Saptabhaṅgī: The Jaina Theory of Sevenfold Predication: A Logical Analysis

Author(s): Pragati Jain

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 3, The Philosophy of Jainism (Jul., 2000), pp.
385-399
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400181 .
Accessed: 14/11/2012 19:17

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy
East and West.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SAPTABHANGI-THE JAINATHEORY OF SEVENFOLD
PREDICATION: A LOGICAL ANALYSIS

PragatiJain
ofPhilosophy,
Department Indiana Bloomington
University,

The SyjdvadamahijarT is a commentary on Hemacandra'sAnyayoga-vyavacchedika.

Written in 1292 byMallisena,theSyidvadamahijarr is a workconsisting ofthirty-two
versescriticizingthephilosophical positions of theother schools-Vaidesika, Nyaya,
Vedanta,Samkhya,Buddhism, and Carvaka-in favor of the Jaina anekintavida,
'thedoctrine
literally, ofnon-onesidedness'. A beliefinthenon-onesided, pluralistic
natureof realitymeantthattheJainasviewedconflicting philosophical systems as
equally valid, each systembeing a correct of
description just one aspect of this
manifold Theymaintained
reality. thatonlybysynthesizing all ofthesedescriptions
couldthephilosophical truth be obtained.Thus,theJainaanekantavida was a pos-
itivedoctrine, the
accepting validity of all philosophical theories, provided thatthese
wereappropriately qualified to make explicitthe relative nature of each theory.In
orderto establishtheirdoctrineof anekantata, theJainasmade use ofSaptabhahgT
('sevenmodes'),a theory ofsevenfold predication, whichwas a methodofpredica-
tionemphasizing the'non-onesidedness' ofreality.
A detailedaccountofSaptabhaigris containedin sections23 and 24 ofMalli-
serna'sSyidvadamainjarT-'the blossomclusterofthedoctrine ofsyat'.Itis theterm
syatin thesevenpredications thatdoes theworkin exposingtherelativenatureof
the predications; hence Saptabhahgr is also knownas syadvada,'the doctrineof
syat'.The use of is a
syat distinguishing feature ofthesystemofsevenfold predica-
tion,whichsetstheSaptabhahgr oftheJainasaside fromthesystems developedby
theotherschoolsofIndianthought. Indeed,SaptabhaigT has beenhailedbysomeas
themaincontribution ofJainism to thephilosophical traditions of India.However,
Saptabhargr has also been severely criticized on the grounds thesevenpredi-
that
cationsare madewithoutlogicalbasis,and thatthesystemis self-contradictory by
virtueofthefourth predication. In this essay, I examine the subtleties ofthe seven-
foldsystem ofpredication, and suggest thatthesevenpredications can be seento be
theresultofa preciseand systematic analysis.I also providean interpretation ofthe
fourth predication thatrenders thesystem ofSaptabhahngf freefromcontradiction.

TheSystemofSevenfold
Predication

Saptabhangris a systemof predications,seven in all, that can be employed to

describe an entitywith respectto some predicate. Accordingto the Jainas,each
predicationexpressesonly one aspect of the truthabout the entitybeing discussed.
The seven predicationstakentogether,however,providean exclusive and exhaus-

PhilosophyEast & West Volume 50, Number3 July2000 385-399 385

? 2000 by University
of Hawai'i Press

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 tivelistofthecorrectwaysofspeakingabouttheentity.
A statementoftheseven
can be extracted
predications fromtheSyadvadamai-jarTn1
section23:
1. syjtastieva sarvamiti
2. syatna astieva sarvamiti
3. syatastieva sy t na astieva iti
4. syatavaktavya eva iti
5. syitastieva syjtavaktavyam eva iti
6. syatna astieva syatavaktavyam eva iti
7. syatastieva syat na astieva eva iti
syatavaktavyam

1. possiblyeverythingsimplyexists
2. possiblyeverythingsimplydoes notexist
3. it
possibly simplyexists,possiblyitsimplydoes notexist
4. possiblyitis simplyunutterable
5. possiblyitsimplyexists,possiblyitis simplyunutterable
6. possiblyitsimplydoes notexist,possiblyitis simplyunutterable
7. possiblyitsimplyexists,possiblyitsimplydoes notexist,possiblyitis simply
unutterable2
Heretheword'possibly'is a translation oftheterm'syat'.'Syat'is derivedfromthe
rootVas-'to be'; it is the optativeform,thirdpersonsingular, and is generally
translatedas 'could be' or 'maybe'or 'perhaps'.In thecontextofthesevenpredi-
cations,'syat'comesto mean'possibly',butnotin thesenseoftherebeingsome
uncertaintyas to whether or notthesentenceis true,butrather inthesenseofthere
beingsome way inwhich the sentence is
really The
true. term 'syat'qualifiestherest
ofthesentence:itsaysthatina certainway,orfromsomeparticular standpoint,the
sentenceis (undoubtedly) true.So, forexample,thefirstpredication statesthat"in a
certainsense, everythingsimplyis," or "there is some point of view fromwhich
everything simply exists."Forease ofexpositionI willleavesyatuntranslated inwhat
follows,the idea hopefully being clear.Further
considerations of the function ofsyat
inthesevenpredications willbe takenup below,inthesectionon A ModalAnalysis
of 'Syjt'.Theword'unutterable' inpredications(4) through ofthe
(7) is a translation
Sanskrittermavaktavya. Sincea plausibleinterpretation of avaktavya in thefourth
predication is a majorthemeofthisessay,I willdefera discussionof itsmeaning
untillater.
Now,whilethesevenpredications as statedintheSyadvidamaiijarT are initially
madewithreference to reality,
they are notrestrictedto thisuse. Afterall, we may
wantto speakaboutparticular objects theworld,too. So anothercommonstate-
in
mentofthesystem ofsevenfold predicationusestheexampleofa pot:(1) syat,the
the
potexists,(2) syat, pot does not exist, so on. Infact,itis possibleto gener-
and
by using predicates other than 'exists' to state the seven
alize this even further,
predications.This would lead to the followinggeneralstatementof the seven predi-
cations:

386 East& West

Philosophy

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 1. syat,a is F
2. syat,a is not-F
3. syat,a is F; syat,a is not-F
4. syat,a is avaktavya
5. syjt,a is F; syat,a is avaktavya
6. syat,a is not-F;syat,a is avaktavya
7. syat,a is F; sy t,a is not-F;syat,a is avaktavya,

wherea standsforanyobject,and Fforanypredicate.However,in listingtheseven

the
predications, SyadvadamanijarT mentions only the predicate'exists',and this
ofSaptabhahgr.
seemstypicalofearlyexplications Thisdoesn'tnecessarily indicate
thatSaptabhahgr ofthesystem
lacksthegenerality presentedabove,fora statement
well be replacedwith'The bookexistsas green',
suchas 'The bookis green'might
or somesuchsentence.Andindeed,Mallisenaremarks intheSyadvadamanjarT that
seven-modes... withregardto a singlething
thereis the "possibilityof even infinite
foreach state."3Thisgoes some of theway to suggesting thatthe generalization
givenabove is at least in
implicit the In
SyadvadamafijarT. anycase,themainthingto
notehereisthattheJainasviewSaptabhahgT as notjusta groupofsevenstatements,
but insteadas a systemencompassinginfinitely manystatements, occurringin
groupsofseven-potentially, sevenforeach statementoftheform'a is F'.

A Logical Excursion

Whyis itthattherearesevenpredications,and notsix,say,oreight?Thisis a natural

questionto ask,and, indeed,BimalMatilalhas suggested thatcertaincriticismsof
Saptabhahgf on thisaccount are based on a misunderstanding due to a failureto
providean answerto thisquestion.4The keylies in realizingthatthesevenpredi-
(1), (2), and (4) above. The other
cationsare based on three'simple'predications:
predicationsare complexones, givingall of the possiblecombinations of these
three.Although thismaybe obscuredby theorderin whichthe predications are
presented,the factthatthe seven are
predications built out of the above three is
mentioned intheSyadvadamahijarT:
explicitly

Astitvamr saha na virudhyate.

na astitvena Avaktavyatvam api vidhinisedhitmakam
any-
na
onyam virudhyate.... Anena ca na astitvi
astitv
trayena nirvirodhata-upalaksita.
sakala-saptabhahgyJ avaktavyatva-laksan'a-bhargaka-
AmTsim eva trayan
am mukhyatvat
ca
sesa-bhahganramsamyoga-jatvena amTsueva antarbhivititi.

Existence
is notcontradictory
to nonexistence.
Also,unutterability, ofaffirma-
consisting
tionandnegation
is notmutually Andbythisthenoncontradiction
contradictory.... of
thewholesystem ofSaptabhahgT is understood,
bymeansofthetriadofmodesdefined
as nonexistence,
existence,[and]unutterability; thesethreealoneare theprincipal,
since
inasmuchas theremainingmodesare includedin them,byarisingfromcombinations.5
(myitalics)

Pragati
Jain 387

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 We willreturn,
inthesectionsbelow,tothequestionofcontradictionraisedhere
in thetext.Matilalprovidesa nice symboliccharacterization
of the sevenpredi-
'+' forthefirst
cations.6Writing '-' forthesecondpredication,
predication, and '0'
thesymbolic'values'ofthesevenpredications
forthefourth, areas follows:
+ - + 0 +0 -0 +0

Mathematically, thesevenvaluesarethenonempty members ofthepowerset7 ofthe

set{+, -, 0}. Matilal'schoiceofsymbolsforthethreesimplepredications is a nat-
uralone: thefirst predication 'a is F' is a positivestatement, ascribingtheproperty F
to theobjecta; thesecondpredication'a is not-F'is negativein thesame sense.
Matilalchoosesthesymbol'O' to represent thefourth predication 'a is avaktavya',
hinting thatit is neutral. Butwe will have more to say about the'neutrality'ofthe
fourth predication later.
The idea of ascribing'values' to the predications is a fruitful
one. As noted
earlier,corresponding to each objecta and each predicateF,thereare sevenpredi-
cations,each predication providing a correctway of speakingabout the world.
Matilal'scharacterization shows that thereare also seven valuesassociatedwith
each objecta and predicateF -we couldsaythatthesearetheseventruth-values of
thesentence'a is F'. So, givenan objecta and a predicateF,we couldsaythatthe
sentence'a is F' is positive(ortrue)ifa is F,and (undera standard accountoffalsity)
negative(orfalse)justincase a is not-F. Finallywe couldsaythat'a is F' is neutral if
a is avaktavya. Andthenthereis a simpleidentification betweenthesevenpredi-
cationsofSaptabhargT and thepossibletruth-values thata sentenceoftheform'a is
F' can take(leaving aside thefunction of theterm 'syt"',whichwe willtakeup inthe
nextsection):
1*. true
2*. false
3*. trueand false
4*. neutral
5". trueand neutral
6*. falseand neutral
7*. true,false,and neutral
Mostadherents of classicallogic,whichhas onlythetwotruth-values of true
and false,wouldviewthissystem as puremadness,and wouldreject
oftruth-values
(3*)through (7*)outofhand.Butitis interesting to notethatvariouscontemporary
logicianshave investigated logicswithvaluestakenfromthepowersetofthestan-
dardtwotruth-values.8 Forexample,GrahamPriestendorsesa three-valued logic
withthevaluesTrue,False,and Both,9 andJ.MichaelDunn'sfavoritelogic four
has
In
values:True,False,Both,and Neither.10 fact,Priestactuallyinvestigates a logic
withvalues taken fromthe powersetof {True, False, Both}," resultingin a seven-
valued logic. Recall thatthe seven values presentedabove arise fromthe powerset
of {True, False, Neutral},and so it may be temptingto identify of
the truth-values
SaptabhangTwith those of Priest'sseven-valued logic, simplyby interpreting the

388 East& West

Philosophy

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
'neutrality'
ofthefourth predication as beingbothtrueand false.Butmaywe not
insteadinterpret thefourthpredication as beingneutralbyvirtueof havingneither
thatcannotbe denied,and,indeed,we will
value?I believethatthisis a possibility
see thatthereis a sensein whichthefourth encompassesbothofthese
predication
'neutral'values.

A ModalAnalysisof'Syat'

Inthelistoftruth-values above,themostglaringis (3*):howcan a sentencebe true

as well as false?Or, in termsofthethirdpredication, ifa is F how can a also be
not-F?Is the thirdpredication Not
self-contradictory? surprisingly, the term'syat'
playsan important roleinshowingthatitis not.
Letus introduce a piece ofterminology. We willsaythatthethreesimplepredi-
cations(1), (2), and (4) are independent iftwoconditions hold:
a. No twoof(1), (2), and (4) implythethird
b. No twoof(1), (2), and (4) implythenegation ofthethird
Ifwe assumethat(1), (2),and (4) are independent (we willsee shortly thattheyare),
thenconditions (a) and (b) givetwoimportant properties of the seven predications of
Saptabhafgr. Firstly, condition (a) ensures thateach possible combination of (1), (2),
and (4) givesa newpredication; thatis,predications(3), (5), (6), and (7) are distinct
fromeach otherand also from(1),(2),and (4). Condition (b) ensuresthatnoneofthe
predications (3), (5), (6), and (7) are contradictory-provided, ofcourse,that(1), (2),
and (4) are freefromcontradiction. So thepossibilityof (3) beingcontradictory is
ruledout if(1), (2), and (4) are independent; forifcondition(b) is satisfied, then(1)
and (2) are notcontradictories, and so (3),thecombination of(1) and (2), is notself-
contradictory.
Itisthepresenceoftheterm'syat'thatdetermines theindependence ofthethree
simplepredications. EarlierI suggested thatsyitcould be translated as 'in a certain
sense',or 'froma particular point of view',qualifyingthe sentence as beingrelative
to thepointofviewtaken.I think thattheidea isthatthetruth ofa sentenceis never
absolute,butratheris conditional on some standpoint fromwhichthesentenceis
true;itis onlytruerelative to someparticular conditionobtaining. Drawingon this
idea ofconditions, Matilaloffers an interpretation
oftheterm'syit'in thesepredi-
cationsas an operator that"turnsthecategoricalproposition intoa conditional."12
He thengivesthefollowing analysisofthefirst twopredications:
1'. Ifp thena is F,and
2'. Ifq thena is non-F,

wherep and q are 'standpoints'

fromwhicha is F
-Ein (1'), or a is non-F(2'). Of
course, herep and q are different standpoints,and so, underthisanalysisof syMt, itis
clear that(1') and (2') are not contradictories,
nor even contraries.They are, in our
new terminology, independent.Byexplicitlyintroducing conditionalsin place ofthe
term'syit', Matilal makes the independence of the threesimple predicationsobvi-

Pragati
Jain 389

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ous. And we can now see whythethirdpredication is notself-contradictory
on
Matilal'sinterpretation:
thethirdpredication
simply asserts thatthere
is some stand-
pointp fromwhicha is F and also someotherstandpoint q fromwhicha is not-F.
AnexamplefromtheSyidvadamaiijarT willclarify
thislastpoint:
Tatrasyatkathamcit astieva sarvarm
sva-dravya-ksetra-kala-bhava-rOpena kumbhadi na
Tathchikumbhodravyatah
punahpara-dravya-ksetra-kila-bhava-rupena. parthivatvena
asti na apyadi-rOpatvena.
Ksetratah na kanyakubjaditvena.
pataliputrakatvena Kalatah
na vasantikaditvena.
saisiratvena Bhavatah syamatvenana raktaditvena.

Here,from somepointofview,everything, pot,etcetera,

simply exists
withtheformof
itsownsubstance,place,time,
nature; butnotwith theform ofanother
substance,
place,
time,andnature.Forinstance:
a potexists as earthen
withrespecttosubstance
andnot
withan aqueousform, etcetera;itexists
as beingofPataliputra
inrespect
toplace,and
notKanyakubja,etcetera;itexistsinthecoolseasonwithrespect totime,notbeingof
thespring,
etcetera;
itexists
witha blackcolorwithrespecttonature,butnotwitha red,
etcetera,
color.13
So, supposeitis 'thecool season'and thatthereis a blackearthenware potin Pata-
liputra.Then, employing Matilal's terminology,we can say thatfrom the standpoint
of earthensubstances, the pot exists,but it does notexistfromthe standpoint of
aqueous substancesor metallicsubstances, and so forth. Itexistswhenconsidered
fromthestandpoint of Pataliputra, butfailsto existfromthestandpoint of Kanya-
kubja or Canberra or Bloomington. And so on. The two in
syat'operators' thethird
predication showthatthepositivepartof(3) (intheexampleabove,'thepotexists')
is to be consideredfromone standpoint, whilethenegativepart('thepotdoes not
exist')is to be considered fromsomeotherstandpoint.
One drawbackofMatilal'sapproachis thatit is difficult to givean accountof
whatwe are to understand bythe'standpoints' p and q. Forexample,ifwe under-
standbyp somesetofconditions, then(1') saysthata is F ifthissetofconditions
obtains.Thismaybe an adequateconditional analysisof(1),buttakeninthisway,p
is nota standpoint, and itisclearthatMatilalintends itto be. However,ifp is indeed
a standpoint, thenitseemsthatthedesiredconditional analysisof(1) is not(1'), but
insteadsomething like(1'*):
(1'*) Ifwe are considering from
things thepointofviewofp, thena is F
Andthenthedifficulty becomesone ofdetermining whatthestandpoint p shouldbe.
In factitis peculiarto singleoutone particular standpoint p fortheanalysisof(1),
whenitseemsthatwhatis requiredis a statement thatquantifies overstandpoints:
(1) holds just in case there is some standpoint p such that viewed fromp, a is F.
WhileMatilal'sanalysisofsyitas a conditional-forming operator makes itclearthat
thesimplepredications are independent, itseemsthatthisapproachgivesawaytoo
much-it makesreference to a particular standpoint when it isn'tany particular
standpointthatwill do the task.
One way aroundthisis to employmodal operators,fortheterm'syat'does seem
to have modal force.The modal operatorO, read 'possibly',seems well-suitedto
representingthe functionof syat.Ifcpis a sentence,thenwe writeOp forthe sen-

390 East& West

Philosophy

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
tence'possibly,cp',whichis understood to be truejustincase thereissome'possible
world'inwhichcpis true;or,alternatively, thereis somewaythatthingscouldbe so
thatcpholds.Without the
stretching standard of 0 too much,we can
interpretation
bringthisinto our framework:O(p is true
just ifthereis some pointofview,orsome
wayofconsidering suchthatcpistrue.Thefirst
things, can thenbe
threepredications
analyzed as follows:
1". O (a is F)
2". 0 (a is not-F)
3". 0 (a is F); 0 (a is not-F)
Itshouldbe clearthat(3") is notself-contradictory:
itsimply assertsthatthereissome
of
way considering things (some so
standpoint) thata is F,and also some(other)way
ofconsideringthings(some other so
standpoint) thata is not-F.This modalapproach
has theadvantageoverMatilal'sconditional analysisofproviding a uniforminter-
ofthefunction
pretation ofsyatinthesevenpredications.

The FourthPredication

We now turnto perhapsthe mostpuzzlingaspectof SaptabhanigT. How is one to

understand the fourthpredication? The terma-vaktavya is the 'negation'of the
gerundive vaktavya, whichcomesfrom theroot /vac-to speak-and so avaktavya
comesto mean'notto be said'. Takenquiteliterally, thefourth predicationcould
have normative force:it could be takenas forbidding one to say something. But,
morelikely, the
given nondogmatic nature of Jainaphilosophizing, theuse of avak-
tavyahereis descriptive-the idea beingthatitjustcan't be said,tryas one might.
ThusF. W. Thomastranslates avaktavya as 'unutterable'.Thisdoes seemto be the
mostliteral translationofavaktavya, but,inEnglish at least,itis quitepuzzlingtosay,
forexample,thatthepotis unutterable. Of course,theproblemhereis thatunutter-
abilityis a property of words:it is wordsthatare utterable or unutterable,and it
doesn'tmakesensefora nonlinguistic object to be unutterable. I thinkthatit is in-
structiveto examinethe ways in whichotherauthorshave translated avaktavya.
Dhruvatranslates itas 'indescribable', whileMatilalchoosestheterm'inexpress-
ible'. These termshave the sense of therebeinginsufficient resourceswithinthe
to
language convey some situationin the world. Indescribability perhapsempha-
sizesthecomplexity ofphenomenaintheworldas a barrier to providinga descrip-
tion;inexpressibility seemsto place moreemphasison theinadequacyof linguistic
resources. Still,thequestionremains: justwhatis theintended senseofavaktavya in
thefourth predication?
Itwillperhapsbe usefulto return to theSyadvadama-ijarTr foran explanation of
thefourth predication:
Dvabhyamastitva-na-astitva-dharmabhyam yugapadpradhanataya arpitabhyamekasya
vastuno t drsasya?abdasyaa-sambhavad avaktavyam Tathhi
jTvadivastu.
abhidhitsyd.rnyugapadekatrasad itianena vaktum
sad-asattva-guna-dvayam aiakyam.Tasyaasattva-
t. Tathaasad itianenaapi. Tasyasattva-pratyayana-asamarthya-
pratipadana-asamarthatv

Pragati
Jain 391

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 abhNv t.... Itisakala-vacaka-rahitatvat
avaktavyam vastuyugapatsattva-asattvabhyrim
pradhana-bhava-arpit bhyam-ckrcntamvyavastisthate.
Whenthereis a desireto expressa singleentitywiththetwoattributes existenceand
nonexistence, as
appliedsimultaneouslyprincipal, theentity, et
soul, ceterais avaktavya,
fromtheimpossibilityofsucha word.Forthus:thepairofqualities,existenceand non-
existence,are unableto be statedsimultaneouslyin regardto one thingby theterm
becausethattermis incapableofexpressing
'existent'; thenonexistence ofthething.Nor
bytheterm'nonexistent',
similarly because thattermhas nottheabilityto expressits
existence....Thusfromthelackofall formsofexpression theentity is avaktavya,
being
overcomebysimultaneous existenceand nonexistenceappliedas principal.14
I thinkthatthissheds some lighton the intendedsense of the termavaktavya.The
fourthpredicationis used when an entity-say,a pot-both existsand does notexist
froma single standpoint(I take it thatthis is what it is forthe two attributes'exis-
tence' and 'nonexistence'to be "applied simultaneouslyas principal").This is the
crucialdifference betweenthethirdand fourth predications-recall thatthethird
predicationsays that there is a standpointfrom which the potexistsand a (probably
different)
standpoint from which the potdoes not exist.The fourthpredication says
thatina certainsensethepotis inexpressible, andthequoteabove indicates thatthis
comesaboutbecauseofthelackofa 'form
inexpressibility ofexpression'todescribe
thesimultaneous (i.e., from a existence
singlestandpoint) and nonexistence ofthe
pot.The term'existent'doesn'tdescribethe pot,forthistermfailsto capturethe
nonexistence ofthepot,and theterm'nonexistent' is also inadequatesincetheex-
istenceofthepotthenremains unexpressed.So itseems thatwhatis beingsuggested
isthatlanguageis incapableofdescribing thepot;thepotis inexpressible bya single
term.
This raisestwo obvious objections. First,in sayingthatthe pot is inexpressible,
haven'twe just used a singleterm(namely,the term'inexpressible')
to express
thisis a cheap shot,but,in anycase, theSyidvadamahijarT
it?Admittedly, has an
answer:
na ca sarvatha
avaktavyam. gabdenaapi anabhidheyatva-prasargMt.
Avaktavya
ineveryway;becauseoftheconsequenceofbeinginexpress-
Butitis notinexpressible
ibleevenbytheword'avaktavya'.15

The idea is thatitis not in everyway thatthe pot is inexpressible,butjustfromsome

particularstandpoint(afterall, thisis the functionof the syit operator).The second
objection is moreinteresting. Whytheemphasison a singletermto describethepot?
Whynotuse twowords(ormore);or,giventherichness oftheSanskritlanguage,a
compound?Surely one could say "there
is a sensein which thepot both existsand
does notexist"-is thisnota 'formofexpression' thatdescribesthepot?In short,
why is it necessaryto 'switch' to the termavaktavya?I thinkthat Dhruva has an
answerto this,but I shall returnto thispointlater.Fornow these ideas give riseto a
moreseriousproblemwiththe fourthpredication:isn'titself-contradictory?
The textis explicitin statingthatthe fourthpredicationis made "withsimulta-

392 East& West

Philosophy

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
neous affirmation and negation"''16 (of existence).Whereasthe thirdpredication
escapes thechargeofcontradiction by applyingexistenceand nonexistence to an
entitysuccessively (syat,thepotexists;syat,thepotdoes notexist),itis clearthatthe
fourth predication intended
is foruse whenthesepredicates are to be appliedto an
entitysimultaneously. And to say thatthe potboth and
exists does notexistis to say
something contradictory. To putitslightly thefourth
differently, predicationhasonly
one sy~toperator, and so itstatesthatthereisjusta singlestandpoint from whichthe
potexistsand also does notexist.Inthenotation oftheprevioussectionabove,this
wouldbe analyzedas:
4". < (a is F and a is non-F)
Putlikethis,thereis no escapingthefactthat,unlike(3"),(4") is self-contradictory.
Butis (4") a reasonableanalysisofthefourth predication?Itdoes seemtocapturethe
notionof"simultaneous affirmationand negation," butis thisreallyhowwe are to
understand the fourth predication? Does the fourthpredicationreallyembodya
contradiction?
Matilalthinks thatitdoes. He writes:
Thefourth however,
predication, a problem.
presents For,itseemstoapplytwoincom-
patible ...
predicates tothe in
subject thesame breathorsimultaneously.
Althoughthe
is
statementconditionalizedwiththesyjtoperator,
itonlymeansthatundercertain
a thing
conditions willhavetwocontradictory
characters. heremaybe
Thus,thespeaker
takentohavecontradicted
himself
andsaidnothing.17

According to Matilal,then,thefourthpredication is useless.I disagreewithMatilal's

claimthatto contradict one's selfis to say nothing; thereare respectablelogical
systems thatadmit of contradictions.
But I think thatit is importantto observethat
theJainascertainly do not intendthe fourth predication to be an acceptanceof
contradiction intotheirsystem.Indeed,section24 of the textis givenover to
that
'showing' thesystem ofSaptabhangT is freefromcontradiction. I shallexamine
the(not-so-clear!)
arguments inthissectionlater.Inanycase, Matilalconcedesthat
thefourth predication maysomehowbe 'saved' byan appeal to a hiddenmeaning,
whichcan be made explicitin orderto resolvetheapparentcontradiction. As an
he quotesan exampletakenfromStrawson:
illustration

[W]ecansayofa man,"He is bothoversix-foot

tallandundersix-foottall,"andthen
that
explain he hasa disease
that
makes him but
stoop, if
that he were cured andwere
abletostandupright
hewouldtopthesix-foot
mark....InthiswayI thinktheJainascan
answerthechargeofself-contradiction the
against fourthpredication.18
I findthisexplanationquiteunhelpful.
Matilal'sexamplesoundsmorelikean
attempt to answerthechargeofself-contradiction
againstthe thirdpredication:
he
seems to be explainingthe contradictionin the sentence "He is both over six-foot
tall and undersix-foottall" by analyzingthisas "Fromone pointof view, he is over
six-foottall,and fromanotherpointofview he is not."And as a defenseofthefourth
predication,his explanationseems quite unsatisfactory; given thatthe textmakes it
clear thatthefourthpredicationis not intendedto be self-contradictory,itseems that

PragatiJain 393

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 thereshouldbe someattempt toaccountforthetextas itstands,without resorting to
hiddenmeanings to explainthefourth predication. Indeed,thereis good reasonto
suppose that the fourth predication is in fact not self-contradictory, and does not
standinneedof'saving'inthewayMatilalsuggests. Inseeingthefourth predication
as involving a contradiction, Matilalin effect accepts(4") as a correctanalysis;he
analyzesthetermavaktavya as standing in place ofthepredicate"bothexistsand
does notexist."His accountmakeslittlereference to thepresenceofthetermavak-
tavya in the fourth predication, yet I think that itis withthistermthatthekeyto un-
derstanding thefourth predication lies.
In all fairness, Matilaldoes add theparenthetical remark: "Thismaypartially
justifythe use of 'inexpressible' to denote this predication, two contradictory
for
are
predicates supposed to cancel or erase each other."19 So hereis an attempt to
explainthe'switch'to avaktavya fromthephrase"bothexistsand does notexist."
Matilaldoesn'tthinkthatthe use of the termavaktavyadoes away withcontra-
dictions, butthattheuse ofthiswordisjustified bythefactthatthetwocontradic-
torypredicates, existenceand nonexistence, takentogether, cancel each otherout
(and,I assume,resultin no contradiction). Matilalwouldthensaythatan appeal to
hiddenmeanings allowsone to makesenseofthefourth predication. Still,theover-
riding sense of Matilal's account is that, as itstands, the fourthpredication is self-
contradictory, and thiscontradictory natureis in needoffurther explanation.
Dhruvaon theotherhand,suggeststhatthetermavaktavya is employedpre-
cisely to avoid self-contradiction. He describes the fourth predication as a "State-
mentofindescribability arising frommaking affirmation and negation conjointly and
also involving a contradiction which can be got over by
simultaneously,--thus
the statement of italics).
making indescribability"20 (my
I thinkDhruvahas a good pointhere.To use thetermavaktavya to describea
pot,say,is to acknowledgethatcontradictions suchas thatembodiedin thestate-
ment"thereis a senseinwhichthepotbothexistsand does notexist"are bad and
are notto be admitted intothesystem. The idea hereis thatby'switching' to avak-
tavyato makethestatement "thereis a senseinwhichthepotis inexpressible" one
avoidssayingsomething contradictory. This makes itclear thatthe fourth predica-
tionis notto be thought ofas involving a contradiction, forthereis nothing contra-
dictory aboutascribing to an
inexpressibility entity.21
So herewe have one possiblereasonforthe use of thetermavaktavya-itis
introduced as a meansofavoidingthecontradiction thatwouldotherwise be present
ina system thatallowsone to predicate simultaneous existenceand nonexistence to
an entity. Implicit inthisreasoningis thethought thata system thatadmits of con-
tradictions is incoherent, or at leastimplausible, a thought thatis madeexplicitin
section24 ofthetext.Heretheauthortakesgreatpainsto 'show'thatthesystemis
entirely freefromcontradiction. The argument givenis notparticularly clear,but
worthmentioningnonetheless:

na virudham....Ayamabhiprayah.Paraspara-parihdrena
[S]ad arthesuasattvarn ye
vartatetayohSTta-usnavat Na ca atraevam.Sattva-
virodhah.
saha-anavasthdna-laksanjo

394 East& West

Philosophy

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 asattvayoritaretaramavisvag-bhavenavartanMt. Na hi sattvamasattvamr
par-
ihrtyavartate.
Para-rtpena ...
api sattva-prasahgt. Na caghat.dau
asattvamsattvamr var-
parihrtya
tate.Sva-rOpenaapi asattva
prapteh.Tathica iti.
nirupikhyatvit-sarva~oinyati
Nonexistenceinexistent Thisisthemeaning:
objectsis notcontradictory.... whentwo
thingsarewith mutualexclusion, likehotand cold, is
there contradiction, as
defined
non-abiding But
together. suchis notthecase existence
because
here; and nonexistence
occurwithout mutualseparation.Indeed,ina pot,etcetera, doesnotoccur
existence
with ofnonexistence;
theexclusion becauseoftheconsequence evenin
ofbeingexistent
theform Andnonexistence
ofanother.... doesnotoccurwith ofexistence,
theexclusion
becauseoftheresultofnonexistence evenwithitsownform. Andso,beingunidentifi-
able,therewouldbe universal
emptiness.22
How can we makesenseofthispassage?The mainclaimseemsto be thatitis
notcontradictory to ascribebothexistenceand nonexistence The rea-
to an entity.
son givenforthisis that,unlikehotand cold, existenceand nonexistence occur
"without mutual separation." And this means thatexistenceand nonexistence
occurin an entity together-thepresenceofone does notexcludethepresenceof
theother.Now theargument forthislastclaimis somewhatpuzzling.As I see it,
theargument consistsoftwoparts:
does notexcludenonexistence
I. Existence
II. Nonexistence does notexcludeexistence
How does theargument for(I) go?Well,supposethatthepotexists,and supposethat
existencedoes in fact exclude nonexistence. Thenitcannotbe thecase thatthepot
does notexist(thisiswhatitwouldbe forexistencetoexcludenonexistence), and so
itcannotbe thecase thatthepotdoes notexistas an elephant,a lightbulb,a blan-
ket,and so on; thatis,thepot mustthenbe 'existent even in theformofanother',
whichis absurd;henceexistencedoes notexcludenonexistence. The argument for
is
(11) quite different:ifnonexistence excludes existence, then the potthat does not
existdoes notexistas anything, noteven as itself.So, if nonexistence excludes
existence,then we cannot even be guaranteed of
self-identityobjects, and hence
nothing wouldexist:therewouldbe "universal emptiness." Thisestablishes (11).The
surprisingconsequence is that notonly is it notcontradictory to ascribe both exis-
tence and nonexistence to an entity, butexistenceand nonexistence are always
predicableof an entity.I do notfindthe argument (as I've construedit)entirely
convincing-I thinkit failsto acknowledgethe difference between'exists'and
as'-but
'exists the interesting pointinall of thisis thatitseems thattheJainasdo not
regardthe simultaneous application of the predicates 'exists' and 'doesn'texist'toan
objectto be contradictory.
Andthisleadsus backto ourearlierquestionofthenecessity ofintroducing the
termavaktavya (inthesectionon The FourthPredication above).Whyis itthat,for
example, "thereis a sense in which the pot both existsand does not exist" is not a
legitimate'formof expression' describingthe pot? Why does the lack of a single
word to describe thispropertyof the pot call forthe introduction
of the termavak-
tavya in the statement of the fourth predication? As I mentionedearlier, I think

Pragati
Jain 395

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Dhruvamaypointthewaytoansweringthisintriguing
question.23 on a
Commenting
in
passage24 the he
SyadvjdamaijarT, writes:
Thegistofthepassageinthetextis toshowhowavaktavya arisesfromattemptingto
combine and
simultaneously withequalprominence thesattvaandthe asattva.
There is
nowordinthelanguagetodothis... butsupposing
there weresucha word, stillitwould
presentthetwotothemindoneafter is nosinglewordtoexpress
theother....[T]here
sattva
andasattva combined.25
simultaneously (my italics)
Thisis interesting.
Dhruvaseemsto be suggesting thatthetwopredicates 'exists'and
'does notexist'can onlybe graspedbythemindone aftertheother,because lan-
guagelackstheresources toexpressthesepredicates simultaneously and withequal
emphasis.Thus,itis notso muchthelackofa singlewordthatforcestheintroduc-
tionof avaktavya, butthe lackof anyexpressionin the languageto presentthese
predicates to the mindsimultaneously ratherthan successively-andof course
a singlewordwould be the bestcandidateforsuch an expression.Thereis no
expression thatcan capturethesetwopredicates withoutlisting themone afterthe
other,and so presentingthem to themind inthatway. The fourth predicationtriesto
thesimultaneous
capturelinguistically application of'exists'and 'doesn'texist'to an
and
entity, the lackofan expression to do thisrenders theentity inexpressible.And
so thetermavaktavya makesitsappearancein thefourth predication.Its use does
notlie in avoidingcontradictions (for,as theJainassee it,thereare none hereto
avoid),but,rather, simplyin attempting to describean entity thatbothexistsand
does notexist,thepossibility
ofwhichdoes notentaila contradiction.

LogicRevisited

Earlier we remarked thatthefirstpredication is a positivestatement ('thepotexists';

'a is F'), andthesecondis negative ('thepot does not 'a
exist'; is Whatabout
not-F').
thefourth I
predication? think Matilal is in this
right regarding predication to be
neutral (and he appropriatelydenotesitwiththesymbol'O'). ButI thinkitis impor-
tantto distinguish betweenat leasttwodifferent waysin whichthefourth predica-
tioncould be thought to be neutral.Firstly,itcouldbe neutralinthesenseofbeing
neither positivenornegative.Thisseemsto be how Matilalunderstands the neu-
trality of thefourthpredication-hesuggeststhatthepositiveand negativepredi-
cates(existence and nonexistence,or,moregenerally, Fand not-F)thatmakeupthe
fourth predication"cancel or eraseeach other." To use thefourth predication,con-
sideredneutralin thisway, is in some sense to say nothingaboutthe object in
question,and notoutofignorance abouttheobject,oroutofan inability todescribe
theobject,butsimplybecausethecancelingofpredicates leavesnothing to be said
about the object. Hence the object is avaktavya.Indeed, the statement'a is avak-
tavya'contains neithera positivenor a negativeascriptionto a of the predicate F,
and so the statementis neutralin a veryliteralsense.
ButI thinkthatitis now clear thatthefourthpredicationis notto be understood
as neutralin this sense. There is, however, a second sense in which the fourth

396 East& West

Philosophy

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
predication could be consideredneutral:in the sense of beingbothpositiveand
negative.We haveseenthattheJainasintend thefourth predication tobe usedwhen
bothexistence(positive)and nonexistence(negative) are to be predicated ofan ob-
the
ject; 'neutrality' ofthefourth
predication from
arises there being no contradiction
in ascribingbothofthesepredicatesto theobject(butimportantly, and contraryto
Matilal,thisis notbecauseexistenceand nonexistence canceleach otherout).And
the appearanceof the term'avaktavya'in the fourth predication is notto avoid
contradictions to
(contrary Dhruva), but is merely a result of a lack of resources
withinthe languageto expressthe two predicates'existence'and 'nonexistence'
simultaneously.

Remarks
Concluding
We haveseen thattheneutral flavorofthefourthpredication comescloserin spirit
to theneutralvalueof'both'thanof'neither'. Andthereis good reasonforthis.As
Matilalnotes,the JainaAnekantavida, forwhichthe SaptabhangT is a tool, is a
of
positivedoctrine acceptance, whiletheneutral value of'neither'is one ofstrong
denial.26To admitthisvalue intothesystemof sevenfoldpredication would have
beento runagainstthemaintenetofAnekintavada. FortheJainas,each predication
of the SaptabhaigT was consideredundoubtedly true,theterm'syMt' ensuring the
non-absolute natureofthepredications. And indeed,accordingto theJainas,with
thequalifying term'syjt"each predicatecan be appliedto anyentity at all, as is
indicatedbytheargument intheSyidvadamanjarT consideredinthesectionabove
on The Fourth Predication. Butthisleadsto thenaturalquestionofthepurposeofa
theory ofpredication underwhichitis correctto applyanypredicateto anyentity
whatsoever. Afterall, is itnotthepurposeofpredication to providea description of
an entitythatdistinguishes itfromeverythingelse?Matilalprovidesa partialanswer
to thisquestionin hisremarks aboutthefourth predication:
TheJainas ... mightreply thatthefourth is notintended
predication todistinguish
the
thingfrom otherthings,butto includeitineverything
else.... TheideaoftheJainasis
probablythatinsuchpredication thepurposeofdescription
might fail,butthepurpose
of
a truth
stating willnotfail.27
I agreewithMatilal'slastclaim here,and in factI would liketo go one step
furtherand suggestthatthe purposeof the predications of SaptabhangTis notto
a
provide description at all. As I see is
it,SaptabhahgT not a to
guide predication.
Whatit is, rather,
is a guideto thecorrectwaysof speaking.Andheretheimpor-
tanceoftheterm'syMt' cannotbe overstated. As Matilalquips:"Adda 'syjt'particle
to yourphilosophic and
proposition you havecapturedthetruth."28

Notes
The originalversionofthisessaywas written
fora graduateseminaron thephiloso-
phies of Indiataughtby Dr. GeraldJ. Larson.
Manyof the ideas herestemfrom

PragatiJain 397

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 J.MichaelDunn'sworkon negation.I wouldliketo thankDr. Larsonand
Professor
Dunnfortheirinterest
Professor and encouragement.
1 - The Sanskritquotedinthisessayhas beentakenfromtheSyidvidamahnjarT of
Mallisena,ed. withintroduction, notesand appendicesby A. B. [Ananda-
sankaraBapubhaT]Dhruva,BombaySanskrit and PrakritSeries83 (Sanskrit,
withintroduction and notesin English)(Bombay:The Department of Public
references
1933). Hereafter,
Instruction, to Dhruvareferto this The
text. trans-
lationsare myown, havingconsultedtheexcellentthoughsomewhatdated
by F. W. Thomas,Sy dvidamahnjarT:
translation TheFlower-Spray oftheQua-
dammodoDoctrine(Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass, 1968),and Charles A. Moore's
shortextractoftheSyjdvjdamanfjarr in A SourceBook in IndianPhilosophy,
ed. SarvepalliRadhakrishnan and CharlesA. Moore (Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress,1957).
2 - Dhruva, p. 143, lines104-112.
Syidvidamanijari,
3 - Ibid., p. 145, lines 157-158: vastunianantinim api sap-
"... pratipary~yam
tabhanigTn-meva sambhavit."
4 - BimalKrishna Matilal,Logic,Language,and Reality:An Introduction
to Indian
PhilosophicalStudies
(Delhi:Motilal 1985),p.
Banarsidass, 309.
5 - Dhruva, p. 148, lines10-15.
Syidvadamanijari,
6 - Matilal,Logic,Language,and Reality,pp. 307-308.
7 - The powersetof {+, -, 0} is the set consistingof all possible combinationsof
the elements+, -, and 0.
8 - Thatis,fromtheset{True,False,Bothtrueand false,Neither
truenorfalse}.
9 - GrahamPriest, LogiqueetAnalyse27 (1984):237-243.
"Hypercontradictions,"
10 - J. Michael Dunn,"A ComparativeStudyof VariousModel-Theoretic Treat-
of FormalNegation",in WhatIs Negation?
mentsof Negation:A History ed.
Dov M. Gabbay and Heinrich
Wansing,AppliedLogicSeries, vol. 13 (Dor-
drechtand Boston:KluwerAcademicPublishers,
1999).
11 - Priest, p. 240.
"Hypercontradictions,"
12 - Matilal,Logic,Language,and Reality,p. 311.
13 - Dhruva, p. 143, lines113-118.
SyjdvadamanijarT,
14 - Ibid.,p. 144, lines 143-152.
15 - Ibid.,p. 145, lines152-153.
16 - Ibid.,p. 143, lines107-108: Yugapadvidhinisedha-kalpanaya
caturthah.
17 - Matilal,Logic, Language,and Reality,p. 312.
18- lbid.
19- lbid.

398 East& West

Philosophy

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
20 - Dhruva,SyidvidamaiijarT, p. 244.
21 - Exceptfortheobvious'contradiction' 'expressed'it,men-
of havingthereby
tionedon p. 392 (above).
22 - Dhruva,Syidvidamanijarn,
p. 149, lines22-28.
23 - Ibid.,p. 247.
24 - The passageis quotedon pp. 391-392 (above).
25 - Here, sattvacan be translated as 'being' or 'existence';asattvaas 'non-
existence'.
26 - Matilal,Logic,Language,and Reality,
p. 305.
27 - Ibid.,p. 313.
28 - Ibid.

Jain
Pragati 399

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.221 on Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:17:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions