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ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION (Formerly CONSOLIDATED ORIX

LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION) vs.


MINORS: DENNIS, MYLENE, MELANIE and MARIKRIS, all surnamed
MANGALINAO y DIZON, MANUEL M. ONG, LORETO LUCILO, SONNY LI, AND ANTONIO
DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 174089, January 25, 2012, C.J. Corona

The registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damage or injury caused by the vehicle, despite
the transfer of ownership over the same.

Facts:

This a case of multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) resulting in


the death of all the passengers in one vehicle, including the Mangalinao spousesa and a sibling of
the surviving orphaned minor heirs.

An action for damages based on quasi delict was filed by the minor children of the
Mangalinao spouses through their legal guardian against the registered owners and drivers of the
two 10-wheeler trucks that collided with their parents’ Nissan Pathfinder. The children imputed
recklessness, negligence, and imprudence on the truck drivers for the deaths of their sister and
parents; while they hold Sonny and Orix equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their respective drivers.

Orix filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the children had no cause of action against it
because it already sold the Fuso truck to MMO Trucking owned by Manuel Ong

The RTC issued a Decision finding the truck drivers and their registered owners, Sonny
and Orix liable for damages. The CA affirmed the RTC’s finding but modified the amount of
damages awarded.

Issues:

1) Whether Orix may be held liable for the mishap.


2) Whether the amount of damages awarded is proper.

Ruling:

1) Orix may be held liable for the mishap. Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso Truck is
liable to the heirs of the victims of the mishap. Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner
to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of
whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is
nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused.

Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed
transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape
said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness
on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually
causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the
Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend
to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability
by disproving his ownership.

Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner
of the amount that they may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the
plaintiff, which Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party complaint against the owner
of the Fuso, Manuel.

2) The damages awarded must be modified.

While the net income of the Mangalinao spouses had not been sufficiently established, the
Mangalinao heirs had suffered loss deserving of compensation. What the CA awarded is in
actuality a form of temperate damages. Such form of damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code
is given in the absence of competent proof on the actual damages suffered. Temperate damages
are awarded in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly
established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured party’s actual
income. In this case, Roberto Mangalinao, was a businessman engaged in buying and selling palay
and agricultural supplies that required high capital in its operations and was only 37 at the time of
his death. Moreover, the Pathfinder which the Mangalinaos own, became a total wreck. Under the
circumstances, we find the award of P500,000.00 as temperate damages as reasonable.

Moral damages are not intended to enrich plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They
are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she had undergone due to the other party’s culpable
action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. While the children did not
testify before the court, undoubtedly, they suffered the pain and ordeal of losing both their
parents and sibling and hence, the award of moral damages is justified. However, the amount
must be reduced to P500,000.00.

In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. It is given by way of example or correction for the public good. Before the court may
consider such award, the plaintiff must show his entitlement first to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages, which the respondents have. In the case at bench, the reckless driving of
the two trucks involved caused the death of the victims. However, the amount of exemplary
damages must be reduced to P200,000.00.

Lastly, because exemplary damages are awarded, it is sufficient and reasonable enough to
grant attorney’s fees of P50,000.00.

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. VS RODELIO ALBERTO and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES
G.R. No. 194320, February 1, 2012, J. Velasco

Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available. It is partly based upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence.

The principle of subrogation covers a situation wherein an insurer has paid a loss under an
insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the insured against a third
party with respect to any loss covered by the policy.

Facts:

A Fuzo Cargo Truck (owned by Alberto and driven by Reyes) bumped the rear portion of a
Mitsubishi Galant and Nissan Bus along EDSA. The strong impact cause the Galant to ram into
the rear portion of the Isuzu Tanker.

Malayan Insurance, which issued the Galant’s Car Insurance Policy in favor of First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the “assured”), paid the latter the damages sustained
by the Galant in the amount of Php700,000. Malayan later demanded the said amount from the
respondents Alberto and Reyes. When respondents refused to pay, Malayan instituted a
complaint for damages for gross negligence against them.

The RTC ruled in favor of Malayan and ordered respondents to pay Malayan the amount
demanded plus attorney’s fees and costs of suit. The CA, however, reversed the ruling of the RTC
and held that the evidence on record has failed to establish not only negligence on the part of
respondents, but also compliance with the other requisites and the consequent right of Malayan
Insurance to subrogation.

Issues:

1. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.


2. Whether there was a valid subrogation in the instant case.

Ruling:

1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.

Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence is absent or not
readily available. It is partly based upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. The requisites for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur rule are the following:

(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.

In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the
Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the
exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on
the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no
contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all
the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a
reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.

2. There was a valid subrogation of Malayan Insurance to the rights of the assured.

Subrogation is the substitution of one person by another with reference to a lawful claim
or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or
claim, including its remedies or securities. The principle covers a situation wherein an insurer has
paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the
insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy. It contemplates full
substitution such that it places the party subrogated in the shoes of the creditor, and he may use
all means that the creditor could employ to enforce payment.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION, ET AL. vs. PURIFICACION VIZCARA,


ET. AL.
G.R. No. 190022, February 15, 2012, J. Carpio

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform
for his own protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the
person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the
injury.

Facts:

On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was
driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his companions
(Cresencio, Crispin, Samuel, Dominador Antonio and Joel). While crossing the railroad track in
Tiaong, Quezon, a PNR train, operated by respondent Estranas, suddenly turned up and rammed
the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio,
Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries.

At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing.
Additionally, the “Stop, Look and Listen” signage was poorly maintained. The “Stop” signage was
already faded while the “Listen” signage was partly blocked by another signboard.

Respondents filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate
driver of the train, before the RTC of Palayan City. In the complaint the respondents alleged the
following:
a) The proximate cause of the accident was the petitioners’ gross negligence in not
providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to persons and properties.
b) At the railroad track, there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or bell installed
to warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching train.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed the following:


a) They exercised due diligence in operating the train and monitoring its roadworthiness.
b) Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed.
c) 400 meters away from the railroad crossing, he started blowing his horn to warn
motorists of the approaching train. However, when the train was already ten 10 meters
away from the intersection, the passenger jeepney being driven by Reynaldo suddenly
crossed the tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the
jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the train, it did not instantly come to a complete
stop until the jeepney was dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of collision.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. PNR, Estranas and Saga was ordered to jointly and
severally pay approximately P2.1M. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC but
reduced the amount.

Issue:

Whether the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the petitioners.
Ruling:

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the petitioners.

Petitioners’ failure to install adequate safety devices at the railroad crossing which
proximately caused the collision. Petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into
consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the
petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in
order to give way to an approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the “Stop,
Look and Listen” signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert
the public of the impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a
dilapidated “Stop, Look and Listen” signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in
working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.

There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents. Contributory


negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person
injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when they were
not even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established during the trial that the jeepney
carrying the respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three to five
meters ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the driver of
the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression that it was safe to proceed.
Likewise, there was no crossing bar to prevent them from proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or
signage to forewarn them of the approaching peril. Thus, relying on his faculties of sight and
hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the impending danger.

The maintenance of safety equipment and warning signals at railroad crossings is equally
important as their installation since poorly maintained safety warning devices court as much
danger as when none was installed at all. The presence of safety warning signals at railroad
crossing carries with it the presumption that they are in good working condition and that the
public may depend on them for assistance. If they happen to be neglected and inoperative, the
public may be misled into relying on the impression of safety they normally convey and
eventually bring injury to themselves in doing so.

CRESENCIO BAO AND HEIRS OF THE DECEASED AMANCIO ASUMBRADO, NAMELY:


ROSALINDA ASUMBRADO, VICENTE ASUMBRADO, ROEL ASUMBRADO, ANNALYN
ASUMBRADO, ARNIEL ASUMBRADO, ALFIE ASUMBRADO and RUBELYN ASUMBRADO
vs. BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC./ CERES LINER, INC. and WENIFREDO SALVAA
G.R. No. 191703, March 12, 2012, J. Velasco

Gross negligence is defined as one that is characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.

Facts:

A bus, owned by Bachelor Express, Inc./Ceres Liner, Inc. and driven by respondent
Winifredo Salvaa, collided with a dump truck after it overtook a jeepney while negotiating a blind
curve in a descending road along the national highway at Magdum, Tagum City. The collision
resulted in damage to both vehicles, the subsequent death of the truck driver, Amancio
Asumbrado (Asumbrado), and serious physical injuries to bus driver Salvaa.

Bao and the heirs of Asumbrado (collectively called petitioners) filed a complaint4 for
quasi-delict, damages and attorney's fees against respondents, accusing Salvaa of negligently
driving the bus.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Bao and petitioners after finding that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the reckless negligence of Salvaa. The CA

The CA affirmed the RTC's findings on respondents' negligence and liability for damages,
but deleted the separate awards of exemplary damages in favor of petitioners for their failure to
prove that respondents acted with gross negligence.

Issue:

Whether the bus driver is guilty of gross negligence.

Ruling:
The bus driver is guilty of gross negligence.
Gross negligence is defined as one that is characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.

Here, when bus driver Salvaa overtook the jeepney in front of him, he was rounding a
blind curve along a descending road. Considering the road condition, and that there was only one
lane on each side of the center line for the movement of traffic in opposite directions, it would
have been more prudent for him to confine his bus to its proper place. Having thus encroached
on the opposite lane in the process of overtaking the jeepney, without ascertaining that it was
clear of oncoming traffic that resulted in the collision with the approaching dump truck driven by
deceased Asumbrado, Salvaa was grossly negligent in driving his bus. He was remiss in his duty to
determine that the road was clear and not to proceed if he could not do so in safety.

Consequently, the CA erred in deleting the awards of exemplary damages, which the law
grants to serve as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar
deleterious actions. However, the award should be tempered as it is not intended to enrich one
party or to impoverish another.

PAULA “EDITH” SERRA vs. NELFA T. MUMAR


G.R. No. 193861, March 14, 2012, J. Carpio

Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly


arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection or supervision of its employees. The liability of the employer is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee.

If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present
is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule
must be duly proven by documentary evidence. The only exception are when (1) the deceased is self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.

Facts:

Armando Tenerife (Tenerife) was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the National
Highway heading in the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the van owned
by petitioner Paulita "Edith" Serra (petitioner) coming from the opposite direction, which was
trying to overtake a passenger jeep, and in the process encroached on his lane. The left side of the
sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan to swerve to the left and end up on the other side of
the road. The van collided head on with the motorcycle, which was about 12 meters behind the
sedan on the outer lane, causing injuries to Mumar, which eventually led to his death.

Nelfa T. Mumar (respondent), the wife of deceased Mumar, filed a complaint for Damages
by Reason of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide and Attachment against petitioner.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay
damages. The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC modified the damages awarded. Based on
respondent’s claim that the victim earned not less than Php6,000 a month, the CA used the
formula for computing Net Earning Capacity and awarded damages for loss of earning capacity in
the amount of Php1,224,000.

Issues:

1. Whether petitioner is liable for damages due to negligence in the selection and
supervision of the van’s driver.
2. Whether the CA’s award for loss of earning capacity is proper.

Ruling:

1. Petitioner is liable for damages due to negligence in the selection and supervision of the
van’s driver.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employee's negligence
causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed
to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its
employees. The liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.

Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, if the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence required in supervising
her driver in order to prevent the accident. She admitted that de Castro had only been her driver
for one year and she had no knowledge of his driving experience or record of previous accidents.
She also admitted that it was de Castro who maintained the vehicle and the she did not know
what was happening when the accident happened.

2. The CA’s award for loss of earning capacity is not proper.

Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule
must be duly proven by documentary evidence. The only exception are when (1) the deceased is
self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available;
or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.

The instant case do not fall under any of the exceptions. First, it is highly unlikely that
there was no documentary proof available to prove his income from his work as a
contractor/manufacturer of grills, fences and gates. Second, deceased was not earning "less than
the minimum wage" at the time of his death.

MARIFER MENDOZA vs. ADRIANO CASUMPANG, ET AL.


G.R. No. 197987, March 19, 2012, J. Velasco

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform
for his own protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the
person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the
injury.

Facts:

On February 13, 1993 Josephine underwent hysterectomy and myomectomy that Dr.
Mendoza performed on her at the Iloilo Doctors’ Hospital. After her operation, Josephine
experienced recurring fever, nausea, and vomiting. Three months after the operation, she noticed
while taking a bath something protruding from her genital. She tried calling Dr. Mendoza to
report it but the latter was unavailable. Josephine instead went to see another physician, Dr. Edna
Jamandre-Gumban, who extracted a foul smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze from her cervix.

The discovery of the gauze and the illness she went through prompted Josephine to file a
damage suit against Dr. Mendoza before the RTC of Iloilo City. Because Josephine died before
trial could end, her husband and their children substituted her in the case. She was a housewife
and 40 years old when she died.

On March 7, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Dr. Mendoza guilty of neglect that
caused Josephine’s illness and eventual death and ordering her to pay plaintiff’s heirs actual
damages of P50,000.00, moral damages of P200,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 plus
costs of suit. On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed itself and dismissed the
complaint in an order dated June 23, 2005.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision on March 18, 2011, reinstating
the RTC’s original decision. The CA held that Dr. Mendoza committed a breach of her duty as a
physician when a gauze remained in her patient’s body after surgery. The CA denied her motion
for reconsideration on July 18, 2011, prompting her to file the present petition.

Issue:

Whether there is medical negligence on the part of the Dr. Mendoza.


Ruling:

There is medical negligence on the part of the Dr. Mendoza.

As the RTC pointed out, Josephine did not undergo any other surgical operation. And it
would be much unlikely for her or for any woman to inject a roll of gauze into her cervix. As the
Court held in Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana:

An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not


complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving
of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been
closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply,
such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of
negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is
negligence per se.

The Court notes, however, that neither the CA nor the RTC awarded exemplary damages
against Dr. Mendoza when, under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be awarded in cases of gross negligence.

OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR. vs. GERONIMO BACOY, guardian and representing the
children, namely, MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ET AL.
G.R. No. 173870, April 25, 2012, J. Velasco

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “where the thing that caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the
ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence – in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical
explanation by defendant – that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of
care.

Facts:

Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney driven by
Allan Maglasang and owned by Oscar Del Carmen, Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in a criminal case. Meanwhile, the father of the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo
Bacou, filed an independent civil action against Del Carmen on behalf of the minor children
left by the Monsalud spouses.

Del Carmen claimed that he was a victim as well since Allan stole the jeep and was not
hired as a driver. He insisted that Allan was only a conductor (and had been released from
employment lately) and it was Allan’s brother, Rodrigo who was hired as a driver. Del Carmen
filed a carnapping case against Allan but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The RTC held Del Carmen subsidiary liable. The CA, on the other hand, adjudged Del
Carmen primarily liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered
owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third parties
caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen
not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but
also because, given the circumstances, Del Carmen is deemed to have given Allan the implied
permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers were assigned to the said jeep. After a
day’s work, the jeepney would be parked beside the brothers’ house and not returned to Del
Carmen’s residence. The said parking area was not even fenced or secured to prevent the
unauthorized use of the vehicle, which can be started even without the ignition key.

Issue:

Whether the owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused by the
operation of such.

Ruling:

The owner of vehicle (Del Carmen) is directly and primarily liable.

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “where the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the
accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or
control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence – in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable
and logical explanation by defendant – that the accident arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care. All three requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
are present in the case at bar.

FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES vs. JOSE A. ESPINAS


G.R. No. 173870, April 25, 2012, J. Carpio

Insofar as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the
employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such
owner.

Facts:

Espinas, while driving, was hit by another car. The other car escaped from the scene of the
incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number. After verifying with the Land Transportation
Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car, with plate number UCF-545, is Filcar.

After sending several letters to Filcar and to its President and General Manager Carmen
Flor, demanding payment for the damages sustained by his car without response, Espinas filed a
complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor demanding the amount of P97,910.00,
representing actual damages sustained by his car.

Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espinas’
car, the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the husband of Carmen Flor.
Filcar further stated that when the incident happened, the car was being driven by Atty. Flor’s
personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.

Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault
or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor.

Issue:

Whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident,
may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas.

Ruling:

Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus
vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will
generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. The law,
however, provides for exceptions that an employer is made vicariously liable for the tort committed
by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on
an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the
negligent act or omission committed by his employee.

It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor
vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the
tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.

Filcar is not be permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing on the
blame to another party; in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his alleged driver,
Floresca.

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