SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.G.R. NO. 134577, NOV.
18, 1998 o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters
o While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all
the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who
could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
o Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress
other than Senate President and House Speaker
o Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of legislature
o Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure
and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body
adopting them
FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan
and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate
President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly
elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that,
with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority
leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan
comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him,
the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus,
also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.
Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the
Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority
leader
of legislative procedure
RULING: The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times.
When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of
any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by
any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
“majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is
no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other
than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one
half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the
larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a
group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number
would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the
minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it
is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the
leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a
multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by
petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties,
one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant
minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either
belong to different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has
the right to select the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress
other than Senate President and House Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent
on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the
power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner
of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But,
in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may
not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano,
this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure
and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body
adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not
have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and
prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe
the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has
no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies
the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this
Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the
law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would
practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
JOSE AVELINO VS MARIANO CUENCO
83 Phil. 17 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Election
of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right
to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next
session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino
delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon
insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad
and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He
however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying
tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being
raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies
and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being
out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session
due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they
requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just
banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was
immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then
stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made —
that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made
it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session
in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tañada was
subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz
yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as
the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was
even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following
day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed
a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the
rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take
cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers,
the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant
to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The
SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at
liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the
majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy
lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be
the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator
Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a
minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the
Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been approved
only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a
hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of
the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two
sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such
session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as
evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23
senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto,
excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority
of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum,
“the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of
all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference
between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a
majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the
first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a
arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator quorum to do business” and the fact that said provision was
Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority of
would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority,
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14,
not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution,
1949)
but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or
to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes
contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was which make attendance of the member concerned impossible,
elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee even through coercive process which each house is
senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the
not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment
which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere
24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the
Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum. members” as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5)
Title VI of the original Constitution which required “concurrence
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume
of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a
jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which
member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present
justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of
Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground
the members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was
that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the
in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate,
constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere
the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21,
formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session
1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a
with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s election as Senate
majority.
President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the
dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by
issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino
group, but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts to
block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the
SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is
in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements
of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as
Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Pacete v Commission on Appointments G.R. No. L-25895. July session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965;
23, 1971
Whether the petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed;
Facts: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed
and
by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as
Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case.
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his
Held: WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus
duties as such. As his appointment, was made during the recess of
and the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments is
Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at
commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by
its next session in 1965.
petitioner.
On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he
The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge
likewise included in his petition, through the Judicial
of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his
Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as
confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as
municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment had been
to costs.
by-passed.
Ratio: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion
Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was
for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in the absence
filing a motion for the reconsideration of the confirmation of the
of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of
appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,
what is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover
Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had
tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a
received.
collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority
were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what
Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus
respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
was led to notify the then Secretary of Justice accordingly,
contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and
following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such
pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the constitutional
body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically
prescription.
vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question . .
In view of confirmation
." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial
In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was
Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his
contended that his confirmation became final and irrevocable
position as municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed.
upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth
The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise
Congress on May 21, 1965.
named respondent as he had, as a consequence, withheld
In view of construction
petitioner's salaries.
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v.
Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the
Issue: Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become
Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the
final and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth regular
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion
by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their
approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and
submitted anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider
the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be
a final disposition of such a motion."
1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the
argument that the motion for reconsideration of Congressman
Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the
confirmation of petitioner's appointmentand that, accordingly,
it should be considered non-existent. His opinion continued:
"Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the members
present in favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to
'reopen' the appointment — and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation
— and to require a resubmission of the appointment for
confirmation."
2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have
the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress."
That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a
single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad
enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is
the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.
3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are
not invaded. Thus even legislative acts and executive orders are
not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly, there is
nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the Commission on
Appointments, especially so, when as in this case, a construction
sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual
to a public office. The task becomes unavoidable when claims
arising from the express language of the Constitution are pressed
upon the judiciary. So it is in this case. It is a truism that under the
circumstances, what cannot be ignored is the primacy of what the
fundamental law ordains.
As due process is impressed with both substantive and procedural
significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is thus not unduly
limited.
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA G.R. NO. 127255, AUGUST 14, 1997
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240,
whichamends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so
that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate
approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption andmoved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared
the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There
being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair
and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by
then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in
character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conformto them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only
those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure
of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The
claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established
by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or
even more just.
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR. VS SALIPADA PENDATUN
109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department –
Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech
entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged
then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently,
House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order
to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and
that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he
may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before
the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where
he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the
matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is
dismissed.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Bills Must Originate EXCLUSIVELY from the House of
Representatives; Undue Delegation of Legislative Power; Equal
Protection Clause
Facts: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions
contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate
to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following
conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate
of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the
sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included
within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since
this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has
powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by
law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege
that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary
of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance
can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a
mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President
who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in
Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative
power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.
3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and
equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Discussions:
1. Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law,
but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution
to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives,
but Senate has the power not only to propose amendments,
but also to propose its own version even with respect to
bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in
the House. the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be expected to
be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the
other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws.
2. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature.
 3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means
that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons
or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.”
Rulings:
1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue
bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives,
the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate
income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily,
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain
any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the
House revenue bill.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only
of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power
of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications
for the purposes of taxation has long been established.
Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised,
the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the
State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a
rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent
a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.
VERA V. AVELINO, 77 Phil. 863
FACTS: Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the
President and the Congress of the Philippines a report regarding
the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the
province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting
in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the
popular will.
During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a
pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report
ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero –
who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator
receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the
protest lodged against their election.
Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their
colleagues responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to
annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy
their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also
allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over
contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications.
Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to
determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are
valid.
2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending
hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections.
RULING:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of
separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”,
and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who
shall be admitted to its membership.
Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath
amounts to suspension of the petitioners from their office, and
conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of
the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine
Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition
should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we
could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a
member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial
predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and
balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.
The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any
speech or debate" in congress, Senators and congressmen "shall
not be questioned in any other place."
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this
privilege to include the giving of a vote or the presentation of a
resolution.
. . . It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to
limit it towards spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as
forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body
by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing,
must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, . . .
(Kilbourn vs. thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.)
In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer questions put
to him by the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress, concerning the business of a real estate partnership, was
imprisoned for contempt by resolution of the house. He sued to
recover damages from the sergeant at arms and the congressional
members of the committee, who had caused him to be brought
before the house, where he was adjudged to be in contempt. The
Supreme Court of the United States found that the resolution of the
House was void for want of jurisdiction in that body, but the action
was dismissed as to the members of the committee upon the
strength of the herein above-mentioned congressional immunity.
The court cited with approval the following excerpts from an
earlier decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own
benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their
representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear
of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I, therefore, think that the article
ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design
of it may be answered. . . (103 U.S., 203.) (Emphasis ours.)
Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby relates
apparently as controlling, the following incident:
In 1910, several Members of Congress having been served with a
writ of mandamus in a civil action brought against them as
members of the Joint Committee on Printing and growing out a
refusal of a bid of the Valley Paper Company, for the furnishing of
paper, the Senate resolved that the Justice issuing the writ had
"unlawfully invaded the constitutional privileges and prerogatives
of the Senate of the United States and of three Senators; and was
without jurisdiction to grant the rule, and Senators are directed to
make no appearance in response thereto." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)
Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for their
votes in approving the Pendatum Resolution. Having sworn to
uphold the Constitution, we must enforce the constitutional
directive. We must not question, nor permit respondents to be
questioned here in connection with their votes. (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, supra.)
Alejandrino v Quezon G.R. No. L-22041. September 11, 1924
Facts: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly
conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for
having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera. He was
deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a
senator. He filed mandamus and injunction against respondent
Senate President Manuel Quezon from executing the said
resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.
Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and
entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court:
(1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents
enjoining them from executing the resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void;
and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of
mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them
to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as
Senator
Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a
cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the
judgment of the court. So ordered.
Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch
thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative
powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks
jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be
sustained.
The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to
abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may,
nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty
of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution,
and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a
department has been transcended. The courts must determine the
validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all
private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the
other departments.
In view of the propriety of mandamus
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or
its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative
in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative
functions and over which they have exclusive control. The final
arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at
least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon
and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the
person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature
of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a
mandamus is to be determined."
In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House
Members
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The
Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to
represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature.
These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by
the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.)
They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature.
However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds,
expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House
may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly
behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for
any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then
included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two
Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to
"remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the
Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct
hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the
two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike
the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.
In view of effects of punishment
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged
dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of
representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates
the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency
an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the
electoral district of representation without that district being
afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension,
the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension
for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
In view of no remedy
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to
suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office
for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet
the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive
reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of
coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. If it be said that conclusion leaves the petitioner
without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the
repository of all wisdom and all power.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN (2001)
JANUARY 4, 2012
356 SCRA 636 – Political Law – The Legislative Department –
Suspension of a Member of Congress – Violations of RA 3019
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then
Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about
32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad
faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a
violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago
were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other
criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this
information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago.
Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a
motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of
Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan
ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from
office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a
member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each
“… house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting
been filed against him. his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case
may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from
the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID
commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office”
would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she
still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against
him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence