ADARNE, JENNICA G.
A no less important consideration is that the Rules of Court allow only two occasions when a
1. Motion for New Trial
JORGE NAVARRA and CARMELITA BERNARDO NAVARRA and THE RRRC
DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT
BANK
FACTS:
The petitioners and their family corporation, the RRRC Development Corporation, executed a
real estate mortgage in favor of private respondent Planters Development Bank to secure the
payment of a loan in the principal sum of P1.2M. When the petitioners failed to pay, Planters
caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The sheriff issued a certificate of sale in
favor of Planters as the highest bidder. The one-year period having expired without the
petitioners exercising their right of redemption, ownership of the five parcels of land was
transferred to the private respondent.
Planters sent a letter of demand to the petitioners to vacate the premises, but the demand was
rejected. It then filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession and the trial court
granted said petition. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Consequently, petitioners filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari alleging that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The CA
dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner then came to
the Supreme Court for review under Rule 45.
The petitioners submit that the writ of possession should not have be issued because they are
already the owners of the subject property by virtue of the perfected and partially
consummated contract of sale. To prove their claim, they presented to the respondent court an
exchange of letters which the petitioners insist has established a meeting of minds between
them and Planters relative to their repurchase of the subject properties. The petitioners also
ask the SC to consider the four letters which they have attached to their petition claiming these
to be newly-discovered evidence that would substantiate their allegation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a motion for new trial filed before the Supreme Court should be granted
RULING:
As defined, newly-discovered evidence is evidence which could not have been discovered prior
to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence and which is of such character as
would probably change the result.
The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was promulgated on September 12, 1988. On
the other hand, the letters are dated October 24, 1988, and November 12, 1988. As they were
not existing at the time the respondent court rendered its decision, and indeed prior to the
trial, they could not by any kind of diligence have been discovered at all during that period. It is
clear that they do not qualify as newly-discovered evidence under the definition as they came
into existence only after the trial.
party may file a motion for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. That
motion may be filed only with the trial court under Rule 37 or with Court of Appeals under
Rule 53 but never with the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the SC to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in proceedings below, its jurisdiction being limited
to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. Such review
does not extend to reversing the factual findings of such courts save only in the exceptional
instances which the SC have laid down in a number of decisions.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
2. Receivership
CENTRAL SAWMILLS, INC. vs. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO.
FACTS:
A decision was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, jointly and solidarily.
A writ of execution was issued to enforce said judgment but it was returned unsatisfied by the
sheriff.
On August 4, 1958, the Insurance Commissioner wrote a letter addressed to Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. stating that the examination disclosed that the company had, as of
December 31, 1957, total admitted assets of P715,689.29, as against total liabilities of
P645,096.94 and capital paid-up of P259,700.00 which was impaired in the amount of
P189,097.65. Compliance with their letter of July 18, 1958, regarding the covering of said
impairment is reiterated and its failure to comply with all the foregoing requirements within
the time limit set forth will compel them to suspend or revoke the certificates of authority to do
insurance business issued in favor of the company.
The plaintiff filed the present petition for receivership in view of the return of the Sheriff of
Manila to the effect that the writ of execution could not be satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in an action for the collection of a debt, where there is already a final and
executory judgment, the Court has the authority to appoint a receiver of the properties of the
judgment debtor which are not involved in the action, in aid of the execution of said judgment
RULING:
YES. Section 1 (d) of Rule 61 [now Section 1(c) of Rule 59] is not applicable here because all the
cases of receivers contemplated in said section are only cases wherein the properties being
placed under receivership are those involved in the very litigation in which such receivership is
ordered. This is evident from the opening paragraph of said section which says that “one or
more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of the action, may be
 appointed ... in the following cases.” In other words, this qualifying clause, “the property, real
or personal, which is the subject of the action” applies to all the cases specified in Section 1.
It is undisputed that in the case at bar, the properties being placed under receivership are not
the subject of the action. The provision applicable to the circumstances of the case at bar is
Section 39 (now Section 41) of Rule 39 and not Rule 61 (now Rule 59) of the Rules of Court.
Said section provides:
SEC. 39. Appointment and bond of receiver. — The judge may, by order, appoint the
sheriff, or other proper officer or person, receiver of the property of the judgment
debtor; and he may also, by order, forbid the transfer or other disposition of, or any
interference with, the property of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution. If
a bonded officer be appointed receiver, he and his sureties shall be liable on his
official bond as such receiver but if another person be appointed he shall give a bond
as receiver as in other cases.
*[Section 41. Appointment of receiver. — The court may appoint a receiver of the
property of the judgment obligor; and it may also forbid a transfer or other
disposition of, or any interference with, the property of the judgment obligor not
exempt from execution.] -1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
It is unnecessary or superfluous to bring in Rule 61 (now Rule 59), which is of doubtful
applicability, when Section 39 (now Section 41) appears to be clearly and fittingly applicable. If
at all, the other provisions of Rule 61 (now Rule 59), may be resorted to only insofar as they
prescribe the procedure and the bond related to the carrying out of such receivership.
WHEREFORE, with the above clarification that Section 39 (now Section 41) of Rule 39 is the
provision applicable to the receivership herein in question, the same being in aid for money,
the disputed orders of the court a quo are hereby affirmed.
3. Certiorari
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in
the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written
demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges
for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Davao City.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182
(DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat
of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ. Aggrieved by such
turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due
process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition
of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule
against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March
2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa
already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver
that DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly
to the Court?
RULING:
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the
Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.
The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the
dismissal of the recourse.
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms
that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Supreme
Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy. These reasons must be clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot
and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Hence,
that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for
some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
 Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented.
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was permissible,
the petition must still be dismissed.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard,
mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that
the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus for lack of merit.
4. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
ADOLFO RACAZA vs. SUSANA REALTY, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the lessee of a portion of a piece of land owned by respondent corporation. He
started renting this portion of the lot in 1952 when his wife, Evarista P. Racaza, bought an
unfinished house that had been built on it. On assurance of respondent that petitioner's family
could stay on the land by paying a monthly rent of P15, petitioner finished the construction of
the house and he and his family lived in it. On December 16, 1955, however, petitioner was
asked to vacate the land because respondent needed it. The demand was followed by the filing
on February 10, 1956 of a complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Pasay City.
Petitioner and his family remained in the premises as the case was dismissed for failure of
respondent to proceed to trial.
On December 17, 1957, petitioner received another letter from respondent demanding anew the
surrender of the premises. On February 19, 1958, another ejectment suit was filed against him,
the complaint alleging that respondent needed the lot "for the purpose of constructing
improvements thereon and for other uses but that despite repeated demands petitioner refused
to leave the premises.
After trial, the court ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and pay P15 a month until he
had done so. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pasay. He asked for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it,
claiming that the complaint was filed more than one year after the alleged unlawful detainer.
Again, petitioner was ordered evicted. It was held that petitioner's illegal possession should be
deemed to have started on December 17, 1957, when the second demand to vacate was made on
him, because the complaint in this case was not intended to revive the one previously
dismissed for lack of prosecution. Since the complaint was filed on February 19, 1958,
jurisdiction over the case was properly acquired by the municipal court.
Petitioner asked for a reconsideration and, failing to secure one, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. He contended that the municipal court did not have jurisdiction because by
respondent's own evidence rents had not been paid since July, 1955 and it should be from this
date that the one-year period should be counted.
After stating that in actions for unlawful detainer, notice to vacate need not be alleged but may
merely be shown by evidence, the appellate court ruled that the one year period should not be
counted from July, 1955 because the parties had stipulated that petitioner was up to date in the
payment of rents. Neither should it be reckoned from when the first demand to vacate was
made because it was respondent's privilege, as lessor, to waive the right to bring an action
based on the first demand. Rather, the starting point should be when the second demand to
quit was made. The appellate court also ordered the respondent to reimburse the petitioner the
amount he spent for finishing the construction of the house in the amount of P3,500 instead of
P12, 000 which the petitioner demands.
Still not satisfied, petitioner asked the appellate court to reconsider its decision. When his
motion was denied, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Is demand necessary in an action to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term?
When did respondent’s cause of action accrue?
RULING:
This case was brought not on the theory that petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the
theory that the lease had expired and that respondent had asked petitioner to vacate the land.
The averment that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is equivalent to an allegation that
the lease expired at the end of every month. It is therefore immaterial that rents had not been
paid since July, 1955, since what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of the
lease. This being the case, demand to vacate was unnecessary.
Rule 70, Section 2 requires previous demand only when the action is "for failure to pay rent
due or to comply with the conditions of his lease." Where the action is to terminate the lease
because of the expiration of its term, no such demand is necessary. In the latter case, upon the
expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if
the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be
brought against him even before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70,
section 2.
Accordingly, upon the expiration of the lease in this case, petitioner became a deforciant
unlawfully withholding possession of the property. There was no need for a demand to be
served on him, except to negate any inference that respondent, as lessor, had agreed to an
extension of the term of the lease under article 1687 of the Civil Code.
As earlier stated, petitioner was twice asked to quit the premises. The first was on December
16, 1955, but the complaint filed afterwards was dismissed for non-suit. The second time he
 was asked to move out was on December 17, 1957. Petitioner insists that respondent's cause of
action must be deemed to have accrued on December 16, 1955. But, as already stated,
respondent's action is not based on non-profit of rent coupled with a demand; its action is
based on the expiration of the term of the lease and the demand made by it to vacate the
premises merely evidences its determination not to extend the lease. Moreover, even if the
action were based on non-payment of rent, the one-year period should be reckoned from the
second notice, on the theory that respondent has the right to waive his action based on the first
demand and to let the lessee remain in the premises.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
5. Manner of Making Allegations in a Pleading
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and
MARTHA S. DAVID
FACTS:
Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David were married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the
spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was
registered in the name of "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A.
David" and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 156043 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated with
each other.
Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to
Titan Construction Corporation for ₱ 1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale dated April 24,
1995, and that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 130129 in the
name of Titan.
Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale
executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore
void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that the property be
reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value
because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney dated January 4, 1995 signed by Manuel which
authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. Titan thus prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
In his unverified Reply, Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature
purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the
property. Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint which
was granted by the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint
impleading Martha as a co-defendant in the proceedings. However, despite personal service of
summons upon Martha, she failed to file an Answer. Thus, she was declared in default. Trial
then ensued.
On March 7, 2000, the RTC issued a decision which (i) invalidated both the Deed of Sale and
TCT No. 130129; (ii) ordered Titan to reconvey the property to Martha and Manuel; (iii)
directed the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new title in the names of Manuel and
Martha; and (iv) ordered Titan to pay ₱ 200,000.00 plus ₱ 1,000.00 per appearance as
attorney’s fees, and ₱ 50,000.00 as costs of suit.
In its decision dated July 20, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted
the award of attorney’s fees and the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as costs.
Titan moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s unverified reply should be deemed as an implied admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the Special Power of Attorney
RULING:
The Special Power of Attorney purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void. The RTC
found that the signature of Manuel appearing on the SPA was not his genuine signature.
As to the issue of the validity or invalidity of the subject Special Power of Attorney the Court
rules that the same is invalid. As aptly demonstrated by plaintiff’s evidence, particularly the
testimony of expert witness Atty. Desiderio Pagui, which the defense failed to rebut and
impeach, the subject Special Power of Attorney does not bear the genuine signature of plaintiff
Manuel David thus rendering the same as without legal effect.
Moreover, the genuineness and the due execution of the Special Power of Attorney was placed
in more serious doubt as the same does not contain the Residence Certificate of the plaintiff
and most importantly, was not presented for registration with the Quezon City Register of
Deeds which is a clear violation of Sec. 64 of P.D. No. 1529.
As regards defendant Titan Construction Corporation’s assertion that plaintiff’s failure to verify
his Reply (wherein the validity of the Special Power of Attorney is put into question) is an
implied admission of its genuineness and due execution, this appears at first blush a logical
conclusion. However, the Court could not yield to such an argument considering that a rigid
application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court will not be given premium when
it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interest of justice.
It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is a forgery
was not made under oath. However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under oath,
alleged that the sale of the subject property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was
without his knowledge, consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is nothing on
the face of the deed of sale that would show that he gave his consent thereto. In Toribio v.
Bidin, it was held that where the verified complaint alleged that the plaintiff never sold,
transferred or disposed their share in the inheritance left by their mother to others, the
defendants were placed on adequate notice that they would be called upon during trial to prove
the genuineness or due execution of the disputed deed of sale. While Section 8, Rule 8 is
mandatory, it is a discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its
purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation should
 be one which assists the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important, a just
determination of the disputed issues.
Moreover, during the pre-trial, Titan requested for stipulation that the special power of
attorney was signed by Manuel authorizing his wife to sell the subject property, but Manuel
refused to admit the genuineness of said special power of attorney and stated that he is
presenting an expert witness to prove that his signature in the special power of attorney is a
forgery. However, Titan did not register any objection. Furthermore, Titan did not object to the
presentation of Atty. Desiderio Pagui, who testified as an expert witness, and even cross-
examined said witness. Neither did Titan object to the admission of said witness’ Report when
it was offered in evidence by Manuel. In Central Surety & Insurance Company v. C.N. Hodges,
it was held that where a party acted in complete disregard of or wholly overlooked Section 8,
Rule 8 and did not object to the introduction and admission of evidence questioning the
genuineness and due execution of a document, he must be deemed to have waived the benefits
of said Rule. Consequently, Titan is deemed to have waived the mantle of protection given it by
Section 8, Rule 8.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the recovery by petitioner Titan Construction
Corporation of the amounts it paid to Martha S. David in the appropriate action before the
proper court.
6. Motion to Dismiss
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION vs. ALBERT LIM, doing business under the
name and style "New H-R Grocery"
FACTS:
The present controversy stemmed from a contract of sale between Universal Robina
Corporation and Albert Lim. Pursuant to the contract, petitioner sold to respondent grocery
products in the total amount of P808,059.88. After tendering partial payments, respondent
refused to settle his obligation despite petitioner’s repeated demands. Thus, petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 227, Quezon City, a complaint against respondent for a
sum of money.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue stating that there is not even a remote connection by the
parties to Quezon City, where the Regional Trial Court sits, the plaintiff corporation has
principal office at Pasig City and the defendant is from Laoag City. Accordingly, petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration together with an amended complaint alleging that the parties
agreed that the proper venue for any dispute relative to the transaction is Quezon City. The
trial court granted the motion and admitted petitioner’s amended complaint.
Summons was served upon respondent, however, for his failure to file an answer seasonably
and upon motion of petitioner, the trial court issued an order declaring him in default and
allowing petitioner to present its evidence ex parte.
However, on April 17, 2001, the trial court, still unsure whether venue was properly laid, issued
an order directing petitioner to file a memorandum of authorities on whether it can file a
complaint in Quezon City. Subsequently, on May 11, 2001, the trial court again issued an order
dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court. Petitioner then
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review but it was dismissed due to petitioner’s
failure to attach thereto an explanation why copies of the petition were not served by personal
service but by registered mail.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioner’s complaint on the ground of
improper venue
RULING:
NO. Sections 2 and 4, Rule 4 of the same Rules provide:
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply –
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on
the exclusive venue thereof.
Clearly, in personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or
her residence or the place where the defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a
specific venue which could be in a place where neither of them resides.
Corollarily, Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for the instances when the trial court
may motu proprio dismiss a claim, thus:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Implicit from the above provision is that improper venue not impleaded in the motion to
dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action motu
proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and
prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when it dismissed the petition motu
proprio. It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading from
respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper venue, before dismissing
the petition.

In the instant case, respondent, despite proper service of summons, failed to file an answer and
was thus declared in default by the trial court. Verily, having been declared in default, he lost
his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and present his defense, including his
right to question the propriety of the venue of the action.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED.
7. Rule 39, Sections 1 to 14 - Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgments
SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO, as represented by their attorney-in-
fact MARILOU TOPACIO-NARCISO vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and
MORTGAGE BANK
FACTS:
The petitioners obtained a loan amounting to ₱ 400,000.00 from the respondent. To secure
the loan, the petitioners executed a real estate mortgage over Lot 1224-B-1 LRC Psd-15436 in
favor of the respondent. The petitioners failed to pay the loan, prompting the respondent to file
a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage. To satisfy the obligation, the Provincial
Sheriff of Bulacan sold the mortgaged property at public auction, where the respondent
emerged as the highest bidder. Accordingly, a Certification of Sale was issued in favor of the
respondent and registered with the Registry of Deeds.
The respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the mortgaged
property before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela City. The RTC granted the
petition conditioned on the posting of a ₱ 100,000.00 bond. Upon posting of the required
bond, the RTC issued a writ of possession, commanding the sheriff to place the respondent in
possession of the property.
The writ of possession was not implemented because the petitioners, filed with the RTC, a
petition to set aside the auction sale and the writ of possession (with application for a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction). The RTC issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent and the Deputy Sheriff from implementing the writ
of possession it previously issued. After hearing, the RTC, issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering the respondent and the Provincial Sheriff to desist from implementing the
writ of possession and to refrain from interfering with and disrupting the possession of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
More than two years after the filing of the Answer and the Reply, and after a series of
postponements at the instance of both parties, then Presiding Judge Teresita D. Capulong
issued an order dismissing the respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession on
the ground of failure to prosecute.
The petitioners contend that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the writ of
possession issued on February 16, 1984 may no longer be enforced by a mere motion but by a
separate action, considering that more than five years had elapsed from its issuance. The
petitioners also argue that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies to the present case
since a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is neither a special proceeding nor a
land registration case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of possession may be enforced upon mere motion of the applicant after
the lapse of more than five years from the time of its issuance
RULING:
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds application only to civil actions and not to special
proceedings.
This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured
as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time
as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land
registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent
with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status,
condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no
further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the
part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of
registration.
In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex parte
petition for the issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed separately by
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which regulates the methods of effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage.
Once the writ of possession has been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the
writ without delay. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in
the transfer of title. The trial court does not exercise discretion in the issuance thereof; it must
grant the issuance of the writ upon compliance with the requirements set forth by law, and the
provincial sheriff is likewise mandated to implement the writ immediately.
Thus, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the
purview of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED.