ST. JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY vs. SAMAHANG workers are actually St.
s are actually St. James' regular employees in its motor
MANGGAGAWA SA ST. JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY
GR No. 151326, 2005-11-23
Facts:
1. The Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James School of Quezon
City ("Samahang Manggagawa") filed a petition for
certification election to determine the collective bargaining
representative of the motor pool, construction and
transportation employees of St. James School of Quezon
City ("St. James")
2. There were 149 eligible voters and 84 voters cast their
votes.
3. St. James filed a certification election protest challenging
the 84 votes. St. James alleged that it had 179 rank and file
employees, none of whom voted in the certification
election. St. James argued that those who voted were not its
regular employees but construction workers of an
independent contractor, Architect Conrado Bacoy
4. MED-ARBITER ruled that at the time of the certification
election, the 84 voters were no longer working at St. James.
It also ruled that since the construction projects have ceased,
some of the workers were no longer entitled to vote in the
certification election.
5. Samahang Manggagawa appealed to THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR. The DOLE reversed the ruling. The DOLE ruled that
Samahang Manggagawa seeks to represent the non-
academic personnel or the rank and file employees from
the motor pool, construction and transportation
departments, and not all the rank and file employees of St.
James.
The DOLE ruled that the list submitted by St. James contained
only the administrative, teaching and office personnel of the
school.
Issues:
St. James questions the validity of the formation of the labor
union and the validity of the certification election.
Ruling:
THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT.
The Validity of the Formation of the Labor Union
St. James may no longer question the validity of the
formation of the labor union.
The Med-Arbiter recommended the cancellation of the union
registration. DOLE Regional Director IV Romeo Young
("Director Young") adopted the Med-Arbiter's
recommendation and cancelled Samahang Manggagawa's
union registration.
The BLR reversed Director Young's Decision the Court of
Appeals dismissed St. James' petition and affirmed the BLR's
Decision. The Court of Appeals ruled that the construction
pool, construction and transportation departments. The
Court of Appeals also ruled that Architect Bacoy is a labor-
only contractor and thus an agent of St. James, which is the
real employer.
This Court denied the petition for St. James' error in the
choice or mode of appeal
The Validity of the Certification Election
According to St. James, the certification election was
conducted without quorum.
WE CANNOT SUSTAIN THE ARGUMENT.
St. James has five campuses the Philamlife and Scout Alcaraz,
Quezon City campuses which are pre-schools; the Parañaque
City and Calamba, Laguna campuses which offer elementary,
secondary and college education; and the Tandang Sora,
Quezon City campus which offers elementary and secondary
education.
The members of Samahang Manggagawa are employees in
the Tandang Sora campus. Under its constitution and by-
laws, Samahang Manggagawa seeks to represent the motor
pool, construction and transportation employees of the
Tandang Sora campus. Thus, the computation of the quorum
should be based on the rank and file motor pool,
construction and transportation employees of the Tandang
Sora campus and not on all the employees in St. James' five
campuses.
Section 2, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides:
Section 2. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion
proceedings.
All employees who are members of the appropriate
bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner at
the time of the certification or consent election shall be
qualified to vote. A dismissed employee whose dismissal is
being contested in a pending case shall be allowed to vote in
the election.
In case of disagreement over the voters' list or over the
eligibility of voters, all contested voters shall be allowed to
vote. However, their votes shall be segregated and sealed in
individual envelopes in accordance with Section 9 of these
Rules.
The motor pool, construction and transportation employees
of the Tandang Sora campus had 149 qualified voters at the
time of the certification election. Hence, the 149 qualified
voters should be used to determine the existence of a
quorum. Since a majority or 84 out of the 149 qualified
voters cast their votes, a quorum existed in the certification
election.
St. James further alleges that the names of the 84 voters are
not on the list of its rank and file employees. On this score,
we sustain the factual finding of the DOLE that the list
submitted by St. James consists of its administrative, teaching
and office personnel. These administrative, teaching and
office personnel are not members of Samahang
Manggagawa.

HEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

Principles:
Section 13, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code ("Omnibus Rules") provides:

Section 13. Proclamation and certification of results by

election officer; when proper.

Upon completion of the canvass there being a valid election,

the election officer shall proclaim and certify as winner the
union which obtained a majority of the valid votes cast under
any of the following conditions:
a) No protest had been filed or, even if one was filed, the
same was not perfected within the five-day period for
perfection of the protest;

b) No challenge of eligibility issue was raised or even if one

was raised, the resolution of the same will not materially
change the result.

For this purpose, the election officer shall immediately issue

the corresponding certification, copy furnished all parties,
which shall form part of the records of the case. The winning
union shall have the rights, privileges and obligations of a
duly certified collective bargaining representative from the
time the certification is issued. The proclamation and
certification so issued shall not be appealable.
 PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL v. MANILA DIAMOND
HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION,
GR NO. 158075, 2006-06-30
Facts:
1. The union, which was registered on August 19, 1996 before
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),filed a
Petition for Certification Election before the DOLE.
2. The DOLE-NCR denied the union's petition as it failed to
comply with legal requirements, specifically Section 2, Rule V,
Book V
3. The union later notified petitioner of its intention to
negotiate, by Notice to Bargain, a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) for its members.
4. Acting on the notice, the Hotel advised the union that
since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive
bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such.
5. The union clarified that it sought to bargain "for its
members only," and declared that "[the Hotel's] refusal to
bargain [would prompt] the union to engage in concerted
activities to protect and assert its rights under the Labor
Code."The the union announced that its executive officers as
well as its directors decided to go on strike in view of the
management's refusal to bargain collectively, and thus called
for the taking of strike vote.
6. Petitioner thereupon issued a Final Reminder and Warning
to respondent
7.The union went on to file a Notice of Strike on September
29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB)
Conciliation conferences were immediately conducted by the
NCMB
8. In the conference held on November 20, 1997, the union
demanded the holding of a consent election to which the
Hotel interposed no objection.
9. However the next day, the union suddenly went on strike.
The following day, the National Union of Workers in the
Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined
the strike and openly extended its support to the union.
10. At about this time, Hotel supervisors Vicente T. Agustin
(Agustin) and Rowena Junio (Rowena) failed to report for
work and were, along with another supervisor,Mary Grace U.
de Leon (Mary Grace), seen participating in and supporting
the strike.
11. Petitioner thus filed a petition for injunction before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Mary Grace and Agustin were terminated prompting the to
file for an illegal dismissal.
12. The NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) directing the strikers to immediately "cease and desist
from obstructing the free ingress and egress from the Hotel
premises."
13. The service upon the strikers of the TRO notwithstanding,
they refused to dismantle the tent they put up at the
employee's entrance to the Hotel.
14. As then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano Trajano's attempts
to conciliate the parties failed, he, acting on the union's
Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, issued an order
certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration,
and directing the striking officers and members to return to
work within 24 hours and the Hotel to accept them back
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike.
15. On petitioner's motion for reconsideration, then DOLE
Acting Secretary Jose Español, Jr., by Order of April 30, 1998,
modified the April 15, 1998 Order of Secretary Trajano by
directing the Hotel to just reinstate the strikers to its payroll,
the NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and that the
union officers and members who were reinstated to the
Hotel's payroll were deemed to have lost their employment
status. And it dismissed the complaints filed by Mary Grace,
Agustin, and Rowena as well as the union's complaint for ULP.
16. On appeal the Appellate Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC, and therefore affirms the
ruling of the NLRC as follows:
(1) that the strike is illegal;
(2) that the union officers lost their employment status
when they formed the illegal strike; and
(3) That the dismissal of Ms. Mary Grace U. de Leon, Vicente
C. Agustinand Rowena Junio is valid.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the strike was illegal
(2) Whether those ordered reinstated are entitled to
backwages
Ruling:
1. This Court finds the strike illegal.
Only the labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
The union (hereafter referred to as respondent) is
admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority
of the employees of petitioner, hence, it could not demand
from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their
behalf.
2. Respondent insists, however, that it could validly bargain
in behalf of "its members," relying on Article 242 of the
Labor Code.[39] Respondent's reliance on said article, a
general provision on the rights of legitimate labor
organizations, is misplaced, for not every legitimate labor
organization possesses the rights mentioned therein.Article
242 (a) must be read in relation to above-quoted Article 255.
On respondent's contention that it was bargaining in behalf
only of its members, the appellate court, affirming the NLRC's
observation that the same would only "fragment the
employees" of petitioner, held that "what [respondent] will
be achieving is to divide the employees, more particularly,
the rank-and-file employees of [petitioner] . the other
workers who are not members are at a serious
disadvantage, because if the same shall be allowed,
employees who are non-union members will be
economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate
their terms and conditions of work, thus defeating the very
essence and reason of collective bargaining, which is an
effective safeguard against the evil schemes of employers in
terms and conditions of work." This Court finds the
observation well-taken.
3. This Court notes that RESPONDENT VIOLATED ARTICLE 264
WHICH PROSCRIBES THE STAGING OF A STRIKE ON THE
GROUND OF ULP DURING THE PENDENCY OF CASES
INVOLVING THE SAME GROUNDS FOR THE STRIKE.
Further, the photographs taken during the strike, as well as
the Ocular Inspection Report of the NLRC representative,
show that the strikers, with the use of ropes and footed
placards, blockaded the driveway to the Hotel's points of
entrance and exit, making it burdensome for guests and
prospective guests to enter the Hotel, thus violating Article
264 (e) of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 264 (e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any
act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (Emphasis...
supplied)... the union officers should be dismissed for staging
and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3,
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code which provides that ". . .[a]ny
union officer who knowingly... participates in anillegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
thecommission of illegal acts during strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status . . ."
An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for
mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union
officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly
participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal
act during a strike.
The appellate court found no convincing and substantial
proof, however, that the strikers-members of respondent
who participated in the illegal strike committed illegal acts.
The list failed to specifically identify the ones who actually
committed illegal acts, however. Such being the case, a
remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter, through the NLRC, is
in order for the purpose only of determining the respective
liabilities of thestrikers listed by petitioner.
ISSUE OF BACKWAGES
The general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in an
economic strike on the principle that "a fair day's wage"
accrues only for a "fair day's labor." Even in cases of ULP
strikes, award of backwages rests on the court's discretion
and only in exceptional instances.
Jurisprudential law, however, recognizes several exceptions
to the "no backwages rule," to wit:
when the employees were illegally locked to thus compel
them to stage a strike;
[60] when the employer is guilty of the grossest form of ULP;
[61] when the employer committed discrimination in the
rehiring of strikers refusing to readmit those against whom
there were pending criminal cases while admitting
nonstrikers who were also criminally charged in court;
[62] or when the workers who staged a voluntary ULP strike
offered to return to work unconditionally but the employer
refused to reinstate them.
Not any of these or analogous instances is, however, present
in the instant case.
Principles:
1. Article 255 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND
WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority
of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit
shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an
individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and
regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making
process of the establishment where they are employed
insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights,
benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and
employers may form labor-management councils: Provided,
That the representatives of the workers in such labor
management councils shall be elected by at least the majority
of all employees in said establishment. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
2. This Court cannot overlook the events that transpired prior
to the strike that the Union staged on November 29, 1997. It
is beyond argument that a conciliatory meeting was still
scheduled to be held on December 1, 1997 before the NCMB.
In this conciliatory meeting, petitioner Union could have
substantiated and presented additional evidences.
3. Thus, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tiu 8. Respondent urges this Court to apply the exceptional rule
vs.National Labor Relations Commission: enunciated in Philippine Marine Officers' Guild v. Compañia
Maritima and similar cases where the employees
"The Court is not unmindful of this rule, but in the case at bar
unconditionally offered to return to work, it arguing that
the facts and the evidence did not establish events [sic ]
there was such an offer on its part to return to work but the
leasta rational basis why the union would [wield] a strike
Hotel screened the returning strikers and refused to readmit
basedon alleged unfair labor practices it did not... even
those whom it found to have perpetrated prohibited acts
bother tosubstantiate during the conciliation proceedings. It
during the strike.
is not enough that the union believed that the employer
committed acts of unfair labor practice when the It must be stressed, however, that for the exception in
circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie [showing to] Philippine Marine Officers' Guild to apply, it is required that
warrant [such a]... belief." the strike must be legal.
4. It is also evident from the records of the instant petition,
specifically from the Notice of Strike, that their principal
ground for the strike was the "refusal of the Hotel
Management to bargain collectively with the Union for the
benefit of the latter's members."
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the petitioner
UNION is not a certified bargaining unit to negotiate
acollective bargaining agreement (CBA) with private
respondent Hotel
6. It is doctrinal that the exercise of the right of private sector
employees to strike is not absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article
XIII of the Constitution, provides:
SECTION 3. x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane... conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be
held illegal where the means employed are illegal. Thus, the
employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion
in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to
the rights to property... renders a strike illegal. And so is
picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when
accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and
coercion as to constitute nuisance.
7. In Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union
(PTUC) v. Court of Industrial Relations,
This Court made a distinction between two types of
employees involved in a ULP: those who are discriminatorily
dismissed for union... activities, and those who voluntarily go
on strike even if it is in protest of an ULP. Discriminatorily
dismissed employees were ordered entitled to backpay from
the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the day of
their discharge, whereas employees who struck as a
voluntary act of protest against what they considered a ULP
of their employer were held generally not entitled to
backpay.
 STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION v.
SECRETARY OF LABOR
GR No. 162355, 2009-08-14
Facts:
1. Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in
behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for
certification election among the regular rank-and-file
employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its
Affiliates
2. Med-Arbiter ordered the dismissal of the petition due to
inappropriateness of the bargaining unit.
3. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union reorganized
itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-
SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file
employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation.
4. [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition. It alleged that
[SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than
20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are
its members. [CLUP-SLECCWA] claimed that no certification
election has been held among them within the last 12 months
prior to the filing of the petition
5. SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that
it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] as the exclusive
bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and
that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced
between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be
dismissed for violating the one year and negotiation bar
rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
6. [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to
[SLECC'S] Motion to Dismiss. It assailed the validity of the
voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC] and their
consequent negotiations and execution of a CBA. According
to[CLUP-SLECCWA], the same were tainted with malice,
collusion and conspiracy involving some officials of the
Regional Office.
And that it violated one of the major requirements for
voluntary recognition, i.e., non-existence of another labor
organization in the same bargaining unit.
The Med-Arbiter's Ruling
CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for direct certification on the
ground of contract bar rule.
The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA
between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-
SLECCWA's petition for direct certification.
The Ruling of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
The Secretary found merit in CLUP-SLECCWA's appeal. The
Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and
registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could
not bar CLUP-SLECCWA's petition. CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates
Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at
the time of SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Secretary and
quoted extensively from the Secretary's decision.
MSLEC's voluntary recognition was void and could not bar
CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for certification election.
Issues:
SLECC asserted that the appellate court commited a
reversible error when it affirmed the Secretary's finding that
SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was done while a
legitimate labor organization was in existence in the
bargaining unit.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-
registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to the
rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC
and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor
organization at the time of SLECC's voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide
whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not
among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless
such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to
(c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union, having
been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be
considered as having acquired juridical personality which
may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for
SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration of CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition
proceedings with SMSLEC.
Employer's Participation in a Petition for Certification
Election
We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a
motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for certification
election. In petitions for certification election, the employer is
a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal
the Med-Arbiter's decision. The... exception to this rule,
which happens when the employer is requested to bargain
collectively, is not present in the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
Principles:
1. BARGAINING UNIT
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization
are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining
unit. We explained the concept of a bargaining unit in San
Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma, where we stated that:
A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body
of employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights
and duties of the parties... under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate
collective bargaining unit are:
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule);
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) similarity of employment status.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has categorically
ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining
history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination
of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.
However, employees in two corporations cannot be treated
as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two
corporations are related.