E.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

Cruz: Purpose. -- The doctrine of separation of powers is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group
of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. More
specifically, according to J. Laurel, the doctrine is intended to secure action, to forestall over action, to prevent depotism and to
obtain efficiency. xxx

Blending of Powers. -- There are instances under the Consti. when powers are not confined exclusively w/in one dept but are in fact
assigned to or shared by several departments. As a result of this blending of powers, there is some difficulty now in classifying some
of them as definitely legislative, executive or judicial. As J. Homes put it vividly when he remarked that "the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to another." The powers of govt may not at all times be contained w/ mathematical
precision in water-tight compartments bec. of their ambiguous nature, e.g., the power of appointment, w/c can rightfully be exercised
by each dept over its own administrative personnel. xxx

CASE DIGEST

1. In Re: Rodolfo Manzano

Facts: RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice pursuant to EO 856 as
amended by EO 326 by then Governor Rodolfo Farinas. He sent a letter to the SC stating that before he accepts the
appointment, he would like to request for the issuance of a Resolution (1) authorizing him to accept his appointment and
assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to it (2) that his membership to the said Committee is not violative
of the Independence of the Judiciary or may be considered as an abandonment of his position in the RTC (3) to
consider that his membership in the committee is a part of the primary function of an Executive Judge. However,
on e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e E O ’ s , i t w a s r e v e a l e d t h a t a m o n g t h e f u n c t i o n s
o f t h e C o m m i t t e e i s t o r e v i e w complaints against any apprehending officer xxx who may be found to have
committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for the appropriate action. Another function
is t o r e c o m m e n d t h e r e v i s i o n o f a n y l a w o r r e g u l a t i o n w h i c h i s b e l i e v e d p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e
p r o p e r administration of criminal justice.

Issue: Whether or not the acceptance of Judge Manzano of his appointment in the Committee will violate the doctrine of separation
of powers

Held: It is evident from the stated functions of the Committee that it performs functions that are administrative in
nature which are defined as those involving the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature xxx.

Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative
Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon
the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Under Art.8, Sec12 of the Constitution, the members of the xxx courts xxx shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

While the doctrine of separation of powers is xxx not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, xxx it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume position xxx which are non-judiciary in character xxx if he is expected to be
confined to the task of adjudication. xxx He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official.

This does not mean that the RTS judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility. An RTC judge should render
assistance to said Committees xxx but only when it may be reasonably incidental to the fulfilment of their judicial duties.
Hence, the request was denied.

2. Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 143

FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and
Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct.
7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he
took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec.
8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that
Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935,
the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.

Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of
the National Assembly

RULING:

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by
actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks
and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government.

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the
limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is,
to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And
thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last
day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body
had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at
the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

HELD:

The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935,cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

3. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs POEA

Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15,
1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as
owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have
been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of
the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA
had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Issue: Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction

Held: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1,
1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board
created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."

The award of P180, 000.00 for death benefits and P12, 000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its
Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted
by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. But the petitioner
questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the
cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model
contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it
to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices.” The petition is dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner

4. Casibang vs Aquino

FACTS: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected

M a y o r o f Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. Herein petitioner filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the
election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of as the proceedings continued, the 1973
Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction
over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which —Section 9 of Article XVII
[Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended
that "...the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973Constitution.
Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under
its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the
pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. CFI ruled in favor of Yu.

ISSUE: WON the protest case is a political question

HELD:
No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the
incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent
Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure".
The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between
protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein respondent Yu — was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and
legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and
obligations of the position. If the protestee’s election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in
office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issue therein
involved — a purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Any judgment to
be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII. Neither does Section 2
of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the
National Assembly the power to enact a local government code.

5. TAÑADA vs. CUENCO

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Tañada and Diosdado Macapagal sought to oust respondent senators Mariano J. Cuenco and
Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal, alleging that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, and the Senate
itself, in nominating then choosing the respondents, respectively, had acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear
violation of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution (1935):

Section 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three
upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest numbers of votes
therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Respondents allege that: (a) the Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate
in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Tañada has
exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators."

ISSUE: 1 . A r e t h e a l l e g a t i o n s b y t h e r e s p o n d e n t s c o r r e c t ?

2. Is this case a mere political question?

RULING:
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. This case is not an action against the
Senate and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members
of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the
exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed
the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the
Congress of the Philippines. Yet, it does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and
approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the
Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. The Court is also called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias – a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate – on behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the
party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate
is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power
thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate proved of
the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection there with. Whether an election of public officers has
been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election
procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute,
and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights." The
court does not only have jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein

6. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990]

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground
that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No.
6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was
enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for
the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by
virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the
1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution
No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated
November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for
the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed
the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and
on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issue.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who
merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his
opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners
were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive
and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of
franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or
television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective
office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be
gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other
candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither
the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The
people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee
full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.

The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional.

7. Daza vs Singson

Facts: Cong. Daza, a member of the Liberal Party, was one of the representatives who were chosen to represent the
said party in the Commission of Appointments. When the party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, it resulted
to the swelling of its members to 159 and thereby reducing the members of the LP to only 17. Because of this, the House
of Representatives revise its operation in the COA withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein respondent Luis Singson. Cong. Daza challenges his removal.

Alleging that the

reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political
realignment because LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. Cong. Singson, on the other
hand, contends that the question raised was political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the issue raised is political in nature, thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Court

Held: The issue at bar does not involve the discretionary act of the HR that may not be reviewed because it is political in nature.
The issue involved here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the COA.
Consequently, the issued presented is justiciable rather than political, for it involves the manner of filling the COA as
prescribed in the Constitution (legality) and not the discretion of the HR in the choice of its representatives (wisdom).
Moreover, even if the question is political in nature, it would still come in the powers of the SC to review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 8, Section 1 of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch on instrumentality of
the government.

8. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

Facts: Sometime in 2005 RA 9335, also known as the attrition act, was instituted. This law imposed a system of rewards and
punishment upon government officials who belonged to the BOC and the BIR. The main gist of the law was that officials belonging to
these departments would be rewarded for collections in excess of the set quotas, and punished by dismissal if unable to reach the same
quotas. AGPL contests the constitutionality of the law, claiming among many other alleged negative effects, that it will encourage the public officials
of both these departments to become mercenaries and lead them away from the proper performance of their duties.

Issue: Will the regularity of the performance of the duties of the officials of the BIR and BOC be cast into doubt as a result of this law?
Held: Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties.

This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue
targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection. The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it.
It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) especially in this case where it is an underlying principle to
advance a declared public policy. Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and
mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. Public service is its own
reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty,
industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.

F. DELEGATION OF POWERS

CASE DIGEST

1. Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary 211 SCRA 219 July 3, 1992

Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

FACTS: On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO
443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil
and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Sec. 24 of Art. 6 of the Constitution which provides:

“All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.”

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such
power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that
therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution
provides as follows:

“(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government.” There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress
to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits”
“tariff rates. . and other duties or imposts”.

2. People vs Vera

Political Law – Delegation of Powers

FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC
and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the
he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.
The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec.
11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty.
There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in
carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the
doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section
of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of
probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not
avail of their right to probation.

3. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs POEA

Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15,
1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as
owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have
been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of
the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA
had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Issue: Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction

Held: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1,
1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board
created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."

The award of P180, 000.00 for death benefits and P12, 000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its
Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted
by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. But the petitioner
questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the
cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model
contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it
to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices. "The petition is dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner.

4. Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

J. Cruz

Facts: Petitioner transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these were confiscated by the station commander in
Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the RTC of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of asupersede as bond of P12,
000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise
by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

The same result was decided in the trial court.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright confiscation without giving the
owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of
legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers
to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?

Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio: The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law. Constitutional grant to the Supreme Court
to review. Justice Laurel's said, “Courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a
law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or
excise the affliction.”

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controversy. In the due process clause, however, the
wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for
all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing
conditions. Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due process lest they be confined to its interpretation like a
straitjacket. There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.

There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based
on human experience or rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An example is a passport of a person with
a criminal offense cancelled without hearing. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which
both restrains and is restrained by due process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of
carabos with an exception. While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, it can’t be said that it complies
with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap. Summary action may be taken in
valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it. There was no reason
why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method to confiscate carabos was oppressive.

Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately. This was a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separation of powers. The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the
law during that time was valid.

5. Tablarin v. Gutierrez G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

Feliciano, J.

Facts: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the
petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of
Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing
on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted and administered
as previously scheduled.

Issue: Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which
forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
Board of Medical Education

Held: The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rulemaking authority by an administrative agency like the
Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety.

In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and regulation of medical
education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

6. Pelaez vs Auditor General

Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this is
purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or
other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more sub
provinces…The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds
to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EO’s are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has
been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed” except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in the
areas affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.”
Pelaez argues, accordingly: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?” The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred
from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez’
argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger
power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
— and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

7. PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. vs. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 165299 December 18, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner’s plant located at 114
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated waste water generated from
petitioner’s laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River. Furthermore, the
Investigation Report stated that petitioner’s plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On
5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted waste water sampling of petitioner’s effluent.

The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen
Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation. Petitioners submitted its
application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water
pollution. No compliance followed. It was reported that petitioner’s waste water treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently,
another waste water sampling was conducted but the results still failed. A Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before
the LLDA.

Petitioner requested another test. This time, it showed compliance. Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October 2001 and
its corresponding daily penalty be set aside and that the imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September
2001. It is respondent’s position that the Notice of Violation and the Imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it
had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment to abate the water pollution. This Public Hearing Committee finds respondent’s
arguments devoid of merit. Presidential Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any person found in violation
thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5, 000.00) [sic] for every day during which such violation continues. The mere discharge
of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD No. 984. CA held that LLDA has the power to impose
fines.

ISSUE: WON LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984.

HELD:
YES. Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions, which was once
lodged with the National Pollution Contro l Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive
Order No. 192 (EO 192). SC disagree. Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the Office of the
President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which
assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),
LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and
enforcement. Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to
carry out its duties and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the power of LLDA
to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency has
also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.

The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same manner, we hold that the
LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region.