EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT Art VI Sec27, 1987 v Art VI
Sec20,1935 Consti
Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs Brigido Valencia
11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to
an Item
Facts: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-
petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and
Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own
television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They
were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of
Communications, for operating even after their permit has
expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued
operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that
any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease
operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the
appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as
approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget
of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations
for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no
appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there
are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in
violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom.
And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this
provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not
legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been
adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it
follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains
Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig
Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an
Appropriation Bill
Facts: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the
constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY
’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does
not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when
she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section
25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted
in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The
SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo
that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions”
in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate
provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.
Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon
208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic
Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of former
President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the
constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these
laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed
the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should
not give preferential treatment to certain or select government
officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition
with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by
P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished
PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the
repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect,
RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted
their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional
budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the
allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the
government; among such obligations is the allotment for the
pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which
provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in
the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges
and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by
the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of
the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the
accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act
1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to
set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither
does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of
existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional
since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items
in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part
of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion
of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this
case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained
to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
THE PRESIDENT
Singular Executive
CARMEN PLANAS v. JOSE GIL
Facts: Petitioner , a member of the municipal board of the City of
Manila, criticized the acts of certain government officials in
connection with the general election for Assemblymen held on
November 8, 1938 in one of the local dailies. The statement as
published in the issue of La Vanguardia of November 17, 1938,
included the following statements:
“… In Manila, the opposition should have won the November 8
elections, but lost instead because of a disastrous
division due to people who commercialized their candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President precisel
y so that the President maydevote all his time to the administratio
n of public affairs for the welfare of the people, but thePresident w
as the first to play politics. Publicly expressing his preference for
candidates of his liking; and with the President all other officials of
the government also moved, taking part in electoral campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to flatten t
he opposition and preventcandidates supported by the people fro
m going to the National Assembly, and with frauds and violations
of all rules of the civil service to push to victory the candidates of
the Nacionalista Party and the administration, all constructive
opposition in the country is useless ...
"… It is reasonable to believe
that the President is from this moment paving the way for hisreele
ction. It is to be feared that the new National Assembly will change
this wise provision of our Constitution to permit the reelection of
President Manuel L. Quezon."
The day following the publication of the foregoing statement, the
petitioner received a letter, where she is informed that she needs
to appear before the Commisioner of Civil Service to prove her
statements otherwise she may be suspended or removed from
office.
At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her counsel,
appeared at the office of the respondent and delivered to him a
letter, Annex B, in which she voiced objection to the authority of
the respondent to conduct the investigation. The respondent
Commissioner did not desist from proceeding with the
investigation, but announced before adjourning the hearing of
November 22nd that he would decide the question raised as to his
jurisdiction on November 26, 1938.
It was at this state of the investigation that the petitioner filed in
this court her original petition for prohibition of November 25,
1938, in which she at the same time prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent
commisioner from continuing with the investigation.
Issues:
1. WON the courts have jurisdiction over this case
2. WON the president has the power to order the
investigation
3. WON the investigation is in accordance with the law
Ratio/Holding: The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner.
1. Yes.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding.
The Commissioner of Civil Service is the party respondent and the
theory is advanced by the Government that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the
President of the Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the
present proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen
Planas. The argument is farfetched.A mere plea that a subordinate
officer of the government is acting under orders from the ChiefExe
cutive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor c
onclusive upon this court.Like the dignity of his high office, the rel
ative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicialinterference is
not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate off
icials andemployees of the Executive Department to the extent tha
t at the mere invocation of the authoritythat it purports the jurisdi
ction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an execu
tiveorder is necessarily abated or suspended.
Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the ord
erly administration of justice,or to prevent the use of the strong ar
m of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or amultiplicit
y of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922]) This
court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and
will accordingly proceed to determine the merits of the present
controversy.
2. Yes.
It is not denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the
order, but it is contended "that the said investigation with a view
to petitioner's suspension or removal is against Article VII, sec. 11
(1) of the Constitution of the Philippines and is not warranted by
any statutory provision." (Par. XV [b], amended petition.) It,
therefore, becomes necessary to inquire into the constitutional
and legal authority of the President to order the investigation
which has given rise to the present controversy.
A perusal of our Constitution will show
that extensive authority over the public service is granted thePresi
dent of the Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution begins in its
section 1 with thedeclaration that "The Executive power shall be v
ested in a President of the Philippines." Allexecutive authority is th
us vested in him, and upon him devolves the constitutional duty of
seeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VIII, sec. 11, sub
sec. 1, last clause.) In thefulfillment of this duty which he cannot ev
ade, he is granted specific and express powers andfunctions. (Art.
VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and express powers and f
unctions, hemay also exercise those necessarily implied and includ
ed in them. (Myers vs. United States [1926]) The National
Assembly may not enact laws which either expressly or impliedly
diminish the authority conferred upon the President of the
Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes
[1921]) The Constitutionprovides that the President "shall have co
ntrol of all the executive departments, bureaus, andoffices" (Art. VI
I, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise general supervision o
ver all localgovernments as may be provided by law" (Ibid, second
clause). This power of control andsupervision is an important cons
titutional grant. The President in the exercise of the executivepow
er under the Constitution may act through the heads of the executi
ve departments.
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the
President to conduct an investigation of the nature involved in this
proceeding, and in view of the nature and character of the
executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercisegener
al supervision over all local governments and to take care that the
laws be faithfullyexecuted must be construed to authorize him to o
rder an investigation of the act or conduct, ofthe petitioner herein.
Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is c
ertainlynot without limitation, but it at least implies authority to in
quire into facts and conditions in orderto render the power real an
d effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and
not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of
actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and
investigation.
Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the Chief
Executive by our Constitution, we should be reluctant to yield to
the proposition that the President of the Philippines who is
endowed with broad and extraordinary powers by our
Constitution, and who is expected to govern with a firm and steady
hand without vexatious or embarrassing interference and much
less dictation from any source, is yet devoid of the power to order
the investigation of the petitioner in this case. We should avoid
that result.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the
grant of the supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this regard
was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of
views in that body, mainly between the historical view which
recognizes the right of local self-government (People ex rel. Le Roy
vs. Hurlbut [1871]) and the legal theory which sanctions the
possession by the state of absolute control over local governments
(Booten vs. Pinson,
[1915]). The result was the recognition ofthe power of supervision
and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwise would
be animperium in, imperio to the detriment of a strong national go
vernment.
Apart from the constitutional aspect, we find that section 64 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides as follows:
"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-
General (President) shall have such specific powers and duties as
are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in
particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
*******
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any
person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of
the Constitution, still subsists. It is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and has not been abrogated or repealed by the
National Assembly. (See sec. 2, Art. XV, Constitution.)
3. Yes.
The interest of the public service requires that these charges be
investigated, so that, if found to be true, appropriate action may be
taken against the parties alleged to have been guilty of illegal acts,
and if found untrue and made without justifiable motives, the
party making them may be proceeded against in accordance with
section 2440, in connection, with section, 2078, of the Revised
Administrative Code." Assuming that this is not one of the grounds
provided by law for which the petitioner may be investigated
administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm. Code), there is weight in the
argument that the investigation would still be in order
if for no other purpose than to cause a full and honest disclosure of
all the facts sothat, if found proper and justified, appropriate actio
n may be taken against the parties alleged tohave been guilty of th
e illegal acts charged. The enforcement of the law and the
maintenance of peace and order are primarily an executive
obligation. The declaration that the President should "takecare tha
t the laws be faithfully executed" is more an imposition of an oblig
ation than aconferment of power. His oath requires him to "faithful
ly and conscientiously fulfill" his duties asPresident, "preserve and
defend" the Constitution and "execute" the law. This duty of theEx
ecutive to see that the laws be faithfully executed is not limited to t
he enforcement oflegislative acts or the express terms of the Const
itution but also includes the due enforcement ofrights, duties, obli
gations, prerogatives and immunities growing out of the Constituti
on itself andof the protection implied by the nature of the governm
ent under the Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle)
We are vigilantly alive to the necessity of maintaining and protecti
ng the constitutional guarantyof freedom of speech and of the pres
s, no less than the right of assembly and petition which,according t
o Stimson (The American Constitution As It Protects Private Rights
, 152), is its originrather than its derivation. In the present case, ho
wever, the petitioner is not denied the right, nor is shebeing invest
igated because she had exercised that right. She has a perfect right
to criticize theGovernment, its administration, its policies and offic
ials, but she may not, on the plea of freedom ofspeech and of the pr
ess, impute violations of law and the commission of frauds and the
reafter fold herarms and decline to face an investigation conducte
d to elicit the truth or falsity of the charges formulatedby her. Othe
rwise, the guarantee which, in the language of Wendell Phillips, is "
at once the instrument,and the guarantee, and the bright consumm
ate flower of all liberty" would degenerate into an unbridledlicens
e, and render the Government powerless to act.
Carmen Planas vs Jose Gil
67 Phil. 62 – Political Law – Separation of Powers – Rule of Non-
Interference
Facts: In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board
member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the acts of
certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a
newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from
Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president
directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of
the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is
accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless
such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and
not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to
which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her
statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen
and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions
and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative
investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice
in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of
the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil,
however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing
that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution,
the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief
Executive which are of purely administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders
issued by the President.
HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits
of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct
nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-
interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the
validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical
separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political
philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more
truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding.
He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way.
The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the
Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him is
directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has
no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas.
The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer
of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive
may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor
conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the
relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference
is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate
official and employees of the executive Department to the extent
that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the
jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of
an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the
case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but
since she made allegations against the administration it is but
right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to
elicit the truth.
Jose Villena vs Secretary of the Interior
67 Phil. 451 – Political Law – Control Power – Supervision –
Suspension of a Local Government Official – Power to suspend comes
with the power to remove
Facts: Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s.
After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the
suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who
approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena
averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the
matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local
government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of
the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that
power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law
governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are
those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as
amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must
exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that
power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern
the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective
local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the
genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an
LGU official under investigation.
HELD: Yes.
There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to
suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On
the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor
by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that “The
provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude“.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly
granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial
governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and
precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar
power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the
President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner
from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as
amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to
law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by
law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if
he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the
incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both
to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078,
Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power
to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal
official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to
give way for an impartial investigation.
ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO 9 SCRA 619 [1963]
FACTS: The Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade requested for special
permit to withdraw Pepsi Cola concentrates from the customs
house. Petitioner Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-angco advised
the counsel for Pepsi-Cola to try to secure the necessary release
certificate from the No-dollar Import Office. Aquiles Lopez of said
office wrote petitioner, stating that it could not take action on the
request, as the same is not within the jurisdiction of the Office.
Following Secretary of Finance Hernandez’s approval of the
release, petitioner authorized release of the concentrates.
When Customs Commissioner Manahan learned of said release, he
ordered the seizure of the goods but only a portion thereof
remained in the warehouse. Thus, he filed an administrative suit
against petitioner.
After an investigation, respondent Executive Secretary Natalio
Castillo found petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and considering him resigned, with
prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs. Petitioner
wrote Pres. Garcia, asserting that the action taken by respondent
had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have his
case originally decided by the CSC, as well as of his right or appeal
to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision under RA
2260 is final. By authority of the President, respondent denied
reconsideration, as well as the appeal. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to make direct action
on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service
in spite of the provision now in the Civil Service Act of 1959.
HELD: The action taken by respondent executive Secretary, even
with the authority of the President in taking direct action on the
administrative case, petitioner, without submitting the same to the
Commission of Civil Service is contrary to law and should be set
aside.
The following are the reasons:
1. Under sec 16 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers and
employees in the classified service. The only limitation to this
power is the decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the
Civil service Board of Appeals, in which case said Board shall
decide the appeal within a period of 90 days after the same has
been submitted for decision, whose decision in such cases shall be
final. It is therefore clear that under the present provision of the
Civil Service act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and
having been deprived of the procedure and down therein in
connection with the investigation and disposition of this case, it
may be said that he has been deprived of due process guaranteed
by said law.
2. Let us now take up the power of control given to the President
by the Constitution over all offices and employees in the executive
department which is not invoked by respondents as justification to
override the specific provision of the Civil Service Act. The power
merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the
subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It
only means that the President may set aside the judgment of
action taken by the subordinate in the performance of duties.
3. Not the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is
that it would entirely nullify and set aside at naught the beneficent
purpose of the whole Civil Service system as implanted in this
jurisdiction which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those
who belong to the classified service, in derogation of the provision
of our Constitution which provides the “No officer or employee in
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law.” The power of control of the President may
extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and
employees who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointee or do not belong to the classified service for
to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line
with the provision of our constitutional which says; “The
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers
in the President alone in the courts or in the heads of department”
and with regards to these officers provided by law for a procedure
for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority.
One such law is the Civil Service Act of 159.
In Case of Temporary Disability
CONSTRUCTIVE RESIGNATION
JOSEPH ESTRADA VS MACAPAGAL & DESIERTO
353 SCRA 452 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – De Jure vs De
Facto President – Arroyo a de jure president
Facts: Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on
leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.
From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent
from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend
of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The
exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19,
Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the
Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that
General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of
Erap’s surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the
Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Erap’s legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not
say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that
he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the
past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come ahead in the same service of our country. Estrada’s
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not
give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
PROHIBITIONS Art VII Sec13
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of
the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284
Facts: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent
and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to
Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO
284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Exceptions to the Prohibition of holding another office
DELA CRUZ V. COA
NATURE: Certiorari under ROC 65. Action arising from a COA
disallowance
FACTS:
 Office involved: National Housing Authority (NHA)
 Officers involved: Officials of various Cabinet-level
departments who sat on the NHA Board as alternates of the
Cabinet secretaries who were ex-officio members of the
NHA Board, by virtue of PD 757§7 (the NHA Law) [THE
ALTERNATES].
 Sep. 19, 1997 – In compliance with the ruling in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the Commission on
Audit (COA) issued a memorandum stating that EO 284 had
been declared unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet
members, their deputies, and assistants to hold other
offices; and directing its designated auditors in all national
government offices to:
o immediately cause the disallowance of additional
compensation/remuneration given to and received
by government officials affected by the decision’s
ruling on the multiple position rule
o effect the refund of such payments from the time the
decision became final on Feb. 22, 1991
 Oct. 23, 1997 – NHA Resident Auditor Salvador VASQUEZ
thus issued a Notice of Disallowance against the payment of
representation allowances and per diems to the Cabinet
members who were ex-officio members of the NHA Board
and/or their alternates who actually received such
payments.
o The total amount disallowed was P276,000,
covering the years 1991-1996.
 On behalf of the alternates who received the disallowed
allowances and per diems, NHA Chairman of the Board
Dionisio dela Serna appealed the disallowance on the
ground that the SC issued a resolution in the CLU case
clarifying that the multiple position rule does not cover
other appointive officials whose rank was Assistant
Secretary or lower; and that the alternates were all ranked
Assistant Secretary or lower.
 Sep. 22, 1998 – COA denied the appeal.
o COA conceded that the alternates were indeed
ranked Asec. and lower, but ruled that they were
sitting on the NHA board by virtue of authority
derived from the office of the Cabinet secretaries
they were representing. As such they are mere
agents and their right to receive benefits flows from
their principals. Since their principals were barred
from receiving remuneration from the NHA under
the multiple position rule, so should the agents. The
spring cannot rise higher than its source.
 The alternates filed the present petition with the SC
ISSUE (HELD): W/N the disallowance of the remuneration for the
alternates of the ex-officio members of the NHA Board is valid
(YES)
RATIO
 Under §7 of the NHA Law, the following Cabinet Secretaries
are mandated to sit in the NHA Board:
 o Secretary of Public Works, Transportation, and
Communications
o Secretary of Finance
o Secretary of Labor
o Secretary of Industry
o Executive Secretary
o NEDA Director-General
 While the alternates are not these officials, they are their
alternates, and still under §7, their “acts shall be considered
the acts of their principals”.
 CLU v. Executive Secretary is controlling: “The prohibition
against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not,
however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said officials'
office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise `any
other office' within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials.”
 On the term ex-officio: “The term ex officio means `from
office; by virtue of office'. It refers to an `authority derived
from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position.' Ex officio likewise denotes an `act done in
an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office.' An ex officio member of a board is
one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office,
and without further warrant or appointment. x x x”
 On the right to receive remuneration for an ex officio
position: "The ex officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of
Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex
officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his
principal office in defining policy in monetary banking
matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in
the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance,
or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution."
 CAB: Petitioner officials who are on the NHA Board as
ALTERNATES of the Cabinet members and ex-officio
members of the NHA are prohibited from receiving
additional compensation. To rule otherwise would be
giving the alternates a better right than their principals.
The alternates cannot receive the compensation to which
their principals are not entitled to in the first place.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.
Powers and functions of the President
Executive Power
L. S. MOON & CO., plaintiff-appellant, vs. Honorable FRANCIS BURTON
HARRISON
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17226 March 1, 1922
L. S. MOON & CO., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
Honorable FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON, Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands,
Honorable DIONISIO JAKOSALEM, Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, and Honorable JUSTO LUKBAN, Mayor of the city of
Manila, defendants-appellees.
Thos. d. Aitken for appellant.
Jose A. Santos for appellees.
STATEMENT
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff and appellant "is a duly registered
partnership, domiciled and doing business in Manila."
That the hon. Francis Burton Harrison is the duly appointed, qualified
and acting, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, and, as such, its
Chief Executive; that the Hon. Dionisio Jakosalem is the duly appointed,
qualified and acting Secretary of Commerce and Communications and
the official designated by executive order of the said Govern-General as
the executive in charged of rice, its sale and distribution in the
Philippine Islands; that the said Justo Lukban is the duly appointed,
qualified and acting Mayor of the city of Manila, and, as such,
designated by the said Governor-General and Secretary of Commerce
and Communications as their assistant in charge for the city of Manila
of rice, its sale and distribution.
That on September 24, the plaintiff was the owner of 2,330 ½ kilos of
rice, No. 1 quality, imported from Siam at a cost to plaintiff of P26.32,
Philippine currency, per cavan, and 150 cavans of glutinous rice
imported from Hongkong on the 14th day of July, 1919, at a cost of
P22,25 per cavan; that the said rice at the time of its purchase was
bought in the open market and at the then prevailing market prices.
That defendants, pursuant to Act No. 2868 of the Philippine Legislature
and pursuant to Executive Orders No. 56 and 67 issued by authority of
said Act, have seized the said 2,330½ kilos of Siam rice of plaintiff and
deprived him of it, for the purpose of distribution to the public at large;
that said seizure was made without compensation to plaintiff, although
defendants have promised to pay there for at the rate of P16.25,
Philippine currency, a cavan and no more, which price is below the
reasonable value of the rice and is unjust; that payment at said rate
does not constitute just compensation and a seizure under the
circumstances alleged constitutes a confiscation of private property
contrary to the fundamental and organic law of the Philippine Islands
and an invasion of those constitutional rights that no one may be
deprived of his property except by due process of law and with just
compensation; that the just and reasonable value of the rice seized as
aforesaid in Manila at the time of said seizure was with respect to the
Siam rice mentioned P26.32 per cavan.
That so much of said Act No. 2868 and its defendant Executive Orders
that fix an arbitrary maximum selling price for rice and corn is
unconstitutional and void as being in contravention of the Constitution
of the United States and the Jones Bill, in so far as they guarantee to
individuals the right to own and dispose of lawful property as they
please and guarantee that the same may not be taken without due
process of law and just compensation.
That in so far as Act No. 2868 purports to make it a crime to sell rice above the
maximum price fixed by Executive Orders, it is unconstitutional and an invasion
of property rights guaranteed by the Jones Bill, and that defendants threaten
prosecution for each violation.
It is further alleged that the action is brought on behalf of certain firms and
generally on behalf of all rice importers, and that the enforcement of the
provisions of Act No. 2868 would result in a great multiplicity of civil and
criminal actions, and that this case is one of common and general interest
affecting alike all dealers and importers of rice and corn, and that the
reasonable price of the rice seized an confiscated is P26.25 per cavan. Plaintiff
prays judgment as follows:
First. That defendants, their subordinates, agents, attorneys and employees be
enjoined from further seizure of rice stocks.
Second. That defendants be ordered to return stocks seized as alleged or in lieu
thereof pay to the owners a just and reasonable compensation therefor as may
be fixed by this court.
Third. That so much at Act No. 2868 as permits the fixing of a maximum sale
price for rice and corn and provides for the punishment of infractions of said
law be declared unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined.
Fourth. For such other and further relief as to this court may see just and
proper; to which the defendants filed the following demurrer:
I. The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because —
(1) The court has no jurisdiction to control by injunction the
official acts of the Governor-General, and
(2) This is in effect a suit against the State.
II. There is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, because, upon the facts
alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff L. S. Moon & Co. has no right to
sue on behalf of others not named in the complaint.
III. The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action, because —
(1) Act No. 2868 of the Philippine Legislature is constitutional,
in that its enactment was a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the State;
(2) The facts stated in the complaint do not entitle the plaintiffs
to the relief demanded, in that —
 (a) Plaintiff's have another adequate remedy at law;
(b) The court has no jurisdiction to control by
injunction the official acts of the Governor-General:
(c) "Plaintiff prays an injunction against the
enforcement of a criminal statute upon the ground
that it is unconstitutional; but the constitutionality of a
criminal statute may not properly be determined in an
action against the Chief Executive for injunction, to
prevent its enforcement. The validity of a criminal
statute may be determined in a criminal action for an
alleged violation thereof;" and
(d) "The action is against the defendants in their
respective official capabilities, and no facts are alleged
which, if proved, would authorize a personal judgment
against defendants for the value of the rice seized by
them in their official capacities to a statute, even
though the statute be unconstitutional, and the law
does not authorize a money judgment against these
defendants as public officials by reason of acts
performed by them in their official capacities."
IV. The complaint is, upon its face, ambiguous, unintelligible and
uncertain, particularly in the following respect, to wit: ". . . Plaintiff
pleads irreparable injury by reason of the official acts of the defendants,
and yet prays judgment against them for the return of the rice 'or in
lieu thereof pay to the owners a just and reasonable compensation
therefor as may be fixed by this court.'"
Wherefore, defendants pray that the complaint be dismissed, with costs.
The trial court sustained the demurrer upon the second, third, and fourth
grounds, and overruled it as to the first, to which ruling the plaintiff duly
excepted.
October 8, 1920, the court dismissed the action, to which the plaintiff duly
excepted and appealed to this court, assigning the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in sustaining the second ground of demurrer to
the second amended complaint to the effect that there was a misjoinder
of parties plaintiff.
II. The lower court erred in sustaining the third ground of demurrer to
the second amended complaint to the effect that the complaint did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
III. The lower court erred in sustaining the fourth ground of demurer to
the second amended complaint to the effect that the complaint was
ambiguous, unintelligible and uncertain.
IV. The lower court erred in not holding the acts complained of as an
illegal invasion of private rights and the Act (No. 2868) authorizing
them as unconstitutional.
V. The lower court erred in dismissing the action without first having
had a trial on the merits.
JOHNS, J.:
The complaint against "Honorable Francis Burton Harrisons as Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, Honorable Dionisio Jakosalem as Secretary of
Commerce and Communications, and Honorable Justo Lukban as Mayor of the
city of Manila, defendants," and it is specifically alleged "that the Hon. Dionisio
Jakosalem is the duly appointed, qualified and acting Secretary of Commerce
and Communications and the official designated by executive order of the said
Governor-General as the executive in charge of rice, its sale and distribution in
the Philippine Islands; that the said Justo Lukban is the duly appointed,
qualified and acting Mayor of the city of Manila, and, as such, designated by the
said Governor-General and Secretary of Commerce and Communications as
their assistant in charge for the city of Manila of rice, its sale and distribution."
That is to say, as to the acts claimed to have been committed by the defendants
Jakosalem and Lukban, it is specifically alleged that they were under and by
virtue of the orders and instructions of the Governor-General, and that in the
commission of the alleged acts, they were simply obeying the Governor-General,
who was their superior officer.
At the time of their commission and the filing of the complaint, Honorable
Francis Burton Harrison was the duly appointed, qualified and acting Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands. This court will take judicial knowledge of the
fact that he no longer holds that position, and that for some time it has been
held by the Honorable Leonard Wood. The complaint is against the Honorable
Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. This
court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that he no longer holds that
positions, and that for some time it has been held by the Honorable Leonard
Wood.
The complaint is against the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, and is not against him as a citizen or private
person. No order of substitution has been made. Hence, you have a case pending
against defendants who were acting under the orders of a Governor-General,
who has ceased to be Governor-General . The complaint prays "that the
defendants, their subordinates, agents, attorneys and employees be enjoined
from further seizure of rice stocks." Upon that branch of the case, an injunction
against the defendants has become, and is now, a moot question. The action is
against the Governor-General in his official capacity, and he no longer holds that
position. The alleged acts of Jakosalem and Lukban were committed by them as
agents and servants of the Governor-General. It must follow that the plaintiff is
not entitled to an injunction against the defendants. A restraining order as to
them would be vain and useless.
The complaint alleges, in substance, that the 2,330½ kilos of rice was of the
market value and reasonably worth P26.32, Philippine currency, per cavan, and
that the defendants seized the rice and took it away from the plaintiff, "for the
purpose of distribution to the public at large," and that they have promised to
pay him P16.25, Philippine currency, a cavan, and are not willing to pay any
more, and that the seizure was a confiscation of private property contrary to the
fundamental and organic law of the Philippine Islands, and in violation of a
constitutional right. The complaint alleges that the acts were committed under
Act No. 2868 of the Philippine Legislature, and pursuant to Executive Orders
Nos. 56 and 67 issued by authority of said Act.
Section 1 of the Act says:
The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,
rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of
State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation
in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the
distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have
such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time, the quantities of palay, rice or
corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand.
(d) To purchase, if necessary, through any Government
Department or Bureau or through any company established by
the Government, or through any other agency that the
Government may designate, the amounts of rice, palay or corn
that may be necessary for distribution and resale preferably
and as far as possible at the centers of production.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, shall consider that the public interest requires the
application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by
proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith
shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
From the pleadings, we must assume that in the commission of the alleged acts,
the Governor-General was acting in his official capacity, and was engaged in the
performance of a duty enjoined upon him by the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands. It is now contended that the law in question is unconstitutional and
void. At the time of the alleged acts, he was exercising the discretionary power
which was vested in him as Governor-General. Whatever may be the rule as to
the personal liability of an Executive, after a law has been finally declared
unconstitutional, no court has ever held and no final decision will ever be found
holding an Executive personally liable in damages for the exercise of a
discretionary power under a law before it has been held unconstitutional.
Machem on Public Officers, p. 394, pars. 603, 604 and 605, says:
Par. 603. Governmental duties are owing to the public. — Again, the
duties, which are imposed upon these great departments are such as
are owing to the public at large and not to individuals, and this rule is
as true of the executive department in the exercise of the constitutional
powers confided to it as such, as it is of either of the others. For the
performance of such duties, as has been seen, the officer must respond
only to the public and not to individuals.
Par. 604. Governmental powers are confided to the discretion of the
officer. — So, as also, the powers which by the constitutional are
conferred upon the executive department are usually of such a nature
as are confided to its discretion. They are often called political powers,
and for their due administration the judgment and discretion of the
officer to who they are confided must be appealed to. In the exercise of
such powers, it is well settled that the officer will not be controlled by
the courts, but he is, as was said by Chief Justice Marshall, "accountable
only to his country in his political character, and to this conscience."
Par. 605. Governmental officers not liable to private action. — Following
out the doctrine of the preceding sections, therefore, it may be laid
down as a general rule that no public officer or agency charged with the
exercise of governmental authority of this description, can be called
upon to answer, in a private action, for the manner in which that
authority has been exercised.
In paragraph 607, the same authors says:
President of the United States. — No case has yet arisen in which it has
been attempted to hold the President of the United States amenable to a
private action for his official conduct; and, certainly, so far as the
performance of the great political power which are conferred upon him
is concerned, no such action could be maintained. Speaking of this
subject, Chief Justice Marshall said: "It is scarcely necessary for the
court to disclaim all pretensions to such a jurisdiction. An extravagance,
so absurd and excessive, could not have been entertained for a
moment. The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion. Question in their nature
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive, can never be made in this court."
Par. 608. Cabinet officers and heads of departments. — The same
immunity has been extended to cabinet officers and the heads of
departments in the performance of those duties which are confided to
their official judgment and discretion. . . .
Par. 609. Governor of States. — The same immunity extends also to the
governors of States, "The governor of the State," says Judge Cooley, "is
vested with a power to grant pardons and reprieves, to command the
militia, of refuse his assent to laws, and to take the steps necessary for
the proper enforcement of the laws; but neglect of none of these can
make him responsible in damages to the party suffering therefrom. . . .
The executive, in these particulars, exercises his discretion, and he is
not responsible to the court for the manner in which his duties are
performed. Moreover, he could not be made responsible to private
parties without subordinating the executive department to the judicial
department, and this would be inconsistent with the theory of
 republican institutions. Each department, within its province, is and
must be independent."
For the same reason, the rule of nonliability applies to judicial officer.
Page 400, par. 619, the same author says:
Judicial officer not liable to private action for judicial act within his
jurisdiction. — It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by
authority and reason, that no civil action can be sustained against a
judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have
been injured by the officer's judicial action within his jurisdiction. From
the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to
exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the
individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however
erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear either to the
party or to others.
There is a legal presumption that any law enacted by the Legislature is valid,
and the Governor-General had a legal right to assume that Act No. 2868 was
valid. It was neither his official province nor duty to say whether the Act was or
was not constitutional.
By the organic law, it is the duty of the legislature to make the law; of the
executive to enforce; and of the courts to construe the law. The courts only have
the power to declare a law unconstitutional. In the very nature of things, it is not
the duty of the Governor to say whether a law is or is not constitutional. It is his
duty to enforce the law until such time as it has legally been declared
unconstitutional. To hold an executive personally liable in an action for
damages for the performance or nonperformance of official duty, in legal effect,
would make him a judge as to when a law is or is not constitutional.
If it is the duty of the executive to both construe and enforce the law, and he is
personally liable in damages for a wrongful construction of the law, very few
laws would be enforce, and no reputable and responsible man would accept the
office of Governor.
In their learned and exhausting brief, counsel for appellant have not cited any
authority, and none will ever be found, holding a governor personally liable in
an action for damages, for the enforcement of any law before it has legally been
declared unconstitutional.
In the instant case, Act No. 2868 was enacted by the Legislature. By its terms
and provisions, certain duties were thrust upon the Governor-General. He had a
legal right to assume that the law was valid, and in the exercise of his discretion,
he undertook to enforce the law and to carry out its terms and provisions, and it
is that of which the plaintiff complains.
Although we do not agree with some of the statements and conclusions of the
trial court, under the existing facts, an injunction as to defendants here is a moot
question, and would be a vain and useless order of the court. Hence, the plaintiff
is not entitled to that relief. Whatever may be the rule as to such alleged acts
committed after a law has been declared void, assuming that all the facts which
plaintiff alleges are true, at the time of their commission, the defendants has a
right to assume that the law was valid and are not personally liable to the
plaintiff in an action for damages. For such reason, the judgment of the lower
court is affirmed, without costs to either party in this court.
Assuming that the market value of rice was P26.32 per cavan, and that the
defendants were only ready and willing to pay P16.25 per cavan, it may be
claimed that the taking of the rice was a confiscation of his property to the
amount of the difference between the actual value and the proposed value. But,
conceding that to be true, the defendants are not personally liable in an action
for damages. Their acts were official and discretionary, and they had a legal
right to assume that the law was valid. In the commission of the alleged acts,
they were acting for, and representing, the Government of the Philippine Islands
under a law enacted by its Legislature, and it is elementary that without its
consent no suit or action lies against the Government itself. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
STREET, J., concurring:
The complaint in this case suffers in may opinion from the defect of an improper
joinder of distinct causes of action, and for this reason the judgment of the trial
court may properly be affirmed. The misjoinder of different causes is
discernible in the circumstance that the complaint purports to be brought
specifically on behalf of the following persons and firms, to wit, "L. S. Moon &
Co., Kwong Nam Sang, Wong Yon, Kwong Tan Chong and generally on behalf of
all rice importers, there being many such in business in the cities of Manila,
Iloilo and Cebu, and also on behalf of all the dealer of important or locally grown
rice, of whom there are thousands doing business throughout the Philippine
Islands." (Par. VIII of complaint.) In the second paragraph of the prayer for relief
it is asked that the defendant officials be ordered to return to their respective
owners the stocks of rice seized by them, and in other parts of the same prayer
injunctive relief is sought against the enforcement of Act No. 2868.
It is evident that the various acts of seizure here complained of constituted
wrong against the respective owners property in attempting to enforce their
different causes of action in a single proceeding. Moreover, I am unable to see
the propriety of joining a cause of action founded on the particular grievance of
one personality in the same action in which is it sought to enforce rights
pertaining to many.
It the prayer of the complaint had been limited to a petition to recover of the
rice alleged o have been taken from L. S Moon & Co., it would in my opinion have
stated a good cause of action; and the right of the plaintiff to recover such rice
would not be in any degree prejudiced by reason of the official character of the
persons by whom the unlawful seizure was made.
The statement in the opinion to the effect that this action is not now
maintainable, for the reason that the official named as defendants have been
succeeded in office by other persons is a proposition to which I am unable to
subscribe as I am under the impression that an action against a public officers is
not abated by a change in the incumbency of the office pending the action,
where the action is in its nature against the office (1 C. J., 146); and the practice President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC
of this court has, I think, been inconformity with this idea. is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court
however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where
Government of the Philippine Islands vs Milton Springer
the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such
50 Phil 259 – Law on Public Officers – Power to Appoint is exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of
Essentially Executive persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception
is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC)
was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No.
2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued
E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate
President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that
the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General
who is the head of the government (President at that time was
considered the head of state but does not manage government
affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate
President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate
President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No.
37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton
Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter,
a quo warrantoproceeding in behalf of the government was filed
against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into
the Board of NCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House
Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.
HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine
of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the
legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a
public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government
owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To
extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate
Marcos, petitioner VS. Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from
the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and
was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise
and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats &
following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a
chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove
that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order
the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent
the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos
from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s
power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the
claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of
national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed
that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to
life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of
the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to
travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution,
may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by
the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive
powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23).
Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is
not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers
not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect
the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the
people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II,
Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to
Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything
which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),
inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman,
American President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of
the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible
depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to
be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the
light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of
case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter
that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers
of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is
whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual
bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened
before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on
the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of
law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current
problem can only be answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear &
present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility &
obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety
from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political
& economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the
country. Compassion must give way to the other state
interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live
& die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed by the
Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick,
prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return
would pose a threat to national security. Fears were mere
conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were
outlined to limit her powers & not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to
impair Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that
one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is
absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police
power of the state to restrict this right if national security,
public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It
can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be
arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national
security or public safety. Fears are speculative & military
admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to
handle Marcos’ return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would
threaten national security should be agreed upon by the
court. Such threat must be clear & present.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of
eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after finding that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989,
Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the
interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility
and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of
Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising
the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right
as citizens to return to their country of birth and all other
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own
country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of
former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses
be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for
Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.
Ratio:
1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to
warrant reconsideration.
2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its
decision has not changed. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to
provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have
ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal”
claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant
of executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying
principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest
to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in
conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton).
Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources
not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional
text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship.
Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of
legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with
implied powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest &
welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that duty
and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
Ople vs. Torres [Rights of Privacy]
FACTS: This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate
the Administrative Order No. 308 or the Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System issued by President
Fidel V. Ramos.
The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O.
will violate the rights of the citizens of privacy as guaranteed by
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.
HELD: Yes.
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection.
The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the
Constitution:
"Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights
"Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws."
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly Reference System" null and void for being unconstitutional.
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." Control of Executive Departments
"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law."
"Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."

"Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself."
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that
A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O.
No. 308.

But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the

overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,
much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They
threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The petition is granted and declared the Administrative Order No.