LONZANIDA VS COMELEC [311 SCRA 602] ISSUE: WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales
from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)
FACTS:
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the
May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was
again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest.
The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8,
1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation,
His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that
he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his
proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of
the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term
limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC
issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions
maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that
his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the
purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he
was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the petitioner’s assumption of office in
1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the
duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months
before the next mayoral elections.
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.
HELD:
No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, “the term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law
shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.”
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same
rule, that: “No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.”
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term.
 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO.
G.R. NO. 146738; MARCH 2, 2001
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on
June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend the
President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from
jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based
numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation,
which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked
the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and
an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding
officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd
continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing
organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands
of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the
beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he
wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will
remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on
May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying
he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada
and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered
by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also
prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President
of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.”
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable,
whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo
presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government
spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution,
overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand
was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of
the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous
president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court
held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the
succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore,
the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied
resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of
its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of
peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality
test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court
held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court
added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a
public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President.
From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another)
 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a
broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent
of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies
Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment
only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the
or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

FACTS:

The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the
President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other
appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government
and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it
unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting
the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or
employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said
Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless
otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated
on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is
constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII,

section 13 of the constitution.

RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both
Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple
positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust.
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of
 ESTRADA VS DESIERTO
G.R. NO. 146710-15; MARCH 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-
taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun
in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting
his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat
of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the
14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
 exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government.
 exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the President.
 extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review
 intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review.
 presented a political question;
 involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right
of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment.
Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence—
bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned—
constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final
statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any
kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them
as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.
As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress
recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle
of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of
the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge,
who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by
mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to
show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the
judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were
still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really
have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
CHAPTER 11
 JOSE VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a
similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President
of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his
67 Phil. 451 – Political Law – Control Power – Supervision – Suspension of a Local greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be
Government Official – Power to suspend comes with the power to remove exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner
prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he
FACTS: were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be
Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial
the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power
the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not
Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial
power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec investigation.
2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the
Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to
the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the
provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are
those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words,
the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if
he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to
be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of
the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under
investigation.

HELD: Yes.

There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of
a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged
in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that
“The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath
against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude“.

The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of
the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is
 CARMEN PLANAS VS JOSE GIL
67 Phil. 62 – Political Law – Separation of Powers – Rule of Non-Interference
FACTS:
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila,
published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including
Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter
from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her
to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain
and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over
the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is accountable for her political
acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable
under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to
that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the
newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to
discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an
administrative investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in
case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The
CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of the case
hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the
CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the
court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of
purely administrative in character.
legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the
light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism
and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither
compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent
and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken
by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no
jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is
farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is acting under
orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither
decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative
immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a
sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive
Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports
the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order
is necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was
not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against
the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the
right to elicit the truth.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the
President.

HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction
are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such
cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not
necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or
constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate
 MYERS V. UNITED STATES so.” Dissent. Justice McReynolds found that “it is impossible for me to accept the
view that the President may dismiss, as caprice may suggest, any inferior officer
Brief Fact Summary. Appointee to the postmaster of the first class in Oregon was whom he has appointed with consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive
forced to resign. inhibition by Congress after his own lengthy review of precedent. Justice Brandeis
felt that the central issue was “May the President, having acted under the statute in
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution “grants to the President the executive
so far as it creates the office and authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the
power of the government- i.e., the general administrative control of those executing
Senate is in session, the provision which prescribes the condition under which a
the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers-a
removal may take place?” Justice Holmes emphasized the fact that the office was
conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
created by Congress.
executed; that article 2 excludes the exercise of legislative power by Congress to
provide for appointments and removals, except only as granted therein to Congress Discussion. “To hold [an opposite rule] would make it impossible for the President,
in the matter of inferior offices; that Congress is only given power to provide for in case of political or other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take care that
appointments and removals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition the laws be faithfully executed.”
that it does vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with the
Senate’s consent; that the provisions of the second section of article 2, which blend
action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the executive, are
limitations to be strictly construed, and not to be extended by implication; that the
President’s power of removal is further established as an incident to his specifically
enumerated function of appointment by and with the advice of the Senate, but that
such incident does not by implication extend to removals the Senate’s power of
checking appointments.”

FACTS: Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get the Senate’s permission to
remove the postmaster of Portland, Oregon. That individual had been appointed with
the Senate’s advice and consent. The President asked for the individual’s resignation
without consulting the Senate first, and the Senate refused the President permission
to do so.

ISSUE: “[W]hether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of
removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate.”

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (the Supreme Court) produced
a long-winded opinion, examining the legislative and adjudicative history of executive
appointments, including Marbury v. Madison. It concluded that Tenure of Office Act of
1867, “in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive
officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally
 ARSENIO LACSON VS MARIANO ROQUE
92 Phil. 456 – Political Law – Supervision Over Local Governments
FACTS:
The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly defamatory
and libelous utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed
a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The
special prosecutor recommended the suspension of Lacson to the President. The
President, through acting Executive Secretary Mariano Roque, issued a suspension
order against Lacson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post.
HELD: No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the
President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true that the
President “shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments,” but
supervision does not contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are
always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject
to constitutional limitations
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section
64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done “conformably to law;” and
only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he “may at any time remove a
person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the
Philippines.” Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law, in
this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.
Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa
97 Phil. 143 – Political Law – Control Power – Revised Administrative Code –
Supervision
FACTS:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed
against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant
Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter.
Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter
appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a
petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which
provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the
Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control, direction, and supervision over
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or
designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the
power of control over a mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive
Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides: “The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”
 Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the
power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all
local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general
supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the
President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but
he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him
over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to
bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments
over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as
may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to
be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may
order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of
the 1935 Constitution.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to
“receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office,
and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the
charges are serious, “he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally
or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.” Sec 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the
Department Head over the administration of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to
Mondano’s office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral
turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final
conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must
suspend a mayor not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but because
of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.

In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority

of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
 FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more
chaos.
(177 SCRA 668)
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking
FACTS:
preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the
fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the essence of the duty of the government.
respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under
abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time
the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their
and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.”
welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.

ISSUE:

Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?

RULING:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the
peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only
 Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property,
which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese
Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the
war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public
dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be
alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the
case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex
situs applies.
ISSUES AND HELD:
and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict
with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law
should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no
question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the
respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the
relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the
alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in
what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring
the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned
by Filipinos is inapplicable.

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion

unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the
respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of
law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute
over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect
of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined;
 BINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO (G.R. NOS. 91223-26)
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office
of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have
been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure.
FACTS:
In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism,
the petitioner assumed office on on April 7, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino
of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as
Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager, approved by the President on
the same date.
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of
PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.
On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho
as the new Secretary of Tourism.
On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a
memorandum designating him concurrently as General Manager, effective
immediately, until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a
permanent capacity.
Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance
with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title.
Subsequently, while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental
petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose
A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano
was impleaded as additional respondent.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his
designation.
2. Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority
HELD:
Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority,
provides as follows:
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General
Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a
term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the
expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been
appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will
by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the
person named.
The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed.
The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the
Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion,
which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not
possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter
ego of the President.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in
his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the
part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he
was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment
and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given
to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. “
 The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the
President of the Philippines when “performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business,” which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor
of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not
‘disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” as also happened in the case at
bar.
With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must perforce
fall to the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential
prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even
if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely
a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in
fact it was (albeit for a different reason).i•t•c-aüsl In either case, the petitioner’s claim
of security of tenure must be rejected.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good
faith that he was being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of
Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time
the designation was made. This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino
later approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where the petitioner
was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position as General Manager of the
PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical appointment required
to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23
of P.D. No. 564.
The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title
to the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
ULPIANO SARMIENTO III VS SALVADOR MISON
156 SCRA 549 – Political Law – Appointment of “Head of Bureaus” – Officers
Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
FACTS: This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then
president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members
of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the
appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists
that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the
COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of
Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation
by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one
of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the
1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which
require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require
confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of
Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed
by the COA.
LACSON VS ROMEROFACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President of
thePhilippines, provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was confirmed
by theCommission on Appointment on August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on
August10, 1946, and thereafter performed the duties of that office.Upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on May 17, 1949, the
Presidentnominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the
samedate, the President nominated for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros
Orientalrespondent Romero. Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by
theCommission on Appointments on May 19, 1949.Lacson neither accepted the
appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac.But respondent Romero took
his oath of office (the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental) inManila on June 16, 1949,
notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to his station.
Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental,he notified Lacson of his
intention to take over the office the following day, but Lacsonobjected. Hence this
petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the position
Held:
The Court ruled that:The appointment to a government post like that of provincial
fiscal to be completeinvolves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the
President. Then to makethat nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on
Appointments of theLegislature has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the
acceptance thereof bythe appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps,
nomination andconfirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the
Executive andLegislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary
step to make theappointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee
himself. He may or he may not accept the appointment or nomination. As held in the
case of Borromeo vs.Mariano, 41 Phil. 327,"there is no Power in this country which
can compel a man toaccept an office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to
accept his appointmentas provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do
so, then he continuesas provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said
office was created,unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of
Negros Oriental
DOMINADOR AYTONA VS ANDRES CASTILLO
SCRA 1 – Political Law – Appointing Power – Midnight Appointments
FACTS:
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia
during the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of
the Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he
issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at the same time he
appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed
a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central
Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal
averred that the ex-president’s appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly
done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the
incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would
have the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in
his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked
by the president. Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the
upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a
general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in
here it may be since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and
impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice,
fairness and righteousness.

VIVENCIO ALAJAR VS ALBA & JUDGE EVANGELISTAON
November 4, 2011Political Law – Control Power – Removal of Appointed LGU
officials
FACTS:
RA 603 created the City of Roxas. Sec 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall
be appointed by thepresident. Pursuant t the law, Alba was appointed as
the mayor. Later on, the president sentcommunication to Alba telling him that
he will be replaced by a new appointee, Alajar. Alajar was thendeclared as the acting
mayor. Alba refused to leave his post and he appealed his case before the
JudgeEvangelista who ruled in favor of him. Alajar then complained. Alba argued that
section 2545 of the RACw/c provides: “ Appointment of City Officials. – The
President of the Philippines shall appoint, with theconsent of the Commission on
Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and
he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . .”, has been declared
incompatiblewith the constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed orsuspended except for cause as provided by law”,
because the two provisions are mutually repugnant andabsolutely irreconciliable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alba can be removed by the president upon displeasure.
HELD: The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good
behavior, had anyvested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress
could not deprive him. The question is notnovel. There seems to be but little
difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right.“Admittedly, the act
of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and fixing
the“term” or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right
and the “tenure” or theterm during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is
a valid and constitutional exercise oflegislative power. In the exercise of that power,
Congress enacted RA 603 on April 11, 1951, creating theCity of Roxas and
providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period
duringwhich the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President,
so, the logical inference isthat Congress can legally and constitutionally make the
tenure of certain officials dependent upon thepleasure of the President. Therefore,
Alba was appointed by the pleasure of the resident and can also beremoved when
that pleasure ceases
DRILON V. LIM
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187of the Local
Government Code Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the
Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null
and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In
a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the RTC declared Section 187 of
the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision
therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision
over local governments. In this case, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section
187 unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax
ordinances. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first
being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to
it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional
and whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than
supervision, over the local government
HELD:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of
the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the
Code should be. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing
the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax SALVADOR A. ARANETA v. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN.
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As the court sees it, that was an act not of control but of mere G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191. April 30, 1957
supervision. Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two
grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non- FACTS:
compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected
the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and
the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor
As regards the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court has carefully examined every one said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of
of the exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to
indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties. restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said
The minutes of the hearings are found in the exhibits and such show that the
E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.
proposed ordinances were published.

ISSUE:

W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise
of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.

HELD:

VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or
catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture
and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed
necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect
its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare
of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and
strict conformity with law.

Distinction bet:
Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves discretion of what law shall be
Execution of Law – authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised
under and in pursuance of law.
GASCON VS. ARROYO
TOPIC: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Expropriation
Note: There wasn't exactly an issue, as the court dismissed the case because the
petitioners did not have locus standi. If the need arises, I would say the issue is
"Whether or not the Agreement to Arbitrate, as an alternative to a lawsuit against the
State, is valid"; to which, the answer is yes. Either way, I'll just enumerate below the
court's statements regarding the expropriation topic.
The Executive Secretary, in entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate," was acting for
and in behalf of the President when he signed it. Hence, the aforesaid agreement is
valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines.

FACTS:
Lopez family is the owner of 2 television stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4, which
they have operated through the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
When martial law was declared on Sept 21, 1972, Ch. 4 was closed by the military
and its facilities were taken over by Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) which
operated it as a commercial TV station
In 1978, KBS was taken over by the National Media Production Center (NMPC),
which operated it under Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4)
After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, the PCGG sequestered the TV stations
and the Office of Media Affairs took over the operation of Ch. 4
Where the government takes property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
The government's immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen.
Note: In a separate opinion, Justice Feliciano remarks that the above comments as
obiter dicta.
Petition dismissed.

On. April 17, 1986, the Lopez family requested Pres. Aquino to order to return to
them Chs. 2 and 4

On October 18 1986, Ch 2 was returned to the Lopez family

Upon the Lopez family's request, the respondent Executive Secretary, by the
authority of the President, entered into with ABS-CBN, represented by its Pres.
Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate"

Arbitration Committee was created composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for RP
and Atty. Pastor del Rosario for ABS-CBN, and retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos
as Chairman

ISSUE/HELD

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. VS JOSE PAÑO
21 SCRA 895 – Political Law – Delegation of Control Power to the
Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao.
The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone.
Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he
is a co-owner.
Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The
Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise
denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal.
He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation
of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the
presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the
matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional
powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the
Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate powers which are
not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this
allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus
gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary
who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall
remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case,
no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be
reversed.
ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO,
No.L-17169, 9 SCRA 619, February 16, 1960, Argued, November 30, 1963,
FACTS:
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates which
were no tcovered by any Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels approached
Collector of Customs Ang-Angco to secure the immediate release of the
concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the release certificate from the No-
Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angco which
stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not
take action on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned
the Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval of the release on the basis of
said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally released the concentrates. When
Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an administrative complaint
against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been
discharging the duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority
of the President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in the
classified civil service.
PREVIOUS HISTORY:
Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of
the administrative casein subordinate officers of the executive branch of the
government.
HOLDING:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the
classified civil service.
REASONING:
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of
petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil
Service, and having been deprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the
investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been deprived of
due process as guaranteed by said law. The Power of control of the President may
extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees but not with
regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to
them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our
Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department"
(Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose
appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law
for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One
such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.

Significance:

It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the
administrative case of an employee under classified service even with the authority
of the President without submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service.

*NO Noblejas vs Salas

*NO Jacob vs Puno


DE LEON VS. CARPIO
78 SCRA 457 (1989)
- "Alter-ego" Doctrine
FACTS:
Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of
Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body
declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its
jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to
seek relief from the Civil Service Commission.
The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were
invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenure
under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement.
However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued
by the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,” claiming that they were null and
void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued
to him by the Secretary of Justice
HELD:
It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the
Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive
departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the
Philippines.
The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and
other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The
constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not
require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature.
Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet
and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his
discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President
as their immediate superior. “Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior)
In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent
to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his
functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been
respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of
Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department,
the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretary’s directives, which are
presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.

RUFFY v. CHIEF OF STAFF
75 PHIL 875
FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of
war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on
February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a
guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a
petition for prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further
proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not
subject to military law at the time of offense.
ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d).
The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized
by the United States army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article
of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution
which provides that “National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts martial are agencies of
executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no
merits and is dismissed with costs.
Constitutional Law 1: State Functions / Concept of State
KURODA v. JALANDONI
42 O.G. 4282
FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army, is
charged before a military commission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He
seeks to establish the illegality of EO 68 on the grounds that it violates our
Constitution and that the petitioners are not charged of crimes based on law since
the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not EO 68 is unconstitutional; and
2) Whether or not Kuroda may be charged for violation of Hague Convention’s rules
and regulations
HELD:
Executive Order 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office is valid and
constitutional. The president has acted in conformity with the generally accepted
policies of international law which are also part of the Constitution pursuant to the
incorporation clause stipulated in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution. The rules
and regulation of Hague Convention form part of and are wholly based on generally
accepted principles of international law and were even accepted by the United States
and Japan for they are signatories to said convention. Such rules and regulations
therefore form part of the law of the Philippines regardless of whether or not it was a
signatory to the same. Thus, Kuroda may be charged for violation of its rules and
regulations.
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Fundamental Principles and State Policies.
Article II, Section 2. Incorporation Clause.
YAMASHITA VS STYER
G.R. NO. L-129; DECEMBER 19, 1945
FACTS:
Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army
group of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a
prisoner of war of the United States of America but was later removed from such
status and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal charged before an
American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer,
Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.
Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he
be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military
Commission be prohibited from further trying him. He questions, among others, the
jurisdiction of said Military Commission.
ISSUE/S:
1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case?
2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent, therefore having
jurisdiction over the war crimes?
RULING: 1. NO. 2. YES.
1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It
seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his
former status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The relative
difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military
measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition
cannot issue against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for
prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not
made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged,
without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to
refrain from trying the petitioner.
The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even
if the commission be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford
(pp. 50, 61, ante), “. . . an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the
United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be considered
as a violation of this country’s faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep
and uphold.”
2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and
convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to
create a military commission is an aspect of waging war, military commanders have
that power unless expressly withdrawn from them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United
States has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the laws of war in
appropriate cases.
*NO Aquino Vs Military Commision No. 2
 should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the military court

created totry the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to
subsist.

ISSUE2:

OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34
FACTS:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they
were placed inCamp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They
were charged with (1) unlawfulpossession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2)
conspiracy to assassinate President andMrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate
cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatadand Vicente Paterno; (4)
conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño andOnofre Corpus; (5)
arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez,Teodoro
Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracyand
proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the
petitionerswent to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas
corpus.
The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to
trycivilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD:
The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts
ortribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A
militarycommission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the
period of martiallaw, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long
as the civil courts are openand functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such
body relating to a civilian is null andvoid for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunal concerned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD:

The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time
thecase reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from
military

confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a
w

rit of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot andacademic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been
released from their confinement inmilitary detention centers, the instant Petitions for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ZAMORA
FACTS:
The President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility
patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. On Januray 17, 2000,
the IBP filed the instant petition to declare the deployment of Philippines Marines
unconstitutional thus null and void alleging that no emergency situation would justify
the employment of soldiers for law enforcement work and that the same is in
derogation of Article II Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint visibility patrols violate the Constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military
HELD:
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian enforcement and that it does not contravene Section 3, Article II of
the Constitution. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the LOI itself
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. The
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character
of the police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution and not with the military. What is in here is mutual support and
cooperation between the military and the civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian
supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.
MARCELO MONTENEGRO VS CASTAÑEDA
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being
a Prerogative by the President
FACTS:
In October 1950, Montenegro’s son was arrested by military agents. Three
days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free for
his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to
his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus
demanding the detainers to bring his son’s body and explain his detention.
Castaňeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter
invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegro’s petition should be granted.
HELD:
As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegro’s petition is likewise
denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent
danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be
placed in doubt.

BARCELON VS BAKER
FACTS:
This case was an application for a writ of
habeas corpus which it alleged that Barcelon is
detained and restrained of his liberty at the town of Batangas, in the Province of
Batangas, and that the detention and restraint of the said applicant is is wholly
without legal authority and not under or by virtue of any process issued by any court.
Respondents admit that they are detaining the body of the said Felix Barcelon, but
deny the right of the court to inquire into the reasons therefor by virtue of the
resolution issued by the Philippine Commission and the executive order of the
Governor-General suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
Provinces of Cavite and Batangas. The Philippine Bill section 5 provides that the
Governor-General is hereby authorized to suspend writ of habeas corpus in the said
provinces because of the fact that certain organized bands of ladrones in said
provinces were in open insurrection against the constituted authorities; and the said
bands, or parts of them, and some of their leaders, were still in open resistance to
the constituted authorities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial department of the Government may investigate
the facts upon which the legislative and executive branches of the Government acted
in providing for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habes corpus in the
province of Cavite and BAtangas
HELD: NO. It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such
laws and regulations as will effectually conserve peace and good order and protect
the lives and property of the citizens of the State. It is the duty of the Governor-
General to take such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of
enforcing such laws. If the judicial department of the Government, or any officer in
the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the President or of the
Governor-General under the conditions above supposed, before complying with such
orders, then the hands of the President or the Governor-General may be tied until
the very object of the rebels or insurrectos or invaders has been accomplished. IN
THIS CASE, Congress had authority to provide that the President, or the Governor-
General, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, might suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
In cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, when the public safety might require it.
the conclusion set forth in the said resolution and the said executive order, as to the
fact that there existed in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection
against the constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion of
the legislative and executive branches of the Government, after an investigation of
the facts. That one branch of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands
has no right to interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the
discretionary acts of another independent department of the Government. The
doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to
any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, such
person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those
facts has been recognized in this case. The authority to suspend the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus is exclusively vested in the legislative and executive branches of
the government and their decision is final and conclusive upon the Judicial
Department and upon all persons. Therefore, the application for the writ of habeas
corpus is denied.

TEODOSIO LANSANG VS GARCIA
(G.R. NO. L-33964)
Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro
Case
FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971
causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth
of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by
Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the
suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently
abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into
the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by
Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established.
Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including
two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In
the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic
Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by
Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus
GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE
121 SCRA 472
FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
14 detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having
a conference in the dining room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14
detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They were
arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PCs know, hence, the present
petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid
HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a
judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period.
PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President
the power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
In addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has been replaced by
Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provided for in the said
decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons
committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period of one year, with the cause or
causes of their arrest subjected to review by the President or the by the Review
Committee created for the purpose..
PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntadois hereby
given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon
granted the said appellant shall bedeemed to take effect only upon the grant of such
withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with thisResolution, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into hiscustody the said
appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National
Police or the National Bureau of Investigation. [*NO CULANAG VS DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS]

FACTS:

Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and each issentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an
indemnity. The appellantsseasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993,
the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January1994, however, appellant Francisco
Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They weregranted a conditional
pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will
bereleased from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and
accepted their sentence,and hence, the appeal should be dismissed. They were
discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28

December 1993. Atty. La’o further in

formed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his provincewithout consulting
her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal
andconsider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote
has not filed a motion towithdraw his appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mengote’s conditional pardon is valid?

RULING:

No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect
until theperson withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and
Mengote has not filed amotion to withdraw his appeal.

ESPUELAS VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-2990; DECEMBER 17, 1951
FACTS:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran,
Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he
were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the
tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing
copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening
News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the
Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written
by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife
translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President
Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife
his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in
the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC
against the Government of the Philippines?
HELD:
Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being
no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be
affirmed with costs.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written
bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the
seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to
persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and
what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on
persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech
cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental
structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes
not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously
refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the
adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone
the conviction could be upheld.
Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or
riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke
violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and
substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir
up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to
resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to
repress the evils which press upon their minds.
 President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and

because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due
process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally
pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
WILFREDO TORRES VS HON. NEPTALI GONZALES constitutional vice.
152 SCRA 272 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Pardon – Not Subject to
Judicial Review/Scrutiny
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and
FACTS: who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
by the president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In
RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a
1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of
convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’
violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to
pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him
Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not
for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him
subject to judicial scrutiny.
were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is

necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of
the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his
original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon,

and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act,
not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the
 FLORENCIO PELOBELLO VS GREGORIO PALATINO
Absolute Pardon
FACTS:
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo
warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold
office because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned.
Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello averred that
Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also
invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-
Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by President
Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after
Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held that
since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and
attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is
therefore eligible for the public office in question.
SALVACION MONSANTO VS DEPUTY EXEC SEC FULGENCIO FACTORAN
Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective
FACTS:
Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was
sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a
letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it
was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance
referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsanto’s
request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon
does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the
pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought
about by her acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for
the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which
has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay
for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner’s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in
the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger
of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.