Corruption is widely considered to have adverse effects on economic development through its

negative impact on the volume and quality of public investment and the efficiency of
government services. Conversely, many of these macro variables are determinants of corruption.
However, there are few studies of this two-way interaction at the macro level. This thesis aims to
extend the current literature on corruption and development by explicit investigation of two
diverse channels through which corruption and economic development interact, namely
women's share in politics and pollution. For each variable, the thesis presents a theoretical
model in which corruption and economic development are determined endogenously in a
dynamic general equilibrium framework. We have four main results. First, female bureaucrats
commit fewer corrupt acts than male bureaucrats because they have lower incentives to be
corrupt. Second, corruption affects pollution directly by reducing pollution abatement resources
and indirectly through its impact on development. As pollution and development appear to have
an inverse U-shaped relationship, the total effect of corruption on pollution depends on the
economy's level of income. Third, we confirm a simultaneous relationship between corruption
and development. Fourth, for sufficiently low income levels, corruption and poverty may be
permanent features of the economy. In addition to the two theoretical models, the thesis also
presents an empirical investigation of the causal effect of women's share in parliament on
corruption using panel data and gender quotas as instruments for women's share in parliament.
Our results overturn the consensus since we find no causal effect of women's share in
parliament on corruption, except in a particular case of Africa with reserved seats quotas.