Antipode Compossibility

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1 Journal MSP No. No. of pages: 30 PE: Kirsten
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7 Thinking State/Space Incompossibly
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9 Martin Jones
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Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, and Wales Institute of Social
11 & Economic Research, Data & Methods (WISERD),
12 Aberystwyth University, UK;
13 msj@aber.ac.uk
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15 Bob Jessop
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Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, UK;
17 r.jessop@lancaster.ac.uk
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20 Abstract: This paper develops multi-dimensional analyses of socio-spatial relations. Building
on previous research, we identify some tensions associated with different dimensions of socio-
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spatiality and introduce the theme of compossible and, more importantly, incompossible socio-
22 spatial configurations. Two short studies are deployed to highlight the socio-spatial implications
23 of the principle that not everything that is possible is compossible. The first shows the power of
24 thinking varieties of capitalism compossibly (via the concept of variegated capitalism) and then
examines the successive strategies adopted by the European Communities and European Union
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to address the significance of changing patterns of variegation for approaches to European
26 integration, spatial strategies, and economic and social policies. The second case discusses
27 some resulting problems for state spatial projects, starting in the 1980s with spatial planning,
28 promotion of a Europe of the Regions and/or of Europe and the regions, and then turns to
examine city-regional development strategies.
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30 Keywords: TPSN, compossibility, incompossibility, variegated capitalism, regions
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32 This paper starts from recent attempts to develop a more complex and
33 multi-dimensional analysis of socio-spatial relations based on scholarly
34 recognition of their polymorphic nature (Jessop 2009a; Jessop, Brenner
35 and Jones 2008; cf Brenner 2009; Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto 2008;
36 Sheppard 2002). It applies this approach to state space in general and
37 to two short studies of the European Union and English regionalism
38 in particular.1 The most general feature of the state as a political form
39 (pre-modern as well as modern, pre-capitalist as well as capitalist) is
40 its grounding in the territorialization of political power. Note that the
41 territorial as a distinctive political form is not to be conflated with the
42 terrestrial2 as a general substratum of this and other forms of socio-
43 spatial organization. How these other forms are related to territoriality
44 as opposed to terrestriality is an interesting and important feature of
45 socio-spatial configurations (see below). To address these issues, we
46 will elaborate an earlier account of socio-spatiality, developed with
47 Neil Brenner, by identifying some tensions associated with different
Antipode Vol. 00 No. 0 2010 ISSN 0066-4812, pp 1–30
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2010.00796.x

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3 dimensions of socio-spatiality and introducing the theme of compossible
4 and, more importantly, incompossible socio-spatial configurations.3 We
5 present this approach in three steps: a brief account of the state, an
6 elaborated account of the territory-place-scale-network schema of socio-
7 spatiality, and two cases at different scales to indicate the geographical
8 value-added of these concepts.
9 A primary feature of states is the historically variable ensemble of
10 technologies and practices that produce, naturalize, and manage part of
11 terrestrial space as a relatively bounded container within which political
12 power is exercised to achieve various, more or less well integrated, and
13 changing policy objectives. This involves the intersection of politically
14 organized coercive and symbolic power, a clearly demarcated core
15 territory, and a fixable population on which political decisions may
16 be made collectively binding (such as the exercise of law and order,
17 and the collection of taxation and other sources of revenue). The
18 range of policy objectives compossible (ie able to co-exist) with this
19 political form is, as Weber (1948) noted for the modern state, very
20 large and typically involves other types of socio-spatial organization
21 too.
22 The variability of the territorialization of political power is reinforced
23 when we consider the inter-state system.4 This involves more than
24 the Westphalian inter-state system, which evolved in phases from the
25 seventeenth to twentieth centuries and is still far from exhausting the
26 global political order. Other modes of territorializing political power
27 have existed (eg chiefdoms, feudalism, empires, suzerainty, tributary
28 relations), some co-exist with the Westphalian system (eg city-states,
29 warlordism, despotic rule, informal empires); new expressions are
30 emerging (eg the European Union, which has been interpreted as a
31 rescaled “national” state, a revival of medieval political patterns, a
32 post-sovereign form of authority, or a new type of empire); and yet
33 others can be imagined (eg a world state or global governance oriented
34 to perpetual peace). Non-territorialized space can be seen as terra
35 nullius (ie terrestrial space that, populated or not, exists outside the
36 formal control of a state). The absence of territorial control does not
37 exclude, of course, other socio-spatial patterns, such as stateless (or
38 non-territorialized) polities or nomadic communities, linkages between
39 places and/or scales, or rhizomatic networks. Noting this variation
40 raises questions about (com)possible articulations among forms of
41 territorialization, the adjudication of claims over terra nullius broadly
42 conceived, and the ability of some states to exert extra-territorial
43 rights, ie to claim immunity from the sovereign jurisdiction of other
44 states and/or the right to impose their domestic law on residents,
45 organizations, or other entities in territory formally controlled by another
46 state.
47

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3 Introducing Compossibility and Incompossibility
4 For this issue of Antipode, we aim to capture some of these complexities
5 by drawing out some socio-spatial implications of the principle that not
6 everything that is possible is compossible. This principle was introduced
7 for other purposes in natural theology and later deployed in process
8 metaphysics (see Rescher 1975, 1998) but we will integrate it into
9 the critical realist approach deployed elsewhere in our discussions
10 of socio-spatiality (Brenner et al 2003; Jessop, Brenner and Jones
11 2008). Critical realism distinguishes the real, the actual, and the
12 empirical.5 In these terms research on compossibility goes beyond
13 what is possible by virtue of real causal mechanisms and tendencies
14 considered individually to focus on what is compossible at the level of the
15 actual as diverse causal mechanisms and tendencies interact in a given
16 socio-spatial field. More importantly, it invites questions about what is
17 incompossible by virtue of such causal interaction. In complex fields
18 where multi-causality and equifinality operate, the number and range
19 of incompossible combinations commonly far exceed compossible
20 ones. This may result from the operation of counter-tendencies for an
21 otherwise possible event or chain of events, but the more interesting
22 cases concern real opposition, antagonism or contradiction among
23 events that are possible when seen in isolation but incompossible when
24 taken together. This argument has major ontological and epistemological
25 implications.
26 Its ontological significance is captured, of course, in the basic
27 proposition that not everything that is possible is compossible. This
28 is one way to define the relative structuration of a given social field in
29 its wider context, ie the higher the ratio of incompossible to compossible
30 combinations, the more the structuration (cf Massey 1995, 2005). More
31 generally, while this proposition could be read in purely logical terms, it
32 is more fruitful to explore (in)compossibility in terms of the contingently
33 necessary variation, selection, retention, and institutionalization of given
34 socio-spatial configurations over space–time. Epistemologically, this
35 proposition implies that certain socio-spatial relations that are feasible
36 (or, alternatively, infeasible) when considered without regard to their
37 articulation with other such relations within a given spatio-temporal field
38 may prove infeasible (or, alternatively, feasible) when viewed in their
39 articulation with different sets of relations. Thus our analytical grasp
40 of possibility and impossibility, compossibility and incompossibility
41 will shift as research proceeds and becomes more concrete and
42 complex.
43 Taken together these remarks suggest that, in examining
44 compossibility in terms of the real, the actual, and empirical, attention
45 must shift from elements to moments, from events to ensembles, and a
46 fortiori, from flat ontologies to depth ontologies.
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3 • The critical realist distinction between real and actual already
4 implies that what is possible at the level of real mechanisms may
5 not be actualized when several real mechanisms are activated.
6 • While individual elements are possible insofar as they exist or
7 have existed, not every element is compossible with all other
8 elements. This invites us to consider possible “worlds” within
9 a specific socio-spatial field.6 Thus, whereas elements can be
10 regarded as pre-given materials (albeit typically pre-interpreted and
11 socially constituted), they can be seen as moments when combined
12 with other elements to produce sedimented blocs, ensembles, etc
13 (see Dodgshon 2008). This brings our approach close to process
14 philosophy.
15 • Compossibility involves more than fleeting co-existence due to
16 chance variation: it depends on the actual scope for co-selection,
17 then co-retention, and later, co-institutionalization based on the
18 structural coupling of compossible processes and their social
19 supports. This requires a shift from individual events to emergent
20 ensembles that have a relative coherence that can be reproduced for
21 significant periods. For the actualization of specific socio-spatial
22 possibilities depends on interaction among different elements of
23 co-evolving socio-spatial configurations.
24 • This requires careful theorization and study of stratified
25 compossibilities and, further, of the dynamics initiated by
26 potentially incompatible, opposed, or contradictory socio-spatial
27 processes connected to one or more other socio-spatial dimension.
28 Thus, in contrast to singularity, individuality, and “flat ontologies”
29 (Jones III, Woodward and Marston 2007), we argue for analyses
30 of the contingent articulation of relata in specific, and potentially
31 asymmetric, ensembles that have distinctive emergent properties
32 and causal powers. In the case of the state, for example, we are
33 interested not only in the “state effect” but also the effectivity of
34 the state as a focal point of territorialized political power.
35
36 Three further features of this approach as we would like to see
37 it developed can be identified at this point. First, given our critical
38 realist framework, we highlight the significance of contradictions,
39 dilemmas, and tensions at the level of the real and the actual. Thus
40 we introduce some basic tensions involved in socio-spatial organization
41 and explore their implications for the dialectics of territory, place,
42 scale and network. For the same reason we emphasize mechanisms
43 and tendencies rather than base our arguments on the (inter)playfulness
44 of metaphors (cf Sheppard 2008:2604, citing Gregory 2000:172–173).7
45 Second, in distinguishing elements and moments, we aim to avoid the
46 problems of origins insofar as what matters for our purposes is the
47 condensation of elements into the moments of a specific socio-spatial

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3 configuration and the subsequent re-articulation of that configuration.
4 And, third, we stress, on various grounds, the incompleteness of all
5 attempts at totalization and hence the practical impossibility of fully
6 formed totalities. This requires attention to coherence and incoherence,
7 zones of stability and instability, deferrals and displacements, etc.
8 Taking compossibility seriously suggests three protocols for
9 analyzing states: do not analyze states purely in territorial terms—
10 forms of territorialization of state power depend on compossible
11 multidimensional socio-spatial matrices; do not assume the
12 homogeneity and fixity of states but examine the scope for polymorphy
13 and flexibility; and, where possible, do not study individual states but
14 explore how their forms and functions shape compossible interstate
15 systems.
16 These protocols can be applied to, among other issues, the role
17 of states in securing spatio-temporal fixes (Jessop 2006). For states
18 contribute to the relative stabilization of society by managing economic
19 and social contradictions, strategic dilemmas, and their repercussions
20 within the state system. This role is inherently spatial, and always
21 provisional, and involves not merely state intervention in territorial
22 terms but also in regard to place, scale, and networks (see below). This
23 has been discussed elsewhere (Brenner 2004; Jessop 2002) for the state
24 in Atlantic Fordism and its crisis and we will not repeat these arguments
25 here. Analyses of what follows the Keynesian welfare national state
26 have been equally productive, highlighting various tendencies that affect
27 the territorial, place-related, scalar, and networked dimensions of the
28 state (compare Allen and Cochrane 2007; Büchs 2009; Etherington
29 and Jones 2009; Goodwin, Jones and Jones 2005; Keating, Cairney and
30 Hepburn 2009; MacLeod and Jones 2007; Pike and Tomaney 2009) and
31 the changing importance of the state qua territorialized political power
32 relative to other modes of governing conduct (eg Jones, Woodward and
33 Marston 2007; Raco 2003; Rose and Miller 2008). This includes a shift
34 from government to governance, as these new arrangements involve
35 diverse social partners and stretch beyond formal state structures, and
36 an associated shift from government to meta-governance (see below).
37 These changes can be explored productively, as we show below, with a
38 dynamic concept of (in)compossibility that is concerned with variation,
39 selection, retention, and institutionalization.
40
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42 On the Limits of Possibilist Socio-Spatial Analysis
43 Informed by recent trends in the socio-spatial restructuring of states
44 and as argued elsewhere (Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008), four
45 main spatial turns have occurred during the last 30 years and, while
46 each turn highlights different themes, they also have close theoretical
47 and empirical connections. They are concerned with territory, place,

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3 scale, and network respectively and have typically been generated
4 by concerns to interpret and explain major changes in socio-spatial
5 organization in the postwar world. Referring readers to Jessop, Brenner
6 and Jones (2008), here we simply note that these debates tended to
7 focus successively on fine-tuning concepts relevant to the privileged
8 dimension of socio-spatiality and/or on deploying one or other turn
9 over-enthusiastically in empirical analysis. This is apparent in all
10 four turns, albeit unevenly and in diverse forms, especially in more
11 theoretical work. Each lends itself to the metonymic conflation of a part
12 (territory, place, scale or networks) with the whole (the totality of socio-
13 spatial organization), whether due to conceptual imprecision, an overly
14 narrow analytical focus, or the embrace of an untenable ontological
15 (quasi-)reductionism (cf Jessop 2009a). Indeed, the scope for variation
16 in socio-spatial forms is maximized in such one-dimensionalist work
17 because it ignores the constraints on the actualization of any given
18 dimension that arise from its articulation with other dimensions in
19 any given socio-spatial configuration. In contrast, for us, possibility
20 does not entail compossibility. The critical realist distinction between
21 ontology and epistemology is helpful here. For, while examining a
22 single dimension of socio-spatiality may well be justified as a simple
23 entry point into a complex research field, one should not confuse the
24 range of possibilities posited at this step in the analysis for what is
25 compossible when additional dimensions are introduced (cf Jessop
26 2007a, 2009b). Conversely what seems impossible on one socio-spatial
27 dimension may prove possible when conjunctural “contamination” from
28 other dimensions is removed.
29 During the last decade, this approach has been applied to various
30 forms of socio-spatial restructuring, and some of its central categories—
31 such as strategic selectivity, accumulation strategies, state projects,
32 state strategies and hegemonic projects—have in turn been spatialized
33 (Brenner 2004; Jessop 2007a). These strategic-relational insights can
34 be advanced by: including all four structuring principles and associated
35 strategies and practices and, additionally, taking account of relevant
36 second-order concepts (see below); investigating their implications for
37 specific spatio-temporal fixes or other types of TPSN configuration; and
38 examining the compossibility and/or incompossibility of particular sets
39 of spatio-temporal fixes and the respective substantive relations that are
40 being fixed. One could thereby study socio-spatiality as a heterogeneous
41 series of contradictory, dilemmatic, strategically selective, spatio-
42 temporal, discursive-material ensembles; and, on this basis, explore
43 how these ensembles (or particular elements within them) interact in
44 particular conjunctures to reconfigure socio-spatial relations in ways
45 that sometimes lead to compossible outcomes and on other occasions
46 to problems generated by incompossibility (cf Jones 2009a). Two
47 commentaries have noted some of this regarding our recent work

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3 Table 1: Revisiting sociospatial relations
4
Dimension of Principle of Associated
5
socio-spatial socio-Spatial configurations of Socio-spatial tensions
6 relations structuration socio-spatial relations and dilemmas
7
8 Territory Bordering, Construction of Bordered vs
bounding, inside/outside divides, cross-border relations
9
parcellization, Constitutive role of (eg “hermit state” vs
10 enclosure outside “free state”)
11 Place Proximity, spatial Construction of spatial Container vs connector
12 embedding, areal divisions of labor; (eg particularism vs
13 differentiation differ-entiation of social cosmopolitanism)
14 relations horizontally
among “core” vs
15
“peripheral” places
16 Scale Hierarchization, Construction of scalar Single scale vs
17 vertical divisions of labor; multi-scalarity (eg
18 differentiation differentiation of social unitary city-state vs
19 relations vertically multi-scalar
among “dominant”, meta-governance
20
“nodal” and “marginal” regime)
21 scales
22 Networks/ Interconnectivity, Building networks of Enclosed network vs
23 reticulation interdependence, nodal connectivity; networks of networks
24 transversal or differentiation of social (eg “functional
“rhizomatic” relations among nodal region” or “formal
25
differentiation points within region” vs
26 topological networks “unbounded region”
27 or “virtual region”)
28
Source: modified from Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008:393).
29
30
31
(Mayer 2008; Paasi 2008) but have neglected the scope for a more
32
dialectical analysis of socio-spatial path-dependency and path-shaping
33
and, especially, their implications for changing forms of statehood.
34
35
36 A Compossibilist Revision of the TPSN Framework
37 Our response to these challenges is a further development in the
38 heuristic perspective that, due to its focus on territory (T), place (P),
39 scale (S) and networks (N), has been termed the TPSN framework
40 (Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008). Table 1 presents these structural
41 principles, specifies their consequences for the patterning of those
42 relations, and, most importantly, identifies basic tensions associated
43 with each. While the first three columns in the table, reproduced
44 from Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008), serve mainly definitional and
45 pedagogic purposes, the fourth column introduces a new element into
46 the discussion. Specifically, this column identifies sites of tension and
47 dilemmatic terrains that introduce: a dynamic element in the study

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3 of socio-spatiality; an entry point for analyzing compossibility and
4 incompossibility in strategic-relational, critical realist terms; a means of
5 undertaking periodization and more robust comparative analysis within
6 and across TPSN configurations; and a chance to bring strategic agency
7 into analyses of socio-spatial transformation.
8 Ontologically, each dimension identifies a real socio-spatial
9 structuring process principle and object of socio-spatial structuration
10 and, epistemologically, if offers an abstract-simple entry point into
11 more concrete-complex socio-spatial analysis. When the latter remains
12 isolated as research continues, however, whether through conceptual
13 inflation, essentialism, or fetishism, this will result in one-dimensional
14 (quasi-)reductionism in analysis, interpretation, and explanation.
15 However concrete the analysis becomes, it stays rigidly within the
16 theoretical horizon of the privileged entry point. Ontological complexity
17 thereby disappears from the research horizon. When territorialization as
18 a structuring principle is applied only to territory as the product of
19 territorialization, for example, the analysis will neglect the limits on
20 possible forms of territorial organization rooted in other dimensions
21 of socio-spatial analysis (or other structuring principles). Similar
22 arguments apply to place, scale, and network centrism (Jessop, Brenner
23 and Jones 2008).
24 The problems of one-dimensional possibilism can be avoided through
25 more systematic investigations of the interconnections among the
26 four spatial dimensions of social relations—that is, the mutually
27 constitutive relations among their respective structuring principles and
28 the specific practices associated with each principle (cf Casey 2008).
29 Such inquiries would facilitate studies of spatial complexity based
30 on: the elaboration of sufficiently rich concepts for each dimension
31 of socio-spatial relations and their typical forms of tension and
32 dilemmas; the development of more complex categories reflecting types
33 of (dis)articulation and (in)compatibility among them; the effective
34 introduction of agency as a crucial factor and force in socio-spatial
35 dynamics and transformation; and their deployment in ways that permit
36 observers to explore more precisely their weighting and articulation
37 in a given spatio-temporal context. Applying these general protocols
38 to statehood, for example, scholars could adopt different entry points
39 whilst still ending with complex-concrete analyses in which each
40 moment finds its proper descriptive-cum-explanatory weight (for some
41 methodological foundations, see Bertramsen, Thomsen and Torfing
42 1991:122–141; Jessop 2007a: 225–233; 2009b; Sayer 2000:86–96, 108–
43 130).
44 It follows that focusing on one-dimensional possibilities is especially
45 inappropriate for phenomena as complex as the state or inter-state
46 system, which involve all four first-order dimensions of spatiality as
47 well as many second-order features (such as positionality or mobility,

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3 which, we will argue, are best defined in terms of the combination of
4 first-order principles). Starting from the latter, we can develop a more
5 complex understanding of the contradictions and dilemmas involved in
6 second-order features too. Thus the potentially endless spiral movement
7 from abstract-simple to concrete-complex analyses must consider the
Q1
8 logic and dynamics of compossible TSPN combinations, understood
9 more complex concepts can be developed by examining how different
10 structuring in terms of the dialectic of path dependency and path shaping
11 in broader sets of spatio-temporal and discursive-material constraints.
12 To avoid misunderstanding, we do not claim that territory, place,
13 scale, and territory are the only dimensions of socio-spatiality. There are
14 certainly second and, indeed, n-th order emergent socio-spatial relational
15 properties (mobility and positionality are second-order examples) and
16 other first-order dimensions may exist. Likewise, first to n-th order
17 configurations cannot exist8 apart from other features of the natural and
18 social worlds. They are always articulated with other substantive natural
19 and social relations and these constrain the form, shape and trajectories
20 of compossible TPSN combinations—especially when account is taken
21 of potential contradictions and dilemmas within and across first and n-th
22 order dimensions—and the socio-spatial relations through which they
23 are mediated, produced and transformed (on other forms of contradiction
24 from a political economy perspective, see Jessop 2002).
25
26
27
28 A Compossibilist Strategic-Relational Approach
29 to Statehood
30 To show the potential of this approach, Table 2 cross-tabulates each
31 socio-spatial dimension seen as a structuring principle with the other
32 three dimensions viewed as fields of operation of that principle. This
33 shows that structuring principles do not just apply to themselves—a
34 route to mutually isolated forms of one-dimensionalism—but affect
35 other socio-spatial fields too. This matrix shows that each spatial
36 concept can be deployed in five ways. This extends Jessop, Brenner
37 and Jones (2008:396), which identifies only the first three applications.
38 For example, territory can be explored:
39
40 • In itself as a product of (re)bordering strategies that operated on
41 the existing terrestrial landscape (this involves reading the matrix
42 diagonally, hence territory←→ territory);
43 • As a structuring principle (or causal mechanism) that impacts
44 other already structured fields of socio-spatial relations that may be
45 undergoing restructuring in other respects too (this involves reading
46 the matrix horizontally, hence: territory → place; territory → scale;
47 territory → network).

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3 Table 2: Beyond one-dimensionalism: conceptual orientations
4
Fields of operation
5 Structuring
6 principles Territory Place Scale Networks
7
Territory Past, present, and Distinct places in Multi-level Inter-state
8 emergent a given government system, state
9 frontiers, borders, territory alliances,
10 boundaries multi-area
11 government
Place Core–periphery, Locales, milieux, Division of Local/urban
12
borderlands, cities, sites, labour linked governance,
13 empires regions, to differently partnerships
14 neo-medievalism localities, scaled places
15 globalities
16 Scale Scalar division of Scale as area Vertical ontology Parallel power
political power rather than based on networks,
17
(unitary state, level (local nested or non-
18 federal state, etc) through to tangled governmental
19 global), spatial hierarchies international
20 division of regimes
21 labour
22 (Russian doll)
Networks Origin-edge, ripple Global city Flat ontology Networks of
23
effects (radiation) networks, based on networks,
24 Stretching and poly-nucleated horizontality spaces of
25 folding cities, with multiple flows,
26 Cross-border intermeshed entrypoints rhizome
27 region, inter-state sites
system
28
29 Source: Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008:395).
30
31
32 • As a structured field, produced in part through the impact of other
33 socio-spatial structuring principles on territorial dynamics (now
34 reading the matrix vertically, focusing on the territory column and
35 considering the linkages from: place → territory; scale → territory;
36 and network → territory).
37 • As a site of structural tensions specific to each dimension, taking
38 us beyond typology [and beyond what, in the worst case, as
39 noted by Mayer (2008) and Paasi (2008), is mere taxonomic fury]
40 towards a potentially more dynamic analysis. For example, the
41 territory←→territory cell raises the issue of the formally and
42 substantively adequate balance between the extremes of hermetic
43 closure and a borderless world; likewise, for the territory →
44 place cell, we find tensions facing global cities, city-regions, gated
45 enclaves, free cities.
46 • As a terrain of strategic dilemmas associated with these tensions
47 and, a fortiori, of agency that makes a difference. The intersection

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3 of tensions linked to different dimensions of socio-spatiality
4 requires specific types of action to resolve, displace, or defer
5 the contradictions and crisis tendencies associated with a given
6 socio-spatial configuration—one key aspect of which would be
7 specific forms of spatio-temporal fixes and their compossibility.
8 Thus the territory–territory cell invites consideration of issues of
9 multi-level territorial governance, federalism, confederalism, inter-
10 state consortia (or consociation), and so forth (cf Blatter 2003;
11 Schmitter 1996). This requires an analysis that breaks with a
12 purely self-referential account of the governability of states as
13 discrete political territorial units; and examines their formal and
14 substantive adequacy for providing compossible spatio-temporal
15 fixes for problems generated within and beyond the state system.
16 Likewise the territory → place cell could be analyzed in terms of
17 the specific spatio-temporal fixes associated with global cities and
18 global city-regions (expanding at the cost of national states and
19 hinterland regions with strong centre–periphery dynamics as well
20 as at the expense of the “third world” inside the global city) (cf
21 Sassen 1996; Scott et al 2001). Or, turning to other territory-place
22 configurations, one could ask how gated enclaves displace their
23 costs into the social and political environment or, again, how free
24 cities expand at the cost of the natural environment and exploited
25 subaltern classes (eg Kohn 2004). An interesting issue relevant
26 to (in)compossibility is how far a TPSN configuration can be
27 organized around analogous poles of the respective tensions of a the
28 TPSN schema, for example, bordered, contained, monoscalar, and
29 characterized by closed networks or whether, conversely, socio-
30 spatial configurations require some differentiation in this regard if
31 they are to prove stable.
32
33 Apart from the last remark, these five guidelines remain stubbornly
34 two-dimensional, indicating the need for further work. Three-
35 dimensional concepts are found and four-dimensional concepts are
36 certainly feasible, although their diagrammatic representation and
37 practical testing pose serious problems (see Jessop, Brenner and Jones
38 2008:392). In addition, Sheppard (2002) and Leitner, Sheppard and
39 Sziarto (2008) have recently proposed “positionality” and “mobility”
40 as important socio-spatial concepts. Nicholls (2009) advances this in
41 his work on “social movement space”, which explores how networks
42 are forged in places. Whilst affirming their importance, we see these
43 as second-order concepts that presuppose the first-order concepts
44 introduced above.
45 Treating the four dimensions self-referentially and in terms of their
46 interactions, including their implications for potential contradictions,
47 crisis tendencies, and dilemmas, is central to the research programme

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3 that we are recommending here. For this enables interactions among the
4 four dimensions to be understood as expressions of diverse attempts at
5 strategic coordination and structural coupling in specific spatio-temporal
6 contexts in the face of various TPSN-specific tensions (eg Bulkeley
7 2005; Gough 2004; Jessop 2001, 2009a, 2009b; Jones 2009a; Kramsch
8 2002; MacLeod and Jones 2007; Painter 2008; Trudeau 2008; Uitermark Q2
9 2002; Ward 2003).
10 Research into these socio-spatial configurations can be undertaken
11 from a compossibilist and/or incompossibilist perspective. The
12 former would address the relative coherence that comes from a
13 variable combination of similarity across socio-spatial forms and
14 complementarity among functions. However marked the similarity
15 among forms, forms problematize function and may not contain social
16 conflicts. This is where spatio-temporal fixes become critical in terms
17 of their differential ability to displace and/or defer crisis tendencies,
18 contradictions, and conflicts. Complementarity is also significant here
19 because it can provide requisite variety and a repertoire of responses
20 for crisis management, including flanking and supporting mechanisms
21 to compensate for the typical propensities to fail associated with the
22 primary structuring forms and principles (cf Jessop 2006; see also
23 Crouch 2005). An incompossibilist approach would focus in turn on
24 the ways in which similar forms in contradictory social formations
25 eventually generate mutually reinforcing crisis tendencies and/or in
26 which different but non-complementary forms can produce blockages,
27 impasses, and stalemates. Excess similarity has been evidenced recently
28 in the increasingly one-dimensional pursuit of neo-liberalism on a
29 global scale, leading to a crisis in global neo-liberalism and a crisis
30 of the finance-led accumulation regime in the case of economies that
31 underwent neo-liberal regime shifts (compare Hutton 2008; Jessop
32 2009c; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005). The latter cases are illustrated
33 in the dialectics of market, state, and governance failure (for differing
34 perspectives on this, see Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur 2005; Higgs
35 2004; Jones and Etherington 2009; Jones and Ward 2002).
36
37
38 Rethinking State/Space Compossibly and Incompossibly
39 We now offer two brief studies: the changing socio-spatiality of the
40 European Union as a state in the process of formation and English
41 regional policy respectively. The first shows the power of thinking
42 varieties of capitalism compossibly (via the concept of variegated
43 capitalism) and then examines the successive strategies adopted by the
44 European Communities and European Union to address the significance
45 of changing patterns of variegation for approaches to European
46 integration, spatial strategies, and economic and social policies. The
47 second case discusses some resulting problems for state spatial projects,

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3 starting, for present purposes, in the 1980s with spatial planning,
4 promotion of a Europe of the Regions and/or of Europe and the regions,
5 and then turn to recent city-regional development strategies. The case
6 study material is drawn from UK experience (but for similar trends
7 occurring in cities and regions elsewhere, see Beer et al 2005; Brenner
8 2003, 2004; Crouch et al 2004; González 2005; Hall and Pain 2006;
9 Kazepov 2005; Le Galès 2002; Sagan and Halkier 2005).
10
11
12 Thinking Varieties of Capitalism Compossibly
13 While the topic of varieties of capitalism (VoC) might seem unconnected
14 to changing state spatialities, this is due to the firm-centredness of much
15 of the relevant literature or, more generally, its focus on industry–finance
16 relations or business models. A common distinction between liberal
17 market and coordinated market economies fails to differentiate among
18 modes of coordination. In response, Schmidt (2008) has suggested the
19 notion of “state-influenced” market economies for cases outside the
20 usual binary contrast. This implies that the state is important only in
21 “exceptional” cases whereas its forms and functions, albeit variable,
22 matter in all cases. We recommend three steps to overcome this deficit:
23 first, interrogate the socio-spatial assumptions of varieties of capitalism
24 approaches; second, consider the changing socio-spatial articulation
25 of different sets of varieties proposed to date (eg Amable 2003; Coates
26 2003; Hall and Soskice 2003; Hancké et al 2007; Streeck and Yamamura
27 2001; Whitley 1999) and their insertion into the world market; and third,
28 investigate the links between varieties of capitalism and state forms.
29 This will reveal the limitations of the main accounts and explanations
30 proposed in the 1980s and 1990s9 for varieties of capitalism and
31 also show the intimate connection between these varieties and their
32 respective state forms.
33 From a compossibilist perspective, previous work on varieties of
34 capitalism can be criticized on five grounds. First, it fetishizes national
35 territory in focusing on (families of) national models, treating them
36 as rivals competing on the same terrain for the same stakes, and
37 ignoring potential complementarities within a wider international or
38 global division of labour. This is, of course, a form of methodological
39 nationalism in which national states and their boundaries serve to define
40 the scope of different models. This focus on territorial logics clearly
41 conflicts with the logic of the space of flows entailed in the organization
42 of the world market (cf Harvey 2003; for a critique, Jessop 2006).
43 Second, there is often wide variation within any individual national
44 economy across its different sectors and/or regions, casting doubt
45 on the national economy as an analytical unit and raising questions
46 about divisions of labour defined in terms of place and/or scale, both
47 within national frontiers and across them in transnational networks. This

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3 problem cannot be solved by invoking the key role of national states in
4 shaping institutional and regulatory frameworks for all economic players
5 in a national economy—especially as state formations on other scales
6 and networked international regimes also have increasingly important
7 roles. Third, and relatedly, a focus on national economies ignores
8 alternative socio-spatial configurations such as emerging supranational
9 blocs, global city networks, or global commodity chains. Interestingly,
10 such cross- and intra-national variations are connected to the socio-
11 spatial configurations associated with forms of capitalism as well
12 as to the changing dynamic of the world market. Fourth, concern
13 with varieties of capitalism may lead to neglect of the market-
14 mediated competitive pressures and political initiatives that encourage
15 convergence among them, whether through European integration and
16 harmonization and/or US-sponsored expansion of networked, world
17 market-friendly international economic regimes. In this regard, states,
18 the inter-state system, and international regimes are critical factors in
19 shaping VoC dynamics. Fifth, the emphasis on “horizontal” comparisons
20 and/or competition among national or regional varieties of capitalism
21 diverts attention from the “vertical” relations between core and periphery
22 (Radice 1999) and ignores important asymmetries in the competition and
23 co-evolution among varieties of capitalism due to differences in their
24 capacities to shape the world market. For, to paraphrase the well-known
25 revisionist principle in Animal Farm: “all varieties of capitalism are
26 equal but some are more equal than others” (Orwell 1945; cf McMichael
27 1990 on the role of incorporated comparison where one model has a
28 strong constitutive impact on the structural environment in which other
29 models operate; Jessop 2007a on ecological dominance; and Konings
30 2008 on the influence of asymmetrical intermediary capacities in global
31 circuits of finance).
32 The growing integration of the world market makes it especially
33 inappropriate to study “varieties of capitalism” in isolation. The idea
34 of compossibility is fruitful here because it suggests the existence of a
35 single variegated capitalism (cf Jessop 2007b; and, albeit on different
36 theoretical grounds, Peck and Theodore 2007). There are five main
37 grounds for this, corresponding to the five criticisms outlined above.
38 First, rejecting methodological nationalism, a focus on the changing
39 global division of labour suggests a tendentially emerging single
40 variegated capitalism within a self-organizing, emergent ecology of
41 varieties of capitalism rather than a more or less enduring set of national
42 varieties that occupy distinct niches that are potentially independent
43 of each other. This has major implications for changing forms and
44 functions of states viewed as specific mechanisms of government and
45 governance.
46 Second, rather than describing and interpreting them as if each
47 variety occupied a separate silo, it would be better to explore the scope

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3 for rivalry, competition, antagonism, complementarity, or co-evolution
4 across different models of capitalism and their spatio-temporal fixes
5 (cf Crouch 2005). Focusing on variegated global capitalism involves
6 identifying and explaining zones of relative stability in terms of their
7 changing complementarities, asymmetries, contradictions, and crisis-
8 tendencies in a complex “ecology” of accumulation regimes, modes
9 of regulation, and spatio-temporal fixes; and, importantly, noting their
10 respective capacities to displace and defer contradictions and crisis
11 tendencies into the future and/or elsewhere into zones of relative
12 incoherence, instability and even catastrophe.
13 Third, interpreting conventional varieties of capitalism in this way
14 highlights the need to relate comparatively successful performance in
15 certain economic spaces not only to their external as well as internal
16 conditions of existence but also—and crucially—to the costs that such
17 success imposes on other spaces and future generations.
18 Fourth, in this context, neo-liberalism is not just one variety of
19 capitalism among others that has proved more or less productive and
20 progressive (or more or less inefficient and exploitative) and could
21 be adopted elsewhere with the same positive (or negative) results,
22 as if the whole world economy could be organized along these
23 lines. We must reject, as Radice (1999) argues, claims about the
24 suprahistorical superiority of one or another disembedded model of
25 capitalism. For example, not all economies can establish their national
26 money as the world currency and run massive and growing trade
27 deficits, not all national states can be military masters in a unipolar
28 world, and so on. This is not just a matter of logical compossibility.
29 It also concerns discursive-material, spatio-temporal compossibility,
30 that is, the substantive fit (or otherwise) among varieties of capitalism.
31 This involves not only the economic competitiveness of a given
32 form of capitalist organization but also the capacity of its political
33 regime(s) to promote this form in and beyond its territorial and extra-
34 territorial contexts in relations among places, interscalar relations, and
35 networks.
36 Fifth, examining the world market in terms of centre–periphery
37 relations as well as in terms of simple national differentiation raises
38 important socio-spatial questions about state capacities. This has
39 long been recognized in geo-economic and geo-political studies and
40 highlights the need to explore different forms of structural coupling
41 and co-evolution among political economic spaces. In these terms,
42 for example, the US model (if it has a singular character) entails
43 many co-evolved relations with other economies subordinated to
44 its logics. Within the ecology of the changing world market there
45 is enormous scope for variation and variegation and, where this
46 exceeds the limits of compossibility, the resulting crises may force
47 the reimposition of relative unity or produce the “mutual ruin of the

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3 contending classes” or various forms of so-called state failure and social
4 stagnation.
5 In short, rather than considering varieties of capitalism in isolation,
6 we should explore their structural coupling, co-evolution, and mutual
7 compossibilities. This also requires us to consider the contradictions and
8 mutual incompossibilities among varieties and stages of capitalism and
9 their implications for the future dynamic of “variegated capitalism” at
10 the level of the world market. This is critically related to questions
11 about the state and its changing socio-spatial configurations, abilities to
12 promote one or another variety of capitalism, and secure spatio-temporal
13 fixes appropriate thereto. Varieties of capitalism can be explored in
14 terms of their responses to the contradiction between the economy
15 considered as a pure space of flows and the economy as a territorially
16 and/or socially embedded system of resources and competencies. The
17 liberal market economy is linked in ideal-typical terms to a liberal
18 state. It is important to note here that the liberal state also constitutes a
19 form of intervention in the organization of the market (Foucault 2008;
20 Gramsci 1971) and, in the current period, this is associated with policies
21 that promote liberalization, deregulation, privatization, resort to market
22 proxies in the public sector, internationalization, and cuts in direct taxes.
23 The Rhenish version of the coordinated market economy is linked to a
24 neo-corporatist mode of state intervention, which involves the state in
25 modulating the balance of competition and cooperation, de-centralized
26 “regulated self-regulation”, a widening of the range of private, public,
27 and other “stakeholders” in the pattern of corporatist negotiation, an
28 expanded role for public–private partnerships, policies to protect the
29 core economic sectors in an increasingly open economy, and efforts to
30 maintain high levels of taxation to finance social investment. Dirigiste
31 (or statist) coordination of market economies involves in turn resort to
32 regulated competition, state-guided national strategies rather than top-
33 down planning (indicative or prescriptive), increased governmentalized
34 audit of private and public sector performance, the expansion of public–
35 private partnerships under state guidance, neo-mercantilist protection of
36 the core economy (extending in the current global economic crisis to so-
37 called financial mercantilism), and the development of new collective
38 resources to facilitate economic security and global competitiveness.
39 In turn, the East Asian export-oriented model involved a Listian
40 developmental state that guided economic growth, initially for national
41 security, then catch-up development, and most recently, innovation-led
42 competitiveness. Despite neo-liberal policy shifts and imposed structural
43 adjustment policies, a post-developmental neo-mercantilist state still
44 engages in meta-guidance, in part through networks, of the economy,
45 privatization measures are selective and tied to state strategies (or the
46 interests of state managers), liberalization of collective consumption
47 (under GATTS) has been limited, free trade under WTO rules has been

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3 imposed gradually (outside of the IMF crisis) and protection continues
4 in the name of national security, and the tax system is still largely
5 developmentalist.
6
7
8 Thinking Varieties of Capitalism and EU State
9 Formation Incompossibly
10 We now apply these general arguments to European state formation,
11 where economic and political forces are seeking to restructure national
12 states and economies in the hope of solving the longstanding structural
13 “problem” of competitiveness within regions, national economies,
14 and the wider European economic space. The resulting policies and
15 their historical sequencing can be studied in terms of the principle
16 that not everything that is possible is compossible. Central to our
17 analysis is a focus on the potential for incompatibility, antagonism
18 and contradiction within and between the four first-order socio-spatial
19 structuring principles of territories, places, networks, and scales (and,
20 by extension, possible second- or third-order principles) and their
21 implications for the compossibility of different state spatial strategies
22 and state spatial projects.
23 The six founding members of the European Economic Community
24 (EEC) had modes of growth and regulation belonging to one or another
25 of the regulated varieties of capitalism as well as one or another form of
26 conservative-corporativist welfare regime or, in Italy’s case, a clientelist
27 Mediterranean welfare regime (cf Hantrais 2000; Ruigrok and van
28 Tulder 1996). The initial steps towards European integration aimed to
29 integrate Western Europe into Atlantic Fordism; and the “Monnet mode
30 of integration” was concerned to create a “Keynesian-corporatist” (sic)
31 form of statehood on the European level favourable to different national
32 Fordist modes of development (Ziltener 1999). Rather than involving a
33 strong principled commitment to economic liberalism at almost any cost Q3
34 at this stage, market integration was expected to have spillover effects
35 that would consolidate regulated capitalism on a wider scale and also
36 lead to deeper political integration. For this reason, the early stages of
37 integration encouraged the development and coherence of the European
38 Communities as instances of variegated regulated capitalism.
39 The situation changed as the European Community expanded to
40 include members with different modes of growth, regulation, and
41 welfare. Initially the UK was relatively isolated as a liberal market
42 economy (and this in part motivated the French veto on earlier entry)
43 but nonetheless served an important intermediary role in spreading the
44 influence of de-regulated international finance into the Continental
45 heartland.10 The growing incompossibility of different varieties of
46 capitalism was aggravated by the emerging crises of Atlantic Fordism
47 and its differential impact across national models in Europe—with

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3 some making neo-liberal regime shifts at different times and some
4 making neo-liberal policy adjustments, thereby increasing the economic
5 and social heterogeneity in the original core, intensifying the crisis in
6 European integration, and prompting the search for a new mode of
7 integration. This made it harder to create the conditions to re-scale state
8 planning from the national to the European level and/or to establish
9 a tripartite Euro-corporatism (on Euro-corporatism, see Falkner 1998
10 and Vobruba 1995; on its limits, Streeck 1995). The Monnet mode of
11 coordinated market integration was replaced by the more liberal internal
12 market project, creating conflicts among neo-liberal, neo-corporatist,
13 and neo-statist currents. Eastwards expansion of the European Union
14 has aggravated the incoherence of the EU—an effect that is far from
15 accidental but was promoted by neo-liberal forces within and beyond the
16 European Union and that has, more recently, seen neo-liberal chickens
17 come home to roost because of over-rapid deregulation and debt-fuelled
18 speculation, threatening the overall stability of the EU.
19 These problems encouraged a turn to the open method of coordination
20 (OMC) in the 1990s, which was officially consolidated in the Lisbon
21 agenda. The latter had strong support from the founding members of the
22 EEC and from Austria, Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden. It combines
23 a commitment to international competitiveness with retention of the
24 European social model and can be seen as a compromise between
25 neo-liberal and social democratic variants of capitalism. The emerging
26 Lisbon project is closely tied to the shift from a Keynesian-welfarist
27 mode of integration to a more Schumpeterian-workfarist mode. This
28 involves the de- and re-territorialization of the state, the de-statization
29 of crucial economic and social policies, the re-scaling of state power,
30 and an increasing emphasis on networked power. Retaining older forms
31 of European statehood would have been incompatible with the changes
32 in accumulation regimes and hindered after-Fordist re-regulation.
33 The growing incompossibility of an increasingly variegated European
34 economic space with the Monnet model of integration helps to explain
35 the shift away from policies of harmonization and the development
36 of the open method of coordination as one among several examples
37 of “multi-scalar meta-governance conducted in the shadow of post-
38 national hierarchy” (Jessop 2007a). In contrast to the earlier pursuit
39 of various measures of positive integration alongside the pursuit of
40 negative integration, growing incompossibility has produced a bias
41 in economic and, to a lesser extent, social policy towards negative
42 integration and collibration. Pursuit of measures that tend to eliminate
43 restrictions on “the four freedoms” (the free flow of goods, services,
44 capital, and labour) tends to weaken the coherence of the respective
45 national cores of coordinated market economies and to advantage
46 mobile capital (on the neo-liberal bias of negative integration, see
47 Altvater and Mahnkopf 2007; van Apeldoorn 2002). The OMC is

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3 a distinctive form of collibration, that is, the judicious mixing and
4 remixing of market, hierarchy, networks, and solidarity to improve
5 overall outcomes (cf Dunsire 1996), which represents a major response
6 to the growing incompossibility of distinct varieties of capitalism within
7 an increasingly integrated economic and political space that has been
8 subject to growing pressures from an increasingly integrated (and, more
9 recently, crisis-stricken) world market. From one viewpoint, given the
10 ecological dominance of neo-liberalism on a world scale from the 1980s
11 onwards (cf Jessop 2007a), the pursuit of neo-liberalism within the EU
12 appeared to be the line of least resistance given the co-existence of
13 several “varieties of capitalism” with their complex contradictions. One
14 indicator of this is the changing position of the European Round Table,
15 which is an important site of compromise between contending fractions
16 of capital and a major vector of the interiorization of external constraints
17 as well as intra-European conflicts and contradictions (cf van Apeldoorn
18 2002). The OMC helps to mediate the resulting variegation without
19 relying purely on negative integration and without imposing a one-
20 size-fits-all economic and political programme. It does this by allowing
21 states to pursue different approaches to shared EU objectives, thereby
22 facilitating the extended reproduction of a variegated capitalism based
23 on the structural coupling and co-evolution of different modes of growth
24 and regulation with different modes of insertion into the European and
25 wider world markets.
26 This emerging trend in institutional restructuring and strategic
27 reorientation can be contrasted with the usual alternative accounts
28 of the rescaling of the traditional form of sovereign statehood or
29 the revamping of liberal intergovernmentalism inherited from earlier
30 integration rounds. The emphasis is on efforts at continuing collibration
31 in a changing equilibrium of compromise rather than on systematic,
32 consistent resort to a single method of coordination to deal with a fixed
33 pattern of complex interdependence. Effective collibration depends in
34 turn on “super-vision” and “supervision, that is, a relative monopoly
35 of organized intelligence combined with overall monitoring of agreed
36 governance procedures (Willke 1996). Thus we have seen repeated
37 rounds of constitutional debate over the design of the Europolity as
38 well as growing resort to and expansion of comitology, social dialogue,
39 public– private partnerships, mobilization of non-governmental bodies
40 and social movements, etc, as integral elements in attempts to guide
41 European integration and steer European Union policy-making and
42 implementation (Scott and Trubek 2002). The recent and continuing
43 crisis over the European constitution and its validation through national
44 referenda and/or legislative decision-making indicates the problems of
45 economic and political incompossibility in an expanding European
46 Union that is itself located in an increasingly heterogeneous world
47 market and polity.

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3 Reflecting the complex position of the European Union within
4 a variegated capitalism that is not confined to European economic
5 space but extends to the world market, EU meta-governance has
6 become a crucial site for contending political forces both within and
7 beyond the EU as they seek to shape its overall strategic direction
8 and/or specific economic and social policies (cf van Apeldoorn 2002;
9 Ziltener 2001). Thus it has been a vector for American neo-liberal
10 pressures to redesign the world order and for attempts to promote an
11 alternative European model. While the initial compromise position was
12 embedded neo-liberalism, the current economic crisis illustrates how
13 the balance of forces has shifted in this regard against neo-liberalism
14 within the European framework. Even before this volte face, however,
15 the tendential Europeanization of economic and social policy had
16 been closely linked, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to the
17 increased role of subnational and cross-national agencies, territorial
18 and/or functional in form, in its formulation and implementation. In this
19 regard there has been a significant scalar division of labour between
20 the EU, national states, and sub-national tiers of government linked
21 to different forms of networking and efforts at governmentality. The
22 current struggle over the most appropriate response to the global crisis
23 of neo-liberalism that was “made in America”, first emerged there,
24 and has since spread to Europe with a vengeance. This has revealed
25 significant differences once again between the economies that undertook
26 the most marked neo-liberal regime shifts (Eire, Iceland, the UK,
27 Spain, the Baltic Republics, and Eastern and Central Europe) and
28 those that inclined more to neo-liberal policy adjustments (notably the
29 Benelux economies, Scandinavia, and Germany) and the limits to their
30 compossibility within the current constitutional, institutional, and meta-
31 governance arrangements.
32
33
34 Thinking Regional State/Space in Europe Compossibly
35 While this narrative exemplifies the dynamics and limits of
36 compossibility, we do not want to encourage another one-dimensional
37 turn, this time compossibilist in nature, as if all theoretical and practical
38 problems could be solved by a single-minded turn in this direction.
39 Indeed, since this turn is premised on the territorial, place-centric, scalar,
40 and network turns, single-mindedness is especially inappropriate. Thus
41 we recommend looking at compossibility and incompossibility in terms
42 of the differential scope for loose and tight coupling among socio-spatial
43 dimensions in different contexts and in terms of variation, selection,
44 retention, and institutionalization. Thus our second case is more
45 compossibilist than incompossibilist in its line of argument. It explores
46 the scope for apparently contradictory or even incompossible policies
47 to be pursued regionally through a combination of muddling through,

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3 mutual limitation, uneven development. This pattern has nonetheless
4 proved incompossible with economic and social performance that
5 matches obvious competitors, leading to gradual economic decline and
6 placed England in a poor position to respond to the global crisis in
7 neo-liberalism and the national crisis in finance-led accumulation.
8 Our approach can be deepened by revisiting the hotly contested
9 concept of “region” and the roles played by regions in economic
10 governance and socio-economic development. There is growing
11 recognition that regions are necessarily contingent historical
12 geographical accomplishments with many possible natural and/or
13 social bases (MacLeod and Jones 2007). This opens them to a
14 compossibilist analysis in terms of their multiple individual bases and
15 the compossibility of different regions within and across space–time.
16 Such an analysis would examine inherited TPSN landscapes and the
17 shifting balance of forces mobilized behind different past, present, and
18 future socio-spatial configurations. The strategically selective terrain on
19 which regional projects are pursued is crucial. As Paasi notes:
20
21 Regions are always part of this action and hence they are social
22
constructs that are created in political, economic, cultural and
23
administrative practices and discourses. Further, in these practices
and discourses regions may become crucial instruments of power that
24
manifest themselves in shaping the spaces of governance, economy
25
and culture (2001:16, our emphasis).
26
27 The “new regionalism” project is the latest political and policy
28 manifestation of such constructs regarding state spatiality in the after-
29 Fordist period. It is re-shaping the meaning of political space and
30 encouraging new forms of political mobilization and action (see Keating
31 1998; MacLeod 2001; Scott et al 2001). In stark contrast to the
32 “encagement” and “entrenchment” state strategies of Atlantic Fordism
33 that rested on the regulatory primacy of national territory and domestic
34 place (cf Brenner 2004; Jessop 2009a), it promises sound post-national
35 governance through the regulatory primacy of post-national scalar
36 divisions of labour and connectivities among different social fields
37 mediated through multiple networks. This political strategy began in the
38 1980s with the “Europe of the regions” discourse, which promoted inter
39 alia spatial planning based on regions to apply European structural funds
40 and cohesion policies (Borrás Alomar, Christiansen and Rodrı́guez-Pose
41 1994; Keating 1998). This is now shaping efforts to build city-regions
42 across Europe based on economic clusters, knowledge-based economy
43 strategies, and growing self-awareness of localities as socio-political
44 entities (Hall and Pain 2006; Harrison 2007). Power and responsibility
45 are being shifted from the national to lower tiers of government
46 and governance, reflecting the relativization of scale that destabilized
47 national space as well as an expanded role for rhizomatic networks

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3 of networks that cross-cut conventional territorial forms (Blatter 2004;
4 Veltz 1996). Q4
5 This helps to explain why decentralized approaches, tailored to sub-
6 national, regional and local circumstances are considered better able
7 to address the continuing problems caused by entrenched territorial
8 inequalities in growth, income and employment (cf Dunford and Perrons
9 1992). Decentralized structures are also expected to deliver an enhanced,
10 democratized, political settlement that renders economic development
11 institutions more open and accountable to local, regional and sub-
12 national territorial circumstances (see OECD 2001). Nonetheless to
13 secure relative coherence among these multiple forms and sites
14 of decentralization, network forms of organization are considered
15 necessary (for an early UK example, see EC 1996). Such multi-scalar
16 meta-governance informs not only UK regional policy but also, more
17 significantly, emerging TPSN configurations like the EU (Jessop 2007a).
18 Finally, decentralization allegedly offers a territorial shape capable
19 of nurturing culture, developing social and political imaginaries, and
20 promoting regional distinctiveness (see Elias 2008; Harty 2001; Jones
21 and MacLeod 2004).
22 Yet these processes do not operate in a spatial vacuum: space can hold
23 legacies. This poses the question whether the new regionalism is not only
24 a possible (ie abstractly feasible) state project but also compossible with
25 the inherited institutional landscape, the balance of forces, and any other
26 projects in play. Some factors favouring the initial selection of the new
27 regional imaginary are its productive fuzziness, its resonance across
28 such diverse fields as identity, culture, economics, politics and policy,
29 and its adaptability to different contexts and conjunctures. In addition,
30 it promises to address the imperatives of economic competition, the
31 institutional and legitimacy crises of the (after-)Fordist state, and
32 pressure for devolution and constitutional change within the regions
33 themselves. Factors favouring its effective integration into state spatial
34 strategies include its compatibility with the shift from a spatio-temporal
35 fix that prioritizes territory-place to one organized around scale-network,
36 its coherence with the open method of coordination, and its promise
37 of addressing the congestion of local economic initiatives associated
38 with numerous rounds of spatial planning and economic governance
39 (Goodwin, Jones and Jones 2005; Pike and Tomaney 2009). But it
40 is worth asking whether the new regionalism involves more than a
41 short-term coincidence of diverse elements of regional policy and could
42 be retained and institutionalized into a socio-spatial configuration that
43 is compossible in the longer term. For not only would its retention
44 depend on its capacity to promote economic competitiveness and social
45 cohesion but also on its capacity to secure decentralization, open up
46 the state apparatus, and empower sub-national governing communities.
47 Experience to date is very uneven and probably negative because only

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3 partial successes have been recorded (compare Blatter 2003; Borrás
4 Alomar, Christiansen and Rodrı́guez-Pose 1994; Bromley et al 2006;
5 Cole 2006, 2008; Hazell 2006; Jeffery and Wincott 2006; Jones 2004;
6 Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003; Rodrı́guez-Pose and Gill
7 2005; Rossi 2004; Royles 2007).
8 England is certainly a site of competing TPSN spatial strategies
9 and illustrates the role of muddling through in coping with combined
10 and uneven development. Since the late 1990s the government has
11 pursued economic and political strategies based on decentralization
12 (eg new economic governance through city-regions, devolved policies
13 for the “skills society” and knowledge-based economy) and others
14 that concentrate economic, political, and state power in similar fields
15 (eg through the Review of Sub National Economic Development and
16 Regeneration and subsequent Single Regional Strategies as multi-
17 level “coordination points” to provide a “clearer set of objectives
18 and responsibilities”—see Communities and Local Government and
19 Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform 2008).
20 Yet the decentralization/devolution initiatives counteract others
21 that involve new territorial projects, place-based initiatives, scalar
22 reshuffling, or networked opportunities (Allen and Cochrane 2007;
23 Etherington and Jones 2009; MacLeod and Jones 2007; Morgan 2007).
24 Here we see TPSN state strategies responding to problems created by
25 state intervention itself—a crisis of inherited forms of TPSN crisis-
26 management (cf Offe 1984). Some of this is now acknowledged,
27 prompting attempts to bridge the gap through networked governance
28 projects such as Local Area Agreements and Multi-Area Agreements.
29 These are cross- and inter-territorial alliances (in terms of their
30 geography and policy remits) and build on experiments such as Local
31 Strategic Partnerships. All three projects exemplify meta-governance
32 (Jessop 2008), which also shapes efforts at territorial coherence via
33 Regional Select Committees and a Council of Regional Ministers,
34 created to “supervise” Regional Development Agencies and other
35 activities within and across the regions. Coordinated implementation
36 is still hampered by inherited inflexibility of the state apparatus due to
37 the fragmented legacies of individual departments and policy initiatives
38 and their scalar interpenetration and/or interference. This has led one
39 of us to identify an “impedimenta state”, that is, a trend for the state to
40 become the medium and outcome of a series of economic development
41 rationalities, which are being implemented through multiple spatial
42 strategies and projects, but their apparent incompatibility and baggage-
43 like polity is reproducing irrationality (Jones 2009b).
44 We would suggest that exit from these crises requires adequate
45 responses to the socio-spatial contradictions of the neo-liberal model
46 without regenerating the older problems that neo-liberal state spatial
47 restructuring was meant to resolve. While efforts are being made to

C 2010 The Authors
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1 24 Antipode
2
3 support and flank neo-liberalism (a form of “neo-neo-liberalism”),
4 this model is already showing its limitations. A new synthesis is
5 clearly required that not only moves beyond present blockages within
6 national territorial and economic space, but also addresses the problems
7 emerging from the wider reorganization of the inter-state system within
8 a rapidly changing world market and global social formation. At
9 the time of writing, however, state policy offers more of the same.
10 Given a “credit-crunch” driven recession with economic restructuring
11 comparable to the early 1980s, formal regionalization is continuing
12 and becoming more interventionist. There is significant interest in
13 a “Regional Communications Hub” for each Regional Development
14 Agency territory to coordinate information on what is happening in the
15 region. Discussions inside the state reveal confusion about and with
16 a discourse of “messaging narrative” and “audience segments”, which
17 when connected to a new “Economy Communications Group” of the
18 major ministries, is seen as a basis for coordinating government publicity
19 across the English regions.
20
21
22 Conclusion
23 In response to acknowledged weaknesses in socio-spatial theorizing over
24 the past 30 years, reflected in diverse theoretical deficits, methodological
25 hazards and empirical blind spots, we have suggested some ways
26 to expand the TPSN scheme introduced by Jessop, Brenner and
27 Jones (2008). Although we have illustrated this through two case
28 studies in particular fields, the compossibilist approach has wider
29 significance. In our concluding remarks, we return to these bigger
30 issues. One proposal, little developed here, is to link the TPSN scheme
31 to tensions and dilemmas, opening space for recognition of agency;
32 another, more elaborated but still provisional, proposal is to explore
33 compossibility and, more significantly, incompossibility. The latter is
34 central to such analyses because, to reiterate, not everything that is
35 possible is compossible. This affects the general deployment of socio-
36 spatial concepts (what seems possible from a one-sided concern with
37 territoriality, for example, may prove impossible when its articulation
38 with other socio-spatial dimensions is considered). It also underlines
39 the significance of variation, selection, and retention: what seems
40 possible for short-term co-existence of elements or events may prove
41 impossible—in other words, incompossible—in the medium or long
42 term or, alternatively, may require changes elsewhere to make it
43 compossible. In this context we suggest that:
44
45 1 the relative weight of the four first-order dimensions of socio-
46 spatiality introduced above varies with different types of socio-
47 spatial fix—sometimes territory, sometimes place, sometimes

C 2010 The Authors
Journal compilation

2
3 scale, sometimes network, and sometimes combinations (see
4 below) matter more in securing the coherence of spatio-temporal
5 relations
6 2 crises can be explored in terms of the growing incoherence of
7 these four socio-spatial dimensions as previously organized under
8 the dominance of one (or two) such dimensions
9 3 crisis resolution often depends on the emergence of a new spatio-
10 temporal fix that reorders the relative importance of territory,
11 place, scale, and network
12 4 territory–place was important during Atlantic Fordism and, after
13 the crisis of its primary spatio-temporal fix, scale–network has
14 become more significant
15 5 with a focus on absence and co-absence11 as well as presence
16 and co-presence, and inviting inquiries into the possibility,
17 impossibility, compossibility and incompossibility of specific
18 sets of socio-spatial relations, “geographies of compossibility
19 and incompossibility” is a valuable addition to the conceptual
20 vocabulary of socio-spatial inquiry.
21
22 Finally, we suggest that, when located in a broader strategic-relational
23 framework sensitive to possibility and compossibility, the TPSN schema
24 is useful in refining socio-spatial theory and, a fortiori, in analysing
25 socio-spatial transformations.
26
27
28
29
Endnotes
1
The TPSN schema below derives from intermittent debate among Neil Brenner, Bob
30
Jessop, Martin Jones and Gordon MacLeod (see Brenner et al 2003; Jessop, Brenner and
31 Jones 2008). Its compossibilist framing was developed by the current authors. Martin
32 Jones thanks The Leverhulme Trust for support through a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
2
33 The terrestrial is used here to include earth, water and sky considered as first nature
34 and as built environment. Even the telematic is emergent from the terrestrial insofar
as it provides the conditions and medium for cyberspace (for a different take on the
35
terrestrial, territorial, and telematic, see Luke 1994).
36 3
For an analysis prefiguring some of these arguments, see Gough (1991).
37 4
In principle, a solitary state could exist if it turned part of terrestrial space into a
38 territorialized area non-contiguous with another territory controlled by another state.
5
39 Critical realists distinguish the real as the deep layer of underlying causal mechanisms,
tendencies and counter-tendencies, the actual as the level on which real forces are
40
actualized, and the empirical as the level of evidence for this effect.
41 6
We prefer the term ensemble to assemblage because we regard the latter term as too
42 rigid and demanding a translation of agencement (cf Venn 2005).
7
43 “. . . those who have been persuaded by the claims of deconstruction have set dialectics
44 aside, challenging the metaphysic of binary opposition . . . and refusing to conceive of
45
difference as contradiction” (Gregory 2000:172–173).
8
They might be fruitfully studied in such terms in certain contexts.
46 9
Analyses vary across periods: Shonfield’s classic work, for example, highlighted the
47 state’s significance for the dynamic of post-war capitalism (Shonfield 1965).

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1 26 Antipode
2
3 10
Konings (2008) notes that continental banks also exploited the separation of industry
4 and finance in the Anglo-Saxon model to move some of their international financial
5 activities to the City of London, which, in turn, modified the way in which the liberal
6 financialization model operated.
11
Co-absence occurs when absenting some x removes the possibility of some y.
7
8
9
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Paper: anti_796
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Reference
Q1 Author: In the section A
Compossibilist Revision
of the TPSN Framework,
please check the sense of the
following text:
“Thus the potentially ......
discursive-material
constraints.”
Q2 Author: Please provide
reference details for Jessop
(2001, 2008), Hancké
et al (2007), Streeck and
Yamamura (2001), Ruigrok
and van Tulder (1996),
Dunsire (1996).
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Reference
Q3 Author: Ziltener (1999) or
(2001)? Please give correct
year.
Q4 Author: Blatter (2003) or
(2004)? Please give correct
year.
Q5 Author: Please give English
translations for the titles
of Altvater and Mahnkopf
(2007), Jessop (2009b),
Ziltener (2001).
Q6 Author: Please cite the
following in the text or
remove from reference
list: Arrighi (1990, 2004),
Brenner and Theodore
(2002), Harvey (1982),
Haughton and Counsell
(2004), Johnson (2008),
Jonas and Ward (2007),
Kennedy (1989), Kitschelt
(1991), Le Galès and
Lequesne (1998), Marshall
(1987), Poulantzas (1978).
Q7 Author: Please give page
numbers for Brenner (2009),
Jessop (2006)
Q8 Author: Please give names
of all editors for Gregory
(2000)
Q9 Author: Please give an
update for Jessop (2009c),
Jones (2009a).

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