#1

China Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129644, March 7, 2000

Held: The assignment was done in fraud of creditors. China Bank is, therefore entitled
to rescind the same. Under Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code, contracts which are
undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any manner collect the claims
due them, are rescissible. The existence of fraud with intent to defraud creditor may
either be presumed in accordance with Article 1387, NCC or duly proved in accordance
with the ordinary rules of evidence. Hence, the law presumes that there is fraud of
creditors when:
a) There is alienation of property by gratuitous title by the debtor who has not reserved
sufficient property to pay his debts contracted before such alienation; or
b) There is alienation of property by onerous title made by a debtor against whom some
judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued.
The decision or attachment need not refer to the property alienated and need not have
been obtained by the party seeking rescission.
#2

G.R. No. L-11075 June 30, 1960

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. CARIDAD CAPISTRANO

Held: We believe that Philippine peso bills come within the concept of "merchandise," as
this term is understood in Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code. As
defined by the same Code, merchandise, when used with reference to importations or
exportations, includes goods, wares, and in general anything that may be the subject of
importation or exportation. (Sec. 1419.) It cannot be gainsaid that money may be a
commodity — an object of trade.

Money in the country where it is current, is both a measure of value and a

medium of exchange, while in other countries it is a commodity bought and sold
in the market, and its value fluctuates in the market like that of other
commodities. (58 C. J. S. 845, citing Richard vs. American Union Bank, 170 N.
E. 532, 535, 69 A. L. R. 667.)

In the same manner that in the Philippines the United States dollar bills which have
ceased to be legal tender, are considered merchandise, the Philippine peso bills when
attempted to be exported, as in the present case, may be deemed to have been taken out of
domestic circulation as legal tender and treated as commodity. Hence, they may be
forfeited pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 37 in relation to Section 1363 (f) of the
Revised Administrative Code.
#3

Standard Oil Co. vs Jaranillo

44 PHIL 631
GR No. L-20329
March 16, 1923

Held: The Registrar's duty is MINISTERIAL in character.

There is no legal provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to
determine or qualify the nature of the document presented before him.
The determination of the nature of the property lies with the courts of justice, and not by
the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, the act of recording a chattel mortgage operates as constructive notice of the
existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the
instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. As such, the Registrar should therefore
accept the legal fees being tendered, and place the document on record.
#4
Bicerra v. Teneza
[G.R. No. L-16218. November 29, 1962.]

HELD:
House is immovable property even if situated on land belonging to a different owner;
Exception, when demolished.
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on
which it is built (Article 415, paragraph 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true
regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different
owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and
hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases.

#5
Ladera, et. al. vs. Hodges, et. al. , O.G No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952
Held: The sale of the land was not made without the proper publication required by law
of the sale of immovable property. In this instance, the determination of whether or not
the house in dispute is an immovable or movable property is vital. The undisputed rule is
whether it is immovable by destination (place by the owner of the tenement), an
immovable by incorporation(attachment not necessarily made by the owner of the
tenement) or an accession. A true building is an immovable or real property whether the
owner of the land is a usufructuary or lessee erects it. Moreover, when Ladera built the
house in question, she was not a mere lessee but occupied the land under a valid contract
with Hodges to sell it to her. Thus, the object of the levy and the sale was real property.
The publication in a newspaper in a general circulation was made making the execution
sale void and conferred no title to the purchaser. Furthermore, there was a valid exercise
of redemption. So, at the time Magno sold the property to Villa, Magno no longer had
title over the property strengthening the fact that since there was no title, the subsequent
sale was null and void.

#6
Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc.
G.R. No. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 98
HELD: While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building
constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct
from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean
one thing—that a building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the absence of
any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
owner. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the
construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of
appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building
attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.

#7

Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.

G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 401

HELD: The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal
property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in
Ladera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil)
is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a
usufructuary or lessee. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in
accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual
delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista
could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was
not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction” is untenable.

#8
G.R. No. L -11658 (February 15, 1918)
LEUNG YEE vs. FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J.G.
WILLIAMSON

Ruling:

The building is real property, therefore, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registryof Real Property.
The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal property does
not change its character as real property. Thus neither the original registry in the chattel
mortgage registry nor the annotation in said registry of the sale of the mortgaged property
had any effect on the building. However, since the land and the building had first been
purchased by “Strong Machinery” (ahead of Leung Yee), and this fact was known to
Leung Yee, it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, and should
therefore not be entitled to the property. “Strong Machinery” thus has a better right to the
property.

#9
Bautista, et. al. v. Supnad, (CA) 59 O.G. 1575, 1578
Buildings are always immovable under the Code. While there is a holding to the
effect that a building which is merely superimposed on the soil or is sold for immediate
demolition may be considered as a movable or personal property, Justice J.B.L. Reyes
clarified that the rule that a building is immovable or real property has reference only to a
“true building” or one which is not merely superimposed on the soil.

#10
Tsai v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 324
HELD: While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of
the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a contrary
indication. In the case at bar, the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is
to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. Assuming that the properties in question are
immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an
obligation under the principle of estoppel. It has been held that an immovable may be
considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the
payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at
bar.

#11

Yap v. Tañada

G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464

HELD: Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property,
among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that
it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object." The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated
from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously, the
separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening
of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.

#12
Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer
G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 197
HELD: The equipment in question is movable. So that movable equipment to be
immobilized in contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principal
elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be
"unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." Thus,
the Court distinguished those movable which become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry from those which may
not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and
principal.
The tools and equipment in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential
and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and
cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals—acquired as movables and used
only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and
equipment, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such
equipment, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on without the
repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop
belonging to another.

#13
Fels Energy, Inc. v. The Province of Batangas and the Office of the Provincial Assessor
of Batangas, G.R. No. 168557, 16 February 2007

HELD

Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
provides: “SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – Any owner or person
having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial,
city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days
from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of
Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form
prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such
affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.” Instead of appealing to the
Board of Assessment Appeals (as stated in the notice), NPC opted to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision, a remedy not sanctioned by law.

#14
Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954, 96 Phil. 70

HELD: Replevin is applicable only to personal property. The machinery and equipment
in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of
said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated
from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in
order to remove the said outfit, it became necessary not only to unbolt the same, but also
to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment were
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said immovable. For
these reasons, they were already immovable pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article
415 of the Civil Code.

#15

Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO [G.R. No. L-15334. January 31, 1964.]

Held: The steel towers are personal (not real) properties. Be it noted that:

a. they do not come under paragraph 1of Article 415 because they are neither
buildings or constructions adhered to the soil;
b. they do not come under paragraph 3 of Article 415 because they are not attached to
an immovable in a fixed manner, i. e., they can be separated without breaking the
material or causing deterioration of the object to which they are attached;
c. they do not come under paragraph 5, because they are not machineries, receptacles, or
instruments, but even if they were, they are not intended for an industry to be carried
on in the premises.
#16
PHILIPPINE REFINING CO. vs. JARQUE,COROMINAS G.R. No. L-41506

RULING: “Personal property” includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the
Chattel Mortgage Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage
includes an affidavit of good faith. The absence of such affidavit makes mortgage
unenforceable against creditors and subsequent encumbrances.

A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference
between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that
the first must be noted in the registry of the register of deeds.

#17
RUBISO VS. RIVERA, 37 PHIL 72

HELD:

1. The legal rule set down in the Mercantile Code subsists, inasmuch as the amendment
solely refers to the official who shall make the entry; but, with respect to the rights of the
two purchasers, whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is the one
entitled to enjoy the protection of the law, which considers him the absolute owner of the
purchased boat, and this latter to be free of all encumbrance and all claims by strangers
for, pursuant to article 582 of the said code, after the bill of the judicial sale at auction has
been executed and recorded in the commercial registry, all the other liabilities of the
vessel in favor of the creditors shall be considered canceled. 1awphil.net

The purchaser at public auction, FaustoRubiso, who was careful to record his acquisition,
opportunely and on a prior date, has, according to the law, a better right than the
defendant Rivera who subsequently recorded his purchase. The latter is a third person,
who was directly affected by the registration which the plaintiff made of his acquisition.

2. Ships or vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent, of the
nature and conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in the
world commerce; and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the Code of
Commerce are nearly identical with those of article 1473 of the Civil Code.

#18
Sibalvs Valdez G.R. No. L-26278 August 4, 1927

Held:
The Supreme Court concludes that par. 2 of Article 334 (415) has been modified by
section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that for the
purpose of attachments and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
“ungathered products” have the nature of personal property. The lower court therefore
did not commit any error in holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property
and, as such, was not subject to redemption.

#19
US vs Carlos
G.R. No. 6295, 21 Phil 543September 1, 1911

HELD:
While electric current is not a fluid, still, its manifestations and effects like those of gas
may be seen and felt. The true test of what may be stolen is not whether it is corporeal or
incorporeal, but whether, being possessed of value, a person other than the owner may
appropriate the same. Electricity, like gas, is a valuable merchandise and may thus be
stolen. (See also U.S. v. Tambunting, 41 Phil. 364).

#20
Salas v. Jarencio
L-29788, August 30, 1972

HELD: There being no proof that the lot had been acquired by the City with its own
funds, the presumption is that it was given to it by the State IN TRUST for the benefit of
the inhabitants. Residual control remained in the State, and therefore the STATE can
lawfully dispose of the lot. Thus, Republic Act 4118 is valid and constitutional and this is
so even if the City of Manila will receive NO COMPENSATION from the State.

#21
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.
G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008

HELD:

On the first issue, the well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.

As to the second issue, the tax declarations presented were only for the years starting
1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why
the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas
were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes
starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or
possession of the land only in that year.

As to the third issue, the 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under
the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 (RA 9176) further amended
the Public Land Act and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares,
consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual
may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence,
respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for
registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007
hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and
thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have
any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This
assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares,
when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case,
respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when
respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

#22
G.R. No. 46373 January 29, 1940
Carlos Palanca vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ruling:
River and navigable estuary, useful for commerce, navigation and boating and fishing,
have the character of public domain and their legal status in this regard has not been
affected by the possession of Carlos Palanca, either that was the time of this possession,
that there can be no prescription against the state on public property.
For these reasons the appeal is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals
confirmed.

#23

G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

Salvador H. Laurel vs. Ramon Garcia, Raul Manglapus, and CatalinoMacaraig

Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on
his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed
true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices
fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all
Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related
properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on
conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

#24

Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905

Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility,
or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government
shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an
increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so
gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment
of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by
said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad vs.
Director of Lands, supra.)

#25
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155650. July 20, 2006.

HELD: There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC)

is not exempt from real estate tax. However, the Court ruled that MIAA is NOT a GOCC.
Firstly, under the Administrative Code, a GOCC is defined as “any agency organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least 51%” of its capital stock”. MIAA is not organized as
a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no
capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. While
MIAA has capital, it is not divided into shares of stock and hence it is not a stock
corporation. MIAA is also NOT a non-stock corporation because it has no members. The
Court opined that even if we assume that the government is considered as the sole
member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their members. Moreover, it
was said that MIAA is not organized for any of the purposes that a non-stock corporation
is established under the Corporation Code, namely charitable, religious, educational,
professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service or
similar purposes. Rather, it is organized to operate an international and domestic airport
for public use. Hence, the Court noted that MIAA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. Pursuant to this
ruling, it was noted that MIAA does not need to meet the two conditions set forth by the
Constitution for GOCCs with special charters, to wit: (1) that it must be established for
common good; and (2) that it must meet the test of economic viability. The second test is
further elucidated as one that applies to GOCCs that perform economic or commercial
activities and need to compete in the market place. Economic viability refers to more than
financial viability but also includes capability to make profit and generate benefits not
quantifiable in financial terms. MIAA, a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers and performing governmental or public functions, need NOT meet the
test of economic viability. These instrumentalities need not be economically viable since
the government may even subsidize their entire operations for they perform essential
public services for the common good.

#26
Chavez v Public Estate Authority
GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002

Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. These duties are particularly in
answer of the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern, and of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of
the public domain among Filipino citizens.
Furthermore, the court considered that the petition raised matters of transcendental
importance to the public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning
the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the issues
raise are of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social, economic
and moral well-being of the people.
The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the
court to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution
intended to safeguard the national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to
transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single corporation. The court does not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.
The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.
Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The
instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the
Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the
terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal or
constitutional question.
The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final agreement as required by the constitution.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are permanently enjoined from implementing the amended JVA which is
hereby declared null and void ab initio.

#27
Chavez v. National Housing Authority
G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
HELD: The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a government agency not tasked to
dispose of public lands under its charter – it is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based
on the special patents are transferred to the National Housing Authority (NHA) by the
Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State
which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned
by Filipinos. The combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with
Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an
official declaration that the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no
longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive
declaration that the reclaimed areas are not necessary anymore for public use or public
service when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the National
Housing Authority (NHA) partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial
development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not
the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project.

#28
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 639
HELD: The lease was an encumbrance included in the prohibitions of the patent because
it impairs the use of the land by Morato herself. As for the mortgage, it is a legal limit on
the title and if there will be foreclosure because Morato was not able to pay her debts, the
property will be auctioned. It is also a limitation on Morato's right to enjoy and possess
the land for herself. Encumbrance, as defined, is an impairment on the use or transfer of
property, or a claim or lien on the property where there is a burden on the title. Thus,
Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent on these points. Moreover, the property
became a foreshore land because it turned into a portion of land which was covered most
of the time with water, whether it was low or high tide. Foreshore is defined as land
between high and low waters which is dry depending on the reflux or ebb of the tides. In
accordance with this land reclassification, the land can no longer be subject to a pending
patent application and must be returned to the State.

29. Taleon vs Secretary of Public Works

Appellants' contentions are without merit. First of all, full trial was not needed. The
issues raised before the court a quo were all purely legal and thus could be resolved on the basis
of the pleadings and memoranda filed and the administrative records sent up to it. No necessity
was there for further reception of evidence. Anent the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public
Works, this point has been squarely covered in Lovina v. Moreno, L-17821, November 29, 1963.1
There We upheld the power of the Public Works Secretary under Republic Act 2056 to declare as
a public navigable stream any alleged depression or bodies of water even inside titled
properties. Regarding the alleged second decision of the Secretary, its non-existence has been
officially certified by the Chief of the Records Division of the Department of Public Works, the
official custodian.4 This alone is proof enough that there is no such decision.5 But even granting
that there is really such a decision, it would not help appellants' cause any. Said decision would
still be wanting of legal force and effect since Secretary Moreno had already lost jurisdiction to
revoke the former ruling because of the appeal then already taken by appellants themselves to
the Office of the President, which affirmed the former ruling. All the necessary facts being
already before the court a quo, no further trial was required. Its decision rendered at that stage
was therefore sanctioned by the Rules.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners-
appellants.

30. Baguio’s Citizen Action vs City Council

 The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all
the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant
made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature.
Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous
donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In
the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government
and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to
exclude matters, which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.

32. Rabuco vs Villegas

No. The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength
of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in
the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale
on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does
not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the
Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislature’s right of control and
power to deal with State property. When a property is owned by a political subdivision in its
public and governmental capacity, the Congress has absolute control as distinguished from
patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be
deprived without due process and without just compensation.

33. Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs City of Zamboanga

If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are
for public use since it is the only one that is available to the general public, and all the
rest are patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use but to public
service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for
a public service, the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.
If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved
are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be
deprived of its own property without just compensation. If the law on Municipal
Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and
therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal
Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as
patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall
under the control of the State, otherwise certain governmental activities would be
impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws."

34. Macasiano vs Diokno

No. The ordinance or resolution authorizing the lease and use of public streets
or thoroughfares as sites for a flea market is invalid. Property for public use, in the
provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid
for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of
them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered
public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government which
are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or
regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the
authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented
because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to
non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for
the approval of the ordinance.
35. Quirubin vs Alconcel
This Court has invariably held that a possessory information inscribed in the property
registry demonstrates prima facie that the possessor of the land to which it refers is the owner
thereof. 5 Further, under the provisions of sections 39, 40, and 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the lapse of a period ten years was sufficient for the possessor of realty inscribed in
the registry to be regarded thereafter as the legitimate owner of said realty, when his
possession had been inscribed in the registry for over ten years. 6 In the case at bar, the trial
court found that Fulgencio Querubin, the father of the petitioner, had inscribed his possessory
information in the Registry of Property of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, as early as April 26, 1895, and had
been in continuous possession of the land therein described for more than 10 years, excluding
the time that the property was submerged. Thus, the petitioner Querubin must be deemed to
have conclusively proved his ownership of the property in dispute, or, in the very least, shown a
prima facie title of ownership thereto. In the latter situation, the respondents Alconcel et al.
may dislodge Querubin from his claim only by a superior title. Considering, however, that
Alconcel, et al. have no more than mere tax declarations covering their respective claims the
earliest of which dates back only to 1939 (contrasted with Querubin's tax declaration dated
1934), it follows that Querubin's claim must prevail over that of Alconcel, et al.

36. Santos vs Estejada

This contract, as may be seen by its contents, did not transfer the ownership of the
property to the parties Victoriano Santos and Andrea Espinosa, neither does it show that these
spouses had any legal reason to support their possession of the said land. In the decision
rendered in the case of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Miguel Topiño et al., (4
Phil. Rep., 33), the rule was laid down that: "In an action of ejectment the plaintiff seeking to
recover possession of land must recover upon the strength of his own title rather than upon the
weakness of the title of the defendant, and the burden of showing his title rests upon him who
asserts it."1awphi1.net
In the decision of Belen Vs. Belen (13 Phil. Rep., 202), it is stated: "Mere possession of
the thing claimed is sufficient to insure respect for the present holder, while no other person
appears to show and prove a better right, in accordance with the doctrine of the courts."
In the same decision of the following was likewise laid down: "If the plaintiff, upon whom rests
the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exceptions or
defense."
In view of the fact that the plaintiffs have not duly proved their title to the land actually
occupied by the defendants, the Estejadas, as the tenants-on-shares and representatives of
Domingo Balugay, who is found to be the lawful owner of the said land, although the proofs
adduced by him are somewhat deficient, there exists no legal ground upon which to deprive him
of the possession he now enjoys as owner.

37. Garcia vs Court of Appeals

No. Garcia’s possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He
has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to
defeat PBCom’s Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner.
The Court stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. On the other hand,
possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess
means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in
one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder.
The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner
for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. Consequently, it is of no moment that
petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. On
the other hand, petitioner’s subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother’s share in
the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the
estate submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the
property was no longer considered owned by petitioner’s parents.

38. Javier vs Veridiano

No. The following are the requisites of res judicata: a) there is final judgment or order;
b) the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter; c) former judgment is a judgment on
merits; and d) identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. The first three are
present. There is identity of parties in the case. What is required is not absolute but substantial
identity of parties. In the case, Rosete is a successor in interest of Babol by title. Nevertheless,
there is no identity of cause of action. CC 926 is a complaint of forcible entry or accion
interdictal where the issue is physical or material possession of real property. In this case, Javier
merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the land without asserting title. CC 2203-0
is an action to recover a parcel of land or accion reivindicatori. In this case, Javier expressly
alleged ownership (by virtue of the Original Certificate of Title issued) and specifically prayed
that she be declared the rightful owner and be given possession of the disputed portion. A
judgement in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and
declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for
determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

39. German Management & Services vs Court of Appeals

No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time when German
Management excluded the farmers, there’s no longer an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation. That actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion by the farmers have
already lapsed 12 years ago when they began occupying the said land. In fact, they were already
peaceably farming the land.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Further, there is
now a presumption of ownership in favor of the farmers since they are the ones occupying the
said property. They can only be ejected either by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria
through which the spouses Jose’s better right may be proven.

40. Yu vs De Lara et al
The circumstances adverted to are insufficient to constitute abandonment, which
requires not only physical relinquishment of the thing but also a clear intention not to reclaim or
reassume ownership or enjoyment thereof. No possessory rights whatsoever can be recognized
in favor of appellants, because they are in fact nothing but squatters, who settled on the land
without any agreement with the owner paying neither rents to him, nor land taxes to the
government, and who impliedly recognized their squatters' status by purchasing only the houses
built by the original settlers. Their occupancy of the land was at the owner's sufference, and
their acts were merely tolerated which could not affect the owner's possession.
The implication of the argument is that this action of unlawful detainer was improperly
brought against them in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan. A person who occupies the
land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary fiction for ejectment is the property remedy against him.

41. Gumiran vs Gumiran

In the present case the allegation in the complaint is simply that the plaintiff has been
"deprived" of the land of which he is and has been the legal owner for a long period. This
allegation is not sufficient to show that the action is based upon the provisions of said section
80. Moreover, upon an examination of the prayer of the complaint, it is seen that the plaintiff is
not only seeking to be repossessed of the land but desires also a declaration that he is the
owner of the same.
It is not believed that it was the intention of the legislature in giving justices of the
peace original, exclusive jurisdiction in the cases mentioned in the section 80, to thereby deprive
the Courts of First Instance of original jurisdiction in other cases of dispossession, where the
plaintiff desires to have the question of his title determined at the same time, even thought the
action should be commenced in the Court of First Instance within the year. For all of the
foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so decide that, under the facts alleged in the
complaint in the present case, the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction and therefore the
demurrer presented by the defendant should have been overruled.

42. Gutierrez vs Rosario

With reference to the first assignment of error, the lower court did not decide that the
plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of the land in question. The decision of the lower
court was to the effect that an action for the possession of the land in question could not be
maintained in the court of the justice of the peace for the reason that more than one year had
elapsed after the alleged illegal possession and before the commencement of the action. It is
possible that in an action of ejectment, commenced in the proper court, the plaintiff may be
able to show that he is entitled to the possession of the land in question.
The action being one for forcible entry and detainer, commenced in the court of the justice of
the peace, not be changed to an action of ejectment by an amendment of the pleadings in the
Court of First Instance. The above conclusion, of course, in now way indicates that the plaintiff is
not entitled to the possession of the land in question. The conclusion is simply that the alleged
wrongful possession having extended over a period of more than one year, the justice of the
peace had no jurisdiction to consider it.

43. Isaguirre vs De Lara

As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a
mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee. However,
even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of
his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security
it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an
action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged
property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds there from given to the creditor
to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. The trial court correctly issued the writ
of possession in favor of respondent. Such writ was but a necessary consequence of affirming
the validity of the original certificate of title in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at
the same time nullifying the original certificate of title in the name of petitioner Cornelio
Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for
respondent to go back to court simply to establish her right to possess subject property.

44. Heirs of Roman Soriano vs Court of Appeals

No. It should be noted that the meat of the post decisional agreement sought to be
executed was the creation of a sub- lessor and sub-lessee relationship between the de Veras
and Roman Soriano. While it appears from the above resolution of the trial court that there was
a basis for private respondents’ demand for reasonable compensation for the use of the
premises and for joint possession as a co-owner, the filing of a motion for execution of the post
decisional agreement between the de Vera spouses and the petitioners predecessor, Roman
Soriano, was not the proper remedy. The pleading filed with the trial court was captioned
“Motion for Execution.” However, it was very clear that, under the circumstances they were in,
the relief demanded by the private respondents can properly be asked for in an unlawful
detainer case or in other proper proceedings. A case for unlawful detainer was already brought
by the private respondents against the petitioner but the former sought its dismissal for reasons
not known. Be that as it may, there is still a pending civil action between the parties (Civil Case
No. 15958) where possession is one of the issues to be resolved.

45. Caisip vs People

Article 429 is inapplicable, Cabalag was given 20 days from June 6, 1959 within which to
vacate the premises. Cabalag did not, on June 17, 1959 — or within said period — invade or
usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner
may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not “repel or prevent in actual or threatened
. . . physical invasion or usurpation.” They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her
husband were in possession. It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of
violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from “doing
something not prohibited by law,” (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her “to do
something against” her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), “whether it be right or
wrong,” thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code.

46. People vs Pletcha

Yes. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force not only to
prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is sort of self-defense. It is
lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not
possess by force. The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights
constitutes a justifying circumstance under our penal laws.
The appellant need not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of
property. The situation required immediate action and Article 429 gave him the self-executory
mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance.

47. Custodio vs CA
No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left
because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was well
within his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement
agreement, either by contract or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the
right to build the fence. It was only after the judgment in the trial court that the easement was
created which was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the just compensation.
Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa when he built the fence, therefore, there is
no actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this case, the damage has to be borne
by Mabasa.

48. Andamo vs IAC

Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. Clearly, from petitioner’s
complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others.

49. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. vs Guaranty Oil Co.

Courts have seen before them the interest of the owner of the land where such minerals
are found, and from this view have stated the “absolute ownership” doctrine, namely, that the
landowner is the absolute owner of the minerals either solid or fluid or gaseous found on or in
his land. This rule was found to do injustice to the neighboring landowner, and the opposite
extreme was then suggested, that it, that the one does not “own” such minerals until they are
definitely appropriated. It does not seem to have been perceived that ownership was merely a
term referring to an aggregate of legal relations in the “owner” and hence denoted the number
of such relations beyond which the ownership would be “absolute” instead of “qualified.”

50. Republic vs CA, Dela Rosa

No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the
Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must
be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over
the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is
being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof,
for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein.

51. Villanueva vs Claustro

First. The law provides that the beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the
course of the water has naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout
their respective lengths. Second. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the
accessory, as it is a mode of acquisition, provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion,
since the accessory follows the nature of the principal, and there need not be any tendency to
the thing or manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto
ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident. Third. The occupation of a
thing belonging to another may lead to another mode of acquisition, which is the prescription of
ownership, whenever the possession of such thing under ordinary prescription, which is that
alleged of twenty years, is accompanied by the other requisites prescribed by law, such as good
faith, proper title and legal period of time. Mere occupation is not a title of acquisition except
when it concerns "things which can be appropriated by reason of their nature, which have no
owners, such as animals which are the object of hunting and fishing, hidden treasure and
abandoned property."

52. Morales vs CA
We cannot sustain the Court of Appeals. Under the aforequoted provisions, a Regional
Trial Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, should remand a case in the event it
reverses a decision of the MTC which ruled on a question of law, provided that there was no
trial on the merits. A remand is a due process requirement, because it affords the parties an
opportunity to present evidence on the merits of the case. In the case at bar, it is clear that the
MTC afforded due process to the parties; it received relevant evidence sufficient to decide the
ejectment case on its merits. As borne by its decision. As to the manner of entry into possession
by the defendant, this Court finds it difficult to believe that he did so through stealth and
strategy. Being relatives and not estranged at least up to the time when the issue in this case
cropped up, possession of the defendant was open and known to the plaintiff. Likewise, the use
of the land is also known to remain as agricultural, particularly devoted to rice production. The
Court, therefore, finds no compelling reason to remand the case to the MTC, as the underlying
purpose and objective for such remand is already fait accompli. As previously noted, the MTC
observed due process. On appeal, the decision of the RTC was based on the facts adduced by
the parties before the MTC. Consequently, remanding the case to the MTC serves no useful
purpose, for the parties have already presented their evidence. Besides, there was no allegation
that the parties intended to present additional evidence which might warrant a change in the
resolution of the case.

53. Ignao vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Petitioner has the right whether to appropriate the houses or to sell his land. The ruling
of the RTC and IAC contravened the explicit provisions of Art 448 which granted him the explicit
right to choose. The law is clear when it bestows choice upon the aggrieved land owner and not
upon the builders or the courts.

54. Macasaet vs Macasaet

In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful
upon the expiration or termination of the defendants right to possess, arising from an express or
implied contract. To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is illegally withholding possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. This Court has
consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise
that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. In terms of the rights of a builder in
good faith the court ruled that article 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or
planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto.
It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land is
owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon. Consequently,
respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own -- the building and other
improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2)
paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the option
to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that
of the structures -- in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.

55. Munar vs CA
The Munars next contend that the Nieveses cannot anymore collect the rentals because
the special power of attorney executed in their favor was revoked by the Palisocs. This
contention is without merit. The trial court found that the contract of lease was between the
Munars and Nieveses. The Palisocs were not parties to the said lease contract. We have ruled
that a tenant cannot, in an action involving the possession of the leased premises, controvert
the title of his landlord or assert any rights adverse to that title. Neither can he set up any
inconsistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his landlord. Well-settled
is the rule that the mere allegation of ownership of the property in dispute by the defendant in
an ejectment suit or the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property
does not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. The only exception
to this rule is where the question of de facto possession cannot be determined properly without
settling that of ownership because the latter is inseparably linked with the former (Guzman v.
Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 604 [1989]). The exception does not apply to the instant case. The
Nieveses, by virtue of the notarized Conditional Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the
Palisocs, transferred possession of the questioned property to the former. The execution of a
sale, thru a public instrument, shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is
stipulation to the contrary.

56. Feliciano vs Spouses Zaldivar

It has been consistently ruled that “when the owner’s duplicate certificate of title has
not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted
certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.
Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate.”
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to
eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be
supposed that they were aware of the petitioner’s occupation of the property, and regardless of
the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
This right is never barred by laches.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act
was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
Under the circumstances, respondents and Remegia are in mutual bad faith and, as such, would
entitle the former to the application of Article 448 of the Civil Code governing builders in good
faith

57. Pecson vs CA
With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy. Whoever
is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted or sown after paying
indemnity. However, it does not apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the
works on his own land who later on loses ownership by sale or donation.
Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be refunded to the
possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it does not state how to determine the
value of the useful improvement. The case was remanded to the trial court for determination of
the current market value of the apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise it
shall be restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.

58. Pecson vs CA
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or
more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building,
sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid
down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or
planter had acted in good faith. Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case
at bar.
The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the
aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents
have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the
possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as
well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the
right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the
tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown.

59. Nuguid vs CA
The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the CFI of Bataan. The basis for the Court
of Appeals' conclusion that petitioners were buyers in bad faith is ambiguous because said court
relied on the singular circumstance that the petitioners are from Orani, Bataan, and should have
personally known that the private respondents were the persons in actual possession. However,
at the time of the purchase, the spouses Nuguid dealt with Pedro Guevarra and Pascuala
Tolentino, the latter being the actual occupants. The respondents Guevarras, children of the said
Pedro and Pascuala Guevarra, came into the picture only after their parents died. As for the
respondent heirs of Victorino dela Rosa, their being in actual possession of any portion of the
property was, likewise, simply presumed or taken for granted by the Court of Appeals.

60. Rosales et al vs Castellfort

 No. The owner in good faith has to make a choice. He cannot dispense the options
under the law and then eject the builder in good faith. This is because both are in good faith.
However, if after the owner in good faith chose to sell his land to the builder in good faith and
the latter fails to pay the value of the land within the agree period. Only then can the owner in
good faith compel the builder in good faith to remove the building he erected.

62. Filipinas Colleges Inc. vs Timbang

NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS. There is nothing in the language
of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon
the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-
owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445.
Although it is true, it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay
the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's right of retention
provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence
thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building. The second contention was
without merit. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee
Blas is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school
building. With respect to the order of the court declaring appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part
owner of the land to the extent of the value of its personal properties sold at public auction in
favor of the Timbang, this Court likewise finds the same as justified, for such amount represents,
in effect, a partial payment of the value of the land. Failure of the Timbang spouses to pay to the
Sheriff or to Manila Gervacio Blas said sum of P5,750.00 within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the final judgment, an order of execution shall issue in favor of Maria Gervasio Blas to be levied
upon all properties of the Timbang spouses not exempt from execution for the satisfaction of
the said amount.

63. Quemuel vs Olaes

A cause of action presupposes a right of the plaintiff and a violation of such right by the
defendant. According to the complaint itself, the rental of P20.00 monthly and the order to
vacate, were provided in a prior judgment, which is final and its validity is not assailed. The
defendants are not compelling the plaintiffs to rent the property but wanted them to vacate the
premises. If the rental determined by the trial court were excessive, the plaintiffs are free to
vacate the property. For plaintiffs to insist on possessing the property and fixing the rentals
themselves, would have no legal sanction at all.
The plaintiffs claim that their second cause of action is based on Article 448 in
connection with Art. 546, of the new Civil Code. A cursory reading of these provisions, however,
will show that they are not applicable to plaintiffs' case. Under Article 448, the right to
appropriate the works or improvements or "to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land belongs to the owner of the land. The only right given to the builder in good
faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner
of the land to sell such land to the former. This is assuming that the plaintiffs are builders in
good faith. But the plaintiffs are not builders in good faith.

64. Germiniano et al vs CA et al
No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents knew that their stay would
end after the lease contract expires. They can’t bank on the promise, which was not in writing,
of the petitioners that the latter will sell the land to them. According to 1403, an agreement for
the sale of real property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or
memorandum thereof be produced. Other than the alleged promise by petitioner, respondents
had no other evidence to prove their claim.
They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678 may apply if the lessor chooses
to appropriate the improvements. But since the petitioners refused to exercise that option, the
private respondents can’t compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and
improvements. Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private
respondents’ sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

65. Tayag vs Yuseco

Once a choice is made by the landowner it is generally irrevocable. Thus, if the
landowner has opted/elected to appropriate the building but he is unable to pay for the
indemnity or amount, the landowner CANNOT afterwards opt/elect to sell the land. Since
Tayag’s first choice had already been communicated to the court and she had already been
ordered to pay, her duty has been converted into a monetary obligation which can be enforced
by a writ of execution.

66. Depra vs Dumlao

In the first issue, res judicata would not apply should the first case be one for ejectment
and the other for quieting of title. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the land owner has
2 options – to buy the building or to sell/rent his land. This is so because the rights of the owner
of the land is older, and by the principle of accession, he also has a right to the accessories.
The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the fair price of the land, the
expenses incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the increase in value of the land, and whether the value
of the land is considerably more than the value of the kitchen built on it. The RTC shall then give
Depra 15 days to exercise such option.

67. Heirs of E. Navarro vs IAC

It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership under
Article 457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by
the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring
property and requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank
of the river. Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced.
If there’s any land to be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan.
The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river bank may be registered. This is not the
case of accretion of land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable
law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
68. Agustin vs IAC
Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a
riparian owner provided that these elements are present: 1) deposit be gradual and
imperceptible 2) it resulted from the effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is
adjacent to the river bank. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium
deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.
Also, respondent’s ownership over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden
and abrupt change in the course of the river; their accretions were transferred to the other side.
Art. 459 states when the current of a river x x x segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains
ownership provided he removes the same w/in 2 years. And Art. 463 states that whenever the
current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the
owner of the land retains ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the
estate by the current.

69. Gov’t vs Colegio De San Jose

 It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague river overflowed
its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the
effects of the current of the river. It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens
System does not protect the riparian owner against the dimunition of the area of his registered
land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream or river. Accretions which the
banks of the river may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of
the owners of the banks.

71. Reynante vs CA
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining such
accretion, it does not automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have
not registered this with the proper entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by prescription,
which was what occurred in this case. Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in
possession of these lands for more than 50 years, the SC rightly held that the land belongs to
him.

72. Republic vs CA
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it
cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of
registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable
title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands
but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. While it is true
that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by
himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful,
exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has
presented tax declarations and tax receipts. Applicant has more than satisfied the legal
requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

73. Vda. De Nazareno, et al vs CA

No. Article 366 of the [Old] Civil Code provides: “any accretions which the banks of
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current belong to the owners of the estates
bordering thereon.” This provision applies even to Torrens titled lands.
Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams
and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that registration does not protect the
riparian owner (Payatas Estate) against diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
Avulsion cannot be raised as well as a ground to lay claim over the 22 hectares land now
forming part of the Mariquina estate. There was no evidence presented to show that the
increase was due to avulsion. The presumption is that the change was gradual and cause by
erosion of the Payatas bank of the river and consequent accretion to the Mariquina estate. It
follows that the land in question is now a part of that estate and no longer pertains to the
Payatas estate.

75. C.N. Hodges vs Garcia

It should here be stated that in the cadastral proceedings wherein the land object of this
action was sought to be registered by herein defendant Amador D. Garcia, plaintiff C.N. Hodges
did not file any opposition despite due publication of the notice of the application and hearing.
The record also shows that the land now being claimed by plaintiff had been litigated in three
civil cases. In those cases, herein defendant was recognized as the owner of the land and held
legally entitled to its possession. In fact, the land in question had been adjudged to be owned by
him as an accretion to his lot No. 2290.
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as a
result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to
his land used to pertain to plaintiff's estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title,
cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect
the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from
the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks. (Art. 366 of the old
Civil Code; art. 457 of the new.)