Concepts and Modes of Discovery_CivProSat1-6-(AY18-19_PASTOR,GEE,A

PART I

Distinguish the following:

Res Judicata
A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to
a suit as to all matters that were litigated or that could have been litigated in that suit.

Res judicata will be applied to a pending lawsuit if several facts can be established by the party asserting
the res judicata defense. First, the party must show that a final judgment on the merits of the case had been
entered by a court having jurisdiction over the matter. This means that a final decision in the first lawsuit
was based on the factual and legal disputes between the parties rather than a procedural defect, such as
the failure to serve the defendant with legal process.

Once a court makes a final decision, it enters a final judgment in the case. The judgment recites pertinent
data about the case, such as the names of the parties, the fact that a jury verdict was rendered, and the
disposition made. The judgment is filed with the court administrator for that judicial jurisdiction.

The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the merits, must then show that the
decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive as to the matters in the second suit. For example, assume that
the plaintiff in the first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto accident. She sues the driver of the
other auto under a theory of Negligence. A jury returns a verdict that finds that the defendant was not
negligent. The injured driver then files a second lawsuit alleging additional facts that would help her prove
that the other driver was negligent. A court would dismiss the second lawsuit under res judicata because
the second lawsuit is based on the same Cause of Action (negligence) and the same injury claim.

Under the companion rule of Collateral Estoppel, the plaintiff will not be allowed to file a second lawsuit for
money damages using a different cause of action or claim. Under collateral estoppel, the parties are
precluded from litigating a second lawsuit using a different cause of action based on any issue of fact
common to both suits that had been litigated and determined in the first suit. For example, the plaintiff who
lost her auto accident case based on a theory of negligence cannot proceed with a second lawsuit based
on an allegation that the driver intentionally struck her auto, thus making it an intentional tort cause of action.
A court would assert collateral estoppel because the plaintiff could have alleged an intentional tort cause
of action in the original complaint.

The application of res judicata and collateral estoppel produces finality for the parties and promotes judicial
economy. Parties know that when final judgment is entered and all appeals are exhausted, the case is over
and the decision will be binding on all issues determined in the lawsuit.

The thing has been judged, meaning the issue before the court has already been decided by another court,
with the same parties. Therefore, the court will dismiss the case before it as being useless.

In the cage of Degayo vs Dinglasan (G.R. Nos. 173148, April 6, 2015), the doctrine of res judicata is set
forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which in its relevant part reads:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;

Thus, res judicata bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action

In Ligtas vs People (G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015), there is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between
the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first
and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the
second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the
principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a Court's
final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely
burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and
energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.

The case of Tala Realty Services Corp., vs Banco Filipino (G.R. No. 181369), defines the concept of res
judicata which referred to in these cases is the one commonly understood as "bar by prior judgment," which
is enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b). Bar by prior judgment is the traditional formulation of res judicata,
which requires the identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. It is this concept which is used
in determining whether litis pendentia or forum shopping exists. In contrast, and as previously discussed,
res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment requires only identity of parties and of issues. These two kinds
of res judicata are legally distinct.

Accordingly, under the doctrine of res judicata as bar by prior judgment, Banco Filipino could not be
prevented from filing separate actions for reconveyance because each action involved a different subject
matter, i.e., a different parcel of land. Nonetheless, res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment would still
apply to these different cases, as it does here, insofar as they involve material facts or questions which
were in issue and which have been adjudicated in a former action.

Stare Decisis

Is Latin for “to stand by things decided.” In short, it is the doctrine of precedent.
A doctrine or policy of following rules or principles laid down in previous judicial decisions unless they
contravene the ordinary principles of justice.

Courts cite to stare decisis when an issue has been previously brought to the court and a ruling already
issued. According to the Supreme Court, stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” In practice, the Supreme Court will usually defer to
its previous decisions even if the soundness of the decision is in doubt. A benefit of this rigidity is that a
court need not continuously reevaluate the legal underpinnings of past decisions and accepted doctrines.
Moreover, proponents argue that the predictability afforded by the doctrine helps clarify constitutional rights
for the public. Other commentators point out that courts and society only realize these benefits when
decisions are published and made available. Thus, some scholars assert that stare decisis is harder to
justify in cases involving secret opinions.
The doctrine operates both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal stare decisis refers to a court adhering to
its own precedent. A court engages in vertical stare decisis when it applies precedent from a higher court.
Consequently, stare decisis discourages litigating established precedents, and thus, reduces spending.
Basically, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the decision of a higher court within the same provincial
jurisdiction acts as binding authority on a lower court within that same jurisdiction. The decision of a court
of another jurisdiction only acts as persuasive authority. The degree of persuasiveness is dependent upon
various factors, including, first, the nature of the other jurisdiction. Second, the degree of persuasiveness
is dependent upon the level of court which decided the precedent case in the other jurisdiction. Other factors
include the date of the precedent case, on the assumption that the more recent the case, the more reliable
it will be as authority for a given proposition, although this is not necessarily so. And on some occasions,
the judge’s reputation may affect the degree of persuasiveness of the authority

In Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation vs Tagyamon (G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013), the
doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different. Where the facts are essentially different, however, stare
decisis does not apply, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be entirely
inappropriate when a factual variant is introduced.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court
is justified in setting it aside. For the Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not
controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly
a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.

In Tala Realty Services Corp., vs Banco Filipino (G.R. No. 181369), the court applied the time-honored
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which literally means "to adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established," to settle the issue of whether Banco Filipino can recover the
properties subject of the void trust agreement. The rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate
the same issue where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Thus, the Court's ruling
in G.R. No. 137533 regarding the nullity of the trust agreement-the very same agreement which Banco
Filipino seeks to enforce in the proceedings a quo-applies with full force to the present case. Consequently,
Banco Filipino's action for reconveyance of the Sta. Cruz property based on the void trust agreement cannot
prosper and must be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability
of judicial decisions. As well stated by Justice Cardozo in his book, The Nature of the Judicial Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way
between another "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It
would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against
me yesterday when I was defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide
differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material
and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants
are to have faith in the evenhanded administration of justice in the courts.

Ting vs. Velez-Ting (GR 166562), the principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question
of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy
and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. (G.R. No. 197192, June 4,
2014), defined stare decicis as "Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary
judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis
simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from
the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisisis a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue."

Conclusiveness of Judgment
The doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially
passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again
litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required for the operation of the
judgment as an estoppel are identity of parties and identity of issues.

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties [or their
privies] will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit.

In the case of Degayo vs Dinglasan, (G.R. Nos. 173148, April 6, 2015), the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgement is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which in its relevant part reads:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

Thus, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or
question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them
or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing
and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question
furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies
and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same
or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation
of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

In Ligtas vs People (G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015), where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter
in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first
and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by
prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not
identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment”.

In Tala Realty Services Corp., vs Banco Filipino (G.R. No. 181369), it defined Conclusiveness of judgment
as a species of res judicata and it applies where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases,
but there is no identity of causes of action. Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two actions is the same. Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between
the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was
in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but mere1y identity of
issue.

In this case, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment is squarely applicable because Banco Filipino's action
for reconveyance is solely based on a trust agreement which, it cannot be overemphasized, has long been
declared void in a previous action that involved both Tala Realty and Banco Filipino, i.e., G.R. No. 137533.
In other words, the question on the validity of the trust agreement has been finally and conclusively settled.
Hence, this question cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.
Although the action instituted in this case is one for reconveyance, which is technically different from the
ejectment suit originally instituted by Tala Realty in G.R. No. 137533, "the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment still applies because under this principle, the identity of causes of action is not required but merely
identity of issues. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues
in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

In Tabangao Shell refinery Employees Association vs Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (G.R. No.
170007, April 7, 2014), the doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and
was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and
cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required for the operation of
the judgment as an estoppel are identity of parties and identity of issues.

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties [or their
privies] will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit.

The Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment already considered and ruled
upon the issues being raised by the union in this petition. In particular, the said Decision already passed
upon the issue of whether there was already an existing deadlock between the union and the company
when the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over their labor dispute. The said
Decision also answered the issue of whether the company was guilty of bargaining in bad faith. As the
Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment already settled the said issues with
finality, the union cannot once again raise those issues in this Court through this petition without violating
the principle of res judicata, particularly in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.

In particular, with the finality of the Decision dated June 8, 2005, the labor dispute, covering both the alleged
bargaining in bad faith and the deadlock, between the union and the company was settled with finality. As
the said Decision settled essentially the same questions being raised by the union in this case, the finality
of the said Decision rendered this case moot. The union cannot be allowed to use this case to once again
unsettle the issues that have been already settled with finality by the final and executory Decision dated
June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment

Law of the case

The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever
is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
When a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in
subsequent stages in the same case.
The law of the case is a rule of appellate procedure whereby, once an appellate court has answered a
question of law in a given case, the issue is settled for all future proceedings.

In Development Bank of the Philippines vs Guarina Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation (G.R.
No. 160758, January 15, 2014), DBP insists that the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP already
constituted the law of the case. Hence, the CA could not decide the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491
differently.

Guariña Corporation counters that the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not constitute the law of the
case because C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP concerned the issue of possession by DBP as the winning bidder
in the foreclosure sale, and had no bearing whatsoever to the legal issues presented in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
59491.

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means, more
specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.

The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on
the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty and limit the power
of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case
in all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience,
and reason. Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, re-agitation, reexamination, and
reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if parties’ litigants were
allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions
once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case. An itch to reopen
questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up
his corn to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like ordinary sensible persons.
The administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a good one of frequent and
beneficial use.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared
the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal,
notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical
considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented
to it with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be
regarded as the law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other
issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal
questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.

In Ligtas vs People (G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015), what is decisive is that the issues which have
already been litigated in a final and executory judgment precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment,
an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation
of the same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of
the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to
be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue
to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can
no longer be resurrected anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by
the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.

PART II

Illustrate with at least two (2) cases each the consequences of the following:

Failure to avail the modes of discovery

In the case of Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club vs. Sanchez, (G.R. No.182738, February 24, 2014), states
that: A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be
punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states

A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished
for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible
treatment of a party as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail
of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if
a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or
other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such
orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is
not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others."

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated.1âwphi1 To the Court’s mind, the
September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It
is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the
Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence
of possible non-observance of the long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and
photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with the
directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the
mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

In the case of Santamaria vs Cleary (G.R. No. 197122), it states that: When a deposition does not conform
to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party, its
taking should not be allowed. This was the primary concern in Northwest Airlines v. Cruz. In that case, the
ends of justice would be better served if the witness was to be brought to the trial court to testify. The locus
of the oral deposition therein was not within the reach of ordinary citizens, as there were time constraints;
and the trip required a travel visa, bookings, and a substantial travel fare. In People v. Webb, the taking of
depositions was unnecessary, since the trial court had already admitted the Exhibits on which the witnesses
would have testified.

In Afulugencia vs Metro Bank & Trust Co., (G.R. No. 185145, February 5, 2014), to court discussed that
party’s failure to serve written interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the latter may not be compelled
by the former to testify in court or to render a deposition pending appeal. By failing to serve written
interrogatories upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their right to present the bank’s officers as their
witnesses.

Where a party unjustifiedly refuses to elicit facts material and relevant to his case by addressing written
interrogatories to the adverse party to elicit those facts, the latter may not thereafter be compelled to testify
thereon in court or give a deposition pending appeal. The justification for this is that the party in need of
said facts having foregone the opportunity to inquire into the same from the other party through means
available to him, he should not thereafter be permitted to unduly burden the latter with courtroom
appearances or other cumbersome processes. The sanction adopted by the Rules is not one of compulsion
in the sense that the party is being directly compelled to avail of the discovery mechanics, but one of
negation by depriving him of evidentiary sources which would otherwise have been accessible to him.

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed,
unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the
Rules, which provides –

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not
served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open
court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

The purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain
order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written
interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if
it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be
treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result
that a prior written interrogatories might bring.

Refusal to comply with modes of discovery

The sanction for refusal to comply with the modes of discovery may be summarized as follows
If a party refuses to answer any question upon oral examination, the proponent may apply the proper court,
for an order to answer. The same procedure may be availed of when party witnesses refuse to answer any
written interrogatory submitted pursuant to the rules on modes of discovery.

In 2014, Republic vs Santiago (G.R. No. 188881, April 21,) it states that:

Only a willful or bad-faith refusal to comply with a discovery order should warrant the imposition of a harsh
sanction under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court, like exclusion of evidence.

The primary basis for sanctions to be prescribed on abuse of discovery or a refusal to comply with discovery
proceedings is Rule 29 of the Rules of Court. With respect to the refusal to comply with an order to produce
and allow the inspection of a document issued under Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, Section 3 of Rule 29
specifically provides as follows:

Section 3. Other consequences. — If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey
an order made under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or an order under
Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to
be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property or an order made under Rule 28 requiring him to
submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are
just, and among others the following:

(a) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked, or the character or description of
the thing or land, or the contents of the paper, or the physical or mental condition of the party, or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim
of the party obtaining the order;

(b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses or
prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated documents or things or items of testimony, or from
introducing evidence of physical or mental condition;

(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed,
or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party; and

(d) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order directing the arrest of any party or
agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental
examination.

In other words, the sanctions may consist of: (a) regarding as established the contents of the document
sought to be produced; (b) refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose claims or defenses;
(c) prohibiting the disobedient party from introducing designated documents in evidence; (d) striking out
pleadings or parts thereof; (e) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; (f) dismissing the action
or any part thereof; (g) rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; and (h) directing the
arrest of the disobedient party.

The general purpose of the sanctions is to render the discovery process effective. Sanctions serve an
additional threefold purpose, namely: (1) to ensure that a party will not be able to profit from its own failure
to comply with discovery; (2) to secure compliance with the particular order at hand; and (3) to act as a
general deterrent in the case and in other litigations. In Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
the Court has observed that the choice of what sanction to impose upon the noncompliant party is within
the court’s sound discretion, and that such discretion should be exercised having always in mind the
paramount and overriding interest of justice, "[f]or while the modes of discovery are intended to attain the
resolution of litigations with great expediency, they are not contemplated, however, ultimately to be causes
of injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine well the circumstances of each case and to make their
considered determination thereafter.

In another case, Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club vs. Sanchez, (G.R. No.182738, February 24, 2014),
states that: A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice40 may be punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states
that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed
in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply. Under
Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an
order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to
be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court under
Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others.”
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law
imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or
proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of
court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred
in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance
with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose
designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.

REFERENCES:
https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/res+judicata
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis
http://legalresearch.org/writing-analysis/stare-decisis-techniques/
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stare%20decisis
http://attylaserna.blogspot.com/2015/12/conclusiveness-of-judgment.html
http://attylaserna.blogspot.com/2012/09/law-of-case-doctrine.html
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/L/LawofthecaseDoctrine.aspx