People v.

Bon
GR No. 166401
TINGA, J.

Facts:
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time, again at
the house of her grandmother. The following year, when she was twelve, she was abused for the fourth
time by appellant. This time, she was raped in an outdoor clearing after having been invited there by
appellant to get some vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy
spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped. BBB
stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000. On that night, she was sleeping beside
her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed
him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was
holding a knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her
clothes and forced her to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of
BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes "moving up and down." Thereafter, she put on her clothes
and returned to where her sister was. She added that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant
who had molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her
grandmother's house again.

Issue:
Whether or not death penalty is the appropriate penalty for the accused

Held:
No. It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous". The amendatory effects of
Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the definition or
classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis
of the new law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent
nature, constitute a special category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as
basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
People v. Simon
GR No. 93028
Regalado, J.

Facts:
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative,
informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a
certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding
Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt.
Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money from Bustamante,
the team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the
police authorities and barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer
pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had
marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then
left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave
him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the
team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant.
The latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a
jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator.

Issue:
Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case

Held:
Yes. There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses
under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws
which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there
could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws
hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application
and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.
People v. Patriarca
GR No. 135475
Buena, J.

Facts:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de
Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672,
respectively.
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10) armed
companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a
person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished and
Malto complied.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot.
When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie
down. After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his
companions to carry away the dead man.
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back
to his place, together with the military, on March 29, 1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and
were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No.
347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons
Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in
Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.
Issue:
Whether or not amnesty should be granted to the accused.
Held:
Yes. Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended,
by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Domingo v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 109376
Davide, J.R., CJ.
Facts:
The records show that on 26 May 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint with the
Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then president of the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.,
former Deputy Presidential Assistant. The complaint was docketed as TBP Case No. 87-02391.
In an Order dated 1 September 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped from the
complaint Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and therefore outside the criminal jurisdiction
of the Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary investigation against the other respondents. In the
same order, it was also directed that a subpoena be issued to DOMINGO, the President of PNB at the
time of the questioned transactions, it appearing from the evidence on record that he was involved in
the case.However, the subpoena addressed to DOMINGO at PNB, Escolta, Manila, his last known
address, was returned "unserved," since he was no longer connected with the said bank at the time it
was served.
On 9 July 1992, SPO III Diaz-Baldos issued a resolution recommending that DOMINGO and Rodolfo
M. Cuenca be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, but that the complaint be dismissed as against Ferdinand E. Marcos for being moot
and academic by reason of his death, and as against Joaquin T. Venus for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal liability has been extinguished by prescription
Held:
No. In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because both parties
to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetrate fraud against the government. The alleged
anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one
of the original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date,
no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the
counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which
could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the
initiatory complaint was filed.

People v. Pacificador
GR No. 139405
De Leon, J.R., J.
Facts:
That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, Arturo Pacificador, then
Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned
corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine
Smelters Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with
other individuals, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith
promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land in Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the
reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of
a contract, the terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that
time was P862,150.00, thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits,
advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in the
amount of P777,005.50.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by prescription as shown by facts
and circumstances on record and of judicial notice.
Held:
No. In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows that in
computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained in the Revised Penal
Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326.

Sermonia v. CA
GR No. 109454
Bellosillo, J.
Facts:
Petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. At least, it is not expressly denied.
Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred, which
hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party
actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the subsequent
marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged
with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma.
Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid
and subsisting.
Issue:
Whether or not his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription.
Held:
No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to
the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to
almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is
not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his
previous subsisting marriage.

Romualdez v. CA
GR No. 165510-33
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the
filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases
which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the
defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for
the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss
Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-
231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of
prescription.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of prescription of criminal liability should prosper in this case.
Held:
Yes. Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal
construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the
State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply be
implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly and
expressly sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor
of the grantee thereof, the accused.

Llamado v. CS
GR No. 84850
Feliciano, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together with Jacinto
N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49.
The two (2) had co-signed a postdated check payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of
P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted the petitioner alone, since jurisdiction over
the person of Pascual, who had thoughtfully fled the country, had not been obtained. Petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P
200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioner was also required to
reimburse respondent Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for probation by the accused should be granted

Held:
No. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner perfected his appeal. The Court of
Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand the case except for execution of judgment.
Moreover, having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at liberty casually
to attack that jurisdiction when exercised adversely to him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the
conclusion that we have reached, that is, that petitioner's right to apply for probation was lost when he
perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Bela v. Martinez
G.R. No. L-67301
Sarmiento, J.

Facts:
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen
which had been attached to her United States of America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in
effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. On January 3, 1978, the trial court adjudged
petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public
document. On December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City
Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner before
Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge.

Issue:
Whether or not the probation of the accused should be revoked.

Held:
Yes. Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by the court, contrary to the
petitioner's submission. If the probationer has proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the petitioner,
the State is not barred from revoking such a privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is
lessened if probation is not revoked.

Salgado v. CA
G.R. No. 89606
Medialdea, J.
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 0-33798
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Agustin Salgado," before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 86). After trial, judgment was rendered on October 16, 1986 finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application for
probation with the trial court. The application was granted in an Order dated April 15, 1987.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the condition in the probation order modifying or
altering the civil liability of the offender.

Held:
No. The April 15, 1987 Order of the trial court granting the application for probation and providing as
one of the conditions therein that petitioner indemnify private respondent P2,000.00 monthly during the
period of probation did not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but
merely provided for the manner of payment by the accused of his civil liability during the period of
probation.

Fransico v. CA
GR No. 108747
Bellosillo, J.

Facts:
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he failed
to control his outburst and blurted —
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo
walang utak. . . .Mga anak ng puta. . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5)
separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with
gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found
petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, i.e., Crim.
Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and
one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on
each date of each case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis,
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. He was
however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar
Colindres, to appear and testify.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D.
1257 and P.D. 1990.

Held:
No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. Considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats
appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by
the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted
only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him,
and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he
was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

Moreno v. COMELEC
GR No. 168550
Tinga, J.

Facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on
the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4)
Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno
filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that
under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
Issue:
Whether or not the probation of the accused affects his disqualification from running for an elective
local office.
Held:
No. In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the
disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here correct.
We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for PunongBarangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram,
Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Colinares v. CA
GR No. 182748
Abad, J.
Facts:
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he
and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by
the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice
on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled. Dr.
Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds
on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and
potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
Issue:
Whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
Held:
Yes. The Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC.

Basilio v. CA
GR No. 11343
Montemayor, J.
Facts:
Petitioners are owners of Haciendas Fortuna, composed of 36 parcels of land situated in San Carlos
Negros Occidental, originally belonging to the spouses Julio Ledesma and Florentina Ledesma, with
they purchased on July 9, 1948. On March 22, 1950, the collector of Internal Revenue, later on referred
to as the Collector, assessed on Hacienda Fortuna an income tax alleged to be due for the year 1949, in
the amount of P23,704.22, including surcharges and penalties, claiming the Hacienda to be an
unregistered general co-partnership, with the petitioner as the unregistered co-partners. Petitioners
equally claim that they were mere co-owners pro indiviso of the property, and so were not liable for the
amount included in the assessment. By a ruling dated March 12, 1955, the Collector overruled
petitioner's contention, as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration, in a letter dated December
20, 1955. On January petitioner filed the petition aforementioned in the Court of Tax Appeals, docketed
as Case No. 226.
Issue:
Whether or not the Collector can enforce his assessments by means of civil action.
Held:
No. After the creation of the Court of Tax Appeals, we see no reason or occasion for the Collector to
enforce his assessments by means of civil action before the Courts of First Instance. To allow the filing
of ordinary civil cases in the ordinary courts to enforce rulings of the Collector on assessments, would
rob Republic Act No. 1125, creating the Court of Tax Appeals, of its principal objectives, namely, of
the expeditious determination of disputed tax assessments, and also deprive the taxpayer of the remedy
of appeal from the Collector's rulings and decisions to the Tax Court which is in a position to determine
and finally decide said tax assessments in the shortest time possible.

PRBL v. Mangawang
G.R. No. 160355
Callejo, S.R., J.
Facts:
That on November 23, 1992 at around 11:50 oclock (sic) in the morning, at Brgy. Dolores,
Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing
Plate No. CVE-707 with MVRR No. 63044987, registered in the name of the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. of Tarlac, Tarlac, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with reckless
imprudence and managed the said Philippine Rabbit Bus at Brgy. Dolores, Capas, Tarlac, in a careless,
negligent and imprudent manner, without due regard to laws, regulations, ordinances and traffic code
and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to persons and damage to property and
in violation of the Land Transportation Laws, said bus driven by the accused while cruising the
MacArthur Highway towards the south direction, bumped the left rear side of a Toyota jeep with Plate
No. TAB 929 with MVRR No. 64284647 owned by Zenaida B. Dizon of 193 M. Santos St., Pasay City,
Metro Manila, and driven by Eduardo Mangawang towards the north direction, and as a result thereof
said Eduardo Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he was then driving sustained damages of an
undetermined amount, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased and the owner thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not it is unjust and unreasonable for the CA to deprive the petitioner of its right to question
its civil liability.
Held:
No. To allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal case via an appeal from the
decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent
court.

Carpio v. Doroja
GR No. 84516
Paras, J.
Facts:
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso
Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the
street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the
medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three
months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against
Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal
proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
Held:
Yes. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in
effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and
enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings against the employee.

Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos

G.R. No. L-25913
Barredo, J.
Facts:
Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on October 26,
1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are now the petitioners.
The trial court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with two mitigating
circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, sentenced him to an
indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the petitioners, who were represented
in the case by a private prosecutor, in the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000) "without prejudice to
whatever the accused (respondent) is entitled from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
for his services of around twenty-six (26) years as a public school teacher, prior to October 20, 1962."
Both respondent and petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that appellate,
court acquit him and petitioners praying, on the other hand, that respondent be convicted of murder,
that the portion regarding what said respondent will receive from the GSIS be deleted and that he be
ordered to pay petitioners "the aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate
and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether the claim therefor is made in the criminal proceedings itself or in a separate civil action.
Held:
In regard to the civil aspect of a criminal case when no separate civil action has been filed by them, it
should be made clear that when there is no such separate civil action and the claim for civil indemnity
is joined with the criminal case, no record on appeal, whether printed, typewritten or mimeographed, is
necessary, except perhaps when formal pleading raising complicated questions are filed in connection
therewith, and still, this would be purely optional on the appellant because anyway the whole original
record of the case is elevated in appeals in criminal cases.

People v. Bayotas
GR No. 102007
Romero, J.
Facts:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was
charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution
of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General
to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
Held:
Yes. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.