FELICIANO MANIEGO y CATU, petitioner,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Llorente and Yumul for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor
Augusto M. Luciano for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
This petitioner was convicted, by the Fifth Division of the Court of
Appeals, of a violation of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. He
pleads for acquittal, insisting upon purely legal points.
The facts found by that appellate court are substantially the following:
That on February 27, 1947, the accused, although appointed as a
laborer, had been placed in charge of issuing summons and subpoenas
for traffic violations in the Sala of Judge Crisanto Aragon of the Municipal
Court of the City of Manila. It appears furthermore, from the testimony of
Clerk of Court Baltazar and Fiscal De la Merced, then Deputy Fiscal
attending to traffic violations, that the accused had been permitted to
write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against offenders
without counsel, and to submit them to the Court for action, without
passing through the regular clerk. On the day in question, Felix Rabia,
the complainant herein, appeared and inquired from the accused about a
subpoena that he received. He was informed that it was in connection
with a traffic violation for which said Rabia had been detained and given
traffic summons by an American MP. The accused after a short
conversation went to Fiscal De la Merced and informed the Fiscal that
the case had already prescribed. The Fiscal having found such to be the
case, instructed the accused that if the traffic violator had no lawyer, he
could write the motion for dismissal and have it signed by the party
concerned. This was done by the accused and after the signing by Felix
Rabia the matter was submitted to the Court, which granted the petition
for dismissal.
According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (La forteza) of the National
Bureau of Investigation, the accused informed Rabia that the latter was
subject to a fine of P15; that Rabia inquired whether the same could be
reduced because he had no money, and that the accused informed
Rabia that he could fix the case if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia
did and the accused pocketed. This charged was denied by the accused.
The pertinent portion of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime,
in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration
of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally
or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and fine of not less than
the value of the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon if the
same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said
act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding
paragraph. . . .
As correctly indicated by counsel for petitioner the four essential
elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer within
the scope of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the accused
received by himself or thru another, some gift or present, offer or
promise; (3) that such gift, present or promises has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime or any act not
constituting a crime; (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of the
functions of the public officer.
There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the
meaning of article 203, which includes all persons "who, by direct
provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine
Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches,
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or
class." That definition is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does,
every public servant from the highest to the lowest. For the purposes of
the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law of public
officers between "officer" and "employee".
Petitioner, however, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in
regarding him as a public officer, expounded and discussed several
grounds arranged under the following hearings:
a. The doctrine of "the temporary performance of public functions
by a laborer" should not apply in defendant's case.
 b. The overt act imputed on the accused does not constitute a Wherefore, there being no issue about the penalty imposed, the decision
circumstance by which he may be considered a public official. of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto. With costs.

c. His appointment as laborer came from one source, while the Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista
designation and delimitation of the functions of his appointment Angelo, JJ., concur.
came from another source.

After having carefully considered the expository argumentation, we are

unconvinced. The law is clear, and we perceive no valid reason to deny
validity to the view entertained by the Spanish Supreme Court that, for
the purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public
functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public official. This opinion,
it must be stated, was followed and applied by the Court of Appeals
because the accused, although originally assigned to the preparation of
summons and subpoenas, had been allowed in some instance to
prepare motions for dismissal of traffic cases.

And this Tribunal has practically concurred with the Spanish court when
it opined1 that a laborer in the Bureau of Post temporarily detailed as filer
of money orders was a public officer within the meaning of article 203 of
the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, common sense indicates that the
receipt of bribe money is just as pernicious when committed by
temporary employees as when committed by permanent officials.

The second essential element has likewise been proven. The Court of
Appeals said this petitioner received ten pesos from Rabia (and
pocketed the money) in consideration of his "fixing" Rabia's case, and
thereafter he "fixed" it by filing a motion for dismissal, which was
approved in due course.

In connection with the last two elements of the offense, it should be

stated that our pronouncements under the first sufficiently answer
petitioner's propositions elaborated in several parts of his brief, revolving
around the thesis that since he was a mere laborer by appointment he
may not be convicted, because the preparation of motions for dismissal
is not surely the official function of a laborer. Enough to recall that
although originally appointed as a mere laborer, this defendant was on
several occasions designated or given the work to prepare motions for
dismissal. He was consequently temporarily discharging such public
functions. And as in the performance thereof he accepted, even solicited, Sacmar vs. Reyes-Carpio 400 scra 32
monetary reward, he was certainly guilty as charged.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1766. March 28, 2003.*
(OCA-IPI No. 00-979-RTJ)
LINDA M. SACMAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGNES REYES-
CARPIO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 261, Pasig City, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Administrative Complaints; The acts of a judge which
pertain to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless they
are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.—As a rule, the acts
of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary
power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.
To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment; For a
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment to prosper, it must be shown
that the judgment was unjust, and not that the judge merely committed an error
or judgment or took the unpopular side of a controversial point of law—he must
have known that his judgment was indeed unjust.—A perusal of the records,
particularly the assailed decision of respondent judge, hardly show that
respondent judge has indeed knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust
judgment. Complainant failed to satisfactorily show that respondent judge acted
in bad faith, with malice or in willful disregard of her right as a litigant. Although
the application and interpretation of the law by respondent judge differed from
that of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, complainant cannot sweepingly
claim that respondent judge knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. For a
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment to prosper, it must be shown
that the judgment was unjust, and not that the judge merely committed an error
of judgment or took the unpopular side of a controversial point of law. He must
have known that his judgment was indeed unjust. The failure of a judge to
correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does
not necessarily render him administratively liable.
Same; Same; Same; An administrative complaint against a judge cannot
be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties
aggrieved by his erroneous order or judgment—administrative remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not yet been resolved with
finality.—In Nelson Rodriguez and Ricardo Camacho v. Judge Rodolfo Gatdula,
we had occasion to reiterate the ruling enunciated in In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo,
to wit: An administrative complaint against a judge cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by his
erroneous order or judgment. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved
parties and the same has not yet been resolved with finality. For until there is a
final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is
manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent
judge is administratively liable.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment
and Violation of RA 3019.
An affidavit-complaint1 was filed by Mrs. Linda Sacmarcharging Judge
Agnes Reyes-Carpio for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
pursuant to Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Complainant is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 17941
“entitled “People of the Philippines v. Zoren Legaspi” for Grave Threats
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City.
After trial on the merits, accused Zoren Legaspi was convicted of the
crime of Grave Threats, and sentenced to a straight penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor and to pay complainant the sum of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages.2
Accused Legaspi appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. The case was subsequently raffled to Branch 261, presided
by respondent Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio.
On February 21, 2000, respondent judge rendered a
decision3 affirming with modification the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Accused Legaspi was found guilty only of Other Light Threats
under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, and was sentenced to a
straight penalty of thirty (30) days of arresto menor and to pay
complainant the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages.
Complainant claims that respondent judge wittingly afforded
unwarranted benefits to the accused which caused undue injury to her as
private complainant in the case. She likewise avers that respondent
judge exhibited manifest partiality towards the accused when she
disregarded the evidence on record in modifying the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court by downgrading the conviction of accused
Legaspi from “Grave Threats” to “Other Light Threats” thereby reducing
the criminal and civil liabilities of accused Legaspi.
In her Comment,4 respondent judge vehemently denied all the
charges against her. She averred that the attendant facts and
circumstances of the case, in her view, called for a modification of the
conviction of the accused therein. She claimed that she “rendered her
decision in good faith, without malice and without any conscious and
deliberate intent to favor a movie actor whom [she does not] even
know.”5
Respondent judge further informed the Court that the assailed
judgment is now pending review before the Court of Appeals.
In her Reply,6 complainant pointed out that respondent judge, in her
Comment, failed to explain why she unilaterally downgraded the
conviction of accused Legaspi. In effect, respondent judge has impliedly
admitted the charges against her when she failed to specifically
challenge these charges. Complainant assailed the claim of respondent
judge that the downgrading of the offense was rendered in good faith
and without malice.
After several exchanges of pleadings between the parties, Court
Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. rendered the opinion that this
administrative matter is not a proper subject of an administrative
investigation. He pointed out that, pursuant to the rule in Wingarts v.
Mejia,7 complainant failed to show beyond reasonable doubt that the
assailed judgment was unjust and that respondent judge consciously and
deliberately intended to do injustice to her by rendering such unjust
judgment. Accordingly, on October 31, 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative
complaint against respondent judge.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Office of the
Court Administrator.
As a rule, the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are
not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.8 To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment.9
A perusal of the records, particularly the assailed decision of respondent
judge, hardly show that respondent judge has indeed knowingly and
deliberately rendered an unjust judgment. Complainant failed to
satisfactorily show that respondent judge acted in bad faith, with malice
or in willful disregard of her right as a litigant. Although the application
and interpretation of the law by respondent judge differed from that of the
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, complainant cannot sweepingly
claim that respondent judge knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. For
a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment to prosper, it must
be shown that the judgment was unjust, and not that the judge merely
committed an error of judgment or took the unpopular side of a
controversial point of law. He must have known that his judgment was
indeed unjust.10 The failure of a judge to correctly interpret the law or to
properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render
him administratively liable.11 The ruling of the Court in Basa Air Base
Savings & Loans Association, Inc. v. Judge Gregorio G. Pimentel,
Jr.,12 is instructive:
A charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a
criminal offense. The keyword in said offense is “knowingly.” Thus, the
complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but
that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. A
judge’s mere error in the interpretation or application of the law per
se will not warrant the imposition of an administrative sanction against
him for no one is infallible. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will protect
a judicial officer from the charge of rendering an unjust decision.
At any rate, complainant is not left without any remedy to question the
soundness of the decision of respondent judge. Unfortunately, the
records of this case do not reveal that complainant has utilized such
avenues to seek a review of the penalty imposed by respondent judge.
Only accused Zoren Legaspi elevated the matter before the Court of
Appeals. The filing of this administrative case would not have the effect
of setting aside or modifying the penalty imposed on accused Zoren
Legaspi in the assailed judgment.
In Nelson Rodriguez and Ricardo Camacho v. Judge Rodolfo
Gatdula,13 we had occasion to reiterate the ruling enunciated in In Re:
Joaquin T. Borromeo,14 to wit:
An administrative complaint against a judge cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved
by his erroneous order or judgment. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not yet been
resolved with finality. For until there is a final declaration by the appellate
court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous,
there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent judge is
administratively liable. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the complaint filed by Linda
M. Sacmar against Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpioof the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 261, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of
judgment in the absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose on his part. (Heirs of the Late Nasser D. Yasin vs. Felix, 250
SCRA 545 [1995])
To hold a judge guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must
be shown that the judgment is unjust or that it is contrary to law or not
supported by evidence and that it was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. (Gonzales vs. Bersamin, 254 SCRA
652 [1996])
Adm. Case No. MTJ-92-643.November 27, 1992.*
LOUIS VUITTON S.A., complainant, vs. JUDGEFRANCISCO
DIAZ VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, Branch 36, The Metropolitan
Trial Court at Quezon City, Metro Manila, respondent.

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.—The
sole issue for consideration of this Court is whether or not respondent judge is
guilty of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment. The Revised Penal
Code holds a judge liable for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment.
Article 204 thereof provides: Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision shall be punished x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; Malice and bad faith still
have to be proved.—That doctrine, however, is not applicable to the case at bar.
In similar administrative cases separately filed against Judge Liwag and Judge
Dizon, We have ruled that: “In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on
the face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave errorbereft of any
redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust
decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak (sic) an injustice against a
hapless party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such
a character as to give rise to a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such
intent, in short, was clearly deducible from what was already of record. The res
ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving
the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses the
clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or
are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative
the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish
them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary.
Same; Same; Reprimand for delay in promulgation of judgment.—
Thus,when asked to explain the clearly gross ignorance of law or the grave
misconduct irresistibly reflecting on their integrity, the respondent Judges were
completely unable to give any credible explanation or to raise reasonable doubt x
x x.”
EN BANC.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for complainant.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
This is a complaint filed by Louis Vuitton, S.A., represented by counsel,
Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Peña and Nolasco Law Office,
against Judge Francisco Diaz Villanueva of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 36, on the ground that the latter knowingly
rendered a manifestly unjust judgment.
This Court finds the following facts as relevant:
In Criminal Case No. XXXVI-62431, entitled “People of the Philippines
vs. Jose V. Rosario”, Louis Vuitton, S.A. accused the latter of unfair
competition as defined by paragraph 1 of Article 189, Revised Penal
Code. The information stated:
“x x x the above named accused, as owner/proprietor of Manila COD
Department Store x x x did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously manufacture, distribute, sell and offer for sale lady’s bags,
should (sic) bags, wallets, purses and other similar goods made of
leather with the labels, trademarks and logo of ‘LOUIS VUITTON’ and
‘LV’, which are exclusive trademarks owned and registered with the
Philippine Patent Office in the name of private
complainant LOUIS VUITTON S.A. x x x thus, giving to them the general
appearance of goods or products of said private complainant, or such
appearance which would be likely to induce the public to believe that
said goods offered are those of private complainant, in unfair competition
and for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding it of its legitimate trade or
the public in general x x x.”1
On February 8, 1991, before judgment, prosecution filed the
Prosecution’s Memorandum with Motion found in Annex “A” of the
Complaint, where the prosecution prayed:
“Premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the accused
Jose V. Rosario be declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
committed the offense described in the criminal information against him.
In the alternative, if the accused cannot be held responsible for the
criminal information against him, it is respectfully moved that the accused
be committed to answer for the proper offense of “giving other persons
(the supposed concessionaire) a chance or opportunity to commit unfair
competition” (Section 1, Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code in
conjunction with Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).”2
The trial court summarized its factual findings as follows:
“From the records of the case, the evidence presented and the
arguments advanced by the parties, the Court finds that the complaining
witness in this case is the representative and attorney-in-fact, counsel
of Louis Vuitton, S.A. French Company with business address at Paris,
France; that private complainant is suing the accused for the protection
of the trade mark LouisVuitton and the L.V. logo which are duly
registered with the Philippine Patent Office; that on May 10, 1989, Atty.
Felino Padlan of the Quasha Law Office brought a letter to the COD
informing the latter to cease and desist from selling leather articles
bearing the trade marks Louis Vuitton and L.V. logo as the same is the
registered trade marks belonging to the private complainant
which has not authorized any person in the Philippines to sell
such articles; that on August 4, 1989, prosecution witness,
Miguel Domingo bought at the COD ladies’ bag bearing the trade
mark and logo of Louis Vuitton x x x; that again on September 6, 1989,
said Mr. Domingo again bought from the same store a wallet with a trade
mark and logo of LouisVuitton x x x; that on September 28, 1989, the
NBI, upon the request of the Quasha Law Firm applied for a Search
Warrant at the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City; that the
application was granted and the Search Warrant was issued against
COD and was enforced on the same date; that from the implementation
of the said Search Warrant, about seventy-two (72) leather products
were seized; that the accused signed the inventory of the seized articles.
The accused, on the other hand, claimed: that he is not the manufacturer
or seller of the seized articles; that the said articles were sold in the store
by a concessionaire by the name of Erlinda Tan who is doing business
under the name of Hi-Tech bags and wallets.”3
In acquitting the accused, the trial court gave the following reasons:
“From all the foregoing, considering that the accused denied being the
manufacturer or seller of the seized articles, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove that said articles are owned and being sold by the
accused. The prosecution relied as their evidence against the accused
the inventory which was signed by him (accused) with a notation under
his signature “owner/representative”. An examination of the inventory x x
x would show that the same was a prepared form of the NBI and that the
accused was made to sign only on the space on the typewritten word
owner/representative. Aside from this, no other evidence was presented
by the prosecution to show that there is a link between the manufacturer
of the seized goods and the accused. Further, when the case was filed
with the Prosecutor’s Office, it stated the name of the accused as the
owner of the COD, but from the evidence presented, it appears that the
accused is not the owner but the stockholder and the executive-vice
president thereof.
The prosecution evidence show that long before the raid of September
28, 1989, surveys have been caused to be made by the Quasha Law
Firm, not only at the COD but also in other department stores as far as
Baguio City and Cebu City; that these seized products were being sold
not only at COD but also in some big deparmtnet (sic) store such as
Cash and Carry. They could have easily verified from the Securities and
Exchange Commission who the actual officers of the COD [are] to be
charged, but the prosecution did not do this and relied only on the
inventory of the seized goods prepared by the NBI agents with the
typewritten word owner/representative.
With respect to the seized goods, the test of unfair competition is
whether the goods have been made to appear that will likely deceive the
ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care. The seized goods which
were marked as exhibits and presented to the Court would easily show
that there was no attempt on the part of the manufacturer or seller to
pass these goods as products of Louis Vuitton. From the price tags
attached to a seized bag, it could be seen that the article carried a price
tag of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN (P147.00) PESOS, whereas,
upon examination of the expert witness presented by the prosecution, he
testified that a genuine bag of LouisVuitton would cost about FOUR
THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS to FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS. It is apparent that the seized articles did not come close to the
appearance of a genuine Louis Vuitton product. Further, the buckle of
the bag also carries the logo of Gucci, another trade mark. From the
appearance of all the seized goods, it is very apparent that these goods
were roughly done. The quality and textures of the materials used are of
low quality that an ordinary purchases (sic) exercising ordinary [care] will
easily determine that they were locally manufactured and will not pass as
a (sic) genuine LouisVuitton products. From these, the Court finds that
the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of unfair
competition, to wit:
a.That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods
of another manufacturer or dealer;
b.That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or
in the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in the (3) device or words
therein, or in (4) any other feature of their a (sic) appearance.
These elements, to the mind of the Court are absent in this case.
Further finally, the prosecution filed this case against accused Jose V.
Rosario in his personal capacity and not as an officer of the Manila COD
Department Store, which is a corporation, and has a separate legal
personality.”4
In the complaint, complainant pointed out that the respondent Judge did
not consider the motion of February 11, 1990. This omission of
respondent judge allegedly constituted a clear and gross violation of his
ministerial duty in order to allow the accused to escape criminal liability.
Furthermore, complainant claimed that the respondent judge’s failure to
resolve the motion exposed his gross ignorance of the law. Section 11,
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Section 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense.—When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused
cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if
there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court
shall commit the accused to answer for the proper information charged.
Complainant also assailed respondent judge’s findings that there was no
unfair competition because the elements of the crime were not met, and
that the seized articles did not come close to the appearance of a
genuinie LouisVuitton product, the counterfeit items having been poorly
done. According to complainant, in making such conclusions,
respondent judge ignored the ruling in Converse Rubber Corp. vs.
Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc.,5 that “the statute on unfair
competition extends protection to the goodwill of a manufacturer or
dealer”.
Thirdly, complainant criticized respondent judge for his failure to consider
the alleged lack of credibility of Felix Lizardo, the lone witness for the
defense, in rendering the assailed decision.
Lastly, complainant pointed out that respondent judgeviolated the
constitutional mandate that decisions should be rendered within three (3)
months from submission of the case. It appeared that the decision was
dated June 28, 1991 but it was promulgated only on October 25, 1991.
In response to the forgoing accusations, respondent judge set forth in his
comment that:
1.The evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the
conclusion that Jose V. Rosario was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence did not prove all the elements of the offense charged. He
added that in deciding criminal cases, the trial court relies not on the
weakness of the accused’s evidence but on the strength of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
2.His alleged failure to act on the motion was due to the prosecutor’s
failure to point out to the court before judgment was rendered that a
mistake was made in charging the proper offense. He also added that
the prosecutor’s evidence did not also manifest this mistake.
Citing the conclusion of the Prosecution’s Memorandum with Motion of
the complainant, respondent judge averred that the private prosecutor
himself, instead of showing to the court that the proper offense was not
charged, clearly indicated that no such mistake was committed. The
cited statement says:
“It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution has fairly proven that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having committed the
offense outlined in the criminal Information against him. x x x.”6
3. The prayer contained in the Prosecution’s Memorandum with Motion
should have been placed in a proper pleading. He also said that the
private prosecutor should have conferred with public prosecutor if the
former believed that the proper offense of giving other persons a chance
to commit unfair competition would be charged against Rosario. The
failure of both public and private prosecutors to take the appropriate
action provided no reason for respondent judge to commit the accused to
answer for the proper information.
The sole issue for consideration of this Court is whether or not
respondent judge is guilty of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment.
The Revised Penal Code holds a judge liable for knowingly rendering a
manifestly unjust judgment. Article 204 thereof provides:
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a case
submitted to him for decision shall be punished x x x.
The law requires that the (a) offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is
unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust.7 In
some administrative cases8 decided by this Court, We have ruled that in
order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious
and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
In this case, We are constrained to hold that complainant failed to
substantiate its claims that respondent judge rendered an unjust
judgment knowingly. It merely relied on the failure of respondent judge to
mention the motion in the decision, on his alleged reliance on the
testimony of defense witness and on the delay in the promulgation of the
case.
But they are not enough to show that the judgment was unjust and was
maliciously rendered.
A judgment is said to be unjust when it is contrary to the standards of
conduct prescribed by law.9 The test to determine whether an order or
judgment is unjust may be inferred from the circumstances that it is
contrary to law or is not supported by evidence.10
The decision herein rests on two legal grounds: first, that there was no
unfair competition because the elements of the crime were not
sufficiently proven; second, that Jose V. Rosario who was accused as
owner/proprietor of COD was not properly charged as his personality is
distinct from that of the COD’s.
In holding that there was no unfair competition, the
respondent judge said that “the seized articles did not come close to the
appearance of a genuine Louis Vuittonproduct.”11 His pronouncement
obviously had in mind the test to determine unfair competition which this
Court had laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Manuel,12 to wit:
“whether certain goods have been clothed with an appearance which is
likely to deceive the ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care.”
In so finding that the seized products did not come close to the
appearance of genuine Louis Vuittons because they were poorly done,
the court considered not only their appearance but other factors as well,
such as the price differences between the real and the fake products.
Complainant, on the other hand, alleged that they were good
workmanship. But, thid Court is not in a position to review thew evidence
and thereafter conclude that the imitation was poorly or excellently done.
The findings of fact of the trial court, if supported by substantial evidence,
are binding on the Supreme Court.13Even on the assumption that the
judicial officer has erred in the appraisal evidence, he cannot be held
administratively or civilly liable for his judicial action.14
The second ground which was relied upon by the trail court in acquitting
the accused finds basis inthe well-settled doctrine that a corporation has
a distinct personality that of its stockholders/owners. A corporation is
vested by law with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from
that of its stockholders and from that of its officers who manage and run
its affairs.15 Furthermore, Section 23 of the Corporation Code provides:
x x x the corporate powers of all corporations formed under this code
shall be exercised, all business conducted, and all property of such
corporations controlled and held by the Board of Directors x x x.
This decision is assailed to be unjust mainly because it did not consider
the Prosecution's Memorandum with Motion and Motion for Early
Resolution filed by private prosecutor, herein complainant, on February
8, 1991 and February 11, 1991, respectively. According to complainant,
had respondent judge taken the former motion into account, he would
not have acquitted the accused, Jose V. Rosario. Instead, he would have
been guilty for giving others an opportunity to engage in unfair
competition as prescribed by article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent judge's judgement cannot be rendered unjust by this alone
In the first place, it would not have made any difference because Jose V.
Rosario was charged as owner/proprietor. COD is not a single
proprietorship but one that is run and owned by a corporation, Rosario
bros., Inc., of which the accused is a stockholder and Executive Vice-
President. A stockholder generally does not have a hand in the
management of the corporate affairs. On the other hand, the Vice-
President has no inherent power to bind the corporation.16 As a general
rule, his duties must be specified in the by-laws.17 In the criminal case,
the information did not specify his duties as Executive Vice-President.
The trial court had no basis for holding that as such, the accused entered
into a contract with theconcessionaire thereby giving the latter an
opportunity to practice unfair competition. Whereas, Section 23 of the
corporation Code is explicit that the directors, acting as a body, exercise
corporate powers and conduct the corporation's business. The board has
the sole power and responsibility to decide whether a corporation should
enter into a contract or perform any act.18 The amendment of the
charge, as proposed by the private prosecutor, would not in any way
affect the application of the doctrine that the corporation has a
personalitydistinct from that of its owners.
Moreover, the finding of the trial court that ther is no unfair competition
renders the consideration of the notions insignificant. If there was unfair
competition, so would there be no offense of giving others an opprtunity
to engage in unfair competition since there was no unfair competition to
begin with.
Herein complainant also failed to prove malice and deliberate intent on
the part of respondent judge to perpetrate an unjustice. We hereby quote
the decision of this Honorable Court in Sta Maria vs. Ubay,19stating that:
"x x x complainant failed to show any unmistakable indication that bad
faith motivated the alleged unjust actuations of the respondent judge x x
x. Absent, thus, any positive evidence on record that the
respondent judge rendered judgement in question with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice, the x x x charge of the complainant
must fall."
In Mendoza vs. Villaluz,20 this court has also held:
"x x x it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when
required to exercise his judgement or discretion is not criminally liable for
any error he commits provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence
of malice or any wrongful conduct x x x for "no one, called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgement," and "to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders assuming
that he has erred, would be nothing short of harrasment or would make
his position unbearable"."
This pronouncement has been reiterated by Us in the case of Miranda
vs. Judge Manalastas,21 where We said:
"Well established is the rule that mere errors in the appreciation of
evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce and inference of
ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust
decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in administrative proceedings
against him. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice is infallible in his judgement. All that is
expected of him is that he follow the rules prescibed to ensure a fair and
impartial hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom and
bear on the issues presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he find
established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law to guide
him, adjudicate the case accordingly.x x x. If in the mind of the
respondent, the evidence for the defense was entitled to more weight
and credence, he cannot be held to account administratively for the
result of his ratiocination. For that is the very essence of judicial inquiry:
otherwise hte burdens of judicial office will be intolerable." (italics
supplied)
A judge cannot be subjected to liability—civil, criminal, or
administrative—for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as
long as he acts in good faith.22 In Pabalan vs. Guevarra,23 the Supreme
Court spoke of the rationale for this immunity. We held, thus:
"x x x "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper doubt on his integrity. Moreover, his delay in the promulgation of this
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority case deserves a reprimand from this Court as it is contrary to the
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without mandate of our Constitution which enshrines the right of the litigants to a
apprehension of personal consequences to himself." This concept of speedy disposition of their cases.
Judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this complaint is hereby
being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary." DISMISSED for lack of merit. Considering the delay in the promulgation
Still, complainant wants Us to apply the Res Ipsa LoquiturDoctrine as of the decision of this case by respondent judge, a reprimand is in order.
applied bythis Court in the cases of People vs. Valenzuela;24 Cathay SO ORDERED.
Pacific Airways vs. Romillo;25In Re: Wenceslao Narvasa (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Laureta;26 and Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Melo,
Capistrano.27 JJ., concur.
That Doctrine, however, is not applicable to the case at bar. In similar Complaint dismissed.
administrative cases separately filed Notes.—A judge is not liable for eroneous decision in the absence of
against Judge Liwag28 and Judge Dizon,29 We have ruled that: "In malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it (Villamor vs. Salas, 203 SCRA
these res ipsa loquitor resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed 540).
decisions, an inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a It was the duty of respondent judge to take note of the cases submitted
patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision, or a for decision and see to it that the same are decided within the ninety-day
manifestly deliberate intent to wreak (sic) an injustice against a hpless period. (Adriano vs. Sto. Domingo, 202 SCRA 446).
party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such
a character as to give rise to a strong inference that evul intent was
present. Such intent, in short, was clearly deducible from what was
already of record. The res ipsa loquitor doctrine does not except or
dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of
evil intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and
reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already
shown by the record, and no crediblle explanation that would negative
the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to
establish them to support a judgement as to the culpability of a
respondent is necessary.
Thus,when asked to explain the clearly gross ignorance of law or the
grave misconduct irresistibly reflecting on their integrity, the respondent
Judges were completely unable to give any credible explanation or to
raise reasonable doubt x x x.” (italics supplied).
Thus, even granting that res ipsa loquitur is appreciable, complainant still
has to present proof of malice and bad faith. Respondent judge, on the
other hand, may raise good faith as a defense. That good faith is a
defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
remains to be the law.30 He is also given the chance to explain his acts
and if such explanation is credible, the court may absolve him of the
QBE Insurance (Phils.), Inc. vs. Rabello, Jr.
charge.
In this case, We find that the facts and the explanation rendered
A.M. No. P-04-1884 December 9, 2004.*
by Judge Villanueva justify his absolution from the charge. However,
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 03-1656-P)
while he is held to be not guilty, he should avoid acts which tend to cast
QBE INSURANCE (PHILS.), INC. By: MARCELINA F. VALLES, “any proper action” that a third-party claimant may be deemed suitabl,e to
complainant, vs. CRESENCIANO K. RABELLO, JR., Sheriff IV, RTC, vindicate his claim to the property.—Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
Branch 71, Pasig City, respondent. provides that the moment a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to
keep the property levied upon, unless the creditor insists that it should be
Courts; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Writs of Execution; The rule is that when continued, which may be done if such creditor files a bond sufficient to indemnify
the sheriff for whatever damages he may be held liable should the third party
a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a sheriff it is his duty to proceed with
succeed in vindicating his title in a proper action brought separately for the
reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it pursuant to its mandate.—The
purpose. If the third-party claim is sufficient, the sheriff upon receiving it is not
rule is that when a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a sheriff it is his
bound to proceed with the levy of the property, unless he is given by the
duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it pursuant
judgment creditor or his agent an indemnity bond against the claim.The remedies
to its mandate. As officers of the Court, however, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are
just mentioned are without prejudice to “any proper action” that a third-party
bound to discharge their duties with utmost care and diligence, particularly in
claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate his claim to the property. Such a
implementing the orders of the court, for if they err, they will affect the efficacy of
“proper action” is entirely distinct from that explicitly described in Section 17 Rule
the process by which justice is administered.
39, i.e., an action for damages brought by the third-party claimant against the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Respondent sheriff ought to be
officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the
aware that execution could only be issued against a party and not against one
bond for the taking or keeping of the property subject of the terceria. Quite
who was not accorded his day in court, and it was his bounden duty to see to it
that the writ of execution would be implemented only upon properties obviously, this proper action would have for its object the recovery of the
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor—property belonging to third possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting
from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party
persons cannot be levied upon.—In the instant case, respondent asserted that
claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, and such other parties as may
the manifestation he filed before the trial court stating that Rizal Surety and
be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution
Insurance Co. had recently changed its corporate name to QBE Insurance
proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself.
(Phils.) was based on what he saw in the office of Rizal Surety and information
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it is true that once
relayed to him by its employees. Respondent ought to be aware that execution
a third party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the property
could only be issued against a party and not against one who was not accorded
levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party claimant
his day in court and it was his bounden duty to see to it that the writ of execution
unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court, the
would be implemented only upon properties unquestionably belonging to the
circumstances of the instant case constrains the Court to deviate from the literal
judgment debtor. Property belonging to third persons cannot thus be levied upon.
* SECOND DIVISION. tenor of the rules; Where the third party claimant filed a motion to lift notice of
garnishment instead of availing of the remedy of “terceria” and said motion was
Same; Same; Same; Same; It behooves upon sheriffs to confirm and
already pending when it filed its Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, the sheriff was left
establish the veracity of information they receive regarding alleged change in
with little or no alternative but to wait for the trial court’s resolution of the pending
corporate name by making their own verification with the Securities and
motion lest he be charged with usurping a function reserved for the courts
Exchange Commission.—It behooved respondent to confirm and establish the
alone.—It is worthy of note that QBE, instead of availing of the remedy of
veracity of the information he received by making his own verification with the
“terceria” authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which would have been the
SEC. Instead of doing so, he unthinkingly accepted the representations of the
proper remedy considering that QBE is not a party to the case against Rizal
employees of Rizal Surety and hastily filed the Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation
Surety, opted instead to file an urgent motion for the lifting of the notice of
and Motion dated 24 May 2002, informing the trial court, among others, that Rizal
garnishment. QBE then argues that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer
Surety had changed its corporate name to QBE Ins. (Phils.), Inc. This prompted
to release the property the moment a third-party claim is filed. While it is true that
the trial court to issue its 27 May 2002 Order, directing the implementation of
once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the
the Writ of Execution against the properties of QBE. While respondent’s acts may
property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party
not have been tainted with bad faith or malice, he nevertheless failed to
claimant unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court, the
discharge his duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men
circumstances of the instant case constrain us to deviate from the literal tenor of
usually exercise in the management of their affairs.
the rules. Admittedly, QBE’s motion was already pending in court at the time that
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Third Party Claims; Terceria; The
it filed its Affidavit of Third-Party Claim on 11 April 2003. Respondent, in
moment a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to keep the property
levied upon, unless the creditor insists that it should be continued, which may be deference to the authority of the court, refused to act on the third-party claim
considering that QBE’s Urgent Motion to Lift and Affidavit of Third-Party
done if such creditor files a bond sufficient to indemnify the sheriff for whatever
Claim are based on the same grounds. Under the circumstances, respondent
damages he may be held liable should the third party succeed in vindicating his
was left with little or no alternative but to wait for the trial court’s resolution of the
title in a proper action brought separately for the purpose, without prejudice to
pending motion lest he be charged with usurping a function reserved for the
courts alone. Respondent could not be faulted for QBE’s gaffe in availing of the
wrong remedy specially so in this case where QBE failed to show that
respondent’s acts were motivated by malice or bad faith.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Deliberately Giving a False and Perjurious
Manifestation and Motion.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Cirilo E. Doronilla for QBE Insurance Phils., Inc.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a Complaintdated 19 May
20031 filed by Q.B.E. Insurance (Phils.), Inc., at the instance of Marcelina
F. Valles, Financial Controller of the corporation, which charged Sheriff
Cresenciano K. Rabello, Jr. with Gross Misconduct, Grave Abuse of
Authority and Deliberately Giving a False and Perjurious Manifestation
and Motion relative to Civil Case No. 68287entitled “Lavine Loungewear
Mfg., Inc. v. Philippine Marine and Fire Insurance Corporation, et al.”
assigned to Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
Complainant alleged that respondent sheriff unlawfully and
maliciously dragged Q.B.E. Insurance (Phils.), Inc. into the
aforementioned civil case when the latter falsely reported to the court
through an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion2 dated 24 May
2002 that defendant Rizal Surety and Insurance Company (Rizal Surety,
for brevity) had changed its corporate name to Q.B.E. Insurance (Phils.),
Inc. (QBE, for brevity). On the basis of the patently perjurious information
in respondent’s manifestation and motion, complainant averred, Judge
Celso D. Laviña issued the Order dated 27 May 20023 directing the
implementation of the Writ of Execution against Rizal Surety under its
new name QBE Insurance (Phils.), Inc.
A year later or on 24 March 2003, respondent sheriff swooped down
on the offices of the QBE at Makati City, served a Notice of Immediate
Payment and then garnished its bank accounts. Despite the
representations of Atty. Ireneo U. Gacad, in-house counsel and
Corporate Secretary of Rizal Surety, that said corporation is separate
and distinct from QBE, respondent allegedly arrogantly refused to listen
and even threatened to pull out the properties of QBE should it refuse to
immediately pay.
On 25 March 2003 QBE filed an Urgent Motion to Lift 27 May 2002
Order and 24 March 2003 Notice of Garnishment.4 Subsequently, on 11
April 2003, QBE filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim.5 Instead of
expediting service, respondent sent the notice of the filing of an Affidavit
of Third-Party Claim to judgment obligee Haresh Ramnani by registered
mail, rather than by personal service, and gave the latter ten (10) days
within which to post the required indemnity bond. QBE added that
although no indemnity bond was posted by judgment obligee Haresh
Ramnani, respondent unlawfully refused to lift the garnishment on the
bank accounts of QBE.
Finally, QBE alleged that respondent was fully aware that the trial
court’s decision in Civil Case No. 68627 had been appealed to the Court
of Appeals and that the appellate court had issued an injunctive writ,
enjoining and restraining the enforcement of the RTC decision yet he
proceeded with the implementation of the Writ of Execution. In
compliance with the directive dated 5 June 2003 6 of the Honorable Court
Administrator, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., respondent submitted
his Comment dated 31 July 2003,7denying the allegations in
the Complaint.
He explained that the Order dated 20 May 2002 directed him to
enforce the Writ of Execution against the judgment debtors, among them
Rizal Surety. Complying with the trial court’s Order, he tried to serve
the Writ of Executionupon Rizal Surety but he failed to do so because he
was informed that the latter had changed its name to QBE Insurance
(Phils.), Inc. Subsequently, on 24 May 2002 he submitted an Ex-Parte
Manifestation and Motion informing the court of this development.
Consequently, the court issued the Order dated 27 May 2002,
authorizing the enforcement of the Writ of Execution against Rizal Surety
and/or Q.B.E Insurance Company, Inc.
Respondent further alleged that notwithstanding the issuance of
the Order dated 27 May 2002, he held in abeyance the implementation
of the Writ of Execution upon the instructions of the judgment obligee,
Haresh Ramnani, on the ground that he would first investigate the
alleged change of name of Rizal Surety with the Office of the Insurance
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Sometime in the first week of March 2003, Mr. Ramnani verbally
requested him to proceed with the execution of the writ as Ramnani’s
investigation revealed that QBE and Rizal Surety are indeed one and the
same entity. This was followed up by a letter-request on 24 March
20038 from Ramnani and respondent then enforced the writ by serving
a Notice of Immediate Payment to Rizal Surety and/or QBE at its office
located at the 3rd Flr., Prudential Life Bldg., 843 A. Arnaiz Ave., Legaspi
Village, Makati City and by levying its bank accounts in the ANZ Bank,
Ayala branch. On the same occasion, Atty. Ireneo U. Gacad, Jr.
conferred with Mr. Ramnani and they eventually entered into an
arrangement whereby two checks amounting to a total sum of
P5,000,000.00 were delivered to the latter as partial payment for his
claims.
Respondent added that after complainant filed its Urgent Motion to
Lift 27 May 2002 Order and 24 March 2003 Notice of Garnishment which
Mr. Ramnani opposed, the latter requested him in a letter dated 28 April
20039not to act on the third-party claim since only the courts can
determine the merits of the grounds relied upon by the complainant,
which is essentially the same ground raised in their Urgent Motion to Lift
Notice of Garnishment. Meanwhile, on 11 April 2003, QBE filed
an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim anchored on the same arguments
earlier raised in its Urgent Motion to Lift.
Respondent asserted that his report/ex-partemanifestation that Rizal
Surety changed its name to QBE was made in good faith as it was based
on what he saw in the office of Rizal Surety and the information relayed
to him by the employees there. He argued that had QBE simply filed a
third-party claim, he would have no other recourse but to release the
levied property under Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court upon
failure of the judgment creditor to post the required indemnity bond. But
since QBE had earlier asked the court to lift the garnishment for the very
same reasons advanced in the third-party claim, respondent asseverated
that he had no option but to await the resolution of the court, otherwise
he would have pre-empted the ruling of the court on the matter. Further,
respondent stressed that in its Orderdated 15 May 2003,10 the trial court
denied QBE’s motion for lack of merit and he contended that he was
after all justified in not releasing the levied accounts.
Finally, on the charge that he defied the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 5 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 70292, granting QBE’s
Petition for Preliminary Injunction, respondent clarified that the injunction
bond in the amount of fifty million pesos was never approved by the
appellate court as it was allegedly defective. As a consequence thereof,
no preliminary injunction was ever issued by the appellate court to
restrain the enforcement of the Writ of Execution.
QBE filed its Reply dated 16 September 200311 wherein it argued that
under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the Sheriff or the levying officer to release the
garnished property upon the filing of a third-party claim unless the
judgment obligee, on the sheriff’s demand, files an indemnity bond in a
sum not less than the value of the garnished property.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that
respondent be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for gross inefficiency
and admonished to always discharge his responsibilities with due
diligence and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
The rule is that when a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a
sheriff it is his duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness
to execute it pursuant to its mandate.12
As officers of the Court, however, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are
bound to discharge their duties with utmost care and diligence,
particularly in implementing the orders of the court, for if they err, they
will affect the efficacy of the process by which justice is administered. 13
In the instant case, respondent asserted that the manifestation he filed
before the trial court stating that Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. had
recently changed its corporate name to QBE Insurance (Phils.) was
based on what he saw in the office of Rizal Surety and information
relayed to him by its employees. Respondent ought to be aware that
execution could only be issued against a party and not against one who
was not accorded his day in court14and it was his bounden duty to see to
it that the writ of execution would be implemented only upon properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Property belonging to
third persons cannot thus be levied upon.15
It behooved respondent to confirm and establish the veracity of the
information he received by making his own verification with the SEC.
Instead of doing so, he unthinkingly accepted the representations of the
employees of Rizal Surety and hastily filed the Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation and Motion dated 24 May 2002, informing the trial court,
among others, that Rizal Surety had changed its corporate name to QBE
Ins. (Phils.), Inc. This prompted the trial court to issue its 27 May
2002 Order, directing the implementation of the Writ of Executionagainst
the properties of QBE. While respondent’s acts may not have been
tainted with bad faith or malice, he nevertheless failed to discharge his
duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually
exercise in the management of their affairs.16
The fact that the trial court eventually denied QBE’s Urgent Motion to
Lift in its Order dated 15 May 2003 is inconsequential for purposes of
determining respondent’s liability. As may be gleaned from the Order, the
trial court’s basis in denying QBE’s motion consisted of the fact that the
latter entered into a Business Run-Off Agreement with Rizal Surety
whereby QBE agreed, among others, to handle all claims on policies of
Rizal Surety and not for the reason stated in respondent’s ex-
parte motion. Undoubtedly, however, respondent’s allegation in his
motion initially became the basis of the trial court’s Order dated 27 May
2002 which directed the implementation of the writ of execution against
QBE.
 Respondent must be reminded that he should at all times show a
high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties;17 and
owing to the very sensitive function that he performs in the dispensation
of justice, his conduct, moreover, must at all times be above suspicion.18
However, respondent could not be entirely faulted for his failure to
immediately release and/or discharge the garnished bank accounts of
the complainant. A careful examination of the records would reveal that
complainant’s bank accounts were garnished by the respondent on 24
March 2003. Instead of immediately filing a third-party claim, QBE filed
on 25 March 2003, an Urgent Motion to Lift 27 May 2002 Order and 24
March 2003 Notice of Garnishment. It was only on 11 April 2003, that
complainant filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the moment a
third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to keep the property
levied upon, unless the creditor insists that it should be continued, which
may be done if such creditor files a bond sufficient to indemnify the
sheriff for whatever damages he may be held liable should the third party
succeed in vindicating his title in a proper action brought separately for
the purpose. If the third-party claim is sufficient, the sheriff upon
receiving it is not bound to proceed with the levy of the property, unless
he is given by the judgment creditor or his agent an indemnity bond
against the claim.19
The remedies just mentioned are without prejudice to “any proper
action” that a third-party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate his
claim to the property. Such a “proper action” is entirely distinct from that
explicitly described in Section 17 Rule 39,20 i.e., an action for damages
brought by the third-party claimant against the officer within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond for the taking or
keeping of the property subject of the terceria. Quite obviously, this
proper action would have for its object the recovery of the possession of
the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the
allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party
claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, and such other parties
as may be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in the supposedly
wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. 21
It is worthy of note that QBE, instead of availing of the remedy of
“terceria” authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which would have been
the proper remedy considering that QBE is not a party to the case
against Rizal Surety, opted instead to file an urgent motion for the lifting
of the notice of garnishment. QBE then argues that it is the ministerial
duty of the levying officer to release the property the moment a third-
party claim is filed.
While it is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or
right to the possession of the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to
release the property of the third-party claimant unless the judgment
creditor files a bond approved by the court, the circumstances of the
instant case constrain us to deviate from the literal tenor of the rules.
Admittedly, QBE’s motion was already pending in court at the time
that it filed its Affidavit of Third-Party Claimon 11 April 2003. Respondent,
in deference to the authority of the court, refused to act on the third-party
claim considering that QBE’s Urgent Motion to Lift and Affidavit of Third-
Party Claim are based on the same grounds. Under the circumstances,
respondent was left with little or no alternative but to wait for the trial
court’s resolution of the pending motion lest he be charged with usurping
a function reserved for the courts alone. Respondent could not be faulted
for QBE’s gaffe in availing of the wrong remedy specially so in this case
where QBE failed to show that respondent’s acts were motivated by
malice or bad faith.
WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty
and accordingly ordered to pay a FINE of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
Respondent meted with a P1,000 fine for simple neglect of duty, with
stern warning against repetition of similar conduct.
Notes.—A Clerk of Court is liable for the charge of Grave Abuse of
Discretion, Usurpation of Judicial Authority and Tampering of Subpoena
by acting on an oral motion for postponement. (Re: Suspension of Clerk
of Court Rogelio R. Joboco, RTC, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, 294 SCRA
119 [1998])
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and
exercise of power by one without color of title or
Sarmiento vs. Lindayag, 626 SCRA 292, August 03, 2010
 A.M. No. MTJ-09-1743. August 3, 2010.*
[Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-1954-MTJ]
JOSEPHINE SARMIENTO and MARY JANE MANSANILLA,
complainants, vs. HON. AZNAR D. LINDAYAG, ASSISTING JUDGE,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, CITY OF SAN JOSE DEL
MONTE, BULACAN, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Ejectment; Ejectment cases must be
resolved with great dispatch.—The Court finds the evaluation and
recommendation of the OCA well-taken. It bears stressing that ejectment
cases must be resolved with great dispatch. Their nature calls for it.
Same; Same; Same; Without any order of extension granted by the
Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency.—That explains why Section 10 of the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure which applies to an ejectment
complaint, among others, directs that within 30 days after the receipt of
the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for
filing the same, the trial court should render judgment on the case.
Without any order of extension granted by this Court, the failure to
decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency.
Same; Same; The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary requires judges to devote their professional activity to judicial
duties, which includes not only the performance of judicial functions and
responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks
relevant to the judicial office on the court’s operations.—That it took
respondent almost four years to decide the second complaint
unmistakably shows his inefficiency. His above-quoted explanation-
justification therefor does not indeed convince. Just as his statement
about records getting misplaced or misfiled does not. The New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to “devote
their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the
performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the
making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or
the court’s operations.”
Same; Same; It is incumbent upon the judge to devise an efficient
recording and filing system so that no disorderliness can affect the flow
of cases and their speedy disposition.—Rule 3.08 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires that a judge should be diligent in discharging
administrative responsibilities and should maintain professional
competence in court management, hence, it is incumbent upon him to
devise an efficient recording and filing system so that no disorderliness
can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Grave Abuse of
Authority and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In a December 22, 2007 Verified Complaint,1 Josephine Sarmiento
and Mary Jane Mansanilla (complainants) charged Judge Aznar D.
Lindayag (respondent), in his capacity as Assisting Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
with Grave Abuse of Authority and Ignorance of the Law.
Gathered from the Rollo are the following facts which spawned the
filing of the present administrative case.
The Spouses Eliseto Panchito Burlas and Carmelita Burlas filed on
April 20, 1990 a complaint for ejectment against herein complainants
before the then Municipal Trial Court, now the MTCC, San Jose del
Monte presided by respondent.
Respondent dismissed the ejectment complaint by Decision of March
14, 20002 in this wise:
“Whereas here, the only definite ultimate fact averred is “that on or
about October 20, 1998, due to the urgent need of the plaintiffs for the
said property the defendants were notified and given by the plaintiffs a
period of thirty (30) days from said date within which to vacate the said
property to enable the plaintiffs to occupy the same.
A complaint for “ejectment” which does not show [how] defendants’
possession started or continued is defective (Devesa vs. Montecillo, 27
SCRA 822).” (underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
The decision became final and executory on June 13, 2000.
A year and eight months later or on February 2, 2002, the Burlas
spouses filed another complaint (secondcomplaint) for ejectment against
the same defendants-herein complainants involving the same property
and the same cause of action before the same MTCC presided by
respondent.
The defendants-herein complainants raised res judicata as defense
in the second complaint.
The second complaint was submitted for decision on June 16, 2002.
Close to four years later or on May 31, 2006, respondent decided the
case, this time against herein complainants.
In their present administrative complaint, complainants charge that by
respondent’s delay in deciding the secondcomplaint, he is liable for
malicious delay in the administration of justice.
Complainants add that respondent’s decision in the second complaint
was tainted with bad faith and grave abuse of authority and rendered in
gross ignorance of the law as he favored the Burlas spouses, their non-
submission of substantial evidence of possession notwithstanding.
In his February 20, 2008 Comment,3 respondent maintains that
the second complaint was not barred by res judicata as his decision in
the first case was not on the merits.
While respondent assumes responsibility for the delay in rendering
the decision, he posits that the “administrative lapse was not malicious
considering the peculiar situation” he was in which he details as follows:
“The undersigned is the Presiding Judge of MTC-Pandi, Bulacan
since 1992 and the Assisting Judge of MTCC-San Jose del Monte
City since 1995 up to the present. In this station, I conduct trials every
Tuesdays and Thursdays of the week. In this additional station, I do not
have the luxury of having a chamber. I only share a room and a table
with another office staff because of the very acute space problem. Here,
party litigants wait for the call of their cases in the adjacent public market
or in a nearby plaza.
In our very crowded office, records do get misplaced or misfiled with
no conscious design, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity to
cause injury to a party litigant.
Your honor, please look with favor at the fact that the dual positions
of being the Presiding Judge of MTC-Pandi and Assisting Judge of
MTCC-San Jose del Monte with their concomitant workload, necessarily
spreads my mental and physical resources too thinly which accounts for
those occasional administrative infractions attributable to human frailties
for which I am truly sorry.”4 (underscoring supplied)
In its July 20, 2009 Report,5 the OCA gives the following Evaluation:
“x x x x
. . The mere fact that the respondent judge was serving as acting
presiding judge in another sala does not constitute sufficient reason to
exonerate him from liability for delay in rendering decisions and resolving
motions. This is not to prescind from his situation as a judge handling
two courts. It has been stressed in several decisions that if it becomes
unavoidable for a judge to render a decision or resolve a matter beyond
the mandatory period, he may seek additional time by simply filing a
request for such time extension seasonably and supported by valid
reasons. The respondent did not avail himself of this action.
Section 5, Canon 6 (Competence and Diligence) of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary directs judges to “perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.” The heavy load in the
respondent’s sala, though unfortunate, cannot exempt him from due
observance of the provisions of the Code.”6(underscoring supplied).
The OCA Report reflects that respondent had previously been
charged in OCA IPI No. 07-1885-MTJ which was dismissed by the Court
in August 8, 2007, although he was
admonished to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary
period for disposing of motions and deciding cases; and was sternly
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely, [relieved] of his assignment as Assisting Judge of the
MTCC at San Jose del Monte City. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Report further reflects that respondent was also administratively
charged in OCA IPI No. 08-2009-MTJ, for Inefficiency and/or Undue
Delay in the Resolution of a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed
against him in his capacity as the Assisting Judge of the MTCC at San
Jose del Monte City, which is presently being evaluated.7
The OCA thus recommends that respondent be fined in the amount
of P15,000.
The Court finds the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA well-
taken. It bears stressing that ejectment cases must be resolved with
great dispatch.8 Their nature calls for it. As Five Star Marketing Co., Inc.
v. Booc9 holds:
“Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or the right to the possession of the property
involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It
is a “time procedure” designed to remedy the situation. Stated in another
way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to
provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an
alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his
possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace
and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of
possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a
measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the
same by force and violence. And since the law discourages continued
wrangling over possession of property for it involves perturbation of
social order which must be restored as promptly as possible,
technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary
delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided.
In accordance with the above objective, the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure set forth the steps to expeditiously dispose of the
cases covered by the rules, as in ejectment…”10 (emphasis supplied)
That explains why Section 10 of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure11 which applies to an ejectment complaint, among others,
directs that within 30 days after the receipt of the last affidavits and
position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the trial
court should render judgment on the case. Without any order of
extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case
within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency.12
That it took respondent almost four years to decide
the second complaint unmistakably shows his inefficiency. His above-
quoted explanation-justification therefor does not indeed convince. Just
as his statement about records getting misplaced or misfiled does not.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to “devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which
include not only the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities
in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the
judicial office or the court’s operations.”
Rule 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct13 requires that a judge
should be diligent in discharging administrative responsibilities and
should maintain professional competence in court management, hence,
it is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system
so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy
disposition.14
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a
decision is a less serious charge in which any of the following sanctions
may be imposed: (a) suspension from the service without salary and
other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months;
or (b) a fine of more than P10,000 but not more than P20,000.
Respondent having been previously admonished in A.M. OCA IPI No.
07-1885-MTJ to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary
periods for resolving motions and rendering decisions, not to mention
that he was again charged for undue delay in resolving a motion in OCA
IPI No. 08-2009-MTJ which is pending evaluation, the recommended fine
of P15,000 is in order.
WHEREFORE, Judge Aznar D. Lindayag, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan, is, for undue
delay in resolving Civil case No. 11-2002-SJ, FINED in the amount of
Fifteen Thousand (P15,000) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Bersamin, Abad** and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judge Aznar D. Lindayag meted with P15,000 fine for undue delay in [No. 43430. January 7, 1936]
resolving case. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and
Note.—If the caseload of the judge prevents the disposition of cases appellee, vs. FILEMON D. MALABANAN, defendant and appellant.
within reglementary period, he should ask the court for a reasonable
extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. (Mina vs. Mupas, 555 1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL COCK-FIGHTING; DERELICTION
SCRA 44 [2008]) OF OFFICIAL DUTY.—It is not clear whether the Government
 is claiming the right to punish appellant because he did not
institute prosecution against himself for organizing a cock-fight
on a day other than those permitted by law, or because it was
his duty to have prosecutions instituted against all who
attended the cockfights and bet money thereon.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; "MALICIA", DEFINED.—The definition of the
Spanish word malicia, root of the word maliciosamenteused in
article 208, found in 21 Enciclopedia, Jurídica Española, page
542, indicates what the ordinary use of the word connotes, that
the action complained of must be the result of a deliberate evil
intent and does not cover a mere voluntary act.
1. 3.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ARTICLE 208, REVISED PENAL CODE,
CONSTRUED.—It is clear that giving article 208, Revised
Penal Code, the most liberal interpretation possible would
result in impossible conditions in these Islands. If every public
functionary who fails to institute criminal proceedings for every
misdemeanor which he has reason to believe has been
committed, is liable to be sent to jail for a year and a half as a
felon, an intolerable situation would occur. Every municipal
president in the Islands would be subject to conviction by the
machinations of his political enemies, under a statute as
rigorous as any devised by Draco.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Peña, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Eusebio M. Lopez for appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.'
HULL, J.:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Batangas of a
violation of article 208 of the Revised Penal Code.
In July, 1933, appellant was municipal president of the municipality of
San Juan, Province of Batangas, and was engaged in raising funds for
the construction of a ward in the provincial hospital, for tubercular
patients. Notwithstanding all his efforts to secure contributions, he was
unable to approximate the quota which had been set for his town by the
provincial authorities, and he therefore on July 22 and July 29, organized
and held cock-fights, neither day being authorized by law for such
purposes.
Article 208, of which appellant was found guilty, reads as follows:
"ART. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance.—The
penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period and suspension
shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in
dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from
instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall
tolerate the commission of offenses."
It is not clear whether the Government is claiming the right to punish
appellant because he did not institute prosecution against himself for
organizing a cock-fight on a day other than those permitted by law or,
under the last clause, that it was his duty to have prosecutions instituted
against all who attended the cock-fights and bet money thereon.
It is also contended in argument that the word "maliciously" in the Act
means no more than mere knowledge or voluntary violation of the law
and that it only applies to the first clause and does not qualify the
toleration therein denounced. It is true that the word "maliciously" has
been given by the courts different meanings according to the context of
the legislation in which the word is used. The Spanish text of the Act
being the controlling one, the definition of malicia found in
21 Enciclopedia Jurídica Española, page 542, is instructive.
"MALICIA. El estado de espíritu que se complace en el deseo y
práctica de una acción perversa, a sabiendas de su maldad y no
obstante ésta."La malicia es la característica subjetiva o psicológica del
delito, según las ideas tradicionales de la escuela penal española. Así,
desde los comienzos de la codificación, el Código Penal de 1822 definía
el delito de esta suerte: 'Comete delito el que, libre y voluntariamente, y
con malicia, hace u omite lo que la ley prohibe o manda bajo alguna
pena' (art. 1.°). Y aun después de eliminada la palabra en la redacción
del Código de 1870, todavía la repite el Código Penal de la Marina de
guerra, como si fuera de hecho insubstituíble: 'Son delitos y faltas las
acciones u omisiones penadas por la ley y ejecutadas con malicia' (art.
1.°). Pero, ¿llamaríamos realmente 'malicia' al estado de ánimo del
delincuente político generoso, del delincuente pasional honrado? La
formula, no obstante sus apariencias de exactitud, nos parece incapaz
de servir de común denominador a todos los delitos.
"En otra de sus acepciones que en Derecho tiene menos valor, la
palabra 'malicia' equivale a la penetración, sutileza y sagacidad propia
de ciertos espíritus, más o menos habitualmente."
These definitions indicate what the ordinary use of the word connotes,
that the action complained of must be the result of a deliberate evil intent
and does not cover a mere voluntary act.
Looking at it from a practical standpoint, it is clear that giving this
section the most liberal interpretation possible would result in impossible
conditions in these Islands. If every public functionary who fails to
institute criminal proceedings f or every misdemeanor which he has
reason to believe has been committed, is liable to be sent to jail for a
year and a half as a felon, an intolerable situation would occur. Every
municipal president in the Islands would be subject to conviction by the
machinations of his political enemies, under a statute as rigorous as any
devised by Draco.
Appellant admits in his testimony acts which are clearly denounced
by article 199, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
"ART. 199. Illegal cockfighting.—The penalty of arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court, shall be
imposed upon:
"1. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by
betting money or other valuable things, or who organizes cockfights at
which bets are made, on a day other than those permitted by law."
For his infraction of the law he can be punished under this section, and
there is no necessity of straining a highly criminal statute to adequately
punish his acts.
We therefore find appellant not guilty of a violation of article 208 but
guilty of a violation of article 199, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentence him to pay a fine of P10, with subsidiary
confinement in case of insolvency.
The judgment appealed from, as thus modified, is affirmed. Costs
against appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad
Santos, Vickers, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

AVANCEÑA, C. J., dissenting:

It is alleged in the information, among other things, that the appellant,

being municipal president of San Juan, Batangas, tolerated cock-fights at
which money was betted on days not permitted by law. The appellant's
admission that he organized and conducted these cock-fights
establishes this allegation of the information in the sense that he
tolerated the commission of the violation of the law wherein others,
besides him, intervened. In my opinion, this is sufficient to warrant the Hadjula vs. Madianda
affirmance of the sentence. In view of the circumstances of the case, A.C. No. 6711. July 3, 2007.*
however, the absolute pardon of the appellant should be recommended MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROCELES
to the Chief Executive. F. MADIANDA, respondent.
Judgment modified.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Attorney-Client Relationship; The moment
complainant approached the then receptive lawyer-friend to seek legal
advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two
which imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the
ethics of the profession.—As it were, complainant went to respondent, a
lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she
considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant
approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such
relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed
by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is
that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep
inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to
handle the client’s case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too,
is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the
consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever
was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship.
Same; Same; Same; Essential Factors to Establish Existence of
Attorney-Client Privilege Communication; A lawyer breached her duty of
preserving the confidence of a client where the documents shown and
the information revealed in confidence to her in the course of the legal
consultation were subsequently used as bases in the criminal and
administrative complaints lodged against the client.—Dean Wigmore lists
the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client
privilege communication, viz.: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is
sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3)
the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived. With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached
his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the information
revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal
consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and
administrative complaints lodged against the complainant. The purpose
of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible
breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
Same; Same; Same; At the end of the day, it appears clear to the
Court that respondent lawyer was actuated by the urge to retaliate
against the complainant without perhaps realizing that, in the process of
giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on
confidentiality.—The seriousness of the respondent’s offense
notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion,
absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will.
Without meaning to condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at
bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies
and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using
whatever convenient tools and data were readily available.
Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her
conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the
score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was
actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the
process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule
on confidentiality.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gerardo Jose H.M. Laureta for complainant.
Cres Dan D. Bangoy for respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the
complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma.
Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date
September 7, 2002 and filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with violation of Article
2092 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent
used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection
(BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the
Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant
claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some
legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their
conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed
personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth
certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the
respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer
friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have
refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent
soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and
disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant’s account,
precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP
promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the
complainant’s promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the
aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COM-PLAINT3 with the
Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019,4falsification of public documents and immorality,
the last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier
made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures,
complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against
her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for
the latter’s act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information
she revealed in the course of seeking respondent’s legal advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline required respondent to file her answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5respondent denied
giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion
about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them.
Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential
data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read:
“5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA
C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason
that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAW-YER-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never
obtained any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL
PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to
me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or
secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or
CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a
LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to
privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF
INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL
MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners
and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or
accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA
C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of
the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and
unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she
also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover … where she has a
child.
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me
sometime in 1998, are all part of public records ….
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case
just to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES
I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she will certainly be
DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and
CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and
UNLAWFUL ACTS.”
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline came out with a Report and
Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to
the respondent is “protected under the attorney-client privilege
communication.” Prescinding from this postulate, the Investigating
Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when
she “[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation,” and
accordingly recommended that respondent be reprimanded therefor,
thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended
that respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing
the secrets of the complainant.”
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XVI-2004-472 reading as follows:
“RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex “A”; and , finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering the actuation of revealing information given to
respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby
REPRIMANDED.”
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it
together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally
was also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets
and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and
assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship
evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer
certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer,
respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information
acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at
the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client’s case is hardly of readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent
consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her
engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that
no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps
relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,6— realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she
“A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment was violating the rule on confidentiality.
complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former’s
business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby
the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in her handling of
occasion. information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client relationship. She is
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle complained of.
the case for which his service had been sought. SO ORDERED.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On Leave.
the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then Respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda reprimanded and admonished,
the professional employments is established. with stern warning against repetition of similar act.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close Notes.—Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s
non-payment of the former’s fees. cause. (Fernandez vs. Cabrera II, 418 SCRA 1 [2003])
There is no attorney-client relationship between a lawyer and another
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the person where the preparation and the proposed filing of a petition was
attorney-client privilege communication, viz.: only incidental to their personal transaction. (Uy vs. Gonzales, 426
“(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional SCRA 422[2004])
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.”7
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty
of preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the information
revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal
consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and
administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client
from possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a
lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court
feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that
the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error
of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former
friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges
against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were