KILOSA BAYAN VS MORATO

G. R. No. 118910)

FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the
Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110.
Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the
decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as
Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.
Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some
cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official
action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners
do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present
substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

Summary: Ocampo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (GR 158466, 15 June 2004)

Ocampo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

[GR 158466, 15 June 2004]
En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez (J): 13 concur

Facts: On 23 May 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez,
the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the 14 May 2001 elections. He was
credited with 32,097 votes or a margin of 768 votes over Pablo V. Ocampo who obtained 31,329 votes. On 31
May 2001, Ocampo filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an electoral protest
against Crespo, impugning the election in 807 precincts in the 6th District of Manila on the following grounds:
(1) misreading of votes garnered by Ocampo; (2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of election
returns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots written by one person
or two persons (HRET Case 01-024). Ocampo prayed that a revision and appreciation of the ballots in the 807
contested precincts be conducted; and that, thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the
6th District of Manila. On 18 June 2001, Crespo filed his answer with counter-protest5 vehemently denying
that he engaged in massive vote buying. After the preliminary conference between the parties on 12 July
2001, the HRET issued a Resolution6 limiting the issues to: first, whether massive vote-buying was committed
by Crespo; and second, whether Ocampo can be proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District
of Manila. Meanwhile, on 6 March 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases 01-020 (Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio
Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo), and 01-023 (Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo), issued Resolutions
declaring that Crespo is "ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of
residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate his office." Crespo filed a motion for reconsideration
therein but was denied. On 12 March 2003, Ocampo filed a motion to implement Section 6 of Republic Act
6646. On 26 March 2003, Crespo filed an opposition to Ocampo’s motion to implement the said provision. On
27 March 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that Crespo was guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying
him as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Anent the second issue of whether Ocampo can be
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman, the HRET held that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the first
among the remaining qualified candidates,a nd thus held the Ocampo cannot be proclaimed as the duly
elected representative of the Sixth legislative District of Manila. Ocampo filed a partial motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Ocampo filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Ocampo may be proclaimed the winner after Crespo was disqualified by the HRET.

Held: Section 6 of RA 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the
election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not
yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor
cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. Herein, Crespo was declared
disqualified almost 22 months after the 14 May 2001 elections. Obviously, the requirement of "final judgment
before election" is absent. On the other hand, subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner. This principle has been reiterated in a number the Court's decisions, such as Labo, Jr.
vs. COMELEC, Abella vs. COMELEC, Benito vs. COMELEC and Domino vs. COMELEC. As a matter of fact, even
as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the
event that the candidate who won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected. In
Geronimo vs. Ramos, if the winning candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was
elected, a permanent vacancy is thus created. The second placer is just that, a second placer – he lost in the
elections, he was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. He could not be proclaimed winner as
he could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the
nature of the democratic electroral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind
voters’ preferences. At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The Twelfth Congress formally
adjourned on 11 June 2004. And on 17 May 2004, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante
the duly elected Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the 10 May 2004 elections.

he present Senate of the 14th Congress conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the “Hello
Garci” tapes which allegedly contained President GMA’s instructions to former Comelec
Commissioner Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections.
The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and 2006. With respect to the present Senate,
however, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session. Is the Senate investigation valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The SC declared invalid for lack of compliance with the publication requirement the previous Senate
inquiry in aid of legislation on the “Hello Garci” tapes. “However, the Senate may now call for a new inquiry on
the same following the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure in two major dailies last October 2008.”

The Court cited sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which mandates the publication of the rules of
 procedure of either the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees before it
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process.

The SC reiterated its ruling in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
that the phrase “duly published rules of procedure” requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules
of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or
after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set
of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

The Court said that the respondents cannot justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication requirement by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and that they are
published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet
web page. “The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution…The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate,” it said. It added that the
respondents’ invocation of the provisions of RA 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim
of valid publication through the internet was incorrect, stressing that “the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents” but such “does not make
the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.” (GR No. 170338, Garcillano v. House of
Representatives; GR No. 179275, Rañada v. Senate, December 23, 2008)

Avelino vs Cuenco

FACTS

The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano CUenco.

In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then
Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his
supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were
left in the hall.

The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting
President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.

2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

HELD
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the
court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers.

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its
own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused
to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were
alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty
three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be
most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one
that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of
the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held
with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions
herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Petiton dimissed.

People vs. Vera

[GR 45685, 16 November 1937]
First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result

Facts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the
criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case
42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is
the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application
of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed
with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial
unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in
the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a
judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate
penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four
successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly
entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The
Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a
second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of
origin for execution of the judgment.
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions
of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe
good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter,
the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937.
On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng.
The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221,
assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative
of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act
endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or
otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April
19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in
the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that
Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in
GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an
exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was
supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions
were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng
because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been
filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court
for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu
Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all
parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937.
On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution
of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel
for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the
hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But
at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an
end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court
on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery
to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled
hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order
by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a
proper party in present case.

Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really
violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure
of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
Republi c v. Purisi ma
Fact s:
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending
civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of
contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of
Jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the
Machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss
dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Iss ue:

WON the respondent’s decision is valid

Rulin g: No.

The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the
present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability
recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the
positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the
state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a
principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage
in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought
alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still
proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor
General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly
conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability
of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it
could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever- widening scope of state activities at
present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what
principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so
many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland
General Insurance Co.,

Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through
a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice
and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.
Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was
plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions
of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all
the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a
spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the
PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving
Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also
appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was
unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate
President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long
as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did
not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or
by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided
by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation
between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.
The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the
petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the
petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with
the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5)
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the
Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as
President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.
In RE Bermudez
[GR 76180, 24 October 1986]
Resolution En banc, Per curiam: 7 concur

Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, Saturnino V. Bermudez, as a lawyer,
quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides that
"the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the 7 February 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1992. The first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May 1992." Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to
declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 5 (not 7) of Article XVIII of the
Transitory Provision of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to.

Issue: Whether Aquino and Laurel are the legitimate President and Vice President of the Philippines.

Held: The petition states no cause of action. Bermudez's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the provision
is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the
Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of 30 June
1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides
for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under said 1986 Constitution. Mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C.
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice President of
the Republic of the Philippines. Further, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government."