2013 SCC OnLine Gau 741 : (2015) 1 Gau LR 98

In the High Court of Gauhati

(Before A.K. Goswami, J.)

Khargeswar Baruah … Petitioner;

Versus

Khasnur Ali and Ors. … Respondents.

RSA No. 51 of 1999

Decided on June 28, 2013

Pleading — Admission — Admission, if true and clear, is the best proof of the facts admitted and
can by themselves be made the foundation of the rights of the parties — Admission in pleading is
fully binding on the parties that make them and constitute a waiver of proof — Admission by
themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties.

Advocates who appeared in the case:

Mr. B.B. Narzari and Mr. S. Chouhan for the petitioner.

Mr. T. Islam for the respondents.

Cases referred: Chronological

Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779.

Mumtaz Begum v. Md. Mazaharul Hoque, RSA 138 2002 decided on 1.2.2013.

Manindra Kumar Dey v. Mahendra Suklabaidya, 1999 (1) GLT 30.

Punjab Urban Planning & Development Authority v. Shiv Saraswati Iron and Steel Re-Rolling Mills,
(1998) 4 SCC 539.

Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (Dead) by his legal representatives, (1997) 7 SCC 137 : AIR 1997 SC
2719.

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Keshav Ram, (1996) 11 SCC 257 : AIR 1997 SC 2181.

Narendra Kumar v. Vishnu Kumar Nayyar, AIR 1994 Del. 209.

Achal Reddi v. Ramakrishna Raddiar, (1990) 4 SCC 706 : AIR 1990 SC 553.
Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram, (1974) 1 SCC 242 : AIR 1974 SC 471.

Hindustan Steel Ltd., Rourkela v. Kalyani Banerjee, (1973) 1 SCC 273 : AIR 1973 SC 408.

Ambika Prasad Thakur v. Ram Ekbal Rail (Dead) by his legal representatives, AIR 1966 SC 605.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.11.1998 passed by the
learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Darrang, Mangaldoi, in T.A. No. 23/97 modifying the judgment
dated 26.9.1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Darrang, Mangaldoi in T.S. No.
4/94. The respondent/defendant No. 1 has filed a crossobjection.

2. The case set up in the plaint is that in Periodic Patta No. 42/42 of village-Narikali under Lokrai
Mouza, there were two dags: Dag No. 90, which is now numbered as Dag No. 114 and Dag No. 62,
which is now numbered as 107. In Dag No. 62(107), there were 3K 3L of land and in Dag No. 90
(114), there was 7B 4K 6L of land. Land in both these dags were owned by one Tanu. His mother,
Puni, survived him and on the death of Tanu, name of Puni was mutated in the patta. Puni sold 1B of
land to Hari Prasad and 2B to Kerkon Nath. The said land formed part of Dag No. 90 (114). Puni also
gifted 4B 4K 6L of land to one Rupnath Saharia. The land belonging to Kerkon Nath was purchased by
Diparu Nath and accordingly, his name was also mutated in respect of 2B of land. Father of the
plaintiff, Kalaram Koch, purchased 3K 3L of land of Dag No. 62 (107) from Puni by oral agreement
and 4B 4K 6L from Rupnath Saharia in Dag No. 90 (114) and accordingly, his name was mutated in
the patta in the year 1950. On 2.7.1991, the Defendant No. 1 forcibly occupicd 2K 17L of land
covered by Dag No. 62 (107) (Schedule-A of the plaint), which prompted him to file a proceeding
under section 145, Cr.PC and in such proceeding, the learned Magistrate illegally declared
possession in favour of the Defendant No. 1. The Defendant No. 1 also, in collusion with Revenue
Authorities obtained mutation in respect of 1B 2K 5L only of Schedule-B land measuring 2B 2K 17L in
Dag No. 90 (114). In the plaint originally filed, the Schedule of the land was shown as 1B out of 2B 2K
17L and mutation was stated to be granted in respect of 1B land. The plaint was amended and
Schedule-B was changed to 2B 2K 17L. Plaint was also amended stating that mutation was granted in
rcspect of 1B 2K 5L of land.

3. In the suit, the following prayers were made:’

“(a) That the suit of the plaintiff be decreed with cost.

(b) That a declaratory decree be passed that the plaintiff has got right, title and interest of the
Schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ land.

(c) That the main defendant be ejected from the suit land (Schedule ‘A’ + ‘B’) land be demolishing his
houses, structures, fences whatsoever existing and the vacant possession thereof be delivered to the
plaintiff.

(d) That a permanent injunction be issued restraining the defendant, his agents, relatives, servants
and workmen from entering and or dispossessing the plaintiff from the Schedule land.

(e) That a declaratory decree be passed that the mutation in the name of the defendant No. 1 in
Schedule ‘B’ land is illegal, void, inoperative in law and thus liable to be set aside.
(f) That no relief is sought against the pro forma defendant but if they file written statement against
the plaintiff they may be treated as main defendant.

(g) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to?

SCHEDULE A

Land measuring 2K-17Ls covered by Dag No. 107 of periodic patta No. 155 of village-Narikali, Mouza-
Lokrai, bounded by:

Hast: (Nonoi) Mathauri, West: Nonoi river, North: Tapeswar Barua, South: Ambika Nath.”

SCHEDULE B

Land measuring 2B-2K-17Ls covered by Dag No. 114 of periodic patta No. 155 of village-Narikali,
Mouza-Lokrai, bounded by:

North: Tapeswar Barua, South: Tapeswar, Haricharan Nath East: Tapeswar, West: Mathauri.

Thus, the plaintiff prayed for right, title and interest in land measuring 2K 17L covered by Dag No. 62
(107) and 2B 2K 17L in Dag No. 90 (114).

4. In the written statement, defendant No. 1 stated that Schedule-A is not a periodic patta land but
is Government land, which is in occupation of the defendant for last 15 years or so. The boundary of
Schedule-A land is not correct and the said boundary covers land of Hari Prasad and Diparu as well. It
is stated that Schedule-B land belonged to father of the plaintiff, Kalaram Baruah and 1B of the
Schedule-B land was sold by the father of the plaintiff to one Sanibor Nath on 11.04.1977 by a
registered deed and on 31.8.1978, Sanibor Nath, by registered deed, sold the said plot of land to the
Defendant No. 1 and delivered possession thereof. There was a slight discrepancy in the Schedule of
the land sold to Sanibor Nath in that in the south, instead of Diparu, it should have been mentioned
as Hari Prasad. Sanibor Nath had transferred the land which was purchased by him from the father
of the plaintiff but there was some mistake in number of the Dag. Defendant No. 1 had lent Rs. 1,500
to the father of the plaintiff in the year 1978 and being unable to repay the amount, the father of
plaintiff sold the Schedule-B land to defendant No. 1 by making endorsement in the concerning
Chitha, instead of a sale deed, though requested by the defendant No. 1. 1B 2K 5L of Dag No. 90
(114) which is transferred by the plaintiff is to the East of the land purchased by Defendant No. 1
from Sanibor Nath and thus the defendant No. 1 became the owner and possessor of 2B 2K 5L of
land. Mutation order was passed on 13.3.1987, though he was in possession from 1978. The
defendant No. 1 had raised many constructions in the said plot of land-a full wall pucca house in
1978/1979 in the Northern side, another pucca house on the Western side of Schedule-B land, a tin-
roofed house in the Southern side, etc., by spending about 2 lakhs. In the additional written
statement filed, it was stated that plaintiff had endorsed his note with signature in the concerned
Chitha which was duly recorded and the mutation order was passed with the consent of the plaintiff
himself. It is further stated that the plaintiff had not challenged a memorandum with regard to
Scheduled-B land, ordered at the instance of the learned trial court.

5. On the basis of the pleadings, the following issues were framed by the learned trial court:

(1) “Whether there is cause of action to instilate the suit?

(2) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?

(3) Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?

(4) Whether Schedule ‘A’ land is a Sarkari land or periodic patta land?

(5) Whether plaintiff's father Kolaram Baruah sold 1B of land to Sanibar Nath and whether Sanibar
Nath sold the land so purchased to defendant Khasnur Ali as alleged in para 12(11) of the W/S?

(6) Whether plaintiff sold 1B 2K 5Ls land from Dag No. 114 as alleged in para 12 (VI) of the W/S and
whether the defendants name was mutated on 13.3.1987.

(7) Whether the defendant has been possessing the Schedule ‘B’ land since 1978-79 continuously
against the interest of the plaintiff and whether he constructed pacca house, bathroom etc. As
alleged in para 12 (VIII) IX and X of the W/S and whether he spent about Rs. 2 lakhs in constructing
these houses and other structure, etc. On the suit land?

(8) Whether the plaintiff has got right, title and interest over the suit land?

(9) To what relief, if any, are parties entitled?”

6. Subsequently one more additional issue was framed, which is as under : “Additional issue

1. Whether the defendant No. 1 without knowledge of the plaintiff collusively with revenue
authority got his name mutated in respect of 1B-2K-5 Lessas of land out of Schedule land?”

7. During trial, plaintiff examined 4 witnesses and the defendant No. 1 also examined 7 witnesses.
Both the parties had also exhibited a number of documents.

8. The learned trial court, in issue No. 4, recorded the finding that preponderance of evidence goes
to show that Schedule-A land is a periodic patta land. While deciding issue No. 5, the learned Court
held that Ext. ‘Unga’ having not been proved in accordance with law as laid down under section 67
of the Indian Evidence Act, no right, title and ownership could have been conferred on the basis
thereof upon Sanibor Nath by sale deed No. 2543 dated 4.2.1978 in respect of 1B of land out of
Schedule-B land and consequently, defendant No. 1 also acquired no right over the said plot of land
by virtue of Ext. ‘Gha’. While dealing with issue No. 6, the learned trial court took note of the fact
that Defendant No. 1 had admitted that no registered sale deed was made by the plaintiff in respect
of 1B 2K 5L of land under Dag No. 90 (114), forming part of Schedule-B land. The learned trial court
held that though Chitha mutation Ext. ‘Ka’ was executed by the plaintiff, the same cannot transfer a
valid title upon the defendant No. 1. The plea of adverse possession was negatived in issue No. 7 by
holding that on the face of plea of the defendant No. 1 that he had been possessing the suit land by
virtue of purchase, he cannot set up a plea of adverse possession. The learned trial court decided
issue No. 8 regarding plaintiff's right, title and interest over the suit land on the premise that it was
an admitted position that plaintiff's father was the owner of the suit land and as defendant No. 1
failed to prove that he purchased land from the father of the plaintiff, therefore, plaintiff has got
right, title and interest over the suit land. The learned trial court was wrong in opining that it was an
admitted fact that the father of the plaintiff was the owner of the suit land. The suit land comprises
of two Schedules: Schedule-A and Schedule-B. So far as Schedule-B is concerned, in paragraph 22(ii),
the defendant admitted that Schedule-B land belonged to father of the plaintiff. But there was no
such admission with regard to Schedule-A land. The Additional Issue No. 1 was also decided in favour
of the plaintiff and thus the trial court decreed the suit, declaring right, title and interest over the
suit land with a direction to the defendant No. 1 to vacate possession over the suit land in favour of
the plaintiff within six months from the date of delivery of judgment failing which decree could be
executed in accordance with law.

9. The learned lower Appellate Court recorded a finding that there is no evidence on record that
Schedule-A land is a Sarkari land and on the contrary, the evidence on record shows that both
Schedule-A and Schedule-B are periodic patta land since the days of late Tanu Koch. The Appellate
Court had discounted the purported purchase by the father of the plaintiff Kalaram Baruah alias
Kalaram Koch as the purchase was made by Chitha entry and not by execution of sale deed in his
favour. Having held so, the learned Appellate Court opined that “such void transfer of ownership of
land and delivery possession puts the transferee in possession with clear animus on distinct
understanding that from that time onwards the transferor has no right or title to the property and
the transferee adversely possesses the property from the date of such illegal transfer”, and as
Kalaram was in possession for more than 12 years by way of adverse possession, he acquired title of
ownership in respect of the suit land by way of adverse possession and plaintiff, by right of
inheritance, except an area of 1B of land in Schedule-B sold to Sanibor Nath by his father Kalaram.

10. The learned lower Appellate Court also held that the defendant No. 1 failed to prove sale of land
by the father of the plaintiff to Sanibor Nath by Ext. ‘Unga’ and correspondingly by Sanibor Nath to
the defendant No. 1 vide Ext. ‘Gha’. However, as Ext. ‘Ka’ (1) in the Chitha showed that name of the
defendant No. 1 was mutated in respect of 1B of land out of Schedule-B land on the strength of
purchase from Sanibor Nath and as defendant No. 1 was possessing the land comprised in Dag No.
90 (114) for more than 15 (fifteen) years from 31.8.1978, defendant No. 1 had acquired title by way
of adverse possession. It is further held that in respect of 1B 2K 5L of land in Dag No. 90 (114), Ext
‘Kha’, a certified copy of Jamabandi, showed that name of defendant No. 1 was mutated on
13.03.1997 and the period being only 7 years till the date of institution of the suit, defendant No. 1
did not acquire any title by way of adverse possession in respect of the said plot of land.

11. Accordingly, the decree of the learned title court was modified to the extent that the defendant
No. 1 had title in respect of land measuring 1B bounded by Topeswar Nath in the North, Ram Avatar
in the South, plaintiff in the East and mathauri in the West.

12. This second appeal was admitted to be heard on 28.9.1999 on the substantial question of law as
to whether the Lower Appellate Court erred in law in coming to a finding without any pleading and
issue as regards adverse possession.

13. Heard Mr. S. Chouhan, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. T. Islam, learned
counsel for the respondent. I have also perused the materials on record.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that in view of the findings recorded by the learned
trial court in issue No. 7, which is not interfered with by the learned lower Appellate Court, the
modification of the impugned appellate judgment to the extent of grant of decree of 1B in favour of
the defendant No. 1, is not sustainable in law.
 15. He also submits that the learned court below had recorded concurrent finding of fact that
Schedule-A land is periodic patta land and that the defendant No. 1 could not prove purchase of land
measuring 1B from Sanibor Nath and land measuring 1B 2K 5L from the father of the plaintiff. It is
argued by him that when the specific case of the defendant No. 1 was based on transfer of land from
Sanibor Nath and the father of the plaintiff, the learned lower Appellate Court committed grave
error of law in passing the judgment holding that defendant No. 1 acquired title in respect of 1B land
by way of adverse possession. It is also pleaded by him that in addition to that, there is also no
pleading by defendant No. 1 claiming adverse possession and no issues were also framed. It is also
submitted by him that in his written statement, defendant No. 1 had admitted that the father of the
plaintiff had right, title and interest in the Schedule-B land and, therefore, no further proof was
required.

16. The learned counsel, in respect of his submissions, places reliance on the following judgments :
(i) Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram, (1974) 1 SCC 242 : AIR 1974 SC 471 (ii) RSA
138 2002 decided on 1.2.2013 (Mumtnz Begum v. Md. Mazaharul Hoque @ Mukul) (iii) Manindra
Kumar Dey v. Mahendra Suklabaidya, 1999 (1) GLT 30 and (iv) Narendm Kumar v. Vishnu Kumar
Nayyar, AIR 1994 Delhi 209

17. Mr. T. Islam, learned counsel for the respondent/defendant No. 1 submits that though there
was an admission by the defendant No. 1 in the written statement to the effect that Schedule-B land
originally belonged to the father of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the same, it was incumbent on the
plaintiff to prove that he was still the owner of Scheduled-B land in view of the averments made in
the written statement that there had been transfers of land comprised in Schedule-B land and this
burden the plaintiff failed to discharge. It is submitted by him that the plaintiff had only brought into
evidence documents pertaining to record of rights, which cannot be the only basis for establishing
right, title and interest. As the plaintiff is to prove his case and as the plaintiff had failed to prove his
right, title and interest in the suit property, judgment of the learned courts below cannot be
sustained in law. It is further submitted by him that plaintiff was also granted decree by the learned
lower appellate court below on the basis of adverse possession, though not pleaded and, therefore,
the substantial question of law formulated at the instance of the appellant is also squarely applicable
to him. According to him, if it is held that the judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate
court is bad inasmuch as title of ownership was declared in favour of defendant No. 1 by adverse
possession, the cross-objection is also liable to be allowed as the decree of the learned lower
appellate court below was also on the basis of adverse possession, which was not pleaded by the
plaintiff. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliances on the following judgments:
(i) Ambika Prasad Thakur v. Ram Ekbal Rail (dead) by his legal representatives, AIR 1966 SC 605, (ii)
Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (dead) by his legal representatives, (1997) 7 SCC 137 : AIR 1997 SC
2719, (iii) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Keshav Ram, (1996) 11 SCC 257 : AIR 1997 SC 2181 (iv)
Hindustan Steel Ltd., Rourkela v. Smt. Kalyani Banerjee, (1973) 1 SCC 273 : AIR 1973 SC 408 and (v)
Punjab Urban Planning & Development Authority v. Shiv Saras-umti Iron and Steel Re-Rolling Mills,
(1998) 4 SCC 539.
 18. In Nagindas (supra) the Apex Court had said that admission, if true and clear, is by far the best
proof of the facts admitted and they by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the
parties. It has also been held that admission in pleadings stands on a higher footing than evidentiary
admission and the former class of admission is fully binding on the parties that make them and
constitute a waiver of proof. The admission by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights
of the parties and on the other hand, evidentiary admission can be shown to be wrong. In Narendra
Kumar (supra) the Delhi High Court reiterated the proposition that facts which are admitted need
net be proved. It is no doubt true as held in Shiv Saraswati (supra) that the plaintiff must’ succeed or
fail on his own case and cannot take advantage or weakness in the defendant's case to get a decree.
Admission and weakness are two different things and operate at different fields. I am unable to
accept the submission of Mr. Islam that in spite of aforesaid admission in the written statement, it
was necessary for the plaintiff to prove his right, title and interest by tendering into evidence
documents of title. In Ambika Prasad (supra) on which Mr. Islam, in the context of admission, relies,
is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case as the Apex Court had said that
admission in that case was made under some suspicious circumstances at the end of the trial of the
case when the argument had begun, by way of a petition and without amending the written
statement, and thus such admission had weak evidentiary value. The specific case of the defendant
No. 1 was transfer by way of sale from the Schedule-B land by the father of the plaintiff as well by
the plaintiff himself. Both the courts below have concurrently held that defendant No. 1 had failed
to prove the sale of land in accordance with law. It was a burden which the defendant had to
discharge.

19. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court has laid down that proceedings for mutation of
names are not judicial proceedings and they arc in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the
interest of the State and that mutation proceedings cannot be treated as a conclusive evidence of
propriety right. It has also been held that an entry in the revenue extract may, prima facie, be good
evidence of possession and even of the right to hold the land but in law it is not conclusive. In
Keshav Ram (supra), the Apex Court had reiterated that an entry in the revenue papers by no stress
of imagination can form the basis for declaration of title. Similar view has been taken in Balwant
Singh (supra) and it has been held that mutation in the revenue record neither creates nor
extinguishes title nor has it any presumptive value on title and that it only enables the person in
whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question.

20. In respect of Schedule-A land the plaintiff had relied on Ext. 5, a certified copy of Jamabandi.
Similarly, in respect of 1B 2K 5L of land, defendant No. 1 relied on Ext. Kha, which is also a certified
copy of Jamabandi. In view of the law laid down by Apex Court, no title can flow on the basis of such
revenue record. In Mumtaz Begum (supra), this court had held that plea of title on the basis of a un-
registered sale deed and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent. Neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant No. 1 had pleaded adverse possession. However, the learned appellate court decreed the
suit on the basis of adverse possession except 1B of land in Schedule-B land, on which also title was
conferred on defendant No. 1 on the basis of adverse possession. In Mumtaz Begum (supra), this
court stated as follows:
“17. It is settled law that mere possession, even if it is true, for any number of years will not clothe a
person in enjoyment of the property with the title by adverse possession. Adverse possession, in a
sense, is based on the presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse
possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in
possession. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law, but a blended one of fact and
law. A person who claims adverse possession must show: (a) on what date he came into possession,
(b) what was the nature of possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other
party, (d) how long has his possession continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed.
In order to succeed a person pleading adverse possession must clearly plead and establish all facts
necessary to establish his adverse possession. In terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the
starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to
the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. Therefore,
there must be intention to dispossess. Animus possidendi is one of the ingredients of adverse
possession. A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam,
nec precario is necessary to constitute adverse possession.”

21. The reliance placed by the learned appellate court in Achal Reddi v. Ramakrishna Raddiar, (1990)
4 SCC 706 : AIR 1990 SC 553, on the basis of which the learned lower appellate court passed the
impugned judgment applying the law of adverse possession is not attracted in the facts and
circumstances of the case. In Achal Reddi (supra) the Apex Court had laid down that in case of
agreement of sale, the party who obtained possession acknowledges title of the vendor even though
agreement of sale may be invalid. It is an acknowledgement and recognition of the title of the
vendor which excludes the theory of adverse possession. It was also held that position is different in
a case where in pursuance of an oral transfer or a transfer not registered, the owner of the property
transfers the property and puts the transferee in possession with the clear animus on the distinct
understanding that from that time onwards he shall have no right or title to the property. The Apex
Court also laid down that such proposition is to be applied where there is a clear manifestation of
the intention of the owner to divest himself of the right over the property. In the instant, case
neither the plaint nor the written statement was structured so as to warrant invocation of the
principle laid down in Achal Reddi (supra). To reiterate, there is no pleading whatsoever regarding
adverse possession, both by the plaintiff and by the defendant No. 1.

22. The reliance placed by Mr. Chouhan in Manindra Kumar (supra) has no application to the facts
of the case as the ratio laid down in the said case is that objection to mode of proof put forward
must be taken at trial before the document is marked as an Exhibit and admitted into record.

23. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779, the Apex Court stated as
follows:

“12. A plaintiff, filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He
must specifically plead it. In P. Periasami v. P. Periathambi this court ruled that:

“Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else
was the owner of the property.”
 The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to
operate until the former is renounced. Dealing with Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar that is similar
to the case in hand, this Court held:

“4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession
under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his
independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title
or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12
years, i.e., up to completing the period his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since
the appellant's claim is founded on section 53A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication
that he came into possession of land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in
possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the
appellant.”

24. As was indicated earlier, while the learned trial court had granted a decree on the suit land on
the basis of admission, the appellate court had granted a decree on the basis of adverse possession.
In view of the discussions above, this court holds that the plaintiff will be entitled to a declaration of
right, title and interest in respect of Schedule-B land and the defendant No. 1 shall be liable to be
ejected from Schedule-B land. The mutation order in favour of defendant No. 1 in Schedule-B land is
also declared to be illegal and void. It is also held that the plaintiff has failed to prove right, title and
interest in Schedule-A land.

25. The second appeal and the cross-objection are accordingly disposed of modifying the decree of
the learned appellate court in terms of the above. No costs.

26. Send back the lower court records.

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