The International Studies Association, Wiley International Studies Review

The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism
Author(s): Piki Ish-Shalom

Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sep., 2006), pp. 441-468
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International Studies Review (2006) 8, 441-468
The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and

Conservatism1
PIKI ISH-SHALOM
Department of International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
This essay examines the interconnectedness among realism, elitism, and

conservatism, claiming that realism cannot be understood in isolation
from conservative skepticism regarding human nature and the possi-
bility of change. Just as conservatism constitutes the foundation of real-
ism, so it also constitutes the foundation of elitist and structural theories
of democracy, thereby establishing an inherent interconnection among
the three. Such interconnectedness lies at the root of the antagonism
that realists display toward policies that aim to promote democracy.
Contrary to the common wisdom among international relations
scholars, it also implies a strong link between international relations
and political science. Moreover, this interconnectedness discredits the
positivist philosophy of the social sciences, calling instead for a norma-
tive philosophy of the social sciences.
To clear themselves a place among the social sciences, international relations

scholars have tried for too many years to detach themselves from the parent dis-
cipline, political science, arguing that international politics is essentially different
from domestic politics and thus deserves its own corpus of academic conceptual-
ization.2 Similarly, they have tried to distance their theories from any metaphysical
underpinning, including a priori assumptions regarding the nature of humans,
society, and politics, calling instead for positivistic and scientific theorizing that is
based on objectivity and empirical data. As this essay will show, this twofold ap-
proach is misguided and erroneous. Theorizing arises from ideological convictions
that affect the process of determining which data are relevant, which are less so, and
which have no relevance at all. The same ideological convictions are operative in
theorizing normatively and descriptively, domestically and internationally. There-
fore, even descriptive theorizing involves both facts and values and the ideological
engagement of social science theoreticians in their subject matter: the social world.
The positivist philosophy of the social sciences, with its belief in objectivity, is thus
discredited. Finally, an argument is made that we should seek a substitute in a
'The author would like to thank Emanuel Adler, ()ren Barak, Nikolaos Biziouras, (Gill Friedman, Katty
Ish-Shalom, Arie Kacowicz, Oded Lowenheim, Elzbieta Matynia, Johannes Sakaria Mponyana, David Plotke, Mark
Sheetz, Shaul Shenhav, Julie Taylor, the editors of the International Studies Review, and three anonymous reviewers.
The author also benefited from financial support and the intellectual communities of the Leonard Davis Institute for
International Relations at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
and the John M. Olin Institute foir Strategic Studies, both at Harvard University, and the Transregional Center for
Democratic Studies at the New School University.
'Although this is a general tendtency, there have always been dissenters. For a recent example, see Bruce Russett
(2003).
.: 2006 International Studies Review.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350) Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxfiord OX4 2DQ
442 The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism
normative philosophy of the social sciences that is better equipped to consider both
the fact-value nexus and the ideological engagement that theorizing entails.
Substantiating these arguments requires a thorough exploration of realism, the
paradigm that for many scholars establishes international relations studies' autono-
mous status and scientific prestige. To achieve this, the essay focuses on the classical
realism of Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980) as one of the leading theoreticians in the
early days of the academic study of international relations and one of the important
thinkers in the development of the realist tradition. Morgenthau provides a good
starting point not only for chronological reasons, but because he was a very prolific
writer who addressed both issues of international relations and also social and
political philosophy. We, therefore, have abundant evidence to demonstrate the
ideological foundation of Morgenthau's realist theory and its relationship with
more general political theorizing. Morgenthau's realism is founded upon conser-
vative skepticism, which leads him to conceive the desire for power as the consti-
tutive element of humans, society, and politics, and to seek refuge in
rationality-reflected in the balance of power-positing it as the only viable so-
lution against violence. Thus, despite his skepticism with regard to the universality
of rationality in the human race, Morgenthau emphasized rationality in his theory,
hoping to extend its political application.
Morgenthau's expansive discussion on human nature exposed him to the charge
of a lack of scientific rigor. This criticism was spearheaded by Kenneth Waltz, who
proceeded to develop his own version of realism (namely, structural neorealism),
proclaiming it to be scientific and free from metaphysical hypothesizing. Taking
seriously Waltz's claims and the reputation of neorealism as a scientific approach,
this essay examines his theory as a critical case study.
Demonstrating that Waltz's version of realism is also founded on conservative
ideology provides strong confirmation of the nexus between theory and ideology.
Indeed, examination of Waltz's theory exposes conservative assumptions similar to
those of Morgenthau. In Waltz's case, a conservative pessimism led him to omit
from his theory the possibility of change and, as a result, produced a tautological
circularity that favors the status quo and is antagonistic to change.
The constitutive role of conservatism in constructing realism has a similar role in
constructing and justifying elitist and structural theories of democracy. Conse-
quently, checks and balances and the balance of power are mirror images of one
another. The basis for both is a conservative skepticism regarding human nature
and the need to prevent destabilization -the former domestically, the latter inter-
nationally. It is not surprising then to find realist theoreticians propounding elitist
and structural theories of democracy rather than participatory and normative the-
ories. In this interrelationship, we discover how closely associated international
relations and political science theories really are. The interconnectedness is also
apparent in the antagonism that realist theoreticians have displayed toward policies
of democratization, as we shall see below.
The first part of this essay examines Morgenthau's classical realism. The second
part studies Waltz's structural neorealism as a critical case study. Part three explores
the realist antagonism toward policies of democratization, briefly discussing more
contemporary strands of realism, namely, the offensive and defensive strands. The
concluding section advances a critique of the positivist philosophy of the social
sciences and argues for the need for a normative philosophy to replace it.
Morgenthau's Classical Realism

Two components are prominent in the realist theory of Morgenthau: rationality and
the desire for power. The problem is that these two components clash with one
another and cause internal contradictions and weakness in the theory. A way to
PIKI ISH-SHAIOM 443
understand and solve these internal cont

of the essay, is to link them with the i
Morgenthau's Theory of Democr
In his view of the essence, importance,

belongs with many of his generation an
most characteristic representative is
Morgenthau's theory of democracy is m
ations of citizens.
In Morgenthau's (1972:55) most extreme reference to democracy, he refers to it
as an ideology (according to his definition of ideology): an instrument for legit-
imizing the concentration of power within a specific sector of the population,
namely, the middle class. Thus, democracy is not universal and suits only certain
societies; it is both particularistic and relative. But more than that, democracy is
nothing more than a tool in the service of a specific economic order. Morgenthau
(1952:223; see also 1967:142) is usually less critical of democracy than these state-
ments suggest, although he does blame it for several impediments to the proper
functioning of the state, and particularly for impediments related to formulating
foreign policy:
The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking,
reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of ab-
solute good and absolute evil..... The popular mind wants quick results; it will
sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit for today's apparent advantage.
In other words, Morgenthau believes that the public has a black-and-white view of
domestic and international politics and therefore judges them in simplistic moral
terms instead of realizing that they are about power. This view encourages policies
that are moral crusades and, as such, nonrational and destabilizing (Morgenthau
1952:87).
Democratic politics can lead to imprudent and inefficient foreign policy when the
wise statesman makes decisions with the specter of re-election in mind. He bows to
the dictates of the public, trying to gain their votes (his immediate gain) instead of
choosing goals requiring long-term planning and sacrifice. According to Morg-
enthau (1962b:359-360, 369, 411-412; 1962c:5), when the public's manipulability
and propensity to behave as a horde combines with the political expediency of the
politician, democracy can have a clearly lethal impact on a country's foreign policy.
Morgenthau (1962b:224) presents two more claims regarding the highly prob-
lematic nature of democracy. The first is that democracy contains an irreconcilable
dissonance between democratic pretension and democratic reality due to the false
claim that universal equality and freedom is possible, a claim that can be manipu-
lated by unscrupulous politicians to achieve power. The second claim is that demo-
cratic elections demand demagogic and theatrical talents.
The result of these two related arguments is that "in a democracy, ordinariness, not
greatness, gains power" (Morgenthau 1970:137). The qualities of greatness that
Morgenthau (with Hein 1983:3-5) sees in Abraham Lincoln, and that he hopes to
teach other politicians, cannot be fulfilled in a modern democracy, in which one needs
public relations qualities and charisma rather than rationality, foresight, and vision. It
is no surprise then that Morgenthau's (1962b:360) writings contain such a pessimistic
ruling on democracy: "This process of corruption, particularly far advanced in for-
eign policy, puts into question the very survival of democratic government."
This criticism is not just theoretical; Morgenthau criticizes the United States in
which he identifies various maladies, attributable, he believes, to a misguided im-
plementation of democracy. According to Morgenthau (1962b:210-211, 366-368;
1982:266-292), the US regime is a product of committees, agencies, and public

opinion and has become a "new feudalism," characterized by the crumbling of the
regime's structure, the loss of presidential power to committees, and the dominance
of private and sectarian interests instead of national interest. This process has pro-
gressed to the extent that:
the constitutional intent to translate the Presidential and congressional will into
purposeful action, as the movements of the arm reflect the impulses emanating
from the brain, has produced instead the anarchy of a war against all, fought
among as well as within the executive departments (Morgenthau 1970:268).
Indeed, Morgenthau (1962b:390; 1965:13-15) sees US policy as dictated by public

opinion, following the weakness of several presidents. He considers it even more
dangerous that truth and morality have lost all objective meaning and have become
relative and changeable according to the vagaries of public opinion (Morgenthau
1962b:364-365). If we understand that for Morgenthau, moral values are the
values underlying the purpose of the United States and consequently constituting
the foundation of its power, then we understand that the problem is not just one of
morals but concerns the United States' role as a superpower. Democracy as im-
plemented in the United States leads to moral and policy anarchy and the country's
deterioration (Morgenthau 1962c:46-55).:S
Notwithstanding his reservations, Morgenthau is a democrat and argues in favor
of democracy (see also Raskin 1984:87). He fears totalitarian regimes, seeing them
as repressors of freedom. In effect, he views totalitarianism as the outcome of the
dangerous idea that a minority can hold a transcendental truth. When credence is
also given to the related totalitarian claim that these holders of the alleged truth can
be immune from mistakes, the door is open to totalitarian rule and repression
(Morgenthau 1962a: 106-109; 1970:40). Accompanying these fears and in line with
John Stuart Mill [1859]2003), Morgenthau ([1960]1982:4-5) sees free discussion as
important for the examination of different views and for exposing the truth, which
is rational and efficient. Thus, there are two reasons for Morgenthau's belief in
democracy: one is that democracy is essential because of the importance of the
value of freedom; the other reason is instrumental and concerns democracy's (the
correct democracy) ability to develop rational policies.
The question becomes: what does Morgenthau think is the correct form and
essence of democracy? This question has been part of the debate since the early
days of democratic theory between those who see the whole citizenry as a rational
public and therefore favor participatory democracy (for example, Pateman 1970;
Mansbridge 1983; Barber 1984; de-Shalit 1997; Habermas 1998), and those who
see the citizenry as a nonrational or even irrational mass that is prone to manipu-
lation and whose full political participation is a threat (for example, Lippmann
1922, 1934, 1955; Schumpeter 1962; Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1999). Holders
of the latter view tend to see democracy in a minimal way and to try to limit the
public's role in the political process. One of the more influential representatives of
this model was Joseph Schumpeter (1962:250-283), who saw democracy as no
more than a competition between members of the elite over governance. According
to this view, the public's role is to participate in elections every few years and decide
which contestant wins. Periodic elections are also part of a mechanism of checks and
balances that prevents concentrating power in the hands of a group who might
repress the freedoms of citizens. No more is expected from the public than its
'Morgenthau (1970:51-55) claims that this process leads to the US public's loss of faith in its political institutions,
and thus to the creation of "the new left" that orients its actions outside of institutional politics and by such action
diminishes the country's efficiency. In making this argument, Morgenthau points to the development of the new
politics but misses its importance andti its positive aspects -aspects that contradtiict his elitist conception of democracy.
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 445
participation in elections, and any desi

ciety and politics.
This conception is also dominant i
1969:151-152; 1982:246, 258-266, 289) t
and in his way of constructing a view of
seems to be ensuring that the elites par
especially foreign policy. The rest of
ship-its role being to control, not to r
only this kind, will guarantee political
policies.
To summarize, the democracy that Morgenthau propounds is minimalist; the
public has the minimal role of electing the leaders once in several years; and the
elected leaders are almost exclusively responsible for the design and shape of social
and political life. This is closely linked to the conservatism of Morgenthau.
Morgenthau's Conservatism
Among the many scholars (Hoffmann 1977:44-45, 1981:657; Sollner 1987; Grif-
fiths 1992a, 1992b:51-58, 72; Nobel 1995:66; Honig 1996) who identify him as a
conservative," Morgenthau (1962a:286; 1982:195) himself is the most conspicuous
in defining himself thus. Apart from his own declarations, we find evidence of his
conservatism in a variety of issues: first, in his elitist theory of democracy as ex-
pounded above and, second, in his view of the citizens as not sufficiently rational.
These two views reflect a conception of society as not composed of rational and
equal individuals with the right to full political participation and a say in their own
political destiny. It suggests a stratified, nonegalitarian, and elitist perception of
society in which only an educated minority can decide efficiently regarding political
and collective matters.7
Morgenthau's conservatism can also be inferred from his stand on several philo-
sophical and ideological debates that occur between conservatives and liberals.
Thus, Morgenthau (1962a:345-348) argued that in order to define happiness, one
needed a set of chosen values. This claim is important in the debate between the
nineteenth-century liberals and conservatives, which in more recent times has de-
veloped into the debate between liberals (and even more so, libertarians) and
communitarians.8 Morgenthau's claim is based on the conservative assumption that
happiness is not objective and exterior to humans but a product of reasons shaped
4In the only direct reference to Schumpeter in Morgenthau's (1962a:348) writing, he refers to Schumpeter as a
critic of Marxism and expounder of Marxist mythology.
5Morgenthau (1962b:368) does say the following, expanding on his usual position regarding democracy:
"I believe that in a democracy which still possesses its vitality public issues must be debated in the public forum and
that the citizens must be seen, heard, and counted in the interchange of ideas and the interplay of interests, out of
which a new consensus will arise." However, when he gives an example of the kind of forum that can contribute to
the formation of policies, it becomes clear that he is referring mostly to one comprised of the intellectual elites
(Morgenthau 1970:236).
"Others offer revised claims concerning Morgenthau's conservatism: Benjamin Wong (2000:399-404), who
stresses Morgenthau's belief in the rational and irrational aspects of human nature and his view of evil as a necessary
component of politics, identifies Morgenthau's conservatism without explicating it; Christoph Frei (2001:157-170,
177, 205) argues that conservatism and liberalism coexist uncomfortably in Morgenthau, suggesting that he was a
conservative reformulater of liberalism; Duncan Bell (2002) conflates all realist theorists, old and new, classical and
neorealist, Morgenthau included, as conservatives.
7Ilhe elitist conception of Morgenthau also appears in his view of aristocratic diplomacy as the golden age of
diplomacy to which we should aspire. O)n one occasion, Morgenthau (1967:138) goes still further, claiming that
Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain were responsible for the deterioration in British diplomacy and attrib-
uting their incompetence to their being sons of traders, that is, belonging to families only newly joined to the ranks
of the aristocracy. Morgenthau attributes the diplomatic talents of Winston Churchill to his belonging to an old
aristocratic family.
5An excellent example is Michael Sandel's (1984:167-168, 171-176) criticism of John Rawls.
by the common history of a community. The conservative concepts of past, tra-

dition, and class stand out as guideposts to the conduct of society and polity in
Morgenthau's thinking.
This point is important to stress; a certain degree of elitism was always evident
in certain strands of liberalism, especially, although not exclusively, in its earlier
forms (for example, Mill [1859]2003). Therefore, elitism alone does not make
Morgenthau a conservative. However, an ideational structure combining elitism
(especially elitism prompted by a wariness of the irrationality of the common
people) with a belief in organic historical development is more apt for distinguish-
ing conservatism from elitist liberalism. According to conservative ideology, history
is a set of organic developments and changes that gradually reform human com-
munities (rather than societies) into more or less cohesive structures, bonding the
constituent individuals and, more important, limiting their ability to harm them-
selves and the environment. Thus, whereas liberalism emphasizes human ration-
ality as the solution to fallibility and the human pursuit for power, conservatism
emphasizes extra-rational remedies. Whereas liberalism is more tolerant toward
drastic and radical reform, conservatism chooses measured and modest reform.9
Indeed, Morgenthau propounded this ideal conservative combination of elitism,
trust in history, and belief in gradual reform.
Morgenthau's ([1960]1982:2/3) conservatism also emerges in his critique of
thinkers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich
Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud, whom he thinks had broken away from the classical
tradition of political thinking-a tradition Morgenthau wants to see restored. He
also criticizes the tendency of his society to overlook tradition and regularity in
history and to react to whatever happens as new and unique (Morgenthau
1962b:10). Although he himself underscores uniqueness in history, he does so
without undermining tradition and regularity. For Morgenthau, the past is always
present in our lives and conduct, outweighing our liberal desire for progress.
In light of these arguments and beliefs, we can position Morgenthau politically
as a proponent of the conservative ideology. However, his conservatism is unique
in having been adapted-as he points out-to the history and conditions of
US society.10 It is important for Morgenthau to emphasize that true conservatism
champions civil rights and the limitation of government in favor of its citizens. In
this sense, he views Hegel favorably and McCarthy negatively. Morgenthau
(1962a:285; 1962b:390-408) believed that safeguarding rights is antagonistic to-
ward the government that holds public power, but also toward private power, which
can cause the public even more harm. Morgenthau (1982:81-82, 322) argues that
public power-that is, the power of the executive branch-is the least of the evils; it
is the power that should introduce rules for limiting private power. This idea could
lead to limiting the freedom of the individual-the purported owner of social and
economic power-to use his power however he desires. Although this view is not
normally attributed to contemporary US conservatism, it is important to recall the
changes in political theory during the twentieth century, resulting in the switching
of attitudes between liberalism, which initially supported a minimal state, and con-
servatism, which sought a strong state.
"See also Michael Freeden in his seminal work on ideologies. According to Freeden (1996:344-345), one of the
core concepts of conservatism as an ideology is the extra-human origin of human conduct and behavior. Conser-
vatism regards human behavior as the product of factors that exist independently of the individual, such as family,
nation, religion, history, and so on. Another core concept of conservatism as analyzed by Freeden, which can be
fouind in Morgenthaus thinking, is an objection to change, unless it is organic change.
"In an insightful article, Michael Williams (2004) analyzes Morgenthau's realism as a political response both to
his personal experience in the collapse of the Weimar Republic and to the radicalism of thinkers such as Carl
Schmitt. This analysis points to a second reason for the uniqueness of Morgenthau's conservatism. It is a political
response to the horrors brought about by radical political theory, be it from the left or the right, leading Morgenthau
to distance himself from any form of extremism.
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 447
Morgenthau also saw great importa

was the foundation for a healthy, e
casionally led him to social criticism an
American Politics and in Truth and P
1970) criticizes the transmogrification
hedonistic society, which he sees as p
of waste" that has abandoned its mo
pecially painful to Morgenthau (1970
which denied black citizens civil righ
US morality, culture, and academia a
erty. Academia, he believed, had aban
status quo and the power holders or,
Because of these processes, US societ
leaving either totalitarianism or refo
the only way for it to preserve i
1965a:9-11; 1970:32-35, 51-55; 1972
interview with Morgenthau 1984:38
Morgenthau's brand of conservatism
darity. His conservatism shows cert
conditions; as he claims, US conserva
glamorize the past simply because
Morgenthau's is, thus, a conservatis
growth and dynamism. This was th
purpose was to achieve equality in f
should try to promote in the rest
1982:33, 295-298) viewed this set of
osophy and method but a desire to b
This reformist type of conservatism
enthau (1962a:285-286) holds that co
worldview. Both approaches perceive th
but rather as prompted by the forc
therefore move in harmony with these
to prevent the abuse of power by the p
conservative fear of the human desire
sequences. According to this belief, t
trolled, constant forces in human natu
In what follows, we see how these
resolved through his belief in the po
theory of international relations.
Morgenthau's Realist Theory

We will explore Morgenthau's realist
for power, and some connected conc
purpose. At issue is denoting some of
thought such as between human desi
ing them to his ideology.
S''Here again, it is usefiul to stress some of the diff

accept the importance of social solidarity, there ar
justness as the source of solidarity and, to an exte
communal development as the source and justifica
stressing the finctional importance of solidarity a
conservative focus rather than a liberal one. At the
flace of a young immigrant society that lacks any lon
Rationality and Power in Man. Morgenthau's discussion of rationality and the

desire for power moves through human beings to the state and ends up with the
state system. Morgenthau (1972:9-10) sees the desire for power as an immanent
part of human nature, which explains its consistency throughout history. This
desire and passion for power (which emanate from irrational sources and can
lead to irrational behavior) ultimately define man as a political entity. Man, ac-
cording to Morgenthau (1972:191-196), is an animus dominandi, an entity that
first and foremost relates to others and does so through power and domination.1
Power refers to the psychological relationship between the power wielder and the
subjugated object. Specifically, "power is a psychological relationship in which
one man controls certain actions of another man through the influence he exerts
over the latter's will" (Morgenthau 1962d: 11; also 1967:27-29). This relationship
and the desire for power produces constant struggle--"the struggle for power is
universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience" (Mor-
genthau 1967:30-31). This struggle is eternal and is what defines politics and the
political sphere. As we will see in a moment, this struggle is (reflecting a some-
what Hobbesian logic) responsible for creating the state and infusing it with
ethical meaning.
Like Thomas Hobbes ([1651]1909), Morgenthau regards the eternal struggle
between human beings as not only devastating but a hindrance to progress. Like
Hobbes, he also looks to human rationality for salvation. He, thus, views human
rationality as critical to human progress and essential to the construction of pol-
itical theory. However, he also acknowledges the imperfection of rationality,
which he considers largely driven by irrational forces (mainly the desire for
power). Having said this, in the final analysis Morgenthau (1972:10, 153-157)
argues that rationality can minimize the devastation of the struggle for power, at
least by choosing itself and spurning irrationality. In his more pessimistic mo-
ments, as in the epilogue of Truth and Power, there is a practical sense of outrage at
society and a feeling of the tremendous limitations in human rationality. On the
whole, however, Morgenthau constructs his theory around rationality, or at least
its possibility in some people.
Rationality and Power in the State and in Politics. Rationality plays a prominent role
in politics. According to Morgenthau, what distinguishes politics from general
events in history is its rational dimension. This belief shows Hegel's considerable
influence on Morgenthau's thinking. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
([1821]1952:1-13, 216-223; [1837]1975) saw history as a collection of contin-
gent events that could retrospectively (once Minerva's owl had spread her wings)
be identified as part of a grand scheme that represented the gradual actualization
of rationality as well as the actualization of the ideal of freedom. In other words,
the panoramic and retrospective view of history enables us to filter out the con-
tingent and identify the grand, rational scheme of history. It is this philosophy of
history to which Morgenthau (1972:149) subscribed:
The contingent character of social reality embraces only one particular aspect of
social life. Social life is contingent, but it is more than that. Its contingencies are
not mere chaos but follow each other with a certain regularity and are subject to a
certain order. What to the contemporaneous observer seems to be mere chance
... appears in retrospect as a meaningful process, governed, if not by necessity, at
least by certain objective laws.
"Although his basic and most common argument was that all men pursue power, on several occasions Mor-
genthau (1982:318) also posits that the majority are satisfied with wise rulership. Although completely consistent
with his Schumpeterianism, this view, nevertheless, contradicts his argument that desire for power is inherent in
human nature.
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 449
In this quotation, we can find the three f

its own self-actualization-the Hegelian
function involves theorizing--rational
and patterned from the contingent an
most important to us here, is that rati
ment of politics.
Morgenthau expects statesmen to act rat
are defined in terms of power. Rational p
these interests, defining their relative
realize them (which by no means neces
rational politics facilitates achieving the a
Morgenthau is aware that few politician
the vast majority of politicians, especia
specifically, Dwight Eisenhower and L
statesmen (that is, Edmund Burke, W
whom he lauds almost to the extent o
identifies politicians who acted ration
true understanding of human natur
defined as the sphere in which intere
acterized by the need for rational behavio
The state's ability to moderate and har
entrance for understanding its role in
Hobbesian logic in Morgenthau's theor
realizes that in order for culture and c
power struggle must be curbed; this c
important role the state plays in Morg
Domestic societies can afford to outlaw, at lea

violence for private ends and can make th
integrated social organisms with common lo
ice, and a governed monopoly of organized
and comprehensive legislative, judicial, and
To Morgenthau, the state is understood as

to moderate violence and moderate the
loyalty we now know as nationalism-de
era became very strong. Such loyalty w
and replacing it by projecting this desire
arena. "Not being able to find full satis
national boundaries, the people project
national scene" (Morgenthau 1967:99).
tional from this discussion, arguing that
hierarchy according to their loyalty to
mined by benefits that the classes gain
sections of the working class profit great
with the state is the greatest. The prol
state. As a result, it does not identify wi
The state is the organizational and in
(Morgenthau 1967:97-98). It is a histori
War and, as such, can disappear. Mo
":Lincoln was the subject of Morgenthau's (with H

Morgenthau (with Hein 1983:3-5) explains that this wo
'4One wonders what happened to the lessons of World
state armies.
even claims that in the aftermath of the nuclear age, the state and nationalism have
exhausted their capabilities and that we now need a new political principle to
reorganize the patterns of power in a more functional way.
Beyond this rationalistic and functionalistic analysis of the state, however, lies yet
another dimension of analysis that, probably following Hegel again, endows
the state with moral and ethical meaning. According to Morgenthau (1967:260), "in
politics the nation and not humanity is the ultimate fact." The state is the ultimate
fact not just empirically but also ethically; the state and the nation are morally
meaningful in politics. And even though Morgenthau (1972:169-174) sometimes
criticizes utilitarian ethics, he adopts its Weberian version of ethics of responsibility
(Turner and Factor 1984:168-169; Barkawi 1998:159-162)."' This version of ethics
is not fundamentally different from utilitarianism, at least from the perspective of
political praxis. The political act must be judged according to its results, not by its
intentions; this judgment is relative and not absolute, indicating the amount of
damage and the utility of the action. Because of this concept of ethics and the state's
capacity to moderate violence and produce relative order, the state becomes an
ethical value. Its preservation becomes an ethical duty (Morgenthau 1952:238-
242). But even this rational argument cannot hide the enormous ethical value that
the state carries within it, not only because of its function but also because of what it
is. Michael Smith (1981:766-785) argues that Morgenthau largely sees the state as
the mainspring of morality, a Hegelian sittilichkeit. The state is not ethical because of
functional rationality, but rather it possesses immanent value. Here, we see an inner
tension in Morgenthau's thinking. Even though, on the one hand, he views the state
as a historical phenomenon that draws its ethical value from its function, on the
other, he also sees it as an absolute entity with an immanent ethical value. Both
views seem to coexist in his mind, without him deciding between them.
One way or another, the state is an ethical value and the most important political
entity. This brings us to the subject of "interest," which represents a key concept in
Morgenthau's thinking. His political framework, in which an interest is defined in
terms of power, is compatible with the state as the entity on whose behalf, in a
supposedly rational way, vested interests are pursued. This line of reasoning
undergirds the main concepts in Morgenthau's theory. However, the discussion of
what constitutes an interest according to Morgenthau leads us, once again, to two
different views that seem at variance with one another.'6 On the one hand, interests
appear to be rational, objective, universal, and absolute. On the other, and in par-
ticular with regard to the United States, Morgenthau perceives an equivalence
between interest and purpose-purpose whose content is unique to each country's
tradition and culture and that is primarily moral. The purpose of the United States,
according to Morgenthau, is, as mentioned above, equality in freedom, or in other
words, political equality.
There is a difference between the theory of rationality presented in the vari-
ous editions of Politics among Nations and American Foreign Policy (1952) and
Morgenthau's later work on US foreign policy, as constructed in books like The
Purpose of American Politics (1960) and A New Foreign Policy for the United States, which
came out in 1969. In the later work on the United States, we see an effort to
introduce morality into the theory, thus endowing it with greater weight.17
I5On other aspects of Max Weber's influence on Morgenthau, see jim George (1994:91) and Hans-Karl Pichler
(1998:185-200).
'6Both Robert Osgood (1984:32-34) and Kenneth Thompson (1984:30-31) see these two answers as comple-
mentary and as a point for Morgenthau, although they do not help the reader understand how these two answers
can be joined together
"7Some interpreters (Murray 1996:81-107; Mollov 1997:569-570, 1998:93-112) note Morgenthau's changing
attitudes in his later years, when he tried to resolve this tension. They fail, however, to consider Morgenthau's re-
editing and republication of the rational and supposedly objective Politics among Nations.
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 451
The rational and objective dimension is

among Nations is constructed. As such,
statesman for wise action and to the sc
criticize political action. It is in this vein t
a manifesto, a realist manifesto. The co
enthau (1962b:410) suggests in later writ
We assume, as pointed out elsewhere in greater

there exists an objective rational standard by
can be judged. This assumption derives from
the actor on the political scene cannot help b
greater or lesser degree. It is the degree of c
and rational requirements which determines
This quotation contains most of the main

subject of interest. There is ambiguity a
the political act, whether it is indeed rat
Morgenthauian project is to expose this
explicitly claim here that political action is
exists by which we can judge the ration
because these standards evolve from the
that a creature with a rational nature woul
in large sections of Morgenthau's writin
of his texts to provide guidance in polic
Rationality, Power, and the Balance of Pow

and the desire for power play a prom
relations as well. Quite often, when Mo
tem, he is referring to international so
international system in which several en
that affect their behavior toward one a
factors: "Two factors are at the base of
plicity, the other is the antagonism
(Morgenthau 1967:166).
Morgenthau (1962a:274) also claims that
ent part of international society because
have seen, these conflicts can be contro
international societies. In this regard
members of an international society in
political power-morally and socially-rest
bers (the states) and not in the society itse
Two instruments do exist that can moderate to an extent the violence in inter-
national society. The first is the practice of balance of power, and the second is the
existence of international organizations and alliances, although none of these in-
struments is perfect.'8 When one reads Politics among Nations, one gains the impres-
sion that balance of power is a necessary and automatic praxis arising out of conflict.
Morgenthau (1967:161, 202-203; 1970:80) makes various remarks that underscore
the impression that he sees balance of power as an unavoidable consequence of an
unrestrained desire on the part of states to achieve power--a desire that causes
countries to resist each other's policies, thus creating the distribution of power that is
one meaning of "balance of power." Moreover, Morgenthau (1967:161-163) as-
cribes to the system a wish for equilibrium and, applying functional logic, sees the
'5In this paper, we will concentrate on the balance of power mechanism. It is enough to mention here the
skepticism that Morgenthau had regarding international law, alliances, and the like.
balance of power mechanism as the one that automatically preserves the stability of
the system without detriment to the plurality of its member units.
A more thorough reading, however, reveals Morgenthau's deeper conceptu-
alization of the balance of power, a conceptualization that does not diminish the
actors as agents who undertake purposeful acts in order to influence the system
and structure in which they operate (see also Claude 1962:25-37). Indeed,
Morgenthau (1967:8) himself maintains that the balance of power does not exist
in reality but rather represents an ideal model. He goes still further with an
insight that bears a considerable resemblance to the theories advanced by con-
temporary discourse theorists (see Morgenthau 1967:197). Underlying the no-
tion of balance of power, he sees a mechanistic metaphor of the universe and the
forces within it. He does not go as far as to claim, however, that it was the
metaphor that brought about the praxis. The fact that the balance of power is
neither real nor certain and that it is short on policy recommendations finally
leads Morgenthau (1967:207) to conclude that "the balance of power thus as-
sumes a reality and a function that it actually does not have, and therefore tends
to disguise, rationalize, and justify international politics as it actually is." Although
this is an ideal model, it nevertheless contributes something to stability. Mor-
genthau (1970:220-221) even views it as the best method for preventing the rise
of a totalitarian regime on a global scale. Here, we see the application of
Morgenthau's democratic theory to his theory of international politics; balance of
power acts internationally just as the system of checks and balances works do-
mestically in a democratic regime (see also Williams 2004:650).
We also see that the balance of power, whose aim is stability, achieves this end by
keeping the world power structure static. Thus, global stability is ensured by
means of the stratification of states into classes. Some states are superpowers;
others are medium-size powers; and still others are poor and weak. World stability
demands the maintenance of this structure, together with these inequalities. Just
as the elitist theory of democracy (based on conservative ideology) explicitly as-
sumes a classed society, Morgenthau's realist theory makes the explicit assumption
of a stratified world. The conceptions regarding stability found in elitist theory,
conservative ideology, and the realist theory of international relations are very
similar and involve structural stratification of a political, social, and global nature.
We see then the importance of rationality, of power, of desire for power, and of
the balance of power in the construction of Morgenthau's realist theory. We also
observe several of the weaknesses and contradictions in Morgenthau's theorizing
regarding these concepts (that is, the meaning and source of the value of the state,
the meaning of interest and purpose, the meaning of balance of power, and above
all the clash between rationality and desire for power in that both supposedly stem
from human nature and govern human behavior, albeit in opposite directions).
The Conservative Foundations of Morgenthau's Classical Realism. We have examined

each of the spheres of Morgenthau's thought separately. Now let us draw them
together and explain how they are connected and constitute one another and in
the process show how the ideological dimensions can provide a better under-
standing of both his theory and its flaws.
The first step is to recognize the role of theories in Morgenthau's thinking.
Morgenthau (1962b:45) argues that theories are necessary as they draw us nearer
to the truth and facilitate rational political behavior. He considers theory "a tool
for understanding. Its purpose is to bring order and meaning to a mass of
phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible."
And this is to be done, we must remember, while viewing history as consisting of
an ephemeral and accidental dimension. Theory filters out the nonrelevant and
because it is supposed to create order, the criteria for its success are pragmatic.
"What is decisive for the success or failure of a theory is the contribution it makes
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 453
to our knowledge and understanding

and understanding. It is by its result
epistemological pretenses and me
1962b:46; 1967:VII). The potential b
abstract, intellectual sphere involved i
politics. "In short, then, this book end
an empirical and conceptual framewo
United States can at least attempt to
interest of the nation and of man
(Morgenthau 1967:20) argues elsewher
the twentieth century that is devoid o
for its own sake. The dangers facin
include nuclear weapons in a bipola
making research an absolute necessi
plies, can help generate effective, rat
world, prevent wars, and avoid nucle
The best way to understand the impo
and to interests, which are defined in
uting factors in the construction of
perception of history as consisting of
construct a theory is by treating it as an
but not perfectly. Therefore, and bec
on research in terms of its contributi
oretical ideal is an ideal model to whi
conclusion provides some insight into
enthau's realism for mixing descriptio
one of his papers, Morgenthau comme
mits a better understanding of foreign
usual characteristic ambiguity, he sta
duces a more efficient foreign policy
mative dimension (Morgenthau 1962b
that this is the aim of placing interest
political essence and practice. Armed
ality (two practices that do not wholly
by which we can identify politics
(1962b:46-49; 1967:7) uses the analog
photography, and that the accuracy o
efficiency in constructing the map. T
of the relativism of theory and the fact
the truth itself. In other words, reali
about the pursuit of power, and they
It is, however, possible to reconcile th
thinking-that is, his emphasis on the
phasis on the nonrational, and even i
ents are stressed when he tries to und
explain it. When trying to explain rea
an almost positivist way--to relinqu
for being able to explain things and,
positivism), to build a model to wh
repeatedly stresses the importance be
of politics, although the reality is no
O'O(n this point, the reader should note that Willia

apositivism, but he completely ignores the positivist
yet. For example, "a theory of politics cannot help implying that the rational
elements of politics are superior in value to the contingent ones" (Morgenthau
1962b:49).21
But it is even more complex than what we have just described. Morgenthau
(1962d: 110) reaches an almost constructivist understanding in one of his papers:
That theory of social action, however persuasive it may sound to our ears by
virtue of apparently being supported by our domestic experience, is in truth
without foundation. Facts have no social meaning in themselves. It is the signifi-
cance we attribute to certain facts of our sensual experience, in terms of hopes
and fears, our memoirs, intentions, and expectations, that create them as social
facts. The social world itself, then, is but an artifact of man's mind as the reflection
of his thoughts and the creation of his actions.
Although such reasoning is only found explicitly in one place in his writings, it has
bearings on his entire way of thinking. When Morgenthau says that emphasis on
rationality can lead to political progress, he is not just talking about a model for
politicians to aspire to and then use to mend their ways. He also means that theories
that stress rationality make the ideas they posit a social fact to follow. If rationality is
stressed and acted upon, it will become a constitutive element of our political
lives-thus, the importance of rationality in Morgenthau's theory.
In this way, theory-realist theory-can help us overcome our frailties and the
social dangers to which they lead. However, these frailties and their concomitant
dangers only make sense in the context of conservative ideology and the elitist
theory of democracy. Unless one is a conservative, there is almost no reason to heed
Morgenthau's fears and no point in constructing the theory the way he does. In
other words, because of his conservative fears, Morgenthau stresses desire for
power as the constitutive element of man, society, and politics. Just as fear of abuse
of power by the powerful is constitutive in the structural model of checks and
balances, so this same fear is constitutive in the construction of realist theory with its
emphasis on desire for power-and balance of power as the consequence of this
desire-but also its cure. These same beliefs cause Morgenthau to stress rationality,
however partial and weak, and posit it as the viable solution for ending violence. To
Morgenthau, rationality is reflected in the international balance of power and the
domestic system of checks and balances. Moreover, this rationality is largely found
in the properties of theories, that is, in the minds of the minority who formulate
them-an enlightened minority, a scholastic minority, which brings to mind the
political minority that competes for power in the Schumpeterian model of democ-
racy. And, as a result, conservatism along with a structural, elitist form of democracy
become reconciled with Morgenthau's realist belief in the possibility of change
through reforms, rather than through radical changes.
Conservative Foundation of Waltz's Structural Neorealism
But can we generalize from Morgenthau's case? After all Morgenthau declared
himself a conservative, immersed himself in social and philosophical reflectio
and--most important--was denounced as a metaphysical thinker by the influen
Waltz, who, in a sense, overtook Morgenthau in an effort to transform internationa
2"With regard to the point being made here, it would appear that Jack Donnelly (1992:92) misses this aspec
Morgenthau and so sees irreconcilable contradictions in the latter's theory. Ulrik Peterson (1999) offers a diffe
solution to the contradictions in Morgenthau's theory, suggesting that what may appear to be contradictions a
fact signs of Nietzsche's influences. However, Peterson seems to be attempting to legitimize his own post-mo
theory of international relations by anchoring its roots in one of the founding fathers of the discipline. Christop
Frei (2001:94-113), in contrast, although identifying Nietzsche's influence on Morgenthau, stresses that Nietz
influenced Morgenthau's views of elitism, the will fbr power, and irrationalism. Thus, Frei, quite reasonably, sugg
that Nietzsche contributed to Morgenthau's conservatism.
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 455
relations into a scientific and the

Morgenthau's theory is a throwback
unscientific reflections. Alternatively,
may not be able to generalize from M
more contemporary and scientific reali
ers. In order to demonstrate the gen
that is, that realism in general canno
an elitist theory of democracy, let u
using it as a critical case study. Given t
and methodology and because he explici
conservative (in Halliday and Rosenb
the arguments being made here in hi
necessary interconnectedness among
The first step in exploring Waltz is to
functions. Such a discussion will hel
lematic feature of Waltz's theory, na
independent variable (the structure o
variable (the stability of the internatio
only be explained by his conservatism
elaboration of Waltz's conceptualizati
governance, laying the foundation fo
Strange as it may seem for a schol
shift from psychologism, Waltz (1979:6
to control and maintains that "the urge
It is produced also by the desire to con
rather than merely to predict." It i
theorizing in the urge-of all urges-
on the uncontrollable quality of int
contends, is effective as a means of con
reality's complexity.
A theory is a depiction of the organizati

among its parts. A theory indicates that
others and specifies relations among them
everything else, and one domain cannot b
lates one realm from all the others in ord
Using Immanuel Kant, Waltz (1979:5)

the world that interests us, we would
reliably find his way among infinite
Waltz's (1996:56) position is summed
in an analysis; little is included in a t
beautifully simple. Reality is complex
not work against theory. Rather, th
(Waltz 1990:27).
According to Waltz (1965:743-744; 19
to intellectual schematizing, in which t
curiosity and provides systems of ex
antly, helps us practically. By simplify
ability to plan strategically. For this
orizing about world politics, ascribed si
and continuously attempted, albeit un
on his theory (see Waltz 1964:892-
From these two functions, Waltz (19
construction, a provider of explan
demarcating exclusive domains (Waltz 1988:615; 1990:23, 29; 1996:54). However,

most important of all, he described theory as characterized by parsimony and as
replete with omissions. "In making assumptions about men's (or states') motiva-
tions, the world must be drastically simplified; subtleties must be rudely pushed
aside, and reality must be grossly distorted" (Waltz 1990:27). Put more succinctly,
"theory, after all, is mostly omissions" (Waltz 1990:31). But if theory is mainly
omissions, we ought to find out what is omitted from Waltz's theory and why. And
for this, we need an analytical account of his theory.
Waltz's theory is a structural theory. He arrived at his theory after surveying
political theory and finding that no adequate answers had ever been given to the
most important questions of all, those of war and stability. After discrediting political
theory and all previous accounts of war as reductionistic (Waltz 1979:18-19), as
suffering from the "ecological" fallacy (Waltz 1971:456), or from psychologism
(Waltz 1959:28-29), Waltz cleared the way for his structural theory. He defined
"system" as "a set of interacting units" (Waltz 1979:40) and viewed systems as
containing units and structure, where structure is the most important factor in
explaining behavior within the system. Waltz took this conceptualization so far that
in his theory states' intentions and interests are marginalized and the system be-
comes almost reified as a living entity. In a logic borrowed from micro-economics,
Waltz (1979:88-97) argues that the system is created by states and their interactions
and that these interactions are almost compulsory and spontaneous. Moreover, he
contends that once the system is in place, its logic overrides the importance of states
and states' individual features such as intentions, interests, political culture, and so
on. All subsystem factors are marginalized in Waltz's theory, save for one factor that
he regards as the most basic and essential of the states' goals: survival. Given that
the system is anarchic and founded on the principal of self-help, survival becomes
the motivating factor in every state's moves and the overarching consideration in
international behavior. In other words, the system causes states to behave similarly,
as "like units," no matter their internal features.
In addition, Waltz (1979:82) tends to underestimate the effects of other system
factors besides system structure. He conceives the system in a very narrow sense, in
effect, undervaluing system processes and system norms and procedures (see also
Keohane 1989:8; Little 1991:474; Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993:31-33; Schweller
1993:74-77; Powell 1994:324-325; Christensen and Snyder 1997:919-920). For
Waltz (1979:80), the system is equated with its structure, which is "defined by the
arrangement of its parts." This definition helps Waltz (1979:82, 104-107) create a
dichotomous distinction between domestic and international systems--regarding
the former as hierarchic and the later as anarchic, the former as having a division of
labor between the different units and the latter as rejecting such division because
the units (for example, the states) fear the resulting dependency on other units.
Thus, we have an anarchic system of self-help in which every state aspires to
maximize power as an instrument of survival.
By limiting the international system to very narrow and thin bounds, Waltz can
move closer to scientific theorizing. The limits that he imposes create or, to use his
phrase, intellectually construct a bounded domain that may be conceptualized in
terms of variables and causal explanations and, more important, can allow the
international system to be explained parsimoniously and theoretically. But what
does Waltz seek to explain? What does he see as important? We are left only with
the stability of the system and, even that, he defines very narrowly.
Waltz's (1964:887) first step toward theorizing about stability was to define it "in
terms of its [system] durability, as well as of the peacefulness of adjustment within
it." However, he gradually came to view this conceptualization as too normatively
committed and set about redefining it. His redefinition involved two factors: (1) the
endurance of the organizing principal, anarchy, and (2) the absence of a conse-
quential variation in the number of principal parties constituting the system,
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 457
namely the number of poles in the

words, according to Waltz, stability e
and maintains its number of poles. Al
politics, it leaves Waltz's theory too thin
There is more at stake here, which
Waltz's theory. Waltz's definition of sta
the same terms that he uses to define st
as both independent and dependent v
caused by structure. Or, put different
tautological circularity. All that Walt
claim that bipolar structure is the most
structure is what maintains structur
restructure into stable bipolarity. Th
more and more interests from Morge
ally in a theory with only one variable
and the dependent variable. Ultimately
him to tautology. And the way to und
servatism.
The starting point for unraveling Waltz's conservatism is the relationship be-
tween structure and states in his theory. Although his structural theory might imply
determinism, Waltz struggles to avoid a deterministic reading. He claims that
"states' actions are not determined by structure. Rather, as I have said before,
structures shape and shove; they encourage states to do things and to refrain from
doing others" (Waltz 1997:915). Elsewhere (Waltz 1971:470-471), he adds:
the structural factor is only one causal force among many. Leaders may well
appreciate the strength of the constraints upon them, but they may squirm at the
thought of accepting them ... Structural constraints are barriers, but men can try
to jump over them. Structure shapes and limits choices; it establishes behavioral
tendencies without determining behavior
According to Waltz (1979:74-77), structure influences states' behavior through

two mechanisms: socialization and competition. However, Waltz understands so-
cialization not as a sociological process of learning and adjustment resulting in social
cohesiveness. In the Waltzian scheme, socialization is an upshot of competition, an
imitation of effective practices. Both socialization and competition operate accord-
ing to functional logic. States that do not respond to structural pressure will fall
behind or even perish. Waltz's theory contains aspects of social Darwinism (see also
Wendt 1999:151). However, as noted above, Waltz (1993a:54) allows states a certain
freedom of decision, although very limited (see Waltz 1997:915), and acknowledges
that states behave differently and have different aims and strategies. States may
choose misguided strategies and risk structural punishment. Hence, the function-
alism is not total, and social Darwinism alone cannot explain why states behave as
they do, especially given that most states do not perish. This being so, a supple-
mentary explanation is needed, one that augments functionalism by explaining
why it is that most states behave wisely, at least in terms of Waltz's criteria.
As Robert Keohane (1986:167, 173) rightly observes, the connection in Waltz's
theory between structure and states' behavior must be rationalism. Rationalism is
the only basis from which theoreticians can argue safely that states can and, indeed,
do choose correct strategies. However, Waltz's treatment of rationalism seems
highly ambivalent and problematic. According to his thinking, rationality is a
quality of the system, its structure, and its ability to filter out errant states. This is
how we can understand Waltz's (1959:201, emphasis in original) contention that
"if security is something the state wants, then this desire, together with the con-
ditions in which all states exist, imposes certain requirements on a foreign policy
that pretends to be rational. The requirements are imposed by an automatic sanc-

tion: Departure from the rational model imperils the survival of the state." And
even more so his argument (Waltz 1979:76-77) that:
competitive systems are regulated, so to speak, by the "rationality" of the more

successful competitors. What does rationality mean? It means only that some do
better than others-whether through intelligence, skill, hard work, or dumb
luck. They succeed in providing a wanted good or service more attractively and
more cheaply than others do. Either their competitors emulate them or they fall
by the wayside
Rationality, according to Waltz, is not rationality of ends or of means. It is simply

rationality of results and is achieved almost entirely through functionalism and
system filtering. Although Waltz (1986:330-331) argues that he uses rationality as a
very thin notion, his use is actually very robust. The problem is that this rationality
does not belong to states or statesmen, but to an abstract entity, a system, that is no
more than an intellectual construction. Humans, so it seems, are stripped of ra-
tionality in Waltz's theory, and it is here that Waltz's conservatism is most apparent.
Humans are portrayed conservatively as embedded in extra-rational structures
with poor control over their own destinies. Furthermore, although Waltz detests
reliance on human nature for constructing theory, when he does refer to human
nature (only in his pre-theoretical, early writings), he puts across a Morgenthauian
pessimistic view. Waltz's (1959:40, 52-53) pessimism is evident in his mistrust of
efforts to apply reason to social and political problems and the ability of humans to
bring about changes.
It is Waltz's pessimism regarding human nature and human capacities and fac-
ulties that guides him in constructing his theory, which is based on the rationality of
the structure rather than on human rationality. His theory, in its essence, under-
values and even undermines any possibility for structural change. Moreover, his is a
changeless world haunted by everlasting conflict. In other words, conflicts are as
inherent to the world as are wars. All that can be hoped for is that wars do not
escalate into system-wide wars: wars between superpowers. Hence, Waltz (1959:1)
proclaims that "attempts to eliminate war, however nobly inspired and assiduously
pursued, have brought little more than fleeting moments of peace between states."
"We know the evils of the system we have lived with and can only imagine those
that would exist in a noticeably different world" (Waltz 1965:731). He also believes
that "changes spawn uncertainties and create difficulties, especially when the
changes are structural ones" (Waltz 1993a:72). These declarations echo, too, in
his rhetorical question: "Why should the future be different from the past?"
(Waltz 1993a:64).
It is this pessimism and fear of change that support the idea of reading Waltz's
structural neorealism as another incarnation of conservatism in international the-
ory (see also Ashley 1986:258-259, 268-273, 289; Cox 1986:248; Rosenberg
1990:285, 296-297; Griffiths 1992a:222-234, 1992b:77, 98-101). Moreover, these
are not the only supports for such a contention. In the same vein, Waltz (1959:190)
names authority as the harbinger of peace-"the authority, not the categorical
imperative, is the important factor so far as peace is concerned"-arguing that too
much individualism and atomism are antagonistic to conformity, which is essential
for society to function (see also Waltz 1979:75-76). And it is not only individualism
that troubles Waltz; he also thinks that egalitarianism leads to instability, ineffi-
ciency, and impoverishment (Waltz 1967b:228-229). Moreover, even arguments of
justice seem dangerous:
Internationally and domestically, the poor are alienated and frustrated because
they are so little needed. How can the unemployed be said to be exploited? How
can countries offering materials that are in plentiful supply be said to be sub-
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 459
sidizing rich nations through low comm

buying their products, poor countries wo
In this conflictual universe, all one

provided by a balance of power in
similarity between Waltz and Morge
structure responsible for providing
balance of power functions in a crit
1964). Moreover, just as Morgenthau
Waltz (1964:887-888), who regards
United States (Waltz 1986:341; 1991:669-670; 1993b:188, 195; 1997:915)-and it
is this understanding of the balance of power that leads us to Waltz's elitist theory of
democracy. Waltz's theory of democracy reflects his skepticism, which led him to
stress the problems of a regime founded on popular will. At the same time, how-
ever, he emphasizes the importance of democracy and its normative superiority and
maintains that a structural democracy based on a system of checks and balances can,
in fact, resolve some of the problems arising from the exercise of popular will.
Waltz (1967a:12-13, 274-276) also expresses doubts regarding the competency
of citizens to form rational preferences. He suggests that this is because citizens lack
the statesman's ability to analyze changing circumstances and to decide on their
basis; he feels that citizens lack this ability especially with regard to military is-
sues-" does the common citizen, one must wonder, have the fortitude to sustain
costly military programs, the benefits of which are necessarily uncertain?" (Waltz
1967a:269). Waltz (1967a:287) goes even further, pointing out that voting patterns
are expressive and emotional and determined by party loyalty rather than being
instrumental and rational, decided by evaluating interests and means. This analysis
notwithstanding, Waltz (1991:670) commits himself to democracy and, like Mor-
genthau before him, to a structural and elitist form of democracy, one designed to
check and balance the incapacity of citizens, the popular will, and the dangers of
power concentration. Where Morgenthau quoted Schumpeter, Waltz (1967a:13)
quotes Walter Lippmann. And though he tries to qualify Lippmann's extremism, he
does adopt Lippmann's elitist framework. Lippmann (1922, 1934, 1955), one of the
most influential publicists in the United States in the twentieth century, criticized
US foreign policy, claiming that its failures were a result of bowing to public whims.
Lippmann argued that, because the public reacts not to reality but to stereotypes
and manipulation, the role of the public should be limited to the election of leaders
whose task is to take rational decisions without deferring to popular pressure and to
be checked by the other democratic branches of government.
As mentioned earlier, Waltz saw Lippmann's views as too radical, but he does not
try to refute them, only to qualify and moderate them. Waltz (1967a) does this in his
book, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics, in which he attempts to reconcile his
concerns about Lippmann with his democratic commitments, doing so by embrac-
ing a structural theory of democracy. Waltz (1967a:31 1) concludes the book thus:
Democracies less often enjoy the brilliant success that bold acts secretly prepared
and ruthlessly executed may bring. With the ground of action more thoroughly
prepared and the content of policy more widely debated, they may, however,
suffer fewer resounding failures. Coherent policy, executed with a nice combi-
nation of caution and verve, is difficult to achieve in any political system, but no
more so for democratic states than for others.
But he offers this qualified defense of democracy only for the US presidential
democracy with its strict separation of powers, not for British parliamentary
democracy, which he criticizes severely throughout the book (Waltz 1967a: 166-175,
264-266). In this book and elsewhere, Waltz has followed Lippmann's line of
thought, showing how the executive is checked by Congress in the presidential

democratic structure, and addressed Lippmann's concerns fairly adroitly. He also
argues that the United States has successfully built a well-functioning and worthy
democracy-a system in which the Congress has control of resources and advisors
that render it a consumer of ideas, including those critical of the administration.
Thus, Congress creates a structure of effective scrutiny of the administration and,
together with the administration, can shape coherent policies that rise above the
popular will. With this structure, the administration even manages to implement its
policies (Waltz 1967a:164-172, 181, 207-211, 292; 1967c:208).
As we see, then, Waltz is not so very different from Morgenthau-even though
the rhetoric he uses is scientific. Waltz's theory is based on conservative skepticism
and pessimism regarding human rational faculties and on an assumption of our
incapacity to change the system in which we live. Humans are embedded in a
system that is anarchic and conflictual, but it is better than any available alternative.
Moreover, any attempt to change this system is destined to destabilize what we have
and to fling humanity into total and chaotic war. The same fears that drove Morg-
enthau to stress a rationality that he did not believe in but hoped somehow to
achieve by making it a social fact drive Waltz to omit from his theory what he feared
most of all: change. Thus, his theory is haunted by a circular tautology in which the
structure explains the structure, in which the structure (distribution of power, that
is, the number of poles) explains the stability of the structure, namely the continuity
of the existing structure. Consequently, his theory cannot envisage the possibility of
change; its circularity dooms it to irrelevance in times of change.
Yet another issue is involved here. Even though Waltz (1996) tried to distinguish
"international relations" theory from "foreign relations" theory, if we examine his
writings in their historical context, we obtain a different understanding. His most
important book, Theory of International Politics, was published in 1979, during a
period of international tumult, which saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and
the Iranian Revolution. It was a time when US public opinion was pressuring
President Jimmy Carter to resume Cold War policies, abandon the SALT II ne-
gotiations, and adopt a more aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union. Waltz
abhorred the idea of embarking on an aggressive path that might destabilize the
structure and cause a major war. He also loathed the possibility that popular will
might dictate US policy. In this historical context, it is not difficult to understand his
tacit message: nothing fundamental has happened, and there is no need to change
course. The United States should study the events and restrain itself from reacting
hastily in a way that might endanger the imperfect but stable bipolar structure that
existed at the time.
However one reaches it, the conclusion is the same. Realism, both the classical
realism advanced by Morgenthau and the structural neorealism put forward by
Waltz, is founded on a conservative worldview and on conservative premises re-
garding human nature. Moreover, it is a normative and domestic theory as much as
it is a descriptive and international one. Realist theory attempts to advise ruling
elites on how to isolate themselves from public opinion and how to rule wisely. In
the next section, we will see some more specific implications of the realist pro-
specting when it comes to foreign policy.
Realism's Antagonism to Policies of Democratization

Let us explore some of the implications of the interconnectedness among conser-
vatism, realism, and elitism for foreign policy. Realism warns against attempts
at democratization. One obvious reason for such a warning is strategic. These
attempts are regarded as destabilizing crusades, threats to the balance of power,
and obstacles to real vital interests. This is especially so due to the conservative's
distrust of attempts at engineering social and political realities. However, strategic
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 461
arguments do not completely explain

democratizing other countries. The p
among realism, conservatism, and eli
fully understand this antagonism.
On normative grounds, realists comm
best guarantee against major wars and
In other words, balance of power is jus
moral grounds as well. Furthermore, s
democratic commitment shown by rea
racy. Democracy is regarded as the le
devised against a tyrannical concentratio
the freedoms of its citizens from go
guarantees negative freedom. Thus, re
domestic democratic structure that gu
versus an international structure that
ists face a choice of stability and the p
dom from government intervention on
this reasoning (as expressed by the two
concept of democratizing foreign cou
morally, and democratically. By stress
realists are actually committing them
than to its values or citizens. Thus, it
one's own country and not to be overl
outside one's country, that is, outside
ferently, realists believe that it is possib
box, which after all is the way they vi
Scholars holding opposing theories o
normative theories, consider the real
first place, democracy is not the lesser
method of governing and ordering pol
merely guarantees negative freedom.
citizens to enjoy civil and human rights.
participation, democracy provides the
self-fulfillment, and the possibility of
advocates of participatory and normat
contrasting democratic structure with
choice is required between the princip
statesmanship. These scholars also und
moral commitment to democratic valu
feel a sense of commitment to promo
democratization are not crusades destined to destabilize international structure.
When conducted properly (via socialization and the dissemination of democratic
values through domestic agents), democratization can foster a global community of
cooperative democracies and democratic citizens who are capable of self-actualiza-
tion and of achieving rationality. That is not to say this goal has been achieved, or
that it is easily achievable. Yet, promoting democracy abroad is morally worthwhile
and, difficult though it may be, not impossible to achieve (see, for example,
Ignatieff 2003).
Realism is certainly not a monolithic creed. It is divided into different subschools,
either according to the earlier classifications of classical realism and structural neo-
realism or according to the more current classification of offensive and defensive
realism. By studying Waltz as a critical case study, we have seen that conservative
ideology is as much a foundation of structural neorealism as it is of classical realism.
We have also seen that Waltz's foreign policy recommendations follow from
his theory and understanding of democracy, and that he counsels prudence,
maintaining the status quo, and refraining from democratic crusades. But what
about the latter classification, the contemporary classification of offensive versus
defensive realism? Do the arguments presented here apply to these two schools of
realism? Surely, there are some differences between offensive and defensive realism
(see Snyder 1991:11-12; Lynn-Jones and Miller 1995:xi; Frankel 1996:ix; Lynn-
Jones 1998; Taliaferro 2000-2001).
According to defensive realism (a direct offshoot of Waltz's theory), survival cal-
culations in an anarchic system can lead states to moderate their behavior and
perhaps even to cooperate (Walt 1987; Miller 1995; Glaser 1996). Offensive realism
(a somewhat crude version of Waltz's theory) claims that calculations of survival in
an anarchic system inevitably lead to aggression and expansionism (Mearsheimer
1990, 1994-1995, 2001). Each of these subschools of realism recommends different
strategies to cope with the hazards of international politics. These strategies span an
entire spectrum--ranging from cautious balance of power to aggressive expan-
sionism. Neither of these schools of thought, though, will go so far as to embrace a
policy of democratization for fear of its destabilizing consequences.
But we can go even further. According to Jeffery Taliaferro (2000-2001:159-
160), "the intrarealist debate has implications for the conduct of foreign policy." He
bases his argument on the differences between offensive and defensive realism.
However, this claim of Taliaferro was refuted by a realist contribution to the public
debate in the United States prior to the 2003 Iraq War. Two of the most vocal
opponents of the war were Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer. The former is one
of the leading proponents of defensive realism, and the latter the leading propo-
nent of offensive realism. Under the umbrella of the "Coalition for a Realistic
Foreign Policy" and in a series of articles and op-eds (Mearsheimer and Walt 2002a
2002b, 2003a, 2003b), the two joined hands in opposing the coming war. What is
interesting about their efforts is not their opposition to the war per se because their
opposition came from different theoretical and political spectra. What is interesting
is that Mearsheimer abandoned his offensive realist theoretical stand and fully
embraced the defensive realist logic. The joint articles are phrased in defensive
realist terms and propound such ideas as containment and deterrence and th
importance of building international consensus and cooperation. It seems that
when the real world came to haunt him, Mearsheimer understood the crudeness o
his theory and withdrew to the realist attitude of conservative moderation and
prudence. In the process, and without being aware, he discredited his own theory
and empowered defensive realism. Equipped with the reasoning of defensive real-
ism, he participated in the public debate, going on later to criticize neoconservatism
and the Bush doctrine and warning against democratization crusades (Mear
sheimer 2005). Put differently, the Iraq War has strewn after it yet another victim
(although the least painful of them all): the classification of defensive versus of-
fensive realism. When war was on the march, Mearsheimer, seeking refuge in th
warmth of conservative prudence, collapsed offensive realism into defensive real
ism. Thus, even considering the plurality of realism, the arguments set out in thi
article hold and so does the conclusion that realism is founded on a conservative
ideology or, at the very least, upon certain crucial conservative assumptions, and
that it is wary of policies of democratization.
There are departures from this ideal-type relation between realism, conserva-
tism, and foreign policy. The most obvious, of course, is the neoconservatives and
the policies of democratization that they advocate. However, this deviation from the
ideal-type is not as significant as it might seem for two reasons. First, the argument
presented here is that realism is constructed on certain crucial conservative as-
sumptions. That is not to say that conservatism necessarily breeds realism. Con-
servatives advocate an entire spectrum of foreign policies, ranging from the
isolation proposed by archconservatives such as Jesse Helms and Pat Buchanan to
spreading democracy as promulgated by neoconservative circles.
PIKI ISH-SHALOM 463
Morgenthau would probably have opp

that he opposed the Vietnam War,
Mearsheimer 2005). Neoconservative ad
just effort to achieve regime chang
second reason why the neoconservativ
el-the drive toward democratization i
pation and force. It is a concerted eff
external dictate, an effort based less o
doctrine equating democracy with regi
which the structural characterization of
moral attributes.
Conclusions
As we have seen, the relationship between realism, conservatism, and an el

theory of democracy is neither arbitrary nor confined to one strand of rea
Conservatism is the ideological foundation of realist theories of internatio
relations, and conservative ideology imbeds realist theoreticians with an el
understanding of democracy. Realism, conservatism, and elitism are linked in
tych-like relations. Hence, when judging a theory of international relation
must consider that more is at stake than simply the accuracy of the theory a
relationship with the conduct of world politics. When we judge a theory of
national relations, we must consider its moral basis and its moral implication
the world of practice. We should also realize that this moral basis affects not only
external relations of our own and other states and societies (a very import
subject in itself), but also how our own society is governed and how our own
is formed. In other words, theories are not from "out there." Theories arise
our own moral and ideological convictions, not from an analysis of "hard f
regarding the world. Moreover, they do not simply deal with international relatio
(no matter how difficult, complex, and important these are); they also concer
own society and state, its real and ideal organization, and our image of oursel
rational and able citizens. Furthermore, our perception of what constitutes a
and ideal regime closely relates to our view of real and ideal world politics, an
versa. These understandings also concern the way we act. There can be no nea
of treating domestic and international politics separately-not theoretically
morally, and not politically.
These conclusions have bearings on our understanding of the social scienc
Above all, they tend to discredit positivism, which relies on two premises: a s
fact/value distinction (Frost 1998), and the political and ideological detachme
theoreticians from their subject matter, the social world. The professional skills t
theoreticians possess, which enable them to distinguish fact from value and to qu
their ideological convictions when theorizing, form the bedrock of the posit
assertion of scientific objectivity and impartiality. In other words, positivist
tivism is contingent on these two premises. However, as we have discu
theoretical reasoning is founded on ideological conviction, be it follo
Morgenthau's focus on emphasizing or Waltz's on omitting. This ideological f
dation refutes the two positivist premises. First, there is no real fact/value d
tion. Indeed, even the theories we consider factually based, descriptive
explanatory are value-based normative theories. Second, it would be wrong t
that theoreticians are politically and ideologically detached from the social w
The process of theorizing is a product of the theorizer's ideological conviction
2The origin of this dtoctrinal change may be located in the almost consensual acceptance of the proposa
"democratic peace." The notion that democracies do not fight each other leads to an understanding that sp
democracy causes stability. Thus, it is a national interest to spread democracy abroad.
determines what will be emphasized and what will be omitted or, in other words,
what data will be elevated to the status of a theoretical fact. Therefore, we can say
that positivism, with its naive belief in objectivism and impartiality, has been dis-
credited (see also Ish-Shalom 2006).
This conclusion brings the problem of the incommensurability of theories to the
fore. The discussion offered here supports the argument that a broad and common
consensus over the validity of theories cannot, indeed, be achieved because the
theoretical world is as ruptured as the political world. It might have been possible to
achieve broad agreement if all that was involved were questions of the accuracy of
measurements, definitional weaknesses, methodological blunders, and faulty logical
inferences. If this were the case, it would have been reasonable to expect, as one
expects from positivism, a clarification of ambiguities and a correction of mistakes,
followed by the discovery of an objective truth. However, more is at stake in the-
oretical disagreements. In its most essential sense, the dispute involves divergences
over a priori assumptions regarding human nature and humans' rational faculties
as well as over ideological convictions concerning the warranted and realistic way to
organize a society and a polity. Moreover, given that these assumptions and con-
victions are unresolved philosophically or in political life, it would be unreasonable
to expect their resolution in the theoretical world. This, then, is the ideological
framework in which we should understand the interparadigmatic debates that have
dogged international relations from its earliest days.
The ideological and political worlds do have a second lesson to teach us, however.
As politics can demonstrate, different parties and different ideologies do under-
stand each other. Moreover, most of them have enough in common to be able to
construct political systems together, to cooperate with each other, and to form
crossover coalitions. Ideologies can be commensurable, and so also theories. For
this claim of theories' commensurability, though, to really make sense, we have to
define the "system" that the various theories construct and participate in, that is,
what is it that we mean by social science. What we need is to reformulate the social
sciences according to our findings of what, in fact, constitute theories, that is, the
ideological reasoning behind theorizing. Consequently, we should be trying to re-
place positivism with a normative philosophy of the social sciences, which takes the
constitutive relations of value and fact seriously as well as the ideological engage-
ment of theoreticians with their theorized subject matter, the social world. A nor-
mative philosophy of the social sciences would supplant the ethic of scientific
objectivity with a normative ethic and introduce moral reasoning, argumentation,
and evaluation into the process of explanatory theorizing. Instead of having posi-
tivist objectivity as its shaky foundation, morality would provide a sound and plur-
alistic foundation for the social sciences. Under the terms of a normative philosophy
of the social sciences, a genuine sensitivity to the ideological foundation of theor-
etical reasoning could be realized that would clear the way to an effective com-
mensurability (although not agreement) among theories by facilitating a genuine
process of understanding and by evaluating the normative foundations of the var-
ious social science theories. The result would be a more effective and essentialist,
give-and-take critique that clears the way for theoretical improvement and moral,
political, and social progress.
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The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism

Author(s): Piki Ish-Shalom

The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and

Department of International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

This essay examines the interconnectedness among realism, elitism, and

To clear themselves a place among the social sciences, international relations

.: 2006 International Studies Review.

Morgenthau's Classical Realism

understand and solve these internal cont

Morgenthau's Theory of Democr

In his view of the essence, importance,

1982:266-292), the US regime is a product of committees, agencies, and public

Indeed, Morgenthau (1962b:390; 1965:13-15) sees US policy as dictated by public

participation in elections, and any desi

by the common history of a community. The conservative concepts of past, tra-

Morgenthau also saw great importa

Morgenthau's Realist Theory

S''Here again, it is usefiul to stress some of the diff

Rationality and Power in Man. Morgenthau's discussion of rationality and the

In this quotation, we can find the three f

Domestic societies can afford to outlaw, at lea

To Morgenthau, the state is understood as

":Lincoln was the subject of Morgenthau's (with H

The rational and objective dimension is

We assume, as pointed out elsewhere in greater

This quotation contains most of the main

Rationality, Power, and the Balance of Pow

The Conservative Foundations of Morgenthau's Classical Realism. We have examined

to our knowledge and understanding

O'O(n this point, the reader should note that Willia

Conservative Foundation of Waltz's Structural Neorealism

relations into a scientific and the

A theory is a depiction of the organizati

Using Immanuel Kant, Waltz (1979:5)

demarcating exclusive domains (Waltz 1988:615; 1990:23, 29; 1996:54). However,

namely the number of poles in the

According to Waltz (1979:74-77), structure influences states' behavior through

that pretends to be rational. The requirements are imposed by an automatic sanc-

competitive systems are regulated, so to speak, by the "rationality" of the more

Rationality, according to Waltz, is not rationality of ends or of means. It is simply

sidizing rich nations through low comm

In this conflictual universe, all one

thought, showing how the executive is checked by Congress in the presidential

Realism's Antagonism to Policies of Democratization

arguments do not completely explain

Morgenthau would probably have opp

As we have seen, the relationship between realism, conservatism, and an el

BARKAWI, TARAK. (1998) Strategy as a Vocatio

DE-SHALlEF, AVNER. (1997) A Radical Theory of Democracy. Res Publica 3(1):61-80.

OSGOOD, ROBERT E. (1984) The Mission of Morgen

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