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Engineering Standard Operations

Rolling Stock

MFST 830100-01

TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE STANDARD

Version: 1

Issued: June 2012

Owner: Standards Development Manager

Approved By: Authorise For Use By:

Ahmed Dwidar YS Au

Standards Development Manager Chief Engineer

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Approval

Name Position Signature


Rolling Stock
Document
Eddie Yeung Independent
Author
Engineer

Fleet
Victor So Engineering
Manger
Document
Endorsers
GM Current
Wayne Walsh
Operations

Standards
Approving
Ahmed Dwidar Development
Manager
Manager

Authorised
YS Au Chief Engineer
For Use

Amendment Record

Approval Date Version Description


Initial issue under MTM. Originally prepared by Graham
25/06/2012 1 Vallance Consultant – RMAus & Terry Lai MTR Support,
14/12/2010.

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Table of Contents

1 Scope and Purpose .....................................................................................................4

2 Abbreviation ................................................................................................................4

3 Definition......................................................................................................................5

4 References and Legislation ........................................................................................5

5 Responsibilities ...........................................................................................................5

6 Safety & Environmental ..............................................................................................5

7 Approach......................................................................................................................5

8 Minimum in In-Service Conditions .............................................................................7

9 Related Documents ...................................................................................................11

10 Appendix ....................................................................................................................12

List of Tables

Table 1: Minimum in In-Service Conditions............................................................................ 7

Table 2: Comeng Critical Fault – 1st Level ........................................................................... 12

Table 3: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 1st Level........................................................................... 13

Table 4: Siemens Critical Fault - 1st Level........................................................................... 14

Table 5: Hitachi Critical Fault - 1st Level.............................................................................. 15

Table 6: Comeng Critical Fault - 2nd Level.......................................................................... 16

Table 7: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 2nd Level ......................................................................... 17

Table 8: Siemens Critical Fault - 2nd Level ......................................................................... 18

Table 9: Hitachi Critical - Fault - 2nd Level .......................................................................... 19

List of Figures

Figure 1: Fault Classification and Handling............................................................................ 6

Figure 2: Minimum In-Service Standards Development ......................................................... 6

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

1 Scope and Purpose


1.1 The purpose of this document is to set out the Minimum In-Service Standards for
passenger train service safety. Failure to comply with specified requirements of
these standards may increase the risks in passenger safety and safety of railway
operation.
1.2 Minimum In-Service Standards consists of two parts:
i. Fit-to-Run Conditions after Maintenance, and
ii. Minimum In-Service Conditions.
1.3 The “Fit-to-Run Conditions after Maintenance” are specified in RS Technical
Maintenance Plan (TMP) and owned by General Manager – Rolling Stock. This
document shall serve as a baseline against which the preventive maintenance for RS
fleets shall be developed and reviewed.
1.4 This document only defines the minimum performance requirements for equipment
on RS fleets operating in-service. The achievement of such requirements shall be
maintained through condition-based, preventive and corrective maintenance
activities carried out by RS Department.
1.5 This standard is applicable to the following passenger train types:
 Comeng Train
 X’Trapolis Train
 Siemens Train
 Hitachi Train

2 Abbreviation
BVIC Brake Valve Isolation Cock
C Comeng Train both Tread & Disc
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CD Comeng Train Disc type
CT Comeng Train Tread type
DDU Driver's Displace Unit
FSS Flinders Street Station
H Hitachi Train
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
MURL Melbourne Underground Rail Link
PA Personal Address
PEI Passenger Emergency Intercom
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
R1 RMAus Risk Level 1
R2 RMAus Risk Level 2
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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

R3 RMAus Risk Level 3


R4 RMAus Risk Level 4
RS Rolling Stock
S Siemens Train
TMP Technical Maintenance Plan
VICERS Vigilance Control and Event Recorder System
X X’TrapolisTrain

3 Definition
Nil

4 References and Legislation


Nil

5 Responsibilities
Nil

6 Safety & Environmental


Nil

7 Approach
7.1 Risk based approach is adopted for the development of standards. The review
results documented in the report “Functional Safety Risk Assessment to determine
Minimum Requirements for Electric Trains’ prepared by RMAus is the basis for the
development.
7.2 R1 & R2 hazards identified are classified as Critical Faults which are further divided
into 2 levels depending on the fault handling requirements. A complete Critical
Faults list is shown in Appendix A. The remaining hazards with risk ratings lower
than R2 are classified as Non-Critical Faults. The approach for the fault classification
is illustrated in the below flow chart. In principal, a train reported as having a Critical
Fault shall be withdrawn from service. A Level 1 Critical Fault demands train
withdrawal ASAP whilst a Level 2 Critical Fault (ie. Serious Fault as per Metro Train
Operating Standard) allows a train to be withdrawn at the best opportunity to
minimize interruption to train service.

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Risk Assessment Results


Fault
Classification
No
R1 or R2
Hazard?

Yes
Non -Critical
Fault
No
A Single Independent
Failure Event Resulting
in R1 & R2 Hazard?

Yes Yes
Need to be removed
from service i.a.w with
Service Pledge? Operational Yes
Mitigation in
Place? Yes
No No
ASAP?
No

Critical Fault – Critical Fault –


Yes 1st Level 2nd Level

Fault
Handling Train Handling i.a.w Train Withdrawal Train Withdrawal in the Best
Service Pledge from Service Opportunity to Minimise
Train Service Impact

Figure 1: Fault Classification and Handling

7.3 Based on the Critical Fault List, the functional requirements of the equipment whose
failure will lead to a Critical Fault then form the Minimum In-Service Condition
requirements. The approach for the development of the Minimum In-Service
Condition requirements is illustrated on below flow chart.

Fit-To-Run Condition Minimum In Service


After Maintenance Condition

Train Maintenance List of Min Train Equipment


Standards/
Specifications
+ Condition Requirements
(Free from R1 & R2 hazards)

• Train Exam
Checklists
•Major Eqt ( e.g Bogie
& T/M Overhaul
Specifications)
Minimum In-Service
Standards

Figure 2: Minimum In-Service Standards Development

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

8 Minimum in In-Service Conditions


8.1 Identified mitigations shall be applied when the minimum requirements of the in-
service conditions stipulated in the below table cannot be met. Train handling shall
follow the requirements for Level 1 or Level 2 Critical Fault accordingly.
Table 1: Minimum in In-Service Conditions

Component Train Min Requirements Recommended Operational


Equipment Type Control if Min Requirements
(Note 1) cannot be met

Body & External Fittings

Saloon Windows H,C,S,X All Saloon windows shall be Competent employee to


correctly installed and fully protect the open area if
secured with key rubbers and there is any window glass
safety clamps. missing.

Windows, external H,C,S,X All externally mounted equipment The train may proceed
panels, mirrors, shall be in compliance with where damaged equipment
handrails, steps, allowable train outline. can be secured to ensure it
tread plate, does not drag, threaten
equipment covers, other equipment or in any
underframe way exceed allowable
equipment outline.
Drivers mirror / side H,C,S,X All Driver's mirrors and windows
windows shall provide clear rear view of
train.
Driving Cab H,C,S,X Lead cab to be within operating Swept area of the
Windscreen standard. windscreen wiper to be
cleaned to provide sufficient
view to permit safe operation
of the train.
Brake

Air Brake H,C,S,X (i) All Service brakes shall be fully The train may proceed at
functional with braking to each reduced speed under bogie
axle in compliance with each isolated conditions. Details
braking mode. will be provided once mutual
(ii) All emergency brakes shall be agreement with TSV is
fully functional with braking to achieved.
each axle.
Brake Valve C,H The Brake Valve Isolating Cock
Isolation Cock and Switch shall be fully
(BVIC) and switch functional.
Auto Park Brake C,H All Parking Brakes and operating Minimum number of
Switch equipment shall be fully operating Park Brake
functional. Cylinders must be 50% or
Park Brake Switch - C,H greater to hold a fully loaded
local train in the suburban
Park Brake Switch - C,H, S system.
train line

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Component Train Min Requirements Recommended Operational


Equipment Type Control if Min Requirements
(Note 1) cannot be met

Couplings

Scharfenberg C,X (i) All Automatic Couplers, semi-


Dellner S permanent couplers and
Transition Couplers shall be fully
Auto-coupler H mechanically, pneumatically and
Semi-permanent C,S,X electrically functional.
coupler (ii) All train separation detection
Transition coupler C,S,X devices shall be fully functional.
Gangway & Safety H,C At least one chain shall be Cable ties are available for
chains securely and correctly connected Driver to effect temporary
and 2 handrails to be available. repair or Communication
Doors are to be locked to
prevent passengers using
the walkway.
Communications
PA H,C,S,X All PA communication equipment PA of lead car must be
shall be fully functional to ensure operational.
correct and reliable operation.
Fixed Train Radio H,C,S,X Fixed Train Radio The train may proceed if the
Driver has adequate
communication via his
mobile telephone and
portable radio.
Saloon area C,S,X 000 Stickers Serious with a Priority shunt
intercom and Regular PA announcements
emergency call
button.
Whistle H,C,S,X At least one whistle tone warning
shall be functional.

Doors
Door control H,C,S,X (i) All Saloon Doors shall be fully The train may proceed
functional. where the Driver can detect
(ii) Door interlock circuits (Door the fault and take steps to
closed and traction control secure the doors or vacate
circuits) shall be fully functional. the car.
(iii) Door obstacle detection shall No more than 1 door per
be fully functional. side per car to be
inoperative.
Cab to Saloon Door C,S,X Cab to Saloon doors shall be The Cab to Saloon Door of
operated properly. the leading and unattended
cabs must be able to lock.
Or competent employee
travelling to protect

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Component Train Min Requirements Recommended Operational


Equipment Type Control if Min Requirements
(Note 1) cannot be met

Cab Door C,S,X Cab Door of the leading cab shall For Siemens, withdraw the
be able to be operated properly. train if door loop is
Cab Door of the unattended cabs bypassed.
must be able to be locked and For Comeng, the leading
secured. cab door may be fitted with
door latch or dead bolts to
Cab Door as redundant
device provided that the Cab
to Saloon Door is operative.
Cab Door H The Cab Door shall be open and The driver shall secure the
close properly. Cab Door at the leading and
unattended cabs and
withdraw the train from
service.
Environmental Controls

HVAC heating, C,X When ambient temperature > 30 The train may proceed
cooling for cab. . deg C, all leading and trailing car where the Driver’s exposure
2xCab heaters. air conditioning units shall be able to the hot cab does not
exceed 1.5 hours. The driver
to provide the required cooling
shall carry a Thermos flask
requirements and drinks and cooled water
shall be available at FSS
and terminal stations.
HVAC x2 heating, H When ambient temperature > 30 The train may proceed
cooling for cab. deg C, all leading and trailing car where the Driver’s exposure
2xCab heaters. air conditioning units shall be able to the hot cab does not
exceed 1.5 hours. The driver
to provide the required cooling
shall carry a Thermos flask
HVAC heating, S requirements. and drinks and cooled water
cooling for cab. shall be available at FSS
1xCab heater. and terminal stations.
HVAC heating, C,S,X At least one air conditioning unit
cooling for saloon. per car shall provide conditioned
air flow.
Ventilation & Air C,X At least one air conditioning unit
filtering. per car shall still provide fresh air
HVAC ventilation H,S flow.
fans.

Cab booster fan. C,X When ambient temperature > 30 The train may proceed
deg C, all cab fans shall be able where the Driver’s exposure
to provide adequate air flow to the to the hot cab does not
cabs. exceed 1.5 hours. The driver
shall carry a Thermos flask
and drinks and cooled water
shall be available at FSS
Cab fan. S and terminal stations

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Train Min Requirements Recommended Operational


Type Control if Min Requirements
Component (Note 1) cannot be met
Equipment

Internal Fittings & Furnishings

Drivers blinds H,C,S,X The Blind shall be adjustable to


the degree that driver can safely
control train including the use of
PPE.
Saloon Windows. H,C,S,X All Saloon windows shall be Competent employee to
correctly installed and fully protect the open area if
secured with key rubbers and there is any window glass
safety clamps. missing.

Lighting

Headlights -Low & H,C,S,X At least one Headlight per side of During daylight hours no
High beam the leading cab shall illuminate. headlights required. In
MURL/Richmond tunnel a
50kph speed restriction is to
be applied. During night
hours no headlights required
normal white marker lights
are to be illuminated and
speed must not exceed
50kph and 15 kph through
sidings and stations.
Suspension

Secondary X All Primary and Secondary The train may proceed at


suspension. Coil suspension components shall be reduced speed (30kph)
with rubber intact and set at correct ride where the suspension height
element. height. cannot be maintained.

Secondary H,C,S, All Primary suspension The train may proceed at


suspension. 2x components shall be intact. Air- reduced speed (30 kph and
Airbags. Bump bags shall be inflated and set at 80 kph for Siemens) where
stops. correct ride height
the suspension height
cannot be maintained.

Traction

Gear case C All Gear cases shall be fully and


correctly secured to the traction
motor and axle.
Gear box/WN H,S, X The Gearbox and traction motor
coupling coupling shall be fully functional.
Traction cables & H,C All traction cables shall be fully
connections. insulated and secured.

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Component Train Min Requirements Recommended Operational


Equipment Type Control if Min Requirements
(Note 1) cannot be met

Traction Control

Foot& Hand pilot H,C,S,X All Safety devices such as Hand Either foot or hand pilot
valve and Foot Pilot Valves and Control valve must be operative.
Governors shall be fully
functional.
Master Controller H,C,S,X All Traction and control
equipment shall be fully functional
and comply with specified
operational requirements
Wheels

Wheel Set H,C,X,S Wheels shall be fully functional The train may proceed at
and shall fully comply with the reduced speed (40kmh)
conditions specified in the where wheel flats are
relevant maintenance detected in excess of 60mm
documentation long and/or 2mm deep, if the
wheel still rotates and
displaced metal is not
attached to the tread.
Wheel Set CT, Bogie mounted equipment in The train may proceed at
contact with wheel sets shall be reduced speed (80kph)
fully functional. where defective brake
rigging does not prevent the
wheel from rotating.
Wheel Set H,S,CD,X Wheel set mounted equipment The train may proceed at
shall be fully functional. reduced speed (80kph)
where defective disc brake
does not prevent the wheel
from rotating.

Note: Train Type Abbreviations as per section 2

9 Related Documents
MFIS 970100-01 Functional Safety Risk Analysis for Electric Trains

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

10 Appendix
Appendix A – Critical Fault List of the New Risk Based Fault Classification
System
Table 2: Comeng Critical Fault – 1st Level

Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 1st Level Description


Equipment
1 Brake Auto brake Fails to brake train.
Brake Brake Valve Isolation Fails to shut off: brake pipe will continually
2
Cock (BVIC) switch charge.
Body and External Driving Cab Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in
3
Fittings Windscreen visibility.
4 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to remain coupled.
5 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to close when uncoupled.
Couplings Semi-permanent Fails to remain coupled.
6
coupler
7 Doors Door control Unable to close.
8 Doors Door control Fails to indicate correct status.
9 Traction Gear case Mechanical integrity.
Traction control Foot& Hand pilot Fails to hold brake pipe pressure and
10 valve secondary safety device inoperative.

Traction control Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to release brake pipe pressure and
11
secondary safety device inoperative.
Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/Over-heated. Skidded
12 wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long
and /or 2mm deep.
Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication
13
failure. Hot axle box.

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Table 3: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 1st Level

Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 1st Level Description


Equipment
Body & External fittings Saloon Door Fails to close.
1

Body and External Driving Cab Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in


2
Fittings Windscreen visibility.
3 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to remain coupled.
Couplings Semi-permanent Fails to remain coupled.
4
coupler
5 Couplings Gear box Mechanical integrity.
6 Doors Door control Unable to open/close.
Suspension Secondary Failure of secondary suspension. As well
7 suspension. Coil with as excessive wheel loading and unloading.
rubber element
Traction control Foot/Hand pilot valve The primary and secondary safety circuits
8 fail to maintain or break continuity of safety
loop.
Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/Over-heated. Skidded
9 wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long
and /or 2mm deep.
Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication
10
failure. Hot axle box.

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Table 4: Siemens Critical Fault - 1st Level

Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 1st Level Description


Equipment
Body and External Driving Cab Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in
1
Fittings Windscreen visibility.
2 Couplings Dellner Fails to remain coupled.
Couplings Semi-permanent Fails to remain coupled.
3
coupler
4 Doors Saloon Fails to close.
5 Traction Gear box Mechanical integrity.
Traction control Foot/Hand pilot valve The primary and secondary safety circuit
6 fails to maintain or break continuity of
safety loop.
Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged. Skidded wheel with flats
7 in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm
deep.
Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication
8
failure. Hot axle box.

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Table 5: Hitachi Critical Fault - 1st Level

Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 1st Level Description


Equipment

1 Brake Auto brake Fails to brake train.

Brake Brake Valve Isolation Fails to shut off: brake pipe will continually
2
Cock (BVIC) switch charge.

Body and External Driving Cab Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in


3
Fittings Windscreen visibility.

4 Couplings Auto-coupler Fails to remain coupled.

5 Doors Door control Unable to close.

6 Doors Door control Fails to indicate correct status.

7 Doors Saloon Fails to close.

Traction Gear box/WN Bearing Failure, Seizure, Collapse.


8 coupling Misalignment due to uncompensated
wheel machining.

Traction control. Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to hold brake pipe pressure and
9
secondary safety device inoperative.

Traction control. Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to release brake pipe pressure and
10
secondary safety device inoperative.

11 Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/overheated. Skidded


wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long
and /or 2mm deep.

12 Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Gearbox or Bearing failure.


Lubrication failure. Hot axle box.

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Table 6: Comeng Critical Fault - 2nd Level


Item Sub-system Component Equipment Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description
description
Brake VICERS Fails to provide secondary protection
1
for driver incapacity.
Brake Park Brake Switch -local Fails to apply or release local park
2
brake.
Brake Park Brake Switch -train Fails to apply train line park brake.
3
line
4 Brake Auto Park Brake Switch Fails to apply train line park brake.
Body & External Saloon Windows Glass missing fails to contain
5
fittings passengers. Equipment out of gauge.
Body & External Body & External fittings Equipment out of gauge.
6
fittings
Body & Ext Drivers mirror Fails to provide clear rear view of train.
7
fittings
Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to
8
trackside pedestrians and vehicles.
Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control
9
using emergency call button.
Communications PA Unable to communicate to passengers
10
in an emergency.
Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger
11
at any PEI location in an emergency.
Communications PEI. Saloon area intercom Unable to communicate to passenger
12 and emergency call button. in an emergency at individual PEI
location.
13 Couplings Gangway & Safety chains Safety chains disconnected or missing.
14 Doors Door control Unable to release.
Environmental HVAC heating, cooling for Fail to condition the air.
15
controls cab. 2xCab heaters
Environmental Ventilation & Air filtering Failure to provide adequate fresh air.
16
controls
Environmental Cab booster fan Fails to increase air flow into cab at
17 controls ambient temperature >25C.

Internal fittings & Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and
18
furnishings direct radiation.
Internal Saloon Windows Window integrity not to be
furnishing & compromised as per L3-ROS-MAI-007
19
fittings Fleet Maintenance Instruction
Inspection of Train Windows.
Traction Traction cables & Fails to provide electrical insulation.
20
connections.
Traction control Master Controller Fail to power train or to shut off.
21 Potential overspeed leading to
derailment.

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ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Table 7: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 2nd Level

Sub-system Component Equipment Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description


Item
description
Body & External Drivers mirror / side Fails to provide clear rear view of train.
1
fittings windows
Body & External Windows, external panels, Fails to contain passengers. Equipment
fittings mirrors, handrails, steps, out of gauge. Or internal crack in
2
tread plate, equipment window.
covers
Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to
3
trackside pedestrians and vehicles.
Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control
4
using emergency call button.
5 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational.
Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger
6
at any PEI location in an emergency.
Communications PEI. Saloon area intercom Unable to communicate to passenger
7 and emergency call button in an emergency at individual PEI
location.
Environmental HVAC heating, cooling for Fail to condition the air.
8
controls saloon
Environmental HVAC heating, cooling for Fail to condition the air.
9
controls cab. 2xCab heater
Environmental Ventilation & Air filtering Failure to provide adequate fresh air.
10
controls
Environmental Cab booster fan. Fail to increase air flow into cab at
11
controls ambient temperature >25C.
Internal fittings & Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and
12
furnishings direct radiation.
Lighting Headlights -Low & High Failure to illuminate.
13
beam
Traction control Master Controller Fail to power, brake or to shut off train.
14 Potential overspeed leading to
derailment.

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015
PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 17 of 19
ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Table 8: Siemens Critical Fault - 2nd Level


Sub-system Component Equipment Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description
Item
description
Body & External Drivers mirror / side Fails to provide clear rear view of train.
1
fittings windows
Body & External Windows, external panels, Fails to contain passengers. Equipment
fittings mirrors, handrails, steps, out of gauge. Or internal crack in
2
tread plate, equipment window.
covers
Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to
3
trackside pedestrians and vehicles.
Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control
4
using emergency call button.
5 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational.
Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger
6
at any PEI location in an emergency.
Communications PEI. Saloon area intercom Unable to communicate to passenger
7 and emergency call button. in an emergency at individual PEI
location.
8 Doors Door control Unable to open/close.
Environmental HVAC heating, cooling for Fail to condition the air.
9
controls saloon.
Environmental HVAC heating, cooling for Fail to condition the air.
10
controls cab. 1xCab heater.
Environmental HVAC ventilation fans x 2 Failure to provide adequate fresh air.
11
controls
Environmental HVAC Air filtering Failure to provide adequate fresh air.
12
controls
Internal fittings & Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and
13
furnishings direct radiation.
Lighting Headlights -Low & High Failure to illuminate.
14
beam
Suspension Airbag Fails to sufficiently dampen vertical
15 vibration by under inflation.

Suspension Secondary suspension. 2x Potential wheel loading.


16
Airbags. Bump stops.
Traction control Master Controller Fail to power, brake or to shut off train.
17 Potential overspeed leading to
derailment.

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015
PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 18 of 19
ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS
ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE
STANDARD
MFST 830100-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012
L1-CHE-STD-003

Table 9: Hitachi Critical - Fault - 2nd Level

Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description


Equipment

1 Body & External fittings Saloon Windows. Glass missing at the bottom windows with
competent employee to protect the area.

2 Body & External fittings Body & External Equipment out of gauge.
Fittings

3 Body & External fittings Drivers mirror Fails to provide clear rear view of train.

4 Couplings Gangway & Safety Safety chains disconnected or missing.


chains Fall from train.

5 Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to


trackside pedestrians and vehicles.

6 Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using
emergency call button.

7 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational.

8 Brake Park Brake Switch - Fails to apply or release local park brake.
local

9 Brake Park Brake Switch - Fails to apply or release train line park
train line brake.

10 Brake Auto Park Brake Fails to apply or release train line park
Switch brake.

11 Doors Cab Door Fails to open.

12 Doors Door control Unable to release

13 Environmental controls HVAC x2 heating, Fail to condition the air.


cooling for cab.
2xCab heaters

14 Internal fittings & Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and direct
furnishings radiation.

15 Lighting Headlights -Low & Failure to illuminate.


High beam

16 Traction control Master Controller Fail to power train or to shut off.

17 Traction Traction cables & Fails to provide electrical insulation.


connections

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015
PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 19 of 19

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