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Modernity and the Secularization Debate
Author(s): Nicos Mouzelis

Source: Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 2 (APRIL 2012), pp. 207-223
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Article
Sociology
46(2) 207-223
Modernity and the ©The Author(s) 2012
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Nicos Mouzelis
London School of Economics, UK
Abstract
The article shows how the three basic socio-structural features of modernity (inclusion of a wh
population into the national centre, top-down differentiation and widespread individualizati
throw some light on the secularization-desecularization debate - as this is shaped by the writing
of Bryan Wilson, Steve Bruce, David Martin and Charles Taylor.
Keywords
apophatic, desecularization, modernity, rationalization, secularization
One fruitful way of exploring the forms that secularization and desecularization tak
as well as the dialectic relationship between these two processes, is by the use of the
modernity concept.
I Modernity
In socio-structural rather than cultural terms, modernity can be seen as the type of social
organization which became dominant in the West after the English industrial and the
French revolution. It entails three broad structural traits which render modern society
unique - unique in the sense that the above characteristics, in their combination, are not
to be found in any pre-modern social formation. These characteristics are:
• the demise of segmental localism and the mobilization/inclusion of a whole

population into the national centre/nation-state;
• the overall differentiation of institutional spheres;
• the spread of individualization from the elite to the non-elite level.
Corresponding author:
Nicos Mouzelis, Panos, IA, Ekali, 145 78 Athens, Greece.
Email: mouzelis@hol.gr
208 Sociology 46(2)
Massive Inclusion into the National Centre
Employing Durkheimian terminology, one can argue that pre-modern, traditional

communities had a non-differentiated, segmental social organization. In this respect they
were self-sufficient, relatively autonomous vis-a-vis more inclusive social units. In the
West, this localist self-containment/autonomy was first undermined by the absolutist
model of governance which took its more developed form in Louis XIV's France.1 Given
technological developments in the military sphere and interstate competition at the time,
the absolutist model, although challenged in 17th-century England, spread widely in
continental Europe,2 thus paving the way for the large-scale dominance of the nation-state
in the 19th and 20th centuries. This, in combination with the dominance of industrial
capitalism at about the same period,3 led to the gradual decline of segmental localism and
the unprecedented large-scale mobilization and inclusion of the population into the wider
economic,4 political, social, and cultural arenas of the nation-state. This 'drawing-in'
process can be thought of as a vast shift of human and non-human resources from the
periphery to the national centre. From an actor/agency perspective it can (following
Marx and Weber) be conceptualized as a process of concentration at the top of not only
the means of economic production, but also those of violence or domination, as well as
those of influence or cultural production. As the local economic producers, political
potentates, and virtuosi of particularistic rituals and narratives were losing control and/or
ownership of their means of economic, political and cultural production, there emerged
not only a concentration of power in the hands of national elites, but also a shift in
people's identifications and attachments from the local communities to the symbols
and ideologies of what Benedict Anderson has called the 'imagined community' of the
nation-state (Anderson, 1974).
What made this massive process of drawing into the centre possible was initially the
extraordinary expansion of the state's administrative and surveillance mechanisms. In
fact, the nation-state, by using newly developed bureaucratic and military technologies
managed to penetrate into the periphery to a degree unknown to any pre-modern, pre-
industrial social formation, however complex or despotic.5
Top-down Differentiation of Institutional Spheres

The decline of localism and the massive mobilization or inclusion into the national
centre was not merely a quantitative move from the small to the large. In systemic terms,
the drawing-in process took place in a context of rapid and thorough differentiation as
institutional spheres (economic, political, social, religious, cultural) started portraying
their own logic, their own reproductive technologies, their own historical trajectories.
Structural-functional differentiation is not, of course, unique to modernity. Complex
pre-industrial social formations such as empires also portray a considerable degree of
differentiation (Eisenstadt, 1963). But as Marx (1964[1859]) and others have pointed
out, in such societies this process was limited to the top. The differentiated parts or
subsystems of the centre were superimposed on the non-differentiated, segmentally
organized peripheries. This means that the degree of penetration of the centralized
economic, political, and cultural apparatuses is both very weak and highly uneven
Mouzeïis 209
(Mann, 1986). It
reached, in oth
Widespread In
As Giddens ha
delineate rigid
concerning ma
existential prob
adhere to as a m
tainties are rep
also provide so
drastically redu
In late, globali
decline or disa
kets and servic
'compression of
as disembedme
and the emerge
where routines
creates a situat
truths when ta
ist guidance, th
to marry and h
form - in all t
'his/her own b
modes of exist
societies. It is,
centre and top
conditions of d
own' (Beck and
In the light of
secularization
Martin and Ch
the subject.
2 The Secularization Thesis
The idea that modernity is in the long term incompatible with religion has a long his
Bryan Wilson has developed the thesis in a sociologically relevant manner. In his v
industrialization and its concomitant processes (commercialization of agriculture, urb
zation, the development of science, etc.) have undermined the importance of relig
both in terms of its relation to non-religious institutions (familial, educational, econo
etc.) and within the religious sphere proper. In the latter case the church's hold ove
laity's beliefs and practices has diminished in dramatic fashion (Wilson, 1966, 1982, 2
210
Inter-institution
Since the revival

the late 1960s onw
as it was put by c
following Sahlin
evolution, than it
If by specific ev
linked to industr
untenable. As was
only with growin
then the issue is
well as how they
In terms of gener
bility. If by gene
visible if we focu
durée int , then in
to other differen
secularization doe
see a growing tec
to the present, o
religious sphere. M
obviously, it is no
nological processe
again in other pla
sive overall develo
religion, given m
situation where e
detect, in terms o
the control that r
weakening. Of cou
linear nor always
social policies by l
ferentiation betw
And this is more
ment of Catholic
example of dediff
evangelical right i
in eastern and sou
tion but a patrioti
All the above case
ever, disprove the
'general evolution
control of the ch
dominant and irre
řAouzelis 2 1 1
its deep intrusio

disappeared for g
Intra-institutio
The secularizatio
proper. The cont
rapid growth of
informal groups
dynamism of Pe
26-43) - all the a
indicate clearly t
modernity. Furth
countries does no
cases the opposite
scientific and te
propagated rende
type rather ineff
Steve Bruce, in
inter- and intra-
According to Bru
towards secularit
religious revival o
its focus on indiv
to decline and to l
However, if secu
theory but at the
that the move f
Reformation is a
And the same is t
from the denom
model. That the l
tutionalized, mor
religious indiffer
In referring to P
. . . freedom from
core task and thu
removal from the c
population. (2011
Now it is true of
other social sphe
has been remove
institutional term
212 Sociology 46(2)
part of Parsonian theory w

public sphere. But he does n
'allowed the churches to
theorist, differentiation en
relation to other social sph
As far as future developm
global growth of evangelic
growing individualization -
Bruce's idea that the young
values (2011: 69-71) does no
enon particularly marked fr
reaction to enlightenment's
circles of postsecular the
downwards. I believe that th
of religiosity, is here to stay
3 Modernity and R
Modernity's three socio-str
the national centre meant
ized periphery and a differ
there was a certain homo
downwards. In western Ch
was a marked chasm betwe
gious elites and the folk re
communal and religious tr
coexisting with superstit
process of relative homoge
between elites and non-elit
tain rationalization of bel
with economic, political or
zation might increase rathe
laity. If in modernity we s
and violence at the nationa
socialization'. Elites at the
to those at the periphery.
In view of the above, it is
desecularization 'from rationalization/derationalization'. The former distinction should
refer to degrees of secularity or religiosity. Secularity, for instance, can take weak forms
(e.g. indifference or agnosticism) or strong forms (atheism or militant atheism). And the
same is true about religiosity. It can vary from what Epstein (1999) has called minimal
religion to the strong religiosity of those who strictly accept the beliefs, rituals and
other practices of a particular church or religious tradition. As far as rationalization/
derationalization is concerned, growing rationalization may entail, as already mentioned,
Mouzefe 2 1 3
successful attempt
thus the magical o
the official doctr
internally (Weber
site process takes
bership and atten
dogma such as Bu
98ff). A more acc
as witchcraft, alc
Concerning the f
media and the int
initiates. As the sh
books on witchcr
geometrical fashio
than the Harry P
guages and have s
and witches does
practices. But, at
icalization' of the
In the light of t
sionary processe
eliminating thus
munal culture - t
in the non-instit
and acquires glob
4 The Secularization-Desecularization Dialectic
David Martin (2005, 2011) has developed a general theory of secularization. He has
argued, quite convincingly, against a linear view of the secularization process. Equally
convincingly he claimed that the only secularizing process which is in the long term
irreversible is the one linked to social differentiation; that is, to the development of
relatively autonomous institutional spheres.
With this as a background, he has put forward the interesting thesis that, from a
macro-historical point of view, rather than growing secularization or desecularization,
what we see in the Christian West is a constant dialectic between the secular and the
non-secular. Within the religious sphere there are periods of intense religious flourish-
ing which at some point is weakening leading to secularizing tendencies. In turn the
latter tendencies are undermined by a new religious revival. Thus there is a tension
between 'spirit' and 'nature', between a transforming Christian vision of peace and
compassion and the realities of power and violence. As the spirit (divine grace) pene-
trates the 'world', at some point the vision's initial élan is diminished and the religious
thrust recoils.10 As for the character of the recoil, it is affected by the cost that each
religious drive entails:
214 Sociology 46(2)
Crucially I argue that instead

might rather think in terms
Each christianization is a salie
pays a characteristic cost whic
collapse into some version of
David Martin considers his

which applies at least in the
This broad scope, however,
Catholic Christianization e
(2005: 3), he does not take se
agnosticism, total indifferen
church's history was limited
early period, an exception. T
Christian, non-Christian or
only with the dominance of
popular form) spreads to th
the major dynamic was less
different types of religiosit
and western Christianity, b
variety of 'heresies', etc. Al
monarch type of Catholic C
tainly did not take the secu
restricted at the elite level.
I would therefore argue th
later, in the period when th
becoming dominant. It is d
centre, top-down different
differentiated, autonomous
popular religiosity receded -
wards, while at the same tim
educated classes to the popul
that it is useful to examine
sees this dialectic, as Mart
United States - awakenings
It should be stressed, howe
the Christian spirit may lea
traditions and subculture
secularization-desecularizati
tic, a dialectic between Chr
of religious hybridities. In t
Christian faith and the con
the New Age spiritualities
(Taylor, 2007: 618). Given
of solid institutional suppo
struction of one's religious
N'ouze'is 2 1 5
To repeat, if by
to imply) then
dechristianization:
• that which leads to atheism, agnosticism or religious indifference;

• that which leads to the adoption of non-Christian or to hybrid religious forms
within which Christian elements are peripheral.11
Another type of dialectic which is particularly important in the religious sphere today is
the liberal-conservative one. As is well known, the counter culture of the 1960s and the
new spiritualities which followed have led to a subjectivist,12 expressivist religiosity
which stresses less attachment to sacred texts, dogmas and organizational authority and
more to 'heart work', direct experience of the divine and, more generally, the existential
dimension of religious life (see Section 5). The rapid growth of the latter type of religious
subculture has created severe tensions within the established churches between those
who accepted and tried to introduce the new, liberal spirituality into the ecclesiastical
order, and those conservative forces which reacted to the liberalizing tendencies of
sections of the clergy and laity. The extreme reaction to church liberalization occurred in
the United States where the evangelical right tried to expand its message of 'return to the
fundamentals' - a return to be achieved by media control and the creation of powerful
lobbies in Congress (Ammerman, 1994: 43ff).13 Furthermore, the liberal-conservative
religious conflict entered more forcefully the public sphere as ethical problems such as
in vitro fertilization, abortion and euthanasia became issues of popular concern.
5 Between the Secular and the Non-secular
I move now from Wilson's and Bruce's secularization thesis and Martin's secularizat
desecularization dialectic to Charles Taylor's views on the secular age and beyond. T
Catholic philosopher's magisterial analysis (2007) is partly based on the constructio
a threefold typology. The first ideal typical model, the ancien regime or paleo-Durkheim
one, is not clearly differentiated from the traditional local community. Within it the fa
ful do not choose - in the sense that they accept unquestionably the church's dogmas
ritual practices and are church members from birth to death. The second neo-Durkhei
or mobilization model has its origins in the Reformation and refers to a situation w
established churches adopt practices which focus less on dogma and strict rituals a
more on a more flexible, liberal framework. Particularly in the flourishing Ameri
denominations, the idea of choice becomes important; that is, the idea that no church
denomination has the monopoly of truth and that therefore the faithful have the right
explore and to choose. The third expressivist model, having its roots in 19th-centu
romanticism, has developed in a spectacular manner among the youth from the 19
onwards. I focus on the latter model since it generates interesting problems related to
secularization-desecularization debate.
Charles Taylor calls the complex of values underlying the above model expressive
individualism . Expressive individualism reacts against dogmas and the authority of
hierarchically organized religious elites. Religious truth cannot be found in sacramental
216 Sociology 46(2)
mysteries, ex cathedra theo

divine is based on unmediat
the divine existentially, in
that of the assiduous follow
Expressive individualism
outside In the them.
forme
religious views as well as a
space outside the well-estab
new religious movements, w
traditions (Glock and Bellah
groups and networks whi
denominations or congrega
'seekers' who are in a const
network or guru to anothe
gious traditions both Chris
an attempt to achieve 'auth
path of her/his own (Beck
her/his own 'religious biogr
alizing, expressivist feature
According to Taylor, this
lead to a trivialization of th
from the global spiritual su
ever, he thinks that not al
in a facile manner. Some o
for a meaning in life that t
Assessing the present c
leading a meaningful existe
Exclusive humanism can le
salization of moral codes, th
etc. However, this type of
the mysteries of human ex
limiting than the religious
however, according to Tay
What I would like to add t
and the transcendental flo
classify as secular or non-se
secularity and non-secularit
The Indwelling God

This is the view of those w
the divine resides within us.
spiritual flourishing occur
'divine spark'. Here as well t
referring to the depths and
Moüzefó 2 1 7
of view, to belie
of religiosity. As
. . . unless religio
Piety cannot in
disinterested and
life after death. (
Thus, if the reli

exclusively 'inte
since secularity
tive theology, in
essence, is exter
(1963) type tran
exclusively indw
in the restricted
in-between them
level. Heelas, wh
argues that a ma
to the human be
Woodhead, 2005
The Spiritual S
As Charles Taylo
take the form o
rituals and the b
istic, continuous
In the first case
or he becomes f
attempt to find
needs. In other t
istic manner sele
in order to cons
The other type o
in an energetic,
means negative
basic elements: f
unknowable, wh
manner; second,
all calculations,
ject achieves ken
an 'empty vessel
Whereas apopha
but unknowable
2 1 8 Sociology 46(2)
of God's existence. She or he t

techniques, to get rid of all thou
Therefore in this case the seeker
she or he deconstructs habitual w
obstacles to his/her self-realizat
belief system is anti-spiritual. It
within which how to live and wh
the 'tyranny of choices' is overc
thinking, it rather entails not thi
Perhaps the spiritual leader who
is J. Krishnamurti. For the India
more one thinks the more one is
mundane thinking, ruminations
reality or in an after life takes o
Belief of any kind is not only ir
spiritual quest. For spirituality
ing what goes on inside the self
comes near to this type of condi
disappears. What emerges is a
nature (1978, 1985). This type
Buddhism, cannot be called relig
that is transcendental or externa
Taylor's exclusive humanism.
between the secular and the non-
Finally, it should be stressed th
spirituality is an ideal type one.
seeker contain both cataphatic a
spiritual search, one of the two i
Concluding Remarks
I have tried to examine the link
sociocultural features of modern
top-down differentiation and
the following points have been m
1) In the Christian West, inter

down social differentiation, is
and state is not watertight.
attempt to influence social pol
ventions into the political sph
by radical priests in Latin Am
above, religion has ceased irre
On the other hand, in intra-ins
gious sphere proper), one sees
řAouzells 2 1 9
religious reviva
Taylor's expre
fundamentalist
times', have bec
liberal wave has
the times', opp
right to abortion
2) Concerning M
important than
and between th
what is more i
modernity's inc
non-elites and g
other things, e
ments linked to
of a more 'offic
bottom of the s
via books, journ
practices attract
3) Widespread in
nity as far as r
ecclesiastical sp
groups and reli
churches or no
when cataphati
religious 'path
ested in the var
and more to m
purposes or, les
is a preconditio
to the self, the
(2005), 'spiritu
called 'cultic' o
Pentecostalism
elective affini
marked express
with its empha
standards and individual economic success.
I close by stressing once more that the three socio-structural features of modernity allow
both secular and non-secular modes of existence. Given this, the relation between the
two will be shaped in the future not only by structural developments but also by
a variety of conjunctural developments - economic or ecological crises, scientific
discoveries, the future of Islamic fundamentalism, etc. From this point of view neither
the idea of a long-term secularization within the religious sphere, nor the idea of a
220
secularization-des
the secular and the non-secular.
As far as modernity is concerned, what is certain is that given the demise of segmental
localism, the massive inclusion into the centre, top-down differentiation and overall indi-
vidualization, choice is a key element for understanding the present and future religious
landscape. In matters religious, choice ceases to be the privilege or 'burden' of the few,
it spreads downwards. In other terms, it is not only religious virtuosi, intellectuals or
philosophers who ponder the meaning of life and the pros and cons of a secular or non-
secular mode of existence. Religious affiliation ceases to be taken for granted; it is an
issue which concerns people in all social strata. After all, in existential and religious
matters, generalized choice, real or imagined, is what modernity is all about.
Notes
1 The French monarchy and its administration, as it was finally shaped under Louis XIV,
the prototype of European absolutist rule, a model imitated all over Europe. See Clark, 1969
176-97.
2 For the spread of the absolutist state, see Anderson, 1974.
3 For the great transformative power of industrial capital, see Dobb, 1968.
4 Inclusion in this context does not necessarily entail the notion of empowerment of the popu-
lation at large. Inclusion can take both autonomous and heteronomous forms (see Section 5,
footnote 13).
5 For the development of such technologies which enhanced the 'infrastructural powers' of the
state, see Mann, 1995.
6 These cases of the churches' political involvement indicate a reversal of the privatization
trend which characterized the early post-war period (see Martin, 201 1 : 23-4).
7 For the chasm between elite and popular or folk religiosity in several religious traditions, see
Sharot, 2001.
8 For Weber religious rationalization can take a variety of forms. It may entail: the attenuation
of the dualism between elite and popular religiosity, the passage from an ad hoc set of discon-
nected beliefs to a logically more integrated and theologically more coherent metaphysical
system, the bureaucratization of a religious organization, the move to a this- worldly religious
ethic based on work discipline, the other-worldly religious orientation which is based on
bodily and spiritual discipline (ascetism), the strengthening of intellectualist currents in the
religious sphere, etc. (1978[1925]: 399ff).
9 For the distinction between the religious and the magical logic, see Weber, 1978[1925]: 422
andMauss, 1972.
1 0 The spirit-nature or the vision-power dialectic reminds one of Weber 's charisma-routinization
dialectic (Weber, 1978[1925]: 246-54). The routinization or bureaucratization of charisma is
analogous to Martin's 'naturalization' or institutionalization of the 'vision'.
11 The religious revival of the 1970s for instance, as a process of deserialization, at least in
the Anglo-Saxon world, entails the revival of belief in Christian and non-Christian traditions.
See, on this point, Roof, 2001 and Herrick, 2003.
12 On the counter culture of the 1960s and the reaction to it, see Tipton, 1982.
13 The liberal-authoritarian dialectic relates to modernity's inclusionary feature. In a general
way, the mass inclusion into the national centre can take both autonomous and heteronomous
forms. In the former case, civil, political, socioeconomic and cultural rights spread down-
wards (e.g. 19th-century England), whereas in the latter case people are 'brought in' in an
authoritarian manner, without the granting of political rights (e.g. 19th-century Prussia). One
can argue that analogous processes have occurred in the differentiated religious sphere. One
řAouzeWs 22 1
can identify, on t
symbolic interpre
tions, etc. On the
choice and demand
14 This growing l
religious beliefs t
traditions closer
Robertson, 1989)
15 For accounts of
2005; Douglas and
and Woodhead, 2
16 This is the type
modernization in
those who 'believ
17 Apophatic theo
closely but not e
movement that ac
St. Gregory Palam
18 On the 'progre
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MouzeWs 223
Nicos Mouzelis
He has publishe
tions, sociolog
Postmodern So
He is at present
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Date accepted Se

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Modernity and the Secularization Debate

Author(s): Nicos Mouzelis

• the demise of segmental localism and the mobilization/inclusion of a whole

Massive Inclusion into the National Centre

Employing Durkheimian terminology, one can argue that pre-modern, traditional

Top-down Differentiation of Institutional Spheres

2 The Secularization Thesis

Since the revival

its deep intrusio

part of Parsonian theory w

4 The Secularization-Desecularization Dialectic

Crucially I argue that instead

David Martin considers his

• that which leads to atheism, agnosticism or religious indifference;

5 Between the Secular and the Non-secular

mysteries, ex cathedra theo

The Indwelling God

Thus, if the reli

of God's existence. She or he t

1) In the Christian West, inter

Ammerman NT (1994) The dynamics of Christian fundamentalism: an introduction. In: Mar

Glock CY and Bellah R (eds) (

Taylor C (2007) A Secular Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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