JURISDICTION
In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is
HANNAH SERRANA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan—the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in
P.D. No. 1606. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents, which includes
the UP Student Regent.
Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject
to the twin requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is
committed in relation to their office.
It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right, authority, and duty
created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed or enduring at the
pleasure of the power, an individual is interested with some portion of sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has
jurisdiction over the other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the
SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No.
1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and
trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or
educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a
nonstock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by PD No. 1606.
GARCIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under Republic
Act No. 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature—the civil liability for
forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Cases have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil
in Nature while the Latter Is Criminal.
A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from
a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case
absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established
is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth]. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of
evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents’ properties to his legitimate
income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly
formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the
provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act
committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service
of summons. There is merit in petitioners’ contention.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons: “If the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.”
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by
its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and
proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served
personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center,
who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that
substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and
her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such
substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
Requirements as laid down in Manotoc vs CA
1. Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or
the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being “so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for
the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.” Moreover, we indicated therein
that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times
on at least two (2) different dates.
2. Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons
the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
3. Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or
regular place of business.
ESCOBAL VS GARCHITORENA
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the
allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the
commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by P.D. No. 1861 over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their
office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office and the
offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information—it is not
enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the
offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes
committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing
the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties
must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that
the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that
would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the
petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office
and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged
when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include
therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial
court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears
stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.
Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his
office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with
salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence,
the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and
32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no
legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law, which
may be applied retroactively.
PEOPLE VS HENRY GO
DOCTRINE: The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of RA 3019 committed by certain public officers,
as enumerated in PD 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who
are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that
their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it
remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who
allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e)
and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must,
in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the
public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
RAMISCAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: In finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion
to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan. Once the
case has been filed with the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman which has full control of the case.
Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a
motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filling of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject
of the motion
Under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment may be suspended if
there exists unsoundness of mind, prejudicial question and a pending petition for review of
the resolution of the prosecutor in the DOJ in which the suspension shall not exceed 60
days. Ramiscal Jr., failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case.
With respect to the finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan,
and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case. Ramiscal Jr., failed to
establish that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, thus, there is probable
cause in the filing of the case.
PEOPLE VS BENIPAYO
DOCTRINES:
1. Jurisdiction in libel cases belong to the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts.
2. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions
seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
3. The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving violations of RA 3019 committed by certain public officers, as
enumerated in PD 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who
are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of
whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They
are of the conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which
court–the RTC or the Sandiganbayan–has jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The
Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost
concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our
current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is
shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have
concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine whether
the crime is committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a
case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a
latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Article 360 (RPC) as amended by
RA 4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations,
thus: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the now RTC of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya, acknowledged the
unmistakable import of the said provision: There is no need to make mention again that it
is a court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically designated to
try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of
those statutory provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required is
application. What the law ordains must then be followed.
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in
Bocobo v. Estanislao, where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the
trial court even if the libelous act is committed “by similar means,” and despite the fact that
the phrase “by similar means” is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360. In these
cases, and in those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement
that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel
cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera, we explained at length that: The applicable law is
still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction
over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs.
MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction
over libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts
which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to
us, respondent judge’s orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Court’s Orders dated August 14,
1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been
issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of
and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition.”
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter: “Anent the
question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public respondent
Court of Appeals in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The
contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel
cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and
one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable
penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Court’s jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec.
32 ), said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA
520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has
laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases,
hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be
applied to libel cases.”
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error
in ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail
Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character.
Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law
of a special nature. “Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are
special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of
other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law.” A later enactment
like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled
principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law,
the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by
a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the
MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal
or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law
should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as
possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial
conflict should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws, in
brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the
first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking
cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive
jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first
sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of
RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated
the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:
“RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING,
DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES. x x x x “LIBEL CASES SHALL
BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO
THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.”
(Underscoring supplied)
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare
herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for
damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the
jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or
modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction
over defamations in writing or by similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan of
jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of
the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction
to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to
office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249, cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or
even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is
committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the
respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC
chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition,
gross error. This Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-
109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for
further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion
of the other issues raised in the petitions.”
LACSON VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DOCTRINE: Under Section 4, par. b of RA 8249, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender; In enacting RA 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of PD 1606 which does not mention the
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation
to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged
in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of
facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information
does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed
the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged
to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder
was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP
officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.
SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIO
DOCTRINE: The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information.
The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of
the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of
rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide
qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent
offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance.
However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a
special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest
degree.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him
in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having
himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In
other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with
each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six.
Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta
and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying
her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven
successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by
the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in
succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe
the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not
reflected in the record. The trial courts impressions of the star witnesses for the State bind
this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses. Further, all the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi but
positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime,
demolishes the alibi.
Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court,
challenging the order of the respondent Judge Demetriou denying his motion to quash the
Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged rape and homicide. One of
the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of
the non-inclusion of two other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court
cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find
sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there was an
unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, Mayor
Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against
said two other persons.
DISINI JR VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial
function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their
investigatory powers.
Sec. 21 provides that the RTC shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the provisions of
RA 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) including any violation committed by a
Filipino national regardless of the place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the
elements was committed within the Philippines or committed with the use of any computer
system wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such commission any damage
is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was committed, was
in the Philippines.
There shall be designated special cybercrime court manned by specially trained judges to
handle cybercrime cases
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
JIMENEZ VS SORONGON
DOCTRINE: The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can
represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in the SC.
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest,
the suit is dismissible.
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."
In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate
counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code.
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent
the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been
repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the
criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this
exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
DOCTRINE: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in
the complaint or information.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made
by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that
the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x
assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting
them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies "which were the direct and
immediate cause of their deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that
merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not
show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the
accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an
instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve
the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient
averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an
averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery
as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense.
This requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to
which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime
he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine
the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords
with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.
MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in
intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused
is duly informed of the offense charged
In Bedruz vs Sandiganbayan, the court considered the opposition of the accused (Motion to
Suspend Pendente Lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the
prosecution’s motion for hearing.
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity
of the information/suspension, the court believed that the pleadings filed for and against
them achieved the goal of the procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not by just
oral arguments but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’
pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused
public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against
a mandatory suspension under RA 3019, then an accused would have no reason to
complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does not
only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
denial of procedural due process exists.
PEOPLE VS SORIA
DOCTRINE: The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the of ense
should be regarded as a description of only one of ense and the information is not thereby
rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness.
1. Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse.
Carnal knowledge is the central element and it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by
sexual assault. The perpetrator commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into
another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual intercourse but It is
evident from the testimony of AAA that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s
penis which touched her labia and entered her organ. AAA stated that she only knew that it
was the “bird” of her father which was inserted into her vagina after being told by her
brother BBB. Clearly, AAA has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which
touched her labia and inserted into her vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude
that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of AAA’s brother, BBB, which
declaration was hearsay due to BBB’s failure to testify.
The court however found it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the
particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and
relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. Moreover, the prosecution
satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through his
moral ascendancy and influence over “AAA” which substituted for violence and
intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped AAA by sexual assault.
It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter AAA to file
the charges publicly expose the dishonor of the family unless the rape was indeed
committed.
2. The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed
the rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual
assault as described in paragraph 2 thereof. The Information stated that appellant inserted
his penis into the genital of "AAA," which constituted rape by sexual intercourse under the
first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the Information alleged that appellant
used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations
cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was committed
and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the
case. "[W]here an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is
alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient,
notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same offense are
prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the
various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one
offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of
multifariousness." Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is held
to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be
convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending on the
evidence adduced during trial.
In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty of rape through sexual intercourse under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, it is essential to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he
had carnal knowledge of "AAA". There must be proof that his penis touched the labia of
"AAA" or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to
ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.
We reviewed the testimony of "AAA" and found nothing therein that would show that she
was raped through sexual intercourse. While "AAA" categorically stated that she felt
something inserted into her vagina, her testimony was sorely lacking in important details
that would convince us with certainty that it was indeed the penis of appellant that was
placed into her vagina.
Based on the evidence adduced, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of rape by sexual assault.
UNION BANK VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where
the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the
place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two- fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and
the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: Place of commission of the offense. – The
complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within
the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes
an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only
in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed
sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of
its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
SOLIDUM VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE:
1. Civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
The circumstances that have been established do not present the factual and legal bases
for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was
really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That
meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not
necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard.
Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of
the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but
on competent evidence.
2. The civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the
criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.
Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum.
The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their
judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its
fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA
should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a
ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule
would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the
subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach
to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any
kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry.
However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry
conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming
that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to
be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the
operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the
hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an
employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to
his being insolvent.
CASTILLO VS SALVADOR
DOCTRINE: An acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused is not
exempt from civil liability, which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
In Manantan v. CA, we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of
the accused as follows. "Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on
the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not
the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability, which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29
of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x.
A reading of the CA decision would show that Phillip was acquitted because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [S]ince the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt, [Phillip] is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., we explained the
concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of
the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.
In discrediting [Castillo's] allegation that she gave [Phillip] US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the
CA found that: (1) [Castillo] failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a
short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2)
[Castillo]failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the
transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried
toHong Kong; (3) [Castillo's] claim of trust as reason for not requiring [Phillip] to sign a
receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him;
and (4) [Castillo's] behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent
with the actuation of someone who had been swindled.
LIM VS. KOU CO PING
DOCTRINE: If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent
to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of
the criminal action. Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the of ended party may pursue the two types of civil
liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without of ending the rules on forum shopping,
litis pendentia, or res judicata.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender: (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil
liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and
(2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the
Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation,
fraud and physical injuries”).
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal
action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal
offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to
the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of
the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court
hearing the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.”
The independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities
simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
pendentia, or res judicata.
CASUPANAN VS LAROYA
DOCTRINE: The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission
he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of
the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in
a separate civil action.”
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be
filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under
these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers
only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before
the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a
criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted,
and the other a civil case for quasi-delict—without violating the rule on non-forum
shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for
quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating
the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he
is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the
present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a
separate civil action.” This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect
that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period
continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177
of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is
independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is
to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is
proper.
PEOPLE VS ROMERO
DOCTRINE: The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only to the remaining accused-appellant, Martin
L. Romero.
MAGISTRADO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: There is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. A prejudial question is defined as that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the
question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility
of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that
the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,” therefore, the civil
case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion,
and upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide
by the outcome of another case pending in another court, especially where the parties and
the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition
of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants.
Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the
questions raised in the first action are settled, the second action should be stayed. The
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and
the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion
between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is submitted to its sound discretion.
PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL
DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for
parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would
warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of
the criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant
the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
A prejudicial question is defined as: “x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.”
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case,
since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all
the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.16 At
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married.
The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage is granted, it will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
J.M. DOMINGUEZ VS LICLICAN
DOCTRINE: As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale
behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the
concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
1. As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue
that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to
avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
Here, the CA aptly observed the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to
Criminal Case. To be sure, the Civil involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification
of JMD’s meetings, election and acts of its directors and officers, among others. Court
intervention was sought to ascertain who between the two contesting group of officers
should rightfully be seated at the company’s helm. Without resolution of the civil case,
petitioners’ authority to commence and prosecute the Criminal case against respondents
for qualified theft in JMD’s behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the
criminal proceedings.
2. In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave
abuse of discretion when she ordered the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite
the existence of a prejudicial question. Judge Tiongson-Tabora cannot deny knowledge of
the pendency of Civil Case No. 6623-R as the judge presiding over its JDR. As correctly held
by the CA.
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that
should have barred the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip,
for the simple reason that a juridical person can only act through its officers, and the issue
in the main case submitted for JDR before Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one for nullification of
meetings, election and act of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs. Thus, she
knows for a fact that there is a question as to who are the legitimate directors of JMD such
that there is doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to act for JMD.
RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
FENEQUITO VS VERGARA, JR.
DOCTRINE: It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file
an appeal with the RTC. Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the OSG to
represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled
“Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the
Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the
National Prosecution Service,” which was the law in force at the time the appeal was filed,
provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) “shall have
charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal
ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties
incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions.”
1. The Court notes at the outset that one of the grounds relied upon by the CA in
dismissing petitioners’ petition for review is the latter’s failure to submit copies of pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition filed, as required under Section 2,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. While petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, they,
however, failed to comply with these requirements. Worse, they did not even mention
anything about it in the said Motion. Section 3, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides: “Sec.
3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements.—The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.”
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not
difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of
appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to
be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims
and caprices of appellants. In the instant case, petitioners had all the opportunity to
comply with the Rules. Nonetheless, they remained obstinate in their non-observance even
when they sought reconsideration of the ruling of the CA dismissing their petition. Such
obstinacy is incongruous with their late plea for liberality in construing the Rules. On the
above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible.
2. A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined. Upon the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose
of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. The RTC
Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of petitioners’
motion to quash because it leaves something more to be done x x x, i.e., the continuation of
the criminal proceedings until the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined.
Specifically, the MeTC has yet to arraign the petitioners, then proceed to trial and finally
render the proper judgment.
Petitioners contend that the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report,
submitted as evidence by respondent to the prosecutor’s office, showed that the findings
therein are not conclusive and, thus, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report
No. 048-03 that the document examiner found that the signatures appearing in the
questioned Deed of Sale as compared to the standard signatures “reveal divergences in the
manner of execution and stroke structure [which is] an indication that they WERE NOT
WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.” The Court agrees with the prosecutor’s
pronouncement in its Resolution dated September 22, 2003, that although the findings of
the PNP Crime Laboratory were qualified by the statement contained in the Report that “no
definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact that questioned signatures are
photocopies wherein minute details are not clearly manifested,” the fact that an expert
witness already found that the questioned signatures were not written by one and the same
person already creates probable cause to indict petitioners for the crime of falsification of
public document.
In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the ruling of the RTC
that the offense charged was committed and that herein petitioners are probably guilty
thereof.
With respect to respondent’s legal personality to appeal the Order of the MeTC, suffice it to
say that the appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the public
prosecutor who handles the case.
It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal
with the RTC. Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the OSG to represent “the
Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.”
On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled “Reorganizing the
Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City
Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution
Service,” which was the law in force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the
provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) “shall have charge of the
prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in
the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the
institution of criminal prosecutions.” In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has
been held by this Court that the fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal
trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. Since the appeal, in
the instant case was made with the RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City Prosecutor or his
assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had authority to file the same.
Moreover, petitioners’ reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited
provision refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor’s power to file
an information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the
said law which provides that in cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State
Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or
the Chief State Prosecutor. Stated differently, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City
Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal
by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval
of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION VS REYES
DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after
conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic
judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime
has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof.
It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice
secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the
initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be
corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public
prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to
substantiate their respective claims.
It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,9 exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice
secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the
initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be
corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.
In the present case, after review and reconsideration, the Secretary of Justice reversed the
investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause that all the elements of the crime of
estafa are present. Estafa, under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, is committed
by―
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).―Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below: x x x x
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: (a) x x x (b) By
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
In reversing the finding of probable cause that the crime of estafa has been committed, the
Secretary of Justice reasoned out that, [the] theory of conversion or misappropriation is
difficult to sustain and that under the crime of estafa with grave abuse of confidence, the
presumption is that the thing has been devoted to a purpose or is different from that for
which it was intended but did not take place in this case. The CA, in sustaining the
questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, ruled that the element of
misappropriation or conversion is wanting. It further ratiocinated that the demand for the
return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account for it, are
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation, however, the said presumption is rebuttable
and if the accused is able to satisfactorily explain his failure to produce the thing delivered
in trust, he may not be held liable for estafa.
It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a
preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof.
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public
prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to
substantiate their respective claims.
A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding
the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she
received in trust the amount of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks
and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of land. Petitioner wrote a demand letter
for Reyes to return the same amount but was not heeded. Hence, the failure of Reyes to
deliver the titles or to return the entrusted money, despite demand and the duty to do so,
constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation.
To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
he was prosecuted.22 Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter
is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would
lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
ABANADO VS BAYONA
DOCTRINE: The Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual
states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the
information only “as far as practicable.” Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or
required under the rules
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. The courts
must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting
preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question.
The Department of Justic-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far
as practicable. Such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA VS OBIAS
DOCTRINE: The justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over
the investigating prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court; The
justice secretary’s subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the
case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case.
Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, in case the investigating prosecutor
conducts a hearing where there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness,
"[t]he parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be
asked to the party or witness concerned." Hence, the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of
the motion for reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not violate
petitioners’ right to due process. The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the
existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ.
Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor,
after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding
information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. In reversing the DOJ’s
finding of probable cause, the OP found merit in the argument of the respondent that the
DOJ’s finding that she was with Aclan when she went to the residence of Engr. Tria early in
the morning of May 22, 1998, was not sufficiently established. The OP gave more weight to
the affidavit of Calayag stating that Aclan was not around when they and respondent,
among other visitors, were at Engr. Tria’s house at that time -- than that account given by
SA Eduarte, which was uncorroborated.
As to the double sale allegedly committed by the respondent from which the latter’s strong
motive to liquidate Engr. Tria was inferred, the OP found this as a mere expression of
opinion by the investigators considering that Engr. Tria’s widow, Mrs. Pura Tria,
categorically admitted her knowledge of the said transaction. Neither was the OP persuaded
by the NBI’s "kiss of death" theory since it is but a customary way of greeting a friend to
shake hands and hence it cannot imply that respondent utilized this as a signal or
identification for the gunman to shoot Engr. Tria. Respondent’s alleged indifference
immediately after Engr. Tria was gunned down while conversing with her, was also negated
by the affidavit of an employee of Philippine Air Lines based at the Pili Airport, stating that
right after the incident took place he saw respondent in the radio room in shock and was
being given water by another person.
Considering the totality of evidence, the OP was convinced there was nothing suspicious or
abnormal in respondent’s behavior before, during and after the fatal shooting of Engr. Tria
as to engender a well-founded belief of her complicity with the killing of Engr. Tria.
Petitioners, however, maintain that the records are replete with abundant proof of
respondent’s complicity in the murder of Engr. Tria.
Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a
reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state
of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause merely binds
over the suspect to stand trial; it is not a pronouncement of guilt. On the other hand,
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial
evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest.
We reverse the OP’s ruling that the totality of evidence failed to establish a prima facie case
against the respondent as a conspirator in the killing of Engr. Tria. To begin with, whether
or not respondent actually conspired with Aclan and Ona need not be fully resolved during
the preliminary investigation. The absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature
and involves evidentiary matters. The same is better left ventilated before the trial court
during trial, where the parties can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial
function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of
ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. Prosecutors control and direct
the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation,
subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is
merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are
not subject to review unless made with grave abuse.
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on record, we find no such grave abuse
when the Secretary of Justice found probable cause to charge the respondent with murder
in conspiracy with Aclan and Ona.
The following facts and circumstances established during preliminary investigation were
sufficient basis to incite reasonable belief in respondent’s guilt: (a) Motive - respondent had
credible reason to have Engr. Tria killed because of the impending criminal prosecution for
estafa from her double sale of his lot prior to his death, judging from the strong interest of
Engr. Tria’s family to run after said property and/or proceeds of the second sale to a third
party; (b) Access - respondent was close to Engr. Tria’s family and familiar with his work
schedule, daily routine and other transactions which could facilitate in the commission of
the crime eventually carried out by a hired gunmen, one of whom (Aclan) she and her
father categorically admitted being in her company while she visited Engr. Tria hours before
the latter was fatally shot at the airport; (c) Suspicious Behavior -- respondent while
declaring such close personal relationship with Engr. Tria and even his family, failed to give
any satisfactory explanation why she reacted indifferently to the violent killing of her friend
while they conversed and shook hands at the airport.
Indeed, a relative or a friend would not just stand by and walk away from the place as if
nothing happened, as what she did, nor refuse to volunteer information that would help the
authorities investigating the crime, considering that she is a vital eyewitness. Not even a
call for help to the people to bring her friend quickly to the hospital. She would not even
dare go near Engr. Tria’s body to check if the latter was still alive. All the foregoing
circumstances, in our mind, and from the point of view of an ordinary person, lead to a
reasonable inference of respondent’s probable participation in the well-planned
assassination of Engr. Tria.
UY VS JAVELLANA
DOCTRINE: The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a
preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an
of ense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day without regard to the fine.
Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited
pleading, even though the case was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa
as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) ofthe Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A case
which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed
without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon
requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we
find irrelevant Judge Javellana’s argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional
requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. were not referred
to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge
Javellana should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice)
filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al. (hindi ko sure) Judge Javellana did not
provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v.
Lopez, et al. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond
those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby
lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of
said Rule. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez,
et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in
Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
PEOPLE VS VALENCIA
DOCTRINE: 1. Information can be filed without a preliminary investigation against an
accused arrested without warrant.
2. Preliminary investigation; deemed waived when not invoked.
A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court 23 should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 24 Under said Section 7, Rule 112, 25 the
prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a preliminary investigation,
which was done in the accused-appellant’s case
Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary
investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant
signified his readiness to be arraigned, 27 the Court can only conclude that he waived his
right to have a preliminary investigation, 28 when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon
his arraignment.
PCGG VS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
DOCTRINE: 1. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
"actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
2. Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not
there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a
party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."
It must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide
whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. The Court's pronouncement in Ciron v. Gutierrez is instructive
on this matter, to wit:
xxx this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the
determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only on
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the
Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in
court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.] (Emphasis and underscoring in the
original)
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings
- whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine
whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the
supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., the Court defined probable
cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there
is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not
there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a
party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against individual respondents
for lack of probable cause, as will be explained hereunder.
As already stated, individual respondents were accused of violating Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, the elements of which are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. In the same vein, they were
likewise charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of the same law, which has the following
elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) that such contract or transaction is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Notably, private individuals may also
be charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with public officers.
Finally, it was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG's findings contained
in the Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay,
self-serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the
initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, the
Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay, viz.:
Justice Brion's pronouncement in Unilever that "the determination of probable cause does
not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the
admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented" correctly recognizes the doctrine in the
United States that the determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely,
on hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible. In
United States v. Ventresca, the United States Supreme Court held:
While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court has long
held that "the term 'probable cause' . . . means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation," x x x and that a finding of "probable cause" may rest upon evidence which
is not legally competent in a criminal trial, x x x As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United
States x x x, "There is a large difference between two things to be proved (guilt and probable
cause), as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like
difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them." Thus, hearsay may
be the bases for issuance of the warrant "so long as there ... [is] a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay." x x x And, in Aguilar, we recognized that "an affidavit may be based
on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant,"
so long as the magistrate is "informed of some of the underlying circumstances" supporting
the affiant's conclusions and his belief that any informant involved "whose identity need not
be disclosed..." was "credible" or his information "reliable." x x x.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties, x x x.
DE LIMA VS REYES
DOCTRINE: The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or
reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." A quasi-judicial function is "the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders
awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect
as the judgment of a court.
In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of
an accused. The prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent-is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." As such, the prosecutor does not perform
quasi-judicial functions. In Santos v. Go:
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare-his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it. is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-
judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers
akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an
organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and
their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file
an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of
Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions.
In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus was filed against the Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order. The
assailed order directed all prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Celso de los
Angeles of the Legacy Group to the Secretariat of the Special Panel created by the
Department of Justice.
This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance
of the department order was a purely administrative or executive function of the Secretary
of Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform functions similar to that of a court
of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency:
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a
quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasijudicial function when it reviews the findings
of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v.
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, stating: . . . [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does
not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor
rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is
the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor's
power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this
characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial
body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of
law.
But the limited similarity, between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly
ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of
law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and
adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the
same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in
order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or
whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor's orders or resolutions.
RULE 113 – ARREST
SARAUM VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for
objects relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of
their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these
items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that
Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful.
The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are,
therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure.
Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness
on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great weight
and are deemed conclusive and binding. Besides, a review of the records reveals that the
CA did not err in affirming his conviction.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia
fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing
any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. In this
case, the prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug
paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which
were offered and admitted in evidence.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a
warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he
is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of
the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum’s statement that he was not committing a
crime at the time of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to
apprehend him, who was then holding a disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil
and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand, while they were in the course of arresting
somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest, entered
the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of the
illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to his
presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized items
that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses
have adequately explained the respective uses of the items to prove that they were indeed
drug paraphernalia. There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory examination and
finding as to the presence or absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal
substances on said items since possession itself is the punishable act.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects
relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their
lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items
were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that
Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful.
The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are,
therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure.
Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection
thereto when he did not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is
that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move
for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any objection
involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is
deemed waived." In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection to the admission
of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search, only during the formal
offer of evidence by the prosecution.
COMERCIANTE VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the
police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals
and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that
they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly,
a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect
vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per
hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic
sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly
attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former
had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of
standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any
way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were
showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not
have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered
by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu;
and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the
province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in
Comerciante was indeed shabu.
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5
(b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show
that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by
Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and
frisk" search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, the Court had an
opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance
lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they
themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a
basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
x x x x Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to
confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the
earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be
probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the
purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must
not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.
LUZ VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of
arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them.
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on
the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could
not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to
arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized
merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that
the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged
down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they
were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.Even if one were
to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and
must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might
make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner
had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. GRANTED.
ANTIQUERA VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is
not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.
The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid
warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the
door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave
the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and
thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu,
they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165.
That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the
crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of
dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused
was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of
his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by entering a
plea of not guilty.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a “peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.”
This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men
suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had
been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two
fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running
after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to
the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from
the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door,
they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized
the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers
allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid
search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself
is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.”
PEOPLE VS VASQUEZ
DOCTRINE: Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before
the accused enters his plea on arraignment.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his
arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment.
Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any
irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53
Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto
of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest,
thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the
validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure
of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan
that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners. (Citation omitted.)Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking
belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
RULE 114 – BAIL
FLORESTA VS UBIADAS
DOCTRINE: Judges owe it the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are
supposed to apply to a given controversy.
Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas is found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion and of
gross ignorance of the law or procedure in granting an application for bail without affording
the prosecution due process.
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges that, as mandated by the
Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the
very law they are supposed to apply to a given controversy. They are called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be
conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence.
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, on jurisdictional grounds is,
however, a matter for judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved by
the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an administrative complaint.
However, having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Ubiadas is liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision or order which is a less serious charge under Section 9
of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
The Court takes the occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to
balance the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until
his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense
without being subject to punishment prior to conviction, against the right of the State to
protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements.
In the exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, the Ombudsman is
authorized to call on prosecutors or lawyers in the government service for assistance.
Judge Ubiadas was not only aware of complainant’s designation, hence, belying his
explanation that he must have overlooked the same. It also shows his ignorance of the
provision of the Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special reason
for the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of any prosecutor or government
lawyer to assist him.
ZUNO VS CABEBE
DOCTRINE: The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,we held that jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative
to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present
Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.It
must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of
discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise
his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be
held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting
a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in
case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court’s order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based
thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge did not
follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing
before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to
interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing
and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a
bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered
aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
Respondent’s contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the
criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even
assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is
utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly
stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be
conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the
very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must
render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent
failed to live up to these standards.
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPEC. ADM. REGION VS OLALIA
DOCTRINE: The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. If bail can be granted in
deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases—clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights.
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh
process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America
v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in
criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international
law:
1. the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
2. the higher value now being given to human rights;
3. the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and
4. the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law,
on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the
worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the
ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the
evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape
is great. A grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft Court, from
making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.
Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4)
years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk.
As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and
of governing sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoy’s release on bail. As it
were, the petitioner erroneously equates the provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy
to his virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui
Wong contextually dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all
the evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail,
given the evidence for or against the bail application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty
Sui Wong. And in the present case, respondent Sandiganbayan is still in the process of
determining the facts and merits of the main case.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated
only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence.
OKABE VS GUTIERREZ
DOCTRINE: Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one,
intended to modify previous rulings of the Court that an application for bail or the
admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the
warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon; Curative statutes are
by their essence retroactive in application.
In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused, the judge should not rely solely on the said report.[The judge should consider not
only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses,
as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if
any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information. The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to the issuing
judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the investigating
prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with law and
the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the Information.
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information
or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of
the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged of crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, the judge must make a personal determination of the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary
investigation is for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the Information against
the respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom of the Information that from the
evidence presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the
investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor may
the RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of the existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.
LEVISTE VS CA
DOCTRINE: Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s
interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to
society he has never owed; Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending
appeal is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused; In
the exercise of discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal, the proper courts are to be
guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering
that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.
Under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same
rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other circumstances:
1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that
CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends,
from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
ENRILE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good
measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at
trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the
1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
1. Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the
amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of
guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the
discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides: Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial
court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held:
“[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of
guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing
should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
a) In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
b) Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
c) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
2. Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail.
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international
community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We
therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. They arbitrarily ignored the objective
of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted
whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient
showing that the property is under appellants control or possession.
The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question
nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the
CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of
electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the
drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s
control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a
criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of
the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and
satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: To be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him,[31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions
and its attendant circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible
terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an
offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall
establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison
detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the
standard of a person of common understanding in appreciating the import of the phrase
acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality. A reading of the information clearly
reveals that the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality was merely a
continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately
acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic
reading of the information would yield.
Suspension is valid.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused
public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against
the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to
complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does not
only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
denial of procedural due process exists.
PEOPLE VS LARA
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or
a part of custodial investigation.
There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the
latter is not part of custodial investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his
right to counsel.
• That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render
Sumulong's identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have
arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a
police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
• People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the
so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
• The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and
cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not
part of the custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the
witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up.
• An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the
start of the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up
by prosecution witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there
was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was
extracted from him. During the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet
commenced.
• Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here,
appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his
alleged uncounseled confession or admission.
SANICO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a
result was so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the
litigation ought to be reopened to give to the client another chance to present his case.
Without doubt, the petitioner could reasonably expect that his counsel would afford to him
competent legal representation. The mere failure of the counsel to observe a modicum of
care and vigilance in the protection of the interests of the petitioner as the client — as
manifested in the multiple defects and shortcomings discovered in the petition for review —
was gross negligence in any language because the defects were plainly avoidable by the
simple application of the relevant guidelines existing in the Rules of Court. If the
incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was so serious
that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be
reopened to give to the client another chance to present his case. The legitimate interests of
the petitioner, particularly the right to have his conviction reviewed by the RTC as the
superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the altar of technicalities.
PEOPLE VS AYSON
DOCTRINE: The rights guaranteed a person under Art. III, Sec. 12 of the Constitution are
not available when he is not under custodial investigation. Thus, a statement or confession
voluntarily given by an employee during an administrative investigation that he had
malversed his employer’s funds is admissible although without a prior information of said
rights and without the assistance of counsel.
The handwritten admission and statement of accused were declared to be admissible.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is
NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.It prescribes an "option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry.” It simply
secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any
particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to
incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at
any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and
answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to
which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength
of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the
judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative
obligation to advise a witness of his right against selfincrimination. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well-known axiom that everyone is
presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the
very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance
the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It
must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come
into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to
claim it at the appropriate time.
VILLAREAL VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The right to a speedy trial is violated when the proceeding is attended with
unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.
The SC did not see any grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to
speedy trial.
The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the
case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the
order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is
glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo
already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to
secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not
comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in
an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the
prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that
even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court
because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period
of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for
the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on
January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17,
1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable
length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon.
RULE 116 – ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
PEOPLE VS ESTOMACA
DOCTRINE: Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open
court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in
the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge.
The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1
should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an
accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is,
therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal
thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
The transcript of the arraignment shows that it merely consisted of the bare reading of the
5 complaints. It was reported in the transcript that “Reading the information/complaint to
the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect”. Since it was stated in the singular, the court
speculates whether all 5 complaints were actually ready, translated or explained to him on
a level within his comprehension considering his limited education. Parenthetically, there
was no statement of record that appellant fully understood that medium of expression. This
assumes added significance since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional
language, spoken in a major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with variations,
in Capiz.
Within a province or major geographical area using a basic regional language, there may be
other local dialects spoken in certain parts thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted
portion of the transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was
also the idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it would be different if local dialect
was used to denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably, without
identifying what it was.
The significance of this distinction is found right in the provision of Section 1(a) of Rule 116
which, cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required that the
complaint or information be read to the accused in the language or the dialect known to
him, to ensure his comprehension of the charges.
The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readily capable
of unquestionable demonstration, that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo
province and all the way up to and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin
where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are natives, the
local dialect is known as kinaray-a. Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of
extended social or commercial intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily understandable to nor
spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the areas
under its sway for an appreciable period of time. The converse is true for those whose
native tongue is the dialect of kinaray-a, since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo,
or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in technical legal
language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the indictments were translated to
Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or that the appellant was truly and honestly made aware of
the charges and, especially, the consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are
silent and do not reveal anything on this point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding
judge and appellant was translated. Yet a man's life is at stake while this Court wrestles
with that dilemma created by an omission of official duty. Since no valid judgments can be
had upon an invalid arraignment, the cases were set aside and were remanded to the trial
court.
PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN
DOCTRINE: Procedural defect of belated arraignment was cured when the counsel of the
accused participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be
arraigned.
Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was
arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a
procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his
subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time
the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his
person.
The accused is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the
trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance.19 In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment,
conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose
of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his
life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him
of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.
Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question
is: Were appellant’s rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only
at this stage of the proceedings?We do not think so. Appellant’s belated arraignment did
not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the
trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his
counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active participation
in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him;
otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder.
Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties
did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being
convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional
right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will
not allow it.
In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the
cases had been submitted for decision, the error is nonprejudicial and has been fully cured.
Since appellant’s rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only
follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was not violated.
DAAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: 1. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval—it usually involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only
one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than
that for the graver charge.
2. Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings but it
may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit: SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused,
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1
and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial
court at the pre-trial conference,viz: SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for
in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider
the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects
of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial
that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after
the prosecution already presented several witnesses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor,10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to
allow the accused to make such plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a
plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed
as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is
a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. However,
Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial
court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a
capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that
petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to
the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would
"only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong
signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to face would be
lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic benefits they
are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in
committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb
graft and corruption in government."
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea
offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that
petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise
of this Court's equity jurisdiction.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already
restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial
government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the
government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind,
merits consideration.
PEOPLE VS JANJALANI
DOCTRINE:
1. All trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the
meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction; The requirement for a judge
to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.
2. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases
in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to
the accused—the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion
or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea.
3. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment.
The SC ruled that the trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure
under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital of ense; reception of evidence.—When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.
In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accusedappellant’s original plea was “not
guilty,” the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed
his plea to “guilty.”
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in
cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea
to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there
was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open
court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he
understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of
death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or
threatened.
The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by
the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress;
mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Nevertheless, the High Court is not unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against
the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty
to another charge—multiple murder—based on the same act relied upon in the multiple
frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of
guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt—one through an
extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused
during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the
“searching inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the case for rearraignment is not
warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment under consideration.
ABS-CBN CORP. VS GOZON
TOPIC: SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.—Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be
suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of
the President; provided that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
DOCTRINE: The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records
of the investigation.
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela PeñaReyes and Manalastas’
arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during
the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case.
The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits allowed by law. The
doctrine in Crespo v. Judge Mogul was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals
where this court reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining
petitions for review when the case is already pending with this court: In order to avoid a
situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal
may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when
the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court. The trial court should have proceeded with
respondents Dela PeñaReyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60day period from the
filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was
only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court
of Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim
period. It had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying
the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the
requirements of due process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”
ENRILE VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the
court where the Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial
court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order
amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown. The rule requires the information to
describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged
with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that
persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means. The
general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard
against surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with
the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the
bill of particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the
elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual
information included in the bill of particulars.
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be
reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to
grave abuse of discretion is shown.
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the
petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be
itemized or specified are all evidentiary without any explanation supporting this conclusion
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Some of the desired details are material facts that
must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The
Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and
made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary
fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be
found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or
speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither can
we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the
desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the
Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the
scope of the proof; it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters
alleged in the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure
of an accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to evidence
which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less
general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
Sec, 9 Rule 116, Bill of particulars.—The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill
of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify
the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an
action, which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to
properly plead and prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been
defined as a complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or more
particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the
facts recited in the pleading. The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is
to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading properly. In criminal cases, a bill of
particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless
pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to
know the theory of the government’s case; to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at
the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same
offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence. In
dealing with a motion for a bill of particulars in a criminal case, judges should observe that:
(a) the remedy is distinct from a motion to quash in the sense that it presupposes that the
acts or offenses constituting the offense (or the ultimate facts that comprise the crime’s
component elements) are already stated in the Information, albeit may be couched in vague
language; (b) the remedy is, as mentioned, not meant to supply evidential information (or
evidentiary facts); and (c) the particulars to be allowed are only those details that would
allow a man of ordinary intelligence, as may be reasonable under the circumstances, to,
again, properly plead during his arraignment and to prepare his defense for trial.
Accordingly, the analysis involved in motion for bill of particulars should go beyond a
simple ultimate factsevidentiary facts dichotomy. If the Information is lacking, a court
should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the government to file a bill of
particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the
bill to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Notably, the
government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts through
the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to
prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The
accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair
verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries
with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several
predicate criminal acts involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable
period of time.
RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH
PEOPLE VS LACSON
DOCTRINE: The interpretation of Sec. 8 of Rule 117 to the effect that in the event that the
accused is prosecuted anew with the same offense, albeit under an identical information,
the new proceedings being conducted as if the accused has been charged afresh has in its
favor the soundest policy considerations based no less on the fundamental objectives of
procedural rules.
Section 1 (g) of Rule 116—Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme
Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency or a motion
to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment
shall be excluded in computing the period.
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance
of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of
Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar
in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him
from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double
jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been
revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has
control of the prosecution6 without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy
of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence
of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule.
On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent
of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived
or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose
the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the
statute of limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation.
However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original
witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may
have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a
new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new
Information is filed.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the
first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any
motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent
merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the
decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial
court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the
court for its examination.
The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have personally
determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against
the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by the
trial court. He then prayed therein that: 1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court,
and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and 2) warrants for the
arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the
resolution of this incident. Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99- 81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a
mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
PANAGUITON VS DOJ
DOCTRINE: The prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit
before the office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of
the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their
own prescriptive periods.
Act 3326 provides: “Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.”
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus,
the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
“the term ‘proceedings’ should now be understood either executive or judicial in character”.
To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account
of delays that are not under his control.
PEOPLE VS DUMLAO
DOCTRINE: Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash—
insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution
rests its case.
Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of
evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss
the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent
for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present
its evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecutions right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the culpability of the
accused.
It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises.
Not only did it not consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed
the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was
thus without basis and untimely.
SORIANO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3
(a),19 Rule 117 of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments
in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law.
The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal
complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the
charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or
circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense.
Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more
than one (1) offense is charged. They point that Soriano was charged with violation of
DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly
obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they claim that the informations were duplicitous;
hence, they should be quashed.
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information under Section 3(e), Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in
preparing his defense.
By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than
one offense.15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly
states:
Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only
in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one
offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of
DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others.
Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of
charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense only, because all
the charges filed against him proceed from and are based on a single act of obtaining
fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues that he cannot be charged with estafa thru
falsification of commercial document, considering that he is already being prosecuted for
obtaining a DOSRI loan.
The contention has no merit.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or
more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, thus justifying the filing of several
charges against the accused.
In Loney v. People, this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges against the
accused, held: As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions
of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only
limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." In People v. Doriquez, we held that two (or
more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" — x x x if one provision [of law]
requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the other.
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the
same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the two
(2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with
procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a
director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written
approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into
corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The
elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are
essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of
several charges against Soriano was, therefore, proper.
Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, contending
that the same do not constitute an offense.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a), Rule 117
of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the
information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish
the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not
consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the
information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not
constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
material averments do not constitute the offense.
We have reviewed the informations and find that they contain material allegations charging
Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents.
In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation of DOSRI rules, the informations alleged
that Soriano was the president of RBSMI, while Ilagan was then its general manager; that
during their tenure, Soriano, with the direct participation of Ilagan, and by using the
names of Virgilio Malang and Rogelio Mañaol, was able to indirectly obtain loans without
complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements, in
violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 37722 as amended.
Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981 charge petitioners with
estafa thru falsification of commercial document. They allege that petitioners made it
appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans and received the proceeds
thereof when they did not in fact secure said loans or receive the amounts reflected in the
promissory notes and other bank records.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1720 further alleges the elements of estafa under
Article 315 (1)(b)23 of the RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods or other personal property be
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (ii) that there
be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on
his part of such receipt; (iii) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (iv) that there is demand made by the offended party to the
offender.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, on the other hand, further alleged the following
essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)24 of the RPC: (i) that there must be a
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (ii) that such false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means—that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that,
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 1720 & 1981, thus, charge petitioners with the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners.
The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions.
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper
procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on
his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after
trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law.25 Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the
special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional
circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a
petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
CEREZO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any
disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to
dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and
merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s
bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must
be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the
prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on
courts.
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it
rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or
to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the
findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden duty
to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied
in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or
the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the
DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive
duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and
violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and
produced no effect whatsoever.
This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the
merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the
Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew. It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy
did not set in.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a)
after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Since we have held that the Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave
abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal
dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction
and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the
accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
CO VS NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
DOCTRINE: While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a
policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial
for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to
show any evidence that the alleged “vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay in the trial
was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable
motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a
relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.”In determining whether the accused's right
to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the
proceedings.The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such
delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not
exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. “While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and
adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which
prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused
to speedy trial.”
PEOPLE VS DE LEON
DOCTRINE: A Buy-bust operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is
undertaken.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for
the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.
The Court upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and
ruled that the elements of the crime were sufficiently established, thereby affirming the
decision of the CA.
RULE 119 – TRIAL
SALVANERA VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the
following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
To require Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the
exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of the state witness." The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not
have to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state
witnesses. The Supreme Court ruled that a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of
a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the
conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity.
Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer
that the witness has told the truth in other respects. It is enough that the testimony of a
co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are
satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are
corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the circumstances
disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent
that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As co-conspirators, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the
conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators
is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution
witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the
conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed
state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the
crime.
VDA. DE MANGUERRA VS. RISOS
DOCTRINE: It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court
where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can
attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to
the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as
an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the
presence of the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused
may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their
counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to
support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables
the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the
case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the
manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
PEOPLE VS. JIMENEZ
DOCTRINE: The requirement is that a state witness does not need to be found to be the
least guilty; he or she should not only "appear to be the most guilty."
By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of
the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty due to
conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account
his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. What the rule avoids is the
possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in
terms of participation would be penalized.
Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state
witness, what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime
committed.
The SC ruled that from the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion
to discharge Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation,
and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in
the actual killing of Ruby Rose. While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution of the
killing, the records do not indicate that he had active participation in hatching the plan to
kill Ruby Rose, which allegedly came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual
killing of Ruby Rose which was executed by accused Lennard. Montero’s participation was
limited to providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed,
welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and,
together with his co-accused, dropping the steel box containing the cadaver into the sea.
The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to
be the most guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation of
who had the most participation in the commission of the crime. The appellate courts do not
interfere in the discretionary judgment of the trial court on this factual issue except when
grave abuse of discretion intervenes.
PEOPLE VS. DE GRANO
DOCTRINE: Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia,
allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to
wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever
necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is
for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At
such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.
The RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the
absence of the other accused during the promulgation of judgment. Section 14(2), Article III
of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the
trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification
purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which
case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.
When the Decision was promulgated, only Estanislao was present. Subsequently thereafter,
without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and
Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of
the Rules, RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it
also took cognizance of the joint motion.
RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint MR with respect to the
respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a MR that
was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their
standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits
to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.
ASISTIO VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: “Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt;
but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient
in form and substance, etc."
In this case, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the
RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case the RTC
order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal hence may still be subject to an appeal
under Rule 41 of the ROC.
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon
this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised
upon her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial
court that it is bereft of jurisdiction. The requisites that must be present for double
jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of
the accused. There is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the
accusedappellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a
demurrer to evidence he is deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy.
CABRADOR VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: One can avail of a demurrer to evidence only after the plaintiff or the
prosecution has rested its case. Resting one’s case requires a formal offer of evidence which
has been commented on or has been opposed and the court has already ruled on the formal
offer of evidence together with the opposition or comment thereto.
The SC ruled that Cabador filed a motion to dismiss, not a demurrer to evidence. He did
not waive his right to present evidence. There are 2 stages in the trial proper of a criminal
case: (1) prosecution's presentation of evidence against the accused; and (2) accused's
presentation of evidence in his defense. If after the first stage, the evidence appears
insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of
the accused dispense with the second stage, and dismiss the criminal action. There is no
point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the
prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of
dismissal amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in
the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave
of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall
be considered submitted for judgment.
To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss,
the Court must consider the ff: the allegations in it were made in good faith; the stage of the
proceeding at which it is filed; the primary objective of the party filing it.
Cabador in his MTD pointed out how the trial dragged on for years; the gaps between
hearings were long, with hearings often postponed due to the absence of the prosecutor.
And it was compounded by the repeated motions for extension by the prosecutor to make
the formal offer, and its failure to make such offer. He invoked his right to speedy trial.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's
right to speedy trail. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and
oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that
unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss
and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
Cabador did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in
what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime, something that is
fundamental in ay demurrer. It did not touch on any particular testimony or documentary
exhibit. He could not do so because he did not know that the prosecution finally made its
offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his MTD.
A demurrer assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. In this case, after the
prosecution filed its formal offer, the trial court still needed to give Cabador an opportunity
to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And
only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. The MTD
was filed before he could object to the offer, before the trial court could rule on the offer,
and before the prosecution could rest its case. It cannot be said that he intended his MTD
to serve as a demurrer. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence
in his defense.
PEOPLE VS. TAN
DOCTRINE: The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3)
the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. The only instance when
double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Double jeopardy applies. In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court explained the general rule
that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
cannot be appealed.
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had
been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the
case was dismissed without his express consent.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr.,
this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
This exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. RTC did not abuse its discretion
in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s
demurrer to evidence.
Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the
RTC violate petitioner’s right to due process?" Petitioner was given more than ample
opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents which led to the
grant of respondent’s demurrer.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the
demurrer to evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page
Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto.
As correctly observed by the CA, RTC extensively discussed its position on the various
issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s decision
to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the
Best World Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred
shares as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired.
Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted,
final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes.
IMPERIAL VS. JOSON
DOCTRINE: The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
The accused’s right to speedy trial was not violated. Designed to prevent the oppression of
the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time and
to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is considered violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and
the dismissal order may not be appealed because it would place accused in double
jeopardy. It is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65.
Actual damage to government arising from non-liquidation of cash advance is not an
essential element. Instead, mere failure to timely liquidate is the gravamen of the offense.
Even if Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of law, the error
committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. The error committed is of such
nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by prosecution because it would place
accused in double jeopardy. Such error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy had
already set in.
BANGAYAN, JR. VS. BANGAYAN
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, acquittal of accused or dismissal of case against him can
only be appealed by Solicitor General. Court cannot review an order granting demurrer to
evidence. Acquitting the accused on ground by insufficiency of evidence is of such based on
the merits, thus to do so will place accused in double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy already set in. All 4 elements of double jeopardy are present. A valid
information for bigamy was filed against petitioners. They pleaded not guilty to charges
against them and subsequently case was dismissed after the prosecution rested its case. If
the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants demurrer, such dismissal of
the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to acquittal of the accused. Even if trial
court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against petitioners, it only committed an
error of judgment and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by certiorari. It
must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE VS. JOSE GO
DOCTRINE: Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is
merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. To be sufficient, evidence must prove: (1) that
commission of crime and (2) precise degree of participation by the accused. Thus, when the
accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is
sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Trial court effectively failed and /or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against Go,
which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved
hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that banking
industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with
circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving issues. Demand is not an
element of the felony. Furthermore, as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to
be the author of the falsification. It is irrelevant that the proceeds of supposed loans were
made payable to entities other than the alleged borrowers. The bottom line is that they are
encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds were deposited in Go’s bank savings and
current accounts and used to fund personal checks.
PEOPLE VS. PEPINO
DOCTRINE: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from
a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and
relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on an
independent in-court identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the out-of-
court identification during the police lineup.
The illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the
guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day
to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the
accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a
judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test , there was thus ample opportunity for Edward -
before and after the gun had been pointed at him - to view the faces of the three persons
who entered his office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least
once a day" during the four days that he was detained. Edward also saw Gomez seated at
the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota Corolla vehicle. In addition, the
abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and
among those whom he saw there was Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a
good look at the occupants of the car when he was about to be released.
On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the
person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and who brought
him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she was very near when
Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she could not forget Pepino's face.
Police lineup conducted at the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were seven
people in the lineup; Edward was not compelled to focus his attention on any specific
person or persons. While it might have been ideal if there had been more women included
in the lineup instead of only two, or if there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for
Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males and two females in the lineup did not
render the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even
suggested to Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among those
already presented to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before the police
lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants were already the focus of the police and were
thus deemed to be already under custodial investigation when the out-of-court
identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having been tainted
by an irregular out-ofcourt identification in a police lineup. They focused, instead, on the
legality of the appellants' arrests.
The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is
more favorable to him.
RULE 120 – JUDGMENT
LLAMAS VS. CA
DOCTRINE: The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases.
Rule 47 limits the scope of the remedy to judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of RTC for which ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petitions for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The remedy
cannot be resorted to when RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal
case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse,
for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases as stated in Sec 18
Rule 124: only Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56.
PEOPLE VS. MONTECLAROS
DOCTRINE: When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the
commission of crime and though all the persons who took part in commission of the crime
are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. It becomes relevant to determine
the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have different degrees of
responsibility in the commission of crime and consequently, differing degrees of liability.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on nature and degree
of his participation in commission of crime.
Finding guilt of Ida as an accomplice in rape is dependent on proving the guilt of principal
accused. Ida participated in commission of crime by previous acts but her participation, not
being indispensable, was not that of a principal but as an accomplice. Community of design
between acts of Tampus and Ida is present.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. The courts have discretion
to determine the apportionment of civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice, and
accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to basis of allotment.
Each of the participants should be liable only for acts actually committed by him. The
power of the courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and equitable
justification, and cannot be left to speculation and caprice.
Since Tampus died before final judgment, his civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished. His
share in civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice. And even if
Tampus were alive, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil
indemnity. With death of Tampus, Ida’s subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is
also eliminated, following the principle that accessory follows the principal.
HIPOS SR. VS. BAY
DOCTRINE: Mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in
a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either. If petitioners believed that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuance of Order denying Motion to Withdraw Information, the proper remedy
of petitioners should have been to file a petition for certiorari against the assailed order.
Furthermore, once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition
or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.
Remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not
discretionary one. While judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Information can be
compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain
way, i.e. to grant or deny such Motion. The trial court, when confronted with Motion to
Withdraw Information on ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution
of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent
assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfies by the respondent judge
in the case at bar.
PEOPLE VS. LORENZO
DOCTRINE: Presumption of innocence of accused is fleshed out by procedural rules which
place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused in guilty of offense charged
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained
if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of drug. It must be established with moral
certainty. Non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers.
There must be a Chain of evidence. However, in this case, it was not certain when and
where the said marking was done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the
specimens thereafter. Prosecution did not present poseur-buyer who had personal
knowledge of the transaction. The lone witness of prosecution was at least four meters
away from accused and poseur-buyer. With that distance, it was impossible for him to hear
the conversation.
Facts and circumstances create a doubt as to whether sachets of shabu seized were the
same one that were released to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory exam.
PEOPLE VS. BARON
DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction that the appellant
conspired with his coaccused in committing the crime of robbery with homicide. His claim
that he acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury could
not be sustained because there was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat,
preventing his escape that compelled him to take part in the commission of the offense
charged.
There is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in
committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence,
which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for
more than 10 hours and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried
to escape or at least request for assistance from the people around him.
ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner
to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had
caused damage to the spouses.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in
the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In case of
exoneration of the accused, the civil liability may still arise when one, by reason of his own
act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for
petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he
committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, Court
found that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to
spouses Alonto. Moreover, the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed
of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains
valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the
cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and
thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.
The Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to
institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual
and other kinds of damages. Sentences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in
the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative. While a judge has the
discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative. He
must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty.
PEOPLE VS. ASIS
DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a
verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. (2) While certiorari
may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (3) An appellate court in
a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court s evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari
can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of
discretion.
Certiorari is the proper remedy A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the
remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level.
Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo s constitutionally guaranteed
right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. Exception to Finality-of-Acquittal
Doctrine In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a
judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without
exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning
the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. In People v LouelUy,
the Court said that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate upon clear showing
by the petitioner that the lower court in acquitting the accused: (1) Committed reversible
errors of judgment (2) Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
or denial of due process. Such commission of the lower court renders its judgment void. No
double jeopardy When the order or dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court
in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double
jeopardy is not violated.
Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. OSG s
petition for certiorari before the CA, however, is bereft of merit While the CA was erroneous
of dismissing the petition, the OSG s petition for certiorari if given due course is bereft of
merit. While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in
such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
A reading of the OSG petition fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to
due process. Also, what the OSG is questioning are errors of judgment. This, however,
cannot be resolved without violating Abordo s constitutionally guaranteed right against
double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court s
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a
Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those
involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. Error of Judgment v Error of
Jurisdiction Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari.
An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will botbe issued to cure errors by the trial court
in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law.
BASILONIA VS. VILLARUZ
The determination of whether respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting a motion for execution which was
filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment in a criminal case became final and
executory necessarily calls for the resolution of the twin issues of whether the penalty of
imprisonment already prescribed and the civil liability arising from the crime already
extinguished.
Prescription of Penalty
As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, the Court already
opined that evasion of service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of
penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al. expounded on the rule that the culprit should
escape during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty imposed by
final sentence to commence to run.
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final
sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.
Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners.
For the longest time, they were never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite
being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of
imprisonment does not run in their favor. Needless to state, respondent trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution
and in eventually granting the same.
Extinction of Civil Liability
In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for
execution within the five-year period or an action to revive the judgment within the ten-year
period. Worse, other than the bare allegation that the judgment has not been enforced
because the public prosecutor has not acted on the request to file a motion for execution,
no persuasive and compelling reason was presented to warrant the exercise of Our equity
jurisdiction. Unfortunately for private respondent Roblete, the instant case does not fall
within the exceptions afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution was
entirely beyond their control or that petitioners have any hand in causing the same.
In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is concerned, a motion for execution
should be filed in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules and existing
jurisprudence.
MORILLO VS. PEOPLE
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such
cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where
the offense was in part committed.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to
certain procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall
represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted
by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State.
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the
civil aspect of a decision of a lower court, when there is denial of due process of law to the
prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the
State and the private offended party, when there is grave error committed by the judge, or
when the interest of substantial justice so requires.
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby
rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting the aggrieved party’s prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double
jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is
because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is
barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated.
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not under Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG
representing the interest of the Republic, the same should be summarily dismissed. The
unique and special circumstances attendant in the instant petition, however, justify an
adjudication by the Court on the merits and not solely on technical grounds.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an
acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an
acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence
filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the
dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal.
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal
and acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant’s guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt;
but dismissal does tint decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient
in form and substance, etc.
The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of
the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the
defendant moves for me dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the ground that the
evidence tails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such
case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the
prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it
were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent
jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted
for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as
improper. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only
questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of
facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the
bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is
concerned.
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time
of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed
therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under
Rule 45.
Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest the administration of justice be derailed by an
overly stringent application of the rules. Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in
the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no
violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action
for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases
while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
CA decision reversed. RTC decision affirming MeTC’s decision is reinstated.
RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
ESTINO VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a
judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered
which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan
for new trial in relation to the conviction of Estino and Pescadera for violation of Sec. 3(e) of
R.A. 3019.
We resolve to grant petitioners a chance to prove their innocence by remanding the case to
the Sandiganbayan for a new trial of Criminal Case No. 26192. Rule 121 of the Rules of
Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when
new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.
Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears
to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was
unnecessary. In their Supplemental Motion and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed that
they no longer presented the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that
the subject of the charge was the nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without
mention of the RATA nor the 1998 reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled during
trial. They were precluded from presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual
payment of the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget because the prosecutions evidence
was confined to alleged nonpayment of RATA under the 1999 budget.
BRIONES VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been
discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and
produce a different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the
trial, the other conditions were not established.
For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of
the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial;
(b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different
result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other
conditions were not established.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of
due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below. The determinative
test is the presence of due or reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence
in the trial.
Under the circumstances, Briones failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence
to locate the firearm; his allegation in his Omnibus Motion that he told his brothers and
sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded negative results, is purely self-serving. He
also now admits having taken the firearm and having immediately disposed of it at a
nearby house, adjacent to the place of the incident.
Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the location of the subject
firearm, but did not do anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below.
In any case, we fail to see how the recovery of the firearm can be considered material
evidence that will affect the outcome of the case; the recovery of the subject firearm does
not negate the commission of the crime charged.
SALUDAGA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the
evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it
is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that,
if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
The Pornelos affidavit cannot qualify as newly-discovered evidence as it was already in
existence prior to the re-filing of the case.
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered
evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b)
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable
diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching,
and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant
way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it
cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to
the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered
during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’
Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation, offered to dispute the charge that no public
bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject project.
LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis
of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was "newly discovered." Evidence, to
be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due
diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court.
The affidavit of said police officer cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence as the
defense failed to show that it has exerted efforts during trial to secure testimonies of Jurado
and others.
To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such
evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was "newly discovered" pursuant to Section
2,10 Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of
due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below.11 Movant failed to
show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police
officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or
objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed
affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening
of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw
that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was
cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution
eyewitness during the trial.
PAYUMO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: New and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced
and admitted would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new
trial; requisites.
On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in
Criminal Case No. 4219, the Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual
basis. Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that: new
and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial. The
records of the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the criteria for
newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably
change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In
this case, however, such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could
have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the
JAGO records cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. There was nothing that
prevented the accused from using these records during the trial to substantiate their
position that the shooting incident was a result of a military operation. The Court finds and
so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it nullified the November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case
No. 4219. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent court, being clothed with the
power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
RULE 122-125 - APPEALS
MACAPAGAL VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must
contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or
judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this
Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not
only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her
conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail,
because of petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the
Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice
of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down
the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still
dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not
be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are
special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the
petition, which are not present in this case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of
the trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another
fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated
to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision
convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter
disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29,
2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa
and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original
of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
PEOPLE VS. MORALES
DOCTRINE: "The accused must not have opportunity for escape of self-defense"
Since according to the ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario. Under Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In Del Rosario, however,
we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is
not enough -By not availing of the chance to escape (since the other accused were waiting
for them at the distance of 1 kilometer) their allegation of fear or duress becomes
untenable, for it to apply: it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
The fear (threats against family members), were not of imminence as to prevent any chance
of escape, and that this fear they allegedly suffered does not suffice to grant them the
exempting circumstance.
The acts done by the appellants (was involved in the initial abduction, feeding/guarding the
children while they are w/ them, instructing the father to go to Gumi for the ransom)
clearly shows that there was close coordination, indicating a common purpose or design.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at
the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the
same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
established.
It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
QUIDET VS. PEOPLE
While, generally, factual findings of the trial court are accorded respect by this Court, the
Court may look into such factual matters when the trial court has overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which
can affect the result of the case.
The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Quidet is
criminally liable only for his individual acts. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The
essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established
by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interests. However, in determining whether conspiracy
exists, it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness
does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose, which
are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. What is determinative is proof
establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate
the testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this
palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of
constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. In the instant case, we find that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Quidet conspired with Taban and
Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide.
BALABA VS. PEOPLE
Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), which
further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s
appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of
Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled: An error in designating the appellate court is not
fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should
be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the
designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50
of the Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules
of Court reads: "An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright."
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the
expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December
2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued
the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct
the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the
decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it
dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
PEOPLE VS. OLIVIO
Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the
totality of evidence before them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh
the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral
testimony during the trial.
We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when
the evidence relied upon by the trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove
appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral
certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.
In view of the foregoing, acquittal of the accused-appellants is in order.
One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the
other appellants and who was likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to
have perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The record does not show the
reason therefor.
Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are
definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be
treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact,
under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused
who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed.
GUASCH VS. DELA CRUZ
DOCTRINE: In exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the
giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and
mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given
due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits
of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.
As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is
filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in
due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for
such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice
and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to
put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely
why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the
giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and
mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered or the appeal to be given
due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits
of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.
A review of the records shows that the evidence to make a determination of petitioner’s civil
liability is already at the disposal of the trial court. For example, the checks covering the
amounts owed by petitioner to respondent in the total amount of P3,300,000.00 were
already submitted by petitioner to the trial court as Annexes to the Motion to Quash28 that
she filed. Neither can it be said that petitioner’s right to due process shall be violated if her
civil liability be determined in the same case.
PEOPLE VS. TARUC
DOCTRINE: Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to
a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to
the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.
1. The escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from
exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital
punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a
duty to review all death penalty cases. In this case, considering that the penalty imposed by
the trial court was death, the Court of Appeals rightly took cognizance of the case. Upon
review by the appellate court, however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua.
2. By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v.
Ang Gioc,18 the Court enunciated that: “There are certain fundamental rights which
cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them.
This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he
pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after
the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his
right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x.”
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment
against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have
waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his standing
in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court.
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land,
accused-appellant revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to
speculate, at his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out
of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such
conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings
before the RTC, as well as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of
Appeals, and even until now when his appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so
audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would succeed.
TIU VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal
proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.
At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the
Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
96-413, through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State
in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended
party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition
must fail.
COLINARES VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: When an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the
case to the trial court
Ordinarily, Arnel Colinares would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds
that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of
four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the
right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
***Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by
the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968)
provides: That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. Since Arnel appealed his
conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from
applying for probation.***
While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to
such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that
privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months.
If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to
the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into
account the full circumstances of his case.
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The finality of a CA decision will not bar the state from seeking the annulment
of the judgment via a Rule 65 petition; finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120
does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments.
Only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief
being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in
order to give life to the constitutional edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be
exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to
appeal – as when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final
and executory.
Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating: Further prosecution via an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already
been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after
failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons
supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he
had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial
consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the
powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be
allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while
strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the
government’s power and resources are once again employed against the defendant’s
individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the
effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. It must be
clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not
confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our
Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable
to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal
judgment.
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in
an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se
void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had
no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is
on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question
of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition,
the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to
show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.
DUNGO VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due
process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a
higher court authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component
of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to
the Court when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31
According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment
imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had
been imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal
as a matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question including one not raised by the parties.32 Section 13(c), Rule 124
recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the
Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review
on certiorari shall raise only questions of law.34 Moreover, such review is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons.
In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
an accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13(c), Rule 124 to avail of an
appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any
question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal
as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the RTC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
upon the petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45. Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners
began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that
would require an examination of the evidence presented. In the interest of justice, however,
and due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole
case for review.
Ultimately, the SC ruled against Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr, Affirming the
findings of the CA.
MANANSALA VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and
the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a)
that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of
the same Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c)
that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage.
On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as
follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration
of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash
Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents
she prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all
along that Siy never made any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her
personal use; (c) despite such knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report
by inserting therein a statement that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused
great prejudice to Siy as the latter was terminated from her job on account of the falsified
report that she prepared. Basic is the rule that findings of fact made by a trial court are
accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear
disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case or any
clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its
findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this
Court, as in this case.
While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was error for the
MeTC to appreciate the "mitigating circumstance" of acting under an impulse of
uncontrollable fear and for the RTC and the CA to affirm in toto the MeTC's ruling without
correcting the latter court's mistake.
To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating
circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance
provided under Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be
appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of
an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an
injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act
be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in
committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not know the
repercussions of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at
UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do so. As
there was an absence of any real and imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would
have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated
in her favor. Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would modify
Manansala's criminal liability in this case - and also taking into consideration the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law - she must be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum.
RULE 126- SEARCH AND SEIZURE
MICLAT VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: [Under Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165; and the
implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165], the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with
the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioner’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced
against him inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused."
As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established
exceptions. Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding. The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject
to legal and judicial exceptions, namely: (1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (2) Search of evidence in "plain view"; (3) Search of a moving vehicle; (4) Consented
warrantless search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop and Frisk; and (7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not
only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view"
doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Since petitioner’s arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant
before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the
arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence
to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.
[Under Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165; and the implementing
provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
No. 9165], the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with the rule is not fatal. It
does not render petitioner’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him
inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused."
Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of the
drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain of
custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently established. The
factual antecedents of the case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic
sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized
from him were immediately brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were
turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the evidence was marked. The
turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the
official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU endorsed the evidence for laboratory
examination to the National Police District PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was
delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa. After a
qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the same
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the
prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic
chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized from the petitioner at his residence were
also the same items marked by the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and
later on tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS
DOCTRINE: Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality.
This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a
requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. This exception is easy to
understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant
when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles
since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must
be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc
had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to
procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the
essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only
had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was
not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were
present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section
21 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items. While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state
explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not
necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items seized are
inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not
question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial. Even
assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised
this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at
the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on
the matter.
PEOPLE VS. TUAN
DOCTRINE: A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads
the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case
at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was
specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was
accused-appellants residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of
several rooms.
1. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:(1) it
must be issued upon probable cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;(3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
such witnesses as the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
The only issue is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable
cause; and particular description of the place to be searched and things to be seized.
Probable cause generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s)
or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown
by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being
connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched.
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in
this case. Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for
Tuan’s residence after said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant;
and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for
Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He
also arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of Tuan.
2. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place
to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the
address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific
enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-
appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several
rooms.
ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: In a “stop-and-frisk,” it is essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light
of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed
about him. Such a “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
The circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a
search on her person was warranted: The police officers were on a surveillance operation as
part of their law enforcement efforts when PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case. Given his training as
a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to
approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a
police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his
curiosity.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid “stop-and-frisk” operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu
initially noticed in petitioner’s possession - later voluntarily exhibited to the police operative
- was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and
after PO1 Cruz in introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her
arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the
police officer had identified himself. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner
of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over
that of petitioner.
MARIMLA VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: As a rule, search warrants should be filed with the court within whose
territorial jurisdiction the crime was committed (Sec. 2 (a), Rule 126, Rules of Court).
The exceptions to the general rule are:
(a) for compelling reasons, it can be filed with the court within whose judicial region the
offense was committed or where the warrant is to be served;
(b) but if the criminal action has already been filed, the application for a search warrant
can only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending; and
(c) in case of search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti- Money Laundering Act of 2001, the
Tariff and Customs Code, the Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the ViceExecutive Judges of the RTC of
Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the NBI, PNP
and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOC-TF), and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF).
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in
exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the
Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.
At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines
on the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on
January 25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof.
From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge
and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications
for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal
possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On
the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the
application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They
maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no
longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002.
They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search
warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in
violation of the law. The petitioners’ contention lacks merit. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides
that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue
until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are
reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of
Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly
stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. PUNZALAN
I. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. - No
search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present during the
initial search, the search was witnessed by accused-appellants themselves, hence, the
search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing
in the same locality" must be present applies only in the absence of either the lawful
occupant of the premises or any member of his family.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In the case at bench, the
prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the guilt of the accused-appellants
for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-appellants were caught in
actual possession of the prohibited drugs during a valid search of their house. It bears
stressing that aside from assailing the validity of the search, accused-appellants did not
deny ownership of the illegal drugs seized. They have not proffered any valid defense in the
offense charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
2.This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered
from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be
established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. In this case, the
chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly established from the time the heat-
sealed plastic sachets were seized and marked by IO1 Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover
to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office in Quezon City. IO1 Pagaragan was also the one who
personally delivered and submitted the specimens composed of 293 sachets of shabu to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens were kept in custody
until they were presented as evidence before the trial court and positively identified by IO1
Pagaragan as the very same specimens he marked during the inventory.
The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does
not undermine the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized from accused-
appellants. The failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of
seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.