Blandina Hilado vs Jose Gutierrez David

In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon
represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he thenafter entered his appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that in
June 1945, Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado
a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material information was relayed to him by
Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado
returned with a copy of the C​ omplaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an
associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind
the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that
Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter
explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was relayed because all Hilado brought
was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco
because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD: ​Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as
counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional
capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
Further:
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is listening to
his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.

Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: ​It does not matter if the information relayed is confidential or
not. So long as the attorney-client relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations against the client.
Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was only signed by him: ​It still binds him because Atty.
Agrava, assuming that he was the real author, was part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or his employers.
Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco filed his entry of appearance to file a
disqualification: I​ t does not matter. The length of time is not a waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be disqualified,
based on previous atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional confidence once reposed can never be
divested by expiration of professional employment.

ALCALA vs DE VERA
Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case.
On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.
On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty. De Vera failed to inform Alcala about the adverse decision.
On July 17, 1963, the court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution. That was the only time when Alcala learned that he lost. And
because of Atty. De Vera’s failure to inform him of the adverse decision, the period within which Alcala can appeal his case had already
lapsed.
As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De Vera in order to collect damages as he averred that he sustained
damages due to Atty. De Vera’s negligence. The court however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to damages.
Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure to update his client of the status of the case.
HELD: ​No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had been remiss in his duties as counsel for Alcala because
he failed to update him of the status of the case, however, it appears that Alcala did not sustain any damage by reason of such negligence.
But this is not to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will only serve as a mitigating circumstance. The
Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty of simple negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De Vera’s failure to
notify his clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to the client’s interest expected of Atty. De
Vera under the lawyer’s oath.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the client to collect damages from the negligent lawyer.

COJUANGCO VS PALMA

Facts:
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds “deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.”

Respondent Palma [from ACCRA Law Office] was employed by petitioner as his personal counsel. Respondent's excellence in managing
petitioner's legal affairs, prompted petitioner to introduced respondent to his family. Since respondent gained the trust of petitioner and his
family, their relationship became intimate. Respondent then was allowed to tutor the 22 year old daughter of Petitioner.

However, when his concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s back and courted his daughter.
Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. He succeeded in misrepresenting himself to Hong Kong
officials as a bachelor and successfully married petitioner's daughter, eventhough he is legally married.

Respondent argued that, he cannot be punished since there is no allegation that he acted with “wanton recklessness, lack of skill or
ignorance of the law” in serving complainant’s interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married
complainant’s daughter with “utmost sincerity and good faith” and that “it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral man to
marry the woman he sincerely loves.”

Issue:
Whether or not respondent's acts constitutes gross immoral conduct so as to warrant his disbarment from the legal profession

Ruling:
Yes, the Court ruled respondent's action constitutes gross immoral conduct. A gross immoral conduct, the Court said, is a conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community. Thus, measured against this definition, respondent’s act is manifestly immoral. ​First, he abandoned his lawful wife and
three children. ​Second​, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And t​ hird​, he misrepresented himself as a “bachelor” so he
could contract marriage in a foreign land.

In particular, adds the Court, "he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Moreover, the circumstances here speak of a clear case
of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondent’s closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s complete trust
in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he
sneaked at the latter’s back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking.
Moreover, he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter
in Hongkong. He did this without complainant’s knowledge.

The Court stressed again the principle that law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but
even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at
any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.

Respondent cannot rely on complainant's admission that he is a good lawyer, because professional competency alone does not make a
lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension
recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the
extreme penalty of disbarment.