantial, not actual, identity of causes of action and/or identity of
issue, it ruled that the judgment in the judicial foreclosure case relating to Rafael's
obligation to petitioner is final and conclusive on the collection case. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the dismissal
of the collection case.
Ruling: No. A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following
elements concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (b)
the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The Court finds the principle of res
judicata to be inapplicable to the present case. This is because the records are bereft
of any indication that the August 28, 2003 Decision in the judicial foreclosure case
had already attained finality, evidenced, for instance, by a copy of the entry of
judgment in the said case. Accordingly, with the very first element of res judicata
missing, said principle cannot be made to obtain.
This notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner's prosecution of the collection
case was barred, instead, by the principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial
identity of parties and singularity of the causes of action in the foreclosure and
collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner's recourse to
the subsequent collection case. To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground
for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such
that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis
pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; ( b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount
to res judicata in the other. Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a
single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must
be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of
forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but
with different prayers. In this relation, it must be noted that the question of
whether a cause of action is single and entire or separate is not always easy to
determine and the same must often be resolved, not by the general rules, but by
reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule,
therefore, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or
contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the several parts arise
from distinct and different acts or contracts, for which a party may maintain
separate suits. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that
the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor mortgagor,
i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of
sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and
each remedy is complete by itself.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor mortgagee, instituted
an action for judicial in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing
discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing
of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle
of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it
was not shown to have attained finality. Further on the point, the fact that no
foreclosure sale appears to have been conducted is of no moment because the
remedy of foreclosure of mortgage is deemed chosen upon the filing of the
complaint therefor. As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure
proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing
herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the
decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the
collection case is in order. Considering, however, that respondent's claim for return
of excess payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus,
survives the dismissal of petitioner's collection suit, the same should be resolved
based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
[G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005]
8. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, petitioners,
vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE,
Facts In the afternoon of October 28, 1984, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger
jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. It was then raining.
While driving north bound along the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a
passenger bus, owned by Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by
Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner, was trailing behind. When the two vehicles
were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney.
In so doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard
Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was
P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale
shouldered the balance of P13,415.00. Thereafter, Standard and Martina,
respondents, demanded reimbursement from petitioners Pantranco and its driver
Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents to file with the RTC
a complaint for sum of money. In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied
the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court,
not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case. The trial court rendered a Decision
in favor of respondents Standard and Martina.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. It ruled that in the
case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more than P20,000.00 which at
the time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional
Trial Court. Appellants contend that there was a misjoinder of parties. Assuming
that there was, under the Rules of Court (Sec. 11, Rule 7) as well as under the Rules
of Civil Procedure, the same does not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor is it a
ground to dismiss the complaint. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case
since the cause of action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction
and that there are no common questions of law and fact common to both parties.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: Yes. Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises
out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or
fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise
proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue. In this case,
there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the rear
side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether
petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both
respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been
sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed separate
suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain
the same cause of action.
Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in
order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient,
speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Totality Rule: Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides: (d)
Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.This paragraph embodies
the totality rule as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 [9] which states,
among others, that where there are several claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. Respondent Standards
claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total
of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost
or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant case. It
bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had
not yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994.
[G.R. No. 186993 August 22, 2012]
9. THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B. ACERON,
Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG, Respondents.
Facts: Spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of
Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy
Ang (petitioners). On even date, the respondents executed a promissory note in
favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the said amount,
with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand. However,
despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners. The
petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter asking them to pay their
outstanding debt which, at that time, already amounted to US$719,671.23.
Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand letter, the respondents still failed to
settle their loan obligation. Petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles,
California, United States of America (USA), executed their respective Special Powers
of Attorney in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the
purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. Atty. Aceron, in behalf of
the petitioners, filed a Complaint7 for collection of sum of money with the RTC of
Quezon City against the respondents. The respondents moved for the dismissal of
the complaint filed by the petitioners on the grounds of improper venue and
prescription. Insisting that the venue of the petitioners’ action was improperly laid,
the respondents asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the
court of the place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they
reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA.
Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint against them in the RTC
of Quezon City was improper.
RTC: The RTC of Quezon City issued an Order which, denied the respondents’
motion to dismiss. In ruling against the respondents’ claim of improper venue, the
court explained that: Attached to the complaint is the Special Power of Attorney
clearly states that plaintiff Nancy Ang constituted Atty. Eldrige Marvin Aceron as her
duly appointed attorney-in-fact to prosecute her claim against herein defendants.
Considering that the address given by Atty. Aceron is in Quezon City, hence, being the
plaintiff, venue of the action may lie where he resides. The respondents sought
reconsideration of the RTC Order, asserting that there is no law which allows the
filing of a complaint in the court of the place where the representative, who was
appointed as such by the plaintiffs through a Special Power of Attorney, resides. The
respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied. The respondents further
claimed Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not the real
party in interest in the case below; accordingly, his residence should not be
considered in determining the proper venue of the said complaint.
CA: It render a decision which annulled and set aside the Orders of the RTC of
Quezon City and, accordingly, directed the dismissal of the complaint filed by the
petitioners. The CA held that the complaint below should have been filed in Bacolod
City and not in Quezon City. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the complaint should be dismissed for improper venue.
Ruling: Yes. It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are
fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled,
however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a
plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The petitioners’
complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal
action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract.
The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can
file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the
defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the
time the action is commenced. However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the
Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the place
where the defendant resides. The situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is
fixed by the Rules of Court to attain the greatest convenience possible to the litigants
and their witnesses by affording them maximum accessibility to the courts. And
even as the regulation of venue is primarily for the convenience of the plaintiff, as
attested by the fact that the choice of venue is given to him, it should not be
construed to unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred upon him.
Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below; thus, his
residence is immaterial to the venue of the filing of the complaint. Contrary to
the petitioners’ claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the
petitioners, is not a real party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest
in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment
therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the
limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents.
Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of
petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
[G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009]
10. ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge,
RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under
the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents.
Facts: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, before the RTC for replevin
and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go
prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles
in Navarro’s possession. In the first complaint, wherein the plaintiff is Karen, it was
alleged that on August 8, 1997, the said defendant leased [from] plaintiff a certain
motor vehicle as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE
entered into by and between KARGO ENTERPRISES, then represented by its
Manager, the aforementioned GLENN O. GO, and defendant ROGER NAVARRO. In
accordance with the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO
PURCHASE, defendant ROGER NAVARRO delivered unto plaintiff six (6) post-dated
checks each in the amount of SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-
THREE & 33/100 PESOS (₱66,333.33) which were supposedly in payment of the
agreed rentals. When the fifth and sixth checks were presented for payment the
same were dishonored by the drawee bank for the common reason that the current
deposit account against which the said checks were issued did not have sufficient
funds to cover the amounts thereof. The total amount of the two (2) checks is the
sum of ₱132,666.66 therefore represents the principal liability of defendant ROGER
NAVARRO unto plaintiff on the basis of the provisions of the above LEASE
AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE.
The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as the first
complaint, except that the Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase involved is
dated October 1, 1997 and the motor vehicle leased is different. It also alleged that
Navarro delivered three post-dated checks, each for the amount of ₱100,000.00, to
Karen Go in payment of the agreed rentals; however, the third check was dishonored
when presented for payment. RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result,
the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.
In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two
complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease
Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) – the
actionable documents on which the complaints were based. RTC dismissed the case
on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause of action. In response to the
motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed, the RTC issued another order setting
aside the order of dismissal. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go’s leasing
business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in
his leasing business to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that
Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint. Thus, the
lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-
plaintiff. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 with the CA, essentially
contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reconsidered
the dismissal of the case and directed Karen Go to amend her complaints by
including her husband Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. According to Navarro, a complaint
which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of
action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading. CA denied the petition.
Issue: Whether Karen Go is the real party-in-interest.
Ruling: Yes. Karen Go is the real party-in-interest. The central factor in appreciating
the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name
appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T.
GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this identification
was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint. Paragraph 2 defined the
business KARGO ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the
allegation that the defendant "leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle" that was
thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint specifies and attaches as its
integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction between the
plaintiff and the defendant. Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the
picture. As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship,
which is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person. Thus, pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 3 of the Rules, Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action. This legal
reality leads to the question: who then is the proper party to file an action based on a
contract in the name of Kargo Enterprises?
There is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court.
The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of
business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business
name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal
personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action
in court. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who
will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case.
Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager
of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a
matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits.
The business name Kargo Enterprises is in the name of Karen T. Go, who described
herself in the Complaints to be "a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a
resident of Cagayan de Oro City, and doing business under the trade name KARGO
ENTERPRISES." That Glenn Go and Karen Go are married to each other is a fact
never brought in issue in the case. Thus, the business name KARGO ENTERPRISES is
registered in the name of a married woman, a fact material to the side issue of
whether Kargo Enterprises and its properties are paraphernal or conjugal properties.
The registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone,
particularly when the woman is married. By law, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of
whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is conjugal or paraphernal
property, we hold that it is conjugal property.
Article 124 of the Family Code allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act with
authority in managing their conjugal property. No need exists, therefore, for one to
obtain the consent of the other before performing an act of administration or any act
that does not dispose of or encumber their conjugal property.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any
one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-
owners. Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against
Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they
co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code.
Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of
the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit,
based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states: Section 4. Spouses as parties. –
Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not ground to dismiss action. Rule 3, Section
11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is
a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Demand is not required prior to filing of replevin action. For a writ of replevin to
issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules. More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the
position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he has already admitted in his
Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding that he
either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles.