120 Broadway

Suite 1750
New York, New York 10271
646.292.8310 Fax 212.463.7308
www.brennancenter.org

September 27, 2018

Secretary Lawson
Office of the Indiana Secretary of State
200 W. Washington St., Room 201
Indianapolis, IN 46204

Dear Secretary Lawson,

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I write to alert you to a recent opinion in the case of
Curling v. Kemp, advise you of its potential implications for the few remaining states like Indiana that
continue to use paperless DREs as their primary polling place equipment in at least some jurisdictions,
and offer assistance to minimize the risk of continuing to use these systems this fall, as well as to
transition away from them in 2019.
U.S. District Judge Totenberg’s opinion in Curling highlights some of the substantial risks associated
with the ongoing use of paperless DREs, as well as the ways in which the continued use of such systems
may violate the Constitutional rights of voters. The Court stated that Georgia’s “continued reliance on
the use of DRE machines in public elections likely results in ‘a debasement or dilution of the weight of
[Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not completely deny Plaintiffs the right to vote.”1
Litigation pending in South Carolina also asserts that their vulnerable DRE-based voting system violates
the Constitution.
Importantly, the court’s opinion is consistent with the strong consensus of cyber security, national
security, and election administration experts that paperless DREs present a security risk and must be
replaced promptly. Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report this month urging
that “[a]ll local, state and federal elections should be conducted using human-readable paper ballots by
the 2020 presidential election.” Given these facts, and the mounting public concern over election system
security, it is likely that other states, including Indiana will also soon face litigation to ensure paperless
DREs are replaced prior to 2020.

1
Curling v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.309.0_2.pdf.
We understand it will not be possible to replace all of the paperless voting equipment in Indiana this
year, so soon before a major election. We offer two suggestions to make your elections more secure in
the short and long term.
In the short term, there are a number of steps you can take to minimize the risks of using DREs in the
midterm elections. The Brennan Center has prepared a checklist to assist election officials in
contingency planning, including for those jurisdictions that use DREs. We have attached a copy of that
planning checklist.
Specifically, we recommend focusing on items that will mitigate the risks associated with fielding
DREs. These include:
• Conducting thorough Logic and Accuracy testing on 100% of the voting equipment that will be
used in the November election. This will allow you to verify ballots are appropriately
programmed and identify any calibration issues with individual machines.
• Having emergency backup paper ballots printed and distributed to account for 2 to 3 hours of
peak voting. Backup paper ballots will allow voters to cast a ballot if polling places experience
voting machine failures. This will provide time for election officials to deploy replacement
machines or provide additional paper ballots to a polling place since malfunctioning machines
should never be placed back in service during an election.
For a more permanent solution, we strongly recommend that you begin plans for transitioning to paper-
based voting systems as soon as possible after the conclusion of this November’s elections. Two
Brennan Center experts, Edgardo Cortés and Liz Howard, oversaw the transition to paper-based voting
systems while running Virginia’s state elections office. Another Brennan Center expert, Christopher
Deluzio, is currently assisting the Blue Ribbon Commission on Pennsylvania’s Election Security in its
fact-finding and preparation of a report on Pennsylvania’s election security (including Pennsylvania’s
transition away from DREs). We would welcome the opportunity to work cooperatively with you in
developing and implementing a transition plan rather than engaging in protracted litigation to
accomplish our shared goal of fair and accurate elections.
As Judge Totenberg noted in this week’s opinion, “a wound or reasonably threatened wound to the
integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any specific
election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of voting.”2 We share
the same goal of ensuring well-run elections where all eligible voters have the ability to meaningfully
participate and have their vote counted.
Please let us know if you would like any additional information or have any questions. We look forward
to working with you.
Larry Norden
Deputy Director, Democracy Program
Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu
CC: Co Directors of Elections, Brad King and Angela M. Nussmeyer

2
Id. at 45.
 120 Broadway
Suite 1750
New York, New York 10271
646.292.8310 Fax 212.463.7308
www.brennancenter.org

September 27, 2018

Secretary Kobach
Kansas Secretary of State
Memorial Hall, 1st Floor
120 SW 10th Avenue
Topeka, KS 66612-1594

Dear Secretary Kobach,

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I write to alert you to a recent opinion in the case of Curling
v. Kemp, advise you of its potential implications for the few remaining states like Kansas that continue to
use paperless DREs as their primary polling place equipment in at least some jurisdictions, and offer
assistance to minimize the risk of continuing to use these systems this fall, as well as to transition away
from them in 2019.
U.S. District Judge Totenberg’s opinion in Curling highlights some of the substantial risks associated
with the ongoing use of paperless DREs, as well as the ways in which the continued use of such systems
may violate the Constitutional rights of voters. The Court stated that Georgia’s “continued reliance on the
use of DRE machines in public elections likely results in ‘a debasement or dilution of the weight of
[Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not completely deny Plaintiffs the right to vote.”1
Litigation pending in South Carolina also asserts that their vulnerable DRE-based voting system violates
the Constitution.
Importantly, the court’s opinion is consistent with the strong consensus of cyber security, national
security, and election administration experts that paperless DREs present a security risk and must be
replaced promptly. Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report this month urging
that “[a]ll local, state and federal elections should be conducted using human-readable paper ballots by the
2020 presidential election.” Given these facts, and the mounting public concern over election system
security, it is likely that other states, including Kansas will also soon face litigation to ensure paperless
DREs are replaced prior to 2020.

1
Curling v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.309.0_2.pdf.
While Kansas recently prohibited any future purchases of voting machines that do not create a paper
record of each vote cast, simply phasing out paperless voting machines slowly is not a sufficient response
to the risks associated with the ongoing use of these machines.
We understand it will not be possible to replace all of the paperless voting equipment in Kansas this year,
so soon before a major election. We offer two suggestions to make your elections more secure in the short
and long term.
In the short term, there are a number of steps you can take to minimize the risks of using DREs in the
midterm elections. The Brennan Center has prepared a checklist to assist election officials in contingency
planning, including for those jurisdictions that use DREs. We have attached a copy of that planning
checklist.
Specifically, we recommend focusing on items that will mitigate the risks associated with fielding DREs.
These include:
• Conducting thorough Logic and Accuracy testing on 100% of the voting equipment that will be
used in the November election. This will allow you to verify ballots are appropriately
programmed and identify any calibration issues with individual machines.
• Having emergency backup paper ballots printed and distributed to account for 2 to 3 hours of peak
voting. Backup paper ballots will allow voters to cast a ballot if polling places experience voting
machine failures. This will provide time for election officials to deploy replacement machines or
provide additional paper ballots to a polling place since malfunctioning machines should never be
placed back in service during an election.
For a more permanent solution, we strongly recommend that you begin plans for transitioning to paper-
based voting systems as soon as possible after the conclusion of this November’s elections. Two Brennan
Center experts, Edgardo Cortés and Liz Howard, oversaw the transition to paper-based voting systems
while running Virginia’s state elections office. Another Brennan Center expert, Christopher Deluzio, is
currently assisting the Blue Ribbon Commission on Pennsylvania’s Election Security in its fact-finding
and preparation of a report on Pennsylvania’s election security (including Pennsylvania’s transition away
from DREs). We would welcome the opportunity to work cooperatively with you in developing and
implementing a transition plan rather than engaging in protracted litigation to accomplish our shared goal
of fair and accurate elections.
As Judge Totenberg noted in this week’s opinion, “a wound or reasonably threatened wound to the
integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any specific
election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of voting.”2 We share the
same goal of ensuring well-run elections where all eligible voters have the ability to meaningfully
participate and have their vote counted.
Please let us know if you would like any additional information or have any questions. We look forward
to working with you.
Larry Norden
Deputy Director, Democracy Program
Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu
CC: Election Director, Bryan Caskey
2
Id. at 45.
 120 Broadway
Suite 1750
New York, New York 10271
646.292.8310 Fax 212.463.7308
www.brennancenter.org

September 27, 2018

Secretary Grimes
Office of the Secretary of State
Capitol Annex, Land Office
702 Capital Ave., Ste. 21-B
Frankfort, KY 40601

Dear Secretary Grimes,

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I write to alert you to a recent opinion in the case of Curling
v. Kemp, advise you of its potential implications for the few remaining states like Kentucky that continue
to use paperless DREs as their primary polling place equipment in at least some jurisdictions, and offer
assistance to minimize the risk of continuing to use these systems this fall, as well as to transition away
from them in 2019.
U.S. District Judge Totenberg’s opinion in Curling highlights some of the substantial risks associated
with the ongoing use of paperless DREs, as well as the ways in which the continued use of such systems
may violate the Constitutional rights of voters. The Court stated that Georgia’s “continued reliance on the
use of DRE machines in public elections likely results in ‘a debasement or dilution of the weight of
[Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not completely deny Plaintiffs the right to vote.”1
Litigation pending in South Carolina also asserts that their vulnerable DRE-based voting system violates
the Constitution.
Importantly, the court’s opinion is consistent with the strong consensus of cyber security, national
security, and election administration experts that paperless DREs present a security risk and must be
replaced promptly. Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report this month urging
that “[a]ll local, state and federal elections should be conducted using human-readable paper ballots by the
2020 presidential election.” Given these facts, and the mounting public concern over election system
security, it is likely that other states, including Kentucky will also soon face litigation to ensure paperless
DREs are replaced prior to 2020.
While Kentucky recently prohibited any future purchases of voting machines that do not create a voter-
verified paper trail, simply phasing out paperless voting machines slowly is not a sufficient response to
the risks associated with the ongoing use of these machines.

1
Curling v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.309.0_2.pdf.
We understand it will not be possible to replace all of the paperless voting equipment in Kentucky this
year, so soon before a major election. We offer two suggestions to make your elections more secure in the
short and long term.
In the short term, there are a number of steps you can take to minimize the risks of using DREs in the
midterm elections. The Brennan Center has prepared a checklist to assist election officials in contingency
planning, including for those jurisdictions that use DREs. We have attached a copy of that planning
checklist.
Specifically, we recommend focusing on items that will mitigate the risks associated with fielding DREs.
These include:
• Conducting thorough Logic and Accuracy testing on 100% of the voting equipment that will be
used in the November election. This will allow you to verify ballots are appropriately
programmed and identify any calibration issues with individual machines.
• Having emergency backup paper ballots printed and distributed to account for 2 to 3 hours of peak
voting. Backup paper ballots will allow voters to cast a ballot if polling places experience voting
machine failures. This will provide time for election officials to deploy replacement machines or
provide additional paper ballots to a polling place since malfunctioning machines should never be
placed back in service during an election.
For a more permanent solution, we strongly recommend that you begin plans for transitioning to paper-
based voting systems as soon as possible after the conclusion of this November’s elections. Two Brennan
Center experts, Edgardo Cortés and Liz Howard, oversaw the transition to paper-based voting systems
while running Virginia’s state elections office. Another Brennan Center expert, Christopher Deluzio, is
currently assisting the Blue Ribbon Commission on Pennsylvania’s Election Security in its fact-finding
and preparation of a report on Pennsylvania’s election security (including Pennsylvania’s transition away
from DREs). We would welcome the opportunity to work cooperatively with you in developing and
implementing a transition plan rather than engaging in protracted litigation to accomplish our shared goal
of fair and accurate elections.
As Judge Totenberg noted in this week’s opinion, “a wound or reasonably threatened wound to the
integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any specific
election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of voting.”2 We share the
same goal of ensuring well-run elections where all eligible voters have the ability to meaningfully
participate and have their vote counted.
Please let us know if you would like any additional information or have any questions. We look forward
to working with you.

Larry Norden
Deputy Director, Democracy Program
Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu
CC: Executive Director State Board of Elections, Jared Dearing

2
Id. at 45.
 120 Broadway
Suite 1750
New York, New York 10271
646.292.8310 Fax 212.463.7308
www.brennancenter.org

September 27, 2018

Secretary Hoseman
Mississippi Secretary of State
401 Mississippi Street
Jackson, MS 39201

Dear Secretary Hoseman,

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I write to alert you to a recent opinion in the case of Curling
v. Kemp, advise you of its potential implications for the few remaining states like Mississippi that
continue to use paperless DREs as their primary polling place equipment in at least some jurisdictions,
and offer assistance to minimize the risk of continuing to use these systems this fall, as well as to
transition away from them in 2019.
U.S. District Judge Totenberg’s opinion in Curling highlights some of the substantial risks associated
with the ongoing use of paperless DREs, as well as the ways in which the continued use of such systems
may violate the Constitutional rights of voters. The Court stated that Georgia’s “continued reliance on the
use of DRE machines in public elections likely results in ‘a debasement or dilution of the weight of
[Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not completely deny Plaintiffs the right to vote.”1
Litigation pending in South Carolina also asserts that their vulnerable DRE-based voting system violates
the Constitution.
Importantly, the court’s opinion is consistent with the strong consensus of cyber security, national
security, and election administration experts that paperless DREs present a security risk and must be
replaced promptly. Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report this month urging
that “[a]ll local, state and federal elections should be conducted using human-readable paper ballots by the
2020 presidential election.” Given these facts, and the mounting public concern over election system
security, it is likely that other states, including Mississippi will also soon face litigation to ensure
paperless DREs are replaced prior to 2020.
We understand it will not be possible to replace all of the paperless voting equipment in Mississippi this
year, so soon before a major election. We offer two suggestions to make your elections more secure in the
short and long term.

1
Curling v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.309.0_2.pdf.
In the short term, there are a number of steps you can take to minimize the risks of using DREs in the
midterm elections. The Brennan Center has prepared a checklist to assist election officials in contingency
planning, including for those jurisdictions that use DREs. We have attached a copy of that planning
checklist.
Specifically, we recommend focusing on items that will mitigate the risks associated with fielding DREs.
These include:
• Conducting thorough Logic and Accuracy testing on 100% of the voting equipment that will be
used in the November election. This will allow you to verify ballots are appropriately
programmed and identify any calibration issues with individual machines.
• Having emergency backup paper ballots printed and distributed to account for 2 to 3 hours of peak
voting. Backup paper ballots will allow voters to cast a ballot if polling places experience voting
machine failures. This will provide time for election officials to deploy replacement machines or
provide additional paper ballots to a polling place since malfunctioning machines should never be
placed back in service during an election.
For a more permanent solution, we strongly recommend that you begin plans for transitioning to paper-
based voting systems as soon as possible after the conclusion of this November’s elections. Two Brennan
Center experts, Edgardo Cortés and Liz Howard, oversaw the transition to paper-based voting systems
while running Virginia’s state elections office. Another Brennan Center expert, Christopher Deluzio, is
currently assisting the Blue Ribbon Commission on Pennsylvania’s Election Security in its fact-finding
and preparation of a report on Pennsylvania’s election security (including Pennsylvania’s transition away
from DREs). We would welcome the opportunity to work cooperatively with you in developing and
implementing a transition plan rather than engaging in protracted litigation to accomplish our shared goal
of fair and accurate elections.
As Judge Totenberg noted in this week’s opinion, “a wound or reasonably threatened wound to the
integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any specific
election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of voting.”2 We share the
same goal of ensuring well-run elections where all eligible voters have the ability to meaningfully
participate and have their vote counted.
Please let us know if you would like any additional information or have any questions. We look forward
to working with you.

Larry Norden
Deputy Director, Democracy Program
Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu
CC: Senior Attorney, Elections Division, Kim Turner

2
Id. at 45.
 120 Broadway
Suite 1750
New York, New York 10271
646.292.8310 Fax 212.463.7308
www.brennancenter.org

September 29, 2018

Secretary Way
New Jersey Secretary of State
P.O. Box 300, Trenton, NJ 08625

Dear Secretary Way,

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I write to alert you to a recent opinion in the case of
Curling v. Kemp, advise you of its potential implications for the few remaining states like New
Jersey that continue to use paperless DREs as their primary polling place equipment, and offer
assistance to minimize the risk of continuing to use these systems this fall, as well as to transition
away from them in 2019.
U.S. District Judge Totenberg’s opinion in Curling highlights some of the substantial risks
associated with the ongoing use of paperless DREs, as well as the ways in which the continued
use of such systems may violate the Constitutional rights of voters. The Court stated that
Georgia’s “continued reliance on the use of DRE machines in public elections likely results in ‘a
debasement or dilution of the weight of [Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not
completely deny Plaintiffs the right to vote.”1 Litigation pending in South Carolina also asserts
that their vulnerable DRE-based voting system violates the Constitution.
Importantly, the court’s opinion is consistent with the strong consensus of cyber security,
national security, and election administration experts that paperless DREs present a security risk
and must be replaced promptly. Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences issued a
report this month urging that “[a]ll local, state and federal elections should be conducted using
human-readable paper ballots by the 2020 presidential election.” Given these facts, and the
mounting public concern over election system security, it is likely that other states, including
New Jersey will also soon face litigation to ensure paperless DREs are replaced prior to 2020.
We understand it will not be possible to replace all of the paperless voting equipment in New
Jersey this year, so soon before a major election. We offer two suggestions to make your
elections more secure in the short and long term.

1
Curling v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.309.0_2.pdf.
In the short term, there are a number of steps you can take to minimize the risks of using DREs
in the midterm elections. The Brennan Center has prepared a checklist to assist election officials
in contingency planning, including for those jurisdictions that use DREs. We have attached a
copy of that planning checklist.
Specifically, we recommend focusing on items that will mitigate the risks associated with
fielding DREs. These include:
• Conducting thorough Logic and Accuracy testing on 100% of the voting equipment that
will be used in the November election. This will allow you to verify ballots are
appropriately programmed and identify any calibration issues with individual machines.
• Having emergency backup paper ballots printed and distributed to account for 2 to 3
hours of peak voting. Backup paper ballots will allow voters to cast a ballot if polling
places experience voting machine failures. This will provide time for election officials to
deploy replacement machines or provide additional paper ballots to a polling place since
malfunctioning machines should never be placed back in service during an election.
For a more permanent solution, we strongly recommend that you begin plans for transitioning to
paper-based voting systems as soon as possible after the conclusion of this November’s
elections. Two Brennan Center experts, Edgardo Cortés and Liz Howard, oversaw the transition
to paper-based voting systems while running Virginia’s state elections office. Another Brennan
Center expert, Christopher Deluzio, is currently assisting the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Pennsylvania’s Election Security in its fact-finding and preparation of a report on Pennsylvania’s
election security (including Pennsylvania’s transition away from DREs). We would welcome the
opportunity to work cooperatively with you in developing and implementing a transition plan
rather than engaging in protracted litigation to accomplish our shared goal of fair and accurate
elections.
As Judge Totenberg noted in this week’s opinion, “a wound or reasonably threatened wound to
the integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any
specific election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of
voting.”2 We share the same goal of ensuring well-run elections where all eligible voters have
the ability to meaningfully participate and have their vote counted.
Please let us know if you would like any additional information or have any questions. We look
forward to working with you.

Larry Norden
Deputy Director, Democracy Program
Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu
CC: Election Division Director, Robert F. Giles

2
Id. at 45.
 120 Broadway
Suite 1750
New York, New York 10271
646.292.8310 Fax 212.463.7308
www.brennancenter.org

September 27, 2018

Chairman Way
State Election Commission
P.O. Box 5987
Columbia, SC 29250-5987

Dear Chairman Way,

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I write to alert you to a recent opinion in the case of
Curling v. Kemp, advise you of its potential implications for the few remaining states like South
Carolina that continue to use paperless DREs as their primary polling place equipment, and offer
assistance to minimize the risk of continuing to use these systems this fall, as well as to transition
away from them in 2019.
U.S. District Judge Totenberg’s opinion in Curling highlights some of the substantial risks
associated with the ongoing use of paperless DREs, as well as the ways in which the continued
use of such systems may violate the Constitutional rights of voters. The Court stated that
Georgia’s “continued reliance on the use of DRE machines in public elections likely results in ‘a
debasement or dilution of the weight of [Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not
completely deny Plaintiffs the right to vote.”1
Importantly, the court’s opinion is consistent with the strong consensus of cyber security,
national security, and election administration experts that paperless DREs present a security risk
and must be replaced promptly. Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences issued a
report this month urging that “[a]ll local, state and federal elections should be conducted using
human-readable paper ballots by the 2020 presidential election.” Given these facts, and the
mounting public concern over election system security, it is likely that other states, including
South Carolina will also soon face litigation to ensure paperless DREs are replaced prior to 2020.
We understand it will not be possible to replace all of the paperless voting equipment in South
Carolina this year, so soon before a major election. We offer two suggestions to make your
elections more secure in the short and long term.

1
Curling v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.309.0_2.pdf.
In the short term, there are a number of steps you can take to minimize the risks of using DREs
in the midterm elections. The Brennan Center has prepared a checklist to assist election officials
in contingency planning, including for those jurisdictions that use DREs. We have attached a
copy of that planning checklist.
Specifically, we recommend focusing on items that will mitigate the risks associated with
fielding DREs. These include:
• Conducting thorough Logic and Accuracy testing on 100% of the voting equipment that
will be used in the November election. This will allow you to verify ballots are
appropriately programmed and identify any calibration issues with individual machines.
• Having emergency backup paper ballots printed and distributed to account for 2 to 3
hours of peak voting. Backup paper ballots will allow voters to cast a ballot if polling
places experience voting machine failures. This will provide time for election officials to
deploy replacement machines or provide additional paper ballots to a polling place since
malfunctioning machines should never be placed back in service during an election.
For a more permanent solution, we strongly recommend that you begin plans for transitioning to
paper-based voting systems as soon as possible after the conclusion of this November’s
elections. Two Brennan Center experts, Edgardo Cortés and Liz Howard, oversaw the transition
to paper-based voting systems while running Virginia’s state elections office. Another Brennan
Center expert, Christopher Deluzio, is currently assisting the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Pennsylvania’s Election Security in its fact-finding and preparation of a report on Pennsylvania’s
election security (including Pennsylvania’s transition away from DREs). We would welcome the
opportunity to work cooperatively with you in developing and implementing a transition plan
rather than engaging in protracted litigation to accomplish our shared goal of fair and accurate
elections.
As Judge Totenberg noted in this week’s opinion, “a wound or reasonably threatened wound to
the integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any
specific election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of
voting.”2 We share the same goal of ensuring well-run elections where all eligible voters have
the ability to meaningfully participate and have their vote counted.
Please let us know if you would like any additional information or have any questions. We look
forward to working with you.

Larry Norden
Deputy Director, Democracy Program
Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu
CC: Executive Director State Election Commission, Marci Andino

2
Id. at 45.
 120 Broadway
Suite 1750
New York, New York 10271
646.292.8310 Fax 212.463.7308
www.brennancenter.org

September 27, 2018

Secretary Hargett
312 Rosa L. Parks Avenue
8th Floor, Snodgrass Tower
Nashville , TN 37243-1102

Dear Secretary Hargett,

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I write to alert you to a recent opinion in the case of
Curling v. Kemp, advise you of its potential implications for the few remaining states like
Tennessee that continue to use paperless DREs as their primary polling place equipment in at
least some jurisdictions, and offer assistance to minimize the risk of continuing to use these
systems this fall, as well as to transition away from them in 2019.
U.S. District Judge Totenberg’s opinion in Curling highlights some of the substantial risks
associated with the ongoing use of paperless DREs, as well as the ways in which the continued
use of such systems may violate the Constitutional rights of voters. The Court stated that
Georgia’s “continued reliance on the use of DRE machines in public elections likely results in ‘a
debasement or dilution of the weight of [Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not
completely deny Plaintiffs the right to vote.”1 Litigation pending in South Carolina also asserts
that their vulnerable DRE-based voting system violates the Constitution.
Importantly, the court’s opinion is consistent with the strong consensus of cyber security,
national security, and election administration experts that paperless DREs present a security risk
and must be replaced promptly. Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences issued a
report this month urging that “[a]ll local, state and federal elections should be conducted using
human-readable paper ballots by the 2020 presidential election.” Given these facts, and the
mounting public concern over election system security, it is likely that other states, including
Tennessee will also soon face litigation to ensure paperless DREs are replaced prior to 2020.
We understand it will not be possible to replace all of the paperless voting equipment in
Tennessee this year, so soon before a major election. We offer two suggestions to make your
elections more secure in the short and long term.

1
Curling v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.309.0_2.pdf.
In the short term, there are a number of steps you can take to minimize the risks of using DREs
in the midterm elections. The Brennan Center has prepared a checklist to assist election officials
in contingency planning, including for those jurisdictions that use DREs. We have attached a
copy of that planning checklist.
Specifically, we recommend focusing on items that will mitigate the risks associated with
fielding DREs. These include:
• Conducting thorough Logic and Accuracy testing on 100% of the voting equipment that
will be used in the November election. This will allow you to verify ballots are
appropriately programmed and identify any calibration issues with individual machines.
• Having emergency backup paper ballots printed and distributed to account for 2 to 3
hours of peak voting. Backup paper ballots will allow voters to cast a ballot if polling
places experience voting machine failures. This will provide time for election officials to
deploy replacement machines or provide additional paper ballots to a polling place since
malfunctioning machines should never be placed back in service during an election.
For a more permanent solution, we strongly recommend that you begin plans for transitioning to
paper-based voting systems as soon as possible after the conclusion of this November’s
elections. Two Brennan Center experts, Edgardo Cortés and Liz Howard, oversaw the transition
to paper-based voting systems while running Virginia’s state elections office. Another Brennan
Center expert, Christopher Deluzio, is currently assisting the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Pennsylvania’s Election Security in its fact-finding and preparation of a report on Pennsylvania’s
election security (including Pennsylvania’s transition away from DREs). We would welcome the
opportunity to work cooperatively with you in developing and implementing a transition plan
rather than engaging in protracted litigation to accomplish our shared goal of fair and accurate
elections.
As Judge Totenberg noted in this week’s opinion, “a wound or reasonably threatened wound to
the integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any
specific election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of
voting.”2 We share the same goal of ensuring well-run elections where all eligible voters have
the ability to meaningfully participate and have their vote counted.
Please let us know if you would like any additional information or have any questions. We look
forward to working with you.

Larry Norden
Deputy Director, Democracy Program
Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu
CC: Coordinator of Elections, Mark Goins

2
Id. at 45.
 120 Broadway
Suite 1750
New York, New York 10271
646.292.8310 Fax 212.463.7308
www.brennancenter.org

September 27, 2018

Secretary Pablos
Office of the Texas Secretary of State
P.O. Box 12887
Austin, Texas 78711-2887

Dear Secretary Pablos,

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I write to alert you to a recent opinion in the case of
Curling v. Kemp, advise you of its potential implications for the few remaining states like Texas
that continue to use paperless DREs as their primary polling place equipment in at least some
jurisdictions, and offer assistance to minimize the risk of continuing to use these systems this
fall, as well as to transition away from them in 2019.
U.S. District Judge Totenberg’s opinion in Curling highlights some of the substantial risks
associated with the ongoing use of paperless DREs, as well as the ways in which the continued
use of such systems may violate the Constitutional rights of voters. The Court stated that
Georgia’s “continued reliance on the use of DRE machines in public elections likely results in ‘a
debasement or dilution of the weight of [Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not
completely deny Plaintiffs the right to vote.”1 Litigation pending in South Carolina also asserts
that their vulnerable DRE-based voting system violates the Constitution.
Importantly, court’s opinion is consistent with the strong consensus of cyber security, national
security, and election administration experts that paperless DREs present a security risk and must
be replaced promptly. Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report this
month urging that “[a]ll local, state and federal elections should be conducted using human-
readable paper ballots by the 2020 presidential election.” Given these facts, and the mounting
public concern over election system security, it is likely that other states, including Texas will
also soon face litigation to ensure paperless DREs are replaced prior to 2020.
We understand it will not be possible to replace all of the paperless voting equipment in Texas
this year, so soon before a major election. We offer two suggestions to make your elections more
secure in the short and long term.

1
Curling v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.309.0_2.pdf.
In the short term, there are a number of steps you can take to minimize the risks of using DREs
in the midterm elections. The Brennan Center has prepared a checklist to assist election officials
in contingency planning, including for those jurisdictions that use DREs. We have attached a
copy of that planning checklist.
Specifically, we recommend focusing on items that will mitigate the risks associated with
fielding DREs. These include:
• Conducting thorough Logic and Accuracy testing on 100% of the voting equipment that
will be used in the November election. This will allow you to verify ballots are
appropriately programmed and identify any calibration issues with individual machines.
• Having emergency backup paper ballots printed and distributed to account for 2 to 3
hours of peak voting. Backup paper ballots will allow voters to cast a ballot if polling
places experience voting machine failures. This will provide time for election officials to
deploy replacement machines or provide additional paper ballots to a polling place since
malfunctioning machines should never be placed back in service during an election.
For a more permanent solution, we strongly recommend that you begin plans for transitioning to
paper-based voting systems as soon as possible after the conclusion of this November’s
elections. Two Brennan Center experts, Edgardo Cortés and Liz Howard, oversaw the transition
to paper-based voting systems while running Virginia’s state elections office. Another Brennan
Center expert, Christopher Deluzio, is currently assisting the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Pennsylvania’s Election Security in its fact-finding and preparation of a report on Pennsylvania’s
election security (including Pennsylvania’s transition away from DREs). We would welcome the
opportunity to work cooperatively with you in developing and implementing a transition plan
rather than engaging in protracted litigation to accomplish our shared goal of fair and accurate
elections.
As Judge Totenberg noted in this week’s opinion, “a wound or reasonably threatened wound to
the integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any
specific election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of
voting.”2 We share the same goal of ensuring well-run elections where all eligible voters have
the ability to meaningfully participate and have their vote counted.
Please let us know if you would like any additional information or have any questions. We look
forward to working with you.

Larry Norden
Deputy Director, Democracy Program
Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu
CC: Director of Elections, Keith Ingram

2
Id. at 45.