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The Case to Review Murder Investigations
Article in Policing · September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/police/pan053
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Institute of Criminal Justice Studies
MSc in Police Science and Management
Dissertation submitted as partial requirement for the award of MSc in Police
Science and Management.
Reviewing the Reviewers
The review of Homicides in the United Kingdom
Submitted by Dean Jones
Declaration:
I confirm that, except where indicated through the proper use of citations and
references, this is my own original work. I confirm that, subject to final approval by
the Board of Examiners of the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, a copy of this
Dissertation may be placed upon the shelves of the library of the University of
Portsmouth and may be circulated as required.
Signed
Date
Reviewing the Reviewers 1

Abstract
Following numerous ‘failed’ cases at the criminal courts of appeal over the last
decade, the principle of reviewing ongoing murder inquiries was adopted by the
police forces of the United Kingdom. This study sets that process into the historical
context and through a review of the literature, develops a benchmarked review
template or ‘tool’ to assist the review of a murder inquiry against national policy,
good practice and academic research. The tool was evaluated by an experimental
group of six investigators examining a murder using the tool and comparisons made
with a matched control group conducting a review on the same murder without using
the tool. The resultant quantitative and qualitative analysis showed that the
experimental group produced significantly more review comments which were of a
consistently higher quality than the control group. From this research several
recommendations are made, including the adoption of the review tool nationally
through the National Police Improvement Agency. This research aims to assist
reviewing officers’ to complete reviews in a more structured and consistent way,
avoiding the pitfalls of flawed investigative mindset, identifying new lines of inquiry
and capturing learning which can help future generations of senior investigators and
lead to a perpetual cycle of professionalising the investigative process.

Acknowledgements
Dream Policing for the inspiration for this research.
Detective Superintendent Andy Stewart, head of Hampshire Constabulary Major
Crime Department for Support and verification of findings.
The Hampshire Detective Officers who volunteered their time to assist in this research
by completing the reviews.
Doctor Becky Milne and Doctor John Grieve who supported and advised throughout.
Hampshire Constabulary for funding this research as part of the Bramshill
Scholarship.

Contents
Abstract 2
Acknowledgements 3
Contents 4
List of Tables 6
List of Figures 7
Introduction 8
Chapter 1: Investigation in Context 13
Literature Review 13
History of Murder Review 14
Investigative Thinking 20
Investigative Models 25
Chapter 2: Murder Review Process 26
Introduction 26
Previous Research 30
Constituent Parts of a Murder Review 31
Capturing the Learning 32
Chapter 3: Methodology 35
Introduction 35
Design 35
Participants 38
Materials 39
Procedure 41
Scoring and Coding 42

Ethical Issues 46
Risk Assessment 47
Results 48
Quantitative Data 48
Qualitative Data 53
Comments of Participants 59
Discussion 61
Chapter 4: Conclusion 70
Introduction 70
Relation of Findings to Previous Research 71
Generalisability of the Research 72
Key themes 73
Recommendations 76
Glossary of Terms 78
References 80
Bibliography in Respect of Review Tool 86
Additional Reading 89
Appendices 90

Tables
Table 1 Generic Terms of Reference for Murder review (1) 27
Table 2 Generic Terms of Reference for Murder review (2) 27
Table 3 Investigative Weaknesses 28
Table 4 Recommendations 30
Table 5 Previous Research 31
Table 6 Demographic Breakdown of Participants 38
Table 7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Content Analysis 43
Table 8 Qualitative Matrix 45
Table 9 Likert Scale 45
Table 10 Wordage of Participants 49
Table 11 Breakdown of Positive and Negative Comments 51
Table 12 Amalgamated Likert Grading 53
Table 13 Summary of Qualitative Findings 59
Table 14 Overall Increase in Performance of Experimental Group 68

Figures
Figure 1 Revised Guidelines for Major Crime Reviews 17
Figure 2 Five Stage Process of Murder Review 26
Figure 3 Example of Hyperlink Benchmark 40
Figure 4 Quantitative Analysis Chart 50
Figure 5 Positive and Negative Responses – Pie Chart 52
Figure 6 Positive and Negative Responses – Bar Chart 52
Figure 7 Total Qualitative Breakdown 54
Figure 8 Mean of Scores Ignoring Zero 54
Figure 9 Chart Showing Amalgamated Likert Grading 56
Figure 10 Results Within Qualitative Categories 57
Figure 11 Pie Chart of Qualitative Results 57
Figure 12 Graph of Qualitative Results 58

Introduction
‘No greater honour will ever be bestowed on an officer or a more profound
duty imposed on him than when he is entrusted with the investigation of the
death of a human being. It is his duty to find the facts regardless of colour
or creed without prejudice and to let no power on earth deter him from
presenting these facts to the court without regard to personality’
(Baca, 2001, p.1).
Murder review has received little attention in terms of academic research. The review
process can be complex and highly technical and so the research outlined in this
dissertation aimed to produce a ‘reviewers tool’ to aide the reviewer and take them
through the process in small stages, each benchmarked against nationally approved
good practice or empirical academic research. The review tool was evaluated using
Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) to see whether the use of the review tool would
significantly improve the quantity and quality of good and bad practice identified
within a formal murder review.
The research focussed upon review of murder investigations which are ongoing and
‘live’ and not historical or popularly described as ‘cold case’ reviews1, although the
principles can be ascribed to both. The purpose of a live review is to support the SIO,
and ensure that all proper lines of inquiry are being followed. There are some
remarkable success stories in recent years as a result of cold case reviews. Following
some historical and notable cases of murder investigations where the court of appeal
upheld defence applications to quash convictions for murder in the eighties and
1
Cold case reviews, tend to be re-investigations of old undetected murders, whereas reviews of live
inquiries run in parallel with the investigation actively being investigated. Cold cases may be re-opened
due to the fact that new evidence comes to light, and thereby only a part review may be necessary. The
term ‘cold’ in this context is derived from the fact that the investigation has normally ceased and all
identified lines of inquiry have been pursued and no detection has been obtained.

nineties, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) issued Revised Guidelines
for Major Crime Review in an attempt to stem the cases where police were perceived
to have dealt with investigations in an unlawful or incompetent manner (ACPO,
1998a).
There are several reasons for a review of a murder investigation to be triggered. These
can include new legislation, new information becoming available, evolving scientific
advances, complaints and the requirement in the Human Rights legislation to keep
undetected homicides under review and more frequently in the case of this study, the
fact that the murder inquiry is unresolved. However, there is a good case to argue as
does Dream (2005) that even resolved cases should be reviewed to identify learning,
quality control and to identify possible issues effecting what could manifest into a
miscarriage of justice. It is important to differentiate between an investigation and a
review. An investigation is defined under the Criminal Investigations and Procedures
Act 1996 as;
‘An inquiry to ascertain if an offence has been committed, to identify
who is responsible and to gather admissible evidence to be placed
before a judicial authority’.
A review is defined as:
‘A constructive evaluation of the conduct of an investigation to ensure
an objective and thorough investigation that has been conducted to
national standards and which seeks to ensure investigative opportunities
are not overlooked and that good practice is identified’
(Rogers, 2005, p.3).

The emphasis of the review is a rigorous, competent and ethical process in support of
the SIO as opposed to a destructive criticism of the inquiry. Volume crime
investigations are at the forefront of police delivery and government performance
expectations, however if a single homicide investigation is brought into question there
can be significant consequences in terms of public confidence across the whole of the
police service. Few policing activities attract more attention than the investigation of
murder. The public expect such offences to be investigated thoroughly to high
professional standards and by officers who are skilled and experienced. Baca (2001,
p.2) describes the responsibilities of a homicide investigator as:
‘No other assignment has the watched potential for success or failure
through individual effort. The actions bring enormous prestige and
accolades, or deep discredit’.
The investigation of major crime such as murder, is seen by the public as an
index of police competence (Innes, 2003, p276). This was conceptualised by the
mother of murdered schoolgirl Sara Payne when at the 2006 SIOs conference
she stated; “If you put a step wrong in one of these big cases, you will be guilty
for hell freezing over” (Payne, 2006).
Advice from the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) regarding the obligations of
homicide investigation under Article 132 of the European Convention on Human
Rights is that the SIO and investigators are trained and experienced, they are
supervised, records are kept and that the inquiry is reviewed (ACPO, 2006, p 76). This
is also commented upon by Grieve, Crego and Griffiths (2007, p.580).
2
Records be kept for of the rationale for decisions involving human risk

The concept of reviewing inquiries whilst they are live is relatively new, and still
controversial in some quarters. SIOs can be resistant to having another person or body
examining their work, but this will change in time as the process develops and as the
‘emotional ownership’3 of a murder inquiry on the part of the SIO evolves into an
organisational ownership. This study is an attempt to assist in that development, in
order that good and bad practice can be more readily identified by benchmarking
against academically tested research, rather than using the reviewer’s judgement
which is as likely to be as inconsistent and subject to the same personal bias as the
original investigation. It is all about learning and avoiding the mistakes of the past.
The aim of the dissertation was therefore to produce a ‘Murder Review Tool’ for a
murder review which can be used to standardise and formalise the process and which
will assist in the identification of strengths and weaknesses in an ongoing
investigation and thereby reduce miscarriages of justice4 and be put forward to ACPO
to be adopted as part of the Murder Investigation Manual. The objectives were to;
1) Set within a historical context, the importance of reviewing undetected murder
inquiries.
2) Draw together good practice and academic research to propose a standard
template for the purpose of murder review.
3) Test the tool by way of experimental research.
4) Refine the template according to the experimental outcomes.
5) Make recommendations for the review tool to be considered for adoption as
part of the Murder Investigation Manual.
3
Emotional Ownership is the undefined and perhaps irrational concept of a feeling of ownership over a
situation or problem to the exclusion of others (Rigsbee, 2007).
4
Can be defined both as the conviction of the innocent as well as the acquittal of the guilty.

6) Make recommendations to ensure that the learning from murder investigations
is captured within a corporate knowledge.
This study is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the literature and places
murder review within a historical context, including the investigative mindset and
models of investigation. Chapter 2 describes the rationale for the review of murder
inquiries, identifies previous research and breaks down the process into the
constituent parts of a murder investigation. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and
process of the research in detail and discusses the implications of the results. Finally,
Chapter 4 describes the conclusions and makes recommendations for the future of the
murder review process.

CHAPTER 1
Investigation in Context
Literature Review
Reviews of undetected murder inquiries are necessary in order to prevent some of the
miscarriages of justice witnessed since the 1980’s. The cases of the Birmingham Six,
Guildford Four, Carl Bridgewater and Stephen Lawrence are familiar to most as
police failings, however there are many more recent cases such as the Bichard inquiry
into the Soham murders (Rogerson, 2004), Damilola Taylor (Metropolitan Police,
2002), Shipman Inquiry (Smith, 2005) and the Canning’s case (Dyer, 2004) which
show that the failings are a contemporary problem. The reasons for miscarriages of
justice are varied, and include police malpractice, failed investigation, disclosure
issues through to poor legal representation and questionable ‘expert evidence’
(Walker, 1999). As well as the causes of failed investigations characterised by
unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness stereotyping and other forms of
bigotry, Grieve, et al introduce the concept of ‘institutional incompetence’ (2007)5.
Research has shown the police conduct in undertaking criminal investigations is a
significant factor in public confidence (Milne and Savage, 2007). Milne and Savage
reject the term ‘wrongful convictions’ in favour of ‘questionable convictions’ as the
former suggests there has been a ‘denial of the truth’ which may not in fact be the
case. They state that questionable convictions are not only the consequence of poor
investigations, but also ‘inaction’ or ‘no action’, and so the miscarriage may be a
result of a failure to act on the part of investigators. The inactivity of police in the
5
An analogy is made by Grieve et al suggesting that the concept identified by the findings of the
Macpherson inquiry (1999) of ‘Institutional Racism’ may also be described as ‘Institutional
Incompetence’, and that the two may not be mutually exclusive.

early stages of the investigation into the death of Stephen Lawrence is quoted by
Macpherson as an example and is clearly an area of concentration for the review
process (see also Savage, Grieve and Poyser, 2007).
History of Murder Review
In order to emphasise the importance of the murder review process, it is necessary to
place it within a historical context, which will set out the obligation with which the
police have to review homicide cases. Perhaps the first recorded formal review of a
murder was conducted by Leonard Matters in his book ‘The Mystery of Jack the
Ripper’ in 1929, more than forty one years after the last of the five murders in the
Whitechapel area of London (Matters, 1929). This is possibly the most frequently
reviewed case of all time with many researchers claiming to have uncovered the truth.
However in reality, no review has ever conclusively revealed the killer and probably
never will (Honeycombe, 1982)6.
One of the most influential ‘reviews’ of a murder series was the report of Sir
Lawrence Byford (1981)7 into the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ murders where various
recommendations were made and subsequently implemented by the police service
over the period up to 1995. The inquiry revealed a catalogue of errors and
communication problems in managing thirteen linked murder investigations. By the
time the murderer (Peter Sutcliffe) was arrested, he had been interviewed no less than
6
In spite of this, ‘very cold case reviews’ can cast some light on old investigations and interpretations,
as has been the case with the Whitechapel murders (Grieve, 2006). It is true to say that there seems to
be an almost romantic obsession with historical murders, perhaps due to the degree of time which has
passed making them de-personalised (Honeycombe, 1982).
7
The Byford inquiry was not a ‘Review’ in the sense of that described within this research i.e. a review
of a live murder inquiry, but by its very nature did review the whole process of investigation of what
was commonly referred to as the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ Inquiry and therefore was a review in the broader
sense.

twelve times during the course of the investigations which spanned three police force
areas8. The recommendations of the Byford inquiry made several recommendations9.
One of the most important recommendations which has led to developments since its
inception was the appointment of an ‘advisory team’ charged with assisting forces
dealing with complex cases such as this. This manifested itself eventually into the
National Crime Faculty (now National Crime and Operations Faculty), which carried
forward most of the Byford recommendations, albeit fifteen years after he made his
report to the then Home Secretary William Whitelaw. This guidance was produced in
the form of Home Office Circular 114 of 1982 (Home Office, 1982). ACPO issued
further guidance in 1988.
Without doubt, the most significant review of a murder has been the report of Sir
William MacPherson (MacPherson, 1999)10 following the racist murder of the
teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993. The reports which followed placed the whole
police service under the spotlight and diminished public confidence in the
Metropolitan Police Service. The inquiry revealed many shortfalls in the police
investigation from the point of first police attendance and through the inquiry, up until
the failed prosecution of identified suspects. The final report made seventy
8
The investigations were ‘drowned’ by information overload, with 150,000 people interviewed, 27,000
house to house inquiries and 22,000 witness statements to analyse. When Sutcliffe was arrested, this
was almost by accident (Cornwall, 1991, p.14).
9
Recommendations included standardisation of murder incident room processes and procedures, the
adoption of standard computerised recording of data which is now known as the Home Office Large
Major Inquiry System (HOLMES), appointment of an officer in overall command (OIOC) in the case
of linked series murders and standardised training for police officers and staff but in particular training
for those senior officers charged with managing murder inquiries. Byford also made recommendations
into the management of the forensic issues in a complex case and bequeathed the term ‘Byford’
scientist which is appointed to murder inquiries even today.
10
The MacPherson inquiry was not a ‘Review’ in the sense of that described within this research i.e. a
review of a live murder inquiry, but by its very nature did review the whole process of investigation of
the death of Stephen Lawrence and therefore was a review in the broader sense.

recommendations11. Recommendation 19 was that ACPO devise codes of practice to
govern reviews of investigations of crime, in order to:
‘Ensure that such reviews are open and thorough. Such codes should be
consistently used by all police services. Consideration should be given to
such practice providing for reviews to be carried out by an external
police service’
MacPherson, 1999, Chapter 47.
The 1998 ACPO guidance entitled ‘Revised Guidelines for Major Crime Reviews’
(ACPO, 1998a) set out the current review process (figure 1). As an appendix to the
report, ACPO provided a checklist for reviews which is still a valid document today
although amendments need to be made to take cognisance of new technologies,
advances in forensic science and changes in law and policy. This document is
currently in the process of being updated by the National Police Improvement Agency
(NPIA) as at appendix ‘A’.
11
These ranged from first aid training for front-line officers, diversity awareness training for all
officers, to defining a racist incident.

Figure 1: Revised Guidelines for Major Crime Reviews
Agree terms of reference
Incident management log

Policy file
Family liaison file
Sequence of events charts
Statements of main witnesses
Exhibits schedules
Analytical work
SIO briefing
- Establish facts
- Establish investigation theory/hypotheses
- Establish major lines of inquiry
- Visit significant scenes
Conduct review
Initial action Intelligence Policy strategies Planned method of MIR

- Initial reports - Sources - Forensic investigation - Finance
- Initial response - Suspect analysis - Search - House to house - Resources
- Fast track actions - Use of analytical - Arrest - Suspect inquiries - Document
Products - Identification - Other tactical Management
- Use of analysts - Interview options - Disclosure
and researchers - Communication - HOLMES
Analyse findings
Prepare report
Submit to ACC
ACPO, 1998
The MacPherson report criticised the internal review into the Lawrence murder which
was commissioned by the Metropolitan Police and which took place in November
1993 and has become known as the ‘Barker Review’ (Barker, 1993). This review was
described by MacPherson as;

‘…the unquestioning acceptance of the Barker Review by senior officers
is a most serious aspect of this case… the review was flawed both in its
recitation of facts and in its conclusions. The Review provided a
convenient "shelter" to those involved. The failure of all senior officers
to detect the flaws in the Review is to be deplored’.
(MacPherson, 27.24).
The Kent Police review (Edwards and Clapperton, 1995) which followed was
however not subject to the same criticism and this second review uncovered many
flaws in the initial investigation.
The impact of the MacPherson report on the whole police service was examined by
Foster, Newburn and Souhami (2005). Foster et al found there were changes to
murder investigations generally as a result of the case, but changes also occurred in
anticipation of the MacPherson findings. These changes were linked, although not
exclusively, with the Lawrence case. Foster et al identified several changes including
formal reviews of murder investigations12 (Foster et al, 2005). See also Grieve, et al
(2007).
The need to professionalise has led directly from these failed cases to the writing of
the Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) the first version of which was published in
1998 (ACPO, 1998). The document was a first attempt to collate and conceptualise
investigatory good practice, although Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia (1997)
initially introduced the concept of a ‘scientific’ and structured approach to the
12
Changes were apparent such as the introduction of dedicated murder investigation teams in the
Metropolitan Police to concentrate skills and improve the quality of investigations; a homicide
assessment team to attend and advise at life threatening assaults and unexplained death and murder
scenes; more oversight of SIOs and their investigations; critical incident training. These changes led to
an improved initial response at murder scenes and increased scrutiny of investigations.

investigation of crime before the MIM was written. The MIM was reviewed in 2000
(ACPO, 2000), and the latest version was published in 2006 (ACPO, 2006). The MIM
has a ‘sister’ document called the Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative
Procedures (MIRSAP)13 which sets out the procedures and processes within a murder
incident room from the Byford recommendations (ACPO, 2005a). The MIM and the
MIRSAP documents set out the collective learning from murder investigations and
reviews of the past and provide practice advice in the light of new technical and
forensic advances.
The section of the MIM dealing with murder review sets out the objectives and
benefits of the review process to ensure an inquiry conforms to nationally approved
standards, is thorough, has been conducted with integrity and objectivity, that no
investigative opportunities have been overlooked and that good practice is identified
(ACPO, 2006 p.83-88). The MIM outlines the core doctrine for the management of
murder inquiries, and is annexed to the Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005a).
It is not just the review by public scrutiny or internal reviews which have changed
practice over the years. Defence tactics have played a role, in particular the
professionalisation of how defence solicitors act when representing clients in police
custody and through to court as prescribed in the defence solicitors handbook ‘Active
Defence’ (Shepherd and Ede, 2005) and the accreditation scheme ‘Police Station
Skills for Legal Advisers’ (Shepherd, 2004a). In addition to this there have been a
number of child abuse and mental health reviews which have informed and developed
practice.
13
The first version of MIRSAP was in the mid 1980’s as a direct result of the Byford Report.

Investigative Thinking
The Core Investigative Doctrine seeks to plot a set of principles in relation to
policing, in particular crime investigation and refers to the use of hypotheses within
the context of the investigation of crime. Hypotheses are defined as ‘a suggested
explanation for a group of facts either accepted as a basis for further verification or
accepted as likely to be true’ (ACPO, 2005b, p.70). This is a key area for identifying
shortfalls during the course of a review process (ACPO, 2005b, p.70–72). The issue
of identifying hypotheses within a murder inquiry has given rise to much debate
amongst senior investigators, but Heuer (1999) argues that a set of hypothesis should
be identified and the inquiry should seek to disprove each one, the one which remains
is probably the truth14. There is a school of thought that the use of hypotheses within a
crime investigation should be avoided as the investigator could fall foul to the
principles of ‘case construction’ (see Sanders and Young, 2003 below). This is highly
debatable as it could be argued that hypotheses formation is inevitable, otherwise
there would never be a scenario to prove or disprove15. The argument as to whether
investigators should or should not use hypotheses appears to have been settled in
favour of hypotheses forming as this has been adopted within the MIM and Core
Investigative Doctrine. Reviewing of murder inquiries is about examining processes
and action but also decision making rationale and the examination of hypotheses
formulation, considering how the hypotheses are proved or disproved.
14
This concept was first expounded by Sir Arthur Conan-Doyle in his Sherlock Holmes series of
fiction and was the first of his seven principles of investigation (see appendix B). The name ‘Holmes’
and the link with the computer system adopted for the use of major crime inquiries will not escape
notice.
15
One of the early writers on the subject of Hypothecation was William of Ockham (1288 to 1348).
Ockham’s razor was his principle that theory construction should always err towards the simple as this
was more likely to be the truth. Ockham also warned about making hypotheses too elaborate and
‘hypothesising about a hypothesis’ (O’Connor and Robertson, 2005).

The theme of investigative decision making and hypothecation is addressed in the
Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005b, pp 57-73). Heller (1998) describes
generic decision making as ‘a choice between a variety of alternatives and a decision
maker is whoever makes such a choice’. A decision can be made instantly but more
often involves the decision maker in a process of ‘identification, analysis, assessment,
choice and planning’. This is particularly significant for murder reviews as some
infamous cases have revealed16. A study by the Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice in 1993 found that the most common type of error in crime investigation was
related to decision making (Irvine and Dunningham, 1993). This is supported by the
more recent study of Wright (2004). There is a dearth of research in this area (Shalev,
2006) and therefore it is necessary to set ‘working rules’ which is what the MIM and
the Core Investigative Doctrine provide. These working rules also assist in preventing
personal bias based upon racism, sexism and homophobia as well as pre-conceived
ideas based upon people, places and situations (ACPO, 2005b, p.58).
The ACPO Core Investigative Doctrine describes the dangers inherent in many
historical cases of ‘verification bias’17. Sanders and Young (2003) describe this as
‘case construction’ which is where the investigator adopts a hypotheses as to what has
happened and identifies evidence to support that hypotheses to the exclusion of
evidence which does not support or even contradicts that hypotheses18. The opposite
of case construction is ‘case denial’ which is where the investigators form an early
16
Flawed decisions were revealed in the Shipman Inquiry report where initial police action to cease
investigations into complaints proved to be fatal for many subsequent victims of Dr Harold Shipman
(Smith, 2005).
17
Verification Bias is where an investigator forms an early view as to a hypothesis and then
concentrates the focus of the inquiry into supporting that hypothesis to the subjective exclusion of other
lines of inquiry.
18
This phenomenon is particularly evident in the interviewing of witnesses, where there is now a
considerable body of evidence to show that using traditional interviewing methods it is relatively
simple for the investigator to obtain a statement as to what the interviewer wants the witness to say as
opposed to what the witness wanted to say (Milne and Bull, 1999).

view that no crime has been committed which can limit the investigation to proving
that no offence took place. Indeed this is what happened in the case in of Ricky Reel
in 1997 (BBC, 13th May, 2000)19. Such preconceived views on the part of
investigators can lead to ‘premature closure’ of investigations prior to all reasonable
lines20 of inquiry being followed.
Work has been conducted in relation to investigative decision making by Eyre and
Allison, (in print) particularly in terms of decision making errors and false
assumptions in criminal cases made by senior investigators and a significant factor
was found by them to be the investigators mindset21.
The Core Investigative Doctrine describes the many reasons for flawed decision
making on the part of senior investigators and accepts that it may be impossible to rid
ones mind of ‘ingrained flaws’. However as Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa (1998,
p.47-58) argue, if one is aware of the flaws which effect decision making, the
individual may be able to compensate for them. Hammond et al describe the most
common of the decision making traps22, and the tactics to overcome them23. These are
all intrinsically linked to the purpose of the review process. The important issue for
the reviewers however, is to be aware of the anchoring phenomena taking place and
19
When this youth was reported missing the police took the view that there was no crime even after his
body was found in the River Thames.
20
Section 23a of the Criminal Investigations and Procedures Act 1996 was introduced by the
Government, which placed a legal responsibility on the investigator to ‘follow all reasonable lines of
inquiry’.
21
Eyre and Allison’s core area of interest is social cognition and the processes by which individuals
make sense of ambiguous, complex or contradictory information.
22
as being i) over-confidence; ii) over-cautiousness; iii) memory interference or ‘recalability’ and iv)
what he describes as ‘anchoring’. The latter is described as an over reliance upon the first accounts
available to the investigator to the exclusion of further and perhaps more accurate information.
23
These are to; i) view a problem from different perspectives; ii) thinking a problem through alone
prior to consultation with others thus avoiding being anchored by their ideas, and iii) to be open-
minded and seek views from a variety of others to widen the frame of reference.

thus skewering the outcomes and focus of the review. People who have a pre-
conceived belief and who find contradictory evidence tend to re-establish their belief
to take account of this contradictory evidence, by either dismissing it altogether or
amending their belief to take account of this evidence. In this way a degree of
reinterpretation takes place (Persaud, 2006). Laming (14:35, 2003) concluded that
investigative decision making requiress experience and competence based upon
healthy scepticism, open mind but with an investigative approach.
The Core Investigative Doctrine lists five elements of what it describes as the
‘investigative mindset’ necessary for a senior investigator to acquire over time and
with experience;
• Understanding the source of material
• Planning and preparation
• Examination
• Recording and collation
• Evaluation
With the inception of the Metropolitan police task force set up to review race murders
in the wake of the death of Stephen Lawrence, the then Deputy Assistant
Commissioner John Grieve described the review process to be about early self-
inspection because that will make people look at their decisions, look at their
‘mindset’ (Mason, 1998). See also Laming above (2003). The mindset of the
investigating officers of the Deepcut army training camp deaths was the subject of an
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) inquiry where it was alleged that
the team conducting the initial review had pre-conceived beliefs that the deaths were

suicide. This was supported by the subsequent review by Devon and Cornwall police
and although the Surrey officers were subsequently exonerated, it does demonstrate
the importance of the investigative mindset in a criminal investigation (IPCC, 2006).
Irving and Dunningham (1993) conducted research for the Royal Commission on
Criminal Justice in order to identify ways of improving the quality of police
investigations and found that the mindset and the way investigators ‘think’ could be
improved upon as there was a reliance upon traditional methods such as ‘intuition’ for
directing an inquiry and confession evidence to the exclusion of decision making and
reasoning skills. These traditional non scientific methods and attitudes are more likely
to lead to miscarriages of justice (Walker and Starmer, 1999; McConville, Sanders
and Leng, 1991). The area of investigative decision making was subject to some
comment by Lord Laming within chapter 14 and 15 of the inquiry into the death of
Victoria Climbie (Laming, 2003), where the findings were critical of the
investigations which preceded her death24.
Another area of interest to the reviewer which affects the investigative mindset is
what Schank and Abelson (1977) describe as ‘scripts’ and ‘schemas’. These tend to
help us to perceive and interpret in accordance with our experiences of the past.
Individuals tend to rationalise information and events using their own experiences of
life to fill in missing gaps with what they expect happened rather than what did in fact
happen (Black, Bower and Turner, 1979). This can be very problematic especially
when obtaining an account of events from witnesses (Shepherd and Milne, 1999, p.
125).
24
which in part was due to the lack of training given to police officers engaged in child protection at
the time.

Many of the miscarriages of justice referred to can be attributed in part to the
application of the crime control investigative culture (Wright, 2002), but there is now
a move from a crime control to a due process model oriented model of law
enforcement25 (Packer, 1964 p. 1-68; Wright, 2002) at least in respect of murder
investigation, although some might argue that this is reversed for some types of
volume crime. The inception of murder review is part of this move towards due
process, and will further reduce miscarriages.
Investigative Models
It is important when considering the review process to understand the various
investigative models that exist. Appendix C describes the most common models and
which should be read as part of this study. There are many models of investigation
which are explained within the appendix26. In relation to this study the overriding
model which lends itself to the review of murder investigations is that of Kilbride
(2004) which represents a process of murder investigation derived from the MIM and
is a useful model for the review process as well as the original investigation. Kilbride
can be seen at appendix ‘D’. The Kilbride model is not based upon theoretical or
academic models of thinking, but represents an excellent basis on which to judge a
murder investigation based upon the MIM.
25
Crime control and due process models were defined by Packer as two different and competing value
systems. The crime control model effectively saw the point of the criminal justice system as that of
controlling crime as its paramount aim. The due process model in contrast is characterised as intended
to dispense justice but with the underpinning principle of the rights of the individual and adherence to
the rule of law (Packer, 1968). Logically, miscarriages of justice are more likely to take place in a
crime control environment, but the criminal justice system in England and Wales has moved towards a
due process model which in theory at least should reduce ‘questionable convictions’.
26
Carson (2007) should be read to explore the strategic and academic aspects of investigative models.

CHAPTER 2
Murder Review Process
Introduction
A review can be more than just an examination of the processes, procedures and
investigative mindset of the original investigation. Following recommendations in the
Blakey report (2003), 3268 reviews are being considered involving murder cases from
1968 to 1998 in Northern Ireland. The prime reason for this is to give families of
victim’s closure and in order to regain public confidence following the peace process.
It is not just about attempting to secure convictions for homicide offences; it is also
about valuing people and communities (Orde, 2006). Orde describes reviews as a five
stage process as per figure 2.
Figure 2: Five stage process of murder review
Collection
Assessment
Review
Investigation
Resolution
This review is running alongside a separate review by the Office of the Police
Ombudsman of Northern Ireland (OPONI) into deaths involving allegations against
police officers. It has been clear from the experience to date that bereaved families
want to be acknowledged by the authorities and the Family Liaison is key to this
(Orde, 2006).
The review process is also about learning and support for the investigators, not only
about a critical evaluation of work done thus far. The first stage in the formal review

process must be the commissioning of a formal review by a chief officer in
accordance with ACPO guidelines. This is in order to ensure that each review is
sensitive to and focussed on the circumstances of each murder case (HMIC, 2000).
They must have written terms of reference in order that there is no confusion between
the reviewing officer and the commissioning officer as to expectations and
parameters. However the terms of reference may change according to what is
uncovered during the course of the review process. According to Dream Policing’s
Serious Crime Investigations Review Training course (SCIRT), the generic terms of
reference should be as follows;
Table 1: Generic Terms of Reference (1)
1. To seek to identify further investigative leads and/or

intelligence development opportunities in support of the
inquiry.
2. To ensure the investigation is being undertaken in

compliance with Force policy.
3. To identify good practice.
4. To identify issues requiring action at Police Service and/or

Force level.
According to Dream, a review should focus upon the following elements of the
murder inquiry (Rogers, 2005).
Table 2: Generic Terms of Reference (2)
The review should focus upon the following
• Initial action • Interview

• SIO policy and strategy • Media
• Witness and Evidence • Family Liaison
• Intelligence • Major Incident Room
• Forensic evidence • Other investigative
• Arrest and search considerations
- house to house
- CCTV

This is a good baseline to start a terms of reference, however, there are many more
‘components’ of a murder investigation which have the potential to be included within
a review terms of reference. Dream advise that the chief reviewing officer should be
an experienced investigator of equivalent or higher rank to the SIO and should be
credible and preferably from another force area. The reviewing officer should be
assisted by a team suitably skilled in a number of disciplines27.
Current research on the effectiveness of murder reviews is limited. However Nicol,
Innes, Gee and Feist (2004) conducted an analysis of murder reviews from six police
forces. It considered the broad issues around the review process itself, drawing upon
social research and on a survey of force review policies conducted by Her Majesties
Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC, 2000). The study examined 34 review reports from
which both good practice and investigative weakness were identified. In total 690
individual examples of investigative weaknesses were identified categorised under six
major themes:
Table 3: Investigative Weaknesses
1. Investigative response; initial action at the scene,

information gathering, witness/suspect
management
2. Forensics; exhibit management and submission
3. Record keeping; SIO policy file
4. Information management; documents and admin
5. Staffing and resources;
6. Communication; internal and external
The most frequently cited area for investigative weakness was record keeping
followed by document management. The reasons for this were identified to be poor
judgement, non compliance with agreed processes, lack of resources and management
27
The reviewing team, dependant upon the terms of reference should include an experienced
HOLMES supervisor, analyst, senior crime scene manager (CSM), experienced intelligence supervisor,
search adviser and also include a specialist Forensic Science Service (FSS) advisor. (Burdis, 2005).

style. Positive findings of the research found that internal and external
communications were good in the majority of the reviews and ‘innovative’ methods
of investigation were identified in many of the review samples. The review
recommendations fell into two categories; case specific recommendations (70%) and
force level recommendations (30%). The latter related to how forces could improve
their conduct of murder investigations more generally. The overriding consideration
for the study however focussed upon whether the reviews themselves produced a
positive contribution to the investigation. This was inconclusive, but Nichol et al
argue that on the basis that 32% of the cases (10) were detected post the review
process, this would tend to indicate that the review ‘added value’ to the original
investigation. However there is no empirical evidence to support this within the study
as these may have been detected in any event, regardless of the review process.
Another weakness of the study was that the majority of the reviews forming part of
the research were internal in that they were conducted by the investigating force and
so there will always be a question over objectivity, which might not be the case if the
study had concentrated upon externally conducted reviews by another force. There is
no evidence presented as to whether force level recommendations28 were actually
adopted and no comment upon the internal force processes to ensure organisational
learning. The final recommendations of the study were as per table 4;
28
Hampshire Constabulary have adopted a system whereby agreed force level recommendations are
placed onto a centrally held matrix which are periodically reviewed at ACC level and relevant learning
for future reference are placed on the list of perennial actions stored within HOLMES.

Table 4: Recommendations
• ACPO should consider developing a process for routinely auditing

28 day reviews
• The National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) should
encourage regional meetings of review teams for the mutual
support of practitioners and dissemination of good practice
• The findings of common investigative weaknesses need to be
incorporated into the development of future training for SIOs and
more junior investigators and incorporated into the ACPO Murder
Manual
• Research should be undertaken to establish the appropriateness of
28 day reviews
• Larger forces in particular might consider developing routine
processes, for instance through the establishment of review panels
for assessing in-force reviews and relevant recommendations
Previous Research
Burdis (2005) provided a structured model for reviewing a murder inquiry by
breaking it down into various elements, but provides no single review tool or
template. His model consists of a review tool requiring the reviewer to separate
elements of the review process into distinct areas but there is no measure on which to
benchmark the inquiry. Reliance therefore is upon the personal knowledge and
experience of the reviewer. Brennan (2002) however produced a review tool which
breaks down the inquiry into twelve bespoke areas ranging from initial response to
file preparation, and gives ‘areas for consideration’ as a guide to the reviewer. He
describes this as ‘a self inspection document’. In this way there is at least an element
of guidance for the reviewer although this guidance is areas to consider rather than
benchmarking against good practice and policy. Brennan’s review tool appears to be a
useful guide for the reviewer but lacking the independent element of a benchmark.
Beggs (2002) sets out a comprehensive booklet for the guidance of the reviewer with
eleven areas for the review to concentrate upon. It also includes an extensive checklist
for each of those areas and a comprehensive guide to reviewing HOLMES. Again as
with Brennan’s review tool, there is no signposting to good practice and policy by
which the original inquiry can be benchmarked. Webb and Lowton (2000) have

produced a ‘practical guide’ to conducting a review. This is a useful reference for the
reviewer; however there is no benchmarking facility and identification of good and
bad practice is left to the individual opinion. The Ministry of Defence police have a
review template which divides a serious crime inquiry into seventeen areas. It has a
check list for each area as a reminder to the reviewer, but again no benchmark to good
practice and agreed standards (MOD, 2006).
Table 5: Previous Research
Research Core Areas Identified Guidance Given Benchmarking
Burdis Yes No No
Brennan Yes Yes No
Beggs Yes Yes No
Webb and Lowton Yes Yes No
MOD Yes Yes No
Gaylor, (2002) conducted a study of historic undetected murders in Britain and the
USA, and identified the key approaches to the subject. He researched those
undetected historical murders which had the potential for re-investigation, and
identified key investigative strategies most likely to yield a positive outcome29.
Constituent Parts of a Murder Review
There are various strands or strategies within a murder investigation and much
academic research and practice advice has been produced in relation to them. This can
29
Gaylor identified that the most significant factor in the successful re-investigation of ‘cold’ cases
was the advances in forensic science, and in particular DNA technologies, but he also stresses the
importance of adopting a structured approach to the review process itself. This is supported by Turvey
(1999) and also Davidson (2000). It is important to note that the review of an historic case has different
considerations to that of a current case, in particular the sensitivities connected with reviewing
another’s work whilst the original inquiry is ongoing and live. However there are clear similarities in
that the review of both cold case and live investigations seek the same aim and objectives, namely to
identify new lines of inquiry and learn from both good and bad practice.

be used by the reviewer to benchmark the review process in order to ensure there are
comparisons and challenges based on identified policy, good practice and empirical
academic research rather than by the reviewer’s knowledge and experience alone. It is
possible that the reviewer could be tainted by the same flawed investigative mindset
or pre-conceived judgements as the original SIO if there is no independent
benchmark30.
The strategic decision making in a murder inquiry is the responsibility of the SIO, and
that strategic direction is recorded into a document referred to in the MIM (ACPO,
2006) as the ‘policy file’. The ACPO advice and guidance on the keeping of policy
files is contained within a document produced in 1999 called the ‘Revised Guidelines
for the use of Policy Files’ (ACPO, 1999). This document is probably the first point
of reference for a documentary review of a murder investigation. A simple process
map was produced by Kilbride (2004) which can assist both the SIO and the reviewer
in following the sequential strands within a murder inquiry, and is a useful tool to
guide a reviewer (Appendix D).
Capturing the Learning
The learning from murder review may be at inquiry, force and national levels and
there needs to be systems in place to ensure that the police service captures this
learning and become a ‘learning organisation’ (Kerash, 1995), in which the lessons of
30
Academic work which concentrates upon individual facets of a murder inquiry include Feist (1999)
for dealing with the media, Milne and Bull (1999) in respect of interview strategies, together with
internal academically sourced work such as the Integrated Competency Framework (Skills for Justice,
2005). Smith and Flanagan, (2000) examined the skills required of an SIO in a murder inquiry and
identified that the generic skills of management alone were insufficient to lead a complex murder
inquiry. Smith and Flanagan identified that the SIO required knowledge of the various facets of a
murder investigation in order to do their job which differentiated the SIOs role from other management
roles within the police service. These and many other academic works can be used as a benchmark
within the review process (Home Office, 2005b).

reviews are retained within the corporate memory at all three levels31 and the quality
of murder inquiries in the future continuously improve. Perhaps one of the most
important lessons that can be learnt from a murder review is the question ‘could this
have been prevented?’ It is therefore a question about risk and risk management
strategies. The imperative is that the reviewer keeps this question in the forefront of
their minds as it may lead to local, force and even national changes in policy
(Richards, 2003). Research in the Metropolitan Police has shown that 9% of domestic
related murders are potentially preventable by multi agency inventions. The cost of
dealing with the 204 domestic murders in 2005 throughout England and Wales is
estimated to be £295 million, which averages out at £1.45 million each (Moore,
2006). In this respect there is not only an incentive to save lives, but a cost saving
which could potentially be invested in other policing priorities.
In relation to the learning that the police service gains from murder reviews there
needs to be a corporate memory of good practice. Vernon Coaker, Minister for
Policing in addressing the 2006 SIOs conference at Wyboston described the purpose
of murder reviews as ‘reducing further murders by using the learning within a murder
prevention strategy’. He stated that the police service needs to ‘react rapidly to new
learning…if the service is to protect our children, protect our public and protect our
communities’. Adhami and Browne (1996) recommended that in order to create a
‘centre of excellence, to support major crime investigations there should be a central
organisation offering investigative support and advice an all fields of investigation.
This centre of excellence could also act as a repository of corporate knowledge and
policy. As already described, the National Crime Faculty (NCF) took on this mantle
31
Three levels of a review refer to National implications, Force implications and Inquiry implications.

in the mid 1990’s, but the reality was that knowledge and learning from good practice
from murder reviews and debriefs submitted to them was at best intermittent and
unstructured. The police service needs to be smarter and more efficient under the new
National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA), and a process has commenced to
create senior investigators as a profession in its own right.32 (Stelfox, 2007, p.628-
647). The police service have collected much good practice over the years, which has
informed processes and learning, but the mechanisms for collecting learning are
unclear and guidelines need to be formed to ensure that the learning from reviews and
debriefs embeds within training and indeed within the culture.
It is clear that the processes that have evolved especially since the death of Stephen
Lawrence have increased the quality of murder investigations and the introduction of
a review process has assisted with this improvement. It is also however clear that
there is still much that can be done to capture organisational learning, and more
importantly to make this learning assessable to investigators.
32
Professionalising the investigative process (PIP) is a three tier training and development programme
where SIOs are nationally accredited at PIP level 3.

CHAPTER 3
Methodology
Introduction
One of the prime aims of this research was to produce a template or ‘tool’ which can
be effectively used by a reviewing officer to assist them in the review process. In
order to assess the worth of using a structured and guided approach to conducting a
review as opposed to the reviewing officer using their own knowledge, experience
and skill, it was necessary to produce a draft review tool and then field test it. From
this it was possible to draw some comparisons between investigator reviews both
using the tool and a comparative group who did not use the tool.
Design
The review of the literature revealed that there had been a number of previous
templates. However no evidence could be found that these had been formally tested to
see if they assisted in the review process. None of these templates contained a
benchmark against which to judge the initial investigation but rather relied upon the
reviewers own knowledge and experience. The tool was designed following an
extensive literature search whereby the constituent parts of a murder investigation
were identified through clearly defined literature groupings. The draft review tool was
developed and structured in accordance with the MIM chapters with each section
containing a hyperlink connection with good practice policy and where possible,
academic research.

Evaluation of the tool was by way of a 2 x 2 functional design to test the results of an
experimental group using the tool as against a control group who did not use the tool.
The independent variables were;
• Experience of the investigator in terms of both service and experience (table
6)
• Use of the tool in the case of the experimental group, or non use of the tool in
the case of the control group
The dependent variables were;
• Quantity of the comments made in each of 31 categories for both groups
• Quality of the comments made in each of 31 categories for both groups
Controls were put in place in terms of matched groups and the case which was
reviewed was the same for both groups.
The murder inquiry which was given to all participants was the first two months
material of a concluded murder of a female in 2004. It would not have been feasible
to ask the participants to review the whole of the murder investigation as this would
have a mammoth task. The research was looking for the existence of causal
relationships between any differences in content quantity and quality between the
control and experimental groups. Experimentation33 is the preferable strategy to
identify such causal relationships (Robson, 1993, p.79). As Blalock (1964) notes that
causal relationships are simpler to identify in experimental methodology than other
strategies such as case studies or survey. Cause and effect are crucial to this research
33
Experimentation in the social sciences is normally the study of people and their behaviour and
although it is outcomes from people which were being measured in this research, it did not seek to
measure the performance of participants. In this sense this research was perhaps more akin to scientific
research within a pseudo laboratory setting which made control mechanisms far easier to achieve.

and one must be careful to ensure that the outcomes are due to the independent
variables and not to some other extraneous influence.
This experimental style was more appropriate to field test the review tool than other
research strategies such as survey and case study due to the fact that the results of the
research can be more easily measured. Foster et al (2005) used a number of case
studies to assess the impact of the review process on the wider world; however their
research was concerned with outcomes, whereas this research is concerned with the
process of conducting reviews.
Case study is described by Robson (1993, p.40) as ‘development of detailed intensive
knowledge about a single case or of a small number of related cases’. Case study
could be adopted by focussing upon a real murder review as a basis for research, but
this would not test the validity of the review tool. Other methodologies were
considered for this research including survey. Robson (1993, p.40) describes survey
as a ‘collection of information in standardised form from groups of individuals’. It
would have been possible to get participants to use the review tool and then fill out a
structured questionnaire regarding the positive and negative aspects of the use of it.
The tool could then have been amended and adapted in the light of that information.
However there is concern in the fact that participants in the study know they are
engaging in completing a survey where they feel their replies will be known by the
researcher which could skew the results and causing the Hawthorne Effect34
(Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939).
34
Hawthorne effect is from a case study in a factory in the USA in 1939 where it was shown that
behaviour changed due to the fact that the workers knew they were being studied.

Participants
Twelve police detective officers were selected for the study. They were divided
equally into both the control and experimental groups. The two groups were similar in
terms of demographic variables and both included three ‘experienced’ and three
‘inexperienced’ investigators in the area of murder investigation. The experienced
participants were members of the Hampshire Constabulary Major Crime Department
who were working towards level 3 of the NPIA Professionalising Investigations
Programme (PIP)35 and had been the SIO of at least three murder investigations. The
inexperienced participants had little or no experience of murder investigation and had
never performed the role of SIO, but were equivalent to level 2 PIP. The demographic
breakdown of each participant is at Table 6.
Table 6: Demographic Breakdown of Participants
Control Experienced Rank Service Experimental Experienced Rank Service

Group Length Group Length
CE1 Yes Det Supt 26 EE1 Yes Det Supt 26
CE2 Yes Det Insp 30 EE2 Yes Det Insp 27
CE3 Yes D/C. Insp 20 EE3 Yes Det Insp 13
CI1 No Det Insp 21 EI1 No D/C. Insp 21
CI2 No Det Sgt 14 EI2 No Det Sgt 22
CI3 No Det Sgt 20 EI3 No Det Sgt 11
Mean - - 21.83 Mean - - 20
Average Average
The control and experimental groups were therefore of similar composition with the
control group having a slightly higher experience profile. None of the participants
were involved in the murder investigation subject to the study although they will have
been aware of it.
35
PIP is the current accreditation method for investigators on three levels where level 3 is for SIOs.
level 2 PIP is for full time investigators, and level 1 is for the basic investigator.

Materials
Two templates were produced, one for the control and one for the experimental
groups. The control group template was a front piece of simple instructions on the
task and one expandable text box on a standard word document (see Appendix E).
The experimental review tool was similar in appearance but divided into 31 bespoke
categories as per appendix G.
These 31 categories or classes were identified through the literature search by reading
policy documents, academic literature and consulting SIOs. They are broad headings,
each with a number of sub headings36. The main identifying feature of each category
was the fact that the academic work tended to concentrate on these same broad areas
making them simple to signpost to good practice and policy. Collectively the 31
categories complete every area of a murder inquiry.
The categories were arranged in accordance with the MIM chapters for ease of
reference. In order to provide the reviewer with a bench mark for each category a
hyperlink reference was included. So for example under ‘managing communication’
reference is given by hyperlink to the following documents at figure 3;
36
For example the category heading of ‘witness management’ includes; identification; treatment of
witnesses; interview strategy; pre and post trial support as well as witness protection issues. The
category of ‘managing communication’ includes internal communications through briefings and
consultation within the service as well as external communication through the media and other
mediums such as leaflet drops and poster campaigns.

Figure 3: Example of Hyperlink benchmark
Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006, p.224-231)

Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005, p99-100)
Effective Use of Media in Serious Crime Investigations (Feist, 1999)
The Media as an Investigative Resource in Murder Inquiries (Innes, 1999)
Media Advisory Group Guidance Notes (ACPO, 2003)
Further Advice to the Police on the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (H.O.
Circular 115/82
Guidance on the National Briefing Model (ACPO, 2006)
For the purpose of the research however it was soon apparent that it was not feasible
to make all referenced material available and in reality the link only accessed the
MIM through an intranet facility.
Clear instructions were given within the document to ensure that the participants in
both groups identified positive and negative aspects and also to ensure that the
experimental group judged the inquiry against the benchmark and not solely relying
upon their own knowledge and experience. The control group received no instructions
in relation to benchmarking, but were permitted to consult the murder manual and
indeed any document they wished. Each category within the review tool had a
bespoke expandable text box and it was produced on a standard word document. The
tool was given to three SIOs for comment and to see if any areas were missed as well
as being in consultation with the National Centre of Policing Excellence (NCPE) who
manage the MIM for consultation.

The murder that each participant in both the control and experimental groups
examined was the murder of a 23 year old woman in 200437. Due to the size of this
murder it was not possible or reasonable to expect the 12 participants to review
everything. In order to ensure that they all had a reasonable coverage of the 31
categories the following documents were supplied only38:
• The SIO policy log for the first two months of the inquiry, at a stage it was not
detected
• The current situation report for the first two months of the inquiry (a daily
summary of the case)
• The forensic summary for the first two months of the inquiry
The next of kin for the deceased victim were consulted and gave permission for the
murder inquiry to be used as a basis for this study.
Procedure
Following the identification of the two groups, each participant was given a hard copy
pack containing the documents to form the basis of the review39. The control group
concluded their reviews prior to the experimental group commencing their work. This
was in order to minimise cross contamination and skewing of results due to
participants in the control group using the experimental group template or secretly
copying the experimental group results. It was not feasible to ensure that both groups
37
This was a three year long inquiry which culminated in a conviction in December 2006. The case
was therefore closed and within the public domain as a high profile case amongst the local media. The
case had many hundreds of witnesses and thousands of forensic and non forensic exhibits.
38
These documents were chosen as it was estimated that the review could be achieved within a
timescale of 8 to 12 hours and therefore not to impact too much upon the participants normal work
schedule. The participants were allowed to complete this work in duty time.
39
Hard copies were given as not all of the participants had access to the HOLMES database on which
the data was stored. It also gave the opportunity for participants to work on the review flexibly.

were in strict laboratory conditions and so they were able to conduct their reviews in
their own time but by a strict deadline date of four weeks.
The electronic templates of both the control and experimental groups were returned
and the analysis phase of the research commenced. An individual score card was
produced in respect of each participant and a value of one was ascribed to each
positive or negative comment made within each of the 31 categories or classes. The
definition of positive was that the reviewer identified a point of good practice whereas
a negative meant the identification of bad practice or an issue which could have been
dealt with better. Each of the scores were then placed within a sub-category of six to
identify the significance of the positive or negative comment as per table 8. The
twelve completed score sheets were then aggregated into a master score sheet. From
this it was possible to comment on the quantitative values between and within the
independent variables. In order to identify the quality of the individual comments,
they were ascribed a value score using a five point Likert scale which was judged by
two experienced SIOs.
Scoring and Coding
When the murder reviews were completed by the control and experimental groups,
they were analysed using the principles of ‘content analysis40’. One of the most
important issues was the identification of the categories as these were the substance of
the research (Berelston, 1952). A peer review was used to test the coding and to
40
This is described as ‘a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to
their context (Krippendorff, 1980, p21). Robson describes a six point strategy to conducting content
analysis which are largely self explanatory and were used as a basis for the analysis of the data40
(Robson, 1993, p.275-279).

assess reliability. The analysis was subject to independent review to ensure accuracy
and to reduce any observer error and observer bias. Robson (1993, p.280) lists the
advantages and disadvantages of the content analysis approach;
Table 7: Advantages and Disadvantages of Content Analysis
Advantages
a. It is an unobtrusive measure. You can observe without being observed
b. The data are in a permanent form and hence can be subject to re-analysis,
allowing reliability checks and replication studies
c. It may provide a low cost form of longitudinal analysis when a run or series
of documents of a particular type is available
Disadvantages
a. The documents available may be limited or partial
b. The documents have been written for some other purpose other than for the
research, and it is difficult or impossible to allow for the biases or distortions
that this introduces
c. As with other non-experimental approaches, it is very difficult to assess
causal relationships. Are the documents causes of the social phenomena you
are interested in, or reflections of them?
What can be seen from this table is that all of Robson’s advantages are relevant to this
study, and the disadvantages are excluded. The participants were offered anonymity
and the data subject of the review was already in a permanent form and capable of
further re-analysis. The research was low cost in terms of financial resource; it was
fairly high cost in terms of participant’s time which averaged over10 hours across the
two groups. It therefore follows that this was an appropriate and obvious approach to
the research.
In was possible to identify the type of quantitative and qualitative scores within the
completed review templates which allowed for a quantitative statistical comparison
between the two groups and also between the experienced and inexperienced
participants within each groups41.
41
As an example; participant EE1 would depict that they were part of the experimental group, they
were an experienced investigator and they are identified as the first review analysed within that class.

Each participant was ascribed a code to identify the two independent variables as
follows;
First code
• E – Experimental group
• C – Control Group
Second code
• E – Experienced in murder investigation
• I – Inexperienced in murder investigation
Third code
• Numerical identifier to identify the particular participant within the
group.
Each of these identified positive and negative comments within the quantitative
search were then rated using a five point summated rating scale42 (Likert, 1932). In
this way qualitative data around the significance of the data was collected in respect
of both control and experimental groups allowing for quality comparisons between
and within them (Bell, 1993). In this research a five point Likert scale was used
ranging from ‘not significant’ to ‘crucial’. Two SIOs rated the identified comments in
order to aggregate an agreed final rating for each of the 31 categories and the 6 sub
categories at table 8. The Likert scale used is at table 9.
42
A Likert scale is a simple method of measuring attitudes, beliefs feelings and tendencies towards a
given subject, where the respondent indicates strength of agreement or disagreement with a given
statement or series of statements.

Table 8: Qualitative matrix
Category Definition of Category
A National importance and requires notification to ACPO Homicide to

suggest a review of policy or legislative consideration.
B Suggests review of force policy and procedures and are significant issues
which require training of officers
C Identify significant lines of inquiry for the murder under review, and/ or
identify significant shortfalls in the murder inquiry
D Identify good/bad practice which should inform the corporate knowledge
E Identify administrative issues which do nor effect the conduct of the

murder inquiry, or are process issues
F Comments made by the reviewing officer which are questionable and
require further investigation
Table 9: Likert Scale
Not significant Some Significant Very significant Crucial

Significance
1 2 3 4 5
The data was therefore grouped into two distinct areas which were quantitative and
three43 areas of qualitative data as there was a need to identify whether the use of the
review tool assisted the review process in terms of the identification of good and bad
practice and the quality of the overall review. To record quantitative data only was not
sufficient as at the outset there was uncertainty as to the correlation between quantity
and the overall quality of the murder review. In order to make an assessment as to
whether there was a correlation, both types of data were collected separately to allow
for comparisons and whether such a correlation existed44. Independent verification
was used and the whole process was repeated using an experienced SIO and the
43
Three areas of qualitative date were;: 1) Quality according to the Likert Scale; 2) Quality data
according to the sub category of importance as per table 8; 3) Comments of participants.
44
The collection of the quantitative data was simpler than the qualitative data due to the fact that
quantity appears to be an indisputable fact which can be measured in simple ways whereas quality
requires a personal judgement and is therefore subject to the same interferences as those described
within the text discussing investigative mindset.

results agreed by discussion. From the collected and analysed data it was possible to
make some inferences and conclusions regarding the outcomes.
In order to categorise the quantitative and qualitative data, the wordage45 of each of
the thirty one review tool categories were analysed. Comparisons were made between
the total of the control and experimental groups within the 6 sub categories. This data
allowed for inferences as to the extent to which the use of the review tool assisted
officers of a range of experience. In this way it was possible to examine the degree to
which the review tool assisted less experienced officers compared with experienced
officers in the review process. It was possible to make clear inferences as to the
quantity and quality of the review comments using the tool as compared with the
reviews without the tool, in other words the ‘outcomes’ (Robson, 1993, p.79). It was
also possible to make judgements as to the added value of benchmarking against
nationally agreed good practice and policy as against just the reviewers own personal
knowledge, experience and the detectives ‘gut feeling’.
Ethical Issues
There are always sensitivities surrounding any murder inquiry. It was necessary to use
a real murder as the subject of the research as participants may have considered the
research to be unrealistic. Choosing a completed murder inquiry removed any ethical
and legal issues in terms of sub-judice. There were no concerns over confidentiality
due to the fact that the participants were all experienced investigators and were used
to reading about the sometimes disturbing circumstances surrounding a murder. In
addition, the family of the deceased were consulted and consented to the use and
45
Wordage is described in the Collins English Dictionary as the quantity or amount of words

conduct of the material in this way. There were no ethical issues in connection with
the experiment itself. The murder used was ‘owned46’ by the Hampshire Police in
terms of intellectual property and there were no copyright issues.
All participants were given undertakings that they would not be identified within the
research and that they would receive feedback at the end of the process. However they
were allowed to use the experience of conducting the review as part of their learning
for the purpose of PIP accreditation.
Risk Assessment
One of the simplest ways of managing the various risks associated with any project is
to conduct a risk assessment (Frosdick, 1999). The advantage of using a risk
assessment matrix was that the management measures identified in advance helped to
inform the process and consider the factors which could have affected the resultant
findings. The risk assessment can be seen at Appendix H.
46
The murder which was subject of the review was not identifiable, but the intellectual knowledge in
terms of the physical and electronic data is within the ownership of the Hampshire Constabulary and is
subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Hampshire Constabulary reserves the right to defend
disclosure of this murder inquiry if justified within the provisions of the Act and in protection of the
privacy of the family of the deceased.

Results
The primary aim of this research was to produce a review tool or template in order to
assist the process of reviewing a live murder investigation and then field test this tool
for its effectiveness by using a 2 x 2 functional design experiment. The experiment
was to compare the reviews conducted by two matched groups of investigators
consisting of experienced and inexperienced detective officers where the control
group conducted the review without the use of the review tool and the experimental
group used the review tool. The outcomes were analysed for content using both
quantity of positive and negative comments made by each participant and
qualitatively by assessing each of the positive or negative comments against a five
point Likert scale. The comments were further refined into six categories which
identified the significance of each comment. From this data it was possible to produce
observations regarding the value of using a guided template with a benchmark to good
practice and policy as opposed to the investigator using their own experience and
knowledge.
Quantitative Data
To produce only quantity data may be misleading as it is a quality review which is
required, not just a long one. However this study has shown that there appears to be a
correlation between quantity and quality. The numerical mean average time spent
doing the review was 8.66 hours for the control group and 11.58 for the experimental
group. This represents approximately 33% more time taken to use the review tool,
which can be taken as either positive in that more effort was made, or negative in that
the tool is may be inefficient or overly bureaucratic, however the results tend to show
the latter not to be the case. The time taken to complete the review indicates that there

was more effort in having to use the tool rather than not using the tool. Similarly the
overall wordage of each of the reviews compared between the experimental and
control group cannot be a sign of quality, but is an indication as to effort and amount
of content which has in this case shown a consistency between quantity with quality
in the case of the experimental reviews. See table 10.
Table 10: Wordage of participants
Control Time Wordage Experimental Time Wordage

Group taken Group taken
CE1 8 2159 EE1 8 4299
CE2 8 2178 EE2 16 2374
CE3 22 4283 EE3 19 12320
CI1 8 3501 EI1 7.5 4279
CI2 4 1086 EI2 7 2111
CI3 2 376 EI3 12 1302
Mean 8.66 2264 Mean 11.58 4447
Average Average
The mean average increase in wordage for the experimental group was approximately
96%47. The first conclusion therefore is that the use of a guided tool will increase the
amount of data and time taken to complete the task.
Figure 4 is a graph showing the numerical scores for each of the comments divided
between each of the 31 review tool categories (shown on the x axis as ‘class’). Each
of the bar chart columns are colour coded to represent both the experienced and the
inexperienced within the two groups. From this there appears to be some interesting
observations.
47
However when one looks at the data, there are extremes in both groups, namely participants CI3
which is very low and EE3 which is very high. The mean average ignoring these two figures for the
control group is 2642 and for the experimental group is 2873 which represents an increase of almost
9% for the experimental group. However, perhaps the fairest way to portray this difference and
ignoring extremes is to display the median average which is 2169 for the control group and 3327 for
the experimental group. This represents an increase for the experimental group of 53%.

Figure 4: Quantitative Analysis Chart
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Of particular note is that that the comments identified in the reviews of the
experimental group are more numerous that those in the control group. The second
issue which this graph depicts very clearly is the significance of experience in the
identification of comments. This is perhaps unsurprising, but it does highlight that the
experience of the reviewer is a very important factor in the review process. What is
also significant is that the performance of the officers using the tool by far exceeds
that of the officers not using the tool. This may indicate that by directing a response
through a structured template or tool is likely to gather far more information than just
leaving it to the experience and knowledge of the reviewing officer.
Another perspective on the gathering of the quantitative data was whether the
participants identified both positive and negative aspects of the review material. It is
equally important to identify both good and bad practice. Table 11 is a breakdown of
the positive and negative comments within the quantitative data analysis.

Table 11: Breakdown of Positive and Negative Comments
Control Group Experimental Group

Class Positive Negative Positive Negative
1 19 27 41 24
2 0 1 12 8
3 0 0 15 7
4 0 0 1 1
5 1 1 13 16
6 0 0 0 0
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9 1 2 7 5
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15 0 0 11 2
16 13 15 11 0
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18 1 1 4 4
19 0 2 8 3
20 3 6 7 6
21 1 2 12 4
22 2 4 8 6
23 7 0 10 4
24 1 2 6 5
25 0 0 4 5
26 5 7 13 3
27 0 2 0 2
28 0 1 0 3
29 1 1 6 1
30 3 2 1 1
31 0 0 2 0
Total 77 86 233 137
This information is represented clearly within the pie chart at figure 5 which displays
the overall breakdown of positive and negative responses to both control and
experimental groups.

Figure 5: Positive and Negative Responses – Pie Chart
Control Positive
Control Negative
Experimantal Positive
Experimental Negative
This shows that whilst the control group results are roughly equal in terms of positive
and negative comments, there are 70% more positive than negative responses for the
experimental group.
Figure 6: Positive and Negative Responses – Bar Chart
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When one considers the same information in relation to individual class areas at
figure 6 and comparison is made with figure 4, one can see that the green bar
depicting the experienced group positive results is generally longer than the green bar
depicting the experimental inexperienced group at figure 4. This may indicate that the
use of the tool was especially valuable to the inexperienced participants.

Qualitative
The positive and negative responses of both the control and experimental groups were
graded according to a five point Likert scale and amalgamated for each of the 31
classes as per table 12.
Table 12: Amalgamated Likert Grading
Control Control Experimental Experimental

Experienced Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced
Class 1 3.25 2.54 3.25 2.95
Class 2 3.5 3 3.5 3.12
Class 3 0 0 3.26 3
Class 4 0 0 3 0
Class 5 3 2 2.91 2.8
Class 6 0 0 0 0
Class 7 3 0 3.37 3
Class 8 4 3 3.75 3.8
Class 9 3 0 3.8 3
Class 10 0 0 2.75 3.66
Class 11 2.1 0 2.8 3
Class 12 0 0 3 2
Class 13 3 0 3.28 2.66
Class 14 2.5 2 3.1 2.5
Class 15 0 0 3.33 2.5
Class 16 3.31 2.33 3.4 3
Class 17 3 1.5 2.66 3
Class 18 3.5 0 3.25 3.66
Class 19 0 1.5 3.12 3.5
Class 20 2.83 3.33 3.25 2.8
Class 21 3 2 3.5 3.25
Class 22 3.25 2.5 3.42 2.85
Class 23 2.6 2.5 3 3.66
Class 24 3 3 3.2 2.66
Class 25 0 0 3.6 2.75
Class 26 2.85 3 3.11 3.14
Class 27 0 2.5 4 0
Class 28 0 2 3 3
Class 29 3 1 2.75 3.33
Class 30 3 3 3 2
Class 31 0 0 0 3
Total 60.69 42.7 93.36 83.59
Mean of 31
classes 1.95 1.37 3.01 2.69
Mean of
Positive
Scores 3.03 1.47 3.21 2.98

The mean average of the Likert grading in the purest sense where zero values are
counted are shown in the row entitled ‘mean of 31 classes’, where all of the scores
within each of the four sample columns are added and divided by 31 (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Total Qualitative Breakdown
Total Qualatitive Breakdown
Control Experienced
Control Inexperienced
Experimental Experienced
Experimental
Inexperienced
However, it is probably fairer to use the row entitled ‘mean of positive score’ which
adds up all scores within the four sample columns but is divisible only by the number
of scores ignoring zero (see figure 8).
Figure 8: Mean of Scores Ignoring Zero
Mean of Scores ignoring Zero
Control Experienced
Control Inexperienced
Experimental Experienced
Experimental Inexperienced
Using the mean of the 31 classes, there is a 54% increase in quality in the
experimental and experienced group results over and above the control and
experienced group. There is over a 96% increase in quality for the experimental and
inexperienced group compared with the corresponding control inexperienced group.

The most significant finding however is the fact that the inexperienced members of
the experimental group scored only a 1.7% decrease in quality from the experienced
control group members. This suggests that the use of the review tool may increase the
quality of the review regardless of the experience of the reviewing officer.
This is slightly tempered perhaps by the more realistic statistical finding when one
considers only the mean of positive scores where the scores are much closer.
Considering this statistic, there is over a 100% increase in quality between the control
experienced and the control inexperienced results whereas the same comparison for
the experimental group shows only a 7% increase for the experienced over the
inexperienced. The overwhelming inference here is that the use of the tool does close
the gap between experience and inexperience quite significantly. The comparisons
between both sets of experienced officers shows just a 5% increase in quality for the
experimental experienced group over and above the control and experienced group
whereas this is increased to 102% in favour of the experimental inexperienced group
as compared with the control inexperienced group. This suggests an inference that the
use of the tool has a significant increase in a quality review amongst inexperienced
officers, but a smaller significance amongst experienced reviewers. The final
observation is that the control experienced reviewers achieved only a 1.6% increase in
quality over and above the experimental inexperienced officers. The use of the tool in
terms of quality of the review process seems therefore to be significant but not a
replacement for experience. The information within table 12 is represented as a bar
chart in figure 7.

Figure 9: Chart showing Amalgamated Likert Grading
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The most striking observation is the similarity between this chart and that for the
quantitative analysis at figure 4. It will always be similar as it is based upon the same
data, however one could expect some significant variation within some of the class
areas due to the fact that there was the feasibility for each of the class areas to
increase in y axis value by up to five times due to the Likert grading. This did not
happen which tends to create an assimilation between the quantitative and qualitative
parts of this research. In fact, the two charts are almost mirror images of each other,
showing only minor variations.
Another way of portraying the qualitative besides the Likert grading was the sub-
categorisation of the findings into the six areas described at table 8. This table breaks
down the responses of all participants into the significance of each of the review
comments as per figure 10.

Figure 10: Results within Qualitative Categories
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Control - Inexperienced
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60 Experimental - Inexperienced
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Category Category Category Category Category Category
A B C D E F
Clearly and as expected the majority of responses were within the categories ‘D’ and
‘E’. The overall combined results of all the participants is depicted within figure 11
which indicates that within a review the likelihood is that the majority of comments
will be category ‘D’ which are defined within this research as the identification of
good and bad practice. This is followed by category ‘E’ which is defined as
administrative issues which do not affect the conduct of the murder inquiry or are
process issues.
Figure 11: Pie Chart of Qualitative Categories
Sub Category Results
Category A
Category B
Category C
Category D
Category E
Category F

Figure 12 shows very graphically the overall results of the Likert scores. The
consistency in score for the experimental group is striking whereas the control group
is intermittent and inconsistent.
Figure 12: Graph of Qualitative Results
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The overall findings of the qualitative part of this research are shown in Table 13. The
combined overall qualitative score is given within the first row of the chart and shows
the experimental group scoring a 71% increase over and above the control group.
Similarly, the mean average of this qualitative data for all 31 classes shows a similar
difference (there is a small differential due to the fact that scores are only given to two
decimal places). The weakness of these two final figures is that they take into
consideration the many zero scores of the control group which has a greater bearing
upon the quantitative findings rather than the qualitative ones. Having said this,
failure to comment upon many of the class areas does impact upon overall quality.
The third row refers to the mean average of the total qualitative data, but only divided
by the number of class areas where a response was made. In other words, the mean
divisible factor ignored all zero scores for both control and experimental groups. This
is a truer representation of quality, but only for those areas commented upon. This
showed an overall quality increase by usage of the review tool of 37%.

Table 13: Summary of Qualitative findings
Control Sample Experimental Sample
Combined overall qualitative score of 103.39 176.95

the group
Mean average of total qualitative data 1.66 2.99
divided by 31 class areas
Mean average of total qualitative data 2.25 3.09
divided by the number of positive scores
Comments of participants
In addition to the statistical findings, participants were asked to comment upon the
process they had undergone. None of the control group made comments upon the
process other than verbal ones. They articulated in general terms that the process was
difficult and complex, but the use of the tool assisted the process of review. Two
control participants used the murder manual as a guide which they felt gave them a
structure to their review. However in retrospect there was no specific invitation for the
control participants to comment within their issued review template unlike the one
issued to the experimental group. This was identified as a weakness in the research
methodology and signified a difference between the control and experimental groups.
The experimental groups made the following comments on the review tool.
Participant EE1 had initially commenced a review within the control group when
changed to the experimental group. He commented;
‘Having reviewed the case using the other document (the control free
text template), I expected just to regurgitate the same information in this
report (the experimental review tool). As there are more questions, there
is a need to for more replies. Some of the additional questions in this
second document (review tool) serve as a valuable reminder to any
reviewer that some of the information that they do not normally think
about may exist and therefore should be reviewed’.

A comment from participant EE2 was that some of the 31 categories seemed to
overlap. This is perhaps inevitable in a process as complex as a murder investigation
can never be categorised perfectly into exact categories and there will always be an
element of overlap. Experimental participant EE3 commented;
‘The document in itself is extremely detailed and is structured in a
manner that directly relates to the key areas of a murder investigation
identified in the murder Investigation Manual. It is consequently logical
and lends itself to benchmarking against national guidance and the
structure of the SIO policy log. In achieving the detail and referenced
benchmarking required, the review tool becomes a lengthy and time
consuming document. This prompts a detailed review but requires some
continuity in the review officers thought processes that can be disrupted
when applying the document to this exercise and around additional
demands’.
The inference here is that a reviewing officer needs to be given the time to complete
what is a complex and time consuming process. The reality of the study was that the
participants although allowed to complete the reviews in duty time, experienced an
impingement upon their other duties. This was always going to be a weakness in the
research.
Experimental and inexperienced participant EI1 commented;
‘The layout of the document is good to focus the mind on the key areas of
the review and break them down into manageable chunks. The ability to
be referenced to some immediate help is also very useful’.
Perhaps the most impactive comment however was by the experimental and
inexperienced participants who stated;

It was really hard work. I found it really difficult, but it made me learn
the murder manual back to front. It was like doing a training course.
This is a really interesting comment in that it opens the door for the review tool not
only to be available for a practical review tool, but also an aide to training and
development. This will be explored more in the discussion section.
Discussion
The experimental group results far outweighed the control group scores in terms of
both quantitative and qualitative data creating the inference that there was a
correlation between quantity and quality. In the absence of any other factor it is
concluded that this difference was caused by one of the independent variables and as
both groups were similar in make up (independent variable 1) the only other factor
was the use or non use of the review tool (independent variable 2). The use of the tool
also took 33% more time to complete and the possibility that this is a negative factor
of the tools use seems to be negated by the clear evidence that the use of the tool
increased the quality of the review significantly. This correlates to time spent on the
review adding to the quality and of course the quantity of information reported on.
This is unsurprising, as by directing the participant to pay attention to all thirty one
aspects of the review process must inevitably focus the mind to comment upon
aspects that otherwise would not have occurred to other than the most experienced of
reviewing officers. In this respect, a criticism of the research could be accused as
being ‘doomed to success’. This charge would be a valid criticism were it not for the
counter argument that the use of a review tool could act as a limiting factor to
innovation and freedom of thought which one may argue would be the case by the use
of the review tool. This latter argument however does not seem to be borne out by this

study. Another counter argument against the assertion that the use of a tool could be a
limiting factor is that within the review tool, each of the 31 categories presented a free
text facility which encouraged freedom of thought and ingenuity but within the
restricted and bespoke category being considered by the reviewer.
One possible criticism which could be levied however is that the existence of the 31
categories in itself is restrictive to only reporting on those categories and failing to
report beyond that which is asked for. However this tends to be negated in that none
of the control group reviews reported upon any areas outside of the 31 categories
identified within the review tool.
Another factor within the research was the significant difference between results in
both the qualitative and quantitative between the experienced and the inexperienced
participants. It is very clear that the experience of the reviewer is a significant factor
in quality and quantity in both the control and experimental groups. The inference is
that an officer detailed to perform a review should be very experienced within the
field of murder investigations. The review tool has shown to compensate both the
experienced and inexperienced officers but by the very nature of the fact that the
control experienced group outperformed the experimental inexperienced although by
a small margin indicates that the provision of a guided review tool is not a complete
substitute for experience. The clear inference is that the use of a structured tool is
likely to gather far more quality information than leaving the process to individual
thought, knowledge and experience.

Although the comments above are generalisations from the results of this study, there
are some exceptions48.
One area worthy of comment is the fact that many of the responses were in relation to
the class 1 (policy log). This is unsurprising as this represented a substantial amount
of the material supplied to all a participants, but it may be that the concentration in the
minds of the reviewing officer tends to focus upon the thought processes of the SIO as
this does direct the murder inquiry and is an obvious focal point for observation
perhaps above any other single document within a murder investigation. Another
interesting possibility is that the participants may be more interested in their own
areas of responsibility and expertise and thus comment upon some aspects of the
review accordingly. It was particularly noticeable where participants in both control
and experimental groups tended to major on their individual areas of expertise. These
were in particular the areas of interview strategy and family liaison, which produced
quantity and quality of comment over and above areas unfamiliar to the participants.
Again, this is not surprising, indicating that within a murder review, a variety of
expertise is required to ensure a quality review product, regardless of the review tool
albeit that the tool will assist in guiding the reviewer to good practice and assist in the
overall process.
48
The quantitative results for categories 16 (forensic strategy) and 30 (Major incident and HOLMES
procedure). These could be the symptom of the vagaries of any small scale study such as this one, but
could also be indicative of the fact that one of the experienced members of the control group is
particularly experienced in both these fields (participant CE2). This individual on close examination
seems to have accounted for the differences from the average of the rest of the scoring. Indeed this
officer has been responsible for wring national policy in terms of category 16. As far as class 30 is
concerned, the differential is so small as to be insignificant.

Ignoring class area 6 (missing person reports) and class area 31 (post charge
maintenance) which were not relevant to the case being examined, it will be noted
that there is not a single response in the control sample to the following class areas; 3
(fast track actions); 4 (perennial actions); 10 (Identification of links with other
crimes); 12 (multi-agency and partnership working); 15 (crime scene management)
and 25, (elimination inquiries). This represents a significant area of a murder
investigation which has effectively been missed by the control group. There are
thirteen other areas within the control group results where there are five or less
responses which indicate that the control participants hardly examined these areas at
all. Collectively this represents that over 50% of the review task was either ignored or
only scant attention paid thus highlighting more than any other factor the benefits of
using a structured review template. The most impactive graphical image of qualitative
results within this study is at figure 12. The consistency of the experimental group
compared with the control group is apparent.
One of the most interesting aspects of this research was the evaluation of the positive
and negative comments made by both control and experimental groups. There were
far more positive comments identified within the experimental group in most
categories over and above the findings within the control group. There could be
several reasons for this, firstly reviews and debriefs within the police service tend
historically to concentrate upon shortfalls and identified problem areas. This may be
due to the perception of a blame culture existing within the police service, where good
work is expected and bad work is punished. This is not necessarily the reality, but a
commonly expressed belief. (Morris, 2004, ch 8.71), see also Laming (2003). If this
were to be the case in the sample it may explain the results for the control group

identifying a larger percentage of negative comments whereas the experimental group
had a specific task to benchmark against the MIM thus easily identifying where good
practice was demonstrated as well as negative aspects. The control group had more
comments in the negative than positive whilst this was reversed in the experimental
sample49. If one examines the scores for both groups under class 1 (policy logs) at
table 13, it will be seen that over twice as many positive comments were made by the
experimental group than the control group, but less negative comments were made by
the experimental group than the control group. Although only a small difference, this
was a departure from the norm for this study, and one may have expected more
negative responses from the experimental group than the control group in line with
the other class areas. This may have been caused by the participants in the control
group giving a negative response based upon their own view of how a policy log
should be written whereas when directed through the use of the review tool, the
guidance identified in the MIM may have tempered the result when benchmarked
against good practice described there.
There are a number of anomalies within the study which break from the normal
position of participants in the experimental group scoring higher than the control
group. For instance within class 11 (evidence of review and management
intervention) there is a higher score for the control group. This may be due to the fact
that the majority of this score was attributable to two participants within the control
experienced group who were serving as review officers and had more experience in
this field. The largest anomaly however is within class 16 (forensic strategy) where
the performance of the control experienced group is greater than that of the
49
Unfortunately there were no female participants in either group and it would have been interesting to
see whether the identification of the positive verses negative has a gender influence.

experimental group, but on further examination it is clear that this is due in particular
to one of the control group who was extremely experienced within this field and
whose experience far outstrips any of the other participants. This is a weakness of a
small scale study of this nature – the possibility that a particular variable can skew
small parts of the results. However, if one takes all of the responses as a whole there
is considerable evidence that the tool was a significant factor in gathering quantity of
data.
The quality of the data charted at table 14 was obviously subject to the same
anomalies as already described as the same responses were used. However the Likert
grading within the chart are the mean averaged score and therefore not effected by the
quantity of the responses and look purely to the quality. The final breakdown by class
is depicted at table 14. Within the discussion, reference is made only to the mean
average positive scores and not the true mean average as the latter brings negative
scores into the control group average and this brings the scoring down substantially.
The quality of the review comments within the experimental group is higher than that
of the control group, and perhaps the most significant observation is the significant
improvement the use of the tool appears to make in the inexperienced officers who
participated in the study. The control experienced group only marginally achieved a
higher score than the experimental and inexperienced group by .05, representing
under 1.7% more in terms of quality score. The experimental inexperienced group
achieved a score more than double that of the control inexperienced group. The strong
inference is that although the tool appears to have increased the quality of the review
for experienced reviewing officers, it is an aide particularly to the inexperienced
reviewing in terms of quality as well as quantity.

As with the quantitative data, there are anomalies with the individual class scores50.
The second form of qualitative evaluation of responses was dividing the results into
six sub categories to indicate the value of the review comments. The results at figure
10 show clearly that the experimental group identified many more features of the
review than did the control group who had no benchmark on which to gauge the
quality of the review. Within category ‘D’, the experimental group produced twice as
many results as the control group and significantly more in category ‘E’. The
inference here is that not only does the use of the tool by the experimental group
produce a better review in terms of quality, it also produces better results in terms of
the significance of the review material which itself is a qualitative measure. The
results for categories A, B, C and F are inconclusive, but there is a massive difference
in the amount of information within categories D and E where the experimental group
far exceed those of the control group regardless of experience. The areas of high
significance of the qualitative findings of the study in both the control and
experimental groups therefore based upon the information available is quite low, very
few issues identified which fitted into categories A B and C. This was fully expected
as the material given to the participants was limited. They could have been given the
same material but with some ‘false’ information alien to the real investigation as a test
to see if participants identified these A B and C categories, but this would have
diverted attention from the main aim of the research and could have come across to
50
There were four areas where the control and inexperienced group scored higher than the
experimental inexperienced. These were; class 20 (house to house inquiries); class 24 (community
involvement); class 27 (surveillance strategy) and class 30 (major incident and HOLMES procedures).
Again there is no known explanation for this although factors of personal interest and expertise may
have come into play as discussed.

have been unreal51. However, this does not impact upon the potential as a principle
for the use of a review tool to identify higher categories of significance in a real world
review.
The ‘bottom line’ in terms of overall mean average qualitative scores combining both
experienced and inexperienced participants from both groups is that the use of the tool
gives an overall increase in quality of 37% in this study (see table 15). It is worth here
to summarise the increase in performance of the experimental group discovered in all
aspects of the evaluation as at table 14:
Table 14: Overall increases in performance of the experimental group
Quantitative and Qualitative % increase of

Summaries experimental group
Time taken to complete the review 33
Overall wordage 96
Wordage ignoring extreme variables 9
Wordage showing median average 53
Overall quantitative comments 227
Positive responses 302
Negative responses 159
Mean of 31 classes experienced 54

(qualitative)
Mean of 31 classes inexperienced 96
(qualitative)
Overall qualitative comments 71
Mean average of total qualitative 80

comments divided by 31 class areas
Mean average of qualitative data 37
divided by the number of positive
scores
51
There are clear advantages in giving participants real and untouched information both in terms of
reality and ethically in case the tampered version of the real inquiry papers became the subject of
comment outside of the academic environment.

From this data therefore there is a clear indication that the use of the review tool
increases the quality of the review data by about one third over and above the control
group. The interesting statistic to note is that this tends to correlate with the time taken
to conduct the review and both are consistent with using the review tool.

CHAPTER 4
Conclusions
Introduction
The study achieved all of the six objectives as outlined on page 12;
1) The historical context of murder reviews is set out within the literature review
which gives a brief chronology of where the United Kingdom police service is now.
2) A template or review tool was produced using identified good practice, policy and
academic research.
3) The tool was tested by experimental research and found to produce more
information both in terms of quantity and quality than a matched control group.
4) No refinement of the tool was identified during this process.
5) The National Centre for Policing Excellence as part of the NPIA has been
approached and will consider adopting the review tool. The next stage will be a
formal presentation to them for adoption into their murder review programme and
re-draft of the murder review guidelines and possible inclusion into the murder
Investigation Manual.
6) The final recommendation is that all murder reviews should be submitted to a
central body within the NPIA to be included in the good practice database in order
that the learning can be captured into organisational knowledge for later training and
dissemination of good practice.
Chapter 1 placed the research within a historical and contemporary context through an
extensive literature review which identifies some of the infamous miscarriages of
justice and failed police investigations of the last quarter of a century. The reasons for

these failings are explored by reference to the academic research into investigative
thinking decision making and the various models of investigation.
Chapter 2 explains the rationale for conducting murder review and breaks down a
murder inquiry into its constituent parts which formed the basis of the murder review
tool. Previous attempts at this process are identified and explores how the police
service might capture the learning from the review of murder inquiries.
Chapter 3 details the methodology and design of the research in some detail as well as
exploring the ethical issues associated with conducting research into what is an
emotive subject, leading to a comprehensive risk assessment. The results of the study
are explained graphically both in respect of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
the research which leads to a discussion section exploring those results.
Chapter 4 sets out the conclusions of the study and makes recommendations for future
activity and research in the light of the research outcomes.
Relation of Findings to Previous Research
The review tools referred to provide no evidence of evaluation; therefore it is not
possible to relate the findings of this research to anything which is directly
comparable. However, it may be legitimate to consider the findings to other research
which compares a structured tool to unstructured methodologies to collect data. One
such comparison is some early work being conducted into ‘Self Administered
Interview’ by the University of Abertay in Dundee (Gabbert, Hope and Fisher, 2006).
This interview tool is currently being evaluated and consists of a self help structured

interview template where the witness to an event completes the various sections
themselves as to what they saw, heard and experienced as part of a criminal
investigation. It is designed not as a replacement for a one to one witness interview,
but to be administered in cases where there are many witnesses and it is not possible
to interview them all in a timely fashion. Early evaluations identify that the quantity
and quality of the information gained is high. Field tests in operational settings have
not yet been completed and so no empirical evidence of its worth is yet available but
the early findings support the outcome in this study.
Generalisability of the Research
This is clearly a small scale study which has limitations in terms of how the findings
can relate to the real world and how generalisations regarding its usefulness can be
made. However there is a strong indication that the use of the tool to assist review
officers in conducting murder reviews will bring a positive benefit. One of the
limiting factors within the research was the fact that all the participants were male.
Females were originally identified to partake but were unable to do so for personal
reasons. It may have given a different dimension to analyse any differences a female
reviewer may have contributed. Perhaps the biggest limiting factor in terms of
generalisability was the fact that all the participants were from the same police force.
It may have been interesting to gather differing perspectives from officers from other
forces who had differing policies, training and experience. The positive from these
two perceived negatives however is that the study did compare like with like. One of
the identified problems identified within the risk assessment was that a structured tool
could limit original and innovative thought on the part of the reviewer. This does not
appear to be the case as the tool has a free text box for all the thirty one categories and

expressions of originality could be recorded within these. Another interesting
dimension would have been to trial the review tool on a non police reviewer. This
may have revealed any ‘incestuous thinking’ or mindset present within the police
culture. Such reviews of police investigations are common place when one considers
public inquiries of the kind referred to within this paper. However this was outside the
scope of this research but would be interesting to trial in future studies.
The murder which was the subject to this review was a limiting factor in that it was
not possible to give all the paperwork to the reviewing officers, however this was
unavoidable in order to make the experiment manageable for the participants. The
next step would be to field test the tool on a murder in a real operational setting and
gain the views of the reviewing officers as to the worth of using it. The results could
be similarly compared with reviews not using the tool. For the purpose of the
research, no weighting was made on any one of the thirty one categories over any
other. In reality some of the categories are perhaps more important than others. This
was not a problem for the research however as the aim was to identify increase in
quantity and quality and both can be considered as a whole.
Key Themes
There are a number of important issues that flow from this study which perhaps go
beyond the scope of the original stated aims. The first is the principle of using a
structured and directed method to achieve an outcome as opposed to a free text and
open process. Within the context of the study, it would appear that a guided approach
produced a better outcome. This however may not be transferable to other contexts. It
is certainly the case that if one wishes to collate certain information, a ‘form’ or

guided list of questions is perhaps the best way of efficiently gathering what is
required, however if one wishes to encourage innovation and free thinking, this could
be restricted by a structured approach.
A particular theme for this study was that in considering the results, there appears to
be no replacement for experience in murder investigation to the review of a murder
enquiry, although the use of the murder review tool will substantially reduce the gap
and compensate for inexperience. This may well be an expected result of the study,
however this research does tend to confirm the ACPO stance that reviewing officers
need to be experienced in the actual investigation of murder. Having stated this
however, the use of the structured tool does enhance the quality of the review both for
experienced and inexperienced officers to such an extent that its use cannot be
ignored by ACPO and there are certainly uses in this approach for the review of other
investigations where experienced officers in a particular discipline are not available.
The use of the review tool closes the gap between experience and inexperience to
such an extent that serious consideration should be given to its use.
One of the key outcomes of the study is confirmation of what was perhaps not
surprising; that there is a correlation between the final quality outcome and the
amount of resource put into a review. This suggests that when commissioning a
review, ACPO should pay particular attention to the amount of resource they are
prepared to put into the process, which must be proportionate to the risks associated to
the particular review under consideration. The issue of proportionality and ‘best
value’ should be at the forefront of their minds and in particular the balance of
resource of the review investigation as compared to the original murder inquiry. It

would appear to be a ridiculous situation if the review took place in favour and at the
expense of the murder investigation itself.
The study tends to endorse the principles of the MIM and the Core Investigative
Doctrine. The weakness in this assertion is that the review tool does not consider any
other investigative model. However the literature and the research does tend to
support the MIM as the preferable model for the investigation of murder; if not all
crime. Similarly the principles espoused within the Core Investigative Doctrine
appear to be founded upon empirical research identified within this study and thus
poses the best bases to benchmark a murder investigation against, which the murder
review tool seeks to do.
The research shows that the investigative mindset of the investigators is such an
important factor within a murder investigation that it has many implication not only
for the training of senior investigators, but also for the selection in terms of their very
character in how they can adopt such issues as diversity and be truly open minded and
objective in how they approach a murder investigation, or a review of a murder
investigation. These skills are not necessarily present within all investigators but must
surely be key criteria in the future for the police service to deliver a level of service to
the public which is acceptable in terms of crime investigation, and be compliant with
the terms of the Human Rights Legislation
The study tends to endorse the adoption of ACPO of the PIP process and the work of
the NPIA in professionalising investigations as this promotes the acquisition of
knowledge and the demonstration by evidence of competence.

The research demonstrates the importance of a structured approach to the
investigation of murder. The adoption of the National Intelligence Model52 (NIM) in
2002 is testimony to the benefits of standardised processes and procedures. It does
therefore follow that the review of a murder investigation should be as equally
structured; this structure is provided by the murder review tool.
In addition to the outcomes described, the use of the tool as an aide to training and to
repeat a comment from one of the inexperienced participants; “it was really hard
work. I found it really difficult, but it made me learn the murder manual back to front.
It was like doing a training course”.
Final Recommendations
Final recommendations are:
• The review Tool should be adopted as part of the SIO development
programme, whether that be the Murder Investigation Manual or the ACPO
Guidelines on reviewing murders.
• NPIA should place the Tool on the NPIA SIO website with all hyperlinks
attached which will ensure good practice, policy and procedure is
immediately available to all reviewing officers.
• The Tool should be regularly reviewed and updated in line with new policies,
legislation and new technologies.
52
The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is a business process model adopted by all police forces in
England and Wales by codes of practice under the Police Reform Act 2002. The NIM is a standardised
system of prioritising and actioning non reactive police activity.

• All reviews nationally should be submitted to the NPIA to ensure
organisational learning and monitoring of standards.
Many lessons have been learnt already from the reviews of murder investigations
nationally. One such review was of the tragic murder of Sussex school girl Sara
Payne. Her mother Zara Payne, speaking at the 2006 SIO conference at Wyboston,
made comment on how the police service had moved on and progressed in terms of
the professional way that the police investigate murder partly due to the learning
gained from the lessons from the review of her childs death. She stated;
‘If this is what she has done in her death, think what she would have done in her life’.
Let this be a testimony to the value of the review of murder investigations.

Glossary of Terms
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)

An association representing all officers of assistant chief constable and above. It is
divided into business areas and conducts research and develops policy in respect of
the whole range of policing activity.
Blakey Report
This was a 2003 report by Her Majesties Inspector of Constabulary into the quality of
murder inquiries in Northern Ireland. One of the recommendations was that all
murders between 1968 and 1998 should be considered for review
Centrex
This was the umbrella agency which took over from what was ‘National Police
Training’ and has now been superseded by the ‘National Police Improvement
Agency’.
Core Investigative Doctrine

This document sets out definitive national guidance and is intended to set out the
combined knowledge of the police service into coherent guidance.
Dream Policing
Dream Policing is a private company now called Servoca PLC which provides a range
of services to the police and other organisations including the provision of training.
One of the courses run by them is the Serious Crime Investigators Review Training
(SCIRT).
European Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Act 1998)

The Human Rights Act gave legal effect to the European Convention, which is a set
of principles which guarantee everything from the right to life through to the freedom
of thought. I applies to public bodies and therefore covers police investigations
Her Majesties Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC)

HMIC is a statutory body with a remit to inspect police forces in England a Wales to
ensure that they deliver a good service to the public.
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)

The IPCC was set up in 2004 with a remit to oversee the whole of the police
complaints system independent of the police.
Independent Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland (IPONI)

This is the Northern Ireland equivalent to the IPCC (see above).
Integrated Competency Framework (ICF)

The ICF is the framework of competencies administered by the agency ‘Skills For
Justice’ which is a National Training Organisation (NTO) for the criminal justice
sector.
Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP)

This manual was first published in the mid 1980’s and the latest version in 2005 and
sets out the internal processes and procedures within a MIR. It also sets out the
standard forms and individual functions of the personnel who staff the MIR.
Murder Investigation Manual (MIM)

First published by ACPO in 1998, again in 2000 and finally in 2006, the MIM sets out
good practice in relation to setting up and investigating a murder. It sits alongside the
MIRSAP manual which describes the internal running of a major incident room.
Murder Review
A constructive evaluation of the conduct of an investigation to ensure a thorough
investigation that has been conducted to national standards and seeks to ensure
investigative opportunities are not overlooked and that good practice is identified.
National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE)

This was set up following the then ‘National Police Training’ merging into Centrex,
and represents the part of NPT which encapsulated certain disciplines such as the
NCF and NCOF as well as the covert policing training section.
National Crime Faculty (now the National Crime and Operations Faculty)
A section within Centrex (now the NPIA) which was set up as one of the
recommendations of Byford Report. It commenced in 1995 and consisted of four
interlinking subsections of training, operations, research and analysis.
National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA)

This is a new agency set up in 2007 with a remit to implement the government’s
reform agenda and replaces what were several other agencies such as PIO and
Centrex.
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 1991 - 1993

This Royal Commission was charged with examining the effectiveness of the
Criminal Justice System following several high profile miscarriage of justice cases. Its
remit was wide ranging but one of the recommendations was the setting up of the
Criminal Cases Review Commission.
Senior Investigating Officer (SIO)

An SIO is the main decision maker and who sets the strategic direction of an
investigation of a murder, abduction or rape.

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Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Appendices
Appendix A Updated Draft Guidance on Reviews
Appendix B Sherlock Holmes Seven Lessons
Appendix C Investigative Models
Appendix D Murder Investigation Process Chart
Appendix E Control Group Review Template
Appendix F Class Categories
Appendix G Murder Review Tool
Appendix H Risk Assessment

Appendix A

Major Crime Reviews
INTRODUCTION
The importance of carrying out independent reviews of major crime investigations

is recognised throughout the Police Service. The ACPO Crime Committee issued
Revised Guidance for Major Crime Reviews in 1998. This 2007 version takes
account of current working practice and recent updates that have been made to
both the Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) and the Major Incident Room
Standard Administration Procedures (MIRSAP).
Where individual force policies have previously been published, consideration

should be given to revising them in the light of these guidelines.
This document gives guidance in relation to the setting of policy and the issues
concerning the review process.
DEFINITION
A review is an examination of material gathered by a current investigation by an

independent person, on behalf of ACPO. It’s aim is to ensure that the
investigation:-
• Conforms to nationally approved standards;
• Is thorough;
• Has been conducted with integrity and objectivity;
• Has not overlooked any investigative opportunities; and
• That good practice is identified.
This definition makes a clear distinction between the formal review process and
routine management interventions by Chief Officers.

ROLE OF ACPO
The role of ACPO in relation to major crime investigations is outlined in the

Murder Investigation Manual 2006 section 3.
Chief Officers must ensure that clear policy exists to reflect their expectations in
relation to the conduct of major crime reviews. The ownership of this policy,
should rest with a named ACPO officer.
In individual cases, this officer is responsible for commissioning and managing

major crime reviews. This will involve setting the terms of reference, appointing a
review officer, providing resources and management support and implementing
the findings of the review.
POLICY
Force policy must make a clear distinction between the formal review process
and day-to-day management interventions.
These types of interventions are outlined below, but may vary from force to force.
Initial Assessment
This assessment is usually carried out within 24 to 72 hour of the instigation of
the investigation. It is carried out by senior CID management who will look at the
categorisation of the incident in accordance with MIRSAP 2005 and assess
strategic issues, logistics and the structure and resourcing of the investigation.

Mature Assessment
This assessment is carried out after the initial response phase of the incident
when the facts of the incident are clear. This may involve the SIO completing a
short pro forma document which can provide helpful prompts for actions, and as a
mechanism to highlight emerging problems. A guide in relation to areas to be
considered can be found in MIRSAP 2005.
Peer Assessment
This is an informal assessment which occurs around the 7 day mark of an
investigation, and looks at the actions performed and decisions made to date.
This type of assessment is carried out by fellow SIO’s and is a useful process for
supporting the SIO during the vital initial stages of the investigation.
A written record should be kept of this assessment.
Historic Assessment (also known as Cold Case reviews)

These assessments are conducted in cases of long-term undetected homicide
cases and stranger rapes, with a view to evaluating whether there are grounds for
opening new lines of enquiry.
They should be carried out every two years or when there are significant changes
in legislation or technology that may assist the investigation. These changes tend
to be advances in forensic technology. Occasionally it may be appropriate to
assess if previously unwilling witnesses can make new contributions to the
investigation.
Retention
Force policy should also include guidance in relation to the retention and storage
of case papers and exhibits. In the past reinvestigations of cases that are
undetected have sometimes been frustrated by case papers and exhibits being
lost, damaged or destroyed.
Guidelines are given under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 2000
as to the length of time these items should be retained.

THE REVIEW PROCESS
Terms of Reference
The reviewing officer should be given written terms of reference by the ACPO
officer commissioning the review. Ideally, these should be drawn up following
consultation with the SIO.
It is recommended that terms of reference provide for a full review to be carried

out in accordance with the process map within the methodology section of this
document. This is because a full review is the only means by which forces can be
satisfied that the objects of a review have been achieved.
Where chief officers feel that a full review is not desirable or not possible,
narrower terms of reference should be drawn up to look at relevant areas of the
investigation. Priority should be given to key solvability factors, and to
establishing the effectiveness of the investigation, particularly in respect of issues
such as scene management, forensic strategy and major lines of enquiry.
In some cases the commissioning officer may just require the review officer to
look at one specific critical issue that has been judged to have the potential to
have a detrimental effect on the investigation and the force. These targeted terms
of reference would amount to a thematic review.
The terms of reference should specify the purpose of the review and then specify
which facets of the investigation that should be looked at in order to achieve the
specified purpose.
The Chair of the ACPO Homicide Working Group provides advice to chief officers
formulating of terms of reference in complex or difficult cases. Requests for such
assistance should be made through the ACPO office.
Review Criteria
It is recommended that, the following investigations are reviewed:

• all undetected offences of murder or stranger rape

• other undetected serious offences, e.g. attempted murder, unprovoked
sexual assault or other serious crimes.
• offences of this nature that have been discontinued prior to trial
• where the defendant has been acquitted
• any offence where the verdict has been overturned on appeal to a higher
court.
In cases where there has been an acquittal the circumstances and nature of that
acquittal needs to be assessed prior to any decision being made as to if the
investigation is to be reviewed and to the extent of that review.
Timing
The timing of a review can be critical and consideration should be given as to

when maximum benefit can be obtained from appointing a reviewing officer.
Some forces take the view the ‘earlier the better’ and appoint the reviewing officer
after seven days if the offence is undetected. In general, if a case has not been
detected after twenty-eight days from the outset of the enquiry a review should
commence at the earliest opportunity. In exceptional cases, there may be good
reasons to delay a review, for example, to avoid disruption to a critical phase of
the investigation. Under these circumstances a written record of the reasons for
delaying the review should be made.
Reviews should be an ongoing process, preferably using the same reviewing

officer. The frequency with which subsequent review reports are prepared is a
matter of judgement for the relevant ACPO officer. In any event, it is good
practice to conduct an assessment immediately before every undetected murder
or rape is ‘closed down’.
Reviewing Officer and Team
The appointment of a reviewing officer requires careful consideration. In the past,

some forces have seen this appointment as an opportunity to provide career
development for the reviewing officer. This is a practice which, in general terms,
should be avoided.

As one of the principal objectives of the review is to support and assist the
investigation, the reviewing officer should have a career profile which includes
recent and relevant investigative experience in the area of major crime
investigation and an understanding of the role of the SIO at PIP level 3. Only by
appointing an officer with such experience will the SIO and others have
confidence in the opinions of the reviewing officer and whether that person will
bring true added value to the process.
The reviewing officer should be at least of equivalent rank to the SIO, when this is
not possible, the overall determining factors in selecting a reviewing officer should
be based on relevant and credible experience.
In all undetected cases categorised as A+ or cases involving high profile,

complex or where there are sensitive issues affecting the investigation,
consideration must be given to appointing a reviewing officer from another force.
As part of that decision making process forces should take into consideration the
availability of a suitably experienced and independent review officer within their
force, the issues surrounding the investigation and the impact of the investigation
on the police service.
In most cases, it will be necessary to appoint a team of officers to work with the
reviewing officer. The team should comprise officers of different ranks and skills
with wide practical experience including someone with a detailed knowledge of
HOLMES2.
Other specialist assistance such an analyst, an experienced scenes of crime

officer or other forensic science support may be required dependant on the terms
of reference and the nature of the investigation to be reviewed. NPIA Crime
Operations Support can provide advice and support in the in relation to this area.

Methodology
Where possible, reviews should be based away from the operational incident
room. Including of a HOLMES 2 operator in the team makes this possible as it
enables the system to be accessed from an independent location, thereby
removing the need to visit the incident room (except where, for example,
documents need to be checked against the computer record or some other
important aspect requires discussion).
The reviewing officer must be supplied with copies of the Policy File, sequence of
events, statements, exhibits schedules, log of events and the current situation
reports. This enables officers involved in the review to be fully informed before
commencing the review.
It is essential that the SIO provides a briefing to the reviewing officer and the
review team. At the start of the review, a visit to the scene of the crime by the
reviewing officer and supporting team is desirable.
Once it has been decided which lines of enquiry are to be examined, they should
be prioritised accordingly. Reviewers should not set or accept unrealistic
deadlines.
The SIO and their senior management team should be informed of anything
requiring immediate attention. Regular meetings during the review can assist in
achieving this. Below is a flow chart outlining the suggested methodology to be
followed when carrying out a review.

Agree TOR
with ACC
Select Review
Team
SIO Briefing
• establish facts
• establish investigation theory, ie
hypotheses
• establish major lines of enquiry
• visit significant scenes
Conduct
Review
Initial Action Intelligence SIO Policy File Planned Method MIR

• Report • Sources content including of Investigation • Finance
• Initial • Suspect • Forensic Strategy • H2H • Resources
Response analysis • Search Strategy • Suspect • Document
• Fast Track • Use of • Arrest Strategy Enquiries management
Actions analytical • Identification • Other tactical • Disclosure
products Strategy options • HOLMES
• Use of • Interview Strategy
Researchers • Communication
analysts Strategy
Analysis
Findings
Prepare Report
Submit Report
to ACC

Reports and Subsequent Action
The reviewing officer should prepare a report for the ACPO officer who
commissioned the review. It is good practice to allow the SIO to read the report
prior to submission to check for factual accuracy and make an initial response,
should they wish to do so. Any responses should be forwarded to the ACPO
officer, together with the report.
Care should be taken in the wording of the report. It should remain objective and
sensitive to the needs of the SIO whilst achieving the objectives set out in the
terms of reference.
A useful approach to reporting review findings focuses on three forms of

observations made during the investigation. These will cover individual decision
making as well as system level findings. The areas focused on are as follows:-
• Observations about the adequacy of the methods used to
gather and record material
• Observations concerning the adequacy of the various sub-
processes used in the investigation; and
• Observations on the interpretation of the material and how it
shaped decisions made during the investigation
The findings of a review, particularly the recommendations, lessons learned and

suggested good practice, should be formally considered for adoption by the
ACPO officer. These findings would generally fall into three categories:-
• Case specific recommendations
• Force recommendations and
• National recommendations
Dependant in which category the recommendation is placed will depend on the

action to be taken and the method of dissemination of the finding.
Many forces have found it beneficial for the report to be formally considered by a
review panel. This usually comprises an ACC Chair, Head of Crime, Divisional

Commander and Scientific Support Manager and any other member who the
Chair feels would be capable of contributing to the process. Any such meeting
should also be attended by the reviewing officer who should present the findings
of the review, and the SIO who should be invited to respond.
Reviews should be a dynamic process. They should not only be used to assist
the SIO in the investigation of a crime, particularly identifying lines of enquiry
which need to be pursued, but also to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of
major crime investigations. At the end of each review process, lessons learned
and identified good practice should be circulated within each force. Where
appropriate, relevant force policies and working practices should be revised in the
light of review findings.
Role of National Policing Improvement Agency
The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) has an important role to play
in the dissemination of nationally recognised good practice and lessons learned
from major crime investigations.
It is recommended that Chief Officers include in their force policies the need for
the lessons learned and suggested good practice to be forwarded to NPIA so
these issues can be disseminated to forces countrywide and inform the needs of
future training.
NPIA Crime Operations Support have representatives on all regional review

groups and publish on the Genesis website ‘ Investigative Suggestions’ which
capture good practice investigations, they are also able collate review documents
and highlight reoccurring problems to the Homicide Working Group so
appropriate action can be identified to remedy this problem nationally.
Disclosure
In the event of a person or persons being charged in connection with a major

crime investigation where a review has been conducted, the report should be
revealed to the CPS in accordance with the principals of CPIA.

The review report will almost invariably be ‘relevant material’ and therefore needs
to be considered in relation to disclosure The prosecutor, in consultation with the
SIO, will then determine whether the whole or any part of the review report
undermines the prosecution case or assists the defence case and should,
therefore, be disclosed to the defence.
There may be circumstances when the prosecution may feel it appropriate to

claim Public Interest Immunity (PII) status in respect of part of all of the review
report.
Chief Officers should consider policy in relation to the access to review reports
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 but in general no disclosure under
this act should take place until all legal proceedings or subsequent enquiries have
taken place.

Appendix B

Sherlock Holmes's Seven Vital Lessons
Or, THE WHOLE ART OF DETECTION IN A
NUTSHELL
By John C. Sherwood
assembled from Dr. John H. Watson's memoirs and remarks elsewhere
1: “One should always look for a possible alternative and provide against it. It is the first rule of
criminal investigation."
2: "I never guess. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to
twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts."
3: "Use your time sparingly. Determine what you have. Then determine what you need. Then
look for what you need in the place where it must be."
4: “There is nothing so important as trifles. Never trust to general impressions, but concentrate
yourself upon details."
5: "Singularity is almost invariably a clue."
6: "It is a mistake to confound strangeness with mystery. The most commonplace crime is often
the most mysterious, because it presents no new or special features from which deductions may
be drawn."
7: "When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be
the truth."
I'VE LONG SUSPECTED that, like myself, some people have begun to read Dr.
Watson's chronicles about Sherlock Holmes in an effort to discover the great
detective's "secrets" to sound reasoning and successful crime detection.
The difficulty is that, with that goal in mind, it's extremely time-consuming and
somewhat exasperating to sort through many hundreds of thousands of words in four
novel-length and 56 story-length chronicles, with all of their “non-instructive,” even
romantic aspects, along with their myriad personal characterizations and social
portraits of late Victorian and Edwardian life. As Holmes himself told Watson, they
certainly do not make up a “series of lectures” but rather a set of “tales.” Learning,
therefore, is hit and miss. How maddening it is to seek just the right phrases that
teach!
You need fret no more on this issue. The synopsis is at hand. The Rules that follow
comprise just 144 words -- a Baker Street dozen dozen.
The Sherlockian Canon can and should be read for their many nuances, but what
follows here is an attempt to distill the chief points from several of the great
detective’s 19th century cases. Admittedly, one of these rules is not quoted from the
Canon (although it is easily inferred), but is taken instead from practical instructions
made repeatedly during Holmes's 100 visits to The Victorian Villa Inn from 1987

through 1999, his last visit having occurred a few months after his 145th birthday.
This point is made largely because it was at the Villa that Holmes applied the seven
specific lessons that follow, referring to them repeatedly and pointedly, in an effort to
assist some 2,000 individuals over a period of a dozen years to achieve a greater
understanding of his methods. For that reason, we believe that the points made below
are the most practical and useful that Holmes has offered, as set down by Dr. Watson
and as stated at the Villa. There certainly are many other useful points of instruction,
but none so basic as these -- and the success of the Villa's guests in solving a variety
of criminal cases suggests that this is true.
There is no discussion here of Holmes's vast knowledge of criminal history and

sensational literature, his application of specific sciences such as chemistry and
anatomy, his access to peculiar research materials and informants, or his skills in
memorization, disguise, languages or psychological manipulation. We have not
included the various instructive but rather specific statements for which Holmes was
justifiably famous (with the exception of his response to "The dog did nothing in the
night-time": "That was the curious incident."). Instead, the list that follows is limited
to statements that focus on the detective's overall attitude rather than his methods --
for Holmes himself appears to treat that attitude as supremely important.
Sherlock's Seven Vital Lessons: An Expansion
Rule One:
“One should always look for a possible alternative and provide against it. It is
the first rule of criminal investigation." [Quoted by Dr. Watson in "The Adventure
of Black Peter," an investigation from 1895.]
Addenda: This axiom -- another way of saying "Don't put all your eggs in one basket"
-- is stated as Holmes's "first rule" in actual conscious practice, but let’s begin by
noting that it is not stated outright until a full 14 years have passed in the active
partnership of Holmes and Watson.
Immediately, we run up against a seeming contradiction. Holmes also is

noted for saying that he follows “docilely" wherever the facts lead him
(a point stated more clearly in Rule Two). But here we have Holmes
stating that it is more important to consider provitional solutions -- and
to back up your evidence for your foremost hypothesis. Theories are
difficult things to juggle when one is told to beware of theories in the
first place.
The way out of the maze lies in knowing that, before attempting to formulate
hypotheses, it's wise to make one's self aware of the potential existence of multiple
hypotheses, so that one eventually may choose one that fits most or all of the facts as
they become known.
But there's a risk in this: One might become aware of a theory that, because of an
internal inclination, one embraces before all the facts are in. Those who play favorites
with an unsubstantiated theory are almost invariably unwilling to abandon it later.
That's why Holmes also advises that one should set aside any and all prejudices when

considering facts.
Students of Holmes's cases know that he disregarded this axiom himself in "The
Adventure of the Yellow Face," a case that shamed him; but, then, it occurred in early
1888. From an analysis of this “first rule,” therefore, we deduce that Holmes did not
even recognize it as the “first rule” until ca. 1888 -- which explains why we don’t find
it stated until a case that occurs after that date. Apparently, Holmes learned a great
deal from that shameful incident at Norbury.
Rule Two:
"I never guess. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly
one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts."
[Derived from statements made during "The Sign of Four" and "A Scandal in
Bohemia," both from 1888.]
Addenda: This observer was tempted at first to elevate this axiom to the status of the
“first rule,” had it not been for the fact that Holmes himself had specifically stated
otherwise. Indeed, the "Whole Art of Detection" actually could be summarized with
that opening sentence: "I never guess." These three words serve as a dynamic
"mission statement" for the detective, attorney, police officer, judge, journalist,
physician, paramedic -- indeed, for a host of other professions from which the public
seeks and expects life-affirmation and, above all, accuracy.
But, as we know from Holmes's other comments, such logic is rare. Consider the next
time you hear people preface their statements of "fact" with the words "I think ..." or
"I suppose that ..." or "I believe ...". Each of these phrases is an admission of guilt:
The speaker is guessing, assuming, leaping ahead of factual information and drawing
inferences without providing evidence.
Rule Three:
"Use your time sparingly. Determine what you have. Then determine what you
need. Then look for what you need in the place where it must be." [Watson's
chronicles do not provide this axiom, and it is possible that he never heard it until
after his last recorded adventure with Holmes. However, it has been stated often
during investigations at The Victorian Villa Inn.]
Addenda: This is merely a synthesis of Holmes's process for an efficient

investigation. It's possible that Holmes never provided Watson with such a statement
because he regarded Watson more as an assistant than as a protegé. Watson relates a
few instances wherein he conducted solo investigations, only to be berated by Holmes
for his poor approach.
Chronicles such as "The Adventure of the Six Napoleons" and "The Adventure of the
Blue Carbuncle" bear out this approach's effectiveness. Holmes applies the axiom
most effectively to the discovery of clues. In "The Boscombe Valley Mystery," he
knows that he must locate a murder weapon; he looks in a location where he might
expect to find one, and finds a rock with grass growing underneath it. In "The
Adventure of the Dancing Men," he deduces that a third shot may have been fired,
and finds the casing that proves his provisional theory -- by looking for it near the
window that had been opened earlier -- in the place where it had to have been.

From Watson's chronicles, we also learn that Holmes often had several cases at hand
at the same time. To obtain maximum results, it would not have been practical for
Holmes to use his time inefficiently. Instead, he became what a modern psychologist
might called goal-directed, setting small goals along the way toward achiving the
major goal of solving a case. Ultimately, it may have been his overriding goal to
collect sufficient fees to purchase a small Sussex bee-farm to which to retire.
Rule Four:
“There is nothing so important as trifles. Never trust to general impressions, but
concentrate yourself upon details." [Derived from statements made during "The
Adventure of the Man with the Twisted Lip" and "A Case of Identity," both of which
occurred in 1887.]
Addenda: Once the investigator has the proper attitude about facts and
theories, as well as an effective approach, it is time to collect facts. It is
ironic that this statement from Holmes comes from two minor cases
from 1887, when it is obvious that he was well aware of it as an axiom
in 1881, the year of Watson's first major case with him -- "A Study in
Scarlet").
And yet at this point in the 19th century, the axiom still was not
generally known, understood or shared by professional detectives,
either official or unofficial. The history of the investigation of crime is well known to
have been changed inexorably by the popularization of Watson's writings about
Holmes, and the subsequent adoption by Scotland Yard's Criminal Investigations
Department of the minute examination of crime scenes so that detailed and thorough
searches could be conducted.
By focusing on details rather than the "broad" and often prejudiced view, it became
possible for the CID to throw aside bad old habits (such as assuming guilt by
association) and develop new ways to deal with tangible details (it may not be a
coincidence that the use of fingerprint identification grew significantly at this time).
Rule Five:
"Singularity is almost invariably a clue." [Quoted in "The Boscombe Valley
Mystery," which occurred in 1889.]
Addenda: Here we have the point of the "dog in the night-time" stated as an axiom,
but in bald way rather than concerning a specific (and inverted) circumstance.
"Singularity" can be viewed as "the thing that stands out above all else" and is not to
be confused with "oddity," for the singular event may not seem very odd at all.
Naturally, it is not at all difficult for virtually any investigator to note a "smoking
gun," a very basic form of singularity. But a smoking gun may not be an oddity, say,
at a shooting range or in a huntsman's lodge.
But a subtler form of singularity is the dog that did not bark in "Silver Blaze." This
non-event was the singular circumstance of the case, but it went unnoticed by all but
Holmes; admittedly, it is difficult for most investigators to notice the absence of a
circumstance, but by drawing attention to it, we realize that, between the extremes of

the smoking gun and the non-barking dog lies a broad spectrum of singular
circumstances.
To cite a few Sherlockian examples, these include the nailing-down of a bed near a
useless ventilator, beeswing in just one of three wine glasses and a killer's loss of a
pair of eyeglasses in a house filled with coconut-matting. Each of these singular,
standout circumstances pointed uniquely to the correct solution.
Rule Six:
"It is a mistake to confound strangeness with mystery. The most commonplace
crime is often the most mysterious, because it presents no new or special features
from which deductions may be drawn." [Quoted in "A Study in Scarlet," Watson's
first recorded case with Holmes, which occurred in 1881.]
Addenda: Puzzlement is the risk all crime investigators face. Much of it is self-
generated, the result of prejudice, improper technique and/or inattention to detail.
Most "red herrings" are not placed deliberately, but exist only in the mind of the
investigator. In defense of those who are lesser than Holmes, puzzlement is a natural
result of the truly odd or unique circumstance, and Holmes here is wise to call
attention to the inclination -- which, no doubt, he had recognized in himself early on,
for this is the axiom which has the earliest recorded date.
For example, in "The Adventure of the Norwood Builder," the discovery of a bloody
thumbprint on a wall puzzles the incautious official police, but Holmes knew it
pointed to a specific solution because the print had not been present during his initial
(and detailed) examination. Perhaps most famous of all "strange" circumstances in
Holmes's cases is that of the footprints of a gigantic hound found near the body of Sir
Charles Baskerville in 1888. To the locals who were aware of the Dartmoor legend of
the spectral Hound, the circumstance suggested something hideous and supernatural.
To Holmes, however, it suggested ... the presence of a gigantic hound. From that fact,
he deduced the existence of a place where such a beast might be kept, as well as a
keeper with a motive to frighten or kill. The rest, as is often said, is history.
Rule Seven:
"When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however
improbable, must be the truth." [Quoted in "The Sign of Four," Watson's second
recorded case with Holmes, which occurred in 1888.]
Addenda: This is the most famous of Holmes's axioms, and -- because of its fame --
possibly is the most abused and misapplied. There is great room for confusion and
disagreement over what is precisely is "impossible" and what is "improbable,"
because what was impossible in the early 19th century (instant communications, X-
rays, fingerprint identification, for example) certainly had become possible by
Holmes's day; the distinction often requires specific knowledge and insight.
What's more, it's not possible to apply this axiom on its own in the hope of conducting
a successful investigation without taking the other axioms into consideration. For
example, the person who follows this last axiom -- but who remains prone to
guesswork or who ignores details -- is bound to fail. But the person who cautiously
applies ALL of the axioms where and when appropriate, and who cultivates habits

and skills of conscientious investigators (persistence being the most vital and
underappreciated) cannot help but succeed.
Text © 1999-2004 by MysteryVisits.com, West Grove, PA
An intriguing REACTION to the "Seven Lessons" by Mr. BEN NOVAK

Appendix C

Investigative Models
The overriding benchmark for the review of a murder investigation must be the MIM,
which provides a model of investigation set out and approved by ACPO. However
there are other models of investigation and it is necessary to explore some of these in
order to ensure that the correct processes are employed to address the individuality of
each murder investigation. Indeed some of the models may be used within the overall
context of the MIM.
Although not a model of investigation in the strictest sense, the National Intelligence
Model (NIM) cannot be overlooked. NIM is a business process model and all police
forces in England and Wales were required to be compliant with the model by 2004
(Home Office, (2007). NIM is a model to ensure that information and intelligence
received is dealt with in a particular and standardised way taking cognisance of
strategic and tactical priorities and in a way which maximises the use of resources in
accordance with the optimum outcome through a ‘tasking and coordinating process’
(TCG), (Flood, 1999). This is particularly significant in the context of a murder
investigation, where the investigators need to optimise sometimes limited resources.
The reviewer of a murder investigation would inevitably be looking for NIM
compliance within the context of a murder investigation.
Police investigations are generally categorised into either ‘reactive’ or ‘proactive’
investigations. Reactive investigations follow an incident or report of a crime and are
examinations as to what happened and ‘who did it’. Proactive investigations
concentrate upon either a known offender or group of offenders and examining that
subject or subjects or examining a known and identified policing problem and

engaging tactical options to address the problem (O’Neill, 2005: p.46). A murder
investigation by its very nature generally fits into the category of a reactive
investigation. However, within this reactive investigation, proactive strategies are
employed to solve a reactive crime (Hampshire Police, 2006). The MIM describes
many of these proactive strategies which can be employed within a murder
investigation such as the use of surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources
(ACPO, 2006, p271–283). It is necessary to differentiate between reactive and
proactive enquiries as each may employ a very different skill set, but it is important to
note that the two are not mutually exclusive. One important area within both types of
investigation however is the requirement to be human rights compliant (ACPO, 2006,
p 76). This is particularly important as many proactive strategies breach Article 8 of
the European Convention of Human Rights (Right to respect for private and family
life) which was adopted into English and Welsh law by the Human Rights Act 1998.
Such strategies may include covert surveillance and monitoring of an individual. In
order to ensure such activity by the police and indeed any authority is legal, necessary
and proportionate, the activity must comply with the conditions laid out within the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. This is a particular area for the
reviewer of a crime to concentrate upon as non compliance could be fatal to the
successful prosecution of offenders.
One model of investigation taught to police officers is the SARA mnemonic which
stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment as summarised by Eck
(2006) at figure 2. This is a useful model for the initial investigator to have in their
mind when attending the scene of a crime, however it does not assist in the ‘what’ to
do by way of investigation (O’Neill, 2005, p.60).

Figure 2: The SARA model
Eck, 2006
Shepherd and Mortimer (1999) developed a system he calls ACCESS which stands
for Assess, Collect, Collate, Evaluate, Scrutinise and Summarise. He used this system
to interrogate and question police cases as part of his defence work in many cases
(Shepherd and Mortimer, 1999). Another of Shepherds systems often used as a
collation tool is his ‘SE3R’ method, which has now been incorporated within detective
training as part of the Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme (ICIDP),
and is a method of analysing information and splitting it into its component parts in
order that complex information can be understood (Shepherd, 2004).

Osterburg and Ward (1996) suggest that investigators should approach crime
enquiries as the ‘science of investigation’ and go about it as a reconstruction of the
past as a historian would. Sekaran (2000, p21) however describes an investigation as
research, defined as ‘an organised systematic, databased, critical, objective, scientific
inquiry into a specific problem that needs a solution’, and produces a cyclical model
the main stages of which are; i) problem identification; ii) hypotheses forming; iii)
research design; iv) measurement; v) data collection; vi) data analysis and vii)
generalisation (see figure 3).
Figure 3: Scientific model of research
Problem
Observation Theoretical
framework
Hypotheses
Refinement of
theory
Or
Implementation Constructs
Concepts
Operational
definitions
Interpretation
of data
Research
Analysis of Design
data Data collection
Sekaran, 2000
O’Niell (2005, p70-80) has produced an eight stage model for crime investigation
starting with input, initial response, hypothecation, investigative plan to test
hypotheses and then through an investigative cycle with constant review and then
finally the outcome once the hypotheses is proved, and others disproved. Innes (2003)
develops a conceptual framework for understanding the methods undertaken by the
police in the investigation of murders, and whilst not a model in itself, he seeks to
identify the practices and processes involved in the investigation of homicides. There

are similarities with all models of investigation in the sense that there tends to be a
collecting stage, some kind of analysis, action and then evaluation. They all tend to
follow the intelligence cycle recommended in the Baumber report of 1975.
Figure 3: The Intelligence Cycle
Direction
Disseminate Collect
Analyse Evaluate
The Baumber Report 1975
These models appear to be a variation on the same theme, namely a basic framework
to set investigative mindset and order the investigators thinking into a logical pattern.
The only one however which is prescriptive in terms of what lines of enquiries the
investigator should follow, and benchmarking the minimum requirements for how this
should be done is the MIM and the Core Investigative Doctrine.

Appendix D

MAJOR CRIME INVESTIGATION PROCESS
(A sequential Model of the Investigation Process with acknowledgement to the ACPO Murder Investigation Manual)
REVIEW
Objective is to constructively evaluate to HMP CHARGE (+ Post Investigation)

ensure it conforms with national
standards, is thorough, has been Within 28 days of OIC IN CUSTODY (the issues below require early planning) MIM ch 9
conducted with integrity and objectivity, sentence for a homicide Remand file
to ensure no investigative opportunity offence the SIO will send Bail applications PLANNING Action upon RECEPTION INTERVIEW PACE IDENTIFICATION FORENSIC
has been overlooked and to identify a full detailed report to Case file arrest ( Suspect and HA) Photograph suspect (prepare early)
good practice. HMP Lifer Unit Witness issues Inspect for injury by Dr PEACE model Time clock
Soc/scientist ( this is the
ACPO Protocol (Aug Graphic presentation of evidence Always check prisoners’ Offence Reviews Witnesses Intimate sample
ACPO Crime recommend the below other half of the scene)
1999) (Ch 11 MIM) property-look closely at Defence Supt review ID Officer Non-intimate samples
Three tier search of address
format for Reviews watches , rings ,shoesfor Adviser Extensions to custody ID parade/Promat Authority
( forensic, CID, Polsa)
blood evidence Special warning Administration of Video DNA premiums
House to house
1) Initial action Feedback to SIO Disclosure applications Street Fingerprint search
FSS urgent submissions
Monitoring Confrontation Medical examination
2) Intelligence CURRENT SITUATION REPORT
3) SIO Policy file 1) Scenes

2) The victim
3) The investigation FAMILY LIAISON (MIM Ch 9)
4) Planned method of investigation INITIAL DECISIONS IMPORTANT CHECKS BY SIO
4) Suspects
(Commencement of Investigation plan 1) Keep informed and record
5) MIR 5) General
see MIM Ch 9).Establish Policy in contact Is the Paper flow within the
(ACPO crime 1998+ MIM Ch 12)
Policy book in respect of: 2) Manage liaison officers and Process/HOLMES system compliant
ensure they are fully briefed with Mirsap-
1) What is being 3) Use Victim Support
investigated 4) Recorded strategies should Double check messages 1-100
include:
DISCOVERY of 2) Why paper or Objectives Statement read statements - do they
CRIME HOLMES Decision about released info self-audit?
3) Location of room Requests by family not acceded
4) Structure of Squad and to and complaints by family Are statement read documents held up in
staffing Lay advisory and intermediaries intrays awaiting actions to be raised.
5) Initial lines of enquiry policy
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF INSTIGATE MAJOR EITHER IMPACT ASSESSMENT 6) Define scene area Exit strategies Is the Holmes full prioritisation of actions
INFORMATION ENQUIRY 7) Scene security briefing (1,2,3,,) required
1) Full HOLMES (Principles) 8) Family liaison
Either obvious Major Crime 2) Mini Squad 9) Witness support plan Actions outstanding - is the team doing
Decide paper or HOLMES
OR SIO & D/SIO (Commence within 4 hours) 10) House to house COMMUNICATION PROCESSES the important actions?
Declared Major Crime by Detective DS inside 11) Search Parameters
Location of room
Superintendent DS outside 1) Acknowledge impact 12) Action in event of an Squad briefings -minuted Is analysis leading to conclusions
DC 2) Assess impact generally in unplanned arrest Internal - Senior CID/ACPO
Initial resources
Disclosure/exhibits collaboration with external 13) Arrest policy ,officer Media Crimewatch/reconstructions
Explain Mirsap agencies safety. Forensic fully involved
14) Tactical interview Circulations internally Confirm actioning process of H to H
Compliance 3) Manage impact on forms
community and/or minority management Road checks-heightens local
groups 15) Finance application awareness with public
16) TIE policy and level of Patrol Officers’ updates Examinations completed by FSS - clear
4) Concerns of family should minuted conferences prevent
be adequately and approval Internet
17) Initial press position misunderstanding
sensitively addressed
ACPO Crime (South and media
PERMISSION/AUTHORITY management Outstanding fingerprints-understand the
Wales) LINES OF ENQUIRY matrix of checking and what databases
18) Indexing policy , PDF,
D/C Supt (specify in Policy Book) have been checked
and Sequence of
Coroner’s Officer events
HO Pathologist VICTIM (MIM Ch 3 + 7) DNA on database
19) Sensitive material
Location PM 1) History/background/habits/photo a) Define what doesn’t
policy
Resources PM UPDATE CORONER INQUEST 2) Sequence of events victim fit No value marks - all have a value to the
20) Intelligence strategy
Information from PM 3) Witnesses/video of movements investigation
FAST TRACK ACTIONS MIM Ch7 21) Call handling from the
Photograph clothes Sudden death report SIO report b) Investigate
public
Update regularly (MIM ch 12) SUSPECT (MIM Ch 3 +10) coincidences Development of Forensic evidence-
1) How is control of scene
Second PM /release 1) Description Is the Policy working between Office
established?
of body 2) Behaviour/MO/databases c) Test the logic of Manager, Exhibits Officer and SOC?
4) Method of elimination inferences
2) What is initial evidence? SCENE MANAGEMENT(see SOC 5) Informants/surveillance/ Review Photographs/video of scene
Policy) 6) Witnesses d) A contradiction in the
3) Who needs immediate SCENE ASSESSMENT conclusion means
interview? 1) Initial callout one of the premises
SCENE(S) (MIM Ch 4)
2) Control of scene 1) Location - why? 1) Identify, secure ,protect is false Examine all exhibits and how actions are
4) Lateral evidence grab - videos 3) Assessment 2) Victim - appearance CHECK 2) Sequence of events scene raised to progress them.
etc 4) Arrangements 3) Weapon used/left PIRENNIAL 3) Significant witnesses
5) Removal of body 4) Pattern and distribution ACTIONS 4) Physical evidence recovery Check exhibits audit standards
5) Family contact 6) Post Mortem wound
CRIME FACULTY (NCF) SCENE COMPLETION
7) Dealing with suspects 5) Force and locus of wound
6) Search arranged 8) Recovery of Forensic 6) Sexual activity
Accredited specialists 1) SIO approve SCENE DISPOSAL
evidence 7) Ancillary activity ADMIN FORENSIC Directed via Forensic
7) Resources en route and those Behaviour Forensic completion
9) Preparation for arrest 8) Expressive/instrumental management team (SIO,CSM,FA)
required Research analysis 2) CID search for Preferably retain and
10) General considerations aggression 1) C/Complaint
Reviewing the Reviewers Profiler 117 1) Identify Urgent submissions relevant non- alarm, then clean and
11) Three tier search 2) D/C Supt
Scene assessment 2) Second stage submissions forensic evidence release
12) Leaving scene spreadsheet
Advice re available databases 3) Office manager/Exhibits officer 3) Polsa search for
13) Development of evidence 3) Crimsec 7A
and SOC develop forensic hidden evidence
DCI Kilbride, Hampshire
28th September 1999/updated 17/11/04
Appendix E

Murder Investigation Review
Instructions
Thank you for participating in this study. You have been given the policy file, Current
Situation Report and the Forensic Summary for a murder and your task is to review
that document using this form.
You may take as long as the task takes. It is not to test your performance in doing this
task.
Your review will be based upon the policy log, current situation report and the
forensic summary as it existed up until 11th April 2004. This is due to the fact that it
would be too time consuming to review the whole murder enquiry. The report box is
expandable and so the amount you write is not restricted.
You should mention positive aspects of the enquiry as well as negative ones and your
findings should be in the form of a report.
Please do not write anything in a non-shaded area.
In order to produce your report, simply click into the shaded area. Please do not write
anything in a non-shaded area. Whilst you are performing this task, if you have any
questions, please phone Dean Jones on 07901 515312.
You should email your final report to Dean Jones and copy it to Andy Stewart.
Name:
Rank:
Length of Service:
Current PIP level of accreditation:
Briefly outline you experience as SIO:
Date of the review:
Overall time taken to conduct this review

Murder Investigation Review Tool
Review Team: LEAVE THIS BLANK
Review SIO
Review D/SIO
Review Team
Terms of Reference: LEAVE THIS BLANK

Benchmark:
Your review parameters are to review the investigation using available documentation
and prepare a report in accordance with the following terms of reference:
• Identify further or missed lines of enquiry
• Identify good practice
• Identify bad practice and your recommendations
• Identify areas which you cannot comment upon due to lack of information
• Make general comments and recommendations as to the further investigation
of the murder
Your Report

Appendix F

Categories
1 SIO Policy Log

2 Initial Response
3 Fast Track Actions
4 Perennial Actions
5 Identification of the Enquiry Team and Key Roles
6 Missing Person Reports
7 Summary and Aim of the Investigation
8 Use of Hypotheses
9 Standard Analytical Products
10 Identification as to Links with other Crimes
11 Evidence of Review and Management Intervention
12 Multi-Agency and Partnership Working
13 Investigative Support
14 Identification of Scenes and Scene Parameters
15 Crime Scene Management
16 Forensic Strategy
17 Pathology
18 Searches
19 Passive Data Generators
20 House to House Enquiries
21 Witness Management
22 Family Liaison
23 Managing Communication
24 Community Involvement
25 Elimination Enquiries
26 Suspect Management
27 Surveillance Strategy
28 Covert Human Intelligence Sources
29 Reconstructions
30 Major Incident and Holmes Procedures
31 Post Charge Maintenance

Appendix G

Murder Investigation Review
Instructions
Thank you for participating in this study. You have been given the policy file, Current
Situation Report and the Forensic Summary for a murder and your task is to review
that document using this form.
You may take as long as the task takes. It is not to test your performance in doing this
task.
Your review will be based upon the policy log, current situation report and the
forensic summary as it existed up until 11th April 2004. This is due to the fact that it
would be too time consuming to review the whole murder enquiry. The report box is
expandable and so the amount you write is not restricted.
You should mention positive aspects of the enquiry as well as negative ones and your
findings should be in the form of a report.
Please do not write anything in a non-shaded area.
In order to produce your report, simply click into the shaded area. Please do not write
anything in a non-shaded area. At the top of each section there is a reference to where
policy and good practice can be found. You have been provided with this policy and
good practice. Your task is to ‘benchmark’ the policy file against these documents
which you can view through the murder manual which is available on the Genesis
data base on the intranet, or on the Murder Manual CD Rom. You can hyperlink to
this document on
http://www.genesis.pnn.police.uk/genesis/Doc/0/805B9IRCF6G4NDRJ9RBJ7
8M31F/MIMNon-Interactive_final23.10.06.pdf
Whilst you are performing this task, if you have any questions, please phone Dean
Jones on 07901 515312.
You should email your final report to Dean Jones and copy it to Andy Stewart.
Name:
Rank:
Length of Service:
Current PIP level of accreditation:
Briefly outline you experience as SIO:
Date of the review:
Overall time taken to conduct this review

Murder Investigation Review Tool
Review Team: LEAVE THIS BLANK
Review SIO
Review D/SIO
Review Team
Terms of Reference: LEAVE THIS BLANK

Benchmark:
Your review parameters are to review the investigation using available documentation
and prepare a report in accordance with the following terms of reference:
• Identify further or missed lines of enquiry
• Identify good practice
• Identify bad practice and your recommendations
• Identify areas which you cannot comment upon due to lack of information
• Make general comments and recommendations as to the further investigation
of the murder
SIO Policy Log

Benchmark:
Revised Guidelines for Major Crime Review (ACPO 1998)
Please make general observations as to what subjects are covered and which are
missed from the list at Appendix C to this document.
Initial Response
Benchmark:
Murder Investigation Manual (Centrex, 2006, p.35-41)
This may be difficult to assess from the Policy File alone. However please glean what
you can from the available material. In particular you should consider the initial
response of the SIO at pages 39-41.
Fast Track Actions

Benchmark:
Murder Investigation Manual (Centrex, 2006, p.41)

Perennial Actions
Benchmark:
List of Perennial actions within Holmes. Discuss their use.
Identification of Enquiry Team and Key roles

Benchmark:
MIRSAP (Centrex, 2005, p.15-42)
Please comment on which roles have been included and those missed. Consider:
SIO/Deputy SIO/Receiver/Statement Reader/Outside enquiry manager/Office
Manager/Finance Manager/Action Allocator (manager)/Analyst/Crime Scene
Coordinator/HOLMES manager/House to House Coordinator/Exhibits
officer/Disclosure officer/Media manager/analyst/FLO. See
Missing Person Reports

Benchmark:
Murder Investigation Manual (Centrex, 2006, p.43-44).
Guidance on the Management, Recording and Investigation of Missing Persons
(ACPO, 2005).
This will not be relevant to this study and can be ignored.
Summary of Enquiry and Aim of the Investigation

Benchmark:
Revised Guidelines for the use of Policy Files (ACPO, 1999)
See also instructions at the front of the Policy File.
Use of Hypotheses
Benchmark:
Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006, p.54)
Core Investigative Doctrine (Centrex, 2005, p.71-72).
Include the use of ‘null hypotheses’.
Standard Analytical Products

Benchmark:

Major Incident Analysis Manual (ACPO, 2005)
Discuss appointment of analyst and instructions given as against the standard
analytical products.
Identification as to Links with other Crimes

Benchmark:
Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006, p.69-74).
This relates not only to a linked series of crimes, but also to the efforts made to
discover whether the murder could be part of a series. It also relates to the
identification of other crimes which may be connected in some other way.
Evidence of Chief Officer Review and Management Intervention

Benchmark:
Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006, p.76-81).
What evidence is there of management involvement from Head of CID and ACC?
Multi-agency and Partnership Working

Benchmark:
Please comment on all work with other agencies/organisations and comment on the
existence of memoranda of understanding.
Investigative Support
Benchmark:
Comment on the use of NCPE Ops/ Operation Support/Behavioural
Psychologists/Geographic Profilers/Interpol/etc
Identify Scenes and Scene Parameters

Benchmark:
Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006, p.134) and Core Investigative Doctrine
(ACPO, 2005, p.78)

Include all scenes, the reason for parameters and the security arrangements made to
protect scenes.
Crime Scene Management

Benchmark:
Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005, p.77-80)
Include review of initial action/setting objectives for the crime scene
investigators/identifying resources/arrangements for scene preservation/recording the
scene (ie video and graphic re-construction/light and sound testing where appropriate
and release of the scene.
Forensic Strategy
Benchmark:
Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005, p.80)
DNA Good Practice Manual (ACPO, 2005)
Using Forensic Science Effectively (ACPO and FSS, 1996).
Include make up of forensic management team/frequency and nature of forensic
reviews/person in charge of implementing forensic strategy/prioritisation of forensic
submission (fast track, priority and standard).
Pathology
Benchmark:
Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006, p154-170)
The Coroners (Amendment) Rules, (2005)
Post Mortem Examinations and the Early Release of Bodies (Home Office, 1999)
Include notification of the coroner/pathologist attendance at scene/removal of
body/continuity of body/identification of body/attendance at post mortem/FLO
considerations for the PM/secondary PM/release of the body/exhumation (where
relevant).
Searches
Benchmark:
Search Management and Procedures (Centrex, 2006).

Overall strategy to include scene searches/vicinity of scene/access routes/egress
routes/disposal sites/victims home, workplace, vehicle etc./use of dogs/open space
searches/use of search advisor.
Passive Data Generators

Benchmark:
Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005, p.94)
Computer Based Electronic Evidence (ACPO, 2003)
Investigators Guide to ANPR (ACPO, 2006).
This includes CCTV/ANPR/Tachographs/Personal Computers/Telephony/Cell
sites/Voice recording systems and anything else which contains data of potential use
in a murder enquiry. Include integrity of exhibits.
House to House Enquiries

Benchmark:
MIRSAP (2005, p.64, p.82,)
House to House Enquiries (ACPO, 2006)
A Practitioners Guide to Intelligence Led Mass DNA Screening (ACPO, 2006).
In particular you should consider setting objectives/identifying location
parameters/setting time parameters/setting subject parameters/timing of H to H
enquiries/setting personal descriptive form parameters/identifying resources/fast track
H to H enquiries/reassurance to the public/mapping included within the policy file/use
of questionnaires/leaflet drops/briefing of H to H staff/motivation of H to H staff.
Witness Management
Benchmark:
National Investigative Interview Strategy (ACPO, 2004)
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Home Office, 2005)
Working with Intimidated Witnesses: a Manual for Police and Practitioners
Responsible for Identifying and Supporting Intimidated Witnesses (Home Office,
2006)
Practical Guide to Investigative Interviewing (NSLEC, 2004)
Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance for Vulnerable
Witnesses including Children (Home Office, 2002)
Investigative Interviewing, Psychology and Practice Milne and Bull 1999)
Vulnerable Witnesses: A Police Service Guide (Home Office, 2002)

Particular attention should be made to the implementation of a witness identification
strategy including media appeals/notices/leaflet drops/CCTV/local enquiries/people
passing through/local trades people/employees/clubs and pubs/relatives/scene
reconstruction/various locations of scenes/taxi/buses/routes victim and offender
passed through etc.
Consider whether risk assessments have been conducted for vulnerable (YJCE Act
Sct. 16) and potentially intimidated witnesses YJCE Act Sct. 17). Consider special
measures and significant witness (Criminal Justice Act Sct 137) video recording of
interviews. Identify if a witness interview strategy has been made/use of specially
trained tier 3 witness interviewers/use of a tier 5 interview advisor/interviewer
debriefing/identification of reluctant and hostile witnesses. Consideration for pre-trial
support.
Family Liaison
Benchmark:
Family Liaison Strategy Manual (ACPO, 2005)
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Home Office, 2005).
Consider FLO strategy which should include objectives/selection of FLO/number of
FLO’s/information to be released to family and reasons for withholding
information/complaints from family/victim support involvement/use of
interviewers/lay advisers/exit strategy/arrange meeting with the SIO/use of FLO
coordinator/use of family liaison advisor/’family’ defined in policy log?/appointment
of deputy FLO/special considerations where a family member is a suspect/risk
assessment for FLO/briefed to obtain lifestyle and family tree/family given Home
Office pack ‘Information for Families of Homicide Victims’.
Managing Communication
Benchmark:
Effective Use of Media in Serious Crime Investigations (Feist, 1999)
The Media as an Investigative Resource in Murder Enquiries (Innes, 1999)
Media Advisory Group Guidance Notes (ACPO, 2003)
Further Advice to the Police on the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (H.O. Circular
115/82
Guidance on the National Briefing Model (ACPO, 2006)
Concentrate on both internal and external communication. Consider the written media
and internal communication strategy/use of media officer/press conferences/family
appeal/sufficient staff in incident room to accept calls after press
appeals/considerations about naming suspects/use of rewards/briefing of local

officers/contact with local intelligence units/frequency and recording of briefings/use
of intranet/use of force newspaper etc.
Community Involvement
Benchmark:
Guidelines for the Completion of Impact Assessments (ACPO, 1999)
Independent Advisory Groups – A Guide (ACPO, 2005)
Hate Crime: Delivering Quality Service: Good Practice and Tactical Guide. (ACPO
and Police Standards Unit, 2005)
Consider Community Impact Assessment/public consultation/Gold
Group/Independent Advisory Group (IAG)/immediate Patrol Strategy (reassurance,
witness searches and public protection)/public meetings.
Elimination Enquiries
Benchmark:
MIRSAP (ACPO, 2005, p.136-141)
Practitioners Guide to Intelligence led Mass DNA Screening (ACPO, 2006)
Tactical Advice- Using Familiaral DNA Intelligence Products in Serious Crime
Investigations (Home Office, 2006)
Consider trace, interview and eliminate (T.I.E) delineation/elimination criteria
(forensic, description, alibi, other)/intelligence led mass screening
Suspect Management
National Investigative Interview Strategy (ACPO, 2004)
Practical Guide to Investigative Interviewing (ACPO, 2004)
Investigative Interviewing, Psychology and Practice (Milne and Bull 1999).
Practice Advice on Evidence of Bad Character (ACPO, 2005)
Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody (ACPO,
2006)
Practice Advice on Dealing with Legal Advisors (ACPO2006)
Practice Advice on Management of Expert Advisors (ACPO, 2006)
Practice Advice on the Right to Silence (ACPO, 2006)
Consider suspect identification strategy/identification procedures/arrest strategy/cross
contamination/continuity/searches/custody processes/PACE advisor/suspect interview
strategy/pre-interview disclosure/interview manager/PEACE

compliance/samples/medical considerations/mental health considerations/appropriate
adult considerations/downstream monitoring/action team availability/CPS
consultation/24 hour review/magistrates extension.
Surveillance Strategy
Benchmark:
National Standards in Covert Investigations Manual
of Standards for Surveillance Regulated by Part III, Police Act 1997, and Part II
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. (ACPO/SOCA/HMCE, 2005)
Manual of Standards for Accessing Communications (ACPO/ACPOS/HMCE, 2003)
Manual of Standards for the Deployment of Test Purchase and Decoy Officers
(ACPO/HMCE/ACPOS, 2003)
Manual of Standards for the Deployment of Undercover officers (ACPO/HMCE, 2003)
Guidance on the Management of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS)
(ACPO/SOCA/HMRC, 2006)
Consider clear objectives/Authorities/Resources/Management/Disclosure.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources

Benchmark:
Guidance on the Management of Covert Human Intelligence Sources
(ACPO/SOCA/HMRC, 2006)
Disclosure Manual (ACPO and CPS, 2005)
Consider tasking/Recruiting CHIS for the purpose of the murder enquiry/CHIS liaison
officer/Managing the product/Second Policy Log/Disclosure/Tasked witnesses.
Reconstructions
Benchmark:
Consider physical reconstructions (ie last time victim seen)/Forensic (ie
experimentation)/Virtual (ie digital technology) /Documentary (ie plans etc).
Major Incident and HOLMES procedures

Benchmark:
MIRSAP, (ACPO, 2005)

Consider document controls and management/Information management/Indexing/All
indices/Sequence of events/level of indexing/Holmes conventions/Merging
records/Linking records/Protective Marking/Information security/Management of
property and exhibits/Use of Officers reports/Disclosure/Intelligence Cell.
Post Charge Maintenance

Benchmark:
Disclosure Manual (ACPO and the Crown Prosecution Service, 2005)
Consider staffing/Resources/Location/Court support.
Other Useful References for Specific Investigations

Benchmark:
Air Accidents Investigation Branch (2002) Guidance for the Police and Emergency
Services in the Aftermath of an Aircraft Accident. London: Department of Transport.
ACPO (1998) Crime Committee Guidelines for the Preparation of Current Situation
Reports. London: ACPO.
ACPO (2002) Coordinated Policing Protocol between the British Transport Police
and Home Office Police Forces. London: ACPO.
ACPO (2002) Emergency Procedures Manual. London: ACPO.
ACPO (2003) National Working Practices in Facial Imaging. London: ACPO.
ACPO (2004) Road Death Investigation Manual. Bramshill: Centrex.
ACPO (2005) Guidance on the Management, Recording and Investigation of

Missing Persons. Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2005) Guidance on the National Intelligence Model. Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2005) Memorandum of Understanding Agreed Between the Rail Accident

Investigation Branch, the British Transport Police, Association of Chief Police
Officers
and The Health and Safety Executive for the Investigation of Rail Accidents and
Incidents in England and Wales. London: ACPO.
ACPO (2005) User Requirement for Forensic Pathology. London: ACPO.
ACPO (2006) Memorandum of Understanding between the Marine and Air

Investigation Branch and ACPO. London: ACPO.

ACPO, British Transport Police, Health and Safety Executive,
Crown Prosecution Service and Local Government Association (2003)
Work Related Deaths: A Protocol for Liaison. London: HSE.
ACPO, Department of Health and Health and Safety Executive (2006)

Investigating Patient Safety Incidents involving Unexpected Death or Serious
Untoward Harm: a Protocol for Liaison and Effective Communications between the
National Health Service, Association of Chief Police Officers and Health & Safety
Executive. London: ACPO, DoH and HSE.
ACPO and the Forensic Science Service (1996) Using Forensic Science Effectively.
Birmingham: FSS.AP
NDIX 2
Brookman, F. (2005) Understanding Homicide. London: Sage.
Davies, P. (2006) The Investigation of Deaths on Land or Premises Owned, Occupied
or Under the Control of the Ministry of Defence – Protocol. The Journal of Homicide
and Major Incident Investigations, 2(1), pp 33-38.
Home Office (2001) Provision of Therapy for Child Witnesses Prior to a Criminal
Trial. London: Home Office.
Home Office (2001) Provision of Therapy for Vulnerable or Intimidated Adult

Witnesses Prior to a Criminal Trial. London: Home Office.
Home Office (2002) Early Special Measures Meetings between the Police and the
Crown Prosecution Service and between the Crown Prosecution Service and
Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses. London: Home Office.
Home Office (2006) Overseas Deployment of Police Officers and Police Support
Staff. London: Home Office.
White, G. (2006) Prison, Probation and Immigration Related Deaths in Custody –

Protocol for Police Investigations. The Journal of Homicide and Major Incident
Investigations, 2(1), pp 53-78.
LIST OF SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL AVAILABLE ON CD-ROM
ACPO (1998) Guidelines for the Preparation of Current Situation Reports.
London: ACPO.
ACPO (2003) Good Practice Guide for Computer Based Electronic Evidence.
London: ACPO.
ACPO (2005) Guidance on Investigating Child Abuse and Safeguarding Children.

Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2006) Domestic Violence. NCPE Update Briefing No. 1/2006 Wyboston:
NCPE.
ACPO (2006) Guidance on the National Briefing Model. Wyboston: NCPE.

ACPO and Department of Social Security (2001) Disclosure of Personal
Information from the Department of Social Security to Police Forces. London:
ACPO.
ACPO and Financial Services Authority (2005) Memorandum of Understanding

between ACPO and the Financial Services Authority. London: ACPO.
APPENDIX 3
ACPO, British Transport Police, Health and Safety Executive, Crown
Prosecution Service and Local Government Association (2003) Work Related
Deaths: A Protocol for Liaison. London: HSE.
ACPO, Department of Health and Health and Safety Executive (2006)

Investigating Patient Safety Incidents involving Unexpected Death or Serious
Untoward Harm: a Protocol for Liaison and Effective Communications between the
National Health Service, Association of Chief Police Officers and Health & Safety
Executive. London: ACPO, DoH and HSE.
Air Accidents Investigation Branch (2002) Guidance for the Police and Emergency
Services in the Aftermath of an Aircraft Accident. London: Department of Transport.
Baker, A. (2005) Prevention of Homicide and Serious Violence. The Journal of

Homicide and Major Incident Investigation, 1(1), pp 3-14.
Chief Fire Officers Association (2006) Protocol for Fire and Rescue Service
Assistance to the Police in the Search for Missing Persons. Tamworth: CFOA.
Davies, P. (2006) The Investigation of Deaths on Land or Premises Owned, Occupied

or Under the Control of the Ministry of Defence – Protocol. The Journal of Homicide
and Major Incident Investigations, 2(1), pp 33-38.
Grange, T. (2002) Suggested Material for Inclusion in the ACPO Murder Manual
with Reference to the Investigation of Contract Killing. Police Service: Dyfed-Powys.
Home Office (2001) Provision of Therapy for Child Witnesses Prior to a Criminal
Trial. London: Home Office.
Home Office (2001) Provision of Therapy for Vulnerable or Intimidated Adult

Witnesses Prior to a Criminal Trial. London: Home Office.
Home Office (2004) Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies. London:

Home Office.
Home Office (2005) Amendments To Section 64 Of The Police And Criminal

Evidence Act (Pace)1984 Regarding The Taking And Use Of DNA Samples From
Deceased Person. It Also Refers To The Definitions Of An Intimate And Non-Intimate
Swab. Home Office Circular 28/2005. London: Home Office.
Scott, I. (2005) Investigating Drug Related Deaths. The Journal of Homicide and
Major Incident Investigations, 1(1), pp 25-36.

Smith, K. (2006) NCPE Crime Operations – Supporting Serious and Series Crime
Investigations. The Journal of Homicide and Major Investigations, 2(1), pp 39-52.
Stelfox, P. (2006) The Role of Confidants in Homicide Investigations. The Journal of

Homicide and Major Investigation, 2(1), pp 79-92.
Wate, R. (2006) Infant Deaths: ACPO Guidelines. London: ACPO.

APPENDIX 3
Watts, S. (2005) Investigating Deaths in Healthcare Settings. The Journal of
Homicide and Major Incident Investigations, 1(1), pp 37-52.
White, G. (2005) Guidance in the Use of Serving Prisoners as Witnesses. The Journal
of Homicide and Major Incident Investigation 1(1), pp 53-60.
White, G. (2006) Prison, Probation and Immigration Related Deaths in Custody –

Protocol for Police Investigations. The Journal of Homicide and Major Incident
Investigations, 2(1), pp 53-78.
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Appendix H

Risk Assessment
Research Risk Assessment
No Threats HML Management of Risk
1 The independent variable (review tool) L The research of the literature should ensure that all
is not fit for purpose relevant material is identified and each element of
the murder is sufficiently identified and
benchmarked
2 Outcomes are inconclusive due to L Early negotiation should be made to identify and
insufficient access to murder material secure sufficient material
3 Internal validity not achieved M Internal validity can be achieved ensuring that both
the control group and the questioned group have
the same general experience and knowledge which
can be gained from the level of SIO competency
from their managers.
By comparing the content analysis of the report
from the experimental reviewers with the control
reviewers, and ensuring that enough subjects are in
each group. Suggest in this case 5 in each group.
4 External validity not achieved through; 1) Selection will be in consultation with managers
1) Selection of the group subject of the M with knowledge regarding competence and
study experience to ensure that both groups are similar
2) Context in which the study takes L 2) This will be at the officers respective Major
place Incident Room in controlled environment
3) History in terms of experience L 3) See 1 above
4) Specific constructs peculiar to the L None identified
group subject of the study
5 Subject error L This is very low as the manager will select subjects
and will be briefed not to select officers with
known personal or health problems
6 Subject bias M This will be reduced by selecting at least 5 in each
of the experimental and control groups
7 Observer error M An independent verifier or ‘marker’ will check the
observers results
8 Observer bias H As above
9 Construct validity M Peer review will assist in reducing this risk
10 Experimental realism L This is not likely to be a factor as the murder

subject of the review will be a real one
11 Mundane realism L See 10 above
12 Time H The researcher will work closely with the managers

of the officers to ensure that the participants have
sufficient time to complete the experiment
13 Assessment of content analysis could M Test the coding on samples of text and assess
be flawed. reliability. This will be peer reviewed
* HML relates to the relative risk as High (H), Medium (M) or Low (L). (Frosdick, 1999).
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The Case to Review Murder Investigations

Article in Policing · September 2008

Reviewing the Reviewers View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

MSc in Police Science and Management

Dissertation submitted as partial requirement for the award of MSc in Police

Science and Management.

Reviewing the Reviewers

The review of Homicides in the United Kingdom

Submitted by Dean Jones

Reviewing the Reviewers 1

context and through a review of the literature, develops a benchmarked review

experimental group produced significantly more review comments which were of a

reviewing officers’ to complete reviews in a more structured and consistent way,

lead to a perpetual cycle of professionalising the investigative process.

Reviewing the Reviewers 2

Dream Policing for the inspiration for this research.

Detective Superintendent Andy Stewart, head of Hampshire Constabulary Major

Crime Department for Support and verification of findings.

by completing the reviews.

Hampshire Constabulary for funding this research as part of the Bramshill

Reviewing the Reviewers 3

Chapter 1: Investigation in Context 13

History of Murder Review 14

Chapter 2: Murder Review Process 26

Constituent Parts of a Murder Review 31

Capturing the Learning 32

Scoring and Coding 42

Reviewing the Reviewers 4

Relation of Findings to Previous Research 71

Generalisability of the Research 72

Bibliography in Respect of Review Tool 86

Reviewing the Reviewers 5

Table 1 Generic Terms of Reference for Murder review (1) 27

Table 2 Generic Terms of Reference for Murder review (2) 27

Table 3 Investigative Weaknesses 28

Table 5 Previous Research 31

Table 6 Demographic Breakdown of Participants 38

Table 7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Content Analysis 43

Table 8 Qualitative Matrix 45

Table 9 Likert Scale 45

Table 10 Wordage of Participants 49

Table 11 Breakdown of Positive and Negative Comments 51

Table 12 Amalgamated Likert Grading 53

Table 13 Summary of Qualitative Findings 59

Table 14 Overall Increase in Performance of Experimental Group 68

Reviewing the Reviewers 6

Figure 1 Revised Guidelines for Major Crime Reviews 17

Figure 2 Five Stage Process of Murder Review 26

Figure 3 Example of Hyperlink Benchmark 40

Figure 4 Quantitative Analysis Chart 50

Figure 5 Positive and Negative Responses – Pie Chart 52

Figure 6 Positive and Negative Responses – Bar Chart 52

Figure 7 Total Qualitative Breakdown 54

Figure 8 Mean of Scores Ignoring Zero 54

Figure 9 Chart Showing Amalgamated Likert Grading 56

Figure 10 Results Within Qualitative Categories 57

Figure 11 Pie Chart of Qualitative Results 57

Figure 12 Graph of Qualitative Results 58

Reviewing the Reviewers 7

‘No greater honour will ever be bestowed on an officer or a more profound

presenting these facts to the court without regard to personality’