Logic No3 s2016 Half

Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University
Mid La Union Campus

College of Law
San Fernando City, La Union
Reading Assignment No. 3
Legal Logic
Eymard Moises M. Estalilla

CY 2015 - 2016
People v Del Monte | P a g e | 1
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NORBERTO DEL

MONTE Y GAPAY @ OBET, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02070 dated 28 May 2007 which affirmed with modification the Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No.
3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of
violation of Section 5,[3] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5,

Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the municipality of Baliuag,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch
in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram.[4]
The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02.
When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,

pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.[5] On 17 February 2003, the pre-trial conference
was concluded.[6] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr., the
poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against appellant, and a member
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 3/Special Enforcement Unit (SEU)
stationed at the Field Office, Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential

informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan
and reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a
briefing on a buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted. The team was
composed of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1 Gaudencio Tolentino,
Jr. as the poseur-buyer, and PO1 Antonio Barreras as back-up operative. After the
briefing, the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to Poblacion
Dike for the execution of the buy-bust operation.
When the team arrived at appellant's place, they saw the appellant standing alone in
front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino approached appellant. The
informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend, saying "Barkada ko,
user." PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100
bills.[7] The bills were marked with "GT JR," PO1 Tolentino's initials. Upon receiving
the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over
to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying
that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and
recovered from the latter the marked money.
The white crystalline substance[8] in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1
Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos,
Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the any dangerous
drug. The request for laboratory examination was signed by SPO2 Maung. [9] Per
Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002,[10] the substance bought from appellant was
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who examined
the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both prosecution and
defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the fact that the drugs
subject matter of this case was forwarded to their office for laboratory examination
and that laboratory examination was indeed conducted and the result was positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[11]
For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his common-law
wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.
From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this:
On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister's house in Poblacion

Dike when a commotion woke him up. His nephew, Alejandro Lim, was shouting
because the latter, together with appellant's common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and
a niece, was being punched and kicked by several police officers. When appellant
tried to pacify the policemen and ask them why they were beating up his common-
law wife and other relatives, the policemen arrested him, mauled him, punched him
on the chest, slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo. He sustained swollen face,
lips and tooth. His common-law wife was likewise hit on the chest with the palo-palo.
The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house located in
the middle of a field where the former demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The
next day, appellant was brought to the police station.
Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police officers
who manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so that she and appellant
could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and cousin arrived
with the P15,000.00. She was released but appellant was detained. She does not
know why the police officers filed this case against appellant. What she knows is
that they were asking money from them.
Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia

Mendoza.
On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentenced him to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused Norberto
del Monte y Gapay @ Obet GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P5,000,000.00. With cost.
The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government. The Branch of this Court is directed to turn over the same to the
Dangerous Drugs Board within ten (10) days from receipt hereof for proper disposal
thereof.[12]
The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr. to be
credible and straightforward. It established the fact that appellant was caught selling
shabu during an entrapment operation conducted on 10 December 2002. Appellant
was identified as the person from whom PO1 Tolentino bought P300.00 worth of
shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the
trial court was not convinced by appellant's defense of frame-up and
denial. Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he was merely sleeping and
was awakened by the screams of his relatives who were being mauled by the police
officers.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004.[13] With the filing thereof, the
trial court directed the immediate transmittal of the entire records of the case to
us.[14] However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[15] the case was
remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.[16]
On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but reduced
the fine imposed on appellant to P500,000.00. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision dated March 8, 2004 of
the RTC, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding
accused-appellant Norberto del Monte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine
imposed upon him is reduced from P5,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.[17]
A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the Court of Appeals
forwarded the records of the case to us for further review.[18]
In our Resolution[19] dated 10 December 2007, the parties were notified that they
may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from
notice. Both appellant and appellee opted not to file a supplemental brief on the
ground they had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in their respective briefs
and the filing of a supplemental brief would only contain a repetition of the arguments
already discussed therein.
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 21 OF R.A. 9165.[20]
Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen's failure to strictly comply
with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of him together
with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest as
shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino
and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers who had initial custody of the drug
allegedly seized and confiscated, did not conduct a physical inventory of the same in
his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their failure to abide by said
section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced
against him.
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers' alleged non-
compliance with Section 21[21] of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on
appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v.
Sta. Maria[22] in which the very same issue was raised, we ruled:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation
in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant
did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first
time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that
there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
In People v. Pringas,[23] we explained that non-compliance with Section 21 will not
render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar, appellant
never questioned the custody and disposition of the drug that was taken from him. In
fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination
which examination gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. We thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug
seized from appellant not to have been compromised.
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the
making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or
seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule
128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the
evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it
by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered
and appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in
dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the
document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is
non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary
merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the
courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[24] What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[25]
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly
showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of
the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer positively identified
appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of
Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290
gram, which was bought by PO1 Tolentino from appellant in consideration of
P300.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together with the
dangerous drug taken from appellant, more than sufficient to prove the crime
charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal
records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court,
which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which
are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no
glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is
that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.[26]
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained
by the Court of Appeals.[27] Finding no compelling reason to depart from the findings
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we affirm their findings.
Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was framed, the
evidence against him being "planted," and that the police officers were exacting
P15,000.00 from him.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject of a
buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of
the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain denial of the offenses charged,
unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply
fail.[28] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it
is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard
line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. [29] For this
claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a
regular and proper manner.[30] This, appellant failed to do. The presumption
remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were
inspired by an improper motive.
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew,
Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to sway. We find both witnesses not to be
credible. Their testimonies are suspect and cannot be given credence without clear
and convincing evidence. Their claims, as well as that of appellant, that they were
maltreated and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated. As found by the trial court:
The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate himself from liability raised
the defense of frame-up. He alleged that at the time of the alleged buy bust he was
merely sleeping at the house of his sister. That he was awakened by the yells and
screams of his relatives as they were being mauled by the police officers. However,
this Court is not convinced. Accused failed to substantiate these claims of
maltreatment even in the face of his wife's and nephew's testimony. No evidence
was presented to prove the same other than their self-serving claims.[31]
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that
the witnesses for the defense cannot even agree on what time the arresting
policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It explained:
To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 o'clock in the afternoon of December
10, 2002 when he was roused from his sleep by the policemen who barged into the
house of his sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His common-law wife, however, testified
that it was 10-11 o'clock in the morning when the policemen came to the house
(TSN, Oct. 13, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand, Alejandro Lim testified that he went to
sleep at 11 o'clock in the morning and it was 10 o'clock in the morning when the
policemen arrived (TSN, Feb.2, 2004, p. 6). He thus tried to depict an absurd
situation that the policemen arrived first before he went to sleep with appellant. [32]
Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the illegal
sale of drugs, we are constrained to uphold appellant's conviction.
The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Said section reads:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity,
is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1 Tolentino, and there being
no modifying circumstance alleged in the information, the trial court, as sustained by
the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in
accordance with Article 63(2)[33] of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the fine at
P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals reduced to P500,000.00. Both amounts
are within the range provided for by law but the amount imposed by the Court of
Appeals, considering the quantity of the drugs involved, is more appropriate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007, sustaining
the conviction of appellant Norberto Del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Martin
S. Villarama, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring. Rollo, pp. 93-105.
[2]
Records, pp. 112-116.
[3]
Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transporation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals.
[4]
Records, p. 2.
[5]
Id. at 11.
[6]
Id. at 17.
[7]
Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2; records, p. 62.
[8]
Exh. B; id. at 61.
[9]
Exh. A; id. at 60.
[10]
Exh. C; id. at 61.
[11]
TSN, 16 June 2003, p. 10.
[12]
Records, p. 116.
[13]
Id. at 119.
[14]
Id. at 121.
[15]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[16]
Rollo, p. 62.
[17]
Id. at 104.
[18]
Id. at 111.
[19]
Id. at 19.
[20]
Id. at 73-74.
[21]
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs, shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
[22]
G.R. No. 171019, 23 February 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633-634.
[23]
G.R. No. 175928, 31 August 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 842-843.
[24]
People v. Adam, 459 Phil. 676, 684 (2003).
[25]
People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 187, 198.
[26]
People v. Julian-Fernandez, 423 Phil. 895, 910 (2001).
[27]
People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547.
[28]
People v. Sy, G.R. No. 171397, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 772, 783.
[29]
People v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 146805, 16 January 2003, 395 SCRA 317, 323.
[30]
People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 138 (2000).
[31]
Rollo, p. 57.
[32]
Id. at 81-82.
[33]
ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
xxxx
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
People v Salvador | P a g e | 1
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190621 February 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GLENN SALVADOR y BAL VERDE, and DORY ANN PARCON y DEL ROSARIO,
Accused,
GLENN SALVADOR y BALVERDE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph

the items seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items
confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the said items have been preserved.1
Factual Antecedents
For review is the Decision2 dated September 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03230 that affirmed in toto the January 15, 2008 Decision 3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
03-120799-800. The said RTC Decision found. Glenn Salvador y Balverde
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (illegal sale), and
accused Dory Ann Parcon y Del Rosario (Parcon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 11 (illegal possession), both of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165
(RA9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Information4 for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 filed against

appellant in Criminal Case No. Q-03-120799 has the following accusatory portion:
That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, one (1)
plastic sachet of white crystalline substance containing zero point zero four (0.04)
gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
While the pertinent portion of the Information6 for violation of Section 11 of Article II,
RA 9165 filed against Parcon in Criminal Case No. Q-03-120800 is as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and
control one (1) plastic sachet of white crystalline substance containing zero point
zero four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Upon motion of the prosecution,8 the cases were consolidated. On November 4,

2003, appellant and Parcon were arraigned. They entered separate pleas of ‘not
guilty’.9
During the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted the following facts which the
prosecution offered for stipulation:
x x x [T]hat [Police Inspector Leonard T. Arban (P/Insp. Arban)] is a Forensic

Chemist of the PNP; that he received a letter-request for Laboratory Examination for
certain specimen which was marked as Exhibit "A"; that together with the said
request is a brown envelope marked as Exhibit "B"; that said brown envelope
contained a plastic sachet marked as Exhibit "B-1" and thereafter he conducted the
examination of the said specimen and submitted a report marked as Exhibit "C"; the
findings thereon that the specimen was positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit "C-1" and the signature of the said police
officer was marked as Exhibit "C-2". Thereafter, said police officer turned over the
said evidence to the Evidence Custodian and retrieved the same for purposes of the
hearing today.10
Trial ensued. Parcon failed to attend the scheduled hearings, hence, she was tried in
absentia.11
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented PO2 Sofjan Soriano (PO2 Soriano) to testify on the
entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of appellant and Parcon. From his
testimony,12 the following facts emerged:
While PO2 Soriano was on duty in Police Station 2, Baler Street, Quezon City on
September 2, 2003, a confidential informant (CI) arrived at around 9:00 a.m. and
reported that a certain alias Bumski was engaged in the illicit sale of dangerous
drugs in Barangay Pag-asa, Quezon City. PO2 Soriano immediately relayed this
information to Police Chief Inspector Joseph De Vera (P/C Insp. De Vera). A
surveillance operation conducted the same day on alias Bumski, who turned out to
be the appellant, confirmed the report. Thus, a police team was formed to conduct a
buy-bust operation. PO2 Soriano was designated as poseur-buyer while PO2
Richard Vecida, PO1 Alexander Pancho, PO1 Alvin Pineda (PO1 Pineda) and P/C
Insp. De Vera would serve as his backup.
At around 2:45 p.m. of September 3, 2003, the team arrived at Road 10, Barangay
Pag-asa, Quezon City. PO2 Soriano and the CI proceeded to appellant’s house
while the rest of the buy-bust team positioned themselves within viewing distance.
The CI introduced PO2 Soriano to appellant as a drug dependent who wanted to
purchase P200.00 worth of shabu. During their conversation, Parcon arrived and
asked appellant for shabu. Appellant gave her a small heat-sealed plastic sachet that
she placed in her coin purse. Thereafter, PO2 Soriano handed to appellant the buy-
bust money consisting of two 100-peso bills and the latter, in turn, gave him a heat-
sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Soriano then
immediately arrested appellant and recovered from his right hand pocket the buy
bust money. At this juncture, PO2 Soriano’s teammates rushed to the scene. PO1
Pineda arrested Parcon and recovered from her a plastic sachet also containing
white crystalline substance.
Appellant and Parcon were then taken to the Baler Police Station. The items
recovered during the buy-bust operation were marked by PO2 Soriano as "SJ-03"
and "AP-03" and turned over to the designated investigator, PO1 Vicente Calatay
(PO1 Calatay). PO1 Calatay then prepared a letter-request for laboratory
examination, which, together with the confiscated specimen, was brought by PO2
Soriano to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The prosecution intended to present PO1 Calatay and PO1 Pineda as witnesses, but
their testimonies were likewise dispensed with after the defense agreed to stipulate
on the following facts:
PO1 Calatay
[T]hat he was the police investigator assigned to investigate these cases; that in
connection with the investigation that he conducted, he took the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest of PO2 Richard Vecida, PO2 Sofjan Soriano, PO1 Alvin Pineda, and
PO1Alexander Pancho marked as Exhibits "F" and "F-1"; that the specimen[s]
consisting of two (2) plastic sachets marked as Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" were turned
over to him by the arresting officers; that in connection therewith, he prepared the
request for laboratory examination marked as Exhibit "A" and received a copy of the
Chemistry Report, the original of which was earlier marked as Exhibit "C"; that the
buy-bust money consisting of two (2) pieces of Php100.00 bill marked as Exhibits "D"
and "E" were likewise turned over to him by the arresting officer; that he thereafter
prepared a letter referral to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City marked
as Exhibits "G" and "G-1".13
PO1 Pineda
[T]hat he was part of the buy-bust team which conducted a buy[-]bust operation on
September 3, 2003 at about 2:45 a.m. at Road 10, Pag-asa, Quezon City; that he
acted as back-up to PO2 Sofjan Soriano, the poseur buyer in the said operation; that
he was with PO2 [Richard] Vecida and PO1 Alexander Pancho during said
operation; that after the consummation of the transaction between PO2 Sofjan
Soriano and Glenn Salvador, he assisted in the arrest of accused Doryann Parcon;
that upon [body] search of accused Parcon, he recovered from the latter a plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance; that said plastic sachet was marked as
Exhibit "B-2".14
Version of the Defense
In his testimony,15 appellant claimed that at about 11:00 p.m. of September 2, 2003,
he was parking his tricycle outside his residence at 135 Road 10, Brgy. Pag-asa,
Quezon City when a patrol car suddenly stopped in front of his house. Three
policemen alighted, aimed their guns at him, and forced him to board their vehicle.
Already inside were two men in handcuffs sitting on the floor. The police car then
proceeded to Police Station 2 in Baler, Quezon City, where he and the two other
men were taken to a room and frisked by policemen who demanded P20,000.00
from each of them. They were told to call their relatives to inform them of their arrest
for engaging in a pot session. When appellant refused to oblige, PO2 Soriano said to
him: "matigas ka, hindi ka marunong makisama dapat sayo ikulong." He was
thereafter detained and no longer saw the two men he mentioned. Two days later, he
was presented to the Prosecutor’s Office for inquest.
Appellant accused the police officers of falsehood but could not file a case against
them since his parents were in the Unites States of America and he did not know
anyone else who could help him. He denied knowing Parcon and the arresting
officers and claimed that he saw Parcon for the first time during the inquest and the
arresting officers when they arrested him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant and Parcon for the crimes charged. It did not
find impressive appellant’s claim of extortion by the police officers and instead
upheld the buy-bust operation which it found to have been carried out with due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. It ruled that absent proof of evil motive
on the part of the police, the presumption of regularity which runs in their favor
stands. Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

GLENN SALVADOR y BALVERDE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 charged in Criminal Case No. Q-03-120799.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and to pay a fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) PESOS.
On the other hand, judgment is likewise rendered in Criminal Case No. Q-03-120800
finding accused DORY ANN PARCON y DEL ROSARIO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a violation of Section 11, Article II of the same Act. Accordingly, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as MINIMUM to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as
MAXIMUM and to pay a fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P300,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.17 In his Brief,18 he imputed to the RTC the
following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE

GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER
CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. No.

9165.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT

AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE APPREHENDING
TEAM TO PROVE ITS INTEGRITY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ONLY ON PO2 SOFJAN
SORIANO’S TESTIMONY.19
Aside from the prosecution’s failure to prove the elements constituting the crime of
illegal sale of shabu, appellant asserted that the apprehending officers failed to
immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the
same as mandated by Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165; that the
chain of custody was broken since PO2 Soriano could not determine with certainty
whether the plastic sachet allegedly seized from him was the same specimen
subjected to laboratory examination; that the prosecution was unable to substantiate
its claim that the two 100-peso bills were the same money used in purchasing shabu
since the said bills were neither dusted with fluorescent powder nor was he
subjected to fingerprint examination; that the failure to coordinate the buy-bust
operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) was prejudicial to
his substantive right; and, that PO2 Soriano and the buy-bust team did not accord
him due process by failing to apprise him of his rights after he was arrested.
The People of the Philippines, on the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) asserted in its Brief20 that the Decision of the RTC must be affirmed
since the guilt of appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt; that the
prosecution proved all the elements of the illegal sale of drugs; that the testimonies
of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation and their positive
identification of appellant as the seller of the shabu prevail over the latter’s denial;
that the chain of custody of the illegal drug seized from appellant was sufficiently
established; that the failure to use fluorescent powder in the marked money does not
result in a failure of the buy-bust operation since the same is not a prerequisite to
such operation; that the failure of the law enforcers to conduct a physical inventory or
to photograph the seized items in accordance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
is not fatal; that the failure of the buy-bust team to coordinate with the PDEA does
not invalidate appellant’s arrest; that PO2 Soriano’s failure to recall the markings on
the specimen shows that he was not coached as a witness; that appellant’s defenses
of denial and frame-up are unconvincing; and that the failure to apprise appellant of
his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is not fatal since such rights apply
only against extrajudicial confessions.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. Anent the defects in the
chain of custody alleged by appellant, the said court ruled that the evidence proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs sold by appellant to PO2 Soriano was
taken to the police station and marked therein and then forwarded to the crime
laboratory where it was found positive for shabu; the marked money used in the buy-
bust operation was the same money introduced in evidence; and that the failure of
the arresting team to faithfully observe the requirements of conducting physical
inventory and coordinating the buy-bust operation with PDEA are not fatal since the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were preserved. Thus, the
dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is

perforce dismissed. Accordingly, the assailed decision dated January 15, 2008
insofar as the accused-appellant Glenn Salvador Y Balverde is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.22
On February 8, 2010, the parties were directed to file their supplemental briefs. 23 The
OSG opted to adopt the brief it submitted before the CA as its appeal brief while
appellant filed a Supplemental Brief 24 which, however, contains practically the same
arguments he advanced before the CA. Again, aside from questioning the finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against him, appellant questions the arresting officers’
alleged failure to comply with the chain of custody rule.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.

All the elements for the prosecution of
illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently
established in this case.
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the
following elements must be established: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti" 25 or the illicit drug in evidence. "[T]he
commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs x x x merely requires
the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the
exchange of money and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place." 26
In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the elements of illegal sale
of shabu. The testimony of PO2 Soriano reveals that an entrapment operation was
organized and conducted after they confirmed through a surveillance operation the
information that appellant is engaged in drug peddling activities. Designated as a
poseur-buyer, PO2 Soriano, together with the CI, approached appellant outside his
residence. After having been introduced by the CI to appellant as a drug user, PO2
Soriano asked appellant if he could purchase P200.00 worth of shabu. PO2 Soriano
handed to appellant the marked money consisting of two P100 bills and the latter, in
turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. PO2 Soriano then arrested appellant and
recovered the buy-bust money from the latter. Immediately thereafter his back-up
who were monitoring the transaction from viewing distance arrived. Forensic
examination subsequently confirmed that the contents of the sachets bought from
appellant and recovered from Parcon were indeed shabu.
Prosecutions for illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers
who conducted the buy-bust operation. Their narration of the incident, "buttressed by
the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight." 27 Here, the CA affirmed the
RTC’s ruling that the testimonies and facts stipulated upon were consistent with each
other as well as with the physical evidence. Thus, there is no justification to disturb
the findings of the RTC, as sustained by the CA, on the matter.
The defenses of denial and frame-up

are unavailing.
The Court cannot convince itself to reverse the finding of facts of the lower courts on
the basis of appellant’s self-serving allegations of denial and extortion/frame-up.
Denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of a prosecution witness. "A
defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot
be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable

testimony on affirmative matters."28
Appellant cannot likewise avail of the defense of frame-up which "is viewed with
disfavor since, like alibi, it can easily be concocted and is a common ploy in most
prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law." 29 To substantiate this
defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the buy-
bust team was inspired by improper motive or was not properly performing its duty. 30
Here, there is no evidence that there was ill motive on the part of the buy-bust team.
In fact, appellant himself admitted that he did not know the police officers prior to his
arrest. There could therefore be no bad blood between him and the said police
officers. Moreover, there was no proof that the arresting officers improperly
performed their duty in arresting appellant and Parcon.
Non-compliance with Section 21,

Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is
not fatal.
In arguing for his acquittal, appellant heavily relies on the failure of the buy-bust team
to immediately photograph and conduct a physical inventory of the seized items in
his presence. In this regard, Section 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 provides:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
However, failure to strictly comply with the above procedure will not render an arrest
illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence. Substantial compliance is
allowed as provided for in Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of RA 9165.31 This provision reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. (Emphasis supplied).
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and photographed the objects confiscated does not ipso facto
result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render inadmissible in evidence the
items seized. This is due to the proviso added in the implementing rules stating that it
must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved. 32 "What is crucial is
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will
be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." 33
The links in the chain of custody must be established.
"The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as
long as the chain of custody of the same are duly established." 34 "‘Chain of Custody’
means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who had temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody was
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition."35
There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation, namely: "first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court."36
In this case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary value of
the confiscated shabu. There is no evidence that PO2 Soriano lost possession and
control of the seized shabu from the time it was recovered from the appellant until its
turnover to the police station. He marked the seized item immediately upon arrival at
the police station. He turned it over to PO1 Calatay, the investigating officer, who
prepared the letter request for the laboratory examination of the contents of the
plastic sachets. These facts were admitted by the appellant.37
On the same day, PO2 Soriano personally brought the letter request and specimens
to the PNP Crime Laboratory where they were received by Forensic Chemist P/Insp.
Arban who conducted the examination on the specimens submitted. During the pre-
trial conference, appellant admitted the purpose for which P/Insp. Arban’s testimony
was being offered.38 The marked sachet of shabu and the marked money used in
purchasing the same were both presented in evidence.
Appellant’s contention that the marking of the seized sachets of shabu should have
been made in his presence while at the scene of the crime instead of in the police
station fails to impress. It is clear from the earlier cited Sec. 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 that in a buy-bust situation, the
marking of the dangerous drug may be done in the presence of the violator in the
nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team. Appellant
should not confuse buy-bust situation from search and seizure conducted by virtue of
a court-issued warrant. It is in the latter case that physical inventory (which includes
the marking) is made at the place where the search warrant is served. Nonetheless,
"non-compliance with [the] requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items."39
Appellant’s claim that the testimony of PO2 Soriano does not deserve credence due
to his failure to identify and/or recall the markings he made on the subject specimen
also fails to convince. His failure to immediately recall the markings on the
specimens only show that he is an uncoached witness.40 "Such momentary lapse in
memory does not detract from the credibility of his testimony as to the essential
details of the incident."41 It must also be considered that aside from the fact that
police officers handle numerous cases daily, he testified three years after appellant’s
arrest. It is therefore understandable that PO2 Soriano could no longer easily

remember all the details of the incident.
Lastly, appellant’s argument that the entrapment operation is fatally flawed for failure
of the buy-bust team to coordinate with the PDEA deserves scant consideration.
"[C]oordination with PDEA, while perhaps ideal, is not an indispensable element of a
proper buy-bust operation;"42 it is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the
PDEA.43
Penalty
All told, there is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as defined
and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Under this law, the penalty for
the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, is life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However,
with the enactment of RA 9346,44 only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed.45
Thus, the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA is proper.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals that
affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82,
insofar as the conviction of Glenn Salvador y Balverde for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 9346, and the
penalty of life imprisonment and payment of fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon him
are concerned, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA
180,199.
2
CA rollo, pp. 125-137; penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes (now a member of this court) and concurred in by Associate
Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Antonio L. Villamor.
3
Records, pp. 235-241; penned by Judge Severino B. De Castro, Jr.
4
Id. at 2-3
5
Id. at 2.
6
Id. at 6-7.
7
Id. at 6.
8
See Motion for Consolidation, id. at 1.
9
Id. at 29.
10
Id. at 36.
11
Id. at 91.
12
TSN, September 6, 2004, pp. 4-8; TSN, January 12, 2005, pp. 2-5.
13
Records, p. 155.
14
Id. at 162.
15
TSN, November 6, 2007, pp. 3-7.
16
Records, p. 241.
17
Id. at 264.
18
CA rollo, pp. 51-68.
19
Id. at 53-54.
20
Id. at 79-115.
21
Id. at 137.
22
Id. at 140-141.
23
Rollo, p. 20.
24
Id. at 27-38.
25
People v. Dilao, 555 Phil. 394, 409 (2007).
26
People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA 61,
70.
27
People v. Llanita, G.R. No. 189817, October 3, 2012, 682 SCRA
288, 300-301.
28
People v. Alberto, G.R. No. 179717, February 5, 2010, 611 SCRA
706, 714.
29
Id.
30
People v. Alviz, supra note 26 at 71, citing People v. Capalad, G.R.
No. 184174, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 717, 727.
31
People v. Llanita, supra note 27 at 305.
32
People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA
879, 898.
33
People v. Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA
106, 119.
34
People v. Alviz, supra note 26 at 76.
35
Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,
Series of 2002; re Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of
Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment.
36
People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA
295, 307-308.
37
See Records, p. 155.
38
Id. at 36.
39
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165,
Sec. 21(a).
40
People v. Dilao, supra note 25 at 406.
41
Id.
42
People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 683,
696.
43
Id., quoting People v. Roa, G.R. No. 186134, May 6, 2010, 620
SCRA 359, 368-370.
44
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.
45
People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 322,
339.
People v Lazaro | P a g e | 1
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO

LAZARO, JR. A.K.A JUN LAZARO Y AQUINO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] dated 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 02258 which affirmed with modification the Decision [2] dated 27 April
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Baguio City, in Criminal Cases
No. 23227-R, No. 23228-R and No. 23229-R, finding accused-appellant Alfredo
Lazaro, Jr. a.k.a Jun Lazaro y Aquino guilty of illegal sale, possession and use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, under Sections 5, 11,
and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts gathered from the records are as follows:
On 17 June 2004, two separate informations were filed before the RTC against
appellant for illegal sale and possession of shabu under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the informations read:
Criminal Case No. 23227-R
The undersigned accuses ALFREDO LAZARO, JR. a.k.a JUN LAZARO y AQUINO
for VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165 otherwise
known as the COMPREHENSIVE Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, committed as
follows:
That on June 15, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, and without authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and/or
deliver One (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu in the amount of P3,000.00
[should be P300], weighing 0.05 gram to Poseur Buyer SPO1 Dennis G. Indunan,
knowing fully well that said Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu is a
dangerous drug, in violation of the aforementioned provision of law.[3]
The undersigned accuses JUN LAZARO y AQUINO for VIOLATION OF SECTION

11, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 committed as follows:
That on June 15, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused x x x, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control One (1) small heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known
as Shabu weighing 0.04 gram, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license
or prescription in violation of the aforecited provision of law.[4]
On 18 June 2004, an information was filed with the RTC against appellant for illegal
use of shabu under Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, thus:
The undersigned accuses JUN LAZARO for VIOLATION OF SECTION 15 [ARTICLE

II] OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165 [otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002], committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use Dangerous Drugs particularly
Methamphetamine per the result of a Qualitative Examination conducted on the urine
sample taken from him, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.[5]
Subsequently, these cases were consolidated. When arraigned on 28 June 2004,

appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not guilty" to each of the
charges.[6] Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Hordan T. Pacatiw,

Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Dennis G. Indunan, SPO1 Emerson A. Lingbawan and
PO3 Paulino A. Lubos, all of whom are members of the Philippine National Police
and were assigned at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Anti-Illegal
Drugs Team unit, Baguio City. Their testimonies, taken together, bear the following:
On 15 June 2004, at about 12:30 p.m., an informant went to the Criminal

Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Anti-Illegal Drugs Team unit (AIDT),
Baguio City, and reported to PO3 Paulino Lubos (PO3 Lubos) the drug trafficking
activities of appellant in Central Bakakeng, Baguio City. PO3 Lubos relayed the
information to Police Senior Inspector Hordan T. Pacatiw (Inspector Pacatiw), head
of AIDT, who in turn, referred the matter to Senior Superintendent Marvin V.
Bolabola (Superintendent Bolabola), chief of CIDG, Baguio City, for appropriate
action. Superintendent Bolabola formed a team and planned a buy-bust operation.
The team was composed of Inspector Pacatiw who would act as the team leader;
SPO1 Dennis G. Indunan (SPO1 Indunan) as the poseur-buyer; PO3 Lubos as the
seizing officer; and SPO1 Emerson A. Lingbawan (SPO1 Lingbawan) as the
arresting officer. Superintendent Bolabola handed SPO1 Indunan three One
Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills to be utilized as buy-bust money. SPO1 Indunan
marked the monies with "DG-06-15-04." Thereafter, the team coordinated the
planned buy-bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
At around 2:30 p.m. of the same date, the team, together with the informant, went to
appellant's house at 181 Km. 3, Central Bakakeng, Baguio City. Upon arriving
thereat, the informant and SPO1 Indunan saw appellant standing at the balcony of
the third floor of the three-storey house. The informant proceeded inside appellant's
house and talked with appellant at the balcony of the third floor, while SPO1 Indunan
stood outside the house at a distance of 10 meters. The rest of the team positioned
themselves outside appellant's house at a distance of 25 meters. Later, the informant
signaled SPO1 Indunan to approach him and appellant at the balcony of the third
floor. Thereupon, the informant introduced SPO1 Indunan to appellant as user and
buyer of shabu. The informant subsequently excused himself and left SPO1 Indunan
and appellant. Appellant then asked SPO1 Indunan how much worth of shabu he
would want to buy. SPO1 Indunan answered he would like to purchase three
hundred pesos (P300.00) worth of shabu. Appellant knocked at the door of a room in
the balcony and called a certain "Bong." Bong is appellant's brother whose full name
is Ferdinand Bong Lazaro. A man opened the door and handed a green box to
appellant. Appellant opened the green box, took a plastic sachet from it, handed the
plastic sachet to SPO1 Indunan, and demanded payment from the latter. After
examining the contents of the plastic sachet and believing that the same contained
shabu, SPO1 Indunan gave the three marked one hundred peso bills to appellant. At
this juncture, SPO1 Indunan removed his sunglasses and placed it in his pocket as
pre-arranged signal to the other members of the team.
The other members of the team rushed to the crime scene and identified themselves
as police officers. Appellant tried to resist arrest but he was subdued by the team.
Inspector Pacatiw then apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. Afterwards,
SPO1 Indunan frisked and recovered from appellant the buy-bust money and the
green box which contained another plastic sachet with white substance. SPO1
Indunan marked with "DG-06-15-04" the plastic sachet containing white substance
sold to him by appellant, as well as the plastic sachet with white substance found
inside the green box.
Meanwhile, Inspector Pacatiw knocked at the door of a room on the balcony and
called on Bong to open the door but to no avail. Inspector Pacatiw and some
members of the team then forcibly opened the door. Although the team found no one
inside the room, they, however, subsequently saw a man, whom they believed to be
Bong, running down the basement of the house and exiting through its back door.
The man then disappeared.
Thereafter, the team discovered and seized at the third floor of the house several
drug paraphernalias. The team made a written inventory on said paraphernalias, as
well as the plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan and the plastic sachet
recovered in appellant's possession, in the presence of representatives from media,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the barangay. Said representatives signed the
inventory document on the seized items. Inspector Pacatiw took custody of the said
seized items.
The team immediately brought appellant, as well as the items seized, to the office of
the CIDG, Baguio City. Thereupon, the team made a booking sheet, arrest report, a
"Joint Affidavit of Arrest" and an "Affidavit of Poseur-Buyer" as regards the buy-bust
operation. Superintendent Bolabola made a written request for physical examination
of appellant to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. After conducting
a physical examination on appellant, Dr. Elizardo D. Daileg, medico-legal officer of
the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, issued a medico-legal
certificate attesting that no injuries were found on appellant's body. Superintendent
Bolabola also made separate written requests to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office for drug test on appellant and a laboratory examination on the
plastic sachet containing white substance sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan and
the plastic sachet with white substance found in appellant's possession. After
conducting a laboratory examination on the urine sample taken from appellant,
Police Officer 1 Juliet Valentin Albon, Forensic Analyst of the PNP Benguet
Provincial Crime Laboratory Office (Forensic Analyst Albon), issued a report stating
that appellant was positive for shabu. Likewise, after making laboratory tests,
Forensic Analyst Albon issued a chemistry report certifying that the plastic sachet
sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan contained 0.05 gram of shabu while the plastic
sachet recovered from appellant's possession contained 0.04 gram of shabu.[7]
The prosecution also adduced documentary and object evidence to buttress the
testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) joint affidavit of the arresting officers signed by
Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan and PO3 Lubos (Exhibit A);[8] (2) affidavit of the
poseur-buyer signed by SPO1 Indunan (Exhibit B);[9] (3) booking sheet and arrest
report for appellant (Exhibit C);[10] (4) request to conduct laboratory examination on
the two plastic sachets recovered from appellant which was signed by
Superintendent Bolabola;[11] (5) request for drug test on appellant signed by
Superintendent Bolabola (Exhibit D);[12] (6) request for physical examination on
appellant signed by Superintendent Bolabola (Exhibit E);[13] (7) medico-legal
certificate signed by Dr. Daileg (Exhibit E-1);[14] (8) chemistry report on the drug test
of appellant signed by Forensic Analyst Albon (Exhibit H);[15] (9) chemistry report on
the content of plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan and the content of
the plastic sachet recovered from possession of appellant signed by Forensic

Analyst Albon (Exhibit I);[16] (10) inquest disposition issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Baguio City (Exhibit J);[17] (11) written inventory on the items seized from
appellant signed by representatives from the media, DOJ and barangay (Exhibit
M);[18] (12) coordination sheet with the PDEA (Exhibit N);[19] (13) receipt of the items
seized from appellant signed by the members of the buy-bust team (Exhibit O);[20]
(14) two plastic sachet containing shabu sold by and recovered from the possession
of appellant (Exhibit K);[21] and (15) buy-bust money confiscated from appellant
(Exhibit L).[22]
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of appellant and his father, namely
Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. to refute the foregoing accusations. Appellant denied any liability
and claimed he was framed.
Appellant testified that on 15 June 2004, between 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., he was
sleeping in his room at the third floor of a three-storey house located at 181 Km. 3,
Central Bakakeng, Baguio City. He was roused from his sleep by the barking of dogs
outside his house. He opened the door of his room and saw PO3 Lubos, Inspector
Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan, SPO1 Indunan and some members of the CIDG, Baguio
City, namely Warren Lacangan, Jojo Unata and Jun Digula approaching. PO3 Lubos
tried to hit him with the gun but he evaded it. Inspector Pacatiw hit him several times
in the stomach with a gun. Said policemen kicked him several times causing him to
fall on the floor. Thereafter, the policemen destroyed the door of his brother's
(Ferdinand Bong Lazaro) room and entered therein. He was dragged inside the said
room. Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan and PO3 Lubos then took the laptop,
diskman, Buddha coin bank and power tools inside the room. Subsequently, the
policemen brought him to the second floor of the house where he saw Jade Salazar
(Jade), the live-in partner of his brother, Renato Lazaro. The policemen apprehended
Jade, took the latter's bag and a green box, and asked her the whereabouts of Bong.
He and Jade were later brought to the CIDG office, Baguio City. Thereupon, the
policemen took his wallet, demanded an amount of P200,000.00, and told him to
contact Bong so that the latter may help him settle his case.
While appellant and Jade were being held at CIDG office, Baguio City, a certain
Rosita Salazar (Salazar), allegedly a Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge from Abra
and Jade's grandmother, arrived and introduced herself to the policemen. The
policemen ignored Salazar as the latter did not have any identification card. The
policemen then brought appellant and Jade to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office where they were subjected to physical examination. Upon their
return to the CIDG office, the policemen showed them three plastic sachets of shabu
which would be used against them as evidence. Later, however, appellant learned
that Jade was released by the policemen in exchange for a certain amount of money.
During his detention in the CIDG office, he saw PO3 Lubos preparing the marked
money. At that point, he realized that a case would be filed against him in court.
Appellant denied having sold to SPO1 Indunan one plastic sachet containing 0.05
gram of shabu on 15 June 2004. He claimed that it was impossible for the back-up
members of the buy-bust team to have witnessed his alleged sale of shabu to SPO1
Indunan because there were big trees beside the three-storey house which blocked
the view of persons on the ground looking up to the balcony of the third floor. He
denied having received from Bong a green box during the alleged buy-bust and
averred that Jade owned the green box.[23]
Alfredo Lazaro, Sr., appellant's father, testified that on 15 June 2004, at about 2:00
p.m., he was watching television inside his room at the third floor of the three-storey
house situated at 181 Km. 3, Central Bakakeng, Baguio City. Later, he heard the
barking of dogs outside the house. Curious, he opened the door of his room. He then
saw PO3 Lubos and several policemen mauling appellant. Shocked, he uttered
"apay dayta?" (Why is that?). PO3 Lubos and the policemen stopped beating
appellant. As he was already experiencing chest pains, he returned to his room.
Subsequently, he saw the policemen carrying a backpack and a plastic bag the
contents of which belonged to Bong.[24]
The defense also submitted a written undertaking of Jade and a receipt of custody
signed by Salazar in support of its contentions.[25]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant in all of the criminal
cases. In Criminal Case No. 23227-R, appellant was found guilty of violating Section
5 of Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On the other hand,
in Criminal Case No. 23228-R, appellant was found guilty of violating Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal use of shabu) and was penalized with six months drug
rehabilitation in a government center. With respect to Criminal Case No. 23229-R,
appellant was found guilty of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal
possession of shabu) and was meted an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum. He was further ordered to
pay a fine of P300,000.00.
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision partly granting the appeal. The appellate court affirmed the
conviction of appellant in Criminal Cases No. 23227-R and No. 23229-R. However, it
reversed the RTC's ruling in Criminal Case No. 23228-R by acquitting appellant in
the said criminal case.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 12 August 2008.[26]
In his Brief[27] and Supplemental Brief,[28] appellant assigned the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSESS WHILE TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE

TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURES LAID DOWN IN RA 9165. [29]
In the main, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for
illegal sale and possession of shabu.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements
must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.
In prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti as evidence.[30] In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to
establish, through testimonial, documentary and object evidence, the said elements.
SPO1 Indunan, the poseur-buyer, testified that appellant sold to him shabu during a
legitimate buy-bust operation.[31] Per chemistry report of Forensic Analyst Albon, the
substance, weighing 0.05 gram, which was bought by SPO1 Indunan from appellant
for P300.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. SPO1 Indunan narrated the transaction with appellant as follows:
Q What happened next when you were already at the residence of the
accused?
A When we were near the house, we saw a man standing at the balcony, Sir.
Q How many storeys is the house of the accused?
A About three (3), Sir.
Q Where is the balcony where the man was standing?
A At the third floor, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A The Informant told me to wait first and he would go ahead and talk to Jun,
Sir.
A After talking, the Informant signaled me to go near them, sir.
xxxx
A The Informant signaled me to go near them, Sir.
xxxx
A I was introduced to Jun as user and buyer of shabu, Sir.
Q Were you introduced by name?
A No, Sir.
A The Informant excused himself, Sir.
Q And them?
A We talked with Jun and asked me how much will I buy, Sir.
Q In what language or dialect?
A Tagalog, Sir.
Q How?
A "Magkano bang bibilhin mo" and I said "tatlong daan lang," Sir.
A He knocked at the door and called out for "Bong." Sir.
A Bong opened the door and handed Jun something a green box, Sir.
Q How did you know that it was Bong?
A That is what I heard, Sir.
Q Were you able to see the face of Bong during that time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q After Bong had opened the door, what happened next? All this time you
were beside Jun?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next after the green box was handed to Jun?
A The person told Jun "eto na yong box," Sir.
A And Jun opened the box and brought out one (1) plastic sachet and handed
it to me and demanded for the payment, Sir.
Q How?
A He said "akina yong bayad," Sir.

Q After he handed to you that sachet and asked for the payment what did you
say also?
A I first examined the content and after believing that it was shabu, I handed
the marked money, Sir.
xxxx
Q After that what happened next?
A After handling him the money, I gave the pre-arranged signal, Sir.
Q What was your pre-arranged signal?
A By removing my sunglasses and placing it in my pocket, Sir.
Q After you have made the signal what happened next?
A My back-up team rushed to where I am (sic), Sir.
xxxx
PROS. CATRAL:
Q The subject of your operation you already know him initially as Jun, did you
eventually come to know his full name?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What is his full name?
A Jun Aquino Lazaro,Sir.
Q If Jun Aquino Lazaro is in the courtroom would you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a male person who gave his name as Jun Lazaro. [32]
Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan and PO3 Lubos corroborated the aforesaid
testimony of SPO1 Indunan on relevant points.
The prosecution adduced as its documentary and object evidence the transparent
plastic sachet of shabu sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan during the buy-bust
operation, the chemistry report of Forensic Analyst Albon confirming that the plastic
sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan contained 0.05 gram of shabu, and the
marked money used during the buy-bust operation.
Parenthetically, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the

elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified
to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[33] All these elements have
been established. SPO1 Indunan testified that after appellant sold to him shabu, he
(SPO1 Indunan) and the members of the buy-bust team arrested appellant. He then
frisked appellant and recovered from the latter a green box which contained plastic
sachet with white granules. The chemistry report of Forensic Analyst Albon confirms
that such plastic sachet found inside the green box contains 0.04 gram of shabu. The
relevant portion of the testimony of SPO1 Indunan is as follows:
A After we controlled Jun we brought him to our office, Sir.
Q Immediately?
A Yes, Sir.
Q He was not searched at the area of operation?

A He was searched, Sir.
Q Who searched him?

A I, Sir.
Q What was the result of your search?
A I was able to find the marked money, Sir.
Q Aside from the money what else did you recover from the person?
A The content of the box there is still one (1) sachet, Sir.
Q If this sachet which you recovered from the accused will be shown to you
again will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How sure are you that you would be able to identify it?
A I placed my initials, Sir.
Q I am showing to you another sachet, please tell us if this is the same sachet
that you said that was confiscated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Please point to your initial?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When did you place that?
A After the arrest of the accused, Sir.

PROS. CATRAL:
The other sachet may we pray that this be marked as Exhibit "K-1", your
Honor.
COURT:
Mark it please.[34]
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding appellant's illegal sale and
possession of shabu are consistent with the documentary and object evidence
submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to be credible. Both courts also found no ill
motive on their part to testify against appellant.
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. [35]
To rebut the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, appellant interposed the
defense of denial and frame-up. Appellant denied he sold shabu to SPO1 Indunan
and he possessed a green box containing shabu during the buy-bust operation. He
claimed that said green box was seized from Jade and that the arresting officers tried
to extort money from him in exchange for his freedom.
The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy
in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing
evidence.[36] In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in
support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was
presented to bolster his allegations.
It is true that appellant submitted a written undertaking of Jade and a receipt of

custody signed by alleged Abra MTC Judge Salazar in support of his contentions
that the green box was seized from Jade and that he was framed. Nonetheless,
there was nothing in said documents which proved his defenses. In the said
undertaking, Jade merely declares (1) that on 15 June 2004, at about 2:30 p.m., she
was apprehended in the house of appellant by the officers of the CIDG, Baguio City,
for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 9165; (2) that she was informed of her
constitutional rights by the CIDG officers; (3) that she was humanely treated by the
CIDG officers during her investigation and that none of her personal property was
taken or damaged by said officers; (4) that she had no complaint whatsoever against
the CIDG officers; and (5) that she promised to appear if called upon in the
investigation regarding said incident. On the other hand, the receipt of custody
signed by Salazar merely states (1) that she received in good health the living
person of Jade from the custody of CIDG, Baguio City; and (2) that she promised to
present Jade for investigation as regards the incident if required by the proper
authorities. Indeed, the above-cited documents merely describe the circumstances
and conditions of Jade during and after the incident. There was no reference at all to
appellant's claim that the green box was seized from Jade and that he was
framed.[37]
Further, it should be noted that appellant has not filed a single complaint for frame-up
or extortion against the buy-bust team. This inaction clearly betrays appellant's claim
of frame-up.
Appellant imputes ill motive on the part of the buy-bust team by asseverating that he
had a previous quarrel with PO3 Lubos and that he knows some members of the
buy-bust team. Withal, this allegation is uncorroborated and unsubstantiated. Hence,
the imputation of improper motive should be negated. When the police officers
involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to testify against the accused, the
courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties
regularly.[38]
Moreover, motive is not essential for conviction for a crime when there is no doubt as
to the identity of the culprit, and that lack of motive for committing the crime does not
preclude conviction for such crime when the crime and participation of the accused
are definitely proved.[39] In the instant cases, SPO1 Indunan positively identified
appellant as the one who sold to him shabu during the buy-bust operation. He also
testified that he recovered shabu from appellant's possession during said incident.
The defense presented appellant's father, Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. to corroborate

appellant's version of the incident. Initially, it must be emphasized that the testimony
of Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. should be received with caution he being the father of
appellant.[40] Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. testified that upon opening the door of his room, he
saw PO3 Lubos and some policemen beating appellant. He uttered "apay dayta?"
(Why is that?), left the scene, and went back to his room. There was no testimony at
all from him that he tried to restrain PO3 Lubos and the policemen from mauling
appellant, or that he immediately called or sought the help of barangay officials or
higher authorities. His court statement hardly inspires belief as it would be highly
unnatural for a father not to react defensively or sought help if his child is being
maltreated in his presence. In addition, the physical examination report on appellant
states that no injuries were observed on appellant's body immediately after his
arrest. His testimony, therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Given the foregoing circumstances, the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses prevail over the defenses of denial and frame-up of appellant.
Appellant tried to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses based on
the following reasons: (1) there was inconsistency in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as to what language was used in apprising appellant of his
constitutional rights; (2) the informant was not presented as witness during the trial;
and (3) there was no buy-bust operation because appellant was merely instigated by
the informant to sell shabu to SPOI Indunan.[41]
For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as basis for

acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the
accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which has nothing to do with the
elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of the accused. [42]
The inconsistency cited by appellant refers to trivial matter and is clearly beyond the
elements of illegal sale of shabu because it does not pertain to the actual buy-bust
itself - that crucial moment when appellant was caught selling shabu. Such
inconsistency is also irrelevant to the elements of illegal possession of shabu.
Besides, the inconsistency even bolsters the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
as it erased any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[43]
Anent the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of the informant, it is
well-settled that the testimony of an informant in drug-pushing cases is not essential
for conviction and may be dispensed if the poseur-buyer testified on the same.[44]
As to the claim of instigation, where the police or its agent lures the accused into
committing the offense in order to prosecute him and which is deemed contrary to
public policy and considered an absolutory cause,[45] there is nothing in the records
which clearly and convincingly shows that appellant was instigated by the informant
to sell shabu to SPO1 Indunan. What is apparent therein is that the informant merely
introduced SPO1 Indunan to appellant as a user and buyer of shabu and that the
informant did not in any way allure or persuade appellant to sell shabu to SPO1
Indunan.[46] Also, after such introduction, it was appellant who hastily asked SPO1
Indunan how much worth of shabu the latter would want to buy.[47] This obviously
manifests that the idea to sell shabu originated from appellant without any instigation
from SPO1 Indunan or the informant. Indeed, what have transpired in the instant
case was a legitimate buy-bust operation and not instigation. A buy-bust operation is
a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police
officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.
Appellant further posits that the prosecution did not strictly comply with the
procedures laid down in Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 because: (1)
although the written inventory of the seized items bore signatures of representatives
from the DOJ, the media, and the barangay, only the representative from the media
was named; (2) no pictures of the seized items were taken; (3) Forensic Analyst
Albon did not testify with regard to her chemistry report on the subject drugs; (4)
there were gaps in the chain of custody of the subject drugs because the officer who
received the request for laboratory examination of the same did not testify, and the
custodian of the subject drugs from the time they were examined up to their
presentation in trial was not identified; and (5) the prosecution failed to show the
condition of the subject drugs and the precautions taken in preserving their
condition.[48]
It should be noted that appellant raised the buy-bust team's alleged non-compliance
with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This,
he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria[49] in
which the very same issue was raised, we held:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever

justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation
in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant
did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first
time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that
there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal." (Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, we have held in several cases[50] that non-compliance with Section 21,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused's arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.[51] In the present case, the integrity of the drugs seized from appellant
was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the instant case
was shown not to have been broken.
Records revealed that after SPO1 Indunan confiscated two transparent plastic
sachets containing shabu from appellant, he marked each of the two sachets of
shabu with "DG-06-15-04" and turned them over to Superintendent Bolabola, who, in
turn, handed them to Inspector Pacatiw who brought the same to PO1 Guingahan of
CIDG office, Baguio City. The latter then delivered the two plastic sachets each
marked with "DG-06-15-04" to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
for laboratory examination. The same two sachets were received by SPO1 Carino of
PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office.[52] After a qualitative examination
conducted on the contents of the two sachets each marked "DG-06-15-04," Forensic
Analyst Albon found them to positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Upon being weighed, the one plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan was
found to be containing 0.05 gram while the other plastic sachet found in appellant's
possession was determined to have 0.04 gram of shabu.
When the prosecution presented the two sachets of shabu each marked with "DG-
06-15-04," SPO1 Indunan positively identified them as the very same sachets he
bought and recovered from appellant in the buy-bust operation. The two plastic
sachets containing 0.05 and 0.04 gram of shabu, respectively, each had the marking
"DG-06-15-04" as attested by Forensic Analyst Albon in her chemistry report. The
existence, due execution, and genuineness of the said chemistry report, as well as
the qualifications of Forensic Analyst Albon were admitted by the defense. [53] Further,
SPO1 Indunan categorically declared during the trial that he put "DG-06-15-04"
marking on each of the two transparent plastic sachets of shabu recovered from
appellant. Clearly, the identity of the drugs recovered from appellant has been duly
preserved and established by the prosecution.
The fact that Forensic Analyst Albon and the persons who had possession or
custody of the subject drugs were not presented as witnesses to corroborate SPO1
Indunan's testimony is of no moment. The prosecution dispensed with the testimony
of Forensic Analyst Albon because the defense had already agreed in the substance
of her testimony to be given during trial, to wit: (1) that she examined the subject
drugs; (2) that she found them to be positive for shabu; and (3) that she prepared
and issued a chemistry report pertaining to the subject drugs.
Further, not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to
testify in court. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing
the same that imposes such a requirement. As long as the chain of custody of the
seized drug was clearly established not to have been broken and that the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable
that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the
witness stand.[54] In People v. Zeng Hua Dian,[55] we ruled:
After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find that the chain of custody
of the seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to
identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation as witnesses of
other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the
officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of
presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The
prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to
choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
Since appellant's violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
were duly established by the prosecution's evidence, we shall now ascertain the
penalties imposable on him.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the unauthorized sale of shabu,
regardless of its quantity and purity, carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Pursuant, however, to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," only life imprisonment
and fine shall be imposed. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in
imposing the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00 on appellant in
Criminal Case No. 23227-R.
Section 11(3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that illegal possession of
less than five grams of shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one day to twenty (20) years, plus a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Appellant was charged with and found to be guilty of illegal possession of 0.04 gram
of shabu in Criminal Case No. 23229-R. Hence, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
aptly sentenced appellant to imprisonment of 12 years and one day, as minimum, to

15 years, as maximum, and fined him P300,000.00, since said penalties are within
the range of penalties prescribed by the aforequoted provision.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 02258 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales,* Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,** and Abad,*** JJ., concur.
*
Per Special Order No. 744, dated 14 October 2009, signed by Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales to replace
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, who is on official leave.
**
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro was designated to sit as
additional member replacing Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per Raffle dated
20 April 2009.
***
Per Special Order No. 753, dated 13 October 2009, signed by Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad to replace
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., who is on official leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices
Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores concurring; rollo, pp. 2-23.
[2]
Penned by Judge Antonio C. Reyes; records (Crim. Case No. 23229-R), pp. 293-
304.
[3]
Records (Crim. Case No. 23227-R), p. 1.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
TSN, 23 November 2004, 4 April 2005, 5 April 2005, 26 April 2005, 30 May 2005,
1 June 2005, 13 September 2005 and 14 September 2005.
[8]
Records (Crim. Case No. 23229-R), pp. 6-7.
[9]
Id. at 6-7.
[10]
Id. at 8.
[11]
Id. at 15.
[12]
Id. at 13.
[13]
Id. at 11.
[14]
Id. at 12.
[15]
Id. at 14.
[16]
Id. at 16.
[17]
Id. at 181.
[18]
Id. at 8.
[19]
Id. at 139.
[20]
Id. at 18.
[21]
Id. at 45 and 237.
[22]
Id. at 10.
[23]
TSN, 15 and 16 November 2005.
[24]
TSN, 30 November 2005.
[25]
[26]
CA rollo, p. 146.
[27]
Id. at 51-69.
[28]
Rollo, pp. 35-39.
[29]
CA rollo, p. 61.
[30]
People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, 28 July 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 449; People
v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, 23 April 2008, 552 SCRA 627, 637-638; People v.
Santiago, G.R. No. 175326, 28 November 2007, 539 SCRA 198, 212.
[31]
TSN, 5 April 2005.
[32]
TSN, 5 April 2005, pp. 13-28.
[33]
People v. Naquita, supra note 30; People v. Del Monte, supra note 30; People v.
Santiago, supra note 30.
[34]
TSN, 5 April 2005, pp. 22-24.
[35]
People v. Naquita, supra note 30 at 444; People v. Santiago, supra note 30 at
217; People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA, 421, 440.
[36]
Id.
[37]
[38]
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 173795, 3 April 2007, 520 SCRA 458, 468-469;
People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 187, 204; People
v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 172116, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 280, 288.
[39]
People v. Quillosa, G.R. No. 115687, 17 February 2000, 325 SCRA 747, 754-
755.
[40]
People v. Suarez, G.R. No. 153573-76, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 333, 349;
People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 131924, 26 December 2000, 348 SCRA 663, 669; People
v. San Pascual, G.R. No. 137746, 15 October 2002, 391 SCRA 49, 63; People v.
Legaspi, G.R. No. 117802, 27 April 2000, 331 SCRA 95, 114.
[41]
[42]
People v. Santiago. supra note 30.
[43]
Id.
[44]
People v. Naquita; supra note 30; People v. Santiago, supra note 30.
[45]
People v. Boco, 368 Phil. 341, 367 (1999).
[46]
TSN, 5 April 2005, p. 14-15.
[47]
Id. at 15.
[48]
[49]
[50]
People v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, 26, 566 SCRA 571-595; People v. Naquita,
supra note 30; People v. Concepcion, supra note 35; People v. Del Monte, supra
note 30.
[51]
Id.
[52]
Id.
[53]
[54]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, 18 June 2009.
[55]
G.R. No. 145348, 14 June 2004, 432 SCRA 25, 32.
People v Manlangit | P a g e | 1
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189806, January 12, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO

MANLANGIT Y TRESBALLES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the August 28, 2009 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated July 12,
2007[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 03-4735 and 03-4961 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 64 in Makati City. The RTC found accused-appellant Francisco
Manlangit y Tresballes guilty of drug-sale and drug-use penalized by Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On November 25, 2003, an information was filed charging Manlangit with violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully and feloniously sell, give
away, distribute and deliver zero point zero four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug.[3]
On December 11, 2003, another information was filed against Manlangit for breach
of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165, to wit:
That sometime on or before or about the 24th day of November 2003, in the City of
Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law to use dangerous drugs, and having
been arrested and found positive for use of Methylamphetamine, after a confirmatory
test, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use Methylamphetamine,
a dangerous drug in violation of the said law.[4]
During the arraignment for both cases, Manlangit pleaded not guilty. Afterwards, the
cases were tried jointly.
At the trial of the case, the prosecution adduced evidence as follows:
On November 24, 2003, the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Cluster 4
office received information from an informant that a certain "Negro" was selling
prohibited drugs along Col. Santos Street at Brgy. South Cembo, Makati City. The
MADAC thereafter coordinated with the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task
Force (AIDSTOF) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to conduct a joint
MADAC-police buy-bust operation. A team was assembled composed of several
members of the different offices, among which Police Officer 2 Virginio Costa was
designated as the team leader, with MADAC operative Wilfredo Serrano as the
poseur-buyer and Roberto Bayona as his back-up. The team prepared buy-bust
money for the operation, marking two (2) one hundred peso (PhP 100) bills with the
initials "AAM."
Upon arrival on Col. Santos Street, Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, the team spotted
Manlangit standing in front of his house. The informant approached Manlangit and
convinced the latter that Serrano wanted to purchase shabu from him. Manlangit
asked Serrano how much shabu he wanted, to which Serrano replied
that he wanted two hundred pesos (PhP 200) worth of shabu. Manlangit went
inside his house and later reappeared with a plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance. Manlangit handed over the plastic sachet to Serrano who, in
turn, gave Manlangit the marked money. Then Serrano gave the pre-arranged signal
of lighting a cigarette to indicate to the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation
had been consummated. Thus, the rest of the team approached Manlangit and
proceeded to arrest him while informing him of constitutional rights and the reason
for his arrest. The marked money was recovered from Manlangit's pocket. The
plastic sachet was then marked with the initials "FTM" and sent to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for
analysis. The PNP crime laboratory identified the white crystalline substance as
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride in Chemistry Report No. D-1190-03. Manlangit
was also brought to the PNP crime laboratory for a drug test, which yielded a positive
result for use of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.[5]
Manlangit denied that such buy-bust operation was conducted and claimed that the
recovered shabu was not from him. He claimed that he was pointed out by a certain
Eli Ballesteros to Serrano and Bayona. Thereafter, he was allegedly detained at the
Barangay Hall of Brgy. Pitogo. There, he was allegedly interrogated by Serrano as
to the location of the shabu and its proceeds, as well as the identity of the drug
pushers in the area. He also claimed that whenever he answered that he did not
know what Serrano was talking about, he was boxed in the chest. Later on, he said
that he was brought to Camp Crame for drug testing.[6]
On July 12, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 03-4735, finding accused Francisco Manlangit y

Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of
Section 5, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-sale) and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00. Said accused shall be given credit for the period of his
preventive detention.
2) In Criminal Case No. 03-4735,[7] finding accused Francisco Manlangit y

Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of
Section 15, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-use), and sentencing him to undergo
rehabilitation for at least six (6) months in a government rehabilitation
Center under the auspices of the Bureau of Correction subject to the
provisions of Article VIII, RA 9165.
It is further ordered that the plastic sachet containing shabu, subject of Criminal Case
No. 03-4735, be transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
the latter's appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[8]
From such Decision, Manlangit interposed an appeal with the CA.
In his Brief, accused-appellant Manlangit claimed that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To support such contention, accused-appellant
claimed that there was no buy-bust operation conducted. He pointed out that he was
not in the list of suspected drug pushers of MADAC or of the AIDSTOF. He further
emphasized that the buy-bust operation was conducted without first conducting a
surveillance or test buy to determine the veracity of the report made by the
informant. He assailed the fact that despite knowledge of his identity and location,
the buy-bust team failed to secure even a search warrant.
Accused-appellant also raised the issue that the buy-bust team failed to comply with
the procedure for the custody and control of seized prohibited drugs under Sec. 21 of
RA 9165. He argued that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
function was overturned by the officers' failure to follow the required procedure in the
conduct of a buy-bust operation, as well as the procedure in the proper disposition,
custody, and control of the subject specimen.
On August 28, 2009, the CA rendered the decision which affirmed the RTC's
Decision dated July 12, 2007. It ruled that contrary to accused-appellant's
contention, prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of a buy-bust
operation. The case was a valid example of a warrantless arrest, accused-appellant
having been caught in flagrante delicto. The CA further stated that accused-
appellant's unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to show that the witnesses for
the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, in this case the members of the
buy-bust team; thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. After
examining the testimonies of the witnesses, the CA found them credible and found
no reason to disturb the RTC's findings. Finally, the CA found that chain of evidence
was not broken.
Hence, the instant appeal.
In a Manifestation (In lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated February 22, 2010, accused-
appellant expressed his desire not to file a supplemental brief and reiterated the
same arguments already presented before the trial and appellate courts.
The Issues
The issues, as raised in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated September 29,
2008, are:
1. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the
prosecution's failure to prove his built beyond reasonable doubt. [9]
2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the procedure for the custody
and control of prohibited drugs was complied with.[10]
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Accused-appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt
The first paragraph of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 punishes the act of selling dangerous
drugs. It provides:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals.¾The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species
of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions. (Emphasis supplied.)
While Sec. 15, RA 9165 states:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs.¾A person apprehended or arrested, who is

found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test,
shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a
government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII
of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be
applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which
case the provisions stated therein shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)
People v. Macatingag[11] prescribed the requirements for the successful prosecution

of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as follows.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
The pieces of evidence found in the records amply demonstrate that all the elements
of the crimes charged were satisfied. The lower courts gave credence to the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies, which established the guilt of accused-appellant
for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies--particularly those
of the police officers involved, which both the RTC and the CA found credible--are
now beyond question. As the Court ruled in Aparis v. People:[12]
As to the question of credibility of the police officers who served as principal

witnesses for the prosecution, settled is the rule that prosecutions involving illegal
drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-
bust operation. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are
factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial
court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained
by the Court of Appeals, as in the present case.
Moreover, accused-appellant's defense of denial, without substantial evidence to

support it, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of the police officers'
performance of official functions. Thus, the Court ruled in People v. Llamado:[13]
In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to

the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are
police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of
motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over
appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated denial. (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to accused-appellant's challenge to the validity of the buy-bust operation,

the Court categorically stated in Quinicot v. People that a prior surveillance or test
buy is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, as long as the operatives are
accompanied by their informant, thus:
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not
affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of
conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police
authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior
surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police
operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a

trait of good police work. We have held that when time is of the essence, the police
may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the instant case, having been
accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the dangerous
drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance before
they undertook the buy-bust operation.[14] (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, accused-appellant's contention that the buy-bust team should have

procured a search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced. The
Court had the occasion to address this issue in People v. Doria:[15]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another."
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if

he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are
not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
The Court reiterated such ruling in People v. Agulay:[16]
Accused-appellant contends his arrest was illegal, making the sachets of shabu
allegedly recovered from him inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellant's claim is
devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an
entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid
"warrantless arrest," in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private person
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been

accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
Second Issue:
The chain of custody of the seized drug was unbroken
Accused-appellant contends that the arresting officers did not comply with the
requirements for the handling of seized dangerous drugs as provided for under Sec.
21(1) of RA 9165:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.¾The

shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(Emphasis supplied.)
In particular, accused-appellant argues that:
While the marking of the specimen was done in the place of incident by MADAC
operative Soriano, the inventory of the item was done at Cluster 4. There was no
photograph made of the plastic sachet in the presence of the accused, media, any
elected local official, or the DOJ representatives, in clear violation of Section 21, R.A.
No. 9165.[17]
Based on such alleged failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural
requirements of Sec. 21, RA 9165, accused-appellant posits that he should,
therefore, be acquitted. Such reasoning is flawed.
In People v. Rosialda,[18] the Court addressed the issue of chain of custody of

dangerous drugs, citing People v. Rivera, as follows:
Anent the second element, Rosialda raises the issue that there is a violation of Sec.
21, Art. II of RA 9165, particularly the requirement that the alleged dangerous drugs
seized by the apprehending officers be photographed "in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel." Rosialda argues that such failure to comply with
the provision of the law is fatal to his conviction.
This contention is untenable.

The Court made the following enlightening disquisition on this matter in People v.
Rivera:
The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs
is outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which
stipulates:
The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated
pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render
accused-appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso
added that `non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.' The same provision clearly states as well,
that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved.
This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if any, since the
defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may, this Court has
explained in People v. Del Monte that what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for
conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of
ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so
much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.
To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the

continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Here, accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of evidence. His only
contention is that the buy-bust team did not inventory and photograph the specimen
on site and in the presence of accused-appellant or his counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official.
However, as ruled by the Court in Rosialda, as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of RA
9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.
And as aptly ruled by the CA, the chain of custody in the instant case was not broken
as established by the facts proved during trial, thus:
Lastly, the contention of appellant, that the police officers failed to comply with the
provisions of paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in
the custody and disposition of the seized drugs, is untenable. Record shows that
Serrano marked the confiscated sachet of shabu in the presence of appellant at the
place of incident and was turned over properly to the investigating officer together
with the marked buy-bust money. Afterwards, the confiscated plastic sachet
suspected to be containing "shabu" was brought to the forensic chemist for
examination. Likewise, the members of the buy-bust team executed their
"Pinagsanib na Salaysay sa Pag-aresto" immediately after the arrest and at the trial,
Serrano positively identified the seized drugs. Indeed, the prosecution evidence had
established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs from the buy-bust
team, to the investigating officer and to the forensic chemist. Thus, there is no doubt
that the prohibited drug presented before the court a quo was the one seized from
appellant and that indeed, he committed the crimes imputed against him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA's August 28, 2009 Decision in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-9. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in
by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Francisco P. Acosta.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 17-24. Penned by Judge Maria Cristina J. Cornejo.
[3]
Id. at 15.
[4]
Id. at 16.
[5]
Id. at 100-102.
[6]
Id. at 102.
[7]
Should be Criminal Case No. 03-4961.
[8]
[9]
Id. at 40.
[10]
Id. at 46.
[11]
G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 361-362.
[12]
G.R. No. 169195, February 17, 2010.
[13]
G.R. No. 185278, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552; citing Dimacuha v.
People, G.R. No. 143705, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 513.
[14]
G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 458, 470.
[15]
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 704.
[16]
G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 593-594.
[17]
[18]
G.R. No. 188330, August 25, 2010; citing People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347,
October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 879.
People v Umipang | P a g e | 1
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SAMMY UMIPANG

Y ABDUL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the 21 May 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA)[1] affirming the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the Pasig City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG.[2] The RTC
Decision convicted Sammy Umipang y Abdul (Umipang) for violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the CA, are quoted as follows:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling
drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust
team from the [Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special Operation Task Force (SAID-
SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in
the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2] Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and
he was given a ?500.00 marked money. The operation was coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the
length of the street while the other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. The confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing near a
store. The confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off,
the confidential informant said “Sam, pa-iskor kami.” Sam replied “Magkano ang
iiskorin nyo?” The confidential informant said “Five hundred pesos.” Sam took out
three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price
tags–500, 300, and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked
P500.00 to Sam who received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as the pre-
arranged signal that the sale had been consummated. Sensing danger, Sam
attempted to flee but PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and arrested Sam. In a few
seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team [comprised of their team leader, Police Senior
Inspector (PS/INSP.) Obong, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Mendiola, PO3 Hajan,
PO3 Maglana, PO3 Salem, and PO1 Ragos] joined them. PO1 Ragos handcuffed
Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance
were recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials “SAU”
[which stood for Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial,
of accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where he was
booked, investigated and identified as accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul.
PO2 Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the crime laboratory for testing. The
specimens all tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly
known as “shabu,” a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and his brother
Nash Rudin Umipang. According to them:
In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping, accused-appellant and his
family were awakened by loud knocking on the door. The persons outside shouted
“Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo ang pinto kung hindi gigibain namin ito.” Accused-
appellant obliged and opened the door. Five (5) policemen barged into his house
and pointed a gun at him. Against his will and amid the screams of his wife, accused-
appellant was brought to a waiting vehicle and brought to the police headquarters. At
the Taguig Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him P100,000.00 for his
release. He denied the charges and that the alleged evidence were all “planted” by
the police.[3]
Consequently, the following charges were brought against Umipang:
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
sell deliver and give away to poseur buyer PO2 Ruchyl Gasid, one heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, which
substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also
known as “shabu” a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of P500.00, in
violation of the above-cited law.
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
possess and have in his custody and control five (5) heat sealed transparent plastic
sachets, each containing 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.04 gram and 0.04
gram with a total weight of 0.23 gram of white crystalline substance, which
substances were found positive to the tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
also known as “shabu” a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
RTC Ruling
In its 24 July 2007 Joint Decision, the Pasig City RTC found accused-appellant guilty
of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals) and Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article
II of R.A. 9165. The RTC gave more weight to the testimonies of the arresting
officers on how they conducted the buy-bust operation than to accused-appellant’s
claim of frame-up by the police. Thus, for violating Section 5 (Criminal Case No.
14935-D-TG), Umipang was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000. For violating Section 11 (Criminal Case No. 14936-D-TG), he was
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years one (1) day as maximum and to
pay a fine of P300,000.
CA Ruling
In its 21 May 2009 Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision
of the RTC. According to the appellate court, the elements necessary for the
prosecution of the illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs were present and
established. Thus, it no longer disturbed the RTC’s assessment of the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. Furthermore, the CA found that there was no showing of
improper motive on the part of the police officers. With the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties, it ruled against the denials of accused-appellant,
and his defense of frame-up.
We have consistently declared that a review of the factual findings of the lower
courts is not a function that is normally undertaken in appeals before this Court.
However, after a careful scrutiny of the CA Decision, we find it proper to reevaluate
the factual issues surrounding the present case, especially since it is not clear from
the Decision whether the proper implementation of the strict procedural safeguards
laid down in R.A. 9165 was established.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the testimonial evidence of
the prosecution witnesses were sufficient to convict accused-appellant of the alleged
sale and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which are violations
under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. 9165.
Discussion
Accused-appellant argues[4] that since there were two versions presented during trial
– one, that of the prosecution; and the other, that of the accused – the latter version
must be adopted, because the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties should not take precedence over the presumption of innocence of the
accused. He also contends that a surveillance of just 30 minutes was insufficient to
establish that Umipang was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Lastly, accused-
appellant claims that the fact of possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was
not clearly established, and that the evidence allegedly confiscated from him was
merely planted.[5] Alluding to the testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points out that the
former did not see him holding the drugs, and that the sachet was shown only to
PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation
of the RTC Joint Decision in all respects, as it was decided in accord with law and
evidence.[6] The OSG argues[7] that the necessary elements to convict a person
under Sections 5 and 11 were proven beyond reasonable doubt. It then contends
that, absent independent proof and substantiated evidence to the contrary, accused-
appellant’s bare-faced denial should be deemed merely as a self-serving statement
that does not hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no evidence of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against
accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and credence.
Substantive law requires strict observance

of the procedural safeguards outlined in
R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation
conducted by the SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our pronouncement in People v.
Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has
been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise
conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant
downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is
susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion. In People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that “by the very nature of
anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin
can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus,
courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.” Accordingly, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody
of drugs have been laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly
follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have
been followed in proving the elements of the defined offense.[8] (Emphasis supplied
and citations omitted.)
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards[9] that are
applicable in cases of buy-bust operations:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment,
the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be

done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within
twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That
when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be

examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72)
hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the
PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction
or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and
any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner
of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the
offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the
Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided,
further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is
retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or
burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in
the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over
the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a
minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed
to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence
shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or
accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to
the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual
burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall
appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former; x x x.
Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86 of R.A.

9165, which requires the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine National
Police (PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to maintain close coordination with
PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related operations:
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal
Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and
the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws:
Provided, however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI,
PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the
provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any
of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further,
That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the 2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (IRR) set the
following procedure for maintaining close coordination:
SECTION 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal
Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. — x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies — The PDEA

shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and
other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in
support of the PDEA: Provided, that the said agencies shall, as far as practicable,
coordinate with the PDEA prior to anti-drug operations; Provided, further, that, in any
case, said agencies shall inform the PDEA of their anti-drug operations within
twenty-four (24) hours from the time of the actual custody of the suspects or
seizure of said drugs and substances, as well as paraphernalia and transport
equipment used in illegal activities involving such drugs and/or substances,
and shall regularly update the PDEA on the status of the cases involving the
said anti-drug operations; Provided, furthermore, that raids, seizures, and other
anti-drug operations conducted by the PNP, the NBI, and other law enforcement
agencies prior to the approval of this IRR shall be valid and authorized; Provided,
finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement
personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive procedural
safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully before giving full credit
to the testimonies of those who conducted the operations. Although we have ruled in
the past that mere procedural lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not
ipso facto fatal to the prosecution’s cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items have been preserved,[10] courts must still thoroughly
evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural
lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of
the safeguards drawn by the law. Consequently, Section 21(a) of the IRR provides
for a saving clause in the procedures outlined under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165,
which serves as a guide in ascertaining those procedural aspects that may be
relaxed under justifiable grounds, viz:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered

Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — x x
x:
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements

under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
We have reiterated that “this saving clause applies only where the prosecution
recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable
grounds” after which, “the prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized have been preserved.”[11] To repeat, noncompliance
with the required procedure will not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused
if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.[12]
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official

duties of law enforcers,[13] we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under
R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety
precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the
penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. In People v. Coreche,[14] we explained
thus:
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with
evidence found legislative expression in Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on the inventory
of seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered
requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of inventory by imposing on the
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs the duty to
“immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof”. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, in a line of cases,[15] we have lain emphasis on the importance of

complying with the prescribed procedure. Stringent compliance is justified under the
rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and liberally in
favor of the accused.[16] Otherwise, “the procedure set out in the law will be mere lip
service.”[17]
Material irregularities in the conduct

of the buy-bust operations
In the recent case of People v. Relato, we reiterated the following:
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride

prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy
burden of proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation
to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic
duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the
State does not establish the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject
of the prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of
the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the
prohibited substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the
case for the State less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato deserves exculpation, especially
as we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in the face of the
weakness of the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt.[18] (Emphasis supplied and citations
omitted.)
The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which raises
doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
from accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items.
According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the complete name,
including the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order to mark the confiscated
sachets. The marking was done immediately after Umipang was handcuffed.
However, a careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal that his prior
knowledge of the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the latter’s full
name, was not clearly established. Thus, doubt arises as to when the plastic sachets
were actually marked, as shown by PO2 Gasid’s testimony:
A [PO2 Gasid]: We conducted a buy-bust operation on April 1, 2006.

PROSEC. Against whom did you conduct this buy-bust operation?
SANTOS:
A: Against alias Sam, sir.
PROSEC. What prompted you to conduct this operation against this alias
SANTOS: Sam?
A: We received information from our confidential informant that one
alias Sam is selling shabu at Cagayan De Oro Street, Maharlika
Village, Taguig.
PROSEC. Aside from this information that you received from your
SANTOS: informant, was there anything more that your informant told
you about the real identity of this alias Sam?
A: Nothing more, sir, he gave us only his alias, sir.[19]
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. So, after you have taken the item and paid alias Sam and then you
SANTOS: executed the pre-arranged signal that you have already purchased
from him, what happened then?
A: After I made the pre-arranged signal, mabilis po yung mata ni alias
Sam, para ho bang balisa, siguro napansin nya na hindi lang kami
dalawa (2), aakma syang tatakbo, sinunggaban ko na po sya.
PROSEC. So, you held Sam already during that time?

SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. What happened after that?

SANTOS:
A: I introduced myself as police officer and at that time I arrested him.
PROSEC. What about your companions who serves [sic] as your immediate
SANTOS: back up, what happened to them when you were already hold and
arrested [sic] this alias Sam?
A: I noticed my companions approaching us.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. And what did your colleague Ragos do when he arrived at your
SANTOS: place?
A: When he arrived at the place, after arresting alias Sam, he was the
one who handcuffed him.
PROSEC. Was there anything more that was done in that place of occurrence
SANTOS: during that time, Officer?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. Tell us please?

SANTOS:
A: After arresting alias Sam, I frisk [sic] him for the remaining items he
showed me and the buy-bust money I gave him.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. Was there anything that you and your team did in the items that you
SANTOS: confiscated from the possession of the accused during that time
and the shabu that you bought from him?
A: I marked the items I confiscated at the place of incident.
PROSEC. How did you marked [sic] the item that you bought from this
SANTOS: alias Sam?
A: SAU, sir.
PROSEC. And what does that stand for? That SAU?

SANTOS:
A: Stands for the initials of alias Sam.
PROSEC. Is that the only thing that you placed on the plastic sachet
SANTOS: containing the shabu that you bought from this alias Sam during
that time?
A: I marked the shabu I bought as SAU-1.
PROSEC. How about the other five (5) plastic sachets containing the
SANTOS: suspected shabu, what happened to that?
A: I marked them as SAU-2, SAU-3, SAU-4, SAU-5 and SAU-6.[20]
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. Now, after you have marked and inventoried the items that you
SANTOS: bought and confiscated from this alias Sam during that time, what
else happened?
A: After the inventory of the evidences, I turn [sic] them over to
the investigator.
PROSEC. Where did you turn these items to your investigator?

SANTOS:
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. Who was your investigator during that time?

SANTOS:
A: PO1 Alexander Saez, sir.
PROSEC. When you turn these items to your investigator, where were you?
SANTOS:
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. What happened to these items that you turn it over [sic] to your
SANTOS: investigator?
A: He made a request for laboratory examination of the items

confiscated.[21]
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. Now, Officer, this Sam when you have already arrested him,
SANTOS: were you able to know his real name?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. What was his real name?

SANTOS:
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.
PROSEC. Is he present here in Court?

SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.[22]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. When you arrived at the place, by the way, where was your target
HERNANDEZ: area, Mr. Witness?
A: Cagayan De Oro Street, Barangay Maharlika, Taguig City.
ATTY. When you were there, you did not buy [sic] anybody to buy shabu
HERNANDEZ: from the accused?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. So, you did not conduct any test buy?

HERNANDEZ:
A: No, sir.
ATTY. Nor did you make any inquiry with Cagayan De Oro Street
HERNANDEZ: regarding the accused?
A: Not anymore, sir.
ATTY. At that moment, you don’t have any idea regarding the identity
HERNANDEZ: of the accused and also whether he was engaged in illegal
activity?
A: Regarding the identity, he was described by the informant.
ATTY. It was only the informant who knows the accused?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And also your other members, they did not know the accused?
HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.[23] (Emphasis supplied.)
A clearer picture of what transpired during the buy-bust operation, from the marking
of the confiscated items to the arrest of accused-appellant, is provided by the
testimony of PO1 Ragos:
PROSEC. And what is the effect to you of the act of Gasid taking off his cap?
SANTOS:
A: That is the sign that he already bought the shabu.
PROSEC. When you saw Gasid acting that way, being the back up of him
SANTOS: during that time, what did you do?
A: I run [sic] towards them.
PROSEC. Were you able to go near him when you run [sic] towards him?
SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. What happened?

SANTOS:
A: I saw him holding Sam.
PROSEC. When you saw Gasid already holding Sam, what did you do?
SANTOS:
A: I handcuffed Sam.
PROSEC. After that, what happened?

SANTOS:
A: The items confiscated by Gasid were marked with his initials.
PROSEC. Did you see Gasid marking those things that he took from this Sam
SANTOS: during that time?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. What marked [sic] did he put on these plastic sachets?

SANTOS:
A: SAU, sir.
PROSEC. Do you know what SAU connotes?

SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. Tell us?

SANTOS:
A: Sammy Abdul Umipang.
PROSEC. After that, what happened?

SANTOS:
A: He was apprising [sic] of his constitutional rights.
PROSEC. After this person was apprised of his rights, was there
SANTOS: anything more that was done?
A: We went back to the office.
PROSEC. All the members of the team went back to the office?
SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. And together with this alias Sam?

SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. What happened in your office?

SANTOS:
A: We turn [sic] over the evidence to the investigator.
PROSEC. Who was your investigator during that time?

SANTOS:
A: PO1 Saez.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. So, after the team has turn [sic] over the evidences to your
SANTOS: investigator in the person of Officer Saez, was there anything more
that transpired in relation to this event, this incident?
A: We prepared an affidavit of arrest.[24]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. And this information regarding the accused was relayed to you by
HERNANDEZ: your immediate superior?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And this information was the first information regarding the
HERNANDEZ: accused, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. What was told you was that your target person was alias Sam?
HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. No photographs of alias Sam was shown to you?

HERNANDEZ:
A: None, sir.
ATTY. You have no derogatory records of this alias Sam in your

HERNANDEZ: office?
A: None, sir.
ATTY. You have no warrant of arrest?

HERNANDEZ:
A: None, sir.
ATTY. This alias Sam was not included in your watch list?
HERNANDEZ:
A: No, sir.[25]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. So, the markings were placed on the plastic sachets?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. After that Mr. Witness, you brought the accused together with
HERNANDEZ: the items to your office?
PROSEC. Already answered, Your Honor. We are just repeating the same
SANTOS: pattern, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. Mr. Witness, you investigated the accused?

HERNANDEZ:
A: No more, it was PO1 Saez who investigated the accused.
ATTY. So, you did not ask the full name of the accused?
HERNANDEZ:
A: It was PO1 Saez who investigated him, sir.
ATTY. It was PO1 Saez who got his full name and on you [sic] part,
HERNANDEZ: that was the first time that you were able to learned [sic] the
full name of the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. Because you knew him only as alias Sam?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. How about Officer Gasid, it was also the first time that he
HERNANDEZ: learned the full name of the accused?
A: Maybe not, sir.
ATTY. Mr. Witness, you mentioned that it was Officer Saez who delivered
HERNANDEZ: the items to the crime lab?
A: No sir, it was Gasid.
ATTY. But you were not with him when he delivered the specimen to the
HERNANDEZ: crime laboratory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. No further question, Your Honor.

HERNANDEZ:
PROSEC. No re-direct, Your Honor. x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied.)
SANTOS:
The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized items are suspect. From
their testimonies during the trial, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos both admitted that they
only knew their target by the name “Sam.” They both testified that, after accused-
appellant was handcuffed, frisked, and read his rights, they immediately brought him
to the police precinct. They then said that it was a certain PO1 Saez who
investigated him. In fact, in their joint affidavit, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos stated
thus:
Na dinala namin siya [accused] sa aming opisina para sa pagsisiyasat at

pagtatanong tungkol sa detalye ng kaniyang pagkatao at sa layuning
masampahan ng kaukulang reklamo sa paglabag ng Section 5 and 11 of RA
9165.[27] (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge of the
complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which enabled the
former to mark the seized items with the latter’s complete initials. This suspicious,
material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises questions as to how PO2
Gasid came to know about the initials of Umipang prior to the latter’s statements at
the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of where the
marking really took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items were preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who
asked accused-appellant about the latter’s personal circumstances, including his true
identity, and that the questioning happened when accused-appellant was already at
the police station. We thus reiterate:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves
to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting”,
or contamination of evidence.
Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure
of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable
doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the doctrinal
fallback of every drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v.
Casimiro, we held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were
seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting
acquittal on reasonable doubt. These rulings are refinements of our holdings in
People v. Mapa and People v. Dismuke that doubts on the authenticity of the
drug specimen occasioned by the prosecution’s failure to prove that the
evidence submitted for chemical analysis is the same as the one seized from
the accused suffice to warrant acquittal on reasonable doubt.[28] (Emphasis
supplied and citations omitted.)
It is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place
of arrest does not by itself impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the
confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.[29] We have already clarified that the
marking upon “immediate” confiscation of the prohibited items contemplates even
that which was done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team.[30] We will analyze this possible seed of doubt that has been planted by the
unexplained marking of the shabu with the complete initials of Umipang, together
with the other alleged irregularities.
Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek the
third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the
law, the inventory and photographing of seized items must be conducted in the
presence of a representative from the media, from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and from any elected public official. The testimony of PO2 Gasid, as quoted below, is
enlightening:
ATTY. Mr. Witness, you also made the certificate of inventory, is that
HERNANDEZ: correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And since this is a drug operation, you are required by law to make a
HERNANDEZ: certificate of inventory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And that inventory, you are required by law that there should be a
HERNANDEZ: signature of any representative from the media, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And also representative from the Department of Justice, is that

HERNANDEZ: correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And also elected official, Mr. Witness?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. I’m showing to you Mr. Witness your certificate of inventory, do you
HERNANDEZ: confirm that there are no signatures placed by any member of
the media, representative from the Department of Justice and
any elected official?
A: Yes, sir, there is none, sir.
ATTY. And there appears to be an initial of RS above the type written name
HERNANDEZ: Sammy Umipang, who wrote this initial RS?
A: That stands for refuse [sic] to sign, sir.
ATTY. Who refuse [sic] to sign?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.[31]
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. Why was the certificate of inventory not witnesses [sic] and
SANTOS: signed by any members of the media, the DOJ and elected
officials, Officer?
A: That time there is no available representative, sir.
COURT: How did you exert effort to locate available representative of

those officers or persons in the certificate of inventory?
A: The investigator contacted representative from the media, Your
Honor.
COURT: What barangay this incident happened?

A: Barangay Maharlika, Your Honor.
COURT: Did you talk to the barangay captain?

A: No, Your Honor.
COURT: What about the barangay councilman?

A: No, Your Honor.[32] (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the
marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF
did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the
barangay council. There is no indication that they contacted other elected public
officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch
with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable
reason for failing to do so – especially considering that it had sufficient time from the
moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the time of his
arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the
apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section
21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable –
without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to
look for other representatives, given the circumstances – is to be regarded as a
flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to
establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165,[33] or that there was a justifiable
ground for failing to do so.[34]
Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to
take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed
out by the defense during trial,[35] the Certificate of Inventory did not contain any
signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the arresting officer who prepared the
certificate[36] – thus making the certificate defective. Also, the prosecution neither
submitted any photograph of the seized items nor offered any reason for failing to do
so. We reiterate that these requirements are specifically outlined in and required to
be implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.[37]
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted. [38] This is
especially true when the lapses in procedure were “recognized and explained in
terms of [] justifiable grounds.”[39] There must also be a showing “that the police
officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable
consideration/reason.”[40] However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural
safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is
generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence.[41] This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic,
or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an
irregularity in the performance of official duties.[42] As a result, the prosecution is
deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating
reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.[43]
For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude
from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting
officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses
effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti,
especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we
must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, “as every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”[44]
As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities “to exert
greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our
lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society.” [45] The
need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing the evidence of the
prosecution – especially when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust
operation – “redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by protecting civil
liberties and at the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors.”[46]
WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24 July 2007
RTC Joint Decision is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is

hereby ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No.
14936-D-TG on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from
custody, unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
The Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02898 was penned by CA Associate Justice
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
and Arturo G. Tayag.
[2]
The Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 14935-D-TG and 14936-D-TG was
penned by Judge Florito S. Macalino.
[3]
CA Decision at 4-5, rollo, pp. 5-6.
[4]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant at 9-12 (People v. Umipang, CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
02898, decided on 21 May 2009), CA rollo, pp. 47-50. In our 5 April 2010 Resolution,
this Court noted the Manifestation of accused-appellant that he is adopting his 13
December 2007 Brief for the Accused-Appellant filed with the CA as his
supplemental brief (rollo, p. 51).
[5]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant at 11 (People v. Umipang, CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
02898, decided on 21 May 2009), CA rollo, p. 49.
[6]
Brief for the Appellee at 19 (People v. Umipang, CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02898,
decided on 21 May 2009), CA rollo, p. 97. In our 5 April 2010 Resolution, this Court
noted the Manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General that it is no longer filing
a supplemental brief, as it has already exhaustively discussed all the issues in its 22
April 2008 Brief for the Appellee (rollo, p. 51).
[7]
Brief for the Appellee at 8-19 (People v. Umipang, CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02898,
decided on 21 May 2009), CA rollo, pp. 86-97.
[8]
[9]
Id.
[10]
Imson v. People, G.R. 193003, 13 July 2011, 653 SCRA 826.
[11]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8, at 272-273.
[12]
People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, 29 October 2008, 570 SCRA 273.
[13]
Imson v. People, supra note 10.
[14]
G.R. No. 182528, 14 August 2009, 596 SCRA 350, fn. 16 at 358-359.
[15]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8 (citing People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 174771, 11
September 2007, 532 SCRA 630; People v. Santos, G.R. No. 175593, 17 October
2007, 536 SCRA 489; People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 181545, 8 October 2008, 568
SCRA 273; and People v. De la Cruz, supra note 12).
[16]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8 (citing People v. De la Cruz, supra note 12).
[17]
People v. Martin, G.R. No. 193234, 19 October 2011.
[18]
G.R. No. 173794, 18 January 2012.
[19]
Direct examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, TSN, 22 November 2006, p. 4, RTC
records, p. 90.
[20]
Id. at 16-19, RTC records, pp. 102-105.
[21]
Id. at 20, RTC records, p. 106.
[22]
Id. at 25, RTC records, p. 111.
[23]
Cross-examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, id. at 32-33, RTC records, pp. 118-
119.
[24]
Direct examination of Witness PO1 Ragos, TSN, 6 December 2006, pp. 15-17,
RTC records, pp. 151-153.
[25]
Cross-examination of Witness PO1 Ragos, id. at 21-22, RTC records, pp. 157-
158.
[26]
Id. at 30-32, RTC records, pp. 166-168.
[27]
Pinagsamang Salaysay ng Pag-Aresto at Paghaharap ng Reklamo o Demanda,
RTC records, p. 69.
[28]
Supra note 14, at 357-358.
[29]
Imson v. People, supra note 10.
[30]
Id.
[31]
Cross-examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, supra note 19 at 47-48, RTC records,
pp. 133-134.
[32]
Re-direct examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, id. at 49, RTC records, pp. 135.
[33]
See People v. Garcia, supra note 8.
[34]
See People v. De la Cruz, supra note 12.
[35]
Cross-examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, supra note 19 at 47, RTC records, p.
133.
[36]
RTC records, p. 73.
[37]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8; People v. De la Cruz, supra note 12.
[38]
People v. Ulama, G.R. No. 186530, 14 December 2011.
[39]
People v. Martin, supra note 17.
[40]
Id.
[41]
See People v. Garcia, supra note 8.
[42]
See id.
[43]
Id.
[44]
People v. De la Cruz, supra note 12, at 286.
[45]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8, at 278.
[46]
People v. Coreche, supra note 14, at 365.
People v Martinez | P a g e | 1
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARNOLD

MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y
CAROLINO, AND RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-
0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During
Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
The Facts
The Information indicting the accused reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ
y CAROLINO, ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN,
without authority of law, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess
dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled
aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) person[s].
Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.[3]

As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard

Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady
Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it appears that on
September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 o'clock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on
duty at the Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when
a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was going
on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
(PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team
hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the
house of Gonzales was located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria
(Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house,
they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon),
and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the
presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu
residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the
room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime
Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination
on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum
foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test and,
except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez,
claimed that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along
Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper
who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the materials
for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for
Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person
pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven
policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to
the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged
with sniffing shabu.
The Ruling of the RTC
The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y
Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings defined and penalized under Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost
of suit.
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed
of in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1
Azardon, without any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of
denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused were held to have been in
constructive possession of the subject items. A conspiracy was also found present
as there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as
to the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further
held that although the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of evidence
prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was
of the view that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was
not sufficiently controverted by the accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying
for the reversal of the subject decision, presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez
1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants to be

having a pot session at the time of their arrest;
2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the
police to plant the shabu paraphernalia to justify the arrest
of the accused-appellants without warrant;
3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti
has not been sufficiently established;
4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated

testimony of PO1 Azardon insufficient to convict the
accused-appellants of the crime charged;
5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-

appellants.
For accused Rafael Gonzales

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE
CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that
the evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to
be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established.
Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to
raise such issue before arraignment.[5] However, this waiver is limited only to the
arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.[6]
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused,
it has been held that this Court has the power to correct any error, even if
unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just decision, [7] especially when the
transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.[8] While it is true that rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Time and again,
this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools
intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities
should never be used to defeat substantive rights.[9] Thus, despite the procedural
lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in the
case at bench. The clear infringement of the accused's right to be protected against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into
the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. [10] Sec. 2,
Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all

searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following
instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant -- (i) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest;[11] (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a
moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and
frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.[12]
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be
considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a
warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject
items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1
Azardon and his Joint Affidavit[13] with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and
entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned
citizen that a pot session was going on in said house, to wit:
Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell
you how many persons were actually conducting the pot session?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not
armed with a search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did
not know personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing
pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report to you placed
in the police blotter before you proceeded to the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity
of the person who told you that he was allegedly informed that there was an
ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he
does not want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.
Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing
pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately
formed a group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you
could not see what is happening inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet
of shabu on the table while you were outside the premises of the property
of Rafael Gonzales?
xxx
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
COURT:
Answer.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told
you that he was informed by another person that there was an ongoing pot
session going on inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales and you arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.[14]
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b),
on the other hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be present
in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.[15]
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases [16] that tipped
information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search, [17] such rulings
cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust
operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an
informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers
entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an
informer's tip. The case of People v. Bolasa[18] is informative on this matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a
woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately
proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked towards the house
accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house, they peeped inside
through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking marijuana. They then
entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug
paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any
of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-
appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime.
Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was
committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-
appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have
escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no
valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested.
Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not
inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the
window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside
the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving
vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it
cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at
hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted
first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected
culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining
the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have
secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest
being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence
thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants;
hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.[19]
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual
facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [20]
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter
the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b),
the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an offense. As
admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen
who himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the
police:
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused
was based on a tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?

A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in
the house of one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the
information originated but from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going
on? [No Answer]
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot
session was going on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was
going on somewhere in Arellano but you don't know the exact place where
the pot session was going on?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of the

alleged pot session because he claimed that he derived that information
from somebody else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing
pot session, sir.
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?

A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot
session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant don't [sic] know physically what was really
happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there,
sir.[21] [Emphasis supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements
of plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[22]
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally
entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered
the accused with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa
was held to be insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the
warrantless search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be
considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a
customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering

that the identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a
search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The
arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal.
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is
deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded.[23] The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible.
The drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.
As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges
have glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are
able to present the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed
rights in the name of law enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law
fosters the breakdown of our system of justice and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to
uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law.[24]
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the
accused would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with
the chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with
moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities
having failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous
Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board
Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the
confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items taken,
no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to give
them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled from the time of
confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for testing.
Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing reasonable doubt as
to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor was
not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i)
the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not
authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
dangerous drug.[25] Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous
drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the
proximate company of at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to
establish the existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently
established. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts
regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and
tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the
forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[26] Malillin v. People was the first in a
growing number of cases to explain the importance of chain of custody in dangerous
drugs cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.[27]
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,[28] defines chain of custody as
follows:
b."Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and
time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and
used in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the
protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
dangerous drugs controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of
seized or confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their identity
and integrity, as follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a
supervising officer, who would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory
for testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a
number of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the
suspect to place his marking on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably
with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic
container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and the
procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal
the same. In this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the
same condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory
technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he should
put his own mark on the plastic container and seal it again with a new seal since the
police officer's seal has been broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe
the sealed condition of the plastic container when it was handed to him and testify on
the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would
have to present every police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage
personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one's possession has
been. Each of them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not
been tampered with or substituted while in his care.[29]
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
further elaborates, and provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure:
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the

integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not

necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, provided
that (i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In this case, however,
no justifiable ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a failure to
properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure
the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in
court. A review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary
records of the case reveals irreparably broken links in the chain of custody.
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following
were confiscated from the accused, to wit:
a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residues.
b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs
colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white ).
c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.[30]

[Emphases supplied]
At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were
indorsed to Duty Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1
Urbano) for proper disposition.[31] A letter-request for laboratory examination was
prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the following items:
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-1."
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-2."
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A-
3."[32]
[Emphases supplied]
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. Maranion

by SPO3 Froilan Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L
listed the specimens which were submitted for testing, to wit:
SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:
A - A1 to A115 - One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with tag
each containing suspected shabu residue without markings.
B - B1 to B11 - Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing
suspected shabu residue without markings.
C - C1 to C49 - Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing
suspected shabu residue without markings.[33]
[Emphases supplied]
Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a
Confiscation Receipt was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:
DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006
CONFISCATION RECEIPT
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we

together with our precinct supervisor, SPO4 Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members
composed of SPO1 Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and
PO1 Aldrin Guarin apprehended the following names of persons of ARNOLD
MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married, jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this
city; EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471
Lucao Dist., this city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney
driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old,
married, businessman, resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui, Pangasinan and RAFAEL
GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs old, separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad
Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.
Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to
Dagupan City Police Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty
Desk Officer to record the incident and the sachet of suspected Shabu
Paraphernalias were brought to PNP Crime Laboratory, Lingayen, Pangasinan for
Laboratory Examination.
Seizing Officer:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro Dela
Cruz
Affiant Affiant
Remarks:
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed[34]
[Emphases supplied]
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil,
and 27 (of the 49) pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as
identified in the Final Chemistry Report, were presented in court and marked as
Exhibits "H" and series, "I" and series, and "J" and series, respectively. Said items
were identified by PO1 Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.[35]
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were
properly preserved as there was sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized
from the accused were the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for
laboratory examination.
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After
seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory was conducted in
the presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was
prepared, signed, and provided to the accused in the manner required by law. PO1
Azardon, in his testimony,[36] admitted that no photographs were taken. The only
discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure was that the situation happened so suddenly. Thus:
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately
formed a group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place
of Rafael Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.
Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken,
is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[37]
[Emphasis supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance.
The suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-compliance with the
requirements. The police officers were not prevented from preparing an inventory
and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides
specifically that in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and photographs shall
be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the situation may have had should
have dissipated by the time they reached the police station, as the suspects had
already been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been held that in case
of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending officer from immediately
conducting the physical inventory and photography of the items at their place of
seizure, as it is more in keeping with the law's intent to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value.[38]
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases are People v. Garcia,[39]
People v. Dela Cruz,[40] People v. Dela Cruz,[41] People v. Santos, Jr.,[42] People v.
Nazareno,[43] People v. Orteza,[44] Zarraga v. People,[45] and People v. Kimura.[46]
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez
is instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify
is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that
the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory
and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that
the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1)
in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from

harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations
of robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. x x x
Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag
unless the type and quantity of the seized items require a different type of handling
and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by the
handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of custody. [47]
[Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela
Cruz does it appear that the subject items were at all marked. It was only in the
letter-request for laboratory examination that the subject items were indicated to
have been marked with "DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and "DC&A-3." There is no showing,
however, as to who made those markings and when they were made. Moreover,
those purported markings were never mentioned when the subject items were
identified by the prosecution witnesses when they took the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets,
rolled and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to
any individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry
Report[48] that the precise number of each type of item was indicated and
enumerated. The Court notes that in all documents prior to said report, the subject
items were never accurately quantified but only described as "pieces," [49] "several
pcs,"[50] and "shabu paraphernallas."[51] Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates
that all the subject items had "no markings," although each item was reported to
have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the course of processing the subject items
during laboratory examination and testing.[52] Doubt, therefore, arises as to the
identity of the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty that the
subject items seized from the accused were the same ones subjected to the
laboratory examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of
seized items in dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v. People,[53] People v.
Kimura,[54] and People v. Laxa.[55]
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below
gives rise to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the seizure of
the items, it was prepared only three days after. More important, the receipt did not
even indicate exactly what items were confiscated and their quantity. These are
basic information that a confiscation receipt should provide. The only information
contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of the accused and the
general description of the subject items as "the sachet of suspected Shabu
paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory." The receipt is made
even more dubious by PO1 Azardon's admission in his testimony[56] that he did not
personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did not know exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification[57] issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the
subject items were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for
proper disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp.
Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and when the subject items were
transferred from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No
witness testified on how the subject items were kept after they were tested prior to
their presentation in court. This Court has highlighted similar shortcomings in People
v. Cervantes,[58] People v. Garcia,[59] People v. Sanchez,[60] and Malillin v. People.[61]
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to
PO1 Azardon's testimony[62] that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at
the police station, the Letter[63] to the Executive Director of the DDB states that the
apprehending officers were tipped off "while conducting monitoring/surveillance."
Said letter also indicates, as does the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and
seizure occurred on September 4, 2006, and not September 2, 2006, as alleged in
the Information. It was also mentioned in the aforementioned Certification of the
Dagupan Police and Joint Affidavit of the police officers that a glass tube suspected
to contain shabu residue was also confiscated from the accused. Interestingly, no
glass tube was submitted for laboratory examination.
In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the
prosecution's position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items
were properly preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the
Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been
shown to be grossly insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The
corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential
before the accused can be found guilty.[64]
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of
R.A. No. 9165, in People v. Sta. Maria,[65] this Court held that said section was silent
as to the consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be interpreted as
a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal, nor
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only
in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the investigation and
prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still
possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs
cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.
Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not
affect the admissibility of the evidence but only its weight.[66] Thus, had the subject
items in this case been admissible, their evidentiary merit and probative value would
be insufficient to warrant conviction.
It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should prevail. However,
such presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular
performance of duty.[67] Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, the
presumption of regularity cannot stand.
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to
be irregular. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the
presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of the
accused.[68]
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous
drugs cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search
and seizure procedure under the law.[69] Some bona fide arrests and seizures in
dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused because drug
enforcement operatives compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized
items. It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement agencies to exert greater
effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling
of seized drugs.
It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165
may not always be possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not
necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in procedure must be recognized, addressed
and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.[70]
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 [71]
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 [72] (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A.
No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes
the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the
presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form
of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not
incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under
Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that
there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The minimum
penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is
imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first
time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government
center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate
the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of
residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of
dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed
charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there
was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14[73] (Possession
of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs
During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum
penalty under Sec. 12[74] (Possession of Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any
person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same
section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is
prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court
thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise
proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and
solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is
positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to
be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs
should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than
mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-
NO. 03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered
ACQUITTING the accused and ordering their immediate release from detention,
unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this
decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director-
General, Philippine National Police, and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs
Enforcement Agency, for their information and guidance.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the
seized items to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Abad, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-14. Penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. with Associate
Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao,
concurring.
[2]
Records, pp. 140-145. Penned by Judge Emma M. Torio.
[3]
Id. at 1.
[4]
Id. at 145.
[5]
People v. Palma, G.R. No. 189279, March 9, 2010.
[6]
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010.
[7]
C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 Phil 11, 22 (2002).
[8]
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838, 849-850 (2003).
[9]
San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 345, 357-358.
[10]
People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 476, 493.
[11]
Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sec. 13.
[12]
People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 (1999).
[13]
Exhibit "E," folder of exhibits, p. 11.
[14]
TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 10-16.
[15]
People v. Ayangao, 471 Phil. 379, 388 (2004).
[16]
Id., People v. Valdez, 363 Phil. 481 (1999); People v. Montilla, 349 Phil. 640
(1998).
[17]
Id.
[18]
Supra note 13.
[19]
Supra note 13.
[20]
People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632 (1999).
[21]
TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 3-5.
[22]
Supra note 13.
[23]
People v. Valdez, 395 Phil. 206, 218 (2000).
[24]
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010; citing People v. Nuevas,
G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 484-485.
[25]
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 390-
391.
[26]
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259, 274.
[27]
G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632-633.
[28]
Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment.
[29]
G.R. No. 188900, March 5, 2010.
[30]
Exhibit "E," folder of exhibits, p. 11.
[31]
Exhibit "G," folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[32]
Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits, p. 6.
[33]
Exhibit "D," folder of exhibits, p. 10.
[34]
Exhibit "F," folder of exhibits, p. 12.
[35]
TSN, February 9, 2007, p. 6; and TSN, January 22, 2007, pp. 10-12.
[36]
TSN, February 23, 2007, p. 7.
[37]
[38]
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 218.
[39]
Supra note 27.
[40]
G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273.
[41]
[42]
[43]
G.R. No. 174771, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 630.
[44]
G.R. No. 173051, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 750.
[45]
G.R. No. 162064, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 639.
[46]
471 Phil. 895 (2004).
[47]
Supra note 38.
[48]
Exhibit "C," folder of exhibits, p. 9; Exhibit "D," folder of exhibits, p. 10.
[49]
Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits, p. 6.
[50]
Exhibit "E," folder of exhibits, p. 11; Exhibit "G," folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[51]
Exhibit "B," folder of exhibits, p. 7; Exhibit "F," folder of exhibits, p. 12.
[52]
TSN, January 22, 2007, pp. 10-12.
[53]
Supra note 46.
[54]
Supra note 47.
[55]
414 Phil. 156 (2001).
[56]
TSN, February 9, 2007, p. 7; TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 6-7.
[57]
Exhibit "G," folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[58]
G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762.
[59]
Supra note 27.
[60]
Supra note 39.
[61]
Supra note 28.
[62]
[63]
Exhibit "B," folder of exhibits, p. 7.
[64]
People v. Cacao, G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2010, 610 SCRA 636, 651.
[65]
G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 631-632.
[66]
People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 627, 637.
[67]
People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 156-
157.
[68]
People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 173477, February 26, 2010.
[69]
People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762, 784-
785, citing People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259,
277-278.
[70]
Id. at 785.
[71]
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine
(PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma
hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs

and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated
by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties
shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than
fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more
but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300)
grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than
five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu",
or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA,
TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far
beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of
marijuana.
[72]
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. - A person apprehended or arrested, who
is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall
be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government
center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable
where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of
any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the
provisions stated therein shall apply.
[73]
Section 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. -
The maximum penalty provided for in Section 12 of this Act shall be imposed upon
any person, who shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug
into the body, during parties, social gatherings or meetings, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) persons.
[74]
Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
(6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control
any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in the case of medical practitioners
and various professionals who are required to carry such equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the Board shall
prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit
or intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be
prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to
himself/herself, injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed
to have violated Section 15 of this Act.
People v Sabdula | P a g e | 1
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184758 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SONNY SABDULA y AMANDA, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the February 8, 2008 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR. H.C. No. 02726, which affirmed the January 29, 2007 decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City. The RTC decision found appellant Sonny
Sabdula y Amanda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,3 Article II
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
The trial court imposed on him the penalty of life imprisonment.
THE FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute
any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully, and unlawfully sell, dispense,
deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, 0.10 (zero point
ten) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 The prosecution presented Police
Officer (PO) 2 Bernard Centeno at the trial, while the testimonies of PO3 Joselito
Chantengco and PO1 Alan Fortea became the subject of the parties’ stipulations.
The appellant and Shirley Sabdula, on the other hand, took the witness stand for the
defense.
The evidence for the prosecution established that in the morning of February 1,
2004, a confidential informant told the members of the Central Police District (CPD)
in Baler, Quezon City about the illegal drug activities of one alias "Moneb" at a
squatter’s area in San Roque II, Quezon City. Acting on this information, operatives
of the Station Intelligence and Investigation Branch, Baler Police Station 2, CPD
formed a buy-bust team composed of PO2 Centeno (the designated poseur-buyer),
PO1 Fortea, PO2 Rolando Daduya, PO1 Victor Porte, PO1 Louise Escarlan and
PO1 Noel de Guzman.6
At around 7:00 p.m., the buy-bust team and the informant went to the target area.
When they arrived there, the informant introduced PO2 Centeno as his "kumpare" to
the appellant. PO2 Centeno asked the appellant if he could "score" two hundred
pesos worth of shabu.7 The appellant responded by taking out a plastic sachet from
his pocket, and handing it to PO2 Centeno. PO2 Centeno in turn handed P200.00 to
the appellant, and then gave the pre-arranged signal.
As the other members of the buy-bust team were rushing to the scene, PO2 Centeno
introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the appellant. Afterwards, he
frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-bust money from his right pocket.8
The police thereafter brought the appellant to the Baler Police Station 2 for
investigation. Upon arrival, PO2 Centeno gave the seized plastic sachet to SPO2
Salinel who, in turn, handed it to PO3 Chantengco who made a request for
laboratory examination that PO3 Centeno brought, together with the seized item to
the Central Police District Crime Laboratory for analysis. 9 Per Chemistry Report No.
D-140-2004 of Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (the forensic chemist), the submitted
specimen tested positive for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu).10
In his defense, the appellant testified that between 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. on January 29,
2004, he was on board a taxi at C5 Road, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, when a group
of about five (5) men pointed their guns at him and told him to get out of the vehicle.
After he alighted, the armed men told him to board a mobile car11 and brought him to
the Baler Police Station. At the station, the police asked him to remove his clothes,
and confiscated his wallet, bracelet, cap and P300.00. The police then told him that
he would be detained for drug charges and that he would be jailed for 40 years. 12
Shirley’s testimony was summarized by the RTC as follows:
x x x On February 1, 2004, she was at home when her brother was brought to
Precinct 2, Baler[,] Quezon City. On January 29, 2004, at about 11:00 p.m., she
received a text message from Allan Fortea, a policeman, telling her to call a certain
number if she loves her brother. The next day, at about 8:00 a.m., she called Fortea
at the number he gave her. He told her that his brother at Station 2 Baler Quezon
City and asked her to produce P200,000.00 as ransom for her brother. She asked
him if he could talk to him. He allowed her and her brother to talk and the latter
pleaded to her for help and cried. Fortea told her not to talk in their dialect and took
the phone. Fortea then told her to see him at SM North Edsa Car Park on January
30, 2004 at 7:00 p.m. Fortea did not come. At about 9:00 p.m., she proceeded to
Station 2 and met Fortea. He asked her about the money but she told him she
cannot afford it. Her brother was then detained when she failed to give in to the said
demand.13
The RTC, in its decision dated January 29, 2007, found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment. It also ordered the appellant to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
THE CASE BEFORE THE CA
The appellant appealed his conviction to the CA where his appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02726. In its decision of February 8, 2008, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision.
The CA held that the prosecution successfully established all the elements of illegal
sale of shabu: PO2 Centeno, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as
the person who gave him shabu weighing 0.10 gram in exchange for P200.00. The
CA also ruled that the buy-bust team were presumed to have performed their duties
regularly. It added that the appellant failed to impute improper motive on the part of
the arresting officers.
The CA further held that the chain of custody over the seized plastic sachet were
properly established, even if the time of the actual marking of the seized item had not
been shown.
THE PETITION
In his present petition,14 the petitioner claims that he was not selling drugs when the
police arrested him. He adds that his alibi was corroborated by his sister, Shirley. He
also argues that the seized plastic sachet was not properly marked by the police.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the police were presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner. It further maintains that the chain of
custody over the seized drug was not broken.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT the appellant for the prosecution’s
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We restate at the outset the constitutional mandate that an accused shall be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
burden lies with the prosecution to overcome this presumption of innocence by
presenting the required quantum evidence; the prosecution must rest on its own
merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to
meet the required evidence, the defense does not even need to present evidence in
its own behalf; the presumption prevails and the accused should be declared
acquitted.16
I. No moral certainty on the corpus delicti
A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires more than the
perfunctory presentation of evidence establishing each element of the crime, namely:
the identities of the buyer and seller, the transaction or sale of the illegal drug and
the existence of the corpus delicti.
In securing or sustaining a conviction under RA No. 9165, the intrinsic worth of these
pieces of evidence, especially the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises
from the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily
identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident
or otherwise.
Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized
drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the
same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under RA No. 9165 fails. 17
a. The ‘Marking’ Requirement vis-à-vis the Chain of Custody Rule

Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 (which implements R.A.
No. 9165) defines chain of custody as the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs
or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to the
receipt in the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping and the presentation in court for
identification and eventual destruction.
The Court explained the importance of establishing the chain of custody over the
seized drug in the recent case of People of the Philippines v. Joselito Beran y
Zapanta @ "Jose,"18 as follows:
The purpose of the requirement of proof of the chain of custody is to ensure that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug are preserved, as thus dispel
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence. To be admissible, the
prosecution must establish by records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of
the exhibit, from the time it came into the possession of the police officers, until it
was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, and all the way to the time
it was offered in evidence.
Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. "Marking" means
the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the items seized. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, this
Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the
seized drugs casts reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that
the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves
to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at
the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.19
The records in the present case do not show that the police marked the seized
plastic sachet immediately upon confiscation, or at the police station. Nowhere in the
court testimony of PO2 Centeno, or in the stipulated testimonies of PO3 Chantengco
and PO1 Fortea, did they indicate that the seized item had ever been marked.
Notably, the members of the buy-bust team did not also mention that they marked
the seized plastic sachet in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
How the apprehending team could have omitted such a basic and vital procedure in
the initial handling of the seized drugs truly baffles and alarms us. We point out that
succeeding handlers of the specimen would use the markings as reference. If at the
first or the earliest reasonably available opportunity, the apprehending team did not
mark the seized items, then there was nothing to identify it later on as it passed from
hand to hand. Due to the procedural lapse in the first link of the chain of custody,
serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the
prosecution introduced into evidence.
We are not unaware that the seized plastic sachet already bore the markings "BC
02-01-04" when it was examined by Forensic Chemist Jabonillo. In the absence,
however, of specifics on how, when and where this marking was done and who
witnessed the marking procedure, we cannot accept this marking as compliance with
the required chain of custody requirement. There was also no stipulation between
the parties regarding the circumstances surrounding this marking. We note in this
regard that it is not enough that the seized drug be marked; the marking must
likewise be made in the presence of the apprehended violator. As earlier stated, the
police did not at any time ever hint that they marked the seized drug.
In Lito Lopez v. People of the Philippines20 we acquitted the accused for failure of the
police to mark the seized drugs. The Court had a similar ruling in People of the
Philippines v. Merlita Palomares y Costuna;21 the Court acquitted the accused for the
prosecution’s failure to clearly establish the identity of the person who marked the
seized drugs; the place where marking was made; and whether the marking had
been made in the accused’s presence. These recent cases show that the Court will
not hesitate to free an accused if irregularities attended the first stage of the chain of
custody over the seized drugs.
b. The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
[Emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items; [Emphasis ours]
In the present case, no evidence was produced showing that the members of the
buy-bust team had extended reasonable efforts to comply with these requirements in
handling the evidence. The lapse is patent from the following exchanges during trial:
FISCAL ROGELIO ANTERO:
Q: x x x After the body frisk and the recovery of the buy-bust money from the person
of the accused, what happened next?
PO2 CENTENO:
A: We went to the station and turned over to the desk officer for proper disposition.
xxxx
Q: How about the pieces of evidence you recovered?
A: I also turned it over to the desk officer, sir.
Q: Who was the desk officer?
A: SPO2 Salinel, sir.

Q: What did the desk officer do with the evidence?
A: He designated the investigator. Then, the investigator made the proper request for
Crime Lab.
Q: Who was the investigator?
A: PO3 Chantengco.
xxxx
Q: Why do you know that the duty desk officer turned over the pieces of evidence to
Chantengco?
A: I was there, sir.
Q: What happened when this pieces of evidence was turned over to the investigator?
A: The investigator made the request for Crime Lab.
Q: After the request for laboratory examination of specimen was made. [W]hat
happened next?
A: We immediately brought [sic] to the Crime Lab. for examination. 22
These exchanges further show that the apprehending team never conducted an
inventory nor did they photograph the confiscated item in the presence of the
appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice, or an elective official either at the place of seizure, or at the police station.
The Joint Affidavit of the police did not also mention any inventory conducted of any
photograph taken. Corollarily, there was no certificate of inventory or inventory
receipt and photographs of the seized drugs attached to the records.
In People v. Gonzales,23 the police failed to conduct an inventory and to photograph

the seized plastic sachet. In acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt, we
explained that [t]he omission of the inventory and photographing exposed another
weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and photographing
— to be made in the presence of the accused or his representative, or within the
presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected
official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory — were
really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its IRR.24
We recognize that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165
may not always be possible. Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR, in fact, offers some
flexibility in complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., "non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause,
however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses and
thereafter cited justifiable grounds to explain them. In all cases, the prosecution must
have established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had
been preserved.25
These conditions were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the apprehending team to follow the
prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drug. We stress that the
justifiable ground for non-compliance must be adequately explained; the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
II. No Presumption of Regularity

in the Performance of Official Duties
The CA relied on the presumption that regular duties have been regularly performed
in sustaining the appellant’s conviction. This presumption of regularity, however, is
disputable; any taint of irregularity taints the performance undertaken and negates
the presumption.26 It cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.27
In the present case, the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly
seized from petitioner due to the failure of the police to mark, inventory and
photograph the seized plastic sachet effectively negated the presumption of
regularity. The procedural lapses by the police put in doubt the identity and
evidentiary value of the seized plastic sachet. Our ruling in People v. Cantalejo 28 on
this point is particularly instructive:
As a general rule, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the accused
is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have
performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is
tainted with irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence
cannot be regarded as binding truth.29
In fine, we hold that the totality of the presented evidence do not support a finding of
guilt with the certainty that criminal cases require. The procedural lapses committed
by the apprehending team show glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a
reasonable doubt on whether the shabu seized from the appellant was the same
shabu that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually
offered in court as evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drug
bought and sold, the body of the crime - the corpus delicti - has not been adequately
proven. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime
charged.1âwphi1
The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing a serious and
unrelenting campaign against illicit drugs. But we remind our law enforcers to be ever
mindful of the procedures required in the seizure, handling and safekeeping of
confiscated drugs. Observance of these procedures is necessary to dispel any doubt
of the outcome of arrests and buy-bust operations, and to avoid wasting the efforts
and the resources in the apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug
laws.30
WHEREFORE, in light of all these premises, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
February 8, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02726.
Appellant Sonny Sabdula y Amanda is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* In lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per Raffle

dated April 21, 2014.
1
Rollo, pp. 2-7; penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-
Bernabe (now a member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate
Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) and Vicente

Q. Roxas.
2
3
Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals.
4
Records, p. 1.
5
Id. at 18.
6
TSN, January 12, 2005, p. 3.
7
Id. at 4.
8
Id. at 4-5.
9
Id. at 5-6.
10
Records, p. 11.
11
TSN, March 28, 2006, pp. 3-4.
12
Id. at 5-6.
13
Supra note 2, at 18.
14
15
Id. at 56-70.
16
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570
SCRA 273, 282-283.
17
People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA
257, 267.
18
G.R. No. 203028, January 15, 2014.
19
See People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011, 655
SCRA 279, 289-290.
20
G.R. No. 188653, January 29, 2014.
21
G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014.
22
TSN, January 12, 2005, pp. 5-6.
23
G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 123,
24
Id. at 135-136.
25
See People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580
SCRA 259, 272-273.
26
See People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581
SCRA 762, 783.
27
See People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010, 616
SCRA 652, 669.
28
G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 777.
29
Id. at 788.
30
See People of the Philippines v. Rogf!lia Jardine! Pepino-Consulta,
G.R. No. 191071, August 28, 2013.
People v De la Cruz | P a g e | 1
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 185717, June 08, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GARRY DE LA

CRUZ Y DELA CRUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007
Decision[2] in Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused Garry de la Cruz y dela Cruz
(Garry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
In an Information[3] filed on June 3, 2003, accused was indicted for the crime
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th of May, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute
any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense,
deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero
two (0.02) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on July 28, 2003, accused pleaded "not guilty" to the above
charge.[4] Trial[5] on the merits ensued.
After conducting surveillance for a week, the Station Drug Enforcement Unit in La
Loma, Quezon City planned a buy-bust operation against a certain Garry who was in
the Barangay Watch List. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
On May 29, 2003, at around 9:00 a.m., the station's Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Police
Inspector Oliver Villanueva (P/Insp. Villanueva), gave a briefing on the buy-bust
operation. Police Officer 2 Edcel Ibasco (PO2 Ibasco) was designated as poseur-
buyer, while PO1 Roderick Valencia (PO1 Valencia), PO1 Alfredo Mabutol, and PO2
Ronald Pascual were assigned as back-up operatives. Their informant attended the
briefing.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Biak-na-Bato corner Mauban Streets,

Quezon City and arrived there at around 9:30 a.m. The informant introduced PO2
Ibasco to the accused, who was standing in front of a shanty, as wanting to buy
shabu. The accused asked for PhP 100, and when PO2 Ibasco paid the amount, the
former handed over to him a white crystalline substance in a plastic sachet. Upon
PO2 Ibasco's prearranged signal, the other members of the buy-bust team
approached them. The accused, sensing what was happening, ran towards the
shanty but was caught by PO1 Valencia at the alley. PO1 Valencia introduced
himself as a police officer and frisked the accused, in the process recovering the
buy-bust money.
The buy-bust team then brought the accused to the station. The accused was turned
over to the desk officer on duty, along with the substance in the sachet bought from
him and the recovered buy-bust money. After inquest, the Information was filed on
June 3, 2003. Accused was then committed to the Quezon City Jail.[6]
Consequently, the substance inside the sachet believed to be shabu was sent to and
examined by a Philippine National Police forensic chemist, Engr. Leonard Jabonillo
(Engr. Jabonillo). The laboratory result confirmed that the substance was positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Only PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified for the prosecution during the trial. The
testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense.
The accused denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused used the
defense of denial and alleged a frame-up by the arresting officers.
The accused testified that he was arrested on May 29, 2003 at around 9:00 a.m.
inside his house at Barangay Manresa, Quezon City while he was alone drinking
coffee. While two neighbors were talking in front of his house, a Tamaraw FX
arrived. Five armed men alighted from it, whereupon his neighbors ran away and
were chased by them. The armed men then returned, saying, "Nakatakas,
nakatakbo." (They had escaped and ran.) One of the armed men saw the accused
and entered his house. It was PO2 Ibasco, who frisked him and got PhP 60 from his
pocket. PO1 Valencia also entered his house and came out with a shoe box, then
said, "Sige, isakay n'yo na." (Take him in the car.) He asked the armed men what his
violation was but was told to merely explain at the precinct.
In the police precinct, he was investigated and subsequently detained. They showed
him a plastic sachet which they allegedly recovered from him. Then a man
approached him and demanded PhP 30,000 for his release, but he said he did not
have the money. Thereafter, he was presented for inquest.
A witness, Rodolfo Buencamino (Buencamino), narrated that in the morning of May

29, 2003, he called the police precinct to have a certain "Taba," an alleged drug
pusher in their area, arrested. PO2 Ibasco and other police officers responded
immediately. When the police officers arrived, Buencamino pointed to "Taba," who,
however, was able to evade arrest. Thereafter, he was surprised to see the accused
inside the vehicle of the policemen. But he did not know why and where the accused
was arrested since he did not witness the actual arrest.
Another witness, Marbelita Collado Lepiten (Lepiten), testified that she was at the
terrace of her house on 135 Manba St., Manresa, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City, when she noticed the accused talking to a certain "Taba," a resident of the
area. When a maroon Tamaraw FX stopped in front of the house of accused, "Taba"
ran away and was pursued by two men who alighted from the vehicle. The two men
returned without "Taba," who evidently escaped, and entered the house of the
accused. She did not know what happened inside the house but she eventually saw
the men push the accused outside into their vehicle.
The Ruling of the RTC
On February 8, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GARRY DELA CRUZ

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay
a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.
In convicting the accused, the RTC relied on and gave credence to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Citing People v. Jubail,[7]
which enumerated the elements required to be established by the prosecution for the
illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the trial court found that the prosecution had
established the elements of the crime.
The RTC pointed out that Buencamino may, indeed, have called the police to arrest
a certain "Taba," an alleged pusher in the area, but he was not present when the
accused was arrested. The trial court likewise did not accord evidentiary weight to
the testimony of Lepiten, who testified that she saw the accused talking to "Taba"
and that when the police officers entered the house of the accused, she was
unaware of what transpired inside. Thus, the RTC concluded that her testimony did
not provide clear and convincing justification to cast doubt on the candid and
straightforward testimonies of the police officers.
Applying the presumption of the performance of official function, the lack of showing
any ill motive on the part of the police officers to testify against the accused, and the
principle that the bare denial of an accused is inherently weak, the RTC convicted
the accused.
Consequently, with his conviction, the accused started to serve his sentence [8] and
was subsequently committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City.
Aggrieved, accused appealed[9] his conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On June 30, 2008, the appellate court rendered the appealed decision, wholly
affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction of appellant. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DENIED and the

assailed Decision supra is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
The CA upheld the findings of the trial court that the essential elements required for
the conviction of an accused for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 were present in
the instant case. The appellate court brushed aside the irregularities raised by
accused-appellant by putting premium credence on the testimonies of the arresting
police officers, who positively identified accused-appellant in open court. One with
the trial court, the CA found no improper motive on the part of the police officers who,
it said, were regularly performing their official duties. Besides, relying on People v.
Barlaan,[10] the CA held that the irregularities raised that there was no coordination
with the PDEA and that no inventory was made and no photograph taken of the
seized drug, if true, did not invalidate the legitimate buy-bust operation
conducted. Moreover, the CA found that the corpus delicti, i.e., the confiscated
shabu and the PhP 100 bill, were presented as evidence of the commission of the
offense.
The CA also ruled that accused-appellant's mere denial, as corroborated by

Buencamino and Lepiten, deserved scant consideration vis-à-vis the positive
identification by the arresting officers who arrested him in flagrante delicto. Anent
the questioned chain of custody, the CA found it unbroken and duly proven by the
prosecution.
The Issues
Hence, We have this appeal.
Only accused-appellant, however, filed his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental

Brief),[11] while the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of
the Philippines, submitted neither a Manifestation nor a Motion. Consequently, on
July 27, 2009, the Court dispensed with the OSG's submission of a supplemental
brief.[12] Since no new issues are raised nor supervening events transpired, We
scrutinize the Brief for the Accused-Appellant[13] and the Brief for the Plaintiff-
Appellee,[14] filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, in resolving the instant appeal.
Thus, accused-appellant raises the same assignment of errors, in that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5,
ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL.[15]
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Accused-appellant argues that, first, the prosecution has not proved his commission
of the crime charged for the following irregularities: (1) the arresting officers did not
coordinate with the PDEA, as required under Sec. 86 of RA 9165; (2) no physical
inventory was conducted and photograph taken of the alleged seized drug in the
presence of public officials, as required by Sec. 21 of RA 9165; and (3) the chain of
custody was not duly proved by the prosecution. And second, his denial is worthy of
credence upon corroboration by the credible witnesses presented by the defense.
After a careful and thorough review of the records, We are convinced that accused-
appellant should be acquitted, for the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable
doubt his commission of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165.
A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in

flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only
authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything
that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime."[16] However,
where there really was no buy-bust operation conducted, it cannot be denied that the
elements for illegal sale of prohibited drugs cannot be duly proved despite the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the seeming
straightforward testimony in court by the arresting police officers. After all, the
indictment for illegal sale of prohibited drugs will not have a leg to stand on.
This is the situation in the instant case.
The courts a quo uniformly based their findings and affirmance of accused-
appellant's guilt on: (1) the straightforward testimony of the arresting police officers;
(2) their positive identification of accused-appellant; (3) no ill motive was shown for
their testimony against accused-appellant; (4) the self-serving defense of denial by
accused-appellant; (5) the seeming irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation and the arrest of accused-appellant not invalidating the operation; and (6)
the testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten not showing that the buy-bust operation
was not conducted.
Although the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be
disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied in a case under appeal,[17] as
here.
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that
the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of
the corpus delicti.[18]
In People v. Doria,[19] the Court laid down the "objective test" in determining the
credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations. It
is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust
operation--"from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the
offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of sale." [20] We
said that "[t]he manner by which the initial contact was made, x x x the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the `buy-bust money', and the delivery of the
illegal drug x x x must be the subject of strict scrutiny by the courts to insure that law-
abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense." [21]
No Surveillance Conducted
The testimony of PO2 Ibasco on direct examination did not mention an alleged
surveillance conducted by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia prior to the alleged buy-
bust operation, the corresponding intelligence report, and the written communiqué
with the PDEA. The defense in cross-examination put to task both PO2 Ibasco and
PO1 Valencia concerning these matters, as attested to in the Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension[22] executed by the two police officers on May 30, 2003. PO2 Ibasco
testified that his unit, specifically PO1 Valencia and himself, conducted surveillance
on accused-appellant for a week prior to the buy-bust operation on May 29, 2003
which, according to him, turned out positive, i.e., accused-appellant was, indeed,
selling shabu.
PO2 Ibasco on cross-examination testified, thus:
ATTY. LOYOLA:
Being an operative, you are of course, trained in intelligence work?
PO2 IBASCO:
Yes, sir.
Q: You said you conducted surveillance but you cannot show any proof that
there is an intelligence report, you have no proof?
A: Yes, sir. There is, we were dispatched.
Q: Where is your proof now?

A: It's in our office.
Q: Your dispatch order for the surveillance do you have any?

A: I don't have it now sir but it's in the office.
Q: You said that you conducted surveillance for one week, did I hear you right?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: So, you are saying you did not actually see him selling drugs at that time
during the surveillance?
A: We saw him, sir.
xxxx
Q: None. You did not even coordinate this operation with the PDEA?
A: We coordinated it, sir.
Q: What is your proof that you indeed coordinated?

A: It's in the office, sir.
ATTY. LOYOLA:
May I make a reservation for continuance of the cross-examination
considering that there are documents that the witness has to present.
COURT:
What documents?
ATTY. LOYOLA:
The proof your Honor that there was indeed a coordination and the
intelligence report.
COURT:
Will you be able to produce those documents?
A: Yes, sir. "Titingnan ko po."
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
Titingnan?
COURT:
You are not sure? You don't have any copy of those documents?
A: You Honor, what we have in the office is the dispatch.[23]
PO1 Valencia, likewise, on cross-examination testified:
ATTY. LOYOLA:
Mr. Witness, tell me during the orientation, you will agree with me that there
was no coordination made to the PDEA regarding this intended buy bust
operation?
PO1 VALENCIA:
We have coordinated at the PDEA.
Q: You say that but you have no proof to show us that there was coordination?
A: We have, sir.
Q: What is your proof?

A: We have files in our office for coordination.
Q: Are you sure about that?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, based on the information, you already planned to conduct
a buy bust operation against the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you will agree with me that there was no surveillance against the
accused?
A: We have conducted a surveillance one week before the operation and we
conducted surveillance "Pinakawalan namin ang informant."
Q: What do you mean "pinakawalan ang informant"?

A: So that we have a spy inside to verify whether Garry was really selling
shabu.
xxxx
Q: In fact you don't have any information report?

A: We have, sir. It's in the office. It's with Insp. Villanueva.
Q: And because you claim that you have submitted an information and report,
of course, you should have come up with an intelligence report.
A: Yes, sir. It's also in the office of Insp. Villanueva.
xxxx
Q: And the alleged recovered item, the plastic sachet which contained white
crystalline substance was brought by whom to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
A: I cannot remember who brought it sir because it was a long time ago.[24]
These documents--specifically the dispatch order, the intelligence report of the

alleged surveillance, and the written communiqué from the PDEA for the conduct of
the surveillance and buy-bust operation--were not, however, presented in
court. Evidently, these documents are non-existent, tending to show that there really
was no surveillance and, consequently, no intelligence report about the surveillance
or the averred written communiqué from PDEA attesting to coordination with said
agency. Worse, the prosecution never bothered to explain why it could not present
these documents. Thus, there is no basis to say that accused-appellant allegedly

sold shabu a week before he was arrested.
Even putting this lapse aside, the other irregularities raised by accused-appellant in
the backdrop of the uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten tend to
show that there was really no buy-bust operation conducted resulting in the valid
arrest of accused-appellant.
Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that no
buy-bust operation against appellant ever took place.[25] The prosecution's failure to
submit in evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 will not discharge the accused
from the crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an
accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. [26]
No Buy-Bust Operation
But where there are other pieces of evidence putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-
bust operation, these irregularities take on more significance which are, well nigh,
fatal to the prosecution.
Putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation are the uncontroverted
testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, which gave credence to accused-
appellant's denial and frame-up theory. The Court is not unaware that, in some
instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract
information from or even to harass civilians.[27] This Court has been issuing
cautionary warnings to trial courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases,
lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.[28]
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties.[29] Nonetheless, such a defense may be given
credence when there is sufficient evidence or proof making it to be very plausible or
true. We are of the view that accused-appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up
are credible given the circumstances of the case. Indeed, jurisprudence has
established that the defense of denial assumes significance only when the
prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt,[30] as in the instant case. At the very least, there is reasonable doubt that
there was a buy-bust operation conducted and that accused-appellant sold the
seized shabu. After all, a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.[31]
Notably, Buencamino voluntarily testified to the effect that he called the police asking
them to apprehend a certain "Taba," a notorious drug pusher in their area. PO2
Ibasco and company responded to his call and Buencamino helped identify and
direct the policemen but "Taba" unfortunately escaped. Thus, Buencamino testified:
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Mr. Witness, who asked you to testify today?
BUENCAMINO:
I volunteered myself to testify.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell us how, when and where the accused was arrested?
A: I was the one who called-up the precinct to arrest a certain Taba and not
Garry. Taba was the target of the operation.
Q: When was that?

A: May 29, 2003.
Q: Why did you call the police station?

A: Ibasco talked to me to arrest Taba.
Q: Why are they going to arrest Taba?

A: Because he is a pusher in the area.
Q: Why do you know Ibasco?

A: Because he was a previous resident of Barangay Manresa.
Q: You said you called police officer [sic] what was the topic. Mr. Witness?
A: That Taba is already there and he already showed up and they immediately
responded to arrest Taba.
Q: So, Ibasco immediately responded to your call?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: When they arrived in your place what happened else, if any?

A: I pointed to Taba so they could arrest him.
Q: Where they able to arrest Taba?

A: No, sir. He was able to escape.
Q: Whey they were not able to arrest alias Taba what happened, next Mr.
Witness? What happened to Garry Dela Cruz?
A: I was surprised because I saw Garry Dela Cruz already inside the vehicle
and I don't know why Garry was inside the vehicle.[32]
Buencamino's assertion of knowing PO2 Ibasco was likewise not

rebutted. Moreover, the presentation of the police logbook on calls received in the
morning of May 29, 2003 would indeed show if Buencamino or someone else made
a call to the precinct about a certain "Taba," but then, again, the prosecution did not
bother to rebut the testimony of Buencamino. Verily, this time the presumption "that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" [33] applies. In fact, the
prosecution did not even assail Buencamino's credibility as a witness but merely
made the point in the cross-examination that he had no actual knowledge of the
arrest of accused-appellant. Thus, Buencamino was cross-examined:
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
You were not with Garry at the time he was arrested?
BUENCAMINO:
No, sir.
Q: You don't know where he was arrested at that time?

A: I don't know where Garry was, sir.
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
That will be all, your Honor.[34]
More telling is the testimony of Lepiten which, uncontroverted, shows that there was
no buy-bust operation. Her testimony corroborates the testimony of Buencamino
that police enforcers indeed responded to Buencamino's phone call but were not
able to apprehend "Taba." This destroys the buy-bust operation angle testified to by
PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Since the buy-bust operation allegedly happened not
inside the house of accused-appellant but in an open area in front of a shanty, such
cannot be sustained in light of what Lepiten witnessed: The policemen chased but
were not able to arrest "Taba"; thereafter, the policemen went inside the house of
accused-appellant, emerging later with him who was led to the vehicle of the
policemen. Thus, Lepiten testified:
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Mrs. Witness, where were you on May 29, 2003, if you could still
remember?
COURT:
What time?
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
At around 9:00 in the morning.
LEPITEN:
I was at the terrace of the house we are renting while sipping coffee.
Q: Where is that house located?

A: No. 135 Mauban Street, Barangay Manresa, Quezon City.
COURT:
Where is this, Novaliches?
A: No, your Honor, near San Francisco Del Monte.
xxxx
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
While drinking coffee, what transpired next, Mrs. Witness or was there any
unusual thing that happened?
A: Yes, sir. While I was sitting on the terrace in front of the house we are
renting is the house of Garry. Garry was talking to a certain Taba whom I
know.
xxxx
Q: While you saw them talking to each other, what happened next?
A: Suddenly a maroon FX stopped.
Q: Where?
A: In front of the house of Garry.
Q: When this maroon FX stopped, what happened next, if any?

A: Taba ran, sir.
Q: What happened next, if any?

A: Two (2) men in blue pants and white shirt alighted from the maroon FX and
ran after Taba.
Q: Were they able to arrest Taba, Ms. Witness?

A: No, sir. They were not able to catch him.
Q: When they failed to arrest Taba, what did these two (2) men do, if any?
A: They returned in front of the house and Garry and I saw them entered the
house of Garry.
xxxx
Q: What did they do, if any?

A: I don't know what they did inside because I could not see them, sir. Then I
saw them went down and pushed Garry towards the FX.
xxxx
Q: After that what else happened, if any?

A: I just saw that they boarded Garry inside the FX.
xxxx
COURT:
Any cross?
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
No cross, your Honor.[35]
Thus, taking into consideration the defense of denial by accused-appellant, in light of

the foregoing testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, the Court cannot conclude
that there was a buy-bust operation conducted by the arresting police officers as they
attested to and testified on. The prosecution's story is like a sieve full of holes.
Non-Compliance with the Rule on Chain of Custody
Moreover, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the requisite chain of custody of
the seized specimen. "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction.[36] The CA found an unbroken chain of custody
of the purportedly confiscated shabu specimen. However, the records belie such
conclusion.
The testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia, as well as their Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension, were bereft of any assertion on how the seized shabu in a heat-
sealed sachet was duly passed from PO2 Ibasco, the chosen poseur-buyer, who
allegedly received it from accused-appellant, to forensic chemist Engr. Jabonillo, who
conducted the forensic examination. While the testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was
dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense, as duly embodied in the RCT Order
dated March 16, 2004, it is likewise bereft of any assertion substantially proving the
custodial safeguards on the identity and integrity of the shabu allegedly received
from accused-appellant. The stipulation merely asserts:
x x x that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police; that his office
received a request for laboratory examination marked as Exhibit "A"; that together
with said request is a brown envelope marked as Exhibit "B"; which contained a
plastic sachet marked as Exhibit "B-1"; that he conducted a requested laboratory
examination and, in connection therewith, he submitted a Chemistry Report marked
as Exhibit "C". The findings thereon showing the specimen positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit "C-1", and the signature
of the said police officer was marked as Exhibit "C-2". He likewise issued a
Certification marked as Exhibits "D" and "D-1", and thereafter, turned over the
specimen to the evidence custodian and retrieved the same for [sic] purposed
proceeding scheduled today.[37]
While both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified on the identity of the plastic
sachet duly marked with the initials "EIGC," there was no sufficient proof of
compliance with the chain of custody. The records merely show that, after the arrest
of accused-appellant, the specimen was allegedly turned over to the desk officer on
duty, whose identity was not revealed. Then it was the station's OIC, P/Insp.
Villanueva, who requested the forensic examination of the specimen. In gist, from
the alleged receipt of the plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of shabu by PO2
Ibasco from the alleged buy-bust operation, the chain of custody of the specimen has
not been substantially shown. The Court cannot make an inference that PO2 Ibasco
passed the specimen to an unnamed desk officer on duty until it made its way to the
laboratory examination. There are no details on who kept custody of the specimen,
who brought it to the Crime Laboratory, and who received and kept custody of it until
Engr. Jabonillo conducted the forensic examination. The stipulated facts merely
made an allusion that the specimen custodian of the Crime Laboratory had
possession of the specimen and released it for the proceedings before the trial court.
It is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is
the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said
drug be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to
make a finding of guilt.[38] This, the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution must
offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of
custody.[39]
As the Court aptly put in People v. Cantalejo:
x x x the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of the
seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.
x x x failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation of the
presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule, the testimony
of police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full faith and
credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties
regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with
irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[40]
In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with the chain
of custody, We cannot but acquit accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable
doubt. The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify
a verdict of guilt.[41] In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the
defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon
the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [42] As
the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably
be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did
not commit.[43]
In fine, We repeat what the Court fittingly held in People v. Ong, a case similarly
involving a buy-bust operation, thus:
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. While appellant's defense engenders
suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not sufficient for a
conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or probability of guilt. It is
the burden of the prosecution to overcome the presumption of innocence by
presenting the quantum of evidence required.
In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the
prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral
certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise but it
is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. An
acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the appellants'
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. [44]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry De La

Cruz y Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on basis of
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated June 30, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02727 is SET ASIDE. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he is being
lawfully held for another cause.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-20. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this
Court) and Vicente Q. Roxas.
[2]
Records, pp. 127-132. Penned by Presiding Judge Severino B. De Castro, Jr.
[3]
Id. at 1-2.
[4]
Id. at 19.
[5]
During the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses PO2 Edcel Ibasco and
PO1 Roderick Valencia, while the testimony of Forensic Chemist Engr. Leonard
Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense. On the other hand, the
defense presented accused Garry, Rodolfo Buencamino, and Marbelita Collado
Lepiten.
[6]
CA rollo, p. 11, Commitment Order dated July 7, 2003.
[7]
G.R. No. 143817, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 478.
[8]
Rollo, p. 25, Order of Commitment issued on February 27, 2007.
[9]
CA rollo, p. 23, Notice of Appeal dated March 1, 2007.
[10]
G.R. No. 177746, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 849.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 27-29, dated April 22, 2009.
[12]
Id. at 30.
[13]
CA rollo, pp. 37-51, dated September 18, 2007.
[14]
Id. at 73-85, dated January 21, 2008.
[15]
Id. at 39.
[16]
People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179478, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 397, 417; citing
People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 470, 484 and People v.
Juatan, G.R. No. 104378, August 20, 1996, 260 SCRA 532, 538.
[17]
People v. Robles, G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647, 654; citing
People v. Pedronan, G.R. No. 148668, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 183, 188.
[18]
People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547;
People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 169141, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 554, 562.
[19]
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668.
[20]
Id. at 698.
[21]
Id. at 698-699; People v. Ong, supra note 16, at 485; People v. De Guzman, G.R.
No. 151205, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 516, 523.
[22]
Records, pp. 8-9.
[23]
TSN, March 16, 2004, pp. 115-119.
[24]
TSN, August 3, 2004, pp. 10-14.
[25]
People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 447.
[26]
People v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 595
[27]
People v. Daria, Jr., G.R. No. 186138, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 688, 709.
[28]
Sales v. People, G.R. No. 182296, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 680, 686.
[29]
Id.
[30]
People v. Mejia, G.R. No. 185723, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 356, 374.
[31]
Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 144026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 593, 613; citing
People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000, 328 SCRA 185, 194.
[32]
TSN, September 12, 2006, pp. 2-4.
[33]
Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 2(e).
[34]
TSN, September 12, 2006, pp. 4-5.
[35]
TSN, January 30, 2007, pp. 2-6.
[36]
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92, 101-
102; People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762, 777.
[37]
Records, p. 47.
[38]
Sales v. People, supra note 28, at 688-689.
[39]
Catuiran v. People, G.R. No. 175647, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 567, 580.
[40]
G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 777, 788.
[41]
People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 653.
[42]
People v. Caiñgat, G.R. No. 137963, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 387, 396;
citing People v. Mariano, G.R. No. 134309, November 17, 2000, 347 SCRA 109 and
People v. Tacipit, G.R. No. 109140 March 8, 1995, 242 SCRA 241.
[43]
Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA
41, 60; citing People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 503,
512.
[44]
G.R. No. 175940 [Formerly G.R. Nos. 155361-62], February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA
123, 141.

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Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University

Mid La Union Campus

Reading Assignment No. 3

Eymard Moises M. Estalilla

[ G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NORBERTO DEL

On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5,

When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential

On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister's house in Poblacion

Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia

Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

G.R. No. 190621 February 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph

The Information4 for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 filed against

Upon motion of the prosecution,8 the cases were consolidated. On November 4,

x x x [T]hat [Police Inspector Leonard T. Arban (P/Insp. Arban)] is a Forensic

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE

CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. No.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.22

The appeal is unmeritorious.

The defenses of denial and frame-up

be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable

Non-compliance with Section 21,

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

The links in the chain of custody must be established.

arrest. It is therefore understandable that PO2 Soriano could no longer easily

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

[ G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO

The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

Criminal Case No. 23227-R

Criminal Case No. 23229-R

The undersigned accuses JUN LAZARO y AQUINO for VIOLATION OF SECTION

Criminal Case No. 23228-R

The undersigned accuses JUN LAZARO for VIOLATION OF SECTION 15 [ARTICLE

Subsequently, these cases were consolidated. When arraigned on 28 June 2004,

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Hordan T. Pacatiw,

On 15 June 2004, at about 12:30 p.m., an informant went to the Criminal

the plastic sachet recovered from possession of appellant signed by Forensic

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 12 August 2008.[26]

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE

Q How many storeys is the house of the accused?

A About three (3), Sir.

Q Where is the balcony where the man was standing?

A At the third floor, Sir.

Q What happened next?

Carpio Morales,* Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, and Abad,* JJ., concur.