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REPORTS
A thematic report from the Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010
Introduction
Following a comprehensive mapping exercise of existing scenario 1) First, a continued failure to resolve important issues relating
reports on the fate of Southern Sudan and the Comprehensive to implementation of the CPA, including the census, electoral
Peace Agreement (CPA) process, there appears to be a broad register, border demarcation and oil revenue agreement, is
consensus that the humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan a recipe for disaster in Sudan. It certainly could lead to
will deteriorate in 2010. armed conflict between the North and South and/or within
the border states of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile,
This report seeks to acknowledge the negative impact a failed even though the CPA process itself is completed.
CPA process would have on the humanitarian situation in
Southern Sudan, while making the case that failing to address 2) Second, irrespective of progress with the CPA, there is an
intra-South causes of conflict would render a successful urgent need to increase activities that focus on mitigating
CPA process largely meaningless with regards to the current potential triggers for violence within Southern Sudan. This
humanitarian situation in the South. includes election/referendum awareness education to combat
Southerners’ limited access to information and therefore
It is important to stress that although interrelated, the problems questionable understanding of the processes involved;
associated with the CPA process and the causes of intra-South conflict resolution work in the areas worst affected by
violence must be seen as two separate issues, for the purpose of inter-ethnic conflict over resource-use rights; and boosting
effectively addressing both of them. It is obvious that a smooth the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)
and legitimate CPA process would reduce the risks of renewed and its state governments.
North/South fighting, but it would not address the root causes
of most intra-South conflicts. 3) Third, displacement and humanitarian needs will continue to
increase dramatically in 2010 due to intra-Southern conflicts
There still remains a window of opportunity to remedy some resulting from inter-ethnic tensions, water and grazing rights
of the existing problems in Southern Sudan and mitigate against disputes, food insecurity and political marginalisation of
others. However, this window is narrowing quickly as the April minority ethnic groups. Emergency response capacities must
national elections and the 2011 referendum on independence be immediately boosted, both where intra-Southern conflicts
approach. are combined with deteriorating food security, as well as in
the areas historically most vulnerable to renewed North/
In this report NRC outlines three priority areas where international South fighting.
and domestic partners need to focus their activities in order to
address the expected humanitarian challenges in 2010-11.
List of contents
INTRODUCTION 2 PREPARING FOR A WORSENING annex 2: SELECTED IMPORTANT EVENTS:
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 11 2005-2009 19
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT
– KEY CHALLENGES 3 CONCLUSION 16 annex 3: Norwegian refugee council
operations in sudan 20
REDUCING THE POTEnTIAL FOR INCREASED KEY RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 17
C ONFLICT WITHIN SOUTHERN SUDAN 5 annex 4: mapping of existing
annex i: KEY FACTS ABOUT SUDAN 18 sudan scenario reports 21
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NATIONAL ELECTIONS: Southerners in Yei, Central
Equatoria, queuing up to register to vote in the April 2010
national elections. As promised in the 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), the elections are planned to be
Sudan’s first full, multi-party poll in 24 years.
issues have been dangerously neglected, directly contributing to a strong likelihood that no process will satisfy both sides at once).
an increased risk of North/South conflict in 2010-11. Each of • C
onsidering the limited timeframe before the planned
the issues listed above could contribute to increased instability national elections, it is unlikely that all issues relating to
in their own way: Darfuri participation in the elections can be resolved prior
• An election process that is undermined by real or perceived to April. The mandate of the Government of National Unity
failings in 2010 will likely lead to civil unrest in areas with expires in July 2010; if elections are not held or amendments
disputed results. are not made to the 2005 CPA beforehand a constitutional
• A flawed referendum law or loss of faith in the referendum crisis could emerge.
process by Southerners could lead to a unilateral declaration
of independence by the GoSS. There is general consensus that an independent South is the most
• Disputed borders create opportunities for armed conflict likely outcome of a referendum vote in 2011. International
(e.g. Ethiopia/Eritrea; Abyei clashes in May 2008). partners must work from this assumption and focus on ensuring
• The economic uncertainties for both North and South with that the mechanisms for secession are in place and that Southern
regard to oil revenues mean that the risk for armed conflict for Sudan is capable of operating as a viable nation state.
control of oil resources is a strong possibility in the absence
of a negotiated settlement. Excluding the obstacles relating to elections and a referendum law,
• Lack of procedures for North/South military and administrative all of the issues listed above will continue to require resolution
bodies creates ample opportunity for conflict (especially in even in the event of a Southern declaration of independence.
the case of an independent South). The humanitarian, economic and administrative consequences
• The ethnic splits in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile along of an abandoned or illegitimate CPA process are clearly visible
North/South sympathies create a high risk for conflict if both in the history of Sudan’s Second Civil War and should not be
sides are not satisfied that their views have been heard (with underestimated.
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VOTER REGISTRATION: A woman registering to vote outside Aweil, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, during voter registrations in November and
December 2009. People needed either their birth certificate or a witness to verify their identity when registering. Witnesses were commonly
used throughout Southern Sudan.
International and domestic partners must focus on the kinds of i mplemented civilian disarmament programmes; insufficient
activities than can help to mitigate potential triggers for violence efforts to increase civilian and military security force capacity
within Southern Sudan such as: limited understanding of the to ‘maintain’ peace; poor investment in strengthening the ‘rule
election and referendum; inadequate conflict resolution mechanisms of law’ infrastructure in Southern Sudan; and insufficient
for handling land, water and grazing rights issues; poorly integration of tribal leaders into the GoSS political arena ››
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WEAK INFRASTRUCTURE: The unsealed airstrip on Aweil airport, Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Lack of - or weak - infrastructure is a
challenge for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and access to markets in remote areas of Southern Sudan.
(within both Juba-based institutions and state governments). • Identify areas where election education can most easily take
These issues will be important for reducing conflict in Southern place; and
Sudan regardless of whether it becomes independent or not. • Identify areas with the lowest levels of election and referendum
awareness.
Election/referendum education
Election and referendum expectations of Southerners will be The extensive survey done by the National Democratic Institute
a major risk factor in 2010-11, and informing the population (NDI), Imagining the election: A Look at What Sudan’s Citizens
should be seen as a significant part of reducing the potential Know and Expect of Sudan’s 2010 Vote, clearly identifies worrying
for increased violence and displacement over the 2010-11 period. expectations and misunderstandings regarding upcoming voting
Given the short timeframe before the 2010 elections every exercises. Many Southerners are already sceptical of an election
effort should be made to integrate training and information process and fear it could lead to new struggles for power within
dissemination about the elections and referendum into all the South, but many are also unaware of the difference between
aspects of donor activity where possible in the coming the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum.
months. In order to ensure the most efficient use of resources,
international and domestic partners should first: Perhaps the most dangerous trend was the misconception that ››
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Southerners would be voting for independence in 2010. Given The failure of the CPA process to deliver a meaningful peace
that there is a strong likelihood that the NCP and President dividend has left many Southerners disillusioned with the process
Bashir will remain in power following the 2010 elections (a and in some cases feeling that the security situation is getting
result many Southerners already say they will not accept), it is worse rather than better. Three key steps to boosting the peace
important that large numbers of Southerners do not take this to dividend are: strengthening conflict resolution capacities in
mean that a referendum on independence for the South is no the GoSS, alongside increased investment in the security
longer an option. International and domestic partners must be apparatus such as building more police stations with appropriate
enlisted to increase awareness raising activities, using existing resourcing; a more realistic focus on boosting the GoSS’s ability
channels and services to engage as many communities as possible. to deliver basic services; and streamlining donor funding
mechanisms for projects being carried out in Southern Sudan.
Three target areas for generating a greater peace dividend
Another destabilising factor in Southern Sudan has been the Conflict resolution capacities
lack of a substantial peace dividend as a result of the CPA to The failure to create an improved security environment has
date. This is largely due to the failure of donors and the GoSS had the farthest reaching impact on the Southern population.
to deliver a higher degree of improved infrastructure, education Over 300,000 people were displaced by inter-ethnic fighting in
and health services and an improved security environment, Southern Sudan in 2009, excluding those displaced by attacks
particularly outside Juba. There are multiple causes contributing by the nominally Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group
to this: lack of capacity in government agencies, inflexible and in Western and Central Equatoria states. Priority must be given
bureaucratic mechanisms for donor funding, poor coordination to improving the GoSS’s administrative capacities in the areas
between implementing agencies (international and domestic) most vulnerable to conflict resulting from disputes over access
and strong allegations of corruption within the GoSS. to basic resources (water, grazing rights, etc).
The data in the map are subject to availability of IDP figures at the time of Blue
production and represents numbers reported by authorities and/or assessment
teams. It does not claim to be exhaustive or fully verified.
Sudan
White
Nile
Nile #
* Current Humanitarian Operations
58367
boundaries based on Russian Sudan
Upper Nile
Map Series, 1:200k, 1970-ties.
County Boundaries digitized based on
Statistical Yearbook 2009
E
Southern Sudan Commission for Census,
Statistics and Evaluation - SSCCSE.
Digitized by IMU OCHA Southern Sudan
) Malakal
E
"
E 0 ) Aweil
"
3272
"
)
Warrap
37935 124355 E
E EE
#
*
812
) Wau
" Jonglei
E #
*
E
#
*
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Western Bahr el Ghazal
E 48122 E
#
*
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#
*
Ethiopia
EE E
#
* Rumbek
Lakes
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E E
#
*
E E
#
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African
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* #
* #
*
E
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#
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Bor
Sudan
76726
E
Western Equatoria
E
Eritrea
#
*
Southern
Ethiopia
E
#
*
#
*
EE #
* E#
*
#
*
Eastern Equatoria
E E
Central
EE
#
*
African
Sudan Democratic ) Juba
13900
Republic "
Central Equatoria
Republic of Congo
E
Democratic
Republic of Congo Uganda Kenya
#
* 27890 #
) Yambio
"
0 50 100
Kilometers
200 300 400
E#
* E
*
) Torit
"
E
Kenya
The information shown on this map does not imply official recognition or endorsement of any physical, Code: SS-0071
political boundaries or feature names by the United Nations or other collaborative organizations. UN OCHA
and affiliated organizations are not liable for damages of any kind related to the use of this data. Date: 31/12/09 Uganda
Users noting errors or omissions are encouraged to contact the IM Unit, OCHA at imusouth@un.org IMU OCHA SS
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The lack of capacity within Juba-based GoSS institutions and they will be arriving on the banks of the Sobat from December
state governments to mediate, monitor and enforce access to onwards, creating tensions with the Jikany in the area.
these resources between different ethnic groups has played a Directing resources to areas known to be at risk may prove
significant role in the rising levels of inter-ethnic violence preventative if activities are well planned, timed and executed.
witnessed in 2009. Insecurity makes the delivery of health and Conflict resolution efforts carried out by the UNDP, UNMIS
education services, water and sanitation, food security measures and others between migrating nomads and host communities
and livelihood assistance more difficult (or impossible in the in areas such as Abyei, Unity and Jonglei need to be increased
most insecure areas), disrupts economic activities and food in both scope and frequency and seen as imperative to achieving
production, undermines trust in the GoSS by citizens and sows a minimum level of security in the South. Better tracking of the
the seeds for further conflict in the future. political linkages between government and ethnic groups will
also be key, as the politicisation of more traditional conflicts
Increased conflict resolution activities should focus on the over resource access etc, will undermine resolution efforts that
areas known to be prone to inter-ethnic conflict over water and do not take this reality into account.
grazing resources, especially in Jonglei (including North Jonglei/
Upper Nile border), Lakes, Warrap/Unity border and Upper Improving the GoSS’s ability to maintain peace is imperative
Nile. The International Crisis Group’s, Jonglei’s tribal conflicts: if Southern Sudan is to become a viable independent state.
countering insecurity in South Sudan, provides a good example The number of people killed and displaced as a direct result of
of largely knowing of an area where the risk of conflict is intra-South conflict in 2009 highlights the limited impact even
greatest:along the Sobat River on the Jonglei/Upper Nile border a successful CPA process would have on security in Southern
two groups (Lou and Jikany) have consistently had conflicts Sudan. Moreover, there are concerns that the lack of a common
since the 1990s. Given the poor rains in Jonglei in 2009 and the enemy among Southern groups could further destabilise
traditional watering routes used by the Lou, it is known that Southern Sudan in a post-referendum/independence future.
››
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Greater practical focus on increasing Projects must deliver services while simultaneously building capacity
basic service delivery capacities well into the medium-term. As noted by Oxfam in its most recent
In order to address some of the medium- and long-term report on Southern Sudan, the GoSS has only 150 internationals
objectives of improving basic service delivery by the GoSS, more providing technical assistance throughout its ministries, while there
effort needs to be made to improve the administrative capacities were over 3,000 individuals working within the government in
of local and central authorities. At present international post-war Mozambique in 1990. The secondment of a substantial
NGOs provide over 80% of all education and health services in number of persons with leadership experience from local, regional
Southern Sudan. This situation is unsustainable and is the direct and central government agencies in partner countries to the central
result of a failure to develop capacities within the GoSS and and provincial government agencies of the GoSS, could provide an
state governments. Efforts should focus on a realistic timeframe efficient mechanism for recruiting and deploying an increased num-
for handing service delivery responsibilities over to the GoSS, ber of internationals to assist the GoSS in a timely manner. These
but must accept that this will not be possible in the immediate deployments should focus on project management, budgeting and
future. The South did not exist as a state before and the control, interaction with the political leadership and greater
international community should accept that building a viable integration of tribal leaders in decision making processes. These
state will take a very long time and large amounts of aid and individuals would be seconded either directly to the relevant authorities
technical assistance will be required, possibly for decades. or with loose affiliation to UN organisations or other partners. ››
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More efficient donor funding mechanisms Donors need to directly target organisations that have proven
In order to achieve the aim of generating a greater peace dividend implementation capacity and have demonstrated results and
and boost capacity development and service delivery, changes restrict usage of multi-donor funding mechanisms to speed the
must be made to the donor funding mechanisms currently in disbursement of aid flows. Funds that are currently being
place in Southern Sudan. The low level of disbursements from the channelled through UN agencies by donor countries to NGOs
Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for Southern Sudan highlights should be disbursed directly to larger NGOs and avoid the
the inappropriateness of the mechanisms governing the fund and administrative costs and delays of using UN agencies to disburse
the need for a change in how donors direct aid to the region. funds. By doing this, UN agencies would still play an important
role in the disbursement of funds to smaller NGOs with
Total donor funds paid into the MDTF for Southern Sudan limited capacity, and would also be able to play a larger role as a
since its inception were US$593.4m in June 2009. However, coordinating body for all assistance programmes in the South.
the total value of grant agreements signed by the MDTF has
only reached US$234.7m, while the amount actually disbursed By boosting the through-flow of aid funds into Southern Sudan,
was even lower at just US$159.3m. When considering the the necessary increases in large-scale investment programmes
exceptionally low level of development in Southern Sudan for schools, clinics, roads, administration buildings, education
and the extensive investment requirements, a disbursal rate programmes, and teacher and nurse training can be achieved.
of around 27% cannot be considered sufficient.
SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION: A school being built by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Aweil, Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Large scale
investments by donors and the GoSS in school construction and education activities are crucial to meet basic needs and generate a greater
peace dividend in Southern Sudan.
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Preparing for
a worsening
humanitarian crisis
››
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1
UN OCHA, Southern Sudan, December 2009 2
www.internal-displacement.org/countries/Sudan
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The United Nations Security Council has provided UNMIS to work together with GoSS to secure airstrips and main roads
with a partial Chapter VII Mandate to ensure that necessary and ensure ambient security in conflict areas with communities
action can be taken to protect civilians. Given the enormous in need of humanitarian assistance, thus allowing access for
size of Southern Sudan, the extremely challenging logistical assistance provided by UN agencies and NGOs.
conditions and the vast amount of armed groups engaged in
fighting in several provinces of the South, providing direct Boosting preparedness in areas most at risk from renewed
protection to civilians will prove extremely difficult for UNMIS. North/South fighting and LRA-affected areas
The force strength is insufficient, areas of practical operation are Historical displacement patterns should be used as strategy
too limited and there’s both a lack of support from DPKO for tools. During the Second Civil War IDPs from oil-rich areas
protection activities, and unclear expectations of UNMIS, in pre-2005 tended to move towards North Jonglei, Unity, Warrap,
terms of protection of civilians. and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states. In the case of renewed
North/South conflict it is very likely that these areas will see
An alternative and complimentary strategy for strengthened similar IDP movement trends. In addition to this, non-Arab
civilian protection is to improve access in order for humanitarian populations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are more likely
organisations to deliver assistance (emergency shelter, non-food to head for the South if fighting resumes in order to avoid being
items (NFIs), food security items, basic health services, etc) that caught on the “wrong” side of the border, in the context of an
will, if provided professionally, reduce people’s vulnerabilities independent Southern Sudan. Again, this indicates a large influx
to protection risks. UNMIS could play a key role in improving of IDPs into Upper Nile, Unity, Warrap and Northern Bahr el
access for humanitarian organisations. The priority should be Ghazal states if fighting resumes. ››
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Chronic hunger %
SA
0 5 10 15 20 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used
on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance
UD
by the United Nations.
Lake
IA
R
South
SUDAN
EGYPT Nasser Administrative
RABIA
E
L i b
boundary
D
Halaib
SE
Wadi Halfa
y a
A
Semna West
North Selima Oasis
Lake Kumma
N u b i a n
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Wadi Odib
Nubia Muhammad
n
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N O R T H E R N
D e s e r t
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Female illiteracy %
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WESTERN Kosti
En Nahud D Gonder
DARFUR WHITE
5 years primary education % SENNAR
ind
Nyala T'ana
SOUTHERN KORDOFAN Renk Hayk'
0 20 40 60 80 100 Ed Da‘ein Al Fula BLUE
Ed Damazin Aba
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lu
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Radom
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AFRICAN
al
ba Kigille
WESTERN Aweil BAHR (Addis Ababa)
ez Za
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Full child immunisation % SUDAN Kenamuke Towot
ite
Swamp Administrative
Nile
Yambio
Maridi Juba
Town CENTRAL Torit Lotagipi
Ch'ew Bahir
North Track
Railroad
0 100 200 300 km
Victoria
KENYA
Nile
0 100 200 mi
L. Albert L. Salisbury
L. Kyoga
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• GoSS is unable to disarm militias the same, simply minus the South? Separate from the outstanding issues between
• North fails to lend assistance to avoid • The failure of the GoSS and UN agencies to the North and South is the internal problem
violence in the South implement a viable and effective civilian in the South of a lack of a viable security
disarmament programme in the South. apparatus that can protect civilians, disarm
Civil War, from Tinderbox to Conflagration: militias and enforce the rule of law.
Main characteristics Report conclusions Forced Unity. Professionalisation efforts put
• North and South lack a shared vision of the The overriding conclusions from the USIP on hold as SPLA is mobilised for renewed
CPA or the future publications are that there are big overarching fighting against the North. NCP exploits
• Joint integrated units (JIUs) are ineffective in issues such as 2008 census results, border existing divisions within the SPLA/M, but
• Issues of oil revenue sharing remain unresolved demarcation and oil revenue/production Southern forces also more unified against a
• Militia activity continues in the North and agreements between the North and South “common enemy” in the North. Efforts to
South (violence rising) that must be resolved if there is any hope integrate the SPLA into a national force are
• Census results remain disputed by both for maintaining a minimum level of peace unlikely to be successful under this scenario.
sides surrounding the referendum or immediately Forced Secession. Professionalisation efforts
• Referendum law passed though SPLM thereafter. Although USIP scenarios do not put on hold all forces mobilise for renewed
unhappy with final version explicitly outline the humanitarian impacts fighting with the North. Possible splits
• Disarmament does not happen, arms of each case, it is clear that without resolution between SPLA/M (South) and SPLA/M
building on both sides of these outstanding policy issues, the (North) exacerbate insecurity in the South.
• Following a vote for secession by the South, potential for violence will only increase Possilbe disruptions to oil flows would limit
North sends troops to defend oil fields, around the elections and referendum, limiting South’s ability to pay its soldiers.
including some in the South humanitarian efforts to disaster management Agreed Unity. SPLA would be integrated into
• Conflict between the SPLA and Northern and undermining any longer-term development the national army, largely following on the
army erupts around oil region objectives as a result of the unstable macro examples already existing in the JIUs in some
political context. areas. There would also likely be elements
Muddling through: Main characteristics of the SPLA who would not accept this
• A compromise is reached on the 2008 C) European Institute for Security outcome and become an enemy of the
census results Studies (ISS)—three scenarios government in Juba.
• North and South share some semblance for the South Agreed Secession. Professionalisation of
of a vision for a post-referendum Sudan The EU ISS report focuses on the four potential SPLA and Southern security services essential
(before the referendum is held), be it as one outcomes of the next two years: Forced Unity, for the South to become a viable state. A likely
or two nations (some agreements reached Forced Secession, Agreed Unity and Agreed increase in internal conflicts between southern
on key questions of oil revenues and border Secession. Under each of these possibilities, groups as they vie for power and resources
demarcation) the ISS report identifies how key variables will and the state lacks the capacity to contain
• Resolution of outstanding issues relating to affect the outcome. outbreaks of violence.
Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile before
the referendum Variable one: SPLM/NCP negotiate post-2011 The upturn in intra-Southern violence in
issues ahead of referendum 2009 highlights the GoSS’s lack of capacity on
In a separate USIP report, Six important Issues relating to oil revenue sharing, border the internal security front. Although there are
issues for Sudan and its future, USIP focuses demarcation, ownership of state assets, strong suspicions that the NCP is exacerbating
on issues thus far seemingly under explored. North-South security arrangements and problems by arming southern tribes to fight
The issues are: resource agreements (water) all desperately each other, food insecurity and traditional
• Lack of a definition of the term “Popular need to be addressed to reduce the risks of conflicts over water and grazing rights are
consultation” to be employed in South renewed conflict in Sudan. also key factors. Poorly executed disarmament
Kordofan and Blue Nile at the time of the Forced Unity. If negotiations unsuccessful programmes have in many cases made insecurity
referendum on secession. a high likelihood of return to war; worse though asymmetric implementation and
• Fate of Southerners in the North (over Forced Secession. There is a high potential a failure to provide protection for civilians
500,000) if the South votes for independence. for return to war, but also a “no war, no from armed groups. There is concern that
Some expectations of violence against peace” situation. Instability remains high without a common enemy in the North,
Southerners (mainly around Khartoum) if similar to Eritrea/Ethiopia situation. Southern groups cannot maintain a minimum
South secedes. Concerns that the GoSS does Agreed Unity. Negotiations less urgent and level of unity to become a viable state – regardless
not have the capacity to handle a large influx risks of full-scale war are reduced. Some of how it may become independent.
of Southerners coming from the North in an wealth and security agreements will still need
independent South—especially in border to be reached between North and South. Variable three: Credible popular consultation
states where they would arrive first. Agreed Secession. If some post-2011 issues processes in South Kordofan and Blue Nile
• Whether or not the SPLM will put forward a are resolved before the referendum then a states.
Presidential candidate in the 2010 elections. much-reduced risk for return to conflict
• Decentralisation efforts in the South: between North and South. New terms CPA implementation in these areas is considered
How long will the population be patient would need to be set out for establishing to be lagging far behind. At present there is no
with GoSS’s failure to deliver services inter-state cooperation on certain issues; A clear idea of what popular consultation”
and strengthen local and regional higher likelihood of smooth transition and means and what it would look like. There is
administrations? reduced risk of conflict in transitional areas. concern that this process will not adequately
• What would a post-secession Northern Variable two: Progress on professionalizing address grievances that could lead to new
Sudan look like? Would it be more or less the SPLA and Southern security services conflict in these state either before or after 2011.
››
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Forced Unity. Strengthened links between • Timely preparation of elections, including a new North-South war in Sudan. Although
SMPLA/M (South) and groups in Nuba and voter education and registration somewhat on the doomsday side of things,
Blue Nile. Strong possibility of a return to • Timely resolution of census and agreement this scenario is not the most unlikely of those
North-South war. on border demarcation and Referendum Act summarised in this report. The Pandora’s box
Forced Secession. Uncertainty of role of • Peaceful civilian disarmament scenario would look something like this:
SPLA/M in Nuba and Blue Nile regions. • Effective measures for conflict resolution • High levels of election-related violence
Risk of conflict in these regions heightened • Timely implementation of Juba Compact surrounding the 2010 elections which were
and also in Abyei if local conflicts • Norma rainfall and improved trade delayed until June—only just before the
regarding grazing rights for Misseriya remain GNU’s mandate expires in July
unresolved. Proxy war tactics of NCP likely Worst Case: Main triggers • Election results are highly disputed and
to be used in again following referendum • Intransigence by both parties on CPA issues rejected by most Southerners. Most cannot
– increased conflict. • Election-related violence accept that the NCP and Bashir remain
Agreed Unity. SPLA merged into national • SPLA-led forced disarmament of armed in power and failure to resolve voting
army based on JIUs. Increased involvement groups problems with Darfur undermine legitimacy
of SPLM on national stage empowers South • Inadequate conflict prevention and mitigation of the election
Kordofan/Blue Nile non-Arab populations. measures • The South declares unilateral independence
Reduced risks for conflict. • Clashes along the North/South border • North South fighting resumes along the
Agreed Secession. Uncertainty of role of • Inter-ethnic violence and LRA attacks deep border, especially oil areas
SPLA/M in Nuba and Blue Nile. Risks of within Southern Sudan • GoSS receives aerial support from Ugandan
renewed conflict and proxy war tactics by • Large-scale displacement and Ethiopian militaries
NCP in these areas. • Sharp drop in crop production • Eritrea supports the North, as do players in
the Middle East and Arab League
Report conclusions Most Likely Case: Main triggers • GoSS is wracked by insecurity in several
The overall conclusions that can be taken • Election-related violence areas owing to militias backed by NCP,
from the ISS report are that Agreed Unity • SPLA-led forced disarmament Eritrea and Middle East players. SPLA
scenarios offer the greatest chance for peace • LRA attacks along DRC border mostly focussed on border fighting and
between the North and South, but may lead • Inter-ethnic violence holding oil-rich areas
to increase intra-South fighting as some • Implementation of the Juba Compact • IDPs flood from the border areas further
groups are unwilling to accept anything other • High food prices South and from other areas into North
than Southern independence. Again, this Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia
report highlights the overarching policy issues Report conclusions • Economies on both sides of the border are
that will largely make or break prospects for As can be seen from these three scenarios, crumbling as oil production disrupted
peace between North and South. It also the main triggers currently most active are in (regardless of which side controls the oil
highlights how the lack of capacity of the the Worst and Most likely scenario outcomes. fields)
GoSS promises to be a source of conflict and Under these two scenarios OCHA expects • North becomes increasingly isolated
instability in an independent South, regardless large-scale displacements. Under the Worst internationally (ie Eritrea) and increased
of how they get there. The report concludes Case, displaced peoples reach over 500,000, Islamicisation of Northern regime
(as do others) that Agreed Unity scenarios are but when considering that at end-2009 over • Eritrea acts as a conduit for Mujahideen
the least likely going forward. The attractive- 250,000 were displaced as a result of this year’s from Somalia to engage in Sudan
ness of unity with the North for Southerners violence (mainly inter-ethnic), IDPs under the • A new conflict theatre of Christian (West)
has been further reduced by the failure to fully Most Likely Case would likely not be too far vs Muslims is born
implement the CPA over the last 4-5 years. below the levels in the Worst Case. Although
Given this, scenarios for Forced Secession oil prices are forecast to rebound strongly in This scenario recognises certain dynamics
or Agreed Secession are the most plausible 2010, thus boosting GoSS coffers, the political that are currently playing out in the Eritrea/
– both of which foresee increased levels of challenges associated with the CPA, lack Ethiopia conflict and the Somalia conflict.
violence and insecurity in the South and of disarmament and predicted lower food There are interests at play in Somalia that
border states. production (as predicted by FAO), make a would be equally influential in a North-South
scenario closer to the Worst case the most war portrayed as a war between Christians
D) OCHA—three scenario plausible outcome in 2010. Perhaps the most and Muslims. This scenario would have severe
The OCHA has developed three scenarios striking aspect of these scenarios is that consequences for Ethiopian security policy
for its Humanitarian Action Plan 2010 for regardless of whether there is a return to as a nominally Christian country in an
Southern Sudan. Four key variables have been fighting between the North and South, IDPs increasingly radicalised Horn region. Oil
identified to outcomes in Southern Sudan: are set to rise sharply simply as a product of production could resume if the South retain
Inter-ethnic related violence (including LRA intra-Southern violence. control, but only after a pipeline is constructed
violence); Food gaps; GoSS budgetary into Uganda and Kenya—there are several
pressures; and political challenges (including technical reasons why this would be difficult,
failure of CPA implementation. The three E) A new scenario for this report: but regardless, it would take between 18-24
scenarios are classified as Best Case, Worst Pandora’s box – worst case months for a pipeline to be built under the
Case and Most Likely Case. scenario best conditions.
Many of the scenarios outlined in the above
Best Case: Main triggers reports focus almost exclusively on outcomes
• Resolution of census disagreements within Sudan and do not make extensive
between NCP and SPLM reference to the potential regional impacts of
››
23 nrc REPORTS
NRC > Sudan report
0. Present
1. CPA Hurray! (IKV PAX); Best case…
(OCHA) Security
2. Muddling Through (USIP); Most likely case (OCHA)
3. Costly secession (USIP)
4. Border Wars (IKV PAX); Worst case (OCHA) 1
5. Civil war…(USIP)
6. Somalia? (IKV PAX)
7. Pandora’s box scenario
CPA Process 2
5
6
7
24 nrc REPORTS
NRC > Sudan report
Editor: Thomas Horne Author: Christopher Eads Acknowledgments: The author has benefited from discussions with and would like to
thank NRC Sudan and NRC Head Office. Design and Layout: Cox. All photos: Therese Witt. ISBN: 978-82-7411-202-5.
25 nrc REPORTS