PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article 147-Property Regime of void marriage]

FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were born from
this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties, and Erlinda managed their pizza
business.

In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged psychological
incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the time they lived together,
they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. Mario
denied she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns the
properties "existing during their marriage."

In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between Francisco and Erminda. Not
satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed
the trial court decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.

RULING:
No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The marriage of
Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later affirmed by the CA.
Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code.

These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a
man and woman live together under a void marriage.

Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties
and will be owned by them in equal shares.

Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been
acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further
provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code, Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage
NENG KAGUI KADIGUIA MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON

[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000]

FACTS: Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot
three sons. He is engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aida’s dowry. Thereafter, he bought a parcel
of land in Sousa, Cotabato.Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for the second
time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of
Hadji Abdulas second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula
divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji contracted a marriage with Nayo H. Omar and they were childless.He also married Hadji
Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz to whom he had a daughter. Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other
Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui Kadiguia
Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City
but they were childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and selling of
agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City,
some of which were cultivated by tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut Planters
Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without
leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in Cotabato City a petition
for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece,
Tarhata Lauban.
After due publication was made, the children of Hadji Abdula Malang from his previous wives filed their
opposition to the petition. The Shar’ia court appointed the two sons of Hadji Malang as joint administrator
of their father’s respective properties. They submitted an inventory of their father’s property in compliance
with the order of the court. Petitioner likewise submitted an inventory.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The Memorandum that she filed with the Sharia District Court, petitioner
asserted that all the properties located in Cotabato City, including the vehicle and bank deposits, were
conjugal properties in accordance with Article 160 of the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code
while properties located outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the decedent.

OPPOSITOR’S CONTENTION: On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum
that all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties for various reasons:
 First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with petitioner because his having contracted eight
(8) marriages with different Muslim women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a
monogamous marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous
marriage or a common-law relationship.
 Second, the decedent adopted a complete separation of property regime in his marital relations;
while his wives Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis contributed to the
decedents properties, there is no evidence that petitioner had contributed funds for the acquisition
of such properties.
 Third, the presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties is
inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the decedent was married to four (4)
women.
 Fourth, the properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were
titled in the name of the decedent married to Neng Malang because such description is not
conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore, because petitioner admitted in her
 verified petition that the properties belonged to the estate of decedent, she was estopped from
claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties were conjugal in nature just because
some of the properties were titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng Malang. Fifth, if it is true
that the properties were conjugal properties, then these should have been registered in the names
of both petitioner and the decedent.
DECISION OF THE SHARIA COURT:
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held
that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the
latter married eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is
more than one wife because conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage
or a common-law relationship. The court further found that the decedent was the chief, if not the sole,
breadwinner of his families and that petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the other wives
named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The description married to Neng Malang in the titles to the real properties
is no more than that -- the description of the relationship between petitioner and the decedent. Such
description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of gains.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationship of
two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (hereafter, P.D. 1083 or Muslim Code).
RULING: The Supreme Court identified collateral and corollary issues in order to resolve the instant case.
These are as follows, to wit:
1. Law governing the validity of Muslim Marriage celebrated before the Muslim Code.
The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were
celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78
of the Civil Code[31] recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs
and rites, by providing that ---

Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed
in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be
necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92.

However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or other
non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code.But the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration, may at any time before the
expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-
Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.

Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize
their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The
enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78
of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between Muslims thirty years after the approval of the Civil
Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said Code.
2. Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated before the Muslim Code.
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple
marriages. It is also not to be disputed that the only law in force governing marriage relations between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950.
However, the Muslim Code provided for the effect of the Code on past acts which mandates that the
acts prior to its effectivity shall be governed by the law in force at the time of their execution. Being
prospective then in nature, it is the Civil Code of 1950 which shall governed such marriage. This law
contemplates a monogamous marriage.
3. Law Governing the Property Relation of Muslim Marriages celebrated bore the Muslim Code.
In keeping with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is determined by
the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question the
Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether
Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code
provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired
from and after August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties
lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired.
4. Validity of Muslin Divorce prior to the effectivity of Muslim Code:
R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in
accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A.
394) to June 13, 1969.[45] Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949
to June 13, 1969.

From the collateral issues, the Court likewise identified corollary issues in reference to the collateral
issues. These are as follows, to wit:
1. Which among the marriages is valid.
The validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time
when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is
because all of the marriages were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of
which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
2. Who among the surviving children are legitimate and illegitimate.
The children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by the first corollary
issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be determined
by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law.
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December 18,
1993? The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the following:
a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined by the first corollary
issue are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim
Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death.
b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during the period
August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between
the spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as determined under
the first corollary issue may submit their respective evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs
exclusively.
c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code during
the period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and obtained from
the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties.
4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The following are
Hadji Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the
children, as determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force at
the time of Hadji Abdulas death, will govern the determination of their respective shares.
However, the court remanded the case to the court of origin for additional reception of evidence.
MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
THE SPOUSES BEATO C. MACAYRA and ALACOPUE MONDAY

G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984

FACTS: Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. Their children claim that
their parents were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". Both the trial court and
the appellate court rejected this claim of a "military fashion" marriage.

The couple had several children. John Carlos was born in 1903, followed by Lucille, Margaret, Florence,
Fred, and George. Except for the youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed properties
were acquired. The father, Melbourne Maxey, was a member of the 1899 American occupation forces who
afterwards held high positions in the provincial government and in the Philippine public schools system.

The disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales
Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second
wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr.
and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.

The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.

The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband and wife, justice demands that
the woman should be entitled to the share of the property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere
adornment or only for man's comfort and passion."

The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive properties of the late Melbourne
Maxey. It set aside the decision of the trial court, decease valid the deeds of sale, and ruled that the
appellants are the absolute owners of the properties in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not Regina Morales Maxey has a right over the disputed properties regardless if she
contributed to the acquisition of said properties.

RULING: The Supreme Court declared that the disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne
Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold.

Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil
partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in
properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through
decisions of this Court. (Aznar et al. vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 94 Phil. 451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-24449, December 31, 1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil.
135.)

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial
precedents but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the
property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of
them.

This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife
in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and
children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before
the rules on co-ownership would apply. This article is particularly relevant in this case where the "common-
law" relationship was legitimated through a valid marriage 34 years before the properties were sold.

The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay vs. Torres (28 SCRA 489)
must include not only the earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her
contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the
household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise
performing the traditional duties of a housewife.

Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "Yes" because there is no
showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application.

A vested right is defined by this Court as property which has become fixed and established, and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy; an immediately fixed right of present or future enjoyment as distinguished
from an expectant or contingent right (Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711; Balbao
vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). This cannot be said of the "exclusive" right of Melbourne Maxey over the
properties in question when the present Civil Code became effective for standing against it was the
concurrent right of Regina Morales or her heirs to a share thereof. The properties were sold in 1953 when
the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was still
open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the applicable
law.

Hence, Regina Morales Maxey has a right over the exclusive propereties.
Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition
in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was
granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which
they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
FAMILY HOME

MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO vs. ROEL, NOEL and
JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INESG.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and EugeniaSocorro C.
Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine
and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while underthe management of
Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of theproperty. Trial court rendered
judgment again
st Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy
of the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtueof
which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta’s name
was sold at a publicauction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder.
Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with their
children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on theground
that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and is thusexempt from
execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the houseand lot was constituted
jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972
Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family homeshall be exempt
from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debtsincurred prior to the constitution
of the family home. While the respondent contends that the houseand lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and
Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is notdeemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her
debts.Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon theeffectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in1986 to for acts
committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied
property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within theexce
ption provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home.

SONEJA VS CA (wala po akong digest na mahanapan)

LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Gerardo Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte

G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almontewere married in 1989.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he
married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to
be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Jose Gerardo was not
the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and not
petitioner Gerardo.

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time
Jose Gerardo was conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of
private respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right
is strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and
Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired
any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The petition was denied.

 THIRD DIVISION

FILOMENA SONEJA, G.R. No. 161533

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
- versus -
CORONA,**
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(2nd Division) and RAMON SAURA, JR.,
Respondents. June 5, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
 Before us is a petition for certiorari challenging the
[1]
Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75669
dated November 19, 2003 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the Resolution[2] promulgated on March 3, 2003 dismissing her petition
for certiorari.

The facts are undisputed.[3]

On July 1, 1995, petitioner Filomena Soneja, as lessee, and respondent

Ramon Saura, Jr., as lessor, entered into a lease contract over a property located
at 966-F A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The rent was fixed at P5,500.00 per
month for a period of three (3) years from July 1, 1995 to July 1, 1998. Later on,
Filomenas daughter, Renee Soneja, occupied the premises.

In August 1998, the lease contract expired but petitioner remained in the
premises without paying the rent. Because of this, respondent sent a letter to
petitioner demanding payment of P185,280.00, corresponding to the rentals in
arrears, and to vacate the said apartment not later than January 31, 2001. When
petitioner failed to pay, respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against
petitioner and her daughter. The case was referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa,
which issued the necessary certification after the parties failed to settle the
controversy amicably.

On December 5, 2001, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision on

the ejectment case against petitioner. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants

ordering defendants and all other persons claiming rights under them to vacate the
 premises located at 966-F A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and to pay plaintiffs the
following sums:

1. Php185,280.00 representing unpaid rentals from August, 1998 until 31

January 2001, and Php5,500.00 per month thereafter until defendants actually vacate the
subject premises; [and]

2. Php10,000.00 representing attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on January

30, 2002. While the appeal was pending, respondent filed a motion for execution
on May 23, 2002, which was granted through an Order[5] dated May 29, 2002.
Pursuant thereto, a property owned by petitioner and her deceased spouse
situated at Tominawog, San Andres, Catanduanes was levied upon. Petitioner
immediately filed a motion[6] to lift or revoke the levy made upon her property
alleging that the same is her family home and should, therefore, be exempt from
levy or execution based on the provisions of the Family Code.

On August 6, 2002, however, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion to lift or
revoke levy.[7] A motion for reconsideration[8] was filed but was denied for lack of
merit.[9]The order, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, was received by
petitioner on December 9, 2002.[10]

Meanwhile, on January 20, 2003, the RTC issued an Order dismissing

petitioners appeal for her failure to file the required memorandum. Petitioner,
thereafter, filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before the CA on March 12,
2003. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75669.[11]
 On February 10, 2003, petitioner also filed a Rule 65 petition with the CA,
challenging the RTCs denial of her motion for reconsideration with respect to the
levy on her property in Catanduanes. The case was initially docketed as CA-G.R.
UDK SP No. 4783 and was assigned to the Second Division. Later on, the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75669, apparently the same docket number given to
the Rule 42 petition earlier filed by petitioner.

On March 3, 2003, the CA resolved to dismiss the Rule 65 petition for being
filed three (3) days beyond the reglementary period.[12] Petitioner immediately
filed a Manifestation[13] dated March 11, 2003 explaining that the apparent delay
was brought about by the confusion in the CAs docket section. The CA acceded and
allowed petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration.[14]

Subsequently, a Decision[15] was reached by the CA on September 18, 2006

also denying the Rule 42 petition filed by Soneja. The decision, in effect, upheld the
RTCs order, which dismissed petitioners appeal following her failure to file the
required memorandum. Judgment thereto was entered on October 29, 2006.

Meanwhile, earlier, on November 19, 2003, a Resolution[16] was promulgated

by the CA denying the Rule 65 petition for two reasons; namely: no prima
facie error had been committed by the RTC, and the petition was filed three (3)
days late. Undaunted, petitioner elevated the matter before this Court via a Rule
65 petition.

The sole issue is whether the CA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the RTCs decision denying petitioners
motion to lift or revoke the levy on her property argued to be a family home.

Petitioner maintains that the levied property is a family home acquired and
constituted as their familys residence in 1950. She also claims that her temporary
sojourn in respondents apartment unit in Manila, following her husbands demise,
should not be construed as having terminated the nature of the property as a family
home, pursuant to the provisions of the Family Code. Moreover, petitioners
married son also stayed in the said family residence while she was temporarily
staying in Manila.[17]

The petition has no merit.

Settled is the rule that a petition for certiorari is proper to correct only errors
of jurisdiction committed by respondent court, tribunal or administrative
agency.[18] Public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal
power to determine the case, or in excess of jurisdiction if it oversteps its authority
as determined by law. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when respondent
acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner in the exercise of its
judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[19] In a petition for certiorari,
the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope as it is limited to resolving only cases
of jurisdiction.[20]

Here, petitioner argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming
the denial of petitioners motion to lift or revoke levy without even passing upon
the substantive issue on the propriety of levying her family home. She insists that
the levied property in Catanduanes should have been exempt from execution
pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code[21] in relation to Articles 152 to 154
thereof,[22] which she maintains she could have proven had she been accorded the
opportunity to present evidence to this effect.

The contention must fall. The appellate court, in its assailed resolution,
amply explained the reason for the affirmance of the RTCs decision:

[E]ven upon the allegations in the petition vis-a-vis the assailed Order dated August 6,
2002, We find no prima facie error committed by the court a quo in denying herein
petitioners Motion to Lift or Revoke Levy dated June 27, 2002.[23]
 There is also no truth to petitioners allegation that she was never afforded
any opportunity to present evidence to substantiate her claim. A careful perusal of
the records of the case shows that the issue of whether the levied property is a
family home has been squarely passed upon by the RTC. When the motion to lift or
revoke levy was filed on June 28, 2002, it was set for hearing on July 5, 2002, but
neither Filomena nor her counsel appeared on said date.[24] Despite this, the RTC
notified petitioners counsel of the time to file a reply following respondents
request to file an opposition to Filomenas motion.[25] When petitioner still failed to
file a reply, the RTC issued an Order dated August 6, 2002 denying the motion to
lift or revoke levy.[26] The court ratiocinated thus:

The Court agrees with the contention of the plaintiff. Defendant failed to
substantiate her claim that the levied property is a family home. She cannot avoid liability
under the contract of lease which she entered into by claiming that the lease was passed
to defendant Renee Soneja in 1995.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the motion to lift or revoke

levy made upon the property of defendant Filomena Soneja is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.[27]

The RTC also found, through Filomenas own admission, that she had not
been actually residing in the levied property but in the apartment unit she had
leased from respondent, and that it was her married son who was occupying the
said property in her stead.[28]

All these support our view that no abuse of discretion has been committed
by public respondent in sustaining the RTCs decision. A determination of the merits
of petitioners contention would reveal that whatever mistake may have been
committed in the appraisal of the case although we do not see any would, at best,
constitute merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction. The proper
recourse should have been an appeal, not a petition for certiorari.

Petitioner should have zealously raised the matter during the appeals
proceeding before the RTC. Sadly, she allowed the case to be dismissed following
her failure to file the required memorandum. Still, she could have insisted on the
resolution of the said issue in her petition for review had she not allowed the
decision of the CA to lapse without filing a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
therefore has nobody to blame but herself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales per Special Order No. 646 dated May 15,
2009.
**
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 631 dated April 29,
2009.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Jose L.
Sabio, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 62-63.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[3]
Filomena Soneja v. Ramon Saura, Jr., CA-G.R. SP No. 89123, September 18, 2006. Penned by Associate Justice
Jose Catral Mendoza, with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring.
[4]
Rollo, p. 71.
[5]
Id. at 73-74.
[6]
Id. at 75-77.
[7]
Id. at 26-27.
[8]
Id. at 22-25.
[9]
Id. at 28-29.
[10]
Id. at 10.
[11]
Id. at 57.
[12]
Id. at 42.
[13]
Id. at 56-60.
[14]
Id. at 61.
[15]
Supra note 3.
[16]
Id. at 62-64.
[17]
Id. at 16.
[18]
Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154115, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 443, 449.
[19]
Honrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166333, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 280, 289.
[20]
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 617.
[21]
Art. 155 of the Family Code provides in full:
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
1) For non-payment of taxes;
2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
[22]
Arts. 152 to 154 of the Family Code provide in full:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Article 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate
or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
[23]
Rollo, p. 62.
[24]
Id. at 28.
[25]
Id.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Id. at 26-27.
[28]
Id. at 29.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, GR No. 206248, 2014-02-18

Facts:
Grace Grande (Grande) and
Patricio Antonio... and Jerard Patrick
The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own
The parties' relationship, however,... eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her
two children in May 2007.
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC
Since respondent Antonio... failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected
the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her
sole parental custody over their children.
Not satisfied with the CA's Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration... her
motion was denied
Issues:
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation.
Ruling:
This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take
Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of
the children
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain
in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255[14] which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation... has been expressly recognized by their father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an... action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-
half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)... the general rule is that an illegitimate child
shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation
is expressly recognized by the father through the... record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation,
the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio
when a public document acknowledged before a notary... public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court[15] is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not.
It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate... children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean
what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.[16] Respondent's position
that the court can order the minors to... use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide
by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his... illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive
and operates to confer discretion[17] upon the illegitimate children.