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By contrast, while most of us, myself included, would agree that the
concept of meaning is a fundamental and indispensable one, we are
unclear even about the surface structure of statements involving that
concept. . . . As is well known, some, pre-eminently Quine, have pre-
ferred to circumvent this difficulty by investigating the principles
underlying the construction not of a theory of meaning for a lan-
guage, but of a translation manual from it into some known language.
The advantage is that we know exactly what form a translation
manual has to take, namely an effective set of rules for mapping
sentences of the translated language into sentences of the language
into which the translation is being made: we can therefore concen-
trate entirely upon the questions how we are to arrive at a system of
translation as embodied in such a manual, and what conditions must
be satisfied for such a system to be acceptable.3
In other words, the role of radical translation has shifted from under-
mining the concept of meaning to seeming to give us a way to inves-
tigate it. In this case, we can use Quine’s method to demystify claims
about the meaning of baima fei ma in favor of recasting the question
as how we should translate baima fei ma. We translate it into a sen-
tence of our home language in several ways and then address instead
what standards we should use in selecting from among these alternate
translations.
justice, not charity, for white-horse 475
are learned along with other terms via learning a theory. Quine men-
tions here “attribute” and “class” and these help generate his skepti-
cism about even his stimulus meaning. While we can be relatively
certain that a language contains a word that overlaps the stimulus
conditions of our “horse” and “rabbit,” the evidence of stimulus
meaning could never show whether the target language concept has
the same metaphysical meaning––a substance with attributes, set with
members. Quine lists things like “time slices,” “undetached rabbit
parts,” “rabbit stages” along with:
A further alternative likewise compatible with the same old stimulus
meaning is to take “gavagai” as a singular term naming the fusion, in
Goodman’s sense, of all rabbits: that single though discontinuous
portion of the spatiotemporal world that consists of rabbits.15 Thus
even the distinction between general and singular terms is independent
of stimulus meaning. . . . And a still further alternative in the case of
“gavagai” is to take it as a singular term naming a recurring universal,
rabbithood. The distinction between concrete and abstract object, as
well as that between general and singular term, is independent of
stimulus meaning. (W&O, 52–53, emphasis added)
Harbsmeier’s caveats (e.g., “in the relevant sense”) do all the work
because there is also a relevant sense in which looking for a white
horse is looking for a horse. That I am looking for a white horse
certainly entails that I am looking for a horse.
Similarly, if I choose to read it “intensionally,” there seems to be a
parallel sense in which “having a black swan” is not equivalent to
justice, not charity, for white-horse 485
Endnotes
1. This article developed out of a conference discussion at the Eastern Division of the
APA in December 2004. I proposed an interpretive theory of Gongsun Long’s “White
Horse” three decades ago. My thanks to Professor Bo Mou for soliciting my response
to the many alternatives published since then. I am also motivated by seeing advance
copies of Professor Manyul Im’s excellent treatment (forthcoming in Dao: A Journal
of Comparative Philosophy).
This affords the opportunity to reflect the enriched understanding I myself gained since
of the philosophical issues surrounding radical translation in the philosophy of lan-
488 chad hansen
guage and to clarify and correct my original application of it. I thus concentrate here
mainly on the paradox itself rather than its detailed elaboration. My goal is to show how
Gongsun Long’s paradox motivates using Quine’s radical translation approach and
what constraints consideration of Quine’s arguments puts on viable solutions.
2. These points are my main response to the many worthy alternative translations I have
encountered in the interim. They rely on being charitable without considering either
the challenge Quine poses for the usual sinological conception of “evidence for
meaning” or the alternative principle.
3. Michael Dummett, “What Is a Theory of Meaning,” in Readings in the Philosophy
of Language, ed. Peter Ludlow (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 130. Note that
Dummett expresses skepticism that Quine’s work-around can provide a way to
understand meaning.
4. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT press, 1960), 28. The following
quotations from the same book will be cited as W&O with page number(s) in paren-
thetical reference.
5. Sinology typically offers authority as an answer here—it ranks translators as superior/
inferior in general and then uses that ranking to answer more “local” questions.
6. Or, as Dummett suggests above, to circumvent the question of meaning.
7. In this context, however, the terms in which the debate is cast is keassertible as discussed
below in endnote 10.We could be said, instead to be discussing if claiming the paradox
is assertible is shi or fei.
8. This rests on the familiar observation that we are capable of constructing and under-
standing denumerably many new utterances that are both grammatical and
meaningful—the key premise in the argument that human languages are systemati-
cally compositional.
9. The English version of the translation claim derives from Feng Yu-lan’s translator,
Derk Bodde. It renders Gongsun Long’s “main thesis” in English mentioning the
word “universals” then claims Gongsun Long’s “difficulty in proving” the thesis is
heightened by the inability to express the thesis in Chinese (Fung Yu-lan, A History
of Chinese Philosophy (Derk Bodde, trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1952–3), 203). This is a version of the shibboleth that “Chinese words have many
meanings” which implicitly continues “that cannot be distinguished lexically or gram-
matically.” Here the crucial translation rule is “for ma, translate using either the
English term ‘horse,’ ‘horses,’ or ‘horseness.’” The question is “how does the rule
continue?” Is it “depending on what yields a true sentence”? Feng’s own formulation
uses the Chinese term zhifinger for which a dictionary’s list of possible translations
includes: finger, point to, indicate, name, designate, insert, put into, fill, pour into, drop
into, hold up, wear, offer, play, rise, flow, be tinged with, point to, proceed to, fix, measure,
and make. Feng says “that which the name ma zhipoints to is limited to the nature-stuff
shared by all horses.” This claim, itself, is a candidate for radical translation.
10. As I noted above, I address here mainly the string “bai ma fei ma,” but the inter-
pretation will be of the “totality”––e.g., the passage actually says the string in ques-
tion is keassertible and a theory of meaning will have to include assumptions about
meaning and belief to account for that—say as opposed to saying the string is true
or plausible or . . . Clearly the making an attribution of meaning “fit” with the
totality takes more detail and imagination, but Quine’s point that many such fits are
possible remains.
11. See Christoph Harbsmeier’s account in Science and Civilization in China: Volume 7
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 303, for the popular story of using
the paradox to try and avoid customs duty.
12. The most common kind of error in alternative accounts is to present a combination of
an interpretation of “baima fei ma” and a belief or theory to Gongsun Long and then
blithely conclude that rival interpretations are wrong. Conversely, they may read rival
interpretations as “linguistic determinism” as if in offering a rival explanation, they
are implying that no other interpretation is possible (in the sense of being fully
compatible with overt linguistic behavior and verifiable facts). Quine’s challenge
requires showing how, from the many possible interpretive theories, one could give an
objective reason for preferring a single one.
justice, not charity, for white-horse 489
13. I encourage my own students to avoid the word “evidence” in favor or “argument”
and think of evidence as premises in an argument that validly concludes “we should
translate this passage as ____.”
14. Part of Harbsmeier’s case against my mass noun hypothesis is the accusation that it is
“anachronistic.” He sets up the charge by expressing his admiration for Lesniewski
and his “very abstract and complex theory of mereology” then linking it somewhat
mysteriously to Einsteinian claims about the relativity of space and time. Russell
Lesniewski, Goodman, and White’s mereology is tailored precisely to avoid commit-
ment to abstractions like Platonic types, biological species, or mathematical classes/
sets. It seeks to replace these abstractions with constructions out of “naturalistic” parts
and wholes.The metaphysics requires no special reliance on relativity claims.A theory
of mereology would only occur where there was a prior commitment to such abstract
one–many metaphysics with which to contrast it. The reference to “space–time” is not
Einsteinian, but the way a naturalistic part–whole system would deal with the distri-
bution of horses or white stuff across. It is this confusion and the question-begging
assumption that Chinese thinkers did operate with an implicit one–many abstract
metaphysics thatfuels Harbsmeir’s puzzling distinction between a part–whole and a
mereological analysis. “Mereology” is a general term for part–whole ontologies in
contrast to those relying on particulars and abstractions. Graham was originally
correct to link them.
15. Much of Harbsmeier’s objection to my “mass noun hypothesis” appears to come from
mistaking this reference to “fusion” as if it were some kind of physical fusion. Good-
man’s sense, referred to here, is logical, not physical—notice the qualification “though
discontinuous.”
16. Responses to my theories over the years have often focused on my observations of the
mass-like grammar of modern Chinese and assumed that the claim that classical
grammar was mass-like was my “evidence” for the hypothesis (see endnote 13). It is not
a premise in my argument for the hypothesis, but for dealing with a worry that one may
have about the hypothesis (that all intelligent humans must think in one–many and
abstract terms). But Goodman was arguing that we can so construe all common nouns
of English, thus avoiding the need for a universals (hence the characterization of a
Goodman system as nominalism). The hypothesis was attributing to Chinese theorists
of language an assumption that common nouns work as traditional Western ontologies
would have said mass nouns of English do—as singular terms referring a logical fusion
of concreta. That’s why Quine cites Goodman in support of his indeterminacy claim!
For the historical record: The grammar of Chinese was not my motivation for my mass
noun interpretative hypothesis! My motivation was this passage in Quine and Good-
man’s version of mereology—and not pace Harbsmeier by studying a Polish logician!
Notice that Quine refers here to Goodman’s proposed ontology for rabbits! I was
obviously not under the impression that the English term “rabbit” was a grammatical
mass noun!
The argument was for the explanatory power of attributing part–whole assumptions
rather than one–many in explaining many other features of Mohist and Confucian and
Daoist theories of language in combination with other attributed beliefs I detailed in
Chad Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1983). I further speculated that the hypothesis could also explain why
Han reforms would have chosen explicitly to require sortals when counting common
nouns, that is, dividing reference rather than eliminating their occasional post-
head-noun use characteristic of pre-Han writings. My speculative explanation actually
started from my observation that pre-Han Chinese common nouns were not grammati-
cal mass nouns. I have no charitable explanation for why so many writers since have
concluded that Harbsmeier knew better than I did what I was thinking!
17. Why does Quine assume that these ontologies are part of the “meaning”? One
suggestion is that he is still assuming, pre-twin earth, that the meaning determines the
extension. And, as he argues here, the actual extension of these different translations
are dissimilar; for example, one refers to time slices and the other to enduring parts.
It would be preferable to follow Scanlon in distinguishing between meaning of a term
and the range of possible views about the ultimate nature of the subject matter.
490 chad hansen
(Thomas Scanlon in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, Moral
Discourse and Practice [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], 270.) Presumably
Berkeley and Goodman, equally competent in English, both know the meaning of
“rabbit” and disagree about its ultimate nature while having fully competent mastery
of its use in English.
18. Harbsmeier’s early criticism cited my reference to Quine, then simply ignored the
issue Quine raises. He simply goes on talking of “evidence” for meaning claims while
pointing to linguistic behavior—patterns or terms or strings of text—and providing a
translation. If he had understood Quine, he would have seen that this pattern of
argument is circular. Instead, he says: “However, I find nothing in all of traditional
Chinese literature that even remotely suggests that the ancient Chinese ever thought
of anything like mereology, or of apples and evening skies as one object scattered
through time and space” (Christoph Harbsmeier, “The Mass Noun Hypothesis,” in
Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. [La Salle: Open
Court, 1991], 50.) His discussion of my similarly argued case for denying my parallel
argument for urging translators not to use “true” as a translation for any single word
of Classical Chinese is similarly circular, that is, consists of supplying a long list of
passages of classical texts with his question begging translations.
19. Reflect again on Harbsmeier’s objection that he “finds no evidence that Ancient
Chinese” thought of objects mereologically. He also cites no evidence they thought of
them as instantiations of eternal forms or that they thought of them as particulars with
universal, repeatable attributes. But then Harbsmeier blithely attributes the last to
them, illustrating Quine’s point. This assertion is followed by a long discussion in
which he regularly translates all general nouns as English (singular or plural) common
nouns. So his failure to “find any evidence” is his “taking for granted” that the
Chinese, like us, must have “a brief general term for” horses but no brief general term
for horse-stuff.
20. I note a small shift in Harbsmeier’s recent formulations. He now insists only that I had
not shown that he could not translate the words in his preferred way or that my
argument was not deductive. “I find nothing in traditional Chinese literature that
remotely suggests that the ancient Chinese ever thought of anything like Lesniewski’s
mereology, or of apples and evening skies as one object scattered through time and
space. In any case, Hansen does not provide any of the necessary detailed philological
evidence to prove that the Chinese did think in this way” (Harbsmeier, Science and
Civilization in China, 312). In addition to an account of what role “philological
evidence” has in the face of Quine’s skepticism, he owes us an argument that deductive
necessity is the only standard to apply to arguments for meaning (as well as that his
meaning hypotheses are justified merely by not being analytically false. Strangely this
comes just one page after he construes Quine’s skepticism thus: “. . . in some ways we
may attribute to others different and mutually contradictory structure of thought
without risking ever being refuted by any evidence from their speech” (emphasis added).
21. This is simplistic partly because Davidson came to state his principle using both truth
and coherence. The counterpart simplification, of which I was frequently guilty, is to
treat the principle of charity as a maximizing coherence. Coherence among beliefs is
one of the naturalistic cognitive ways humans arrive at beliefs. Others include author-
ity and experience.
22. The usual sign of an interpreter’s taking this route is claiming that “the objector
doesn’t understand Gongsun Long’s point.”
23. Graham enunciates a relatively sophisticated version of this worry in A. C. Graham,
Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle: Open Court,
1989), 414.
24. Remember that the framework of the principle of humanity is explanation via reasons
and reasoning.
25. Professor Chung-ying Cheng’s objections to my interpretation of the White Horse
Dialogue has typically taken this form.
26. See Harbsmeier, Science and Civilization in China, 306. I cannot help citing Harbs-
meier’s justification of this interpretive hypothesis: “When the sophist changes the
example from ‘having a white horse’ to ‘seeking a white horse,’ I cannot help feeling
justice, not charity, for white-horse 491
that he had a perception of this subtle logical difference between ‘having’ and
‘seeking.’” This is perhaps our crucial clue to his conception of “philological evi-
dence.” See endnote 20.
27. A. C. Graham, Unreason within Reason: Essays on the Outskirts of Rationality
(La Salle: Open Court, 1992), 79.
28. His example, however, does not illustrate the counterpart rule of English. “We note
that the English ‘White horses are not horses’ and ‘A white horse is not a horse’ are
similarly open to two such opposing interpretations.” In English, both express the
same logical relation (x) [(Wx & Hx)→|~Hx] and both are false. Neither, as they stand
in English, is open to the interpretation X = Y. His claim about the ambiguity in
Chinese relies on the point I make below—the “is” is disambiguated by the gram-
matical singularity of the items related. Harbsmeier gives as possible translations: “A.
‘White horse’ is not (the same as) ‘horse.’ B. A white horse is not (a case of) a horse.”
(Christoph Harbsmeier, Science and Civilization in China: Volume 7 Part 1: Language
and Logic [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 301.) Harbsmeier’s
attempt to help the reader with his parentheses seem just to confuse things. It is
perfectly clear to an English reader that “white horse” is not “horse” and that a white
horse is not a horse. No “case of” is implied. One cannot help wondering, given his
appeal to Quine, why he does not entertain the theory that Gongsun Long is confus-
ing to use and mention.
29. Notice that if one wanted to explain how an interesting sophistry could emerge from
a false statement of Chinese, one could observe that common nouns of Chinese
function more like singular terms.“Mass nouns, unlike count nouns, play the same role
in sentences that proper nouns do. This makes it natural to regard mass nouns as
logically singular terms—as names” (Hansen, Language and Logic, 35). Harbsmeier
substitutes ellipses for this aspect of my argument in his rebuttal.
30. Ibid., 300.
31. Ibid., 303.
32. Harbsmeier, Science and Civilization in China, 301.
33. William G. Boltz, “Logic, Language and Grammar in Early China,” The Journal of the
American Oriental Society 12, no. 2 (2000): 218–29.
34. Harbsmeier, Science and Civilization in China, 305.
35. My interpretation treated the interlocutor as correct. That is not required of any
adequate interpretation. However, an adequate interpretation should acknowledge
that the interlocutor is correctly rejecting a falsehood.
36. Note that a defense of Gongsun Long could seek to make his larger claim valid—
namely that the paradoxical phrase is keassertible. I suspect that this line of defense is
rarely taken because of resistance to my theory that ancient Chinese philosophers
debated these issues in terms of pragmatic “assertability” rather than semantic truth.