Complete Digest Batch 2

Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#1 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE G.R. No. 170414 August 25, 2010 Carpio, J.:
SYSTEM vs. PACIFIC AIRWAYS G.R. No. 170418
CORPORATION, ET. AL. G.R. No. 170460
PETITIONER:GOVERNMENT SERVICE RESPONDENT:PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, ELY

INSURANCE SYSTEM BUNGABONG, and MICHAEL GALVEZ
NATURE OF THE CASE:

Three consolidated petitions for review
DOCTRINE:
When a plaintiff’s own negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
FACTS:
The Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation (PAC) arrived at the Manila International Airport from El Nido,
Palawan. In command of the aircraft was Ely B. Bungabong.With Bungabong in the cockpit was Michael F. Galvez as co-pilot.
Upon touchdown, the Twin Otter first proceeded to disembark its passengers. After the last passenger disembarked, PAC’s
pilots started the engine of the Twin Otter in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the other end of the airport.Galvez
then contacted ground control to ask for clearance to taxi to taxiway delta. Rogelio Lim, ground traffic controller on duty at the
Air Transportation Office (ATO), issued the clearance on condition that he be contacted again upon reaching taxiway delta
intersection. PAC’s pilots proceeded to taxi to taxiway delta and upon reaching the intersection, Galvez made a request again
which request was granted. PAC then proceeded.
However, while still 350 meters away, PAC’s pilots already prematurely requested clearance to cross the active runway
13. Their request was granted. Upon reaching runway 13, PAC’s pilots did not make a full stop at the holding point to request
clearance right before crossing runway 13. They proceeded to cross runway 13 without asking for an updated clearance. As a
result, they collided with the Philippine Airlines’ (PAL) Boeing 737 which, at that time, was also preparing for take-off along
runway 13. PAL’s Boeing 737 was already issued by Linog, Jr, the air traffic controller on duty, clearance to take off when Pilot
Casiño caught a glimpse of the Twin Otter on the left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross runway 13.
Bungabong suffered sprain on his shoulder while Galvez had laceration on his left thumb. They were treated for serious
and slight physical injuries in Makati Medical Center. Hence, PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 112) of Pasay City a complaint for sum of money and damages against PAL, Casiño, Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog, Jr., and
ATO’s traffic control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as insurer of the Boeing
737 that figured in the collision, intervened.
The trial court ruled that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., as ATO’s
traffic control supervisor, ground traffic controller, and air traffic controller, respectively, at the time of the collision. The trial
court further held that the direct cause of the collision was the negligence of Casiño and Isaac, as the pilots of the Boeing 737
that collided with the Twin Otter. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
PAL, Casiño, Isaac, GSIS, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The
appellate court denied for lack of merit all the motions for reconsideration except the one filed by Linog, Jr. The Court of
Appeals gave weight to the Decision on appeal of the RTC (Branch 108) of Pasay City in a criminal case acquitting Linog, Jr.,
who was convicted in the original Decision together with Alzola and Lim, of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with serious and slight physical injuries in connection with the collision. Since Alzola and Lim did not appeal, the
judgment of conviction against them became final. Alzola and Lim were sentenced to arresto mayor or imprisonment for two
(2) months.
ISSUE:
Who among the parties are liable for negligence under the circumstances?
HELD:
To ascertain who among the parties is liable for negligence, we must refer to the applicable rules governing the specific
traffic management of aircrafts at an airport. The Rules of the Air of the Air Transportation Office apply to all aircrafts registered
in the Philippines. The Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter in this case were both registered in the Philippines. Both are thus
subject to the Rules of the Air. In case of danger of collision between two aircrafts, the Rules of the Air state:
2.2.4.7 Surface Movement of Aircraft. In case of danger of collision between two aircrafts taxiing on the maneuvering area of
an aerodrome, the following shall apply:
Torts and
Damages Digest 3BSY.17-18
a) When two aircrafts are approaching head on, or approximately so, each shall stop or where practicable, alter its course to
the right so as to keep well clear.
.
b) When two aircrafts are on a converging course, the one which has the other on its right shall give way.
In this case, however, the Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter were not both taxiing at the time of the collision. Only the Twin Otter
was taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on take-off roll. The Rules of the Air provide:
2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of an aerodrome shall give way to aircraft taking off or
about to take off.
Therefore, PAL’s aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, not simply because it was on the right side
of PAC’s aircraft, but more significantly, because it was "taking off or about to take off."
For disregarding PAL’s right of way, PAC’s pilots were grossly negligent. Gross negligence is one that is
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected. The Supreme Court ruled that the only plausible explanation why PAC’s pilots did not see the Boeing 737 was that
they did not really look to the left and to the right before crossing the active runway. The SC also ruled that had PAC’s pilots
asked for an updated clearance before crossing an active runway, ATO would then be in a position to determine if there was
an aircraft on a take-off roll at the runway. The collision would not have happened.
The SC is therefore convinced that the immediate and proximate case of the collision is the gross negligence of PAC’s
pilots. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.In this case, the fact that PAC’s
pilots disregarded PAL’s right of way and did not ask for updated clearance right before crossing an active runway was the
proximate cause of the collision. Were it not for such gross negligence on the part of PAC’s pilots, the collision would not have
happened.
The Civil Code provides that when a plaintiff’s own negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, PAC and its pilots, whose own gross negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of their own injuries, must bear the cost of such injuries. They cannot recover damages.
While Alzola and Lim, as found by the trial court in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, may have been negligent in
the performance of their functions, such negligence is only contributory.Their contributory negligence arises from their granting
the premature request of PAC’s pilots for clearance to cross runway 13 while the Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from
runway 13. However, as explained earlier, the granting of their premature request for clearance did not relieve PAC’s pilots
from complying with the Rules of the Air.
Torts and
#2 BAO VS BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC. G.R. NO. 191703 March 12, 2012 Perlas-bernabe, J.
PETITIONER: CRESENCIO BAÑO AND HEIRS OF THE RESPONDENT: BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC./ CERES LINER,
DECEASED AMANCIO ASUMBRADO, NAMELY: INC. and WENIFREDO SALVAÑA
ROSALINDA ASUMBRADO, VICENTE ASUMBRADO,
ROEL ASUMBRADO, ANNALYN ASUMBRADO, ARNIEL
ASUMBRADO, ALFIE ASUMBRADO and RUBELYN
ASUMBRADO
NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for review under rule 45
DOCTRINE:Gross negligence is defined as “one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.”
FACTS:
In the early afternoon of November 6, 1993, respondent Wenifredo Salvana was driving the bus owned by herein respondent,
Bachelor Express, Inc along the national highway at Magdum, Tagum City bound for Davao City. At about 1:20 in the
afternoon, the said bus overtook a PUJ jeepney while traversing a descending blind curve at a speed of 60 kilometers. In the
process thereof, the bus occupied the other lane intended for oncoming vehicles and bumped the 10 wheeler Hino Dump truck
of herein petitioner (Bano). The said incident resulted in damage to both vehicles and the subsequent death of the truck driver,
Amancio Asumbrado and serious physical injuries to bus driver Salvana.
On March 11, 1994, Bano and the heirs of Asumbrado filed a complaint for quasi-delict, damages and attorney's fees against
respondents, accusing Salvana of negligently driving the bus. As a matter of defense, the respondent argued that prior the
collision, the Bus was running out of control due to a problem in the steering wheel system. Furthermore, it argued that, the
problem persisted even with their maintenance efforts. It also claimed that Asumrado had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap.
The Regional Trial Court found that the immediate and proximate cause of the incident was the reckless negligence of the bus
driver. Under the prevailing conditions at that time, the Bus should have not attempted to overtake the jeepney. Herein
respondent was likewise made liable for failing to rebut the presumed fault or negligence on its part.
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the RTC on respondents negligence and liability for damages but
deleted the separate award for exemplary damages for failure on the part of the petitioners to prove that the respondent acted
with gross negligence
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent acted with gross negligence – YES
HELD:
The Court ruled that the respondent was indeed grossly negligent. In the case of Government Service Insurance
System vs Pacific Airways Corporation, it defined gross negligence as “one that is characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.” In this case,
the bus driver overtook the jeepney in front of him as he was rounding a blind curve along a descending road.
Furthermore, there was also only one lane on each side of the center line for the movement of traffic in opposite
directions. Considering the road condition at that time, it would have been more prudent for him to confine his bus to
its proper lane. It was his duty to determine that the road was clear and not to proceed if he could not do so safely.
Hence the court reinstated the award of exemplary damages to petitioners in the amount of P50, 000 in order to serve
as a stern warning to the general public of their duties and obligations.
Torts and
#3 JONAS AÑONUEVO vs. HON. COURT OF G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004 TINGA, J
APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA,
PETITIONER:JONAS AÑONUEVO RESPONDENT:HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME

VILLAGRACIA
NATURE OF THE CASE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
DOCTRINE:
● The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate
cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the
statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury. The
generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law,
or negligence per se
● To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
FACTS:
The accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue
and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong. Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Anonuevo,
traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Anonuevos brother, Jonathan. Anonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the
collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization, and forced him to
undergo four (4) operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Anonuevo before the
RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Anonuevo but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal
charge. Trial on the civil action ensued, and the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Anonuevo.
Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
After denial of their Motion for Consideration, Procter and Gamble and Anonuevo filed their respective petitions for
review with this Court. Procter and Gamble’s petition was denied by this Court while Anonuevo’s petition was given due
course.
In his petition, Anonuevo insists that Villagracias own fault and negligence serves to absolve the former of any liability,
pointing out that Villagracias bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, nor was it duly registered with
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer as required by a 1948 municipal ordinance. He posits, therefore, that Article 2185 of
the New Civil Code applies by analogy.
Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our attention instead to
the findings of Anonuevos own negligence. He also contends that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part,
such would not exonerate Anonuevo from payment of damages.
The Court of Appeals likewise acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracias bicycle, but
characterized the contention as off-tangent and insufficient to obviate the fact that it was Anonuevos own negligence
that caused the accident.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles
2. Whether the doctrine of negligence per se applies to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an ordinance?
3. Whether or not Villagracia was guilty of contributory negligence?
HELD:
1. NO. Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that the law
intended a broader coverage.
There is a fundamental flaw in Anonuevos analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today. He premises that the need for the
distinction between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of these vehicles. The
more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these vehicles. A motorized vehicle
operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by
Torts and
man or beast of burden of direct physical force.

In US v Juanillo, the Court emphasized: A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a
greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and
furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some
extent aid in averting an accident. An automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and
prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances.
While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious,
that more is required from the former to fully discharge the duty than from the latter.
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were
indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to
include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the
peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher
degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply
put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by
analogy.
2. NO. Anonuevo failed to adduce sufficient proof causally connecting Villagracia’s violation of the Municipal Ordinance
to the accident in question.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a
matter of law, or negligence per se. In Teague vs. Fernandez, the Court cited American authorities elucidating on the rule:
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the
injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been
held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.
The statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to
minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracias mishap was precisely the danger
sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated. Anonuevo argues that Villagracias violation should bar the
latters recovery of damages.
We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with
safety regulations, especially considering that Anonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen
Villagracia. Even assuming that Anonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights,
such lapse on the cyclists part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left
turn.
The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have
sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal consequence
unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracias failure
in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government. But such failure alone is not determinative of Villagracias negligence in
relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties and the
degree of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances reasonably require.
The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance
or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such
failure and the injury sustained.
Neither does Anonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal connection between the safety
violations imputed to Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations
in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against Villagracia. Since the onus on Anonuevo is to
conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge
his necessary burden of proving Villagracias own liability.
3. NO.
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence.Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf clarifies that damages may
be mitigated if the claimant in conjunction with the occurrence, contributes only to his injury. To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the
party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#4 STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. vs. G.R. No. 20055 September 10, Peralta, J.
CUARESMA 2014
PETITIONER:STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. RESPONDENT:ARNOLD CUARESMA and JERRY B. CUARESMA
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45
DOCTRINE:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The reason
for this is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Mere allegations, therefore, cannot
be deemed as evidence.
FACTS:
On March 20, 2004, two vehicles figured in an accident at North Avenue, Quezon City. One was driven by Jefferson Cham
and insured with petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc., while the other was owned by respondent Arnold Cuaresma and
driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma. The costs for the repair of Cham’s vehicle was borne by petitioner as the insurer. As
such, petitioner, subrogated to the rights of Cham by virtue of a Release Claim, demanded the payment for the sums paid for
the repair of Cham’s vehicle. Meanwhile, on August 10, 2004, an Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City charging Cham of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. During the
pendency thereof, on March 17, 2008, petitioner, claiming that respondents collided with Cham's vehicle in a reckless and
imprudent manner, filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with the MeTC of Manila against respondents demanding payment of
the sum of P256,643.26 representing the cost of repairs on Cham's vehicle.
Respondents, however, were declared in default for failure to file their responsive pleading to petitioner's Complaint despite
several opportunities granted by the MeTC of Manila. Petitioner, after presenting evidence ex parte, obtained a favorable
judgment from the MeTC finding that petitioner sufficiently proved its claims by preponderance of evidence. The RTC,
however, reversed the ruling of the MeTC. Contrary to the findings of the MeTC, the RTC found, among other inconsistencies,
that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the proximate cause of the damage incurred by Cham's vehicle was respondents'
fault or negligence. In addition, on respondents' argument that the instant case must be consolidated with the prior criminal
suit they filed against Cham, the RTC disagreed and ruled that criminal and civil cases can proceed independently.
On appeal, the CA likewise found that the evidence proffered by petitioner is insufficient to support its averment of negligence.
Consequently, it affirmed the RTC's Decision and further denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner contends that the testimonies of its witnesses Cham (the assured) and Cleto D. Obello, Jr. (Asst. Vice President for
Claims of petitioner) (along with the traffic incident report) sufficiently prove its claims, since the former has personal
knowledge on the events that transpired during the vehicular accident and the latter was in a position to prove the amount
incurred for the repair of the damages on Cham's vehicle. It also argues that its failure to present SPO2 Felicisimo V.
Cuaresma, the police investigator who prepared the traffic accident report submitted in evidence, is not fatal to its cause of
action.
Respondents counter that the bare allegations of Cham on negligence cannot be deemed sufficient to prove petitioner's claim.
They also claim that in order for the traffic accident report to obtain probative value, the police officer who prepared it must be
identified in court.
ISSUE:
Was petitioner able to present sufficient evidence of respondents’ negligence as the proximate cause of the damage to
Cham’s vehicle in order to hold the latter liable for damages
Torts and
HELD:
No.
To prove the allegations in its complaint, petitioner presented testimonies of its assured and its Assistant Vice-President, the
Traffic Accident Investigation Report, and documents evidencing the assured's insurance policy with petitioner as well as the
payment of repair expenses. As aptly ruled by the RTC and the CA, however, the evidence presented by petitioner failed to
preponderantly establish negligence on the part of the respondents.
While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of the expenses for the repair of Cham's vehicle through the
testimony of its Assistant Vice-President and other supporting receipts and documents, it fell short in proving that the damage
caused on said vehicle was due to the fault of the respondents.
The Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following
requisites must be present:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
by him personally or through official information.
In this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above. As correctly noted by the courts below, while the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented
in court to testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or through
official information. Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer was not presented. The Court cannot simply
assume, in the absence of proof, that the account of the incident stated in the report was based on the personal knowledge of
the investigating officer who prepared it.
Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events that transpired during the vehicular collision, his lone
testimony, unsupported by other preponderant evidence, fails to sufficiently establish petitioner's claim that respondents'
negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of the damage sustained by Cham's vehicle.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#5 JOSEFA vs.MANILA ELECTRIC G.R. No. 182705 July 18, 2014.* BRION
PETITIONER:VICENTE JOSEFA, RESPONDENT: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
NATURE OF THE CASE:petition for review on certiorari
DOCTRINE: In some cases where negligence is difficult to prove, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant or some other person who is charged with negligence where the thing or transaction
speaks for itself. This doctrine postulates that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience and in the absence of some
explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence, the very nature of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury. In other words, res ipsa loquitur is
grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of
the accident itself.
FACTS:
At around 1:45 p.m. on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a vehicular accident along Ortigas
Avenue, Pasig City. As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden electricity post, three 75 KVA transformers, and other
electrical line attachments were damaged. Upon investigation, respondent (Meralco) discovered that it was the truck
registered in Josefa’s name that hit the electricity post. Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement
cost of the electricity post and its attachments, but Josefa refused to pay. Thus, on September 28, 1993, Meralco sued Josefa
and Pablo Manoco, the truck driver, for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
Meralco alleged that Manoco’s reckless driving resulted in damage to its properties. It also imputed primary liability on Josefa
for his alleged negligence in the selection and supervision of Manoco. It thus prayed for the indemnification of the amount of
P384,846.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P10,000.00 as litigation expenses, and the costs of the suit.
In defense, Josefa denied that Manoco was his employee when the accident occurred. He also maintained that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of all his employees. As a counterclaim, he sought
the payment of attorney’s fees for Meralco’s filing of a baseless complaint.
In a decision dated April 10, 2006, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC held that Meralco
failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA reversed the RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred
in disregarding the parties’ stipulation at the pre-trial that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA concluded that the
fact that the truck hit the electricity post was sufficient to hold Josefa vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista was
negligent in driving the truck. In the same breath, the CA also stated that the employer’s presumptive liability in quasi-delicts
was anchored on injuries caused by the employee’s negligence. It further ruled that Josefa failed to rebut the presumption that
he negligently selected and supervised Bautista in employment since he did not present his evidence-in-chief during trial.
Even assuming that Bautista was not Josefa’s employee, the CA maintained that Josefa would still be liable for damages
since the law presumes that the registered owner has control of his vehicle and its driver at the time of the accident.
ISSUE:Whether Josefa is vicariously liable for Bautista’s negligence under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Bautista’s negligence was theproximate cause of the propertydamage caused to Meralco.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. This fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict.[36]
Thus, for a quasi-delict case to prosper, the complainant must establish: (1) damages to the complainant; (2) negligence, by
act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.With respect to the third element, the negligent act
or omission must be the proximate cause of the injury.
Nowhere in the records was it shown how and why the accident occurred on April 21, 1991. In the absence of any description
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on such important aspect, fault or negligence cannot be properly imputed to petitioner, simply because his truck bumped into
Meralco’s electricity post. The causal connection between the petitioner’s supposed negligence and the damage was not
shown. Neither was it proved to be the proximate cause of the damage. (Emphases and underlines ours) These statements
constitute deliberate, clear and unequivocal admissions of the causation in fact between the truck and the electricity post.
Judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. These admissions cannot be contradicted unless previously
shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. A party who judicially admits a fact
cannot later challenge this fact for the reason that judicial admissions remove an admitted fact from the field of controversy.
In some cases where negligence is difficult to prove, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendant or some other person who is charged with negligence where the thing or transaction speaks for itself.
This doctrine postulates that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience and in the absence of some explanation by
the defendant who is charged with negligence, the very nature of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the
part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury. In other words, res ipsa loquitur is grounded on the
superior logic of ordinary human experience that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in quasi-delict cases is that the defendant’s negligence is presumed. In other words,
the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to prove that he did not act with negligence. This doctrine thus effectively
furnishes a bridge by which the complainant, without knowledge of the cause of the injury, reaches over to the defendant, who
knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by him to prevent the injury. For this doctrine to apply,
the complainant must show that: (1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
The present case satisfies all the elements of res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and extraordinary for the truck to hit an
electricity post, an immovable and stationary object, unless Bautista, who had the exclusive management and control of the
truck, acted with fault or negligence. We cannot also conclude that Meralco contributed to the injury since it safely and
permanently installed the electricity post beside the street. Thus, in Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279
(1967), we imputed vicarious responsibility to Luzon Stevedoring Corp. whose barge rammed the bridge, also an immovable
and stationary object. In that case, we found it highly unusual for the barge to hit the bridge which had adequate openings for
the passage of water craft unless Luzon Stevedoring Corp.’s employee had acted with negligence.
The finding that Bautista acted with negligence in driving the truck gives rise to the application of paragraph 5, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code which holds the employer vicariously liable for damages caused by his employees within the scope of their
assigned tasks. In the present case, Josefa avoids the application of this provision by denying that Bautista was his employee
at the time of the incident.
Josefa cannot evade his responsibility by mere denial of his employment relations with Bautista in the absence of proof that
his truck was used without authorization or that it was stolen when the accident occurred. In quasi-delict cases, the registered
owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of law. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused while the vehicle
was being driven on highways or streets. The purpose of motor vehicle registration is precisely to identify the owner so that if
any injury is caused by the vehicle, responsibility can be imputed to the registered owner.
In order for Josefa to be relieved of his vicarious liability, he must show that he exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Bautista. In concrete terms, Josefa should show by competent object or documentary evidence that he
examined Bautista as to the latter’s qualifications, experience and service records prior to employment. He should likewise
prove by competent object or documentary evidence that he formulated standard operating procedures, monitored their
implementation and imposed disciplinary measures for breach of these procedures. However, Josefa failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence against him since he waived his right to present evidence during trial. We are thus left with no other
conclusion other than to rule that Josefa is primarily liable for all natural and probable consequences of Bautista’s negligence.
Torts and
#6 BJDC CONSTRUCTION vs.LANUZO G.R. No. 161151 March 24, 2014 Bersamin, J.
PETITIONER:BJDC CONSTRUCTION, RESPONDENT:NENA E. LANUZO, CLAUDETTE E. LANUZO, JANET

REPRESENTED BY ITS E. LANUZO, JOAN BERNABE E. LANUZO, and RYAN JOSEE. LANUZO
MANAGER/PROPRIETOR JANET S. DELA
CRUZ
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari
DOCTRINE:
The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to establish the allegation with competent
evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a single proprietorship engaged in the construction business under its Manager/Proprietor Janet S. de la Cruz
company, it was the contractor of the re-blocking project to repair the damaged portion of one lane of the national highway at
San Agustin, Pili, Camarines Sur.
Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) is the surviving spouse of the late Balbino Los Baños Lanuzo (Balbino); Nena alleged that
Balbino’s Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade placed by the company in the right lane portion of the road,
causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented road, resulting in his instant death at around
6:30 PM on October 30, 1997; and that the company’s failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the project,
1
especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino. Thus,Nena filed a complaint for damages
against BJDC Construction She prayed that the company be held liable for damages.
The company denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed warning signs and lights along the
highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the time of the incident, the lights were working and switched on; that its
project was duly inspected; and that it was found to have satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the safety of motorists. The
company further alleged that since the start of the project in September 1997, it installed several warning signs, namely: (a) a
big SLOW DOWN ROAD UNDER REPAIR AHEAD streamer hung approximately 100 meters before the re-blocking site;…;
(d) barricades surrounded the affected portion of the highway, and a series of 50-watt light bulbs were installed and switched
on daily from 6:00 p.m. until the following morning…; and (f) the unaffected portion of the highway was temporarily widened in
the adjacent road shoulder to allow two-way vehicular traffic.
The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident brought about by his own negligence, as confirmed by the
police investigation report that stated, among others, that Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that time, and the accident
occurred while Balbino was overtaking another motorcycle; and that the police report also stated that the road sign/barricade
installed on the road had a light.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the company. CA reversed the said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitoner’s negligence is the proximate cause of death of Balbino.
HELD: No
The Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not
establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal
accident of Balbino.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense
by the amount of evidence required by law.It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere
allegation is not evidence. Generally, the party who denies has no burden to prove.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. It
refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side. It is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
In order that a party may be held liable for damages for any injury brought about by the negligence of another, the claimant
must prove that the negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury.Proximate cause is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
result would not have occurred.

The test by which the existence of negligence in a particular case is determined is aptly stated in the leading case of Pi cart
v. Smith, as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
First of all, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of illumination instead of the total omission of illumination. Their
first witness recalled that lights had been actually installed. The next witness stated that he had seen three light bulbs installed
in the site. Another witness claimed that she had seen the site to be dark, with only one lane open to traffic, with no light at all.
Obviously, the witnesses of the plaintiffs were not consistent on their recollections of the significant detail of the illumination of
the site.
In contrast, the company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate illumination. Zamora, its flagman in the project,
rendered an eyewitness account of the accident by stating that the site had been illuminated by light bulbs and gas lamps.
Secondly, the company presented as its documentary evidence the investigation report which indicated the finding of the
police investigator on the presence of illumination at the project site. Additionally, the company submitted the application for
lighting permit covering the project site to prove the fact of installation of the electric light bulbs in the project site.
Thirdly, the CA unreasonably branded the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1 Corporal as "self-serving." They were not.
There is no question that Zamora and SPO1 Corporal were thoroughly cross-examined by the counsel for the Lanuzo heirs.
Their recollections remained unchallenged by superior contrary evidence from the Lanuzo heirs.
Fourthly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application here. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means
"the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with
the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. The rule is applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge. For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to exist, namely: (a) the
accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct that
would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering that
it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was
not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of
how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he himself did not take the necessary precautions.
As Zamora declared, Balbino overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid hitting a
barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. This causation of the fatal
injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.
Moreover, by the time of the accident, the project had been going on for more than a month and was already in the
completion stage. Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor
could the Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that Balbino’s motorcycle
was equipped with headlights that would have enabled him at dusk or night time to see the condition of the road ahead. That
the accident still occurred surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the degree of care expected of him as a prudent
motorist.
Torts and
#7 FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER G.R. No. 152033 March 16, 2011 PERALTA, J.:
CORPORATION, vs.WILFREDO DE LOS
SANTOS, BENITO JOSE DE LOS SANTOS,
MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS and
CARMINA VDA. DE LOS SANTOS
PETITIONER:FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER RESPONDENT:WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, BENITO JOSE DE LOS

CORPORATION SANTOS, MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS and CARMINA VDA. DE
LOS SANTOS
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review
DOCTRINE: A person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
FACTS: Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos (Teresa Elena), the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos (Wilfredo),
performed at the Rizal Theater in Makati City, Metro Manila as a member of the cast for the musical play, Woman of the Year.
Same night, at the request of Wilfredo, his brother Armando de los Santos (Armando), husband of respondent Carmina Vda.
de los Santos, went to the Rizal Theater to fetch Teresa Elena after the latter's performance. He drove a 1980 Mitsubishi
Galant Sigma (Galant Sigma), a company car assigned to Wilfredo. Annabel Vilches (Annabel) and Jerome Macuja, joined
Teresa Elena in the Galant Sigma
While travelling along the Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner
and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the
point of impact. The Galant Sigma burst into flames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car.
A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple homicide was brought against Mejia,
which was decided in favor of Mejia.
The family of Annabel filed a civil case against petitioner and Mejia. Wilfredo and Carmina, joined by their minor children, also
filed separate actions for damages against petitioner and Mejia. RTC decided in favor of herein respondents. After the denial
of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the CA and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Petitioner insists that the CA was not correct in ruling that Mejia was negligent. Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that
De los Santos made a turn along White Plains Road without exercising the necessary care which could have prevented the
accident from happening.
The Court is convinced that defendant Mejia was running real fast along EDSA when he saw a vehicle on the opposite side
suddenly turn left towards White Plains.
According to petitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by the victims should also be considered as negligence on the
part of the driver of that same vehicle, thus, mitigating, if not absolving petitioner's liability.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not Mejiah is negligent?
2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable?
HELD:
1) YES. It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically
Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136.8 Given the circumstances, the allowed rate of speed for Mejia's vehicle was 50
kilometers per hour, while the records show that he was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. Under the New Civil
Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules
does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory
Torts and
regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with all the conditions encountered10 which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever
necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.
We, therefore, cannot find any error on the part of the trial court in concluding that he (Mejia) was driving more than his claim
of 70 kilometers per hour. Significantly, the claimed speed of Mejia is still unlawful, considering that Section 35 of RA 4136
states that the maximum allowable speed for trucks and buses must not exceed 50 kilometers per hour.
A person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating a traffic regulation. The
excessive speed employed by Mejia was the proximate cause of the collision that led to the sudden death of Teresa Elena
and Armando.
2) YES. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof.
In the present case, Filsyn merely presented evidence on the alleged care it took in the selection or hiring of Mejia way back
in 1974 or ten years before the fatal accident. Neither did Filsyn present any proof of the existence of the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of its employees. It is significant to note that in employing Mejia, who is not a high school
graduate, Filsyn waived its long-standing policy requirement of hiring only high school graduates.
Filsyn admitted that their shuttle buses were used to ferry Filsyn's employees for three shifts. It failed to show whether or not
Mejia was on duty driving buses for all three shifts. On the other hand, the trial court found that Mejia, by the different shifts
would have been on the job for more than eight hours. Fylsin did not even sufficiently prove that it exercised the required
supervision of Mejia by ensuring rest periods, particularly for its night shift drivers who are working on a time when most o f us
are usually taking rest. As correctly argued by the plaintiffs-appellees, this is significant because the accident happened at
11:30 p.m., when the shuttle bus was under the control of a driver having no passenger at all. Despite, the lateness of the
hour and the darkness of the surrounding area, the bus was travelling at a speed of 70 kilometers per hour.
In view of the absence of sufficient proof of its exercise of due diligence, Filsyn cannot escape its solidary liability as the
owner of the wayward bus and the employer of the negligent driver of the wayward bus
Torts and
#8. MENDOZA v. SORIANO G.R. No. 164012 June 8, 2007 Quisumbing, J.
PETITIONER: FLORDELIZA RESPONDENT: MUTYA SORIANO and Minor JULIE ANN SORIANO
MENDOZA(employer of driver (mother and daughter of deceased Sonny Soriano)
Macasasa)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Rule 45, Petition for Certiorari
DOCTRINE: Under A. 2180, NCC, negligence is presumed and the erring employer must prove the exercise of diligence in
supervising employee.
Under A. 2185, a driver violating traffic regulations at the time of the mishap is also presumed negligent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Medoza is the employer of Lomer Macasasa, driver of a speeding Tamaraw FX, which hit Sonny Soriano while
crossing Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue in Quezon City. Soriano was thrown five meters away while the vehicle
stopped some 25 meters only from the point of impact. Upon checking out the scene of the incident, Macassasa returned to
the FX only to flee instead of heeding the request of Gerard Vilaspin, one of Soriano’s companions, to take Soriano to the
hospital. A school bus took the victim to East Avenue Medical Center where he later died.
Petitioner seeks for the reversal of CA decision finding him liable for damages due to Soriano’s death. She avers she
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family over her employee. Records show Macasasa violated two traffic rules
unther the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (1. Failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives; 2. Failed to
aid Soriano, Section 55, Article V of th Land Transpn Traffic Code). Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, negligence if
presumed if the driver, at the time of mishap, was violating traffic regulations.
CA decision reversed trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for damages by respondents, finding the victim negligent for
crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a small gap in the islands facing rather than the pedestrian overpass. Trial courts
said respondents failed to present evidence to support their allegation of negligence. CA held that the victim’s contributory
negligence did not preclude recovery of damages form Macasa’s negligence. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, there is a
presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection and supervision of the employees, which Mendoza failed to present
evidence to the contrary.
Petitioner contends the respondents failed to present evidence to prove her liability for the negligence of her driver.
ISSUE:Whether or not the failure of the respondents to present evidence to prove petitioner’s negligence precluded the former
from recovering damages?
HELD:NO.
Under Article 2180, employers are liable for the damages caused by employees acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks. Mendoza is liable due to presumed negligence in supervising Macasasa unless she proved she observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
It is unfortunate that petitioner harbored the notion the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case and opted not to present
evidence. This case is a damage suit for Mendoza’s quasi-delict, as owner and employer. In the criminal case against
Macasasa, petitioner was only subsidiarily liable for the delict of the driver and employee. But as owver and employer, she is
directly and separately civilly liable for failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa. Since he was violating traffic
rules at the time of mishap, Macasasa is presumed negligent under Article 2195, NCC.
Torts and
#9 DEL CARMENv. BACOY G.R. No. 173870 April 25, 2012 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
PETITIONER: OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR. RESPONDENT: GERONIMO BACOY
DOCTRINE:
A. The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured
B. The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its
operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.
FACTS:
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their
daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga
Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-
PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del
Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del
Sur and vice versa route.
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-10347 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide
was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March
13, 1997, said court declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor children of
the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219,an independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from
Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma
del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo prayed for the
reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses, as well as the award of attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages
resulting from the death of the three victims, and loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a public school
teacher at the time of her death.
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds have no cause of
action against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan. For his
part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends stole his jeep while it was parked beside his
drivers rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started
by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but without any headlights on. And implying that this
was the manner by which the vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the
statements of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time
of the accident, declared before the investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles headlights were off. Because of this
allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case against Allan and his companions docketed as
Criminal Case No. 93-10380. The case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
RTC Ruling: At first, adjudged Oscar liable subsidiarily but reversed it on MR. It cited Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his employee, the latter should have
committed the same in the discharge of his duties.
CA Ruling: In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of whether there was an employer-employee
relationship between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident.With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr.
liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense
that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also
because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitour is applicable in the case at bar
2. Whether the petitioner is primarily liable for damages.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
HELD:
1. YES. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those
who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable
and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped
and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to
Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who may
not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and
securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution.Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the
victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he
could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep.
Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan to
use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide solid proof that he ensured that the parking area is well secured
and that he had expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As
fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned,
Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to
have been given the absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation, including the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use
it.
2. YES. The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its
operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment. The
main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is
caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other
vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the
interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen which are valid defenses available to a
registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.
Torts and
#10 MACALINAO v. ONG G.R. No. December 14, PUNO, J.

146635 2005
PETITIONER: MARCELO MACALINAO RESPONDENT: EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG and GENOVEVO

Substituted by ESPERANZA MACALINAO and SEBASTIAN
ANTONIO MACALINAO
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
DOCTRINE: Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows
the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
FACTS:
Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at the Genetron International Marketing (Genetron),
a single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian. Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to
deliver a heavy piece of machinerya reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastian’s manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan.
While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong, Genetrons Isuzu Elf truck hit and bumped the
front portion of a private jeepney along Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the collision.
Macalinao incurred the most serious injuries among the passengers of the truck. He was initially brought to the Sta. Maria
District Hospital for first aid treatment but in view of the severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine
Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved to the Capitol Medical Center by his parents, petitioners
herein, for medical reasons and later to the Philippine General Hospital for financial considerations.
Macalinao’s body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as a result of the accident and per doctor’s advice, his
foot was amputated. He also suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition, coupled with the doctor’s
recommendation, led his family to bring him home where he died.
Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against both Ong and Sebastian before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81. After his death, Macalinao was substituted by his parents in the action. A criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries had also been instituted earlier against Ong but for reasons
which do not appear in the records of this case, trial thereon did not ensue.
After trial in the civil action, the RTC held that based on the evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck in a reckless and imprudent
manner thereby causing the same to hit the private jeepney. It observed that while respondents claimed that Ong was driving
cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no evidence was presented to substantiate the claim. It declared Ong
negligent and at the same time, it held that Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Ong. Consequently, the trial court pronounced the two of them jointly liable to pay actual, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for Macalinao’s death. The trial court subsequently increased the monetary
award upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court. It held that the evidence presented by petitioners was
woefully scant to support a verdict of negligence against Ong. And since respondent’s liability hinged squarely on proof of
Ong’s negligence, neither of them could be held liable for damages to petitioners.
Aggrieved at the ruling, petitioners elevated the case to this Court. They herein contend that the evidence conclusively
establish fault or negligence on the part of Ong and justify the award of damages in their favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented established fault or negligence on the part of Ong
Torts and
HELD:YES. The evidence on record coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently establishes Ong’s negligence.
An examination of the photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center
separating the right from the left lane. Based on the motorist’s right of way rule, the Isuzu truck which was headed towards
Norzagaray, Bulacan should have been occupying the left lane while the private jeepney which was traversing the road to the
town proper of Sta. Maria, Bulacan should have been in the right lane. Exhibits L and L-4 among the photographs, however,
reveal that in the aftermath of the collision, the Isuzu truck usurped the opposite lane to such an extent that only its right rear
wheel remained in the left lane, a few inches from the demarcation line. Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of
negligence against Ong is the police report of the incident. The report states that the Isuzu truck was the one which hit the left
front portion of the private jeepney.
While not constituting direct proof of Ong’s negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa
loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that
parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke
the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that
there was no negligence on his part.
The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. This is
based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
Under local jurisprudence, the following are the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence;
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter
of course unless someone is negligent, thus, the first requisite for the application of the doctrine is present. Ong was driving
the Isuzu truck which, from the evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with the private jeepney. Driving
the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it, a fact which shows that the second requisite is also
present. No contributory negligence could be attributed to Macalinao relative to the happening of the accident since he was
merely a passenger in the Isuzu truck. Respondent’s allegation that Macalinao was guilty of contributory negligence for failing
to take the necessary precautions to ensure his safety while onboard the truck is too specious for belief particularly as
respondents did not even present any evidence to prove such allegation. The last requisite is, therefore, likewise present.
Torts and
#11 BATIQUIN v. CA G.R No. 118231 July 5, 1996 Davide, JR., J.
PETITIONER:DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and RESPONDENT:COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D.

ALLAN BATIQUIN ACOGIDO and FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS
NATURE OF THE CASE:The petitioners appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals of 11 May 1994, which reversed the
decision of 21 December 1990 of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental.
DOCTRINE:This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care."
FACTS:
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City from January 9, 1978 to
September 1989. Between 1987 and September, 1989 she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at the said Hospital.
Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime
before September 21, 1988.
In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy who was also a Resident
Physician at the same Hospital, C.I. and O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses performed a simple cesarean
section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital and after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child,
Rachel Acogido, at about 11:45 that morning. On September 28, 1988, Mrs. Villegas checked out of the Hospital . . . and on
the same day she paid Dr. Batiquin, thru the latter's secretary, the amount of P1,500.00 as "professional fee" .
Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also
gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines . . .
which she had been taking up to December, 1988.
The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs. Villegas no end and despite the medications administered
by Dr. Batiquin. When the pains become unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at
the Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City on January 20, 1989.
When Dr. Ma. Salud Kho examined Mrs. Villegas at the Holy Child's Hospital on January 20, 1989 she found Mrs. Villegas to
be feverish, pale and was breathing fast. Dr. Kho conducted an examination and after seeing the result (infection inside the
abdominal cavity) she suggested that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to which the latter agreed.
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the
left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber materials on the right side of
the uterus embedded on [sic] the ovarian cyst, 2 inches by 3/4 inch in size. This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho
described as a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a "rubber glove" . . . and which is also "rubber-drain like . . . . It could
have been a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or could have come from other sources. And this foreign body was the cause
of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery on
September 21, 1988.
The piece of rubber allegedly found near private respondent Flotilde Villegas' uterus was not presented in court, and although
Dr. Ma. Salud Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination, it was not mentioned in the
pathologist's Surgical Pathology Report.
TRIAL COURT
Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress
Record, an Anesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court, however, regarded
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
these documentary evidence as mere hearsay.
The trial court deemed vital Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that when she confronted Dr. Kho regarding the piece of rubber,
"Dr. Kho answered that there was rubber indeed but that she threw it away." This statement, the trial court noted, was never
denied nor disputed by Dr. Kho, leading it to conclude:
There are now two different versions on the whereabouts of that offending "rubber" (1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in
Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the
Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions serve only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin.
All told, the trial court held in favor of the petitioners herein.
COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals reviewed the entirety of Dr. Kho's testimony and, even without admitting the private respondents'
documentary evidence, deemed Dr. Kho's positive testimony to definitely establish that a piece of rubber was found near
private respondent Villegas' uterus. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, the appellate court
then ruled:
The fact that appellant Flotilde can no longer bear children because her uterus and ovaries were removed by Dr. Kho
is not taken into consideration as it is not shown that the removal of said organs were the direct result of the rubber
left by appellee Dr. Batiquin near the uterus. What is established is that the rubber left by appellee cause infection, placed
the life of appellant Flotilde in jeopardy and caused appellants fear, worry and anxiety . . . .
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, dismissing the complaint for damages is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another
judgment is hereby entered ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the amounts of P17,000.00 as and for
actual damages; P100,000.00 as and for moral damages; P20,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees plus the cost of litigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for damages.
HELD:YES.
The petitioners emphasize that the private respondents never reconciled Dr. Kho's testimony with Dr. Batiquin's claim on the
witness stand that when Dr. Batiquin confronted Dr. Kho about the foreign body, the latter said that there was a piece of
rubber but that she threw it away. Although hearsay, Dr. Batiquin's claim was not objected to, and hence, the same is
admissible but it carries no probative value. Nevertheless, assuming otherwise, Dr. Batiquin's statement cannot belie the fact
that Dr. Kho found a piece of rubber near private respondent Villegas' uterus. And even if we were to doubt Dr. Kho as to
what she did to the piece of rubber, i.e., whether she threw it away or sent it to Cebu City, we are not justified in distrusting her
as to her recovery of a piece of rubber from private respondent Villegas' abdomen. On this score, it is perfectly reasonable to
believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve his testimony with respect to other facts. And it
has been aptly said that even when a witness is found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is
not required that the whole of his uncorroborated testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of
belief may be credited.
It is here worth noting that the trial court paid heed to the following portions of Dr. Batiquin's testimony: that no rubber drain
was used in the operation, and that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears
on her hands upon removing her gloves. Moreover, the trial court pointed out that the absence of a rubber drain was
corroborated by Dr. Doris Sy, Dr. Batiquin's assistant during the operation on private respondent Villegas. But the trial court
failed to recognize that the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and Sy were denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule
that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed
found in private respondent Villegas' abdomen] prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to force. This Court has had occasion to delve into the nature and operation of this
doctrine:
Torts and
This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management
of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care."
Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises
upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which
ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the]
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident happened provided [the] character of [the] accident
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence it would not have occurred and
that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged wrongdoer . . . .
Under [this] doctrine . . . the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care
had been used.
xxx xxx xxx
The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is
not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the
facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be primafacie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean
section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as
to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to
appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by
Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of 11 May 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30851 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Torts and
#12 RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
CORPORATION
PETITIONER: LAMBERT S. RAMOS RESPONDENT: C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DOCTRINE: For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the
presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he
or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or
agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming
of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
FACTS:Herein petitioner, Ramos, is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving the Ford Expedition of
petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a Corolla Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by Respondent COL
Realty. Due to the impact of the vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver. Ramos in his opposition argued that he cannot be
held solidarily liable since it is Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued that when
the accident happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting the crossing is the place where the accident
happened.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of
P51,994.80 as actual damages suffered in a vehicular collision?
HELD: NO.
There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda
Street was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not
have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and
intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered
dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue
underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.
As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or
defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence
has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have
suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#13 MERALCO vs. REMOQUILLO G.R. No. L-8328 May 18, 1956 MONTEMAYOR, J.
PETITIONER: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY RESPONDENT: SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as
guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS,
CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD
MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division)
NATURE OF THE CASE: PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
DOCTRINE: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such act or condition is the
proximate cause.
FACTS: Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, to repair a "media agua" said to be in a
leaking condition. The "media agua" was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said "media agua", Magno
received from his son thru that window a 3' X 6' galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing
so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company strung parallel to the
edge of the "media agua" and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
Magno’s widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment
in their favor. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight modification by reducing the
attorney's fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs.
Findings of Facts made by the Court of Appeals:

- The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles on the street and
carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Peñaloza's house was constructed.
- As revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by the trial court, the distance from the electric wire to
the edge of the 'media agua' on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30 inches or 2½ feet. Regulations
of the City of Manila required that 'all wires be kept three feet from the building.
- The fault in complying with the distance requirement was due to the owner of the house, because city authorities
gave him a permit to construct a 'media agua' only one meter or 39 ½ inches wide, but instead he built one having a
width of 653/4 inches, 173/8 inches more than the width permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to
the electric wire to less than the prescribed minimum of 3 feet.
CA’s Ratio in ruling in favor of the Respondent: Although the owner of the house in constructing the "media agua" in
question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still, after making that "media agua", its construction though illegal, was finally
approved because he was given a final permit to occupy the house; that it was the company that was at fault and was guilty of
negligence because although the electric wire in question had been installed long before the construction of the house and in
accordance with the ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere compliance with the regulations does not satisfy the
requirement of due diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other precautionary measures as may be warranted; that
negligence cannot be determined by a simple matter of inches; that all that the city did was to prescribe certain minimum
conditions and that just because the ordinance required that primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet from any
house, the obligation of due diligence is not fulfilled by placing such wires at a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardles s of
other factors.
The electric company has appealed said decision to us.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Manila Electric Company is negligent?
HELD: NO.
The SC agrees to the contention of petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence
and in some measure by the too close proximity of the "media agua" or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the
"media agua". It is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a
remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latter's length of 6 feet. For someone of his age and experience, it is to be presumed that he had training for
the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in
the instant case, his training and experience failed him.
We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. The Company cannot be
expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires
so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to
it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions.
Thus, Magno’s heirs cannot recover. In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed and the complaint filed against the Company is hereby dismissed.
Torts and
#14 PLDT vs. CA GR No. L-57079 Septermber 29, 1989 Regalado, J.
PETITIONER: PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO
TELEPHONE CO., INC. ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petitioner for Review on Certiorari
DOCTRINE: Private respondents cannot charge petitioner for their injuries

where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof.
FACTS: Private respondent spouses instituted an action for damages against petitioner before the CFI for injuries sustained
when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. PLDT avers that the injuries are due to private
respondents' own negligence.
The court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. Both parties appealed with private respondents appealing on
the amount of damages awarded. The CA however reversed the decision and found private respondents negligent. The first
motion for reconsideration of private respondents were denies but the court reversed the earlier CA decision and affirmed the
CFI decision upon 2nd motion for reconsideration of private respondents. Motion for reconsideration by petitioner was denied.
ISSUE: Whether injuries sustained by private respondents were attributable to the fault of petitioner
HELD: The accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was
not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs,
but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. Moreover, it was shown by evidence that the jeep was
running quite fast. The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife
but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their
right to recover damages. Private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries
where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban
had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT
Torts and
#15 LAMBERT vs HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON G.R. No. February 23, J. Ynares-Santiago
160709 2005
PETITIONER: NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her RESPONDENT: HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by Marilou
husband, Glenroy Aloysuis Lambert Castillon and Sergio Labang
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the RTC of Iligan City
DOCTRINE:The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must
thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.The determination of the mitigation of the
defendant’s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.
FACTS:
Ray Castillon borrowed his brother’s (Joel Castillon) motorcycle to roam around Iligan City together with his friend Sergio
Labang, herein respondent. At around 10 pm, after eating at Hona’s restaurant and drinking beer, they traversed the highway
towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney
owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot. This resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray Castillon
and injuries to Labang.
Respondents filed an Action for Damages with Prayer of Preliminary Attachment against petitioner. The complaint was
subsequently amended to include the claim of Joel Castillon for the damages caused to his motorcycle.
The RTC ruled in favor of herein respondents but reduced petitioner’s liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of
Ray. The claim of Joel was dismissed for it was found out that he is not the owner and is therefore not a real party in interest.
Petitioner argues that the negligence of Ray was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore is not liable for
damages.
ISSUE: Whether reversal of the decision of Court of Appeals is proper?
HELD:NO.
The finding of negligence by the Court of Appeals is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon as it would entail going into
factual matters on which the finding of negligence was based. As a rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. The facts as found
by the RTC and CA:
“When Reynaldo Gamot was approaching the side road, he slightly veered to the right for his allowance. Ray Castillon, who
was following closely behind, instinctively veered to the left but it was also the moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned
to the left towards the side road. At this juncture both were moving obliquely to the left. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the
side of the jeepney throwing the driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left front door of the jeepney even
as the motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the right and sped away.”
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate
cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court
correctly held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.
The ruling in Raynera vs Hiceta is inapplicable. In Raynera, the death of the victim was solely attributable to his own
negligence in bumping the rear of the trailer truck which was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Raynera,
being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of
him. The trailer truck therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case at bar. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles
"who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently
contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision.
While we agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty of contributory negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the
Civil Code, we find it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victim’s negligence. In the
case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was
tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.These
circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause.
Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other
words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
Torts and
#16 PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS. G.R. No. 97626 March 14, 1997 Hermosisima, Jr., J.
COURT OF APPEALS
PETITIONER:PHILIPPINE BANK OF RESPONDENT:THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL’S MARKETING

COMMERCE, now absorbed by Philippine CORP. REPRESENTED BY ROMEO LIPANA, ITS PRESIDENT &
Commercial International Bank, Rogelio Lacson, GENERAL MANAGER
Digna De Leon, Maria Angelita Pascual, et al.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
DOCTRINE:Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would do.
Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.
Doctrine of “Last Clear Chance”- an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could
have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo
Lipana, filed a collection suit before RTC of Pasig, Branch 160 against PBC to recover the sum of P304, 979.74 representing
various deposits it had made in its current account with petitioner Bank but which were not credited to its account, and were
instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. Private respondent alleged that the wrong deposit was made due
to the gross and inexcusable negligence of PBC.
From May 5, 1975 to 1976, Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for
the purpose of depositing said funds in the account of RMC with PBC. it turned out, however, that the funds were instead
credited to the account of Yabut’s husband, Bienvenido Cotas, who likewise maintains an account with the said bank.
PBC, on the other hand, had been regularly furnishing Lipana with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances.
Unfortunately, Lipana did not check said monthly statements.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondent and on appeal, the appellate court affirmed the said decision with
modifications.
In the present petition, petitioners submit that the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of RMC and Romeo Lipana in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Private respondent however maintains that the proximate cause of the loss was the
negligent act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Axucena Mabayad, in validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate,
presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad, notwithstanding the fact that one fo the deposit slips was not completely
accomplished.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner Bank’s negligence is the proximate cause of the loss
2. Whether or not private respondent’s omission of checking the bank account statements amounts to contributory
negligence
HELD:
1. YES
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
seventy-eight (78)-yearold, yet still relevant, case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence
of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of
the Roman law. The existence of negligence in given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, reiterated in the case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, defines
proximate cause as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. x x x.” In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad
in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with
which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of “last clear chance” (also referred to, at times as “supervening negligence” or as “discovered
peril”), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent,
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the
latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner
bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their
self-imposed validation procedure.
In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the
fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the
highest degree of care.
2. YES
The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its
monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed
against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly
Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory
negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New
Civil Code.
Torts and
#17 REAL VS. BELO G.R. NO. 146224 January 26, 2007 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
PETITIONER: VIRGINIA REAL RESPONDENT: SISENANDO H. BELO
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
DOCTRINE: No person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury
or loss.
FACTS:
Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of the Philippine Women's University
(PWU) along Taft Avenue. Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also located at
the Food Center of PWU. A fire broke out at petitioner's Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls
in the area, including respondent's stall. An investigation revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from
the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded
compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondent's demand.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before MeTC alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due
diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well as the selection and supervision of her
employees; that petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls. Petitioner denied
liability on the grounds that the fire was a fortuitous event and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of her employees. MeTC ruled in favor of respondent. RTC affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages for the fire that razed the food stalls in PWU
HELD: YES.
The elements of a "fortuitous event" are: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of
human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause
of injury or loss.
It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's
fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls, including
respondent's fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not support petitioner's theory of fortuitous event.
The Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. x x x
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.Employers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-
delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
Torts and
In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were
maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence
in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference
was that petitioner had been negligent.
Torts and
#18 SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC vs. CA G.R. No. July 10, 1998 PURISIMA, J.:
126389
PETITIONER: SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE
DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO,
CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO,
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review under Rule 45
DOCTRINE: In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from
any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.
FACTS:
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school
building along the same College Road. A powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
respondents house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team
of engineers and found that:
“5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the area and the general
direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong
winds having a westerly direction, the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated
along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those located
on both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm.
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper
anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which
serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even bent to
the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.”
It then recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity, the
fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a structural hazard.
In their Complaint RTC for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to their house
rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others houses. In its Answer, petitioner averred that
subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any
portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses
school children, faculty members, and employees, is in tip-top condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of God
and therefore beyond human control such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any
negligence on its part.
ISSUE: Whether or not the damage caused to respondent is brought by a fortuitous event
HELD: Yes. In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked
for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse
consequences.
In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating team that subject
school buildings roofing had no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong winds therefore
ruling in favor of petitioner’s negligence. But this Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that factual
findings by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. After
careful scrutiny,, we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.
Torts and
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is
unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse
consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other
words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence
The person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence
causative of his injury or loss and must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and
conclusions without basis in fact. Private respondents merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which
made an ocular inspection of petitioners school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by
means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For
instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person
shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect
must be clearly shown.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the
partial unroofing of petitioners school building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and design
of said school building were deficient and defective. On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses, city
building official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design of petitioners school building were approved prior to its
construction; that the same city official gave the go-signal for such repairs without any deviation from the original design and
subsequently, authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building, proving that the building does not suffer any
structural defect; that the VP for finance and administration testified that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of
subject school building were regularly undertaken; and that the city government since 1974 admitted in that no complaint
regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before.
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold
that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in
question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents house.
Torts and
#19 PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS vs. G.R. No. 147746 October 5, 2005 CORONA, J.:
SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III
PETITIONER: PERLA COMPANIA DE RESPONDENT: SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III

SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL and PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA
NATURE OF THE CASE: Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
DOCTRINE: The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen
and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which
constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such
as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the
obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident
FACTS:
In 1986, respondent Spouses Sarangaya erected a commercial area known as Super A Building and was subdivided into
three doors, each of which was leased out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third
doors of the building. On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine
Corporation (Matsushita).
Petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (petitioner-corporation) entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the Super A
Building. Petitioner-corporation renovated its rented space and divided it into two: the left side for office and the right to be used by
Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided vehicle.
On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned to Santiago
and, after checking his appointments the next day, decided to warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the
ignition key, the engine made an odd sound and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again
stepped on the accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small
flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when suddenly,
fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs
and arms.
Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air
and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances.
The city fire marshall conducted an investigation and thereafter submitted a report to the provincial fire marshall concluding that the fire
was accidental. The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation had no fire permit as required by law.
Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Damage in (sic) Property was filed against
petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, petitioner-corporation was asked to pay the amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the
commercial building. At the prosecutors office, petitioner Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.
Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict against petitioners for a sum of money and damages, alleging that
Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual
as its employee.
During the trial, respondents presented witnesses who testified that a few days before the incident, Pascual was seen buying gasoline in a
container from a nearby gas station. He then placed the container in the rear compartment of the car.
In his answer, Pascual insisted that the fire was purely an accident, a caso fortuito, hence, he was not liable for damages. He
also denied putting a container of gasoline in the cars rear compartment. For its part, petitioner-corporation refused liability for
the accident on the ground that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Pascual as its branch manager.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents declaring that, although the respondents failed to prove the precise cause of the fire that
engulfed the garage, Pascual was nevertheless negligent based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and that petitioner-
Torts and
corporation, as the employer, was vicariously liable to respondents. CA affirmed this.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies

2. Whether or not Pascual is not liable because the fire was fortuitous
HELD: 1. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the
fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine rests
on inference and not on presumption. It is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or
has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence.
Ordinary refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a
normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact
negligent and responsible for the accident.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same
situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its
year-model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car,
constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in
the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
2. The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito
or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an
obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of
conduct that aggravated the accident
The circumstances on record do not support the defense of Pascual. Clearly, there was no caso fortuito because of his want of
care and prudence in maintaining the car.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the
exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control of
Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. No other person,
not even the respondents, was charged with that obligation except him.
Where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a certain
person and, in the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened had that person used proper care, the
inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that
he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident. They had no
access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned
Torts and
#20 ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC CO. v. CA G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989 PARAS, J.
PETITIONER: THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC RESPONDENT: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (FIRST
COMPANY DIVISION) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN
CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, AND PURISIMA JUAN
NATURE OF THE CASE:Review
DOCTRINE:“When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission".
FACTS:
A strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent
flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel
Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, and proceeded towards the
direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein
that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a
Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ
Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water.
The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they
saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto
dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but he turned back shouting that the
water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio.
When Antonio was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife
Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes requested the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric
Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house.
In another place, and on the same date, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at
the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as
grounded or short-circuited lines. He set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded
and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO
lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office. He saw an electric wire again strung across the street "and the other end was
seeming to play with the current of the water." Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he
returned to the NPC
Engr. Juan went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early
was no longer there.
In defense, defendant sought to prove that the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer
from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. As a public service operator and in line with its business of
supplying electric current to the public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and
damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner incurred liability for the electrocution and consequent death of the late Isabel Lao Juan
HELD:YES.
The Court held that petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where
persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may
not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not
have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission".
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to
note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding
typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's
grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her
property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?
Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a
source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred,
was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise.
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken
lines". The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29,
1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any
INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office.
Hence, the foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not
observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#21 VALENZUELA v CA G.R. No. 115024 Feb. 7, 1996 KAPUNAN, J.

G.R. No. 117944
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL,

petitioner INC., respondents
RICHARD LI, petitioner COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents
Nature of the case: Two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stemming from an
action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained
by her in a vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990
Doctrine: Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
FACTS:
Plaintiff's version:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from
her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd.
with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire
and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot
reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing
to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff
was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was
pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and
sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to
have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days
and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the
artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance. In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral
damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related
expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk
compartment, defendant's car came approaching very fast ten meters from the scene; the car was "zigzagging". The rear
left side of plaintiff's car was bumped by the front right portion of defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's car
swerved to the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. He stated that defendant was under the influence of liquor as he
could "smell it very well".
Defendant Richard Li’s version:

He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet.
Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the
direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car
coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved
to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his
defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion
of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue. He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped the car
of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages,
alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
Lower Court: Sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly
and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.
CA: Agreed with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff but absolved the Li's
employer.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Li was negligent.

2. Whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard,
which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone.
3. Whether or notAlexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, was liable.
HELD:
1. Yes.Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li's testimony was peppered with so many
inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version,
obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuela's corroborated
claims, his allegations were neither backed up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course of trial.
Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora
Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert - as every driver
should be - to those conditions. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not
dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the
accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed
as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol.
2. No. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Courts have traditionally
been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when
placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from
persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in
Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he
fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted
for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. It would be
hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-
parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. Valenzuela did
exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the
unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led
her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all
reasonable precautions.
3. Yes. The relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for
acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point,
however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article
2180 of the Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for
the damage caused by the accident. In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. The
service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up
the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between
Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel. Alexander Commercial, inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.
Torts and
#22 RAMOS vs/ PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967 BENGZON, J.P., J.
PETITIONER: PLACIDO C. RAMOS and RESPONDENT:PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES
AUGUSTO L. RAMOS BONIFACIO
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DOCTRINE:The court held that from Art .2180 two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of
a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
FACTS:Placido Ramos and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of the Ph. And Andres Bonifacio,driver of Pepsi, as a
consequence of a collision involving the car of former and tractor truck and trailer of the latter company.
CFI rendered judgement finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that Pepsi did not sufficiently prove that it exercised due
diligence of a good father of family to prevent damage. Pepsi and Bonficacio were held to be solidarity liable to the petitioners.
However, CA modified its decision and absolved Pepsi as to its liability finding Pepsi diligent in the selection of its driver
Bonifacio. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not Pepsi exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in selecting their employee Bonifacio as a
driver?
HELD:YES.
Pepsi sufficiently proved that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Bonifacio as a driver. Under Art
2180:
... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The court held that from this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that the presumption is
juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a fam ily,
the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
The Pepsi's witness showed sufficient evidence that Pepsi exercised due diligence in selecting and supervising their drivers,
including Bonifacio.
SC had occasion to put it down as a rule that "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's
license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of
service."
NOTE:There's an MR regarding the alleged violation of Pepsi of the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law and the rules and regulation
thereto. Petitioners also argued that the Court should apply Respondent Superior Rule. However, the Court denied such MR
and emphasized that employer's liability ceased once it proves that it has observed diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#23 SPS. SANTOS v. HON PIZARDO GR No. 151452 July 29, 2005 Tinga, J.;
PETITIONER: SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and RESPONDENT: HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge,
ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON
BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q.
SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER RONDARIS, President/Chairman
DOCTRINE:Prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved
FACTS:In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron
Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van’s driver and three (3) of its
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the van’s passengers. After trial,
Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of
civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998. On October 20,
2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan etal.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed. According to the
trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners’ cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the
accrual of the cause of action. The appellate court also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if the
respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the
permissible remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was brought within the
recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.
The trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is
based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private
respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the
criminal case. It is Viron Transit’s contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case and no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action based on delict has prescribed
HELD: NO.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.Such civil liability may
consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable
exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the
offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and
direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit
against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed.
Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of
action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
Torts and
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the
employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission
of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the
complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners’ allegations in their complaint,
opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
Torts and
#24 SPS. VERGARA v. TORRECAMPO G.R.No.193659 June 15, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe, J.
PETITIONER: SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA RESPONDENT: ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN

AND HERMINIA VERGARA
DOCTRINE:
Contributory Negligence.
Moral damages.While moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code,they are only given to ease the defendant's grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the
extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
Attorney’s Fees. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still
attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a
case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
FACTS: When Sps. Sonkin bought the Sonkin, they raised the height of the partition wall and caused the construction of their
house thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall such that a portion thereof became part of the wall of the
master's bedroom and bathroom. On the other hand, Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of the Vergara Property by filling
it with gravel, earth, and soil. As a result, the level of the Vergara Property became even higher than that of the Sonkin
Property. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming from the Vergara Property was leaking into their
bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin
repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had
dumped thereon, but the same went unheeded. Hence, Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages against Sps.
Vergara as well as the other possessors of the Vergara Property.
Sps. Vergara claimed that Sps. Sonkin's act of raising the partition wall made the same susceptible to breakage, which
therefore cannot be attributed to them. Furthermore, in leveling their own property, they are merely exercising their proprietary
rights. Upon trial, RTC concluded that Sps. Vergara's act of dumping earth, soil, and other materials in their property directly
caused the damage to the house of Sps. Sonkin and, thus, they should be held liable for damages in favor of the latter. Sps.
Vergara's co-defendants were exculpated from liability since they were not shown to have participated in the former's act.
Sps. Vergara appealed the entire RTC decision to CA, while Sps. Sps. Sonkin filed only a partial appeal, assailing the amount
of actual, moral, and exemplary damages. CA set aside RTC decision. While the CA concurred with the finding of the RTC that
the cause of the water seepage into the Sonkin Property was the act of Sps. Vergara in elevating their own property, CA
ascribed error upon the RTC in not finding that Sps. Sonkin were guilty of contributory negligence in building their house directly
abutting the perimeter wall. CA deleted the award of actual and exemplary damages, but affirmed the award of moral damages
and attorney's fees. Finally, CA merely ordered Sps. Vergara to to provide an adequate drainage system on their property to be
sufficient under the circumstances. Only Sps. Vergara sought reconsideration from the CA Decision, which was subsequently
denied.
ISSUE: Did CA err in upholding the award of moral damages and attorney's fees?
HELD: YES. Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. In the case at bar, it is
undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the
waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works
which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden. In this
light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their
property so as to minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the easement and
constructed their house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby violating the National
Building Code in the process.
The CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps.
Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their property; Sps. Sonkin is nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only
failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also for disregarding the legal easement
constituted over their property. In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory negligence, SC deems it appropriate to delete the award of
moral damages in their favor. While moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219
of the Civil Code,they are only given to ease the defendant's grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate
the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
Anent the issue of attorney’s fees, the Court deems it inappropriate to award the same in favor of either party. Even when a
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be
awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous
conviction of the righteousness of his cause.In this case, the Court observes that neither Sps. Sonkin nor Sps. Vergara were
shown to have acted in bad faith in pursuing their respective claims against each other. The existence of bad faith is negated by
the fact that both parties have valid contentions against each other.
Torts and
#25 RUKS KONSULT AND CONSTRUCTION G.R. No. January 21, 2015 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
vs. ADWORLD SIGN AND ADVERTISING 204866
CORPORATION and TRANSWORLD MEDIA
ADS, INC.
PETITIONER:RUKS KONSULT AND RESPONDENT:ADWORLD SIGN AND ADVERTISING

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION* and TRANSWORLD MEDIA ADS, INC
DOCTRINE:
Proximate Cause:
Transworld’s initial construction of its billboard’s lower structure without the proper foundation, and that of Ruks’s finishing its
upper structure and just merely assuming that Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2) successive acts
which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages sustained by Adworld.
joint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also referred to as those
who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury.
FACTS:
On August 11, 2003, the adjacent billboard structure owned by Transworld and used by Comark collapsed and crashed
against Adworld’s billboard structure located at EDSA Tulay, Guadalupe, Barangka Mandaluyong. As a result, Adworld sent
Transworld and Comark a letter demanding payment for the repairs of its billboard as well as loss of rental income. In its reply,
Transworld admitted the damage caused by its billboard structure on Adworld’s billboard, but nevertheless, refused and failed
to pay the amounts demanded. As Adworld’s final demand letter also went unheeded, it was constrained to file complaint for
damages in the aggregate amount of P474,204.00.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred that the collapse of its billboard was due to extraordinarily strong winds
that occurred instantly and unexpectedly, and maintained that the damage caused was hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise
filed a Third-Party Complaint against Ruks, the company which built the collapsed billboard structure in the former’s favor.
Transworld alleged that the structure constructed had a weak and poor foundation not suited for billboards, thus, prone to
collapse.
For its part, Comark denied liability for the damages caused to Adworld’s billboard structure, maintaining that it does not have
any interest on Transworld’s collapsed billboard structure as it only contracted the use of the same. In this relation, Comark
prayed for exemplary damages from Transworld for unreasonably includingit as a party-defendant in the complaint.
Lastly, Ruks admitted that it entered into a contract with Transworld for the construction of the latter’s billboard structure, but
denied liability for the damages caused by its collapse. It contended that when Transworld hired its services, there was already
an existing foundation for the billboard and that it merely finished the structure according to the terms and conditions of its
9
contract with the latter.
The RTC ultimately ruled in Adworld’s favor, and accordingly, declared, Transworld and Ruks jointly and severally liable to
Adworld.
The RTC found both Transworld and Ruks negligent in the construction of the collapsed billboard as they knew that the
foundation supporting the same was weak and would pose danger and yet, they did not do anything to remedy the
situation. The RTC then concluded that these negligent acts were the direct and proximate cause of the damages suffered by
Adworld’s billboard.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It adhered to the RTC’s finding of negligence on the part of Transworld and Ru. It found
that Transworld failed to ensure that Ruks will comply with the approved plans and specifications of the structure, and that
Ruks continued to install and finish the billboard structure despite the knowledge that there were no adequate columns to
support the same.
Hence, this petition.

Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring Ruks jointly and severally liable with
Transworld for damages sustained by Adworld
HELD:
The SC saw no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC and the CA and their uniform conclusion that both
Transworld and Ruks committed acts resulting in the collapse of the former’s billboard, which in turn, caused damage to the
adjacent billboard of Adworld.
Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that Transworld’s initial construction of its billboard’s lower structure
without the proper foundation, and that of Ruks’s finishing its upper structure and just merely assuming that Transworld would
reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2) successive acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages
sustained by Adworld. Worse, both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the former’s billboard was
weak; yet, neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on each other’s word that repairs
would be done to such foundation, but none was done at all.
Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence in the construction of the
former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its collapse and the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard
structure. As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld.
Verily, joint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in,
aid or abet the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also referred to
as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury.
Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint
tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves."
The case of People v. Velasco is instructive on this matter:
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not
have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely
because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint [tortfeasors] whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage.Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
In conclusion, the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring Ruks jointly and severally liable with
Transworld for damages sustained by Adworld.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2011 and the Resolution dated December 10, 2012
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94693 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#26 CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. G.R No. December 3, Villarama, Jr.,
vs. ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE TANGONAN 199886 2014 J.
PETITIONER: CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., RESPONDENT: ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY
represented by its General Manager and Chief Executive Officer, GINE TANGONAN
GABRIEL A. TORDESILLAS
DOCTRINE: Under Article 2176, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty;
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
FACTS:
On October 31, 1998, around 9:00 p.m., a motorcycle with three passengers figured in a mishap along the National Highway
of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan. It was driven by its owner Camilo Tangonan who died from the accident, while his
companions respondent Rapanan and one Erwin Coloma suffered injuries.
On March 29, 2000, Rapanan and Camilo’s common law wife, respondent Mary Gine Tangonan, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan a complaint for damages against petitioner. They alleged that while the victims were
traversing the national highway, they were struck and electrocuted by a live tension wire from one of the electric posts owned
by petitioner. They contended that the mishap was due to petitioner’s negligence when it failed to fix and change said live
tension wire despite being immediately informed by residents in the area that it might pose an immediate danger to persons,
animals and vehicles passing along the national highway.
In its Answer, petitioner alleged that the typhoons that struck its areas of responsibility caused some of its electric poles to fall
and high tension wires to snap or cut-off which caused brownouts in said areas. It claimed that they cannot be faulted for
negligence if there were electric wires dangling along the national road since they were caused by typhoons which are
fortuitous events. It also alleged that it was able to clear the said areas of fallen electric poles and dangling or hanging high
tension wires immediately after the typhoons, to secure the safety of persons and vehicles traveling in said areas. It likewise
contended that the proximate cause of the mishap was the victims’ negligence and imprudence in operating and driving the
motorcycle they were riding on.
During the trial, respondents testified and also presented Dr. Triffany C. Hasim as witness. According to Dr. Hasim, the
abrasions of Rapanan were caused by pressure when the body was hit by a hard object or by friction but she is uncertain as
towhether a live electric wire could have caused them. She further said that she did not find any electrical burns on Rapanan.
As with Camilo, she found abrasions and hematoma on his body and that the cause of death was due to "cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to strangulation." She also opined that the strangulation could have been caused by an electric wire
entangled around Camilo’s neck.
Petitioner, for its part, presented four witnesses among whom were SPO2 Pedro Tactac, Tranquilino Rasosand Rodolfo
Adviento. SPO2 Tactac, who investigated the incident, testified that there was a skid mark on the cemented portion of the road
caused by the motorycle’s foot rest which was about 30 meters long. According to him, it appears that the motorcycle was
overspeeding because of said skid mark. Rasos and Adviento, employees of petitioner, both testifiedthat as a result of the
onslaught of typhoons Iliang and Loleng in Buguey and Sta. Ana, Cagayan, the power lines were cut off because the electric
wires snapped and the electric poles were destroyed. After the said typhoons, petitioner’s employees inspected the affected
areas. The dangling wires were then removed from the electric poles and were placed at the foot of the poles which were
located four to five meters from the road.
On December 9, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint for damages of
respondents. It held that the proximate cause of the incident is the negligence and imprudence of Camilo in driving the
motorcycle. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and held petitioner liable for quasi-delict.
ISSUE:
(1) Was petitioner’s negligence in maintenance of its facilities the proximate cause of the death of Camilo and the injuries of
Rapanan?
(2) In the event that petitioner’s negligence is found to be the proximate cause of the accident, should damages be awarded in
favor of Camilo’s heirs even if they were not impleaded?
HELD:
(1) NO.There is no negligence on the part of petitioner that was allegedly the proximate cause of Camilo’s death and
Rapanan’s injuries From the testimonies of petitioner’s employees and the excerpt from the police blotter, this Court can
reasonably conclude that, at the time of that fatal mishap, said wires were quietly sitting on the shoulder of the road, far
enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose any threat to passing motor vehicles and even pedestrians. Hence, if the
victims of the mishap were strangled by said wires, it can only mean that either the motorcycle careened towards the shoulder
or even more likely, since the police found the motorcycle not on the shoulder but still on the road, that the three passengers
Torts and
were thrown off from the motorcycle to the shoulder of the road and caught up with the wires. As to how that happened cannot
be blamed on petitioner but should be attributed to Camilo’s over speeding as concluded by the police after it investigated the
mishap.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-
delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person
for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.
The presence of the first element is undisputed because the unfortunate incident brought about the death of Camilo
and physical injuries to Rapanan. This Court, however, finds that the second and third elements are lacking thus
precluding the award of damages in favor of respondents.
Had Camilo driven the motorcycle at an average speed, the three passengers would not have been thrown off from the vehicle
towards the shoulder and eventually strangulated by the electric wires sitting thereon. Moreover, it was also negligent of
Camilo to have allowed two persons to ride with him and for Rapanan to ride with them when the maximum number of
passengers of a motorcycle is two including the driver. This most likely even aggravated the situation because the motorcycle
was overloaded which made it harder to drive and control. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
(2) NO. Assuming arguendo that petitioner was indeed negligent, the appellate court erred in awarding damages in favor of
Camilo' s legal heirs since they were not imp leaded in the case. It should be noted that it was Mary Gine, the common law
wife of Camilo, who is the complainant in the case. As a mere common law wife of Camilo, she is not considered a legal heir of
the latter, and hence, has no legal personality to institute the action for damages due to Camilo' s death.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#27 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC VS. IAC G.R. no. L-65295 March 10, 1987 Feliciano, J.
PETITIONER: PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC. RESPONDENT: THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL LEONARDO DIONISIO
NATURE OF THE CASE:Petition for review
DOCTRINE: The incident was the natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver’s negligence
FACTS:
On November 15, 1975 at around 1:30 am, herein private respondent was on his way home from a cocktails and dinner
meeting with his boss. According to the respondent, the headlights of his car suddenly malfunctioned as he was proceeding
down General Lacuna Street. As such, he switched the headlights of his car to “bright” and thereupon saw a ford dump truck
looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The said truck was owned by herein petitioner, Phoenix Construction Inc. and
was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
lights nor any so called early warning reflector devices set anywhere near the truck. In order to avoid the impending incident,
Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left but the accident proved to be unavoidable. As a result of the incident, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a nervous breakdown and the loss of two gold bridge
dentures.
Dionisio argued that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which the truck was parked. On
the other hand, the petitioner argued that the proximate cause of Dionisio’s injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at
the time of the incident, under the influence of liquor, without headlights and a curfew pass. Furthermore, the petitioner argued
that even if there is negligence on their part, the same should only be considered as a passive and static condition.
Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of Dionisio, finding that the proximate cause of the injury was due to
the negligence of parking the said truck.
ISSUE:Whether or not the proximate cause of the injury was the negligent manner in which the truck was parked.
HELD: YES
The Court ruled in the affirmative. However the Court noted that both the trial court and the Appellate Court failed to fully
explain the negligence of Dionisio as raised by the defense. With the first factual issue, the Court held that Dionisio was not in
possession of a valid curfew pass at the time of the incident. With respect to the speeding allegations, the Court was convinced
on the basis of the testimonies of the witnesses that the same was travelling at a high speed at the time of the incident. On the
other hand, the court was not convinced with the pieces of evidence presented by the defense that Dionisio was highly
intoxicated at the time of the incident. Lastly, the Court sided with the story of the defense, that Dionisio intentionally switch off
his headlights, as not to be detected by the authorities rather than the story offered by Dionisio that his headlights magically
malfunctioned. Considering the foregoing, the Court still agreed with the rulings of the trial and appellate court that the
proximate cause of the incident was the negligent manner in which the truck was parked. At most, the acts of Dionisio may be
contributory in character. The Court rejected the argument of the defense as being merely in a passive and static condition. The
petitioners arguments are drawn from a reading of some older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. However, the
court emphasized that the said doctrine is not well supported in this jurisdiction. Furthermore, even in the United States,
distinctions between cause and condition are almost entirely discredited.
The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump
truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others
similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the
dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. Lastly, the Court rejected the argument of the petitioner
with respect to the application of the last clear chance. The court held that “The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of
more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the
risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his
employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with
Torts and
that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act
or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must
respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the
risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position
must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.”
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#28 QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005 Garcia, JJ
TIAMZON vs. FULGENCIO DACARA
PETITIONER:QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RESPONDENT:FULGENCIO DACARA

RAMIR J. TIAMZON
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Reviewunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
DOCTRINE:Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
FACTS:
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr., while driving his 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan, rammed into a
pile of earth/street diggings at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government.
As a result, Dacarra, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle
when it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city government to no avail. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara (FULGENCIO), for and
in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Defendantsalleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized
traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. They claimed that they exercised
due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latters negligence and failure to exercise due care.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of DACARA, Sr. under Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
In their appeal to the CA, petitioners maintained that they had observed due diligence and care in installing preventive
warning devices, and that it was in fact the plaintiff who had failed to exercise prudence. Moreover, the lower court
allegedly erred in using Article 2189 of the Civil Code, which supposedly applied only to liability for the death or
injuries suffered by a person, not for damage to property.
COURT OF APPEALS
The CA agreed with the RTCs finding that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by
respondent.
Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death or physical injury, the CA ruled in the
affirmative: We find it illogical to limit the liability to death or personal injury only. For, injury is an act that damages, harms or
hurts and mean in common as the act or result of inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain, distress, or
impairment. Injury is the most comprehensive, applying to an act or result involving an impairment or destruction of right, health,
freedom, soundness, or loss of something of value.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is negligence on the part of petitioner Quezon City Government to
place precautionary measures at the digging site
2. Whether Article 2189 renders petitioner Quezon City negligent per se
Torts and
HELD:
1. YES.
Petitioners insist that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside construction. They
argue that the driver (Fulgencio Dacara Jr.) of respondents car was overspeeding, and that his own negligence was therefore
the sole cause of the incident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined
from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
It is clear that the accident which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the
existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street to place sufficient and
precautionary lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate
warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night.
Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could
not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained
that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the
accident.
Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the attending circumstances
so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed.
2. YES.
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the
maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.Failure of the
defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which
renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the
responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would
deem just and equitable.
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point
to petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondents car. No adequate reason has been
given to overturn this factual conclusion.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#29 Mendoza vs. Spouses Gomez G.R. No. June 18, 2014 Perez, J.
160110
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ
NATURE OF THE CASE: Appeal by Certiorari
DOCTRINE:
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.
FACTS:
An Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) owned by respondent Leonora J. Gomez (Leonora) and driven by Antenojenes Perez
(Perez), was hit by a Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus) registered under the name of petitioner Elvira Lim (Lim) and
driven by petitioner Mariano C. Mendoza (Mendoza).
An Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against
Mendoza. Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate complaint for damages against Mendoza and
Lim.
According to PO1 Rosales, investigating officer of the case, at around 5:30 a.m., the Isuzu truck was heading from Katipunan
Road to E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue. Along Boni Serrano Avenue and upon reaching the corner of Riviera Street, in front of the
St. Ignatius Village, the accident happened wherein the truck’s left front portion was hit by the Mayamy Bus. According to PO1
Rosales, the Mayamy bus, while traversing the opposite lane, intruded on the lane occupied by the Isuzu truck.
PO1 Rosales also reported that Mendoza tried to escape by speeding away, but he was apprehended in Katipunan Road
corner C. P. Garcia Avenue by one Traffic Enforcer Galante and a security guard of St. Ignatius Village.
As a result of the incident, Perez,as well as the helpers on board the Isuzu truck, namely Melchor V. Anla (Anla), Romeo J.
Banca (Banca), and Jimmy Repisada (Repisada), sustained injuries necessitating medical treatment. Moreover, the Isuzu truck
sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis, lights and steering wheel.
After weighing the evidence, the RTC found Mendoza liable for direct personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
and it also found Lim vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the same Code.
The RTC granted the prayer for costs for the repair of the damage vehicle, unrealized income of the respondents as a result of
the accident, moral and exemplary damages, and costs of suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC but deleted the award of unrealized income.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. Was Mendoza’s negligence the proximate cause of the harm?
2. May Lim be held liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability?
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
HELD:
1. Yes.
Article2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendoza’s
violation of traffic laws was the proximate cause of the harm. This is supported by the finding of the RTC, and affirmed by the
CA, that Mendoza was negligent in driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the time of the
collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the Isuzu truck. Having encroached on the opposite lane, Mendoza was
clearly in violation of traffic laws.
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu truck was in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having
been flagged down by a security guard of St. Ignatius Village. The mishap occurred when the Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast
speed as shown by the impact of the collision, and going in the opposite direction as that of the Isuzu truck, encroached on the
lane rightfully occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused the latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and
considerably damaging the Isuzu truck.
2. Yes.
Under such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to another may
nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under certain circumstances. In our jurisdiction,
vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action
under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of his employee.
This notwithstanding, under the registered owner rule, Lim shall be considered the employer and shall be held liable.
It is petitioners contention that although the registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez
(Enriquez), who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-called "kabit
system."
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle
of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the
driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#30 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V CARPITANOS G.R. No. February 6, PARDO

143363 2002
PETITIONER: ST. MARY’S ACADEMY, RESPONDENT:

WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL,
JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA,
NATURE OF THE CASE:Appeal via certiorari
DOCTRINE:“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury.
FACTS:
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City
conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
“Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.”
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed
on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
Petitioner St. Mary’s Academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
HELD:
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 2187 and
2198 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions
and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.
For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. “In order that there may be a
recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence
of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
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Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ ”
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in
fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the
highways or streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that
the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered
owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#31 SABIDO VS CUSTODIO G.R. No. L- August 31, 1966 Concepcion, C.J.
21512
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE: According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or
more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible
for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have
resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor
FACTS:
In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite
directions met each other in a road curve on a bumpy and sliding downward a slope. Agripino Custodia a passenger of LTB
bus, who was hanging on the left side as truck was full of passengers was sideswiped by the track driven by Aser Lagunda at
about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955. Whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on
board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda As a result, Agripino Custodio was injured and died.
Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. However, Belen Makabuhay, widow of Agripino, testified that the 6 x 6
truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had
been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. Lagunda himself admitted that he
already saw the three hanging passengers l when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus
Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas
Bus Co. — hereinafter referred to as the carrier — and its driver Nicasio Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated
the contract of carriage with Agripino, whereas petitioners were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held
solidarity liable in the manner above indicated.
Petitioners now maintain: (1) that the death of Agripino Custodio was due exclusively to the negligence of the carrier and its
driver; (2) that petitioners were not guilty of negligence in connection with the matter under consideration; (3) that petitioners
cannot be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver; and (4) that the complaint against petitioners herein should be
dismissed.
Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver, because the latter's liability
arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the former springs from a quasi delict.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver.
HELD:YES
With respect to the first two (2) points, the carrier and its driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having allowed Agripino to
ride on the running board of the bus, in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was the proximate
cause of Agripino's death. It should be noted, however, that the lower court had, likewise, found the petitioners guilty of
contributory negligence, which was as much a proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners' truck
was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its
right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite
direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and
its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino. In fact, the negligence of the first two (2)
would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the
last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from
the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.
As to whether or not the petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver, the rule is, however, that
Torts and
according to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more
persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a
third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the
whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from
the acts of the other tort-feasor…
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#32 MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs. ELENA G.R. No. L- June 4, 1973 MAKALINTAL, J.:
FERNANDEZ 29745
PETITIONER: MERCEDES M. TEAGUE RESPONDENT: ELENA FERNANDEZ
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition For Review
DOCTRINE: "The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very
thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent."
FACTS:
The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for
hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice.
The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of
about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders, and the presence of
each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away
from the institute.
Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four
instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm
down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not
get burned as it is made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the street.
They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. The panic,
however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing
and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire.
But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead.
The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was "Shock due to traumatic fractures of the ribs with perinephric
hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of
Realistic Institute.
Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment
of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages.
Appellate court declared that the defendant, hereinafter to be referred to as the petitioner, was negligent and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the
fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with.
The second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each,
although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is negligent in lieu of the efficient intervening cause?
HELD: YES
Petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of
ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and
death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis
of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of.
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the
events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in
question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific
situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should
become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding
in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for
the stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind,
for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building.
"The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by
the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing
which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of
the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the
stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be
two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause
applies to such violation.
Torts and
#33 URBANO vs. IAC G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988 Gutierrez, Jr., J.
PETITIONER: FILOMENO URBANO RESPONDENT: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTAND PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition to review CA decision affirming decision of Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding
Urbano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
DOCTRINE: Death must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted. Based on medical findings, the
infection (tetanus) was an efficient intervening cause distinct and foreign to the crime. (llater of between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death)
Tetanus may have been the proximate cause of death, with which, Urbano had nothing to do. It is likely the wound is but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection is due to failure to take necessary precautions.
FACTS: Urbano was found guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries upon Javier.
A quarrel ensued when Urbano found the place where he stores palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal,
which Javier admitted he opened. Urbano hacked Javier on his right palm, which was used to parry the bolo. Unarmed and
running away, Javier was hacked again on his left leg with the back portion of the bolo, causing swelling.
After 22 days, Javier suffered the symptoms of tetanus: lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, he died.
Petitioner contends Javier’s wounds could have been infected by tetanus two or three or a few but not 20-22 days before he
died. Petitioner reiterated that the proximate cause of the death has Javier’s own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no
tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks, he returned to the farm and tended his
tobacco plants with bare hands, exposing the wound to harmful agents like tetanus germs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the injuries inflicted by Urbano constituted the proximate cause of Javier’s death?
HELD: No. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident.
Evidence on record does not clearly show the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the hacking.
Evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time he suffered the symptoms of tetanus,
somehow got infected. Dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof the accused caused the death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. Doubts are present.
Urbano, acquitted of the crime of homicide.

Torts and
#34 PANTRANCO v. BAESA G.R. Nos. 79050-51 November 14, 1989 CORTES, J.:
PETITIONER: PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, RESPONDENT: MARICAR BASCOS BAESA, thru her personal guardian
INC FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her behalf and in behalf of her
minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE, EDMUNDO and SHARON ICO
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review
DOCTRINE:The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to
show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or
should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it.
FACTS:
At about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim,
Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were
aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding
anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa.
The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the registered
owner thereof. From Ilagan, Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some viands to one Mrs. Bascos and
thenceforth to San Felipe, taking the highway going to Malalam River. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and
proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and
collided with it.
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino
Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively damaged. After the accident the
driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to
the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding.
All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein private respondents settled the case amicably under the "No Fault"
insurance coverage of PANTRANCO.
Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed separate
actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO, respectively docketed as Civil Case No. 561-R and 589-R
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
In its answer, PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico’s alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the
accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.
CFI Ruling: Ruled in favor of plaintiffs, awarding damages
CA Ruling: Affirmed CFI Ruling, with modifications anent amount of damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the “last clear chance” doctrine is applicable in the case at bar.
2. Whether the petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ramirez.
HELD:
1. NO. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the
doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident
was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to
avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing
to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus
was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction.
Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding
towards Manila. By the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late
to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The speed at which the approaching bus was running prevented
David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming that
the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court
has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if
the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered"
2. NO. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has
been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. Although this presumption is only a
disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family, this Court believes that the
evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the case of Ramirez,
as a company driver is far from sufficient. No support evidence has been adduced. The professional driver’s license of Ramirez
has not been produced. There is no proof that he is between 25 to 38 years old. There is also no proof as to his educational
attainment, his age, his weight and the fact that he is married or not. Neither are the result of the written test, psychological and
physical test, among other tests, have been submitted in evidence [sic]. His NBI or police clearances and clearances from
previous employment were not marked in evidence. No evidence was presented that Ramirez actually and really attended the
seminars. Vital evidence should have been the certificate of attendance or certificate of participation or evidence of such
participation like a logbook signed by the trainees when they attended the seminars. If such records are not available, the
testimony of the classmates that Ramirez was their classmate in said seminar (should have been presented)
The mere issuance of rules and regulations and the formulation of various company policies on safety, without showing that
they are being complied with, are not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of its employee. It
is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver, the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
#35 ENGADA v. CA G.R. No. June 20, 2003 QUISUMBING, J.

140698
PETITIONER: ROGELIO ENGADA RESPONDENT: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourteenth

Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident.
FACTS:
Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner
of the Tamaraw. While traversing the road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw
from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. The pick-up had just negotiated a
hilly gradient on the highway. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light
flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on
collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its
right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused the
head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a rice field.
The pick-up stopped diagonally astride the center of the road.
Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. Seyan was profusely bleeding from her nose and was in a
state of shock with her eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, she was transferred to St. Paul’s Hospital in Iloilo City
where she was confined. Her medical certificate revealed that she suffered a fracture on the right femur, lacerated wound on
the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right kidney.
Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was
computed at P80,000.
A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious physical injuries was filed with the
Municipal Trial Court of Barotac Nuevo against Rogelio Engada and Edwin Iran. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Imprudence resulting physical injuries and damage to property. Engada appealed to the Court of
Appeals which then dismissed the appeal.
Engada now contends that CA failed to consider that he already relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-
ups right signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more reason to swerve to his left.
Had Iran not swerved to the left the collision would have been avoided. It was Iran who was clearly negligent, says Engada.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the state, counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting Engada.
Petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, according to the OSG, for the following reasons: First,
petitioner for no justifiable reason occupied the opposite lane. Second, while on the wrong lane, petitioner was driving the Isuzu
pick-up fast, and he returned to his own lane only at the last minute. This left Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, with no
opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the accident. Iran’s swerving to the left was his reaction to Engada’s wrongful
act, which appropriately calls for the application of the emergency rule. The rationale of this rule is that a person who is
confronted with a sudden emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt decision based largely upon
impulse or instinct. Thus, he cannot be held to the same standard of conduct as one who had an opportunity to reflect, even
though it later appears that he made the wrong decision. Clearly, under the emergency rule petitioner cannot shift the blame to
Iran, concludes the OSG.
ISSUE: Whether or not Engada is liable for negligence

Torts and
HELD: YES. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane,
petitioner must be held liable. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left.
Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Engada tries to extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of last clear chance. He avers that between him and Iran,
the latter had the last clear chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. But no convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of the abovecited doctrine. Instead,
what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. Petitioner’s act of
swerving to the Tamaraw’s lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached
the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of.
Torts and
#36 CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORP. GR No. 138569 September 11, Carpio, J.
v. CA 2003
PETITIONER: CONSOLIDATED BANK and RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS, and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY,
TRUST CORP. CPAs
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review
DOCTRINE:The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence
of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
FACTS:
Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and
Company, CPAs (L.C. Diaz), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting.
On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya (Macaraya), filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for
P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre (Calapre),
to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller acknowledged
receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit
slips with the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction took time and
Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to
Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the
passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
The following day, 15 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz (Diaz), called up Solidbank to
stop any transaction using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account. On the same day, Diaz formally wrote
Solidbank to make the same request. It was also on the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the
day before, 14 August 1991, of P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of
the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the
withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.
In an Information dated 5 September 1991, L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, Emerano Ilagan (Ilagan) and one Roscon
Verdazola with Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. The Regional Trial Court of Manila dismissed the criminal
case after the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss on 4 August 1992.
On 24 August 1992, L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused.
On 25 August 1992, L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 8. After trial, the trial court rendered on 28 December 1994 a decision absolving Solidbank and
dismissing the complaint.
L.C. Diaz then appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 October 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Solidbank should be held liable for the unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account
of L.C. Diaz
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
HELD: YES.
We hold that Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual.
Solidbanks Fiduciary Duty under the Law
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan. There is a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The
depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement
between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. This fiduciary relationship means that the
banks obligation to observe high standards of integrity and performance is deemed written into every deposit agreement
between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than
that of a good father of a family.
Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation
Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation
is demandable. For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its
depositor.
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the transaction took time and he had to go to Allied Bank for another
transaction. The passbook was still in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the processing of the deposit when Calapre
left Solidbank. Solidbanks rules on savings account require that the deposit book should be carefully guarded by the depositor
and kept under lock and key, if possible. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the
law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. Likewise,
Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his
authorized representative.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or
negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that
Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is
thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden
was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility.
The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in
culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook
while it was processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the
passbook only to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because
it gave the passbook to another person.
Solidbanks failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the withdrawal of the P300,000 by the impostor who took
possession of the passbook. Under Solidbanks rules on savings account, mere possession of the passbook raises the
presumption of ownership. It was the negligent act of Solidbanks Teller No. 6 that gave the impostor presumptive ownership of
the passbook. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have happened.
Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre.
Torts and
Damages Digest 3B
SY.17-18
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to
negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability.
Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the
plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract.
Mitigated Damages
Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. This means
that if the defendant exercised the proper diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence, then the courts may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory
negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the
liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Solidbank Corporation shall
pay private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs only 60% of the actual damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. The
remaining 40% of the actual damages shall be borne by private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs. Proportionate
costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Torts and

PETITIONER:GOVERNMENT SERVICE RESPONDENT:PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, ELY

NATURE OF THE CASE:

NATURE OF THE CASE:

PETITIONER:JONAS AÑONUEVO RESPONDENT:HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME

man or beast of burden of direct physical force.

PETITIONER:STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. RESPONDENT:ARNOLD CUARESMA and JERRY B. CUARESMA

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45

Hence, the present petition.

PETITIONER:VICENTE JOSEFA, RESPONDENT: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

NATURE OF THE CASE:petition for review on certiorari

PETITIONER:BJDC CONSTRUCTION, RESPONDENT:NENA E. LANUZO, CLAUDETTE E. LANUZO, JANET

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari

result would not have occurred.

PETITIONER:FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER RESPONDENT:WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, BENITO JOSE DE LOS

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review

#8. MENDOZA v. SORIANO G.R. No. 164012 June 8, 2007 Quisumbing, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE: Rule 45, Petition for Certiorari

PETITIONER: OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR. RESPONDENT: GERONIMO BACOY

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari

#10 MACALINAO v. ONG G.R. No. December 14, PUNO, J.

PETITIONER: MARCELO MACALINAO RESPONDENT: EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG and GENOVEVO

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

#11 BATIQUIN v. CA G.R No. 118231 July 5, 1996 Davide, JR., J.

PETITIONER:DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and RESPONDENT:COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D.

these documentary evidence as mere hearsay.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for damages.

Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:

xxx xxx xxx

PETITIONER: LAMBERT S. RAMOS RESPONDENT: C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Findings of Facts made by the Court of Appeals:

The electric company has appealed said decision to us.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Manila Electric Company is negligent?

#14 PLDT vs. CA GR No. L-57079 Septermber 29, 1989 Regalado, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petitioner for Review on Certiorari

DOCTRINE: Private respondents cannot charge petitioner for their injuries

ISSUE: Whether reversal of the decision of Court of Appeals is proper?

PETITIONER:PHILIPPINE BANK OF RESPONDENT:THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL’S MARKETING

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

PETITIONER: VIRGINIA REAL RESPONDENT: SISENANDO H. BELO

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

The Civil Code provides:

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review under Rule 45

PETITIONER: PERLA COMPANIA DE RESPONDENT: SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III

NATURE OF THE CASE: Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45

corporation, as the employer, was vicariously liable to respondents. CA affirmed this.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies

NATURE OF THE CASE:Review

#21 VALENZUELA v CA G.R. No. 115024 Feb. 7, 1996 KAPUNAN, J.

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL,

RICHARD LI, petitioner COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents

Defendant Richard Li’s version:

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Li was negligent.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE: Whether or not the action based on delict has prescribed

#24 SPS. VERGARA v. TORRECAMPO G.R.No.193659 June 15, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

PETITIONER: SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA RESPONDENT: ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

HELD: YES. Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:

PETITIONER:RUKS KONSULT AND RESPONDENT:ADWORLD SIGN AND ADVERTISING

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

Hence, this petition.