The honorable peculiarities of Filipino English

Published September 6, 2010 12:20pm

By Lisandro Claudio

Around 15 years ago, my mother exposed her quirky patrician side when she
got into a “petty” argument with her in-laws. My family was then preparing for
the golden wedding anniversary of my lolo and lola, and my uncles and aunts
were drafting an invitation letter. The draft invitation read “We cordially invite
you to the golden wedding anniversary of Atty. Enrique Claudio and Dr.
Victoria Claudio.”

Mom, always concerned with proper etiquette, objected to the use of the title
“Atty.” Unlike “Dr.,” she claimed, “Atty.” was not a proper honorific, but one
invented by title-obsessed Pinoys. Mom argued valiantly, but my uncles and
aunts prevailed.

I was thinking of this incident the other day, so I did some research on
commonly-used professional titles in the Philippines like “Atty.,” “Arch.,” and
“Engr.” True enough, my mother, Prof. Dr. Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, MD, PhD
(titles are really funny), was right. Miss Manners’ (Judith Martin) guide to
proper etiquette does not include these three in her list of accepted English
honorifics. Moreover, if you look through the two most reputable English
dictionaries (Oxford and Merriam Webster), you will note the absence of these
words. The less reputable dictionary.com includes “atty.,” but defines it as an
abbreviation and not a title meant to precede a name. All sources, however, list
Ms., Mr., Mrs., Fr., and Dr.

So why did Pinoys invent titles for professionals?

Personally, I don’t see the need for excessive and insecure claims to higher
education. An “Atty.,” for me, conjures images of either a juvenile lawyer/frat
boy who beats people up simply because he can or a cutthroat goon who
defends everyone from plunderers to warlords (Don’t get me wrong, I’m not
saying there aren’t wonderful “Attys.” The image just bothers me). In contrast,
an attorney who refers to one’s self as “Mr.” or “Ms.” conjures a man/woman of
understated class and humble restraint.

I find it surprising that Filipino English would create new titles, given that our
English is based on the supposedly “democratic” English of the Americans.

Unlike the case of British colonies like India or Malaysia, the English taught to
Filipinos was the “egalitarian” English of the New World. American English, as
conceptualized by Noah Webster, was a language rid of the superfluities and
class distinctions of British English. Webster sought to simplify the language
from spelling to pronunciation. Unpronounced Us were dropped (as in the case
of colour becoming color), and Ss that sounded like Zs became Zs (as in the
change from “organise” to “organize”). Webster also despised the upper-class
English habit of clipping syllables (as in the case of “mi-li-ta-ry” being
pronounced as “mi-li-try”).

For Webster, a standardized American English would allow all Americans to

speak and write the same language. The British spoke different Englishes (from
the Queen’s English, the Scottish brogue to cockney), which created what the
fictional Professor Henry Higgins in My Fair Lady called “verbal class
distinctions.” You could tell a rich Brit from a poor one based on how he/she
spoke. American English, on the other hand, would reflect the sense of equal
opportunity at the center of the American dream. For Webster, all Americans
would speak the same dialect regardless of their class origins.

Webster’s linguistic impulse naturally dovetailed with American

Republicanism, which, in challenging British courtly governance, also
challenged British courtly titles. America is not known for having lords and
ladies.

So if Filipino English is based on American English, why is it more

hierarchical? Why the fetish for professional titles like Atty., Arch., and Engr.? I
have not conducted documentary research on this topic, but allow me to offer
some hypotheses.
A simple answer would be that the Americans who colonized the Philippines
encountered lowland societies that already used Iberian linguistic class
markers like “Don” and “Doña.” Don and Doña, however, are not professional
titles like “Atty.” So we still need to ask why we ended up inventing titles that
reflect one’s educational status.

I suspect the answer lies in the fundamental contradiction of the American

colonial project. The Americans who occupied the Philippines justified their
actions through the rhetoric of “benevolent assimilation.” In other words, they
were only subjugating Filipinos in order to teach them values like American
egalitarianism.

The contradiction here is obvious. How can you teach egalitarianism through a
system (colonialism) that is inherently anti egalitarian? Consider that in order
to successfully subjugate a people, a colonizer must manufacture a desire for
his culture and his society (a desire we now call colonial mentality). In the case
of the Philippines, this is exactly what the Americans did.

The power of American colonialism lay in its emphasis on education – an

education that supposedly exposed Filipinos to the “wonders” of the American
way of life. Through education, the American colonial state bred a new elite of
Filipinos trained in a new, more “modern,” American system. People with
advanced degrees like law or engineering were at the apex of this system. Their
prestige, as such, not only rested on their purported intelligence, but also their
mastery of the colonizer’s way of life.

This, I suspect, is the source of the magical and superstitious attachment we

have to attorneys, architects and engineers. The language we use is still
haunted by our colonial experience. We linguistically privilege professionals
because our colonizers made us value a certain kind of white-collar work.

I must say though: if titles are meant to represent what societies value, we
should make up new ones. Two come to mind: “Trp.” for Trapo and “Cque.” for
Cacique. We routinely elect them, so we must value them.

Oh, but wait, I forgot these people already have a title: “Hon. Cong.” for
honorable congressman. And that, for many reasons (not least of which is the
assertion of being honorable), is the most absurd title yet.
Ax these terms to your paper
William Cullen Bryant, editor of the New York Evening Post from 1829
until 1878, created an “Index Expurgatorius” for his newspaper. Certain words
simply weren’t allowed in its pages.
Likewise, James Gordon Bennett Jr., owner of the New York Herald from
1867 to 1918, had his “Don’t List.” For example, he wouldn’t allow his
journalists to write executive session when they meant secret session.
Keeping a banned-word list is hardly unique to newspapers. The novelist
Ambrose Bierce kept a “Little Blacklist of Literary Faults,” published nearly a
century ago. He despised committed suicide, preferring instead killed himself (or
herself). He likewise disapproved of decease for die, executed for hanged (or put
to death), expectorate for spit, inaugurate for begin, prior to for before and so on.
He wasn’t fond of genteelisms. No real stylists are.
Legal drafters could benefit from a similar verbal blacklist—a simple list of
words that do nothing but blemish the documents that contain them. Learn
them and ax them.
and/or Is it a word? Is it a phrase? American and British courts have
held that and/or is not part of the English language. The Illinois Appellate
Court called it a “freakish fad” and an “accuracy-destroying symbol.” The New
Mexico Supreme Court declared it a “meaningless symbol.” The Wisconsin
Supreme Court denounced it as “that befuddling, nameless thing, that Janus-
faced verbal monstrosity.” More recently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky called
it a “much-condemned conjunctive-disjunctive crutch of sloppy thinkers.”
If a sign says “No food or drink allowed,” nobody would argue that it’s OK to
have both. (Or includes and.) And if a sign says “No admission for lawyers and
law students,” would you argue that either could go in alone? You’d be thrown
out of court.
The real problem with and/or is that it plays into the hands of a bad-
faith reader. Which one is favorable? And or or? The bad-faith reader can pick
whatever reading seems favorable.
I’ve done lots of drafting since 1987, the year when I learned how
unnecessary and/or really is. I’ve drafted court rules, jury instructions, model
contracts, car warranties and many other documents. Never once have I
needed and/or. You won’t either. Kill it.
herein Old-style drafters say they stick to their ways for reasons of
precision. They like the here and there words—apparently unaware of the
ambiguities they’re creating. The problem with herein is that courts can’t agree
on what it means. In this agreement? In this section? In this subsection? In
this paragraph? In this subparagraph? Courts have reached all those
conclusions and more. Use ordinary English words: in this agreement may be
two extra words, but it’s more precise.
 deem The Seattle Seahawks are deemed to be the XLVIII Super Bowl
champions. That’s silly. They are the champs. The word deem should create
a legal fiction, not state the truth. For example, if you said: For purposes of
this agreement, the Denver Broncos are deemed to be the XLVIII Super Bowl
champions, that would make sense. They aren’t really, but we’re treating them
that way. You’ll almost never need to create a legal fiction. So banish deem.
know all men by these presents It’s asinine, sexist deadwood. It’s a
legalistic way of saying “Heads up!” Just cut it.
provided that Experts in drafting have long agreed that this phrase is
the bane of legal drafting. It has three serious problems: (1) its meaning is
unclear—it can mean if, except or also; (2) its reach is uncertain—that is, it
may modify the preceding 12 words or the preceding 200; and (3) it causes
sentences to sprawl. A variant form is the phrase provided, however, that. If
you see it, try inserting a period and begin a new sentence with a
capitalized But. That’s how the drafters of the U.S. Constitution did it—eight
times—and they were grammatically unimpeachable on that score.
pursuant to This is pure legalese. It makes beginners feel as if they
belong to a club. That’s about it. The rule-making body for federal courts has
been stamping it out for more than a decade. Instead of saying that something
is required pursuant to the contract, say it’s required under the contract. Or
say that the contract requires whatever it is.
said As the past tense of say, this word is fine. As a fancy-pants
substitute for the (such as said agreement), it isn’t fine at all. It’s foolish. It
doesn’t add one iota of precision. It makes you sound like a parody of law-talk.
same Many lawyers use same as a pronoun because they think they’re
being precise: I’ve received your notice and acknowledge same. In that
sentence, is same really more precise than it? No.
In fact, same is the source of an ambiguity in the U.S. Constitution so severe
that a constitutional amendment had to cure it. In April 1841, President
William Henry Harrison died after little more than a month in office. Vice
President John Tyler then became our 10th president. But did he really? Article
III of the Constitution reads: In case of the removal of the president from office—
or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
said office—the same shall devolve on the vice president.
So what devolved? The office? The powers and duties of the office?
Contemporaries couldn’t agree, and neither can modern historians.
The passage of the 25th Amendment in 1967 finally resolved the ambiguity.
Now if the president dies or resigns, the vice president becomes president. If
the president is merely unable to serve but remains alive, the vice president
becomes acting president. So a constitutional amendment had to cure one
sloppy word choice: same for it.
 shall Judge Frank Easterbrook, one of the most celebrated jurists in the
country, once wrote in an opinion: “Shall is a notoriously slippery word that
careful drafters avoid.” He’s exactly right. Courts have held that shall can
mean has a duty to, should, is, will, and even may. The word is like a
chameleon: It changes its hue sentence to sentence. Abjure it. Forswear it. You
shan’t regret it.
such What does such mean? To the educated nonlawyer, it means of that
kind. To the lawyer it means the very one just mentioned. I might tell you about
a certain piece of property: 100 Main St. Then I tell you my client bought such
property last week. (You think my client is well-heeled.) Then I say that my
client is constantly buying such property. (You now think my client is a fool to
pay money again and again for the same piece of property.) Like so much other
legalese, suchis inherently ambiguous. Use it only as educated nonlawyers do.
It’s only the lawyers’ use that causes trouble.
whereas This archetypal legalism used to be every lawyer’s idea of how
to begin a contract. No longer. One easy way to avoid it—and to avoid the
never-ending sentence it spawns—is to use the subtitle “Background” or
“Recitals,” followed by short declarative sentences explaining what’s about to
be done and why.
witnesseth It’s usually in all-caps text and spaced out across the line.
Modern readers—even lawyers—take witnessethto be a sort of command. They
think it’s the imperative mood of the verb. But no: It’s indicative. It’s a variant
form in Elizabethan usage. Elizabethan—as in Shakespeare’s day. Lawyers are
slow to update their forms.
In the old days the opener read: This agreement witnesseth that … .
Drafters almost never use it correctly these days. They write: This is an
agreement between [one part and another]. Witnesseth … . That’s risible. Just
cut the witnesseth. Doing so will contribute to your mental health.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for
the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience
and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima
facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is,
he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more

convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten
(10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration

because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section
1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure
that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to

the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished
from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. To "practice" law, or any
1

profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or

profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing

the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A
certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his
profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a
business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a
Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to
be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services
(State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a

Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether
a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or

habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a
law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146),
or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public,
and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented

himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such
as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and
skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to
that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected,
 all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which

calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term
"practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law

presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a
lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining

whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the
practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so

HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from

the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors
as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
 profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent

Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.

Atty. Christian Monsod’s background

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant
or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer
and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod
also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
(pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to
be a member.

*Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.