RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010

Facts:

After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against
said accused for violation of the Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act or
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.

The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he
took when they were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy
for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he
sent through the internet.

The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On
Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC
decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25,
2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case?

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Moreover, the rules he cites do not
apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. In conclusion, the Court
finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.

1
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when
a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her
face on it.

The Indictment

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence against
Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in information that reads:

That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short
Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a
completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish
Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing
substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish
Sagud.1

The Facts and the Case

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and
accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan
courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When
Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he
had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her
to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish

2
rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman
and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to
get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for
sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his
text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face
superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the
message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that
he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003
(Exhibit B).3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He
boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And
he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages
he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my
chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police.
Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he
used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at
the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a
motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers
intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900
cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police
station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as

an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very
much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on
the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and
enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just
one person.

Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities:
the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his
opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish
in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture
from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in
October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after
their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after
he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish
walked out on him.

3
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at
Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at
the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of
his pockets, and brought him to the police station.

Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help
her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the
sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that
he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his
cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have
originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent
the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six
pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card
(Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to
see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in
none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2,
4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four
pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.

After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her
experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of
pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of
her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience." 6 Thus, in its
Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262.

On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a decision dated
January 31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for
review on certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone
message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting
anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262.

The subordinate issues are:

4
 1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this
term is defined in R.A. 9262;

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture
in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in
violation of his constitutional rights; and

4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case.

The Court’s Rulings

Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts
of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

xxxx

Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and
these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:

xxxx

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through

another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following
acts:

5
 xxxx

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological

distress to her.

One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused
Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating
relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and
the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies
a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which
provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to
make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."

But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance"
that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the
offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s
relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual
relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating
relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single
sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating
relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.

6
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-
off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over
time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as
Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough
for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence.

Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be
deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati"
meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he
would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month
romantic relation as continuous.10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be
considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally
and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or
series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of
harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to
protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would
license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications
that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her
substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged
obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.

But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was
not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself
(Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not
clearly show on them.

Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent,
except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not
know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later,
however, she said that she did not have time to delete them. 11 And, if she thought that
she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to
keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she
knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for
several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything
connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her
testimony.1avvphi1

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on
Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene
and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread

7
open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a
revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography
trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What
makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat
to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from
him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed
inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the
cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his
arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the
prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was
used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that
she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in
communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish
and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he
did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone
and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. 13 His
defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who
was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But
Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the
messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such
version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things
on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture,
Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should
have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered
in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. 14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element
of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

8
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April
25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

9
 Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim
that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and
for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come

10
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND

LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.

H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.

Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

PARAS, J.:

A TV ad proudly announces:

"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to
annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because —

A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized

by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license
fees, which is recognized by law;

B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has
intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees.
This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;

C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes

PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed,
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;

D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and
crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended
Petition; p. 7, Rollo)

In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the
declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed
in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is

11
contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of
Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).

The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner
Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila),
can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of
P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also
dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or
water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally
conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was
considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure
and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to
fully attain this objective.

Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise
or permitted by law, under the following declared policy —

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to

centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:

(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games
of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by
the Government.

(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation,
including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other
forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be
allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1)
generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic
projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage
projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and
such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities
which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3)
minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos
without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)

To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.

It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned
P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form

12
of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities'
share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its
own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations
and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration,
PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989,
PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly
supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same
is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic
and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local
autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II,
Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution.

This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most
deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been
described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial
department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146
SCRA 323).

As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply
ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption
must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our
task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that
matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not
hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute
(Lozano v. Martinez, supra).

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice
Zaldivar underscored the —

. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where

questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that
a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable
basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the
challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of
the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
(Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660,
663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta
v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes,
125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)

13
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal
personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases
before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors
because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly
speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of
the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing
and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed
to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President
Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper
parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must
technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other
cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.

Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition
of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its
police power.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as
the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of
Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to
the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of

14
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens".
(Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power
co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming
necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a
dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.

What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?

P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize
thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating
and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was
beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much
needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact
projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the
Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct
intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will
be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of PD 1896.

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the
principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which
exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income
or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or
Local."

(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the
Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of
the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or
earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such
tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in
lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national
government authority (Section 13 [2]).

Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:

(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos
v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show
an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of
Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act

15
which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power
to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No.
7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal
corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67;
Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions
or even take back the power.

(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked.
As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of
"franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively
on the National Government, thus:

Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of

chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of
franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and
other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.

Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse
and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the
national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of
the applicant . . .

Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for
the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is
a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of
Manila.

(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD
1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its
corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:

Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the

affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities
vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities
mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure,
capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the
provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding,
except only with respect to original incorporation.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the

16
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually
is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
subjected to control by a mere Local government.

The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in

any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry
into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland,
4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)

This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local
governments.

Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least,
the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it
can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal
responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)

Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of
what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the
power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).

The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc
Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the
very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.

(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated
by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local
Autonomy) provides:

Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government. (emphasis supplied)

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations"
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until
"amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption
clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to
impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited
in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p.

17
374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio."

Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state

which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary
system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution,
local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can
only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis
supplied)

As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local
government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a
political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board,
162 SCRA 539).

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is
a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to
local governments.

As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express

charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with
the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance
provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void . (Ligan
v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757
following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as
cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)

Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling
are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).

We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores
the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law
as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No.
89572, December 21, 1989).

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G.
2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to
be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling
activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983),

18
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under
certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D.
1869 for one, unconstitutional.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v.
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)

The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all
occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may
do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in
which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would
insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v.
Arizona, 249 US 2651).

Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory
Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and
privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If,
indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive
Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.

The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law
is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
1âwphi1

are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170
SCRA 256).

On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
(Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)

It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily
prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands
that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the
Legislature to decide.

On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12

(Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and
Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also
that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not
self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and
effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing

principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature

19
 failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or
political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v.
Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and
equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise,
their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D.
1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free
enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and
educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board,
162 SCRA 521 —

Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any
case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners
Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to
identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by
that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how
the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The
Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question
the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which
are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not
constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political
departments of government: the President and the Congress.

Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so
when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not
only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social,
and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their
material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily
mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the
antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could
have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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 BASCO VS PAGCOR (197 SCRA 52)

Basco vs Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation

197 SCRA 52 [GR No. 91649 May 14, 1991]

Facts: A TV ad proudly announces: “The New PAGCOR – Responding Through Responsible

Gaming.” But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking
to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, and because –

a. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It
waived the Manila city government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized
by law;

b. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceeding paragraph, the law has intruded into
the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;

c. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR –
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;

d. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from the monopolistic and crony
economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.

Issue: Whether or not the city of Manila may levy taxes on PAGCOR.

Held: No. The city of Manila, being a mere municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. Thus, the charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the
municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act
which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax.

The city of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked. As early
as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of “franchise,
licenses or permits” was withdrawn by PD no. 771 and was vested exclusively on the national
government.

Therefore, only the national government has the power to issue “license or permits” for the
operation of gambling. Necessarily the power to demand or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of “licenses or permits” is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

Local governments has no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR
is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its
shares of stocks are owned by the national government.

21
The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations”
which congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until amended,
repealed or revoked, its exemption clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of
local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is
consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
“decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an
“imperium in imperio.”

What is settled is that the matter of regulating; taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling in a
state concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the state to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R NO. 1773144 May 2007GARCIAFACTS

There are two consolidated cases:-

(G.R. 177271) Petitioner Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) assails various COMELEC Resolutions accrediting Biyaheng Pinoy et. al to
participate in the elections without determining if their nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act.-

(G.R. 177314)
Petitioner Rosales impugn COMELEC Resolution 07-0724 effectively denying their request for
the release of the names of the nominees of the 14 accredited party-lists mention in Rep. Loreta
Rosales’ (Kilosbayan Foundation) letter-request.

12 January 2007 – COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 which prescribed the rules and
regulations to govern the filing and submission of names under the party-list list of representation

Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed
with the COMELEC an urgent petition to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organization

29 March 2007–Rosales sent a letter to the COMELEC Law Department requesting a list of
the groups’ nominees; another letter followed emphasizing the urgency of the subject request.
Neither COMELEC nor its Law Department responded to the request.

3 April 2007 –COMELEC issued an en banc Resolution declaring the names as confidential

22
 Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without determining the qualifications of
their nominees is without basis.

 While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA7941 and
UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d]
as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.

ISSUES

 WON Comelec has violated the right to information and free access of documents as
guaranteed by the Constitution

WON Comelec is mandated by Constitution to disclose the public names of said nominees

HELD

 YES. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale is
the right to information enshrined in the self-executory Article III, Section 7 of the
Constitution.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another
constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in
Government. We refer to

Article II, Section 28 of the Constitution.

The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or
the citizens to be precise.

By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise
of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen
by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of
locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
23
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitionersfor a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respectivepetitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

 The last sentence of Section 7 of Republic Act 7941 (Party-List System Act)
reading “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list”
is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requesteddisclosure. The
prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted
in the polling places on Election Day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute
is to read into the law something that is not intended. As
it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from
disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the Certified List the names of the
party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May2007 elections.

The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to
a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes,
as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental
right to information. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote,
in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in
the House of Representatives. Petition G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. Petition in G.R. No.177314 and
177271, which aims to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups,
sectors or organization accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, are GRANTED.
Comelec is ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list
elections.

24