CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - MIDTERMS DOCTRINES

RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Institution of Criminal Actions (Section 1)

People vs. Bautista Crime involved: slight physical injuries (RPC)

Applicable law: RPC
Note: Sir pointed out the Barangay Complaint - filed on Aug.
11, 1999. Did the Barangay complaint interrupt the
prescriptive period?

It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the

fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period.

The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon

the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with
the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time
the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until
such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by
the proper court.

Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ Crime involved: BP 22 (special law)

Applicable law: Act No. 3326

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P.

Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot
uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can
toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on
4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment,” and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of
the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted.

HENCE​, for violations of special penal laws, under Act No.

3326, the filing of a complaint with the prosecutor for the
purpose of instituting a preliminary investigation interrupts the
prescriptive period.

Further note re: administrative cases/investigations

The nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to
the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
Jadewell vs. Lidua Crime involved: Baguio ordinance
Applicable law: Act No. 3326
For violations of municipal or city ordinances, the filing of an
information in court interrupts the prescriptive period.

Who Must Prosecute (Sections 5,16)

Piñote vs. Ayco What happened​: Judge allowed the defense to present
witnesses when the public prosecutor was in the hospital.
Judge allowed (and ordered) him to cross-examine them
when he attended in subsequent hearings, but he refused.

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the

Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly
prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on
this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the
trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state
interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule
of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.

Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the defense

witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or
a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear
transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to
cross-examine the witnesses.

Respondents intention to uphold the right of the accused to a

speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may
be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is
entitled to due process, so is the State.

People vs. Piccio What happened​: The People, through the private prosecutors
but with conformity of public prosecutor, filed the Notice of
Appeal with CA. (Without the OSG’s conformity)

It is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in

appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is
vested solely in the OSG, which is the law office of the
Government whose specific powers and functions include that
of representing the Republic and/or the people before any
court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as
the ends of justice may require.

Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of

a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of
the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on
the criminal aspect representing the People.
● The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that
the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal
action is the People and not the petitioners who are
mere complaining witnesses.
● For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as
the real parties-in-interest in the criminal case and,
therefore, only the OSG can represent them in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this
Court.
 ● In view of the corollary principle that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party
entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the
criminal case not filed by the People as represented
by the OSG is perforce dismissible.

The private complainant or the offended party may, however,

file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only
insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He
may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without
the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving
his interest in the civil aspect of the case.

People vs. Dela Cerna What happened​: Rape complaint filed before the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, when rape cannot be prosecuted de oficio

It is worthy to note that the rape incidents in this case

occurred prior to the effectivity of RA 8353, The Anti-Rape
Law of 1997 which took effect on October 22, 1997 and
classified the crime of rape as a crime against persons.
● Such being the case, we shall apply the old law and
treat the acts of rape herein committed as private
crimes. Thus, their institution, prosecution and
extinction should still be governed by Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC):
○ Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of
adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness. xxx
○ The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape,
or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case,
the offender has been expressly pardoned by
the above-named persons, as the case may
be.
○ In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices
and accessories after the fact of the
above-mentioned crimes.

The aforequoted article provides for the extinction of criminal

liability in private crimes.
● For the crimes of adultery and concubinage, the
pardon extended by the offended spouse results in
the extinction of the liability of the offender.
● On the other hand, in seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, two modes are recognized for
extinguishing criminal liability - pardon and marriage.
● In all cases, however, the pardon must come prior to
 the institution of the criminal action. After the case
has been filed in court, any pardon made by the
private complainant, whether by sworn statement or
on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal
liability.
○ It must be stressed that private complainant
in this case filed her complaint on May 16,
1997 and even testified against
accused-appellant on March 25, 1998. On the
other hand, she executed her affidavit of
desistance only on July 3, 1998. Clearly, the
pardon extended by the victim to her father
was made after the institution of the criminal
action. Consequently, it cannot be a ground
to dismiss the action in these cases.
○ The reason for this rule is that the true
aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution is
the People of the Philippines whose collective
sense of morality, decency and justice has
been outraged. In such a case, the offended
party becomes merely a complaining witness.
○ The complaint required by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code is but a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the
guilty parties in the name of the People of the
Philippines. Such condition is imposed out of
consideration for the offended woman and
her family who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through with
the scandal of a public trial. Hence, once
filed, control of the prosecution is removed
from the offended party’s hands and any
change of heart by the victim will not affect
the state’s right to vindicate the atrocity
committed against itself.

People vs. Go What happened​: The respondents filed a petition for

certiorari before the CA. However, a copy of the petition was
served only on the private complainant and not the People,
through the OSG, who was not impleaded as party to the
case. The CA, without ordering the respondents to implead
the People, granted the petition.

It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the

CA, respondents failed to implead the People of the
Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition
was obviously defective.
● As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are
prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor.

While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per

se ground for the dismissal of an action, considering that said
party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or
 such times as are just, it remains essential – as it is
jurisdictional – that any indispensable party be impleaded in
the proceedings before the court renders judgment.
● This is because the absence of such indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.

Complaint and Information (Sections 2-4; 6-13)

People vs. Bayabos Crime involved: Hazing

Elements:
(1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or
injury; and
(2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the
person’s admission or entry into an organization.
Information: “xxx fail to take any action to prevent the
occurrence of the ​hazing ​and the infliction of ​psychological
and physical injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOY,
JR. thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FERNANDO
BALIDOY, JR”

Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the

Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not
include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing.
● Regarding​ “psychological and physical injuries”​:
○ The indictment merely states that
psychological pain and physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim.
○ There is no allegation that the purported acts
were employed as a prerequisite for
admission or entry into the organization.
○ Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would
prevent the successful prosecution of the
criminal responsibility of the accused, either
as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of
hazing.
● Regarding​ “hazing”:
○ Plain reference to a technical term – in this
case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete,
as it is but a characterization of the acts
allegedly committed and thus a mere
conclusion of law​.

Lasoy vs. Zeñarosa Crime involved: Dangerous Drugs Act

Point of contention:
● Information: 42.410 grams
● Evidence: 42.410 kilograms
However, the accused were already arraigned, pleaded guilty,
and served their sentence under the Information. An amended
Information was filed indicating “kg” instead of “g”.

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the

statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
 constitutive thereof.
● In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way
that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately
know what is meant, and the court can decide the
matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is
that the information is valid. It is not necessary to
follow the language of the statute in the information.
The information will be sufficient if it describes the
crime defined by law.
● Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is
that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime
was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is,
to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge
against them, is reasonably complied with.

Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110, Section

6, shows on its face that it is valid.
● Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

People vs. Puig Crime involved: qualified theft

Information: “conspiring, confederating, and helping one
another, with ​grave abuse of confidence​, being the ​Cashier
and Bookkeeper ​of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc.”

On the manner of how the Information should be worded,

Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, is enlightening:
● Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

It is evident that the Information need not use the exact

language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether
it enables a person of common understanding to know the
charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly.

It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and

other employees of a Bank who come into possession of the
monies deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in
them by their employer. Banks, on the other hand, where
monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof.
 This is very clear not only from the express provisions of the
law, but from established jurisprudence. The relationship
between banks and depositors has been held to be that of
creditor and debtor.

In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has

firmly established the nature of possession by the Bank of the
money deposits therein, and the duties being performed by its
employees who have custody of the money or have come into
possession of it.
● The Court has consistently considered the allegations
in the Information that such employees acted with
grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and
prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to
it as owner of the money deposits, as sufficient to
make out a case of Qualified Theft.

People vs. Ceredon Crime involved: rape

Information: “sometime in 1995/1998/2000”

The date or time of the commission of the rape need not be

alleged with precision. It is enough for the information or
complaint to state that the crime has been committed at a
time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.
Failure to allege the exact date when the crime happened
does not render the information defective, much less void.

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the

elements of the offense and the constitutive acts or
omissions. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not
an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the
material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The
failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed
does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face.

The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material

ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is
carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation.
In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no
substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or
time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient
that the complaint or information states that the crime has
been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of
its actual commission.

People vs. Soriano Crime involved: “multiple rape”

The Court observes that the information charged more than

one offense in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
● Considering that appellant did not seasonably object
to the multiple offenses in the information, the court
may convict the appellant of as many as are charged
and proved.
● We note, however, that both the trial court and the
appellate court merely found the appellant guilty of
 "multiple rape" without specifying the number of rapes
that appellant is guilty of.
● While this may have been irrelevant considering that
appellant would have been sentenced to suffer the
extreme penalty of death even if only one count of
rape was proven, the same is still important since this
would have bearing on appellant's civil liability.
● Further, there is no such crime as "multiple rape." In
this case, appellant is guilty of two counts of rape
qualified by the circumstances that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the
parent of the victim.

Ricarze vs. CA Crime involved: estafa through falsification of commercial

documents
Information: “with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without
the knowledge and consent of ​Caltex Philippines, Inc.”
What happened: PCIB substituted Caltex as ​private
complainant since it already re-credited the amounts lost by
Caltex.

In case of offenses against property, the designation of the

name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for
as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified.

Senador vs. People Crime involved: estafa

Information: “accused, having obtained and received from one
Cynthia Jaime​”
Trial: private complainant was actually Rita Jaime
Property subject of the case: jewelry, ​specific because of
receipts presented as evidence

In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a

crime against honor, wherein the identity of the person
against whom the defamatory words were directed is a
material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the
person injured is material.

On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged

with estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely
require as indispensable the proper designation of the name
of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is
the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the
information.

It is clear from [Section 12, Rule 110] that in offenses against

property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the
offended party would depend on whether or not the subject
matter of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.

In offenses against property, if the subject matter of the

offense is ​generic and not identifiable​, such as the money
unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation
of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal
of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense
is ​specific and identifiable​, such as a warrant, as in Kepner,
 or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the
designation of the offended party is immaterial.

People vs. Sandiganbayan Crime involved: Section 3(e) of RA 3019

Information: “wilfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted ​benefits ​to his co-accused xxx ​thereby causing
undue injury ​to the residents and students in the area”
What happened: The Sandiganbayan quashed the
Information. It adopted the contention of the petitioner, who,
citing Llorente, argued that the prosecution failed to:
(1) allege, with precision, the exact amount of benefits
granted by Castillo to the Arciagas and
(2) specify, quantify and prove "to the point of moral certainty"
the undue injury caused

For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have

been alleged, an Information charging a violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 need not state, to the point of
specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted
nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty,
the undue injury caused.
● We have consistently and repeatedly held in a
number of cases that an Information need only state
the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the
finer details of why and how the crime was
committed.

As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the

privilege granted by Castillo to the Arciagas to operate the
dumpsite without the need to comply with the applicable laws,
rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents and
students were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal
operation.
● The details required by the Sandiganbayan (such as
the specific peso amount actually received by the
Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation of
the subject dumpsite or the specific extent of damage
caused to the residents and students) are ​matters of
evidence best raised during the trial; they need
not be stated in the Information.
● For purposes of informing the accused of the crime
charged, the allegation on the existence of
unwarranted benefits and undue injury under the
Information suffices.

Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement

becomes clearer when one considers the period when a
motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's
arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidence. It
would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific
peso amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof
of undue injury - to the point of moral certainty, no less at this
stage of the criminal proceedings.

Re: Llorente
Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must
be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral
 certainty." The validity and sufficiency of the Information,
however, was not an issue in Llorente. The import of the
ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established
by the prosecution during the trial and not when the
Information is filed.

Amendment and Substitution (Section 14)

People vs. Casey Crime involved: murder

First Information: “the above- named accused, being then
armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias
"Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with a firearm and ​who
was (sic) still at large​”
Second Information: “the above named accused Joseph
Casey alias "Burl" being then armed with a knife, together
with the accused Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who
was then armed with a firearm”
What happened: Casey was already arraigned and pleaded
not guilty to the first Information. His then at-large co-accused
was then arrested. A second Information was then filed. His
co-accused then pleaded not guilty to the second Information.
Casey appealed to the SC, contending that the trial court
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the charge
against him.

There can be a violation of such right, however, only when the

amendment pertains to matters of substance.
● In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the
information refer to the inclusion of accused appellant
Ricardo Felix to the same charge of murder. They do
not change the nature of the crime against
accused-appellant Casey.
● Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength are similarly
alleged in both informations. No extenuating
circumstance is likewise alleged in both.
● Thus the amendment of the information as far as
accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of form
and not of substance as it is not prejudicial to his
rights.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the

amendment of an information has been said to be whether a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other.

A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an

amendment to an information introduced after the accused
has pleaded not guilty thereto which:
● does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein
● does not expose the accused to a charge which could
call for a higher penalty
● does not affect the essence of the offense
● or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
 opportunity to meet the new averment

had each been held to be one of form and not of substance —

not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Fronda-Baggao vs. People Crime involved: illegal recruitment

What happened: The prosecution wanted four Informations for
illegal recruitment to be amended into just one Information for
illegal recruitment in large scale. The accused has not been
arraigned.

Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial

amendment of the complaint or information may be made
without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it
does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.
● Following the above provisions and considering that
petitioner has not yet entered her plea, the four
Informations could still be amended.

A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it

uses the singular word complaint or information, it does not
mean that two or more complaints or Informations cannot be
amended into only one Information. Surely, such could not
have been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an
absurd situation whereby two or more complaints or
Informations could no longer be amended into one or more
Informations. On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court is relevant, thus:
● SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.

Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four

Informations for illegal recruitment into a single Information for
illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial rights
as this would deprive her of the right to bail which she already
availed of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously, petitioner
relies on Section 14 of the same Rule 110 which provides that
after the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. As
stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been arraigned. Hence,
she cannot invoke the said provision.

Pacoy vs. Hon. Cajigal Crime involved: Homicide -> Murder -> Homicide
Information: “With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita​ in disregard of his rank​.”
What happened: The accused pleaded guilty to the crime of
homicide with the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank. The judge, after arraignment, ordered the prosecutor to
amend the Information to murder because of such
circumstance. The prosecutor then entered his amendment by
 crossing out the word Homicide and instead wrote the word
Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the
same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the
correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from Escuita to
Escueta. The accused later refused to plea again, believing
that his right against double jeopardy was violated. The
Information was later amended again back to Homicide since
the aggravating circumstance was generic, not qualifying.

In the present case, the change of the offense charged from

Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment.
● While the amended Information was for Murder, a
reading of the Information shows that the only change
made was in the caption of the case; and in the
opening paragraph or preamble of the Information,
with the crossing out of word Homicide and its
replacement by the word Murder.
● There was no change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The
averments in the amended Information for Murder are
exactly the same as those already alleged in the
original Information for Homicide, as there was not at
all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e.,
the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance.

Ricarze vs. CA Crime involved: estafa through falsification of commercial

documents
Information: “with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without
the knowledge and consent of ​Caltex Philippines, Inc.”
What happened: PCIB substituted Caltex as ​private
complainant since it already re-credited the amounts lost by
Caltex.

Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or

substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only
a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and
if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts

constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The following have been held to be mere formal amendments:
1. new allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction;
2. an amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one;
3. additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of ​defense
 he has or will assume;
4. an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused; and
5. an amendment that merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely states
with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the

amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance.

In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as

private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The
substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner.
The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks
remained the same, and all such evidence was available to
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution.

Albert vs. Sandiganbayan Crime involved: Section 3(e) of RA 3019

Original Information: “with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality and or ​gross neglect of duty​”
Amended Information: “with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality and/or ​gross inexcusable negligence​”

The second element provides the different modes by which

the crime may be committed, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced

by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a
defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused might have,
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as
amended. On the other hand, an amendment which merely
states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which, therefore,
adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is
an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.

In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase

gross neglect of duty from the Information. Although this may
be considered a substantial amendment, ​the same is
allowable even after arraignment and plea being
beneficial to the accused​. As a replacement, gross
 inexcusable negligence would be included in the Information
as a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court
believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in
form.
● In Sistoza v. Desierto, the Information charged the
accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but
specified only manifest partiality and evident bad faith
as the modalities in the commission of the offense
charged. Gross inexcusable negligence was not
mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court
held that ​the said section is committed by dolo or
culpa, and although the Information may have
alleged only one of the modalities of committing
the offense, the other mode is deemed included in
the accusation to allow proof thereof​.
● Thus, we hold that the inclusion of gross inexcusable
negligence in the Information, which merely alleges
manifest partiality and evident bad faith as modalities
in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, is an amendment in form.

Mendez vs. People Re: for income earned

Accordingly, the addition of the phrase “for the income
earned” before the phrase “for the taxable year 2001” cannot
but be a mere formal amendment since the added phrase
merely states with additional precision something that is
already contained in the original information, i.e., the income
tax return is required to be filed precisely for the income
earned for the preceding taxable year.

Re: The addition of the phrase “doing business under the

name and style of Mendez Medical Group” and the change
and/or addition of the branches of petitioner’s operation

Under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), a resident

citizen who is engaged in the practice of a profession within
the Philippines is obligated to file in duplicate an income tax
return on his income from all sources, regardless of the
amount of his gross income. Under Section 51 B of the NIRC,
the return should be filed with an authorized agent bank,
Revenue District Officer, Collection Agent or duly authorized
Treasurer of the city or municipality in which such person has
his legal residence or principal place of business in the
Philippines.
● Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from
taxable years 2001 to 2003, the petitioner should
have filed a consolidated return in his principal place
of business, regardless of the number and location of
his other branches.
● Consequently, we cannot but agree with the CTA that
the change and/or addition of the branches of the
petitioner’s operation in the information does not
constitute substantial amendment because it does not
change the prosecution’s theory that the petitioner
failed to file his income tax return.
● Here, the prosecution’s theory of the case, i.e.,
that petitioner failed to file his income tax return for
 the taxable year 2001 ​did not change. ​The
prosecution’s cause for filing an information
remained the same as the cause in the original
and in the amended information. For emphasis, the
prosecution’s evidence during the preliminary
investigation of the case shows that petitioner did not
file his income tax return in his place of legal
residence or principal place of business in Quezon
City or with the Commissioner. In short, the
amendment sought ​did not alter the crime charge​d.

We also reject for lack of merit petitioner’s claim that the

inclusion of the phrase “doing business under the name and
style of Mendez Medical Group” after his preliminary
investigation and arraignment deprives him of the right to
question the existence of this “entity.”
● The petitioner however has not drawn our attention to
any of his related operations that actually possesses
its own juridical personality. In the original
information, petitioner is described as “sole proprietor
of Weigh Less Center.”
● A sole proprietorship is a form of business
organization conducted for profit by a single
individual, and requires the proprietor or owner
thereof, like the petitioner-accused, to secure licenses
and permits, register the business name, and pay
taxes to the national government ​without acquiring
juridical or legal personality of its own​.

In the amended information, the prosecution additionally

alleged that petitioner is “doing business under the name and
style of ‘Weigh Less Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’”
● Given the nature of a sole proprietorship, the addition
of the phrase “doing business under the name and
style” is merely descriptive of the nature of the
business organization established by the petitioner as
a way to carry out the practice of his profession.
● As a phrase descriptive of a sole proprietorship, the
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the “entity”
“Mendez Medical Group” because this entity is
nothing more than the shadow of its business owner
petitioner himself.

Venue (Section 15)

Macasaet vs. People Crime: libel

Information filed in: QC RTC
Residence of offended party: Marikina
Note: Sir pointed out that evidence could already be
presented even before trial to question the jurisdiction of the
court as alleged in the Information.

Rules on venue of libel cases:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a
private person, the criminal action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where
the libelous article is printed and first published.
 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the
criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at
the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is
in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office
outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense.

In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at

the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article,
hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila
where ​Abante ​was first published or in the province or city
where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous
article was printed.

Note: Sir also highlighted this part of the case

When does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the
Court of Appeals commence?
● Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n
appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties. When a party files
a notice of appeal, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
case does not cease as a matter of course; its only
effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to
him.

Bonifacio vs. RTC Crime involved: libel

Information filed in: Makati RTC
Why? - Because the offended party ​accessed​ the website
containing the libel in Makati (alleged in the Information)

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place

where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the

complainant is a private individual is limited to only ​either of
two places​, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The
Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the
venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the
offending article was first published and ​accessed by the
private complainant in Makati City. In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first ​publication​.

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to

Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the
 venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas,
meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate
an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation
becomes even more acute where the offended party is a
person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is
motivated by spite or the need for revenge.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first

published are used by the offended party as basis for the
venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity ​where the defamatory article was printed and ​first
published​, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This
pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it

pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the
internet as there would be no way of determining the ​situs of
its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise
of equating his first ​access to the defamatory article on
petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication
would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of
the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires
much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in
situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or
anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may
have allegedly accessed the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information

sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply
because the defamatory article was ​accessed therein would
open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the ​pepcoalition website is likewise accessed
or capable of being accessed.

Rigor vs. People Crime involved: BP 22

Information filed in: Pasig RTC

Violations of ​Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as

transitory or continuing crimes. ​A suit on the check can be
filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the
offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered or dishonored. ​In transitory crimes, some
acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some
in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction
to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the case excludes the other. Hence, a person
charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.

The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the

place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in
 criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored
by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch,
appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San
Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and
knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also
overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that
crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan are triable
by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and
proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in
Pasig City.

Unionbank vs. People Crime involved: perjury (in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping)
Information filed in: Makati RTC
Where Certificate was submitted: Pasay MeTC

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the

subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the
Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise,
the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate
against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary
public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have
been made in Makati City.

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate

falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been
committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the
last portion of the Information.

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was

allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in
Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material
statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus,
Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the
proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant
to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting
the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Sy Tiong vs Caet
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of
the RPC which provides: “shall testify under oath, or make an
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.” in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1)
falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a
criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material
matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of

the RPC essentially involved perjured statements made in a
GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and
submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case
 involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in
a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this
perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the
oath was taken, is the place where the offense was
committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been
the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge
involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.

In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion

supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a
falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue
related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial
proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the
perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and
other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized
the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present
RPC which separately deals with false testimony in criminal,
civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also
penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the
venue should be the place where the submission was made
to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the
place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this
was not the offense charged in the Information.

Treñas vs. People Crime involved: estafa

Information filed in: Makati RTC

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of

estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the
RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City.
● Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the
information, there is nothing in the prosecution
evidence which even mentions that any of the
elements of the offense were committed in Makati.
● The rule is settled that an objection may be raised
based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction
over the offense charged, or it may be considered
motu proprio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over
the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the accused, by express
waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by
the sovereign authority that organized the court and is
given only by law in the manner and form prescribed
by law.
 RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
Civil Actions (Sections 1-3, 5)

Lee v. Chua Crime involved: Perjury

Note: Sir pointed out that while certain crimes, such as
crimes against public interest, technically have no victims,
there can be an action for civil liability when a person’s
credibility or reputation was injured because of the act.

Paul Lee claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against

public interest, does not offend any private party but is a
crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and
orderly administration of laws. He argues that perjury is a
felony where no civil liability arises on the part of the
offender because there are no damages to be compensated
and that there is no private person injured by the crime.

The Supreme Court said that an offended party is "the

person against whom or against whose property the offense
was committed." (Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure). Hence, it is reasonable to assume
that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public
or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable,
and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is
civilly liable is the offended party.

In this case, the statement of Paul Lee regarding his custody

of the TCT covering CHI’s property and its loss through
inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt,
injurious to Chin Lee’s personal credibility and reputation
insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and
responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI.

Cancio v. Isip Actions involved: 3 counts of BP 22 (dismissed), 3 counts of

estafa (dismissed due to failure to prosecute), action for
collection of money arising from dishonored checks (​culpa
contractual​)

Note: Sir pointed out that:

(1) Dismissal for failure to prosecute is dismissal on the
merits (res judicata and double jeopardy will attach)
(2) While Rule 111 only enumerated Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as
independent civil actions, this case ruled that ​Article
31 of the Civil Code is also ​an independent civil
action.
(3) Article 31: When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.

Cancio sought to enforce Isip's obligation to make good the

value of the checks in exchange for the cash he delivered to
respondent. In other words, petitioner’s cause of action is
the respondents breach of the contractual obligation (culpa
 contractual).

The present case is not barred by res judicata because

there's no identity of causes of action. In the present case,
the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action,
which remains separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed
instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing
on said independent civil action based on an entirely
different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan Crime involved: violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act

Ferrer was previously absolved of administrative liability by

the Office of the President. In the present case, Ferrer
moved to quash the Information on the ground that since he
was cleared of administrative liability, the pending criminal
case against him should be dismissed.

SC said that an absolution from a criminal charge is not a

bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. The
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar
the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar
acts which were the subject of the administrative case. While
the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, while that in administrative cases is only
substantial evidence, the basis of administrative liability
differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on
the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime.

Corpuz v. Siapno Action involved: Violation of Administrative Circular Nos.

3-92 and 17-94, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Falsification, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Officer,
Abuse of Authority, Delay in the Administration of Justice
and Ignorance of the Law

Note: Sir pointed out that a fine is not the same as civil
liability. The imposition of the fine in the criminal case is not
for the purpose of indemnifying the aggrieved party but for
vindicating the State for the offense committed by the
wrongdoer.

One of the allegations is that Judge Siapno failed to award

civil damages in some Criminal Cases where the accused
pleaded guilty. Judge Siapno said that he did not award civil
damages in two Criminal Cases because the prosecution did
not present any evidence therefor.

The Supreme Court said that the civil liability arising from a
crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the
offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does
not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action
 against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or
reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to
establish the extent of injuries suffered. •Even in case of an
acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment
shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in
favor of the offended party.

Cruz v. CA Crime involved: Estafa through falsification of public

document (Cruz executed before a Notary Public in the City
of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land
stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered
owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving
heirs)

Manila RTC acquitted Cruz because of reasonable doubt

the same court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the
case, ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel
of land located in ​Bulacan. ​Cruz assailed the ruling with
respect to the civil liability, arguing that the location of the
subject property (Bulacan) outside the court’s territorial
jurisdiction (Manila) deprived the Manila RTC of jurisdiction
over the civil aspect of the criminal case.

The SC said that where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the
court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that
the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a
criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from
the crime.

The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in

the criminal action unless reserved by the offended party. In
the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil
action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the
criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted Cruz of the
crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt,
did not extinguish the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial
court had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant
case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is
located in Bulacan.

Lo Bun Tiong v. Balboa Action involved: forum shopping

There is forum shopping when the following elements

concur:
o identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who
represent the same interest in both actions;
o identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the
latter is founded on the same set of facts; and
o identity of the two preceding particulars

In this case, Balboa instituted the civil action (civil liability

arising from BP 22) prior to the criminal action (for BP 22),
then the civil case may proceed independently of the 3
criminal cases, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.
 As a general rule, the criminal action for violations of BP 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action shall be allowed.
However, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil
liability in cases of violations of BP 22 is allowed when the
civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case.

Co v. Munoz Crime involved: libel (Munoz was acquitted by CA for libel

but Co appealed wrt the civil liability)
Note: Sir noted the different rules involved (Rule 111 and
Rule 120)

The extinction of penal action does not carry with it the

extinction of the civil action ex delicto, regardless of whether
or not the civil action was instituted with or filed separately
from the criminal action.​ The offended party may still claim
civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the liability may arise ​exists​.

-Section 2, ​Rule 111​, Rules of Court:

xxx "​The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on the delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist."

-Section 2, ​Rule 120​, Rules of Court:

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the
guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil
action liability may arise did not exist.

-Instances when, notwithstanding accused's acquittal,

offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto
(according to jurisprudence):
a. if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
b. if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only
civil
c. if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.

In this case, Munoz was not civilly liable because there was
no libel to speak of since the communication was privileged.

Casupanan v. Laroya Actions involved: Criminal case for reckless imprudence

resulting in damage to property and civil case for quasi-delict

WRT INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FILED BY

OFFENDED PARTY​:
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal
action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict
 against the accused. ​Section 3 of the present Rule 111
expressly states that the ​offended party may bring such an
action but the offended party may not recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended
party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

WRT INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FILED BY ​ACCUSED

Under paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the

accused is ​barred from filing a counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal
case​. ​However, the same provision states that any
cause of action which could have been the subject (of
the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint)
may be litigated in a separate civil action. ​The present
Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action which shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended
party is litigated in the criminal action.

Prejudicial Question (Sections 6-7)

Dreamwork v. Janiola Actions involved:

(1) Criminal action for BP 22 (filed by Dreamwork)
(2) Civil action for rescission of construction agreement (filed
by Janiola while the criminal case was pending; alleged
prejudicial question)

Note: Sir noted the statcon issue raised; i.e., that there was
an alleged conflict between Article 36 of the Civil Code and
the Rules of Court and that since Art. 36 is substantive law
while the Rules of Court is procedural law, then the former
should prevail.

Article 36, Civil Code: Prejudicial questions which must be

decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed​, shall be governed by rules of court which the
Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in
conflict with the provisions of this Code.

Section 7, Rule 111, Rules of Court: Elements of prejudicial

question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

There was really no ambiguity. Art. 36 can be interpreted in

two ways. One interpretation conflicts with the Rules of
Court while the other is in harmony with the Rules of Court.
Accused’s interpretation is that since Art. 36 states that
“Prejudicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or ​may proceed x​ xx​”​,
then it is possible that the civil action was filed ​during the
pendency of the criminal action since the phrase “may
proceed” presupposes that there is already a pending
 criminal action.

The Court adopted a second interpretation of Art. 36, which

is in harmony with the Rules of Court. The clause "before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed"
in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may be interpreted to mean that
the ​motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed
during the ​preliminary investigation (hence why Art. 36
states “before any criminal prosecution… ​may proceed”​ )
with the public prosecutor or court conducting the
investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case. This is consistent with the provision below:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.--A

petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the ​office of the prosecutor or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.

First Producers Holdings Corp v. Actions involved:

Co (1) Criminal action for estafa and perjury (filed by First
Producers against Co)
(2) Civil action for damages where the issue is
ownership over the Manila Polo Club proprietary
shares (filed by Co against First Producers after the
criminal case was instituted [but note that in this
case, the requirement that for there to be a
prejudicial action, the civil action must have been
previously instituted, was not yet in the Rules of
Court])

Note: Sir noted that Co can raise the issue of ownership as a

matter of ​defense ​[against his civil liability since the civil
action was deemed instituted with the criminal case]. Also,
sir noted that the proprietary share is a perk.

Co argues that his guilt or innocence may be determined

only after the issue of ownership has been resolved.

The SC said that there’s no prejudicial question because:

(1) The ​civil action for recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal
action. Hence, ​Co may invoke all defenses
pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal
action​. In fact, there is no law or rule prohibiting him
from airing exhaustively the question of ownership.
After all, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the
said defense. The rules of evidence and procedure
for the recovery of civil liabilities are the same in
both criminal and civil cases.
(2) the issue of ownership is not a necessary element of
estafa (hence, the requirement that “the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action” was not met)
San Miguel v. Perez Actions involved:
(1) Criminal case: non-delivery of titles in violation of PD
957 (filed by San Miguel against BF Homes PQ)
(2) Administrative case: action for specific performance
(filed by San Miguel before the HLURB)

An action for specific performance, although pending before

an administrative agency (HLURB), is civil in nature and can
give rise to a prejudicial question. That the action for specific
performance was an administrative case pending in the
HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence
at all. The action for specific performance, although civil in
nature, could be brought only in the HLURB because of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

In this case, the administrative case is a logical antecedent

to the criminal case because the action for specific
performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not
San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the
delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action
would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and
officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs.

Pimentel v. Pimentel Actions involved:

(1) Criminal case: frustrated parricide (filed by Maria
against Joselito)
(2) Civil case: declaration of nullity of marriage (filed by
Maria after she filed the criminal case)

Note: Sir highlighted ratio numbers 3 and 4 below

The civil case for nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial

question to the criminal case for frustrated parricide
because:
(1) The criminal case was filed first
(2) The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar
or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. In the annulment case, the issue was
w/n Joselito is psychologically incapacitated to
perform essential marital obligations; while in the
criminal case, the issue was w/n the accused
performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed the victim as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the accused's will.
(3) The relationship between the offender and the victim
is not determinative of the guilt of innocence of the
accused. At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, Maria and Joselito were married.
Even if the marriage is annulled, Joselito would still
be criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to Maria.
(4) The case of ​Tenebro d ​ oes not apply in this case
because:
(a) there was no issue about prejudicial
question in Tenebro (the issue was about
 the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage to criminal liability for bigamy)
(b) the Court, in Tenebro, said that there's a
recognition written into the law itself that
such marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequence. In fact, the
Court declared that a declaration of nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State's penal laws
are concerned.

Gaditano v. San Miguel Corp Actions involved:

(1) Criminal case: BP 22 and estafa (filed by San
Miguel against Sps. Gaditano)
(2) Civil case: Specific performance and damages
where the issue was the unlawful garnishment by
the bank which resulted in the dishonor of the
checks issued by Sps. Gaditano to San Miguel (filed
by Sps. Gaditano)

Note: Sir highlighted the fact that San Miguel sent notice of
dishonor to Sps. Gaditano three times but Sps. Gaditano still
did not fund the checks (see #4 below)

There is no prejudicial question in this case because:

(1) The issue in the Criminal Case is whether the
Spouses are guilty of estafa and violation of BP 22,
while in the Civil Case, it is whether Asia Trust had
lawfully garnished the P378k from the Spouses’
savings account.

(2) The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the

dishonor of another check.

(3) Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia
Trust liable for unlawful garnishment of the savings
account, the Spouses cannot be automatically
adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of
BP 22, because ​the mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds to support the checks is in itself the
offense.

(4) Furthermore, three notices of dishonor were sent to

the Spouses, who then, should have immediately
funded the check.
(a) When they did not, their liabilities under BP
22 attached.
(b) Such liability cannot be affected by the
alleged prejudicial question because their
failure to fund the check upon notice of
dishonor is itself the offense.

Reyes v. Rossi Actions involved:

(1) Criminal case: BP 22, estafa (filed by Rossi against
Reyes)
 (2) Civil case: rescission of contract and damages (filed
by Reyes; first case filed)

Note: Sir emphasized the fact that a contract is valid and

obligatory until rescinded.

The civil case for rescission of contract is not a prejudicial

question to the criminal case for BP 22 and estafa because:
(1) The issue in the civil case is not a logical antecedent
to the criminal case. While the rescission is
equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical
tie, leaving things in their status before the
celebration of the contract. However, until the
contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the
concomitant obligations subsist. Considering that
the contracts are deemed to be valid until rescinded,
the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are
also deemed to have been validly made, thus
demandable. Thus, Reyes already committed the
violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he
had issued at a time when the conditional sale was
still fully binding upon the parties. Reyes’ obligation
to fund the checks or to make arrangements for
them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to
the future event of extinguishment of the obligation
under the contract of sale through rescission.

RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Santos-Concio v. DOJ [Wowowee case]

The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),

through then Secretary Angelo Reyes, immediately created
an inter-agency fact-finding team to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the stampede. The team
submitted its report to the DOJ.

DOJ Secretary constituted an ​Evaluating Panel to evaluate

the DILG Report and determine whether there is sufficient
basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary
investigation on the basis of the documents submitted.

The Evaluating Panel’s report: ​no sufficient basis to

proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation.

NBI-NCR acting on the Evaluating Panels referral of the

case to it for further investigation, in turn submitted to the
DOJ an investigation report with supporting documents
recommending the conduct of preliminary investigation
for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide
and Multiple Physical Injuries.

Acting on the recommendation of the NBI-NCR, DOJ

Secretary designated a panel of state prosecutors
(​Investigating Panel​) ​to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case and if warranted by the evidence,
to file the appropriate information and prosecute the same
before the appropriate court.

Contentions of Accused:
● In asserting their right to due process, specifically to
a fair and impartial preliminary investigation,
petitioners impute reversible errors in the assailed
issuances, arguing, among other things, that
although respondents may have the power to
conduct criminal investigation or preliminary
investigation, respondents do not have the
power to conduct both in the same case.
● Petitioners also point out that the ​affidavits do not
qualify as a complaint within the scope of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court as the allegations therein
are insufficient to initiate a preliminary investigation,
there being no statement of specific and individual
acts or omissions constituting reckless imprudence.
● Hasty disposition of the case - 24 working days

The measures taken by the ​Evaluating Panel do not

partake of a criminal investigation, they having been done in
aid of evaluation in order to relate the incidents to their
proper context.

Evaluation for purposes of determining whether there is

sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary
investigation entails not only reading the report or
documents in isolation, but also deems to include resorting
to reasonably necessary means such as ocular inspection
and physical evidence examination.

Noteworthy is the fact that the Evaluating Panel was

dissolved ​functus oficio ​upon rendering its report.

It was the NBI, a constituent unit of the DOJ, which

conducted the criminal investigation.

A complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary

investigation differs from a complaint for purposes of
instituting a criminal prosecution.

Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal

Procedure provides that the ​complaint is not entirely the
affidavit of the complainant, for the ​affidavit is treated as
a component of the complaint​. The phraseology of the
said rule recognizes that all necessary allegations need not
be contained in a single document.

It is unlike a criminal complaint or information where the

averments must be contained in one document charging
only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it
vulnerable to a motion to quash.

Although NBI’s report was not sworn to, still, the report can
 be accepted as a complaint since it was ATTACHED TO
OTHER AFFIDAVITS WHICH ARE SWORN.

The allegation regarding the impartiality (institutional bias of

DOJ) through the spoken words of DOJ Secretary was not
considered by the Court. To follow petitioners theory of
institutional bias would logically mean that even the NBI had
prejudged the case in conducting a criminal investigation
since it is a constituent agency of the DOJ.

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or

quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to
an injudicious performance of functions. The presumption of
regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all
phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was
incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory
evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical
calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge.

Borlongan v. Pena [Agent was claiming for his agency fees; purported principal
filed a motion to dismiss in relation to the civil case - agent is
now alleging that the submitted documents (in the motion to
dismiss) were falsified since signatories did not actually affix
their signatures, and were neither stockholders nor officers.

Mere assertions of the agent are insufficient to warrant the

filing of the complaint or worse the issuance of arrests. The
evidence adduced were based on hearsay. The agent failed
to prove personal knowledge of the facts in his information.
Probable cause not established.

PI was not required. The penalty in Art. 172 (crime charged)

of​prision correccional i​ n its medium and maximum periods
shall apply if it was executed in a private document; and
arresto mayor ​in its maximum to ​prision correccional i​ n its
minimum shall apply if it was ​introduced in evidence:
○ Prision Correccional -- 2 years, 4 months, 1
day.
○ Arresto mayor -- 4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months
● Since the crime committed is not covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, the case falls under
the ​exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts
but applying the ordinary rules.
● Preliminary Investigation is NOT applicable - direct
filing before a court or prosecutor.

Estrada v. Ombudsman No law or rule requires the Ombudsman to furnish a

respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his
co-respondents. Accused also does not have the right to
cross-examine his co-respondents.

Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence,

as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
 adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in
administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally
adjudicated, what is required is "substantial evidence" which
cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence
because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence
while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in

Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to
preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory
law giving rise to mere statutory rights. Preliminary
investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and
obligations of parties, while administrative investigations
governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate.
Ang Tibay,as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial
evidence for a decision against the respondent in the
administrative case. In preliminary investigations, only
likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,to preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required to establish
probable cause.

Racho v. Miro The investigating prosecutor who conducted the PI may

be the one to conduct the reinvestigation as well.

The determination of probable cause need not be based on

clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged -- the trial of the case is conducted
precisely for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge

Tolentino v. Paqueo The duty of a ​Regional State Prosecutor do not include

approving the Information filed or dismissed by the
investigating prosecutor. The list is EXCLUSIVE: city,
provincial, & chief state prosecutor.

Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among

the law officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal
of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the
Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did
not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the
non-compliance was a ground to quash the Information.

Crespo v. Mogul Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any

disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction
of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction,
competence, and discretion of the trial court.

Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the

prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court, he ​cannot impose his opinion on the trial court​.

The determination of the case is within the exclusive

 jurisdiction and competence of the courts. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same.

In spite of the prosecutor’s opinion to the contrary,

when the information has already been filed with the
court, it is the ​duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court
to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted.

In order to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the

Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal
may be disregarded by the trial court, ​the Secretary of
Justice should as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information
has already been filed in Court.

Baltazar vs. People Once a case has been filed with the court, it is
that court, no longer the prosecution, which has full
control of the case, so much so that the information may
not be dismissed without its approval. Significantly, once
a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed,
the court may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of
judicial discretion. In doing so, the trial judge must
himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can
be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in
the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required was the trial judge's own
assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for
the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely
to accept the prosecution's word for its supposed
insufficiency.

Although it is more prudent to wait for a final

resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from
the secretary of justice before acting on a motion to
dismiss or a motion to withdraw an information, a trial
court nonetheless should make its own study and
evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the
awaited action of the secretary. The trial court has the
option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the
arraignment of the accused, and whether after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the secretary who
reviewed the records of the investigation, provided that
such grant or denial is made from its own assessment
and evaluation of the merits of the motion.

The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind

 the Judge. It merely assists him in making the determination
of probable cause for issuance of the warrant of arrest. The
Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents
to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification
which are material in assisting the Judge in making his
determination. ​|||

Chan y Lim v. Secretary of
Justice
In Crespo, the Court laid down the rule that once an
Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
rests on the sound discretion of the court. In subsequent
cases, the Court clarified that Crespo d ​ oes not bar the
Justice Secretary from reviewing the findings of the
investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his power of
control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is
merely advised, as far as practicable, to refrain from
entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor's
finding when the Information is already filed in court. In
other words, the power or authority of the Justice
Secretary to review the prosecutor's findings subsists
even after the Information is filed in court. The court,
however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice
Secretary, but must evaluate it before proceeding with
the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

The general rule is that the courts do not interfere with

the discretion of the public prosecutor in determining the
specificity and adequacy of the averments in a criminal
complaint. The determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information in court is an executive
function which pertains at the first instance to the public
prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. The
duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to
determine whether the executive determination was
done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave
abuse.​||| (Chan y Lim v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
147065, [March 14, 2008], 572 PHIL 118-135)
|||

Villaflor v. Vivar y Gozon A component part of due process in criminal justice,

preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive
right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their
claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive
them of the full measure of their right to due process.
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of an information or render it defective.
Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or
constitute a ground for quashing the information. The
trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should
 hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the public
prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
Hence, the RTC in this case erred when it dismissed the
two criminal cases for serious physical injuries (Criminal
Case No. 23787) and grave threats (Criminal Case No.
23728) on the ground that the public prosecutor had
failed to conduct a preliminary investigation.

NEW PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NOT

NECESSARY IF AMENDED CHARGE IS
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
CHARGE— we do not agree that a preliminary
investigation was not conducted. In fact, a preliminary
investigation for slight physical injuries was made by the
assistant city prosecutor of Muntinlupa City. The said
Information was, however, amended when petitioner's
injuries turned out to be more serious and did not heal
within the period specified in the Revised Penal Code.
We believe that a new preliminary investigation cannot
be demanded by respondent. This is because the
change made by the public prosecutor was only a formal
amendment. The filing of the Amended Information,
without a new preliminary investigation, did not violate
the right of respondent to be protected from a hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution; an open and
public accusation of a crime; or from the trouble, the
expenses and the anxiety of a public trial. The Amended
Information could not have come as a surprise to him for
the simple and obvious reason that it charged essentially
the same offense as that under the original Information.
Moreover, if the original charge was related to the
amended one, such that an inquiry would elicit
substantially the same facts, then a new preliminary
investigation was not necessary.​|

San Agustin v. People If the inquest investigation conducted by the State

Prosecutor is void because the suspect is unlawfully
arrested without a warrant, he is entitled to a preliminary
investigation before an Information may be filed against
him.​crime.

Ladlad v. Velasco The joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers states

that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for
Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the
inquest prosecutor could only have conducted — as he
did conduct — an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no
other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors
subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for
Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the
second inquest void. None of Beltran's arresting officers
saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed
Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe
that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting
 officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and
heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech

Rule 114 - Bail

San Miguel v. Maceda When bail is a matter of right, forfeiture of bail is not
absolute. When the accused jumped bail, the judge can
forfeit the original bail BUT SHOULD impose a new
increased bail. When bail is a matter of discretion, The judge
has two options when the accused jumps bail: (1) forfeit the
original bail and impose a new increased bail OR (2) forfeit
the original bail AND not impose a new bail altogether

In verbatim:
Where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding and
forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be
allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of
a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond
confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase
the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to
assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted,
such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision
that excessive bail shall not be required

Lavides v. CA The bail condition that arraignment should take place first
before granting bail, is INVALID. Remember that filing of
motion to quash information should only be BEFORE
arraignment. If the judge would impose the said invalid
condition, the accused would be limited to two options: (1)
file motion to quash information and wait for its resolution
while being detained because or (2) choose not to quash
information and just wait for arraignment in order for him to
eventually post bail.

In verbatim:
to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he
has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right
to bail.

Trillanes IV v. Pimentel 1. Trillanes contends that the Jalosjos case was inapplicable
to him because Jalosjos was charged with rape while his
was a political offense. SC said the rules on bail do not
make a distinction as to the political complexion or the moral
turpitude involved in the offense. What matters, among
others, is the penalty charged by the offense

2. The fact that application for bail was BEFORE or AFTER

trial or conviction is irrelevant in granting/denying bail.
 In verbatim:
The presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights. It is impractical to draw
a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees
for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights
more limited than those of the public.

Andres v. Beltran 1. Absence of counsel for accused at the scheduled hearing

is not a reason for cancelling bail.

2. Once the accused has been admitted to bail, increase or

reduction of bail amount entails hearing is indispensable to
determine "upon good cause shown."

Leviste v. CA If there are no bail-negating circumstances present, the

appellate court still has the discretion to whether or not bail
can be granted; but the list of the circumstances seems to
be complete, what other circumstance can the court still
consider?

Ans: the substantial merits of the case. Since the case was
taken on appeal, the court can determine is the accused was
really guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and this can be the
basis for granting or denying bail. The case called this "a
less stringent sound discretion approach."

See chart below.

People v. Fitzgerald 1. Where the CA granted motion for new trial, it does NOT
mean that the CA's finding that there is strong evidence of
guilt was negated; especially so since it is the CA that has
still control of the case. In this case, the CA only ordered the
RTC to RECEIVE the evidence, and not to RESOLVE the
case entirely. Thus. this bolsters the idea that a motion for
new trial will not negate the finding of strong evidence of
guilt.

2. A mere claim of illness or old age is not a ground for

discretionary grant of bail. This is especially so where the
accused has a psychological finding that he will repeat the
offense again. (Phedophilia)

In verbatim:
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A
mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that
the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who
are seriously sick.

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan In determining bail, the MAXIMUM PENALTY IMPOSABLE

should be considered (yung mismong nakalagay sa law
dapat, hindi yung inimpose na ng judge sa dispositive
portion); however in this case, the SC said, the presence of
 mitgating circumstances can be considered in determining
bail because it will defeat the purpose of bail if it were
otherwise. Remember that the principal purpose of bail is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. Thus, bail, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his
life.

In the Rules of Court, humanitarian reasons are factors in

fixing the AMOUNT of bail, but in this case, humanitarian
reasons were considered as factors in
GRANTING/DENYING bail.

J. Leonen's Dissent:
This puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan
that will predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the
basis of humanitarian considerations. They will have to
decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and
former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those
accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, serious
illegal detention, and other crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.

Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would

make detention in the hospital necessary, courts DO NOT
GRANT bail. They merely MODIFY the conditions for the
accused’s detention. There is now no clarity as to when
special bail based on medical conditions and modified arrest
should be imposed.

There is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on

the basis of humanitarian considerations EXTENDS EVEN
AFTER the medical emergency has passed.

Chua v. CA Where bail is denied by the RTC, the accused cannot filed a
separate petition via a special civil action or special
proceeding to question such denial; otherwise, he is liable
for forum shopping. The accused SHOULD file a motion to
review in the CA as an INCIDENT in his appeal.

TAKE NOTE SA FACTS DITO: In this case, the RTC

cancelled the bail AFTER promulgating judgment. So hindi
na bail as a matter of right yung bail dito; discretion na kasi
convicted na, which is why applicable na yung Sec. 5. So
kung dineny ng RTC yung bail niya kasi may bail-negating
circumstance siya, yung pag tutol niya sa denial na to
DAPAT ISABAY niya sa pag appeal niya sa CA pursuant to
the last paragraph of Sec. 5. Kapag hiniwalay pa niya yung
action, forum-shopping na yun.

Esteban v. Alhumbra Cancellation of bail is not applicable to cash deposit. This is

because cash deposit is different from a surety bond. If the
bail is a cash deposit, the money can be applied to payment
of fines and costs (but not for civil liability). Even if cash
deposit is applicable for cancellation of bail, if the reason for
 cancellation is not one of the grounds enumerated in Sec.22,
then bail cannot be cancelled. In this case, the the arrest of
the accused for committing another crime is not one of the
grounds of cancellation.

BAIL SCENARIOS

If the case originated at the RTC level:

If the case originated at
the MTC level, and the And crime is punishable And crime is punishable by
accused applies: exceeding 6ys imprisonment RP, Death, Life
until Reclusion Temporal, if the Imprisonment, if the accused
(Scenario A) accused applies: files:

(Scenario B) (Scenario C)

Pending appeal at the CA = Pending appeal at the CA:
Bail is ​DISCRETIONARY 1. If with at least one
bail-negating
circumstance = ​DENY
BAIL
2. If no bail-negating
circumstance = Bail is
DISCRETIONARY
Pending appeal at the CA =
DENY BAIL
*This is because conviction by
the RTC is already a
determination of strong
evidence of guilt. (People v.
NItcha, p. 327 of Riano)

*Since bail is a matter of

discretion, hearing must
be conducted

*Substantial merits of the

case can be basis of
exercising this discretion
(Leviste v. CA)

*Accused CANNOT argue

that if there are no
bail-negating
circumstance, bail should
be a matter of right.
Otherwise, it would result
in an absurdity where
scenario B, even if
charged with a higher
penalty, would have a
better chance of being
granted bail than scenario
A whose chance of getting
bail is based on discretion.
(Leviste v. CA)

Upon conviction by the RTC Upon conviction by the RTC:
= Bail is ​DISCRETIONARY 1. If with at least one
bail-negating
circumstance = ​NO BAIL
2. If no bail-negating
circumstance = Bail is
Upon conviction by the RTC =
DENY BAIL
*This is because conviction by
the RTC is already a
determination of strong

Pending Trial at the RTC =
Bail is a matter of ​RIGHT
Upon conviction by the
MTC = Bail is a matter of
RIGHT
Pending Trial at the MTC =
Bail is a matter of ​RIGHT
(see Sec 10 of AM
15-06-10-SC for procedure)
Scenario D: Before filing of complaint or information:
Apply for bail in any court where accused is held. (Sec 17; p.317 of RIano)
DISCRETIONARY
*Remember that upon RTC
conviction, EITHER the RTC judge
or the CA judge can rule on the
application for bail depending on
transmittal of records (Sec 5)
Pending trial at the RTC = Bail is a
matter of ​RIGHT (​Sec 4)
*Thus, RTC judge cannot deny
bail even if accused jumped bail
previously. S/he can only increase
amount of bail. (San Miguel v.
Maceda)
*But take note that increasing bail
requires hearing (Sec 20; Andres
v. Beltran)
(see Sec 10 of AM 15-06-10-SC
for procedure)
evidence of guilt.
Pending trial at RTC = bail is
DISCRETIONARY ​(Sec 4-b)​;
Thus,
1. If strong evidence of
guilt = ​DENY BAIL
(Sec 7)
*The prosecution has
the burden of showing
that the evidence of
guilt is strong (Sec 8;
see Secs.6-7 of AM
12-11-2-SC for
procedure)
*Regardless if accused
is not yet convicted, he
will be denied bail if
there is strong
evidence of guilt of the
crime of Reclusion
Perpetua (Trillanes v.
Pimentel)
2. If not strong evidence
of guilt = ​GRANT
BAIL
(see Sec 10 of AM
15-06-10-SC for procedure)