GAMBOA v. AGUIRRE, GR. No.

141307, 310 SCRA 867 (1999)

FACTS:
In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo
Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP
members, respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting
Governor for the duration of the former’s official trip abroad until his return.

When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session, respondents questioned the authority
of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor and asked him to vacate
the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do so. In another session, 7members of the SP voted to
allow petitioner to continue presiding while 4 others voted against with 1 abstention. Respondents
filed before the lower court a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime, the
Governor re-assumed his office. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as
“temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is
the Acting Governor.”

Petitioner filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier mentioned. Although this case is
dismissible for having become moot and academic considering the expiration in 1998 of the terms of
office of the local officials involved herein, the Court nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common
controversy but novel issue under the existing laws on local government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gamboa, while serving as the Acting Governor, temporarily relinquished the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to preside over the
sessions of the SP.

RULING:
YES.

Ratio Decidendi:
What the LGC provides:
The LGC provides that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to such
function, he becomes the Governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term of his
predecessor, in case of “permanent vacancy” therein. When the vacancy, however, is merely
temporary, the Vice-Governor “shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations)
and perform the duties and functions” of the Governor. But, no such contingency is provided in case
of temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor.

When the Vice- Governor exercises the “powers and duties” of the Governor, he does not assume the
latter office. He only “acts” as the Governor but does not “become” the Governor. His assumption of
the powers, duties and functions of the provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent
vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor. Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor
abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming an Acting Governor or by merely
exercising the powers and duties of the higher office. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting
Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative
prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. By tradition,
the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas
plain members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character. This is
because the authority vested by law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some
legislative powers of Congress.
MENZON v. PETILLA, GR No. 90762, May 20, 1991

FACTS:
In 1988, the DILG Secretary Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting
Governor of Leyte in view of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte.

Subsequently, Santos also designated Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon then took his oath of
office.

In 1989, the provincial administrator inquired from DILG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to
the legality of the appointment of Menzon to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.

Rubillar, Jr. replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-
Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of Menzon as the temporary Vice-
Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the
Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices.

As a result of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505 where it
invalidated the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.

Menzon then wrote to Undersecretary Rubillar to clarify the opinion that the latter issued. Rubillar
replied that Menzon was merely designated to act as vice governor. He was not appointed to the post
since there was no vacancy of the office to speak of.

As a result of this clarificatory letter, the DILG Regional Director requested Governor Petilla that the
resolution issued by the Sanggunian be modified so that Menzon would be able receive his salary as
vice governor, if he was deprived of such. However, Petilla and the Sanggunian refused to correct
Resolution 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of
Vice-Governor.

It was at this instance that Menzon decided to file this petition to determine whether he is entitled to
the emoluments for his services rendered as designated acting vice‐governor. During the pendency of
this case, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed
Governor of Leyte.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a vacancy

RULING:
Yes. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu
contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at
present the duties of the office.

In this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly
elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the
office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of
the office of the Vice-Governor.

There is no showing that Leopoldo Petilla continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-
Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge
them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic
assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor.
The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the
need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the
discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that
particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an
appointment made by a higher authority.
LA CARLOTA CITY v. ROJO, GR No. 181367, April 24, 2012

FACTS:
On March 18, 2004, [the] then Vice-Mayor Rex R. Jalandoon of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental
appointed Atty. Rex G. Rojo (or Rojo) who had just tendered his resignation as member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod the day preceding such appointment, as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary.
The status of the appointment was permanent. The next day, March 19, 2004, the Vice-Mayor
submitted Rojos appointment papers to the Civil Service Commission Negros Occidental Field Office
(CSCFO-Negros Occidental) for attestation. In a Letter dated March 24, 2004, the said CSCFO wrote
Jalandoon to inform him of the infirmities the office found on the appointment documents, i.e. the
Chairman of the Personnel Selection Board and the Human Resource Management Officer did not sign
the certifications, the latter relative to the completeness of the documents as well as to the
publication requirement. In view of the failure of the appointing authority to comply with the
directive, the said CSCFO considered the appointment of Rojo permanently recalled or withdrawn, in
a subsequent Letter to Jalandoon dated April 14, 2004.

Jalandoon deemed the recall a disapproval of the appointment, hence, he brought the matter to the
CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Iloilo City, by way of an appeal. He averred that the Human Resource
Management Officer of La Carlota City refused to affix his signature on Rojo’s appointment documents
but nonetheless transmitted them to the CSCFO. Such transmittal, according to Jalandoon, should be
construed that the appointment was complete and regular and that it complied with the pertinent
requirements of a valid appointment. Before the said CSC Regional Office No. 6 [could resolve the
appeal], the City of La Carlota represented by the newly elected mayor, Hon. Jeffrey P. Ferrer and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod represented by the newly elected Vice-Mayor, Hon. Demie John C. Honrado,
collectively, the petitioners herein, intervened. They argued that Jalandoon is not the real party in
interest in the appeal but Rojo who, by his inaction, should be considered to have waived his right to
appeal from the disapproval of his appointment; that the appointment was made within the period of
the election ban prior to the May 14, 2004 national and local elections, and finally, that the resignation
of Rojo as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod is ineffective having not complied with the
provision on quorum under Section 82(d) of R.A. No. 7160.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENT AS SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD SECRETARY
VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION AGAINST ELIGIBILITY OF AN ELECTIVE OFFICIAL FOR
APPOINTMENT DURING HIS TENURE

RULING:

The 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code which provides, among
others, the powers, functions and duties of local officials and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local government units. Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
states:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
 functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Local Government Code shall x x x provide for the x x x powers and functions and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. In
short, whether a vice-mayor has the power, function or duty of a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is determined by the Local Government Code.

On 10 October 1991, the Congress approved RA 7160 or the Local Government Code. Under RA 7160,
the city vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, thus:

Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the
municipal vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the
sangguniang barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.

(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian
session, the members present and consisting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from the passage of
ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which he

RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as
presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng
mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the
sectoral representatives, as members. As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to break
a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the
votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
considering that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe
otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to
break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a member of the Sanggunian.
MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTY CORPORATION, 234 SCRA 255 (1994)

FACTS:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and
enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing
business permit to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93,
prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the
police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

RULING:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for
the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power
under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: Sec. 16.

General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be
amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first
place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.
For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.