UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury when she falsely declared under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a motion to quash citing that the Makati MTC
has no jurisdiction as the document was submitted and used in Pasay and that there was no
crime committed as not all of the elements of perjury was present.

The lower courts denied the motion saying that Makati has jurisdiction as it was notarized there
and ruled that she was sufficiently charged with perjury.

ISSUE: Whether, in a crime of perjury, the proper venue is where it was notarized or where it
was used.

RULING:

The SC ruled that Makati was the right venue.

The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court where it was stated that criminal action
shall be instituted where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements
occurred.

The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury and provided that Tomas did all things in
Makati, thus making Makati the right venue for the case.
Suy sui vs People 92 PHIL 684

Facts: That on or about the 17th day of July, 1950, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and offer for sale to the public
at 312 Quezon Boulevard, in the said city, one bag of refined sugar, 10 lbs. at P2, which price is in
excess of P0.20 than that authorized by law as the maximum ceiling price of said commodity, to
wit P1.80. After trial the court found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of
P5,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to be barred from engaging in the
wholesale and retail business in the Philippines for a period of five years, with a recommendation
to the President for the immediate deportation of the petitioner. From this judgment the petitioner
appealed, but the same was affirmed by the’

Court of Appeals. The case is now before us on certiorari from the Court of Appeals.Issue: W/N
the petitioner is liable?Held: No. The court ruled that the petitioner failed to raise the point not
only in the Court of First Instance by a motion to quash but also inthe Court of Appeals, as a
consequence of which he must be deemed to have waived the objection. In the first place, under
section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, failure to move to quash amounts to a waiver of all
objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except when the complaint or information
does not charge an offense,or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. It is apparent that the
point now raised by the petitioner is in effect that the information does not charge an offense. In
the second place, as an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, it
should have been the duty of the Court of Appeals to correct such errors as might be found in the
appealed judgment, whether they are assigned or not.

The crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at

the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the
essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. Thus, estafa
may be filed in the place where the offended party has its principal place of business
and office.
People vs. Mariano

Facts:

The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing Mariano of estafa. Mariano
was the Liaison Officer of Mayor Nolasco and is authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess
property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of the municipality. The property received were electric
cables and cable powers amounting to P4,797.35 which he had a duty to deliver to the Mayor. However
he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit, misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the items.

Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information claiming that the court had no jurisdiction. He claimed
that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which
Mayor Nolasco was indicted by the Military Commission under a charge of malversation and found guilty.
He claimed that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco has already been decided by the Military
Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over him. Respondent judge granted the motion to quash
stating that since the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case
involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court, the case for estafa has
already been heard and decided.

Issue:

Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over estafa and
committed by a civilian

Held: there is no concurrent jurisdiction

Ratio:

The question of jurisdiction of respondent CFI is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing
for or defining its jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1948 in Section 44 (f) provides the CFI shall have
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more
than six months or fine of more than 200 pesos. Estafa falls under the original jurisdiction of CFI.

Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
At the time the criminal case was filed on Dec 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said
court is the Judiciary Act of 1948. General Order No. 49 dated Oct 4, 1974, redefines the jurisdiction of
military tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa and malversation are not enumerated therein.
Therefore, the Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.

We do not have here a situation involving two tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime
so as to apply the rule that whoever takes cognizance first acquires jurisdiction exclusive of the other. The
Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the crime of estafa against
Mariano hence there is no concurrent jurisdiction to speak of. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive
jurisdiction of civil courts.
Buaya vs polo

Facts:

Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized
to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of the transactions
and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila. However, an audit of Buaya‟s account
showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850. As a result, she was charged with estafa
before the RTC of Manila. Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the RTC of Manila has no
jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated
were collected in Cebu City. She also contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in
nature. Judge Polo, however denied the motion to dismiss.

Issue:

Does the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction to try the criminal case against Buaya?

Held:
Yes. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides: "In all criminal — prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the
essential elements thereof took place."

The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15,
1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." Clearly then, from the very allegation of the
information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.

Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place
where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is
damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business
and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected
allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that
evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved. (Buaya vs. Polo, G.R. No. L-75079 January 26,
1989)

Buaya v. Polo
Facts:

Buaya is the insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Company. She is required to make a
periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to Country Bankers.
The account of Buaya was audited and it was showed that P358,850 was unremitted.

She was charged with estafa in the Manila RTC. Buaya filed a motion to Quash on the ground that
the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction because she is from Cebu and that the case is civil in nature (a
separate civil case was filed) but was denied. She filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was also
denied. So now, she filed a certiorari in the Supreme Court questioning the denials of such motion by
Judge Polo.

The case did not go through the Court of Appeals

Issue: Did the court have jurisdiction over the case?

Held:

YES. Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Estafa was sufficiently addressed in the information. Estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and
the case can be instituted upon any place where any of the essential requisites of Estafa were
committed. One of the essential requisites of Estafa is damage or prejudice to 3 rd persons. Here, given
that the main office of Country Bankers is in Manila, the non remittance of Buaya which caused damage
to Country Bankers was committed in Manila.

The information in this case reads as follows: “that during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corp represented by Banez duly organized and
existing under the Philippine laws of the Philippines, with principal address at 9th floor, GR Antonio Bldg,
TM Kalaw, ERmita in said city in the following manner: the said accused…. “

The City of manila was alleged in the information so the Manila RTC has jurisdiction.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya

Facts: -Dela Cruz is a Member of the Armed Forces Intelligence and Operations Section

- armed with a MISSION ORDER, DelaCruz proceeds to Maco, Davao del Norte to
investigate reports of illegal cockfighting being conducted

- Delacruz and company catches operators of cockfighting, including deceased Eusebio Cabito
in flagrante

-Delacruz and co.fails to arrest operators but confiscates evidence of the crime (eg. Gaffs,
fighting cocks, etc)

-Delacruz and co. were followed by the cockfight operators on their way back to the PC
headquarters, fighting ensued wherein Delacruz shot Cabito

Aug 2, 1979 Delacruz is charged with homicide in the CFI of Davao

Issues: W/N CFI has jurisdiction over the subject matter

Held: NO.

Ratio: -Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the
court hearing must have jurisdiction over of the subject matter of the case. Determined by the
statute at force at the time the action was commenced

-at that time General Order.59 was operative giving military tribunals exclusive jurisdiction
over all offenses committed by military personnel while in the performance of their official duty

-Delacruz was executing a Mission Order=performing official duties

-court records contain a copy of Mission Order; certificate from secretary of DND is
unnecessary

-CFI was without jurisdiction to try the case

US vs Reyes

Facts

The defendant was charged with the crime of estafa and falsification. He is an employee of the Manila-
Dagupan Railway. He issued a ticket to a passenger who was going from Manila to Caloocan who
continued his trip to Malolos. The ticket issued that simulated the trip was from Manila to Bocaue which
costs 18 cents. There was a 1 peso and 22 cents difference in the fare.

The complaint does not designate the place where the falsification was committed.

Issue: Where must the jurisdiction be vested?

The case must be tried in Tarlac and not in Manila.

 According to the testimony of the accused, he rendered an account to the station master at Tarlac
of the Money collected during the trip. It is also there where he delivered the stub in which the
simulation or falsification was committed.
 In an itemized account of the collections made him on the trip, an entry corresponding to the stub
alleged to have been falsified was dated in Tarlac and contains an invoice of delivery signed by
the accused and a receipt signed by the station master for the sum of 6 pesos and 48 cents.

Because it was within the territory of the court that the appropriation constituting the crime of estafa was
committed and the accused made use of the document alleged to be false at the same territory
CRESPO v. MOGUL

FACTS: An information for estafa was filed against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for
arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice for the filing of the information. The presiding judge,
Leodegario Mogul denied the motion but the arraignment was deferred to afford time for petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court. Crespo then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
writ of injunction in the CA to restrain respondent judge from proceeding with the arraignment of the
accused. The Solicitor General recommended that the petition be given due course and the CA granted
the same.

Meanwhile, Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against
Crespo. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the RTC,
but the respondent judge denied the same and set the date and time for the arraignment. Crespo then
filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus with TRO to restrain Mogul from enforcing his
judgment, which was again issued by the CA. Later on, the CA rendered a decision and dismissed the
petition of Crespo and lifted the TRO. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. W/N a fiscal has the authority to file a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after
the information has been submitted to the court?

2. W/N Mogul acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the arraignment of the
accused?

HELD:

1. Yes, but it must be with the permission of the judge.

2. No, the court acquires jurisdiction of the accused upon the filing of the information by the fiscal.
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal’s
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The
fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation
show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable
doubt. However, such authority is not without any limitation. The same is subject to the approval of the
provincial or city fiscal and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice. Consequently the
Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an
information be filed in Court. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action.
The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the
case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. In order to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review
from the action of the fiscal, when the information has already been filed in Court.
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR.
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for the act of shooting
Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which would have caused her death if not for the timely
medical intervention.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro
Hultman died.
The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information. The
amended information was filed, however, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended
information for lack of preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be
admitted.

HELD:
Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.

Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to matters of form and
provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. An objective appraisal of the
amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the
offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the
supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining
the proper penalty for the crime. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the
amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during
the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and
introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be
demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary
investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
Almeda vs villaruz

FACTS:

Petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with
five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. The amount
of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was
P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that
it be posted entirely in cash. Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post
a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was
denied, and so was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the
amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the
part of Almeda.

At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated
his oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the information
so as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency in the
particular case of Almeda. The trial court granted the respondent fiscal's
motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied.
Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original
information and, then and there, entered his amendment by annotating the
same on the back of the document. The petitioner forthwith moved for the
dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and
a motion for reconsideration were denied in open court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge has the authority to require a strict cash
bond and disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his
provisional liberty.

HELD:
As defined in Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may
be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of
requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction
and yet secure his appearance at the trial.

In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to

conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence
of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be
denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by
reason of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an accused
to bail, the Constitution further provides that "EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL
NOT BE REQUIRED." This is logical because the imposition of an
unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. We have thus held that
"where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a
refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we would
not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required
remedy."

The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his
posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our
law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the
accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of
penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government.
The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this
jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the
case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be
countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes
the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered.
And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a
surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. This is clearly deducible from
the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. — At any time after the amount of bail is
fixed by order, the defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the
nearest collector of internal revenue, or provincial, city, or municipal
treasurer the sum mentioned in the order, and upon delivering to the court a
proper certificate of the deposit, must be discharged from custody. Money
thus deposited, shall be applied to the payment of the fine and costs for which
judgment may be given; and the surplus, if any, shall be returned to the
defendant.
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist
that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.

But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent

judge, we cannot fault the motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's
offer of a surety bond. Based on the petitioner's past record. Fortunately, the
court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it could
increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part
of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose
of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant
while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the
conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and
make an accounting of his movements. Third, the accused might be warned,
though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due process, that
under the 1973 Constitution. "Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified."