PILAPIL VS.

CA

180 SCRA 546

FACTS: Pilapil was on board on the respondent’s bus when he was hit above his eye by a stone hurled by
an unknown bystander. Respondent’s personnel immediately brought him to a hospital, but eventually
he partially lost his left eye’s vision and sustained a permanent scar.

ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case?

HELD: In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting
passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all
risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law
imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof. Its is provided under Article 1763 that A common
carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. Thus, a tort
committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action
against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent
omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could
have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that
when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree
of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of
a good father of a family.
MCKEE VS. IAC
211 SCRA 517
July 16, 1992

FACTS:
A cargo truck and a Ford Escort car had a head on collision wherein it resulted to the deaths of 3 people
and physical injuries to another 3, all passengers of the Ford Escort. The collision occurred when the
Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion while the cargo truck was headed
in the opposite direction when 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane.
Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then
switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck,
which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. Two civil cases were then filed. "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial
court charging Galang, driver of the cargo truck. Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal
charge and ordered him to pay damages. Galang appealed to IAC. Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil
cases and awarded private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fee.
Petitioners appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed decision. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases, it
reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The decision is
anchored principally on the findings that it was Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which
caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of
the defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further
asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee. In a Motion for
Reconsideration, the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the emergency rule is applicable on the case.

HELD: Yes. Emergency rule is defines as, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence.
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual
cause of the tragedy.
The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter
heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go
back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was
the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full
speed towards the car.
BUSTAMANTE VS. CA

103 SCRA 603

Facts: At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a gravel and sand
truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259
along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of
the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver’s
seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as
a result of the injuries they sustained. The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers
contributed to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of
the passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of
them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the liability of the two drivers for
their negligence must be solidary. The Court of Appeals ruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver
had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the
hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.

Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

Ruling: The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as between
defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tort feasors as a test of whether only
one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril,
and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a
negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in
applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit
between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court
erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is
entitled to recovery. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. since the case at bar is not a
suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the
deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred in
absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability
DAMAGES APPLICABLE IN COMMON CARRIER

Art. 1764, Civil Code. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with
Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

DAMAGES RECOVERABLE

(1) Actual or compensatory damages – adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss suffered as duly
proved.

General rule: Recoverable

Exception: Not recoverable by law or stipulation (Art. 2199)

Actual Damages include:

(1) Loss of earning capacity (Art. 2206)

(2) Support (Art. 2206

Art. 2201:

Act Done Liability of Obligor

In good faith
In bad faith, fraud, malice or wanton attitude
Only natural and probable consequences of the
breach, which have could have reasonably been
foreseen
All damages which may be reasonably attributed
to breach

In the absence of a showing that petitioner's attention was called to the special circumstances requiring
prompt delivery of private respondent Pangan's luggage, petitionercarrier cannot be held liable for the
cancellation of private respondents' contracts as it could not have foreseen such an eventuality when it
accepted the luggage for transit. (PanAm World Airways v. IAC, 1988)

(2) Moral damages - incapable of pecuniary estimation; should be proximate result of wrongful act or
omission (Art. 2217)

General rule: NOT recoverable

Exceptions:

(1) Defendant acted fraudulently (Art. 2220)

(2) Defendant acted in bad faith (Art. 2220)

Note: Bad faith – a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or will or for ulterior purpose; must be established by clear and convincing evidence

(3) Mishap resulted in death of a passenger (Art. 2206)

 When it comes to contracts of common carriage, inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier
resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad
faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages in accordance with Article
2220 of the Civil Code. (Ortigas v. Lufthansa, 1975)

What this Court considers as bad faith is the willful and deliberate overbooking on the part of the airline
carrier. The above-mentioned law (Sec. 3, Economic Regulations No. 7 of the Civil Aeronautics Board)
clearly states that when the overbooking does not exceed ten percent (10%), it is not considered as
deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith. (United Airlines v. CA, 2001)

(3) Exemplary damages – if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner (Art. 2232)

(4) Nominal, temperate, and liquidated (a) Nominal – to vindicate or recognize a right that has been
violated or invaded (b) Temperate – for pecuniary loss suffered, the amount of which, from the nature of
the case, cannot be provided with certainty (c) Liquidated – agreed upon by the parties to a contract

(5) Attorney’s Fees and Interest

(5) Attorney’s Fees and Interest

Facts: On April 20, 1983, a collision occurred at about 6:30 in the morning between a gravel and sand
truck, and a Mazda passenger bus along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side
portion of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus. Several passengers of
the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained due to the impact. The trial
court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed with each other in directly causing the
same which led to the death of the passengers. It could not be determined that the proximate cause of
the collision is that the other driver is the who is negligent. In view of this, the liability of the two drivers
for their negligence must be solidary. The Court of Appeals ruled on the contrary, it held that the bus
driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to
overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.

Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

Ruling: The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” The Court is convinced
that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as
between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver
of the cargo truck from liability.