Salapuddin vs.

CA Case Digest

An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or
her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.

Facts:

On November 13, 2007, shortly after the adjournment of the day's session in Congress, a bomb exploded
near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan
Complex. The blast led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar and several others. The explosion
was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle that was parked near the entrance stairs of
the South Wing lobby.

Acting on a confidential information, the police raided an alleged ASG safehouse located in Payatas,
Quezon City, leading to the arrest of several persons, one of which was Ikram Indama, who was the
driver of petitioner Gerry Salapuddin. In one of the affidavits executed by Ikram, he said that he heard
Salapuddin ordering Redwan to kill Rep. Akbar of Basilan.

The prosecution later on included Salapuddin in the complaint for murder and multiple
frustrated murder based on the affidavits of Ikram. Later on, the Secretary of Justice issued a
resolution excluding Salapuddin from the charges.

Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning
the Secretary of Justice's resolution. The CA reversed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice stating
that the totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and
material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of the crime.”

Issue: Whether or not the inclusion of Salapuddin in the case was proper.

Held:

No. Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it demands
more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence. A review of the records,
however, show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every
conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not
the evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission of the
crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered against
Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section
28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted against
his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.

The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing the admission
of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by evidence other than the confession.
In this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set
off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of the other persons
arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was involved in the plan to
set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on
Salapuddin’s association with these persons to conclude that he was a participant in the conspiracy.

Mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not suffice. Relationship,
association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be
the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the
place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila.

It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the complicity. In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or
approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy. There must be positive and conclusive factual
evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy, and not simple inferences, conjectures and speculations
speciously sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence."

It must not be neglected that strict adherence to the Constitution and full respect of the rights of the
accused are essential in the pursuit of justice even in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence, and
all rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of preliminary investigation. It is, thus, necessary
that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the commission of a felony, only those matters which
are constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent and material are considered. No such evidence
was presented to sufficiently establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable
offenses he is accused of. It, thus, behooves this Court to relieve petitioner from the unnecessary rigors,
anxiety, and expenses of trial, and to prevent the needless waste of the courts' time and the government's
resources. (Salapuddin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184681, February 25, 2013)
Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)

FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly entering into an
anomalous contract for the purchase of computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus,
Incorporated.

It appears that four years prior to filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan, petitioners were
merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in a civil case filed
against them before the RTC and on the allegations in an unverified complaint filed before the
Ombudsman by the Anti-Graft League. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a
preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary
investigation was being conducted.

Petitioners filed a motion a motion for reconsideration alleging among others that they were deprived
of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy disposition of their case,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. They filed a motion to quash but the same was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners’ right to speedy trial was violated by the inordinate delay in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation?

HELD: YES. The preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not
in the manner laid down in Administrative Order No. 07. The inordinate delay in the conduct of the
“preliminary investigation” infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of their case.[22] In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,[23] we held that an undue delay of close
to three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case.

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this
case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-
affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation
and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the
charges against them had already been dismissed.

Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge petitioners for
violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against the offender for
violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2)
he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; (3) the contract or transaction
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
 RAY SHU, Petitioner,

vs.

JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY,

RAMON MIRANDA, LARRYMACILLAN, AND EDWIN SO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage submitted
to Metrobank. Both deeds of real estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner,
one in his own name while the other was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation. According
to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of Metrobank. After investigation, the
NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati charging the respondents of the
crime of forgery and falsification of public documents.

The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their
right to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them
and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for
comparison.

The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their
right to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them
and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for
comparison. The findings contained in the questioned documents report only covered the
sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as compared with the
signatures appearing on the two deeds of real estate mortgage. An examination of the
signatures of the petitioner which appear in several documents in Metrobank’s possession
revealed that his signatures in the questioned deeds are genuine.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents were denied of their right to due process during
the NBI investigation.

HELD:

NO. The Court held that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory
and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapableof
granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is
an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require
in accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the
investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible.
 Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, the Court found that no
denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings
were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of
finding the existence of probable cause.

The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the
NBI issued the questioned documents report. There was no categorical finding in the
questioned documents report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report,
too, was procured during the conduct of the NBI’s investigation at the petitioner’s request
for assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report is
inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents from securing a separate documents
examination by handwriting experts based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBI’s
questioned documents report does not directly point to the respondents’ involvement in
the crime charged
People vs. Judge Castillo Case Digest
A search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action
has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no
jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements
for the issuance of such warrant are present.

Facts:

Judge Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued a search warrant against the premises of
Rabino for violation of RA 9165. A search was conducted wherein the PDEA and PNP found 1
sachet of shabu inside the house of Rabino in Aparri, Cagayan. Rabino was charged with violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165. The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by Judge
Castillo.

Before arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally
Acquired Evidence, citing lack of probable cause among other grounds. Judge Castillo granted the
motion to quash, holding that because the minimum penalty for illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years, which
penalty is way beyond imprisonment of 6 years, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain
the application for and to issue the search warrant. As such, the search warrant is null and void and
all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

Issue:

May a municipal trial court issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no
jurisdiction?

Held:

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing
and under oatn or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Necessarily, a motion to
quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place
searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2)
there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other
than the accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has
all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are
found to be wanting.

This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where
the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where
the criminal action is pending.

Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region
where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of
Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs
stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region.
The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant
the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling
reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search
warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another
court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is
merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases
when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has
no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the
issuance of such warrant are present. (People vs. Judge Castillo, G.R. No. 204419, November 07,
2016)
LADLAD vs. VELASCO
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007

Facts:

Beltran Petition:

On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a “State of National
Emergency.” Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao,
Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame.

Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for
which he was arrested.

He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech
Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found
probable cause.

BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.

He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state
prosecutors.

The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy director. The letters
contained results of CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, et al as “leaders and promoters” of an
alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause.

Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such
inquest was void.

Ladlad and Maza petitions:

Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion.

Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest.

During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an
eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes
to media members present during the proceedings.

Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence, considering the
political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the
Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’ case, and the manner in which the
prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation.

Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3.

Issues:
1. WON the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? NO.
2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO.
3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES.
Held:

1)

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only when
the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.

The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a
warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have
conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when
another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they
overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw
Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe
that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw
and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

2)

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of
Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We
have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to
show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership
in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.

3)

The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint must be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability,
before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of
the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of
them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government
official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine
if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case,
otherwise he shall “issue a subpoena to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG letters,
respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the
DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments.”

During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to
an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’
affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings.
Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics during
the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that
petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors
not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding
was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors
who conducted the PI.
PEOPLE v. CIELITO BULURAN
G.R. No. 113940. February 15, 2000

On May 20, 1993, appellant Cielito Buluran and three (3) John Does were charged with the crime
of murder. The Information was later amendedwhen Leonardo Valenzuela was identified as one of
the assailants. Upon arraignment, both accused entered pleas of not guilty. On February 4, 1994,
the trial court, finding conspiracy and treachery, rendered judgment convicting appellants of
murder.

HELD:

First. Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their respective arrests since they
never raised this issue before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Second. There is no violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused during custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial
confession or admission. In this case, the basis of the conviction by the trial court was the
testimonies of the three eyewitnesses, Artemio Avendaño, Jacinto Castillo, and Gloria Castillo.

Third. The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation did not impair the
validity of the information nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. While the right to
preliminary investigation is a substantive right and not a mere formal or technical right of the
accused, nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused
fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
The SC found that no treachery attended the killing. On numerous occasions, we have held that
where a killing was preceded by an argument or quarrel, then the qualifying circumstance of
treachery can no longer be appreciated since the victim could be said to have been forewarned
and could anticipate aggression from the assailants. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation alleged by the prosecution was not proved clearly and convincingly.
Considering that the attack was made about two minutes after the initial altercation, it cannot be
said that there was sufficient lapse of time between such determination to commit the crime and
its execution so as to allow the assailants to reflect upon the consequences of their actions.
Cajipe vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 203605, April 23,
2014
CRIMINAL LAW; PROBABLE CAUSE: Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The prosecution evidence fails
to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG officers.

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DISMISSAL OF THE CASE IS A FINAL ORDER: The fact,
however, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides that an appeal may be taken in a criminal
action from a judgment or final order like the RTC's order dismissing the case against petitioner HPG
officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes of the case, terminates the
proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the case against petitioner
HPG officers. The Court had made a similar pronouncement in Santos v. Orda, Jr. Of course, the People
may refile the case if new evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation will support the filing of
a new information against them. But that is another matter.