Corrected Brief Without Addendum PDF

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________________________________
APPEAL NO. 17-11888

APPEAL NO. 17-12134
APPEAL NO. 17-12376
_________________________________________________________
NAUSHEEN ZAINULABEDDIN
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
v.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
_________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
_______________________________________________________
CORRECTED WITHOUT ADDENDUM

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
APPELLANT
Nausheen Zainulabeddin
4730 South Woodlawn Ave. Apt 3D
Chicago, IL 60615
nausheenkhawaja@gmail.com
Pro Se
Nausheen Zainulabeddin v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees,
Appeal No. 17-11888, Appeal No. 17-12134 and Appeal no. 17-12376
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
In compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and Eleventh Circuit Rule
26.1, Appellant, Pro Se hereby certifies that following persons and entities
have or may have an interest in the outcome of the case:
Judge:
Moody, James- Trial Judge
Wilson, Thomas- Magistrate Trial Judge
Plaintiff/Appellant:
Zainulabeddin, Nausheen- Pro Se
Defendant/Appellee:
University of South Florida, Morsani College of Medicine Board of
Trustees
Adamchak, Joanne
Bognar, Bryan, MD, MPH
Burford, Roberta
C-1 of 5
Cook, Marissa
Brownlee, James, Jr., MD
Deschenes, Robert, PhD
Estevez, Michelle, MD
Klasko, Stephen, MD, MBA
Kumar, Ambuj, MD
Kumar, Mudra, MD
Liggett, Stephen, MD
Lockwood, Charles, MD
Loveren, Harry Van, MD
Lynch, Catherine, MD
Marty, Phillip, PhD
Monroe, Alicia, MD
Roth, Debohrah, MD
Schultz, Daniel
Sinnott, John, MD
C-2 of 5
Skalkos, Olga, PhD
Specter, Steven, PhD
Stevenson, Frazier, MD
Stock, Sandra, MD
Valeriano, Joanne, MD
Zwygart, Kira, MD
USF Counseling Center
University of South Florida Morsani College of Medicine
Attorneys and Law Firms Representing Defendant/Appelle:
Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete, LLP
Dickinson, John. — Attorney representing Defendant/Appellee
Mans, Lori. Attorney representing Defendant/Appellee
Financial Interest
Aga Khan Education Board: Tuition Reimbursement
Khawaja, Jalalluddin- Plaintiff’s Parent- Debt repayment + collateral
damages
C-3 of 5
U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Loan Servicing
Zainulabeddin, Anushah- Plaintiff’s sibling: collateral damages
Zainulabeddin, Mohammed- Plaintiff’s sibling: collateral damages
Zainulabeddin Yasmin-Plaintiff’s Parent—Debt repayment +
collateral damages
Other Interest:
United States Court of Appeals of Federal Circuit
Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, Atlanta, GA
Office.
Calloway-Spenser, Ebony- OCR Compliance Team Leader
Chen, Martin- OCR Investigator
Manigault, Arthur: OCR Compliance Team Leader
Pessin, Stephanie: OCR Investigator
Pierre, Cynthia: OCR office Director
Sausser, Scott, OCR Compliance Team Leader
Shields, Dorris: OCR Assistant Director
C-4 of 5
Velez, Melanie: OCR office Director
Washington, Brandon: OCR Investigator
________________________________
4409 West Varn Avenue
Tampa, FL 33616
C-5 of 5
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34 (c) and 11th Cir. R. 28-2(c); Appellant
submits that oral argument would be helpful due to voluminous record
developed based on new issue on appeal that is federal question and
substantial public interest. Oral argument will assist this court in resolving
issues on appeal. Appellant respectfully requests this honorable court for
hearing an oral argument.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT............C-1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT......................................i
JURISDICTION..............................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES............................................................................3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......................................................................4
I. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.....................5
II. Statement of Facts.......................................................................8
III. Standards of Review.................................................................41
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................................................................43
ARGUMENT................................................................................................44
I. De Novo
A. Title II not Title I.......................................................................44
B. Congress abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity by enacting
section 5 of fourteenth amendment to claims
under Title II.... .......................................................................46
C. 28 U.S.C 1658: The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of
Limitations...............................................................................50
D. ADA Amendments Act of 2008...............................................57
ii
II. Abuse of Discretion Standard Review...........................................67
III. Standard Review...........................................................................68
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................69
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE............................................................71
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.....................................................................72
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs, Inc.,

483 U.S. 143, 169 (1987) ...................................................................53
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,

422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) ...................................................................52
Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. V. Brown.,

466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) ...................................................................51
Ballard v. Rubin,
284 F. 3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2002) ....................................................63
Board of Regents v. Tomanio,

446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) ..................................................................51
Buck v. Bell.,
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ...................................................................48
City of Boerne v. Flores,

521 U.S. 507 (1997) ..........................................................................47
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,

496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) ...................................................................67
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.,

446 U.S. 1, 3 (1980) .................................................................67
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters.,

462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983) .................................................................53
iv
Grassroth v. Moore.,
355 F. 3d at 1288................................................................................68
Guckenberger v. Boston Univ.,

8 F. Supp. 2d 82, (D. Mass. 1998.......................................................60
Haneke v. Mid– Atl. Capital Mgmt.,

131 Fed.Appx. 399, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) .............................................63
Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972)............................................................................48
Jonson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,

421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975) .............................................................56
Klay v. United Healthgroup., Inc.,

376 F. 3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004) ..............................................42
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,

111 S. Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991)..............................................................56
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) .............................................................53
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,

56 F. 3d 1335, 1341 (11 Cir. 1995) ....................................................41
Miller v. King,
384 F. 3d 1248, 1270-1272 (11 Cir. 2004) .......................................48
Monroe v. Thigpen,
932 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1991) .................................................41
Murphy v. United Parcel Service,

Inc. 527 U.S. 516 (1999) .................................................................60.
v
Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) ................................................................49.
Newman v. Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc.,

390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) ..................................................................52
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,

432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) ..................................................................54
Owens v. Okure. 488 U.S.

235, 235 (1989) .................................................................................55
Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 561 (1988)..................................................................67
Quan v. Computer Science Corp.,

623 F. 3d. 870, 888 (9 Cir. 2010) ......................................................69
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,

337 U.S. 530, 53234 (1949) ...............................................................51
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.,

996 F. 2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) ...............................................42
Reed v. United Transp. Union,

488 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) ...................................................................54
Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) ...................................................................54
Ruth v. Dight,
75 Wash.2d 660, 665-66, 453 P. 2d 631, 635 (1969..........................53
vi
Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991)........................................................................54
Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc.

527 U.S. 471 (1999) ...........................................................................60
Tennessee v. Lane,
124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) .....................................................3, 46, 47, 48
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,

383 U.S. 696, 698 (1966) ...................................................................53
United states v. Amadeo,

487 F. 3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007) ............................................................43
United States v. Dudley,

102 F3d 1183, 1186 (11 Cir. 1997) ....................................................42
United States v. Gray,

260 F. 3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) ................................................42
United States vs. Tinoco,

304F. 3d 1088, 1099, 1114 (11th Cir. 2002) ......................................42
United States v. Virginia,

518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996) .................................................................50
United States v. Whiteside,

285 F. 3d 1345 (11 Cir. 2002) .................................................41
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,

446 U.S. 740 (1980) ..........................................................................51
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) ...................................................................50
vii
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist.,
184 F. 3d 296, 317– 18 (3d Cir. 1999) ...............................................63
Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982). ..........................................................................48
viii
FEDERAL STATUES & RULES
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), as amended

(ADAAA)...................................................................................42, 64, 65, 66
Federal “Fallback” Statute of Limitations 28 U.S.C § 1658........4, 44, 50, 56,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973...........................2, 3, 4, 24, 42

43, 44, 45, 59, 63, 67
Section 102 of the 1991 of the Civil Rights Act...........................................57
Title VII of the CRA of 1964........................................................................57
Eleventh Amendment................................................................................2, 39
Fourteenth Amendment...........................................................................46, 47
28 U.S.C. § 1291............................................................................................1
28 U.S.C. §1331.............................................................................................1
42 U.S.C. §12112.........................................................................................45
42 U.S.C. §12131.........................................................................................46
42 U.S.C. § 12202.....................................................................................3, 46
28 U.S.C §1658.......................................................................................44, 50
REGULATIONS
28 C.F.R Part 35............................................................................................46
34 C.F.R Part 104.........................................................................................67
ix
11th Cir. R. 28-2(c) ........................................................................................i.
RULES
Fed. R. App. 32.1(c) ......................................................................................8
MISSCELLANIOUS
Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate

Standard? 71 Geo. L. J. 829, 845-55(1983).......................................50
H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, at 16 (2008) ...........................................................66
H. Wood, Limitation of Action 8 (2 ed. 1893)...............................................50
Letter of Findings issues to University of S. Miss.

(October 16, 1996) .............................................................................61
Tort Law Tort Claims Act-Accrual of Medical Malpractice Action-United

States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), 4, Western New England L.
Rev. 158 (1981) ..................................................................................52
x
INDEX OF APPENDICES VOL I-XII
VOL. Tab Date Title Page

numbers
A-
I 2 1/22/16 Complaint filed in the Circuit 1-58
Court of the 13th Judicial
Circuit in and for Hillsborough
County, Florida
I 2-1 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit A 59-64
I 2-2 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit B 65-167

I 2-3 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit C 168-169
I 2-4 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit D 170-171
I 2-5 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit E 172-175
I 2-6 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit F 176-178
I 2-7 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit G 179-180
I 1 3/17/16 Defendant Notice of Removal 181-186
I 1-1 3/17/16 Dkt. 1 Exhibit B: Summons 187-190
I 1-2 3/17/16 Dkt. 1 Exhibit C: Notice of 191-193
Appearance
I 1-3 3/17/16 Dkt. 1 Exhibit D: Designation 194-196
of E-mail Addresses
I 1-4 3/17/16 Dkt. 1 Exhibit F: Civil Cover 1971-198
Sheet
I 4 3/24/16 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 199-209
and for more Definite
Statement and Supporting
Memorandum of Law
II 6 3/30/16 Plaintiff’s Response in 210-222
Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss and for
more Definite statement, with
xi
Incorporated Memorandum of
Law
II 6-1 3/30/16 Dkt. 6 Exhibit A 223-228
II 9 4/06/16 Case Management and 229-231
Scheduling Order
II 10 4/13/16 Order: Denial of Dkt. 4 232-240
II 11 4/27/16 Defendant’s Answer, Defenses, 241-272
and Affirmative Defenses
II 12 09/08/16 Unopposed Motion to 273-275
Withdraw and for Substitution
of Counsel
II 14 11/09/16 Order Referring Case to 276-280
Mediation and Directing
Selection of a Mediator
II 15 11/29/16 Joint Motion for Enlargement 281-284
of the Discovery and
Dispositive Motion Deadlines
II 17 12/09/16 Notice of Mediator Selection 285-286
and Scheduling of Mediation
II 18 12/13/16 Order Appointing Mediator and 287-288
Scheduling Mediation
II 19 02/01/17 Plaintiff Partially Opposed 289-294
Motion to take Deposition of
Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Mercent
Subsequent to close of
discovery with incorporated
statement of good cause
wherefore
II 19-1 02/01/17 Dkt. 19 Exhibit A: Plaintiff’s 295-297
Notice of Taking Deposition of
Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Marcet
II 20 02/02/17 Granted Order of Dkt. 19 298-299
II 21 02/03/17 Joint Motion to Extend 300-302
Mediation Deadline
xii
II 22 02/04/17 Defendant’s Motion for 303-326
Summary of Judgement
II 23 02/04/17 Defendant’s Notice of Filing 327-328
Deposition Transcripts In
Support of Its Motion for
II & III 23-1 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit A, Volume I: 329-448
Plaintiff’s Deposition
Transcript and Exhibits
III 23-2 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit A, Volume II: 449-563
Plaintiff’s Deposition
Transcript and Exhibits
III & IV 23-3 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit B Deposition 564-650
Transcript of Dr. Deborah Roth
and Exhibits
IV 23-4 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit C: Deposition 651-737
Transcript of Dr. Ambuj Kumar
and Exhibits
IV 23-5 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit D: Deposition 738-810
Transcript of Dr. Saundra Stock
and Exhibits
IV &V 23-6 02/04/16 Dkt. 23 Exhibit D: Additional 811-871
documents
V 25 02/09/16 Notice of Withdrawal of 872-873
Plaintiff’s Motion to Take
Deposition of Dr. Joanne
Valeriano-Mercet
V 26 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Statement of 874-885
Disputed Material Facts
V 26-1 02/19/17 Dkt. 26 Exhibit A 886-893
V 26-2 02/19/17 Dkt. 26 Exhibit B 894-898
V 26-3 02/19/17 Dkt. 26 Exhibit C 899-907
V 27 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Response in 908-927
xiii
Motion for Summary
Judgement
V 28 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing 928-929
Affidavit in Support of
Plaintiff’s Response in
Motion for Summary
Judgement
V 28-1 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Affidavit of Plaintiff 930-956
V 28-2 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Exhibit A, B, C, D, 957-972
V 28-3 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Exhibit E 973-980
V 28-4 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Exhibit F, G, H, 981-995
V 28-5 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Exhibit I, J, K, L 996-1018
V 29 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing 1019-1020
Deposition of Steven Specter in
support of Plaintiff’s Response
in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary
Judgement
V & VI 29-1 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Deposition of Steven 1021-1203
Specter, Ph.D
VI 29-2 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Plaintiff’s Amended 1204-1209
Notice of Taking Deposition of
Dr. Steven Specter
VI 29-3 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 2 1210
VI 29-4 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 3 1212
VI 29-5 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 4 1214
VI 29-6 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 5 1215
VI 29-7 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 6 1216
VI 29-8 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 7 1221
VI 29-9 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 8 1222
VI 29-10 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 9 1223
VI 29-11 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 10 1225
xiv
VI & 29-12 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 11 1242
VII
VII 29-13 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 12 1243
VII 29-14 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 13 1244
VII 29-15 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 14 1251
VII 29-16 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 15 1260
VII 29-17 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 16 1269
VII 29-18 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 17 1270
VII 29-19 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 18 1276
VII 29-20 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 19 1284
VII 29-21 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 20 1285
VII 29-22 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 21 1287
VII 30 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing 1288
Complete Deposition
Transcript of Dr. Ambuj Kumar
in Support of Plaintiff’s
Response in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for
VII 30-1 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Deposition 1290-1362
VII 30-2 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 1 1363
VII 30-3 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 2 1364-1365
VII 30-4 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 3 1366-1371
VII 30-5 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 4 1372-1377
VII 30-6 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 5 1378-1396
VII 30-7 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 6 1397
VII 30-8 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 7 1399
VII 30-9 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 8 1401
VII 30-10 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 9 1402
VII 30-11 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 10 1403
VII 30-12 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 11 1405
VII 30-13 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 12 1406
VII 30-14 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 13 1407
xv
VII 30-15 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 14 1408
VII 30-16 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 15 1409
VII 30-17 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 16 1410
VII 31 02/27/17 Joint Motion to Extend 1418
Mediation Deadline
VII 33 03/01/17 Defendant’s Motion for Leave 1421
to reply to Plaintiff’s Response
to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgement
VII 35 03/07/17 Unopposed Motion to 1424
Withdraw and for Substitution
of Counsel
VII 36 03/08/17 Order Granting Dkt. 35 1427
VII 37 03/15/17 Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s 1428
VIII 38 03/18/17 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 1437
File Surreply to Defendant’s
Reply Memorandum to
Plaintiff’s Response in
Motion for Summary
Judgement
VIII 40 03/22/17 Mediation Report 1440
VIII 41 03/24/17 Plaintiff’s Surreply to 1442
Defendant’s Reply
Memorandum to Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgement
VIII 41-1 03/24/17 Dkt. 41 Exhibit A 1447
VIII 41-2 03/24/17 Dkt. 41 Exhibit B 1451
xvi
VIII 42 04/19/17 Order Granting Summary of 1455-1484
Judgement in Favor of
Defendant
VIII 43 04/20/17 Judgement in Civil Case signed 1485-1486
by Deputy Clerk
VIII 44 04/26/17 Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to 1487-1488
USCA 11th circuit for Dkt. 42
VIII 46 04/27/17 Transfer of Appeal to USCA 1489-1552
11th Circuit (Dkt. 44).
VIII 47 04/27/17 Application for Leave to 1553-1555
Withdraw as Counsel
VIII 48 05/01/17 Motion for Reconsideration 1556-1581
VIII 48-1 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 14 1582-1641
IX 48-2 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 15 to 32 1642-1720
IX 48-3 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 33 to 43 1721-1806
IX & X 48-4 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 44 to 47 1807-1841
X 48-5 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 48 to 57 1842-1935
X 49 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Affidavit 1936-1948
X 50 05/01/17 Motion For Recusal 1949
X 50-1 05/01/17 Dkt. 50 Exhibit A to Exhibit I 1973-2042
X 51 05/01/17 Pro Se Motion of Continuance 2043-2046
XI 54 05/03/17 Order Denying Motion for 2047-2049
Reconsideration (Dkt. 48)
XI 55 05/03/17 Defendant’s Motion to Tax 2050-2055
Costs with Verified Bill of
Costs
XI 55-1 05/03/17 Dkt. 55 Exhibit A 2056-2081
XI 56 05/03/17 Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay 2082-2097
District Court Administrative
Proceedings of
(1) Pro Se Motion of
Continuance
(2) Motion for
Reconsideration
xvii
(3) Motion of Recusal,
Pending Appeal
XI 56-1 05/03/17 Plaintiff’s Responses and 2098
Objections to Defendant’s First
Set of Interrogatories to
Plaintiff. + Exhibits
XI 59 05/08/17 Directions to Clerk for Notice 2164
of Appeal dated April 26, 2017
XI 59-1 05/08/17 Dkt. 59 Exhibit A 2166
XI 60 05/10/17 Notice of Appeal for Dkt. 57; 2178
dated May 10, 2017
XI 61 05/10/17 IFP of USCA FC 2180
XI 64 05/17/17 Plaintiff Opposition to 2185
Defendant’s Bill of Costs
XI 64-1 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit A to E 2199

XI & 64-2 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit F 2214
XII
XII 64-3 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit G 2300
XII 64-4 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit H 2345
XII 64-5 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit 2400
XII 64-6 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit 2304
XII 66 05/19/17 Order granting Dkt. 64 in favor 2405
of Defendant
XII 67 05/22/17 Bill of Costs 2412
XII 69 05/22/17 Direction to Clerk for Notice of 2413
Appeal dated May 10, 2017
XII 70 05/22/17 Notice of Appeal to USCA FC 2429
and Petition of Review
XII 71 05/22/17 Notice of Appeal for Dkt. 66 2431
dated May 22, 2017
XII 74 05/23/17 Directions to the Clerk; 2433
Transfer Error
xviii
JURISDICTION
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges violations of Title II of the American
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq. The district court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. On April 19, 2017; the district court
granted a final order of summary of judgement in favor of defendant based
on her claims that were barred by state’s sovereign immunity. This court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 for final order and 28 U.S.C. 1331 for
federal question jurisdiction.
Appellant’s appeal is a consolidation of three notices of appeal which
were timely filed at the district court. Appellant’s notice of appeal on order
granting defendant’s summary of judgement was filed on April 26, 2017,
Case No. 17-11888 (A-1487)1. The second notice of appeal was filed on
order denying motion for reconsideration on May 10, 2017 which was

1
Designation for “A”. “A” refers to the page number for Appellant’s
Appendix.
- 1 -
submitted on May 1, 2017 under 60(b); Case no. 17-12134 (A-2178). The
third notice of appeal was filed on order denying opposition of billing tax
costs on May 22, 2017; Case no. 17-12376 (A-2431).
The notice of appeal for motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 54) was also
submitted to USCA Federal Circuit. USCA FC Per Curiam final order and
mandate of her Petition for Panel Rehearing dated July 20, 2017, stated in
the footnote,
“because the court lacks jurisdiction over her appeal, Ms.

Zainulabeddin’s pending motions as to the merits of her case
are denied as moot”.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The pertinent part of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Congress has expressly conditioned receipt of federal funds on
waiver of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity to private suits to
enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 28 U.S.C 295 at the
Federal Court. Title II may be enforced through private suites against public
entities. 42 U.S.C. 12133. Congress expressly abrogated the States Eleventh
Amendment immunity to private suites in federal court 42 U.S.C. 12202.
- 2 -
Congress may abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity pursuant to valid
exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. See
Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). Fourteenth Amendment
legislation is applied to cases implicating institutionalization under the Title
II of the ADA. Hence, Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity to claims under the ADA.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the district judge incorrectly the federal law of Title I to her
claims that is not an employment discrimination but a Title II claims
against a public university in which U.S Department of Education,
Federal agency, Office of Civil Rights enforces federal rules and
regulation and prohibits discrimination that violate Section 504, Title
II in postsecondary institution that are federal financial recipient?
2. Whether Congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment for violation of due process
and equal protection clause to Title II claims for this case?
- 3 -
3. Whether the claims in this suit were a violation of the ADA
Amendment Act of 2008 (ADAAA) based on discrimination of
disability due to perceived “mitigating measures”?
4. Whether the civil claims violating federal rights are within the four
years after the claim accrues under the 1990 Federal “Fallback”
Statute of Limitations for claims that were violation of ADAAA?
5. Whether there was obstruction of justice of granting summary of
judgement in favor of defendant based on “self-serving depositions”,
distorted material of fact2?
6. Whether it was abuse of discretion for judge’s denial to recuse
himself3?
STATEMENT OF CASE
This suit is brought forth for claims under Title II and Section 504.
Appellant seeks de novo review of her case based on federal preemption of
Amendment Act of 2008 of the American Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADAAA) and Section 313 for four-year statute of limitation from the date

2
A-1953-1970
3
A-1949-1970
- 4 -
of accrual of the claims. Appellant sets forth reasons that the defendant’s
eleventh immunity is waived; abrogated by the congress under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment.
I. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Appellant’s former counsel filed the law suit on January 22, 2016 (A-1-
58). The case was transferred from the state court to the federal court on
March 17, 2016 by the defendant (A-181 to 186) The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss on March 24, 2016 (A-199) Appellant’s former counsel
filed an opposition to motion to dismiss on March 30, 2016 (A-210). The
district judge denied defendant’s motion to dismiss on April 30, 2016 (A-
232). Defendant filed answer on April 27, 2016 (A-241).
Two defendant counsels have withdrawn. During discovery period;
defendant counsel, John Sikes Gibbs filed to withdraw on September 8, 2016
(A-273). On November 29, 2016; joint motion was submitted for
enlargement of discovery and dispositive motion (A-281). Summary of
judgement was submitted by Defendant counsel, Mr. Ray Poole on February
2, 2017 (A-303) And shortly after Appellant’s former counsel submitted
opposition for summary of judgement on February 19, 2017 (A-908); Mr.
- 5 -
Ray Poole submitted withdraw and substitution of counsel on March 7, 2017
(A-1424). New substituted counsel, Ms. Lori Mans submitted reply to
motion for opposition of summary of judgement within seven days on March
15, 2017 (A-1928). Mediation date of March 22, 2017 was set and
Defendant’s counsel chose the mediator; the mediation was unsuccessful (A-
1440). Appellant’s former counsel submitted a surreply on March 24,
2017(A-1442). District Judge granted summary of judgement in favor of
defendant on April 19, 2017 (A-1445).
Appellant former counsel at the request of Appellant submitted his
withdrawal of his representation to the district court. Appellant submitted
notice of Appeal on April 26, 2017 for Final order of summary of judgement
to USCA 11th circuit. She submitted Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion for Recusal within 10 days of district Court final order of summary
of judgement on May 1, 2017 (A-1556). Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on May 5, 2017 (A-2047) Appellant submitted Notice of Appeal for
order of motion for reconsideration [addressed to federal circuit] on May
10, 2017 (USCA 17-12134). The defendant submitted motion for bill of tax
costs on May 3, 2017 (A-2050). Appellant submitted opposition for that
- 6 -
motion on May 17, 2017 (A-2185). District Judge granted all orders
thereafter in favor of defendant. Appellant submitted notice of appeal for
order for motion for bill of tax costs on May 22, 2017; Case no. 17-12376
(A-2431).
USCA 11 Circuit
Appellant submitted Motion to Transfer Appeal 17-12134 on June 2,
2017. On June 23, 2017; Appellant filed Motion for Emergency Transfer of
Appeal; which was denied by this court on July 24, 2017. Appellant also
filed on June 23, 2017, Motion to E-file and Motion to Supplement Record
on Appeal which is pending at this court. Defendant filed opposition to
Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal on July 5, 2017. Appellant
submitted response to the opposition on July 12, 2017.
On July 10, 2017; the court submitted order to consolidate related
appeals of 17-11888, 17-12134 and 17-12376 and set the briefing date on
August 21, 2017. Appellant submitted a motion for extension of seven days
to file a brief on August 11, 2017 and was granted; filing date for brief was
August 28, 2017 and Appendix is September 5, 2017.
- 7 -
The Brief’s Addendum(s) pursuant to FRAP 32.1(c) [i.e. Special
Appendices] also contain FIOA Response documents for Request 17-02164-
F for U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, Case no. 04-14-
2321 and 04-14-2487. She received “partial” of the requested documents
electronically on August 30, 2017. On July 19, 2017; relevant documents
that were requested to be part of the FOIA response were accepted by OCR
Investigator for her FOIA Request. However, due to potential conflict of
interest reasons. Appellant was suddenly denied those specific documents on
August 30, 2017; when Appellant had already turned in her brief.
Due new legal issues raised in this appeal; Appellant is submitting
Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal with this brief. Supplemental
documents are an Addendum to this brief located in the Special Appendices
(Volume I to III) which includes documents under the FOIA waiver
documents.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was initially brought to the United States near the age of
three. She was placed in ESOL program from second grade to fifth grade SA
433 to 434). She struggled in the International Baccalaureates Program in
- 8 -
high school, particularly in Math and Spanish (Dkt. 63-8, p.7-13). In college,
she was primarily a “B” student (Dkt. 63-8, 15-25).
ADHD
Appellant did not know she may have ADHD until 2008 (Dkt.63-7, p.
20-55). Appellant scores improved as institutions and testing centers became
digitalized (A-1788 to 1792). For example, Appellant’s MCAT score went
up after the MCAT administration was changed from paper-based to
computer format. Appellant took the MCAT in 2006 which was paper-based
format. She earned 7 in physical science, 7 in biological science, 5 in verbal
reasoning and about 29.5% in the writing section. The following year, in
2007; MCAT changed to computer-based format; her Physical Science score
went up to 10 (repeated courses), biological score, 7. And without ability to
circle and annotate; her verbal dropped to 4. Due to a mitigating factor to
type; writing section went up to 80.8% (Dkt. 63-8, p. 83-86).
In the Fall of 2007; she was accepted to Univ. South Florida Medical
Science Master’s program (Dkt. 63-8, p. 26). The Anatomy Master’s
Program; one of the requirement was to have a MCAT score of 24; other
programs required a minimum MCAT score of 20. Appellant had an MCAT
- 9 -
score of 21 from her recent testing administration in August 2007. Appellant
had taken two graduate level courses from one of the graduate programs
already and earned “B”. Hence, informally “appealed” the decision and was
admitted. Appellant benefited from lectures archived online; exams that
were written format. This was an opportunity allowed to all students (A-
1788 to 1792). Appellant had a overall graduate GPA of 3.73 by the end of
Spring 2008 semester (Dkt. 63-8, p. 27). She had two courses yet to take in
the summer 2008 and a thesis paper and presentation.
Appellant sought advice from Anatomy Master’s Program co-director,
Dr. Samuel Saporta regarding advice of making her potential medical
application. He gave advice as he did to students in the program. Due to her
low MCAT score; he advised her focus on the MCAT.
Prior to 2008, a student had the chance to take MCAT only three.
Appellant studied for the last time on the MCAT. She studied for verbal
reasoning section from May to June 30, 2008; with minimal improvement
(Dkt. 63-7, p. 23-24). Hence, Appellant sought assistance from USF
counseling center and was informally diagnosed with ADHD based on the
- 10 -
protocol in July 1, 2008; i.e. WAIS testing, psychologist and psychiatrist
consultation for clinical evaluation (Dkt. 63-8, pp. 22-24).
Appellant took the MCAT in September 2008 with medications and
passed the MCAT with a score of 26R (Dkt. 63-8, p. 83-86). She doubled
her verbal reasoning score, from 4 to a passing score of 8. Hence, she
applied to medical school for the first time from 2008-2009 and also
continued to take master level courses.
Prior to March 2010
The last course; Gross Anatomy started on May 11, 2009 (Dkt. 63-8,
p. 31). Appellant was not on medications for the first test. This is because
she was stated that her diagnosis was “informal” and the results via WAIS
testing indicated it was borderline (A 1788 to A1792). She was accepted to
medical school at USF on May 13, 2009.
Appellant did not do well on her first test near end of May 2009; and
hence, got back on medications on June 2, 2009 (Dkt. 63-7, p. 26). The gross
anatomy course did not post lectures on vide archive as other master level
courses did in the program. Additionally, the exams were multiple choice
and were strictly timed. Appellant failed the course and was unable to get
- 11 -
the Master’s Degree because a minimum grade of “C” was required in
mandatory courses (Dkt. 63-8, p. 31-32)4. Anatomy Program Masters
Director stated to her that the program was undergoing restructuration and
revisions; hence, she did not have to worry. Appellant met with USF
MCOM admissions counselor in July 2009; to confirm her medical school
acceptance was not contingent on the degree.
In first year of medical school in 2009; Appellant took medications
for ADHD (Dkt. 63-7, pp. 26-32). She passed the medical school’s first
semester and final exam, i.e. Molecular Medicine and earned “PC” [i.e. “B”]
(Dkt. 63-8, p. 33-35)5. When Gross Anatomy started in November 2009; she
met with USF MCOM Associate Dean of Student Affairs, Dr. Specter and
stated to him she failed Master’s level Gross Anatomy and wanted to be
assigned a tutor for the course. Appellant was passing near or above average
in all of her courses prior to Cardiology Exam on March 1, 2010 (Dkt. 63-
11, p. 12).

4
Inconsistent and Inaccurate District Judge’s factual findings (A-1456 and A-1951).
5
“ “ (A-1457) See correction in A-1952 and Dkt. 63-8, p. 34.
- 12 -
Exam average Prior to March 2, 2010
Subject Exam Score
Physiology 73%
Anatomy: 81.2%
Neurology: 75.8%
Physical Diagnosis: 72.%
Behavioral Medicine 79%
March 2010
In March 2010; Appellant failed her Cardiology Exam and went to Dr.
Specter for advice. She also revealed to him that she has “informal ADHD”.
Dr. Specter advised her that she may benefit from anti-anxiety medication
and gave her a referral to USF MCOM-affiliated counseling center, i.e.
Health Enhancement for Life-Long Professional Students (HELPS). See A-
1043; A-123; A1985-1986.
The following day, March 2, 2010; Appellant met with psychiatrist at
the USF Counseling Center and in the meeting she discussed her recent
- 13 -
exam score, possible need for anti-anxiety medications (A-1984). The
physician suggested to her of the benefits of accommodations. She gave her
a referral to Florida Department of Education, Rehabilitation Services for a
neuropsychological exam. She stated the likely chance of getting an
appointment was low and the exam itself is expensive. Appellant called the
number and left two voicemails (A-1725).
Appellant met with Dr. Specter and stated to him that her psychiatrist
at USF Counseling Center stated she would benefit from accommodations
on exams. Dr. Specter stated that USF MCOM policy requires a need of
neuropsychological evaluation for accommodations. He stated medical
school protocol is stricter than USF Counseling Center for the basis of
determining “ADHD diagnosis” (A-122 and A-1851).
Appellant called USF MCOM-counseling center, i.e. HELPS based on
the suggestion of Dr. Specter on March 21, 2010. (A-1043; A-1038, A-
1953)6. The counseling report indicates that among other things; that there
was a discussion about ADHD and a recommendation to take a leave of

6
Inconsistent with District Judge finding fact, A-1458
- 14 -
absence to obtain a neuropsychological evaluation (A-1986). Appellant
discussed with Dr. Specter the contents of consultation with HELPS Center.
Dr. Woods also stated that he would contact Dr. Specter as that is what she
had determined the basis for referral, A-1985-1987).
Dr. Specter advised her not to take leave of absence and to complete
the year (A-1050-1051). He did not participate in an interactive process (A-
100; A-109; A-1050; A-1043; A-1851; A-1853). He stated to her that if she
failed the academic year; she would be required to obtain a
neuropsychological evaluation (A-1045-1046; A-1050-1051). She was
passing above average level prior to March 2, 2010; however, after that she
was marginally passing the year (Dkt. 63-11, p. 12).
The comprehensive final exam underwent restructuration (Dkt. 63-11,
p.17). This was a new change to the medical school curriculum7. Appellant

7
In previous years, there was a separate 2-hour exam for each subject.
Similar to the final exam she had taken for molecular medicine course that
she had passed with PC in the beginning of the year. However, the testing
for the system-based approach of the curriculum from November to May;
the examinations in the past lasted about two weeks. And the students were
given about two weeks off to prepare for the final exams. The sudden new
“change to the curriculum” did not give two weeks off to prepare for the
- 15 -
did not finish the comprehensive final exam and ended up failing the subject
subsections, except gross anatomy (Dkt. 63-11, p. 17). Hence, failed the
academic the year (A-1210)
Neuropsychological Evaluation
As per USF Academic Performance Review Committee (APRC) letter
dated June 7, 2010; was required to obtain a neuropsychological evaluation
paid the medical school (A-1047 to 1048; A-1210). Appellant was provided
with a referral to meet with Dr. Schoenberg and also stated she had to meet
with HELPS counseling center as a standard protocol for students who had
failed the year (A-1043). The counselor suggested to her to discontinue
taking ADHD medications until she receives a confirmatory diagnosis from
a neuropsychological exam (A-1977). Hence, she did not ADHD
medications after May 20108.

“new comprehensive final exam” which was 6 hours long besides over the
course of 1-2 weeks.
8
It is unusual that Helps Counseling Center report do not include
those suggestions to get off medications that Dr. Russel stated to her in
Summer 2010, including a counseling session report missing that took place
in March and April 2012. [However, medical records and physician letter
and psychologist report from USF Counseling Center indicate that Appellant
was not on ADHD medications from May 2010 to February 2012].
- 16 -
Appellant was rescheduled twice with an appointment with
Neuropsychologist, Dr. Schoenberg to take the neuropsychological exam.
She met with him on August 05, 2010. In her initial appointment with the
neuropsychological evaluator, Dr. Schoenberg she stated that she has
discontinued her medications and it would be of benefit if she any
information can be provided to her that would require her to request
accommodations since classes had started (See Patient History section, i.e.
term “took medications in A-688 and Dkt. 63-7, p. 20-55). She had been
stated by Dr. Specter that the request and response from disability services
takes time. She stated to him she has discontinued medications as suggested
by USF MCOM-affiliated HELPS Counselor, Dr. Russel. Dr. Schoenberg
gave informal results and stated she did not have any indication of attention
deficits in that meeting; he stated “she should just drink coffee”. As per
requirement; she met with Dr. Schoenberg again in August 12, and
September 2, 2010 as requested (A-1244). In those meetings; he did not
indicate that Appellant had ADHD or needed accommodations. He stated
- 17 -
she had anxiety, however, Appellant perceived that “all students have
anxiety at some point”. He did not state that his initial conclusions indicate
any “diagnostic impressions of ADHD” and that there was a need to get
back on medical treatment for ADHD (A-691; A-1977). He stated that the
report was not complete. He recommended to follow up with Dr. Specter to
obtain the results of the report (A-1249 indicating Dr. Specter was “cc:”; A-
1038-1039; A-1046; A-1065-1067; A-1105-11107; A-1112).
“No ADHD”
Appellant met with Dr. Specter after one month; in October 2010; and
asked him if the report indicated a need to get back on medications and a
need to be on accommodations. He stated quote, “nothing came out it” and
encouraged her to continue doing well (Dr. Specter uses the term
“equivocal” in his Deposition: A-1038-1039; A-1046; A-1065-1067; A-
1105-11107; A-1112). The repeat year of 2010-2011; was a fundamental
change to the curriculum (Dkt. 63-8, p. ). There was no comprehensive final
exam. Appellant did fail cardiology exam again, however, she was able to
compensate by a new “addition” into that block; i.e. final presentation that
enabled her to marginally pass (Dkt. 63-8, p. 41-44). She passed Year 1. Her
- 18 -
scores from Year I 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 were not significantly
different. However, due to the fact there was no comprehensive exam in
2010-2011; it enabled her to pass.
No ADHD again
Appellant started second year of medical school in 2011-2012. She
failed block 1 of second year (A-1212). She was again referred to HELPS
Counseling Center (A-1998). The counselor recommended her to obtain a
copy of the neuropsychological evaluation from Dr. Specter (A-1998).
Appellant stated that Dr. Specter had stated to her in October 2010 that the
report did not indicate she had any deficits that require medical attention,
treatment or accommodations (circumstantial evidence: A-1271, A-1221 and
A-1223). He stated that she should obtain it anyway and bring it to the
center. He also made her go through IQ type of testing which she was not
prepared for due to time constraints (A-1998). She completed WAIS portion
of the testing. She did not feel comfortable that she was unexpectedly placed
in “testing room” without prior notice and also attributed to time constraints.
Appellant met with Dr. Specter as instructed in October 2011; prior to start
of second block of medical school. Dr. Specter confirmed to her that she did
- 19 -
not have any indications of ADHD and need of accommodations. She asked
another question in that meeting; i.e. does APRC have knowledge of the
contents of the neuropsychological report when stating recommendations in
the APRC letter (A-1271, A-1221 and A-1223). With that information from
Dr. Specter; she believed she did not have any right to obtain medical
treatment or accommodations since she did not have an ADHD diagnosis
(A-1977 and Dkt. 63-8, p. 33-36). Appellant failed block 2 and was
dismissed from medical school in Jan 2012 (A-1214).
Discovered Error on Feb 8, 2012
She appealed the decision to APRC; which was unsuccessful (A-
1214). Dr. Specter stated the decision of the APRC in a meeting; in that
meeting he stated that overturning Dean’s Appeal is very unlikely unless it is
a “medical condition”. He also recommended to her to seek new USF
MCOM-counseling services, Office of Student and Resident Professional
Development, Dr. Olga Skalkos (A-1698 to 1707). She met Dr. Skalkos as
she was instructed and she recommended to her to get the
neuropsychological evaluation from August 5, 2010 (A-1221). Dr. Specter
provided her copy which she saw for the first time (A-1216 to A-1222). The
- 20 -
report indicated that there was presence of “ADHD diagnostic impressions”
and she qualified for accommodations (A-1217). Appellant was very upset
and she disclosed her frustration to Dr. Specter in a meeting on Feb 8, 2012
(A-1222). He asked for an explanation for giving her false information for
nearly two years (A-1222). Dr. Specter apologized and gave an inconsistent
answer: he stated to her that he misplaced her report and then he stated that
he confused it with someone else (Dkt. 63-7, p. 33-36; similarly, he gave
inconsistent explanation in his deposition: A-1045, A-1075-1078). He stated
that he will convey this information to APRC; and that it was unnecessary to
go through another stressful Dean’s Appeal due to his error to the APRC.
The Dean’s Appeal was cancelled. Dr. Specter met with the APRC on Feb
16, 2012; and he stated that she was reinstated A-888-889; A-1223). The
recommendations from that letter stated that she was placed on academic
probation standing. She was required to spend $3000 on Kaplan USMLE
Step 1 course prior to restarting the second year (A-1692).
ADHD + Accommodations
After the knowledge of her ADHD diagnosis and the need for
accommodations; she got back on medications (A-1977; Dkt. 63-7, pp. 36-
- 21 -
56). She participated in the interactive process, i.e. met with Dr. Schoenberg
for extra time on exams as her physician recommended and Dr. Specter
conferred allowing her to go back to the evaluator (A-1244; A-1922).
Appellant changed her eating habits from vegetarian to eating meat; since
meat contains tyrosine which is precursor molecule for neurotransmitters
deficient in individuals with ADHD. She moved to a single-room apartment
for distraction free environment. She changed her study habits and
discontinued going to class and watched recorded lectures online.
Dr. Specter’s Deposition
Dr. Specter’s deposition is inconsistent with substantial evidence on
record of medical records, counseling reports, letters from professors,
physician, e-mails and APRC letters (A-1977, A-1984, A-1986, A-1990, A-
1215-1223, A-888) Dr. Specter states that no discussion took place in which
Appellant revealed her ADHD diagnosis and need of accommodations from
March 2010 to May 2010 (A-1045-1046; A-1050-1051). However, he
admits a discussion took place of a need to take a leave of absence (A-1043;
A-1986). The reason for the leave of absence is not a factual finding
determined by the district court. Dr. Specter states that he discussed the
- 22 -
contents of the report in October 2010; which is inconsistent with her
medical records (Dkt. 63-7, p. 20-55). Appellant was not on medications for
ADHD from May 2010 to Feb 2012. District Judge also did not mention a
critical fact that another discussion took place of a possible need for
accommodations and ADHD medications in second year of medical school;
in October 2011 after she failed block 1. This is also on record that she was
suggested by HELPS center. Appellant did as instruct and had that
discussion (A-1998).
Federal Student Loans
Fed loan servicing policy and also stated in their False Certification
Discharge form; question 8 of the form asks
7. Indicate your disqualifying status by checking the appropriate

box”. The list of option include age, physical condition, mental
condition, criminal record and other.
10. “Before certifying or originating the loan, did the school ask you
if the disqualifying status in item 8 exists? (Yes or No).
11. Did you ..inform the school of the disqualifying status before the
loan was certified or originated?
Appellants loans were certified from 2010-2012. Dr. Specter admits in the
deposition that he had knowledge of the report; yet determined it was
- 23 -
“equivocal” (A-1038-1039; A-1046; A-1065-1067; A-1105-11107; A-1112).
He also “determined” after denying her request stated by USF Counseling
Center’s psychiatric and HELPS counseling (violating USF MCOM
Handbook A-109) stating USF MCOM has alternative higher standards. He
misguided her from March to May, 2010 which led her to fail the academic
year I in 2009-2010. He also “determined” from October 2010 to Feb 2012;
that report from Dr. Schoenberg’s indicated that accommodations was
unnecessary; including statements stating she qualifies for services under
Section 504 and ADA. Appellant was disparately treated his “negligence”
(A-1038-1039; A-1046; A-1065-1067; A-1105-11107; A-1112). She was
placed on “Academic Probation” in 2012-2013 since it is a “standard for
some sort of student deficit” (i.e. disability (A-1223; 1077; 1092-1094;
1098). She was expected to perform at an “higher stellar grade standard”
than “74-benchmark applied to all students”. As if accommodations and
medications are some “magic pill”. When she passed the exams despite him
threatening her to take the exam now or get a “0” (A-1719, A-1287, A-
1723). He then participated with the “assistance” of course directors to
determine her grade (A-737 & A-842). She purposely was not told what her
- 24 -
passing grades were and led her to believe she failed and had no option but
to remediate. Appellant discovered for the first time from the Accidental e-
mails the defendant counsel was withholding (A-2400-2404) that she had
actually passed those courses; but was “deceived”. In fact, Dr. Specter knew
she could not reasonably be ready for the exams since there was a death in
the family exactly that day (See A-1287, E-mail from Dr. Specter denying
extension on exam dated Feb 28, 2013 and Grandmother death certificate A-
1772(a)). He took this “opportunistic situation” to create evidence against
Appellant that he can use against her for destroying her career (SA 1164-
1166). Dr. Specter attacks Appellant’s character and states in his deposition
that she did not tell anyone in school about her ADHD (A-1122 versus A-
1788-1792; A-1986, A-1989). Yet, Appellant medical records states that
USF MCOM-affiliated counseling reports stating she was referred by Dr.
Specter and Neuropsych evaluation stating she has a ADHD diagnosis from
USF Counseling Center (A-1221 and A-1985). In fact, she was diagnosed
and being treated by a psychiatrist at the USF Counseling Center on campus
(A-1984) as one of the recommendations from USF MCOM Handbook (A-
122) and would have provided a letter as she did in Feb 14, 2012 (A-1977)
- 25 -
that abides by USF MCOM Handbook, A-109. However, Dr. Specter stated
that USF MCOM standards were “superior” to USF Counseling Center and
needed a neuropsych evaluation; yet “Dr. Specter’s standards”.
Furthermore, he defends his “deception and fraud” so Appellant could not
exercise her rights without knowledge by stating she never applied for
accommodations at an “alternative” USF disability services (A-1082).
Though, the USF Handbook states to report to USF MCOM Student of
Affairs (A-109). Dr. Specter also discouraged her from exercising her right
to appeal to APRC and Dean’s committee since she will have denied due to
her “perceptual deficits” (A-1452-43; A-1160). Dr. Specter himself had
determined as “U” for EBCR II and Doctoring II (A-1286; A1160; A-1162;
A-737 & A-842). Appellant was not in “danger” of failing second year;
since she was allowed to attend to Year II commencement ceremony on
March 4, 2017 (students who are passing are allowed to attend (A-1795-
1796). However, she was suddenly “dismissed” and then threatened when
she exercised her rights (1452-1454).
- 26 -
Benchmark: 74 %
The curriculum continued to undergo significant restructuration from
2012-2013. The faculty set a passing 74% bench mark for all courses (A-
1711-1712). However, if the standard deviation for the block was below for
the entire class; an adjusted benchmark was determined. Appellant did not
seek any tutoring support until after she was dismissed on March 14, 2013.
She had no tutoring sessions from July 2012 to April 4, 2013 (A-1573).
• Course 5: she earned 78% [above 74%]

• Course 6: she earned 70.2% [class standard deviation was ~70%]9
• Course 7: she earned 75% (above 74%)10 Dkt. 63-11, p. 32).

9
29-year old first cousin who had ADHD diagnosis and was contesting her
status in nursing school in May 2010. Appellant’s cousin could have
benefited from Appellant’s diagnosis and need for disability. Ultimately, she
was unsuccessful in her personal attempt to contest her nursing school
status. And that ultimately led to negative downturn of her life; she
committed suicide in December 7, 2012 [second year of medical school
when Appellant had “asked for extensions” that were legally approved so
she can cope with potential collateral death that was caused by
administrative error from March 2010 to Feb 2012] (A-1722)
10
Maternal grandmother passed away in Feb 27, 2012 (A-1723).
- 27 -
Appellant requested extensions for her exams due to family related matters
(e.g. sudden death in the family). She did not request extensions from 2012-
2013 for her disability (1722-1723).
2nd Death in the Family: Extension not granted
Take the Exam or “0”
Her extensions request due to a new death in the family of her
grandmother was not granted (A-1719, A-1287, A-1723; A-1287, A-
1772(a)). She had to take the exam on the spot for Course 7 Test 3 and all
make up exams. She did not attend her grandmother’s funeral ceremony in
her prayer community center. Appellant asked Dr. Specter why stated, “the
story of deaths in the family is getting old”. Due to that, she marginally
passed EBCR II with 67.5% which was passing based on standard deviation
of the class (A-2004-2042; A-1410; A-1421-1423) [inconsistent with factual
finding by district judge]. She earned 180 on the comprehensive NBME
final exam with accommodations. (175 was the benchmark) (A-1716-1717).
Doctoring Evaluations 2009-2011 versus 2012
From year 2009-2011; Appellant received high clinical evaluations
and clinical tests (A-1638-1641; A-1643). In 2012-2013; she received a
- 28 -
lowest clinical evaluation in her academic history at USF MCOM (A-1639-
1640; A-1669). She failed Doctoring I in 2009; not because of clinical
evaluations, but because she did poorly in multiple choice exams (Dkt. 63-5,
p. 5). Doctoring co-Course Director, Dr. Stock stated in regards to her final
clinical exam an e-mail to the Co-Course Director, Dr. Valeriano, she did
better than what I though, if I was grading; I would have passed her (A-
1783). However, as a co-director she “allowed” the preceptors to fail her
without hesitation since that was a determination she had made before she
even started the course (A-818).
Due to a death in the family and missed absences; the faculty had
formulated a plan to complete the Doctoring Course 6 and 7 requirements by
April 3, 2013 (A-862). The District Judge inaccurately weighs factual
findings which were not even part of the “grade” (A-1949-1972).
Doctoring II in March 13, 2013: Incomplete
The scheduled make up day for OSCE was set for on April 3, 2013.
Doctoring II grade in March 13, 2013 (day of dismissal) was still
incomplete. The Doctoring II course directors and preceptor state in an e-
mail asking Dr. Specter March 2013, “what grade we give her; the data is
- 29 -
not in; she still has the OSCE to complete”. She gets an Incomplete.
However, as per e-mail; Dr. Specter, determined to give the final grade of
“U”; when assignments were yet to be turned in and should have been an
“Incomplete”. Appellant passed OSCE successfully in the scheduled date of
April 4, 2013 and also the remediation (A-1285; A-1452-1454).
No Course Appeal option: Remediation while dismissed
The content of the remediation was from USMLE Step 2 level
textbook. This was third year text book. However, clinical exam questions
for remediation came from the new textbook for remediation. She was
required to seek a tutor after dismissal [she sought no tutoring or assistance
prior to dismissal]. Appellant was confused at the “new requirements”
during remediation since they were not materials provided or taught during
second year. She asked the assigned tutor; he stated to her that it was also
unusual because it was the content tested and taught in third year and not
second year (Dkt. 68-11, p.46).
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EBCR II in March 13, 2013: Incomplete
“Special Assignment”
In Evidence Based Clinical Medicine II (EBCR), Appellant passed
with 67.5%; she took the exam, despite the fact there was a death in the
family. She took a “comprehensive final exam for EBCR I and II”; three
days later after she had time to get caught up with a death in the family; and
earned 90%. At the time she was given a grade of “U” on March 13, 2013 by
Dr. Specter; she had yet to turn in “special assignment” which was a new
restructuration project. As per the EBCR II syllabus; special assignment for
repeating students [not all students] is supposed to be 7.5 hours (A-1681-
1683). That is the amount of hours all other students who were not repeating
spent. However, the standard for group repeating students, is that they are
assigned in group of 4 to complete the special assignment. Hence, each
student spends about 7.5 hours. In 2011-2012; students did not have an
opportunity to work in the group. The “repeating” students due to
restructuration; were required to do it themselves. Due to that, the same
special assignment required a student to spend 30 hours (7.5x 4) (A-1682-
1685). Appellant’s grade in March 2013 was not complete. She had made
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arrangement due to death in the family; to complete the “re-do special
assignment” by middle March. She had completed it by the set time;
however, Dr. Roth who had graded only first page of her special assignment;
stated it “needed to be better”; without further feedback (A-1689). Appellant
made an office appointment; to further understand what is the expectation
since a feedback of grading only one page out of 50 pages was not enough
for her to understand what was required from her for “re-do” (A-1689). In
March 12, 2013; Appellant asked Dr. Kumar regarding her grade after she
took the EBCR II final. He stated he did not have the power to determine her
grade, and he should call her back (A-1682; inconsistent with A-1196). She
e-mailed Dr. Kumar later that day; he said go to Student of Affairs and Dr.
Specter will determine your grade (A-1682; A-2005-2041).
Dr. Specter determined grade for Doctoring and EBCR II
and “alternative benchmark”
Dr. Specter stated that Appellant was dismissed because she
performing at the average level and within the benchmark (A-1099-1101).
However, he further clarified his meaning of “struggling” since other
students who were not repeating with even lower scores moved onto third
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year. He stated that since Appellant was a repeating student; the substantive
practices of the University despite the fact they have a disability is that they
had to perform at an “alternative and higher benchmark level. for Appellant”
(A-1711-1712; A-1100).
Internal Grievance Process
Appellant did what Dr. Specter instructed her to do (A-1447-1450;
1452-1454). He served as an advocate for APRC Appeal and Dean’s Appeal
and also corrected and reviewed her appeals (A-1285-1286; A-1628). He
misrepresented information in both of her appeal dated May 3, 2013; hence,
she made an appointment with Dr. Klasko on May 22, 2013. Dr. Monroe
was also present in that meeting. She was not aware she would be attending
that meeting. Appellant stated contents of the conversation that took place in
May 22, 2013; that were also provided in writing to Dr. Monroe on July 1,
2013 (A-1836; A-1726-1734). Appellant received a response Dr. Monroe in
a letter dated October 25, 2013 (A-1836; A-1895; A-1897). After her final
dismissal; Appellant sought legal assistance from Tampa Bay Probono legal
services. She was denied because there were no legal attorneys who
specialized in education law (A-1739-1746).
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OCR Complaint #1
Appellant filed a complaint to federal agency, U.S. Department of
Education, Office of Civil Rights on March 20, 2014. Her complaint was
denied due to timeliness. OCR investigator, Mr. Brandon Washington
wrongly construed “Dr. Monroe’s letter dated October 25, 2013 as
University’s internal grievance process”. In fact, the last internal grievance
process was May 28, 2013. Hence, OCR investigator, misapplied the
“timeliness standard” and closed the complaint. It was evident that Mr.
Washington had prepared to ask a “misleading question” that would close
the complaint due to potential conflict of interest situation. She appealed the
decision to office director, Mrs. Cynthia Pierre and received the denial letter
on June 18, 2014 for OCR Case no. 04-14-2321; inconsistent with A-1764).
Petition for Readmission 2014
Pursuant to USF MCOM policies; Appellant Petitioned for
Readmission from one year of dismissal (A-1613-1614). The Dean and Vice
Dean had resigned. Prior to starting her Petition for Readmission
proceedings; she met with new Vice Dean, Dr. Bognar and requested to him
in writing and in-person to not allow Dr. Specter to have any involvement in
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any her Petition for Readmission proceedings (A-1597). She also provided
him all contents that will be in her Petition in a USB Drive in March 2014
(A-1594-1604). She also informed USF MCOM Registrar, that she has
spoken with Dr. Bognar; to ensure that Dr. Specter is not involved in her
Petition for Readmission proceedings11(A-1617). Dr. Bognar, was her first
year doctoring preceptor (A-1609). She earned good evaluations from him as
part of her grade. As a physician; she entrusted that he would respect her
decision (A-1611-1626).
Violation of Due Process
Discovery materials from trial showed that Dr. Bognar and Ms. Cook,
forwarded all of her e-mails, Petition’s, and gave details of her
communications to Dr. Specter (A-1615-1626). He was cc: and forwarded
and updated and gave “updates” to new Dean and Interim Dean during her
due process (A-1624). He also played a role in delaying her right to Petition
for Readmission for another two months (A-1619). Dr. Monroe and Dr.
Specter stated to Appellant that could Petition in March 14, 2014 (from the

11
Appellant wanted to ensure she was given a fair due process; hence, took necessary
measures by providing evidence in her possession for her sincere request to not have
Dr. Specter involved in her last administrative remedy available.
- 35 -
original date of dismissal). However, that was changed to May 28, 2014 (A-
1611-1614)
One of the roles of Associate Dean of Student Affairs is to organize
and conduct administrative proceedings. However, due to my request; Vice
Dean, Dr. Bognar took the fiduciary role in arranging her Petition for
Readmission hearing (A-1617).
“Legal Liability Known”
Appellant requested copies of her Doctoring Evaluations from 2009-
2012; after conferring with Dr. Bognar that she will be contacting the
Doctoring II course directors for the purposes to gather supporting
documents for her Petition. As per “accidental” discovery material that the
defendant counsel was withholding as per her former counsel (A-2400-
2404). Dr. Specter A-2283 and Doctoring course director, Dr. Stock stated
in an e-mail dated March 27, 2014:
“that is what I thought, so we give her NOTHING. Higher can

ask us for info to give to her. She is likely suing USF and we do
not need to give her any ammunition” (A-1626).
- 36 -
EBCR II and Doctoring II Appeals
Dr. Bognar stated to Appellant from March to June 2014; that
Appellant’s courses appeals for EBCR II and Doctoring II will be reviewed
(A-1775-1776; A-1905; A-1907). Appellant stated to Dr. Bognar that she
was dismissed suddenly when her grades were yet to be turned in March 13,
2013. And after dismissal and without student status; she did not know that
she had the right to appeal her grades (A-1867). Appellant asked if it was
appropriate to contact the course directors to review her course appeals prior
to turning in her Petition. Appellant was stated by Dr. Bognar that Petition
for Readmission committee will review the course appeals and at their
discretion will forward the course appeals to the appropriate course directors
(A-1775-1777). However, the Dean’s Petition Committee did not forward
the EBCR II and Doctoring II course appeals (though appellant remediated
the course since that was the only option she was provided after her
dismissal to continue her studies). She was stated that APRC and Dean’s
Appeal will consider her appeal and possible reinstatement if she
“remediates” (A-1817-1828).
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OCR Complaint #2 and Investigation
USF MCOM waited three months to receive the Petition for
Readmission decision (A-1817 to 1828). The decision was the last
administrative remedy at the University for injunctive relief. Appellant filed
OCR complaint on August 29, 2014, OCR Case no. 04-14-2487 and on
September 25, 2014 it was determined that it was opened for investigation
(A-1750-1784). She was stated by OCR assigned investigator on September
25, 2014 that the allegation that was chosen to be investigated is broad and
encompasses all of her allegations that were “technically dismissed” due to
timeliness. Since issues in her Petition for Readmission encompasses acts
from 2009-2013 (A-1771 to 1774).
“OCR investigator conducted the investigation from September 24,
2014 to Feb 8, 2015. She received the decision letter dated February 9, 2015.
The contents of the decision letter state factually false information (A-1773).
On April 9, 2015; Appellant appealed the decision and received a response
on December 16, 2015 (A-1786; A-1771-1778).
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Demand Letter and Transfer
Appellant hired a counsel in April 2015. He sent two demand letters
on May 12, 2015 and July 2015 to USF Board of Trustees for injunctive
relief and tuition refund (A-60-64; A-1708-1792). Her counsel stated that
they had denied her demands. Appellant transferred her USF MCOM Year I
and II credits to offshore medical school, Atlantic Univ. School of Medicine
(AUSOM) in August 2015. The majority of the rotation sites were in
Chicago, IL. The school was not qualified for Title IV loans. The offshore
school had affiliation with U.S. Accredited school, Davenport University
that offers online graduate programs to offset living expenses. Appellant had
requested accommodations prior to applying to AUSOM. Appellant was
wrongly placed in full time student status in two programs at the same time;
and provided no accommodations from the medical school (A-1634).
Discovery content
After she was given USMLE Step 1 eligibility; Appellant requested
new Associate Dean of Student Affairs of USF MCOM, Dr. Zwygart USF
MCOM to fix Dr. Specter’s incorrect letter to NBME Disability Services
- 39 -
that Dr. Specter had provided to NBME DS dated March 28, 201312 (A-
1629-1630; contrary to A-1155-1158). However, her request was denied.
The next day; her USF Health mailbox account was abruptly closed on
September 29, 2016 in the midst of discovery period (A-1564; A-1583-1588;
A-2400-2404). Her USF Health mailbox contained relevant discovery
evidence and she requested her counsel if he can take appropriate steps to
get her account back for court purposes. She also requested the counsel to
fix the Dr. Specter mistake; which was denied.
Appellant took precautionary measures and consulted ECFMG
Investigator assigned for AUSOM; regarding the difficult situation due to
Dr. Specter’s misconduct. Ultimately, with appropriate guidance how to
handle the situation; Appellant applied for USMLE Step 1 and NBME
Disability Services granted her request for accommodations on April 3, 2017
(A-1634) She received a letter from ECFMG on April 13, 2017 that her

12
Dr. Specter stated in his deposition that the NBME DS letter was a “moot”. However,
he had submitted that letter to NBME DS and was still under review with my new NBME
DS application. He did not withdraw the “moot letter”. Appellant had to plea NBME DS
to remove Dr. Specter’s letter from her new NBME DS application, because it
misrepresented the actual set of events based on her medical records, physician letters,
education records and data.
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transfer medical school has lost accreditation (A-1830). Few days later, her
lawsuit was dismissed on April 19, 2017 (A-316-318).
Injunctive relief
Appellant e-mailed her school for USMLE Step 1 extension (allowed
once in administration); for the purposes to to work on her appeals at this
court. She stated to her transfer school that she will take the exam in the
eligibility period and ask this honorable court for an extension to file her
briefs for a good cause. The following day; she received a letter that she is
“dis-enrolled”. Her USMLE Step 1 registration was cancelled by the transfer
institution.
STATEMENT OF STANDARD REVIEW
1. The district court’s holding that Plaintiff’s state-law claims are barred
as matter of law is subject de novo review by this court. See
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 56 F. 3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 1995). This
Court reviews the statements at issue under reasonable interpretation
of law is a question of law de novo. See United States v. Whiteside,
285 F. 3d 1345 (11 Cir. 2002). The Court abuses its discretion, when
it misapplies the law. See Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1440
- 41 -
(11th Cir. 1991).; Klay v. United Healthgroup., Inc., 376 F. 3d 1092,
1096 (11th Cir. 2004). This court reviews de novo based on
constitutional provision of the statutory limitation as pure question of
law [Federal preemption of claims that violated of ADAAA which are
protected by four-year statute of limitations after the claim accrues
under Section 313 of Judicial Improvement Act of 1990]. United
States vs. Tinoco, 304F. 3d 1088, 1099, 1114 (11th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Gray, 260 F. 3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001).
2. Challenges to the admission or exclusion of evidence that are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dudley, 102 F3d
1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997).
3. This court reviews factual inaccuracies of defendant’s depositions
based on district court record that prove defendant violated ADA
Amendment Act of 2008. This court accepts an attack on appeal of the
factual findings adopted by the district court on the grounds of plain
error or manifest justice. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders,
Inc., 996 F. 2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993)
- 42 -
4. The court reviews denial of motion for recusal of honorable judge was
an abuse of discretion. United states v. Amadeo, 487 F. 3d 823 (11th
Cir. 2007).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court reviews de novo of district court inaccurate application of
Title I to a Title II and Section 504 suit. Defendant is a public entity which is
receives federal financial assistances. Federal Agency, U.S. Department of
Education Office of Civil Rights; hence has jurisdiction that enforces
policies that prohibits discrimination against students against their disability
under Title II and Section 504. Congress abrogated the eleventh amendment
immunity by enacting section 5 of Fourteenth amendment to claims under
Title II in context of institutionalization. Congress’s prophylactic congruent
and proportionate response is appropriate for public interest.
Federal preemption for federal claims for violation of federal
legislature, ADA Amendment Act of 2008 (ADAAA) (Title II) in
conjuncture with claims brought under Section 504. Appellant exhausted all
administrative remedies until December 2016 (DOE Office of Civil Rights
final agency decision of appeal of their investigation for OCR Case no. 04-
- 43 -
14-2487) of same claims with “core nucleus”. Appellant’s former counsel
filed suit within 60 days of agency decision. The Federal claims arose in
March 2010 after ADAAA was enacted on Jan 9, 2009. Congress has not set
time bar for Title II claims and its provisions. The Federal Claim under
Section 313 of the 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of Limitations 28 U.S.
1658 accrued and the complainant must commence action within four years
to when the injury is discovered. The underlying policy and cause of action
with respect to judicial economy and public interest preempts federal
statutes since her claim(s) are bound by federal policies, i.e. medical student
loan tuition and funding by DOE Federal Student Loan Servicing.
Preemption of State law has and will create substantial burden. Public
interest is enforced exercising the federal right and the underlying intent of
the Congress enacting ADAAA.
ARGUMENT
I. De Novo Review
A. Title II not Title I of ADA
The court reviews de novo, because district court judge incorrectly
applied Title I of the of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
- 44 -
(“ADA”) to her discrimination and retaliation claims; when he should have
applied Title II of the ADA (Dkt. 42, p. 10, para 2). University of South
Florida Morsani College of Medicine is a state agency and a public entity; it
is a recipient of federal financial assistance from U.S. Department of
Education. The university is subject to Title VI, Section 504 and Title II of
ADA. Appellant is not an employee at the University, but was a student and
a recipient of federal financial assistance. Appellant discrimination claims
are brought under Rehabilitation Act governed by the standards brought
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). The
district court incorrectly applied Title I of ADA; when the purpose of Title I
of ADA is to prohibit discrimination in regards to employment for “job
application procedures, hiring, advance or discharge of employees,
employee compensation job training and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment” 42 U.S.C. 12112.
Title I does not apply to federal recipient of financial assistance. Title
II is enforced by federal agency of U.S. Department of Education, Office of
Civil Rights. It also enforces Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(section 504), 29 U.S.C 794, and its implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R Part
- 45 -
104. The Section 504 prohibits discrimination and retaliation on the basis of
disability by recipients of Federal financial assistance. Title II of the ADA,
42 U.S.C 12131 and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R Part 35, prohibits
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of disability by public entities.
Appellant is a federal financial recipient, and her medical school education
has been financed by Federal Student Loan Servicing of U.S. Department of
Education; from 2009 to 2013 at University of South Florida Morsani
College of Medicine.
B. Congress abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity by
enacting section 5 of fourteenth amendment to claims
under Title II.
This courts reviews de novo of district judge’s decision her claims are
barred by state sovereign immunity. Congress unequivocally expressed its
intent to abrogate the state sovereign immunity claims under ADA See 42
U.S.C. 12202; Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1985 (2004). Through
valid exercise of Congress power under section five of the 14th amendment
to enforce the substantive guarantees of that Amendment. The legislation of
- 46 -
Title II in the context of institutions; is valid enforcement of the fourteenth
amendment in this case.
In Lane, the Supreme Court held that defendant violated Title II when
two plaintiffs were denied access to the services of the state court system by
reason of their disabilities. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982. Fourteenth amendment
three-part analysis was applied for the court to reach the conclusion. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The court considered (1) the
constitutional rights or rights that the Congress sought to enforce when it
enacted Title II for prohibiting irrational discrimination under Equal
Protection Clause and Due process clause under Fourteenth Amendment,
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988 (2) prophylactic remedy is available pursuant to
congress enactment of Section 5 of Fourteenth amendment when there is
lack of access to services and “inadequate provision of public services and
access to public facilities” (3) congruence and proportionality of remedies of
Title II; in judging the context of constitutional rights at stake under the
category-to-category basis.
The congress determined that enacting section 5 of fourteenth
amendment for enforcing Title II legislation to prohibit against arbitrary
- 47 -
treatment based on irrational stereotypes or hostility and treatment of
disabled persons by state agencies such as unjustified commitment, See.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and abuse and neglect of persons
committed to state mental health institutions, See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982).
In Lane, it was determined that based on the element of “access to
courts”; the institutions decisions to deny accommodations cannot be based
on justification of “ordinary cost considerations and convenience alone”. See
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994. The court remarked on the “sheer volume of
evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional
discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provisions of public
services”. Id at 1991.
The congress determined that a necessary prophylactic legislative was
necessary based on historical predicate for systemic deprivation of
fundamental right and it is no longer a dispute. See Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d
1248, 1270-1272 (11 Cir. 2004). In Buck v. Bell; the compulsory
sterilization law was upheld; “in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence”; it is better for all the world; if instead of waiting to execute
- 48 -
degenerate offspring for crime, or to starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. Three
generations of imbeciles are enough). 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Congress
has also heard unjustified institutionalization and unconstitutional treatment
of persons with disabilities in state facilities which included seclusion in
rooms, restraints and neglectful, abusive and willful indifference that was an
“difficult and intractable problem” that warranted added prophylactic
measures in response”. See Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 737 (2003). Title II provides proportionate response to history and also
congruent response with the requirement of the Due process and Equal
Protection Clauses. The congress requires the state to treat people with
disabilities in accordance with their individual needs and capabilities. The
congress also concluded there was a need to balance the risks exists when
some state officials many continue to make placement decisions based on
hidden invidious class-based stereotypes or animus that would be difficult to
detect or prove and State’s legitimate interests. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 732-
733, 735-736.
- 49 -
Congress determined that Title II prophylactic response was necessary
when the state persistently refuses to follow the advice of its own
professionals and is unable to justify that its decisions was based on
administrative or financial considerations that there was a risk of
unconstitutional treatment. See Hibbs 538, U.S. at 736-737. The Title II also
resolves the unconstitutional exclusion of people with disabilities from their
communities, schools and other governmental services. The proper remedy
under Title II accomplished integration. See United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 547 (1996).
C. 28 U.S.C 1658: The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of
Limitations
The court will never hear the merits of a time-barred claim. And
Statute of limitations are not jurisdictional in nature for they are subject to
equitable tolling and waiver (Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 455 U.S.
385, 393 (1982). The common law imposed no limit on the time in which an
action had to be brought (H. Wood, Limitation of Action 8 (2 ed. 1893).
Tolling provisions suspend the running of the limitations period if plaintiff
was incapacitated, defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the plaintiff’s
- 50 -
injury or right of action. See Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in
Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard? 71 Geo. L. J. 829, 845-
55(1983). In Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. V. Brown; the Supreme Court
has stated that tolling maybe appropriate under federal causes of action
when:
claimant has received inadequate notice, ...when a motion for

appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling the
statutaory period until the motion is acted upon., where the court has
led the plaintiff to believe that she had done everything required of
her,....[or] where affirmation misconduct on the part of a defendant
lulled plaintiff into inaction.. 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984)
The policy takes plaintiff’s and public interest into consideration and
outweighs the defendant’s interest and danger of litigating a stale claim. See
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-34
(1949); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980); Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) [stated that if the federal court
borrows a state statute of limitations for a federal claim, it will also apply the
state’s tolling provision unless they would be inconsistent with federal law
or policy].
- 51 -
The legislature chosen must evaluate the underlying cause of action,
its policies, and society’s interest in having the rights inserted. The society’s
interest is to protect citizen’s rights and deter harmful or other undesirable
conduct. Some statutes give private citizens the right to sue so that they will
act as “private attorney general”. The category of cases included
environment protection and anti-discrimination laws. See Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Newman v. Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)
(Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Important societal interests are
enforced by “private attorney general”, where government lacks either
resources or political will for comprehensive enforcement. Hence, society
has strong interest in having these claims asserted.
Hence, any limitation placed on action is the result of statutory
enactment. Defendant’s interest dictate that he be free from “stale claims”;
while the protection to protect the plaintiff’s right to have reasonable access
to to the court to pursue meritorious claims must be protected (Tort Law
Tort Claims Act-Accrual of Medical Malpractice Action-United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), 4, Western New England L. Rev. 158 (1981).
- 52 -
Legislature must strike a balance between the right to litigate meritorious
claims and the defendant right to be free from defending against stake
claims. See Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 665-66, 453 P. 2d 631, 635
(1969).
In DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, when a federal
claim has no express limitations period, the courts do not assume that the
claim lasts indefinitely. 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). The “fill in the gap” by
supplying a time bar; has been recognized by the Supreme Court, that the
“judiciary is not the appropriate body to create periods of limitations”. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 698 (1966). In Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Assocs, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 169 (1987) (Scalia J. concurring
in judgement) (asserting “quintessentially the kind of judgement to be made
by a legislature” is appropriate when examining the the underlying policies
of a federal cause of actions to determine if federal or state statute of
limitation.
The initial inquiry is whether all claims arising out of the federal
statute “should be characterized in the same way...” Id. The court is most
- 53 -
likely to adopt a uniform characterization when different types of claims can
be asserted under the same statutory provision and there is a strong public
interest in having the claim asserted. The second step in deciding the state
or federal law is whether it would supply the limitation period. And the final
step is determining if the decided statute characterizes the essence of the
claim provides the most appropriate limiting principle. See Reed V. United
Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
275 (1985) (1983 claims).
The decision to borrow state versus federal statute of limitations
encourages judicial abuse. A judge may borrow the short limitations period
to avoid reaching the merits of a claim that he or she does not want to
consider. The arbitrary borrowing of state time-bars for federal claims raises
equitable concerns. For the state does not consider the federal interests at
issue when they adopt state rights or category of state rights. See Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). The state balancing
process does not take litigant’s interest in the federal right as well as public
interest when asserting “state right”. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co.,
- 54 -
111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991) (Posner, J. concurring; legislative analysis of
borrowing forces judges to undertake).
One of the main reasons for enacting the federal law; rather than
leaving the problem to states, is the need for uniformity. The time periods
for federal claims, asserting federal rights vary from state to state, because
each state has its own statute of limitations; the difference in time periods
among states are often quite significant. For diversity claims, the Supreme
Court said in that: We cannot give [the action] longer life in the federal court
than it would have had in the state court without adding something to the
cause of action” See. Walker, 446 U.S. 740, 746 (1980).
In Owens v. Okure, the Supreme Court issued its decision and stated
to just determine whether Mr. Okure’s complaint was timely. The district
court and litigants waited over three years before the court could begin
considering the merits of the case. And during that time, litigant’s lives were
disrupted; they and the courts were forced to expend significant time and
resources litigating the limitation issue and by that time the courts had
determined the claims were timely. 488 U.S. 235, 235 (1989).
- 55 -
The state tolling law may further complicate the problem of determining
whether a federal claim is time barred. In Jonson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc. stated that “state legislature and courts adopt tolling rules to
protect state rights, not federal rights”. 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975). Though
borrowing state law is a general rule. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991). However, courts
recognize that applying a state law would create practical problems and
conflict with federal policy. Id. Hence, when the “federal law is a closer
analogy than available state statue and when federal policies13 are at stake
and the practicalities of litigation make rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking”. Id. Federal statute is appropriate when it
preserves the efficiency and preserves public resources of agency at the
interest of respect to judicial economy.

13
Federal Student Loan servicing policy of False Certification (Loan Discharge
Application) are consistent with federal claims statute of limitations. Appellant is a
federal loan recipient and had financed her medical tuition + living expenses via U.S.
Dept. of Education Federal Student Loans servicing from 2009-2013 (See. Fedloan
Discharge Statement; Appellant has informed Fedloan Servicing regarding matters of
litigations, Dkt 54).
- 56 -
Prior to Judicial Improvement Act of 1990 (JIA); the Congress had
not addressed general statute of limitations for those causes of action that do
not have explicit time-bars. The general fallback statute of limitations for
civil claims arising under the federal legislation enacted by Congress after
December 1, 1990 states that a plaintiff must commence his or her action no
later than four years after the claim accrues. It does not apply for federal
statutory claims that have an explicit limitation period, but it addresses the
“borrowing problem” because it is limited to new federal statutes. Congress
determined that four years was reasonable compromise for prospective
causes of action. Section 102 of the 1991 of the CRA provides damages for
intentional discrimination under Title VII of the CRA of 1964, ADA of
1990, and RHA of 1973.
D. ADA Amendments Act of 2008
The four-year statute of limitations starts when the federal claim
accrues. The accrual for the federal claims started when complainant first
had knowledge of his or her injury. Appellant’s statute of limitations accrued
when she received and discovered the actual contents of her
neuropsychological report from USF MCOM Student Affairs on February 8,
- 57 -
2012 and Dr. Specter apologized to her of misrepresenting the report to her
on February 9, 2012.
Dr. Specter denied her oral request for accommodations around March
22, 2010 after she had consulted her psychiatrist from USF Counseling
Session and speaking with Helps Counseling Center, Dr. Woods at Dr.
Specter’s suggestion (A-1953). She was stated by psychologist (3/2/10) and
psychiatrist (3/21/10) that she would benefit from accommodations in March
2010. Based on evidence from the USF Counseling medical report and also
Helps counseling report; a reasonable inference can be made that that
Appellant requested accommodations around March 22, 2010 (A-1984-
1987; A-1043-44).
Dr. Specter denies that the presence of this conversation in his
disposition. Due to the evidence discovered during trial proceeding; Dr.
Specter ultimately determined to “fail Appellant out” as he determined her
final grade of “U” in EBCR and Doctoring II; when it should have been
“Incomplete” (A-737 & A-842). He also interfered with in her Petition for
Readmission due process when Appellant had made it clear for him to have
no involvement (A-1582-1627).
- 58 -
After Appellant failed the academic year in 2009-2010 and obtained
neuropsychological evaluation as stated in Academic Performance Review
Committee Letter dated June 7, 2010. Dr. Specter misrepresented the
contents of the report from 2010-2012. He admits in his deposition that he
received the report around October 2010 or when the report was complete.
He also admits in his deposition that he read the report and determined that
the results of her report were “equivocal”; despite the fact it stated in the
recommendations that she would benefit from services provided under
Section 504 and ADA. However, Dr. Specter admits that since he perceived
that Appellant did not need accommodations since she was “doing well”.
Appellant has provided burdensome evidence demonstrating that Appellant
was stated that “nothing came out of the report”. And hence, based on the
reliance on Dr. Specter’s interpretation [he was medical school official for
students with disabilities] that Appellant did not have ADHD, was not on
medications from May 2010 to February 13, 2012, did not sought
accommodations since she did not know she had the federal right (without a
medical condition), and had made major life modifications based on that
information (A-1989; Dkt. 68-7, p. 21-55).
- 59 -
Though Appellant was doing well in 2010-2011 in her “repeat first
year”; the contents of the first year that she was studying for the third time.
The first time was in Anatomy Master’s Program, the second time was in
2009-2010 and that year repeating was her third time. Dr. Specter
discriminated against Appellant under ADA Amendment Act of 2008 on
October 2010 when he considered that the “compensatory and mitigating
measures” determined that she did not have a disability and would not
benefit from an interactive process and recommendation stated from
neuropsychologist, “distraction free environment” (A-1038-39; A-1066). He
had also discriminated against Appellant when she had requested
accommodations in March 2010; however, he stated to Appellant to “finish
off the year” (A-1050-1051) and (See Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc.
527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 527 U.S. 516
(1999).
The court held in Guckenberger v. Boston Univ. held a different
standard of reasonable documentation requirement for students seeking
accommodations who had ADHD versus Learning disabilities. The court
ordered that BU to adopt a policy for students with learning disabilities (not
- 60 -
ADD or ADHD) who have current evaluations by trained professionals with
master’s degree and sufficient experience completely retested by
professionals who have medical degrees, or doctorate degrees, or licensed
clinical psychologist in order to be eligible for reasonable accommodations.
The Court approved the then current BU policy of requiring this level of
expertise for diagnosis of ADHD because these “conditions are primarily
identified through clinical evaluations rather than through standardized
testing, and a well-trained eye is essential for proper diagnosis”. The court
further concluded that it had breached its contract and ordered judgement of
aggregate amount of over $29,000 for students “by failing to honor the
express representations of its representatives about the student’s ability to
document their disabilities and receive accommodations from the
university”. Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82, (D. Mass.
1998).
In Letter of Findings issues to University of S. Miss. (October 16,
1996)., OCR ruled that the university (USM) provided “good faith”
temporary accommodations to the complainant until the necessary
documentation could be submitted by the complainant.
- 61 -
Appellant was diagnosed by the USF and also took their WAIS testing and
followed their protocol; in fact, her physician would write a letter if
necessary as she had done on her behalf on February 14, 2012 to the Dean,
Dr. Klasko and Dr. Specter in support of her reinstatement. However, Dr.
Specter stated that a documentation from the psychiatrist from USF
Counseling Center was not sufficient.
Dr. Specter misguided Appellant when she requested accommodations
and he did not act in good faith to enable Appellant to finish the school year
(A-1051: 1-11).
Dr. Specter discriminated against Appellant that she did not need
accommodations in March 2010. Hence, discriminated against her and
stated, go “get antianxiety medications” (A-1984). Additionally, when Dr.
Specter received the neuropsychological report in October 201014. Dr.

14
Appellant could not have received the report since the report was
completed in December 15, 2010. The last date she had contact with the
neuropsychological report was September 2010. There is no record that
Appellant met with Dr. Schoenberg December 15, 2010; when he had
completed the report to “give her the contents of the report”. Additionally,
Appellant was stated by Dr. Schoenberg to go to Dr. Specter and he will tell
her the contents of the report as “part of the interactive process”.
- 62 -
Specter discriminated against her again. And justified that she was
performing above the standards without taking context of collateral damages
that it may have on Appellant for not knowing a vital information that has an
impact on major life activities (A-1039, 1046, 1066, 1105, 1111).
Additionally, although no regulation pertaining to students requires an
“interactive process,” institutions that fail to engage in it are unlikely to
prevail on a motion for summary judgment and may face burdens of proof
they would not otherwise have to bear. Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F. 3d 957, 960
(8th Cir. 2002); Haneke v. Mid– Atl. Capital Mgmt., 131 Fed.Appx. 399, 400
(4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F. 3d
296, 317– 18 (3d Cir. 1999).
Nevertheless, Dr. Specter states in his deposition that he received the
neuropsychological evaluation in 2010 (A-1111). As per Helps counseling
report dated October 2011; it indicates a conversation took place about her
ADHD, neuropsych report and possible need of accommodations [asked if
APRC had the report and that is what their recommendation is] in October
2011 (A-1998). However, he again for the third time; determined that as a
medical official for medical students with disabilities; that her
- 63 -
neuropsychological report indicated that it was “equivocal” in 2010 and did
not need accommodations for 2011-2012 academic year when she still had a
chance to pass that year15.
Placing a student on academic probation standing on the basis of their
disability is also violation of ADAAA. Dr. Specter states in his deposition;
that “any student who has been diagnosed with a medical condition that is
qualified under ADA and Section 504” is automatically placed in academic
probation standing as per University policy (A-1077; A-1092-1094; A-
1098). Due to that, Appellant was placed in academic probation standing in
APRC Letter dated Feb 21, 2012.
Dr. Specter states Appellant was “struggling in all her classes”
because she was “passing [at the Univ. standard benchmark for all students],
but not excelling at a higher and special standard, because she was a
“repeater” on the basis of her disability. This is also a violation of ADAAA.
University policy as per syllabus and student handbook and academic
competency director indicate that the passing benchmark, regardless of class

15 st
1 time: March 2010, 2nd time: October 2010; 3rd time: October 2011
- 64 -
standard deviation was 74 (A-1711 to A-1712). And if the standard
deviation was below 74; the entire class average was adjusted accordingly
(see example of EBCR: A-1012-1014). Appellant passed based on that
criteria and was a “passing level”. She also passed above the bench mark on
the final USF NBME on her first attempt (A-1015; 1634; 1711-1717).
However, Dr. Specter states the reason Appellant was decided to be
dismissed in March 2013 because she was passing, but not at an [even]
higher “repeater” standard on the basis of her disability [i.e. repeater status]
(A-1098).
Dr. Specter discriminates against the ADAAA by holding past
failures when the student was not on medications and accommodations
against them; and labels her past failures due to his negligence as academic
“global deficiency”. One of the objectives of Congress to enact ADAAA in
2009 was that it wanted to prohibit discrimination by aligning the ADA with
other civil right laws. It accomplished that by eliminating the language in the
ADA that had prohibited discrimination of an individual “with a disability
because of a disability” and replaced it with a simple prohibition on
“discrimination on the basis of disability” [distinguishing that discrimination
- 65 -
was on the basis of the personal characteristics of the disability in ADAAA
and not whether that characteristic exists]. H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, at 16
(2008). Hence the language in ADAAA shifted away from the “proving
issues that there is a disability” to “discrimination” itself (A-1858; A-1692-
1696).
This is a concern of substantial public interest and threat. Appellant’s
complaint was accepted against claims in this suit for investigation, OCR
Case no. 04-14-2487; the investigation took place between September 2014
to February 2015. As part of the investigation proceedings; USF MCOM
prepared for their investigation. They prepared a list of students who had
been denied and admitted after they had submitted an application for Petition
for Readmission. There were four USF MCOM students that were on the
list. However, one student with a disability was also readmission around the
same time that Appellant was seeking readmission. The one student who had
a disability was dismissed twice similar to Appellant; but in different
academic years. The student had appealed her dismissal and appealed for
reinstatement on the basis of discovering the disability. The student was
reinstated, however, as per University protocol; was automatically placed on
- 66 -
Academic Probation standing on the basis of the disability (A-1692). The
past academic failures due to “unknown legal disability” were held against
the student and may have contributed to her dismissal the following year for
academic and professional reasons. OCR policy as per Administrative
Procedure Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 1973 (Section 504)
U.S.C. 794 and its implementing regulation at 34 C.F.R Part 104 prohibit
discrimination by disability by recipients of Federal financial assistance (A-
1692 to 1696).
II. ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD REVIEW
Abuse of discretion review has been applied to mixed question of law and
fact involving the “legal conclusions”. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561.
In abuse of discretion review, an appellate court is “not to reweigh the
equities or reassess the facts but to make sure that the conclusions derived
from those weighing and assessments [of the district court] are judicially
sound and supported by the record” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec.
Co., 446 U.S. 1, 3 (1980) (A-1949-1972).
- 67 -
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Grassroth v. Moore; the Eleventh circuit held am action that “invited
error with a parking space” violated the Establishment Clause on the judge’s
view of the monument 355 F. 3d at 1288. The fact finder should not
undertake an uninvited view of scene outside the knowledge or presence of
counsel, and evidence obtained from view should not serve as the basis of
findings of facts should be the case decided on summary of judgement. See
355 F. 3d at 1288. Honorable Judge Moody states in his judicial info website
for the Federal Middle District expressing his community involvement and
public trust (A-1949-1972). He also states that he was a “member of USF
Economic Development Board, Chair of USF School of Psychology
Advisory Committee. The prejudicial error of an uninvited scene with
knowledge of operations of its operation can obstruct justice, the Chief
Justice Moore stated, “You have to walk in and see what you see....just like a
juror would”. Id.
For forth going reasons stated in this appeal; the defendant should be
denied of tax costs because Appellant has (1) merits in the case (2) limited
financial resources as proceeding as in forma pauperis (IFP) (3) presence of
- 68 -
misconduct (4) appellant has litigated in good faith (5) if matters are of
public interest. Quan v. Computer Science Corp., 623 F. 3d. 870, 888 (9 Cir.
2010). District Judge denied all of Appellant’s motions. Appellant had been
approved for IFP and stated financial hardship forgoing reasons in her
opposition to defendant’s bill of costs. Appellant also requested if she can
have permission to file evidence that demonstrates misconduct during
discovery period and confirmed by her counsel. The additional costs
imposed on civil litigant will impose “chilling effect on future litigants”. The
public will fear stating the truth when an indigent litigant is imposed costs
when there is a presence of substantial large financial disparity (A-2185-
2198).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellant, urges this Court to reverse
the district court’s judgement.
- 69 -
Respectfully submitted,
__________________________
Nausheen Zainulabedin
Tampa, FL 33616
- 70 -
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that:
1. The foregoing corrected Brief for Nausheen Zainulabeddin complies with

the volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because the brief
contains ___12984___ words.
2. The brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. 32(a)(6) because
it has been prepared in proportionally spaced font using Microsoft Word
Office 365 Version 15.21.1 in Times New Roman 14-point font.
_____________________________
Tampa, FL 33616
- 71 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 4, 2017, a true and correct copy of the
forgoing brief and appendices, with first class postage prepaid has been
deposited in the U.S. Mail and filed with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and counsel for the defendant-
appellee.
Clerk of the Court for the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303
Defendant-Appellee(s)
Ms. Lori Mans and Mr. John Dickinson
200 West Forsyth Street
Suit 1700
Jacksonville, FL 32202-4317
________________________ __________________
Plaintiff Date
- 72 -

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPEAL NO. 17-11888

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CORRECTED WITHOUT ADDENDUM

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND

In compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and Eleventh Circuit Rule

have or may have an interest in the outcome of the case:

Moody, James- Trial Judge

Wilson, Thomas- Magistrate Trial Judge

Zainulabeddin, Nausheen- Pro Se

University of South Florida, Morsani College of Medicine Board of

Bognar, Bryan, MD, MPH

Brownlee, James, Jr., MD

Deschenes, Robert, PhD

Klasko, Stephen, MD, MBA

Loveren, Harry Van, MD

Marty, Phillip, PhD

Specter, Steven, PhD

USF Counseling Center

University of South Florida Morsani College of Medicine

Attorneys and Law Firms Representing Defendant/Appelle:

Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete, LLP

Dickinson, John. — Attorney representing Defendant/Appellee

Mans, Lori. Attorney representing Defendant/Appellee

Khawaja, Jalalluddin- Plaintiff’s Parent- Debt repayment + collateral

Zainulabeddin, Anushah- Plaintiff’s sibling: collateral damages

Zainulabeddin, Mohammed- Plaintiff’s sibling: collateral damages

Zainulabeddin Yasmin-Plaintiff’s Parent—Debt repayment +

United States Court of Appeals of Federal Circuit

Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, Atlanta, GA

Calloway-Spenser, Ebony- OCR Compliance Team Leader

Chen, Martin- OCR Investigator

Manigault, Arthur: OCR Compliance Team Leader

Pessin, Stephanie: OCR Investigator

Pierre, Cynthia: OCR office Director

Sausser, Scott, OCR Compliance Team Leader

Shields, Dorris: OCR Assistant Director

Washington, Brandon: OCR Investigator

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34 (c) and 11th Cir. R. 28-2(c); Appellant

submits that oral argument would be helpful due to voluminous record

developed based on new issue on appeal that is federal question and

issues on appeal. Appellant respectfully requests this honorable court for

hearing an oral argument.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT......................................i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......................................................................4

I. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.....................5

II. Statement of Facts.......................................................................8

III. Standards of Review.................................................................41

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs, Inc.,

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,

Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. V. Brown.,

Board of Regents v. Tomanio,

City of Boerne v. Flores,

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,

Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.,

DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters.,

Guckenberger v. Boston Univ.,

Haneke v. Mid– Atl. Capital Mgmt.,

Jonson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,

Klay v. United Healthgroup., Inc.,