FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. ALBERTO M INA, HON.
agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision
ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES
G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (Cruz) filed before the
MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in
a criminal case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano
Cruz, is the complaining witness. Cruz describes himself as a
third year law student and justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court and the Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. case —that a
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent
or friend of a party litigant. Cruz also avers that his appearance
was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his
agent in the prosecution of the case.
However, the MeTC denied permission for Cruz to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No.
19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over Cantimbuhan case . Cruz filed a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law
Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding
Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is
the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Cruz filed before the RTC a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the
private respondent and the public respondent MeTC. The RTC
denied the issuance of an injunctive writ. Cruz cites Bar Matter
No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the
appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
of a member of the bar.
Cruz filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration with the
MeTC seeking the reversal of the Denial Order of the said court,
on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In
Abeyance the Trial of the criminal case pending the outcome of
the certiorari proceedings before the RTC. RTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, the MeTC denied the
Second Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion to Hold in
Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already
denied the Entry of Appearance of Cruz before the MeTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
RULING:
Yes. There is really no problem as to the application of
Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on
Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been
confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law
student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have
been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as
private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that
Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the
inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in
1
Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
“Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice.—A law
student who has successfully completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school’s clinical legal education program approved
by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrati ve
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer,
to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal
clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance.—The appearance of the law
student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.”
However, in Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar
Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before
an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively
simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section
34, Rule 138 provides:
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.” 7 (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase “In the court of a justice of the peace” in Bar
Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to “In the court of a
municipality” as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:
“SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the
Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.” (Emphasis supplied)
2
 A.M . No. M TJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003. *
IM ELDA Y. M ADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO
H. M EDIODEA, 12th M unicipal Circuit Trial Court,
Cabatuan and M aasin, Iloilo, respondent.
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court
may—without having to resign from their posts— conduct their
own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own
behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as
counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects the employee to
administrati ve liability.
FACTS:
A Complaint dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y.
Maderada against Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin,
Iloilo. In the Complaint, the judge was charged with “gross
ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct” for
failing “to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure” in Civil Case No. 252.
On September 7, 2001, complainant (maderada) filed
before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo—
presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol—an action for
forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and
damages covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Because complainant (maderada) was the clerk of court
in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited herself from
the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated
respondent judge (mediodea) to hear and decide the
case.
In an Order dated September 13, 2001, respondent
(mediodea) required the defendants in the civi l case to
show cause why the preliminary injunction should not
be granted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing on
September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a
Manifestation on September 17, 2001, praying that they
be given an additional period of ten days to file an
answer. After the September 21 hearing, respondent
reset the hearing to September 28, 2001. Meanwhile,
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
the defendants filed their Opposition to complainant’s
prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO.
The September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after
the defendants’ lawyer questioned the authority of
complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for her
co-plaintiff. Respondent gave the defendants ten days to
file a motion to disqualify complainant from appearing
as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her
opposition thereto.
In his Order dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied
the defendants’ Motion to disqualify complainant from
appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-
plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions praying for
judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In an Order
dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied
complainant’s Motions because of the pending hearing
for the issuance of a restraining order and an
injunction. He likewise denied the defendants’ Motion
for extension of time to file an answer. Complainant did
not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her Motion
for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment on the Complaint, respondent (mediodea)
contends that complainant filed a Petiti on for his inhibition
after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that
the mere filing of administrative charges against judges is not
a ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the
exercise of their discretion, however, they m ay voluntarily
disqualify themselves. It is worth noting that respondent later
inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was then
reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San
Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case
cannot be attributed to him, considering that he was mandated
by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion
presented before him. Besides, complainant allegedly failed to
present evidence necessary for the imm ediate resolution of her
prayer for preliminary injunction. Moreover, she supposedly
failed to exhaust the remedies available to her to question the
3
validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render
a decision on the case.
Respondent likewise refutes complainant’s assertion that
1. she appeared as counsel on her own behalf because she
could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was
allegedly without basis, since her compensation and
other benefits as clerk of court were more than enough to
pay for the services of counsel.
2. He further alleges that she did not secure authority from
this Court to appear as counsel, and
3. that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she
appeared in court.
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court
Administrator
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary
must devote their full time to government service to ensure the
efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they
are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a
profession, they should do so only with prior approval of this
Court.
The OCA added that “engaging in any private business,
vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is
tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in
office.”
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in
the amount of P1,000 for appearing as counsel without
authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar
infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. The
OCA also recommended that she be directed to file her
application for leaves of absence on the days she had appeared
in court to litigate her case.
ISSUE: Whether Maderada, a clerk of court, may appear as
counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff.
HELD: May appe ar for herself but not for co-plaintiff
Practice of Law; A party’s right to conduct litigation
personally is recognized by law; W hen they act as their own
attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence
and procedure as those qualified to practice law;
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute
and defend their own actions; and when they do so they are
not considered to be in the practice of law
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private
vocation or profession when she appeared on her own behalf in
court, the necessary implication was that she was in the
practice of law. We clarify. A party’s right to conduct litigation
personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. —In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.”
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally
do everything during its progress—from its commencement to
its termination. 41 When they, however, act as their own
attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise,
ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. 42 Individuals have
long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own
actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in
the practice of law. 43 “One does not practice law by acting for
himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first
aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly,
involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity
and as counsel by rendering legal advice to others.
Private Practice Defined; Complainant cannot be said to be
in the practice of law.
Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: “x x
x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring
to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of
4
the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public,
as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not
customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a
lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services.
Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to
litigate their own case in court. The right of complainant to
litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her
being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her
the right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-
representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot
make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a
discussion of the Court’s ruling 49 in Cayetano v. Monsod
regarding the extent of the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had
appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for
which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.
Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf
of someone else.
The raison d’etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves
in court will not apply when a person is already appearing for
another party. Obviously, because she was already defending
the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-
plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely
protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will
not give complainant authority to appear in court. The
undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two
distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency
of public service once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, even if we
consider that this was the first-time complainant appeared in
court, that she appeared for her own sister, and that there was
no showing she did so for a fee. Again, we should be reminded
that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility.
Given these circumstances, the penalty of reprimand is
sufficient.
This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any
conduct, act or omission that falls short of the exacting norms
of public office, especially on the part of those expected to
preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from
its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees in
order not to diminish the people’s faith in our justice system.
But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield
the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation
that trifles with judicial processes, 52 and that serves only to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.
CANON 9 RULE 9.01;
BAR M ATTER 730 (June 13, 1997)
I. Canon 9 Rule 9.01
“A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the Bar in good standing.”
1. Delegation of legal work to an unqualified person is
misbehavior
- Practice of law is limited only to individuals duly
qualified in moral character and education and who
passed the Bar examinations
- Practice of law is just a privilege and may be
withdrawn if the lawyer fails to maintain the
standards of moral and professional conduct
- Whether such person is knowledgeable in the law is
immaterial
 Example:
 A lawyer under
suspension from practice
of law is NOT a member of
the Bar in good standing
5
 A lawyer whose authority  Presiding Judge Pastoral issued an order requiring
to practice law has been Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on
withdrawn due to a the next hearing.
change in citizenship or
allegiance to the country
 UP-OLA and Secretary of Justice executed a MOA
is NOT a member of the
dire cting Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the PAO
bar in good standing
to supervise Carmona during the subsequent hearings.
2. A lawyer shall not allow a non-member of the Bar to
 Justice Barredo: a law student appearing before the
misrepresent hi mself as a lawyer
court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a
3. A lawyer cannot delegate his authority without the
supervising lawyer. However UP-OLA submits: such
client’s consent
matter should be left to the sound discretion of the court
- It doesn’t follow that the retained lawyer is
after having at least one supervised appearance.
always authorized to make such delegation to a
 Court En Banc: A law student appearing before the
qualified person. Consent of client needed.
- Client-lawyer relationship is a personal one. RTC under Rule 138-A should AT ALL TIM ES BE
ACCOM PANIED BY A SUPERVISING LAW YER
pursuant to Sec 2 of Rule 138-A.
II. IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING  “Direct supervision and control” requires no less than
UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during
DURING TRIAL (Bar matter 730 June 13, 1997) the hearing, in accordance with the threefold rationale
behind the Law Student Practice Rule:
1. To ensure that there will be no
 Issue raised by retired SC Justice Antonio P. Barredo,
miscarriage of justice;
as counsel for the defendant in Caliwara v. Catbagan:
2. To provide a mechanism to protect law
WON a law student who appears before the court under
school clinic from any potential vicarious
the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule138-A) should be
liability arising from culpable action by
accompanied by a member of the bar during trial.
their law students;
 In the case of Caliwara v. Catbagan, the plaintiff was
3. To ensure consistency with the
represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona Jr, an intern of
fundamental principle that no person is
the Office of the Legal Aid, UP College of Law (UP-OLA).
allowed to practice a profession without
 Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
possessing the qualifications,
presentation of the evidence-in-chief without the
particularly a license, as required by law.
presence of the supervising lawyer.
 Allowing a law student to appear before the court
 Justice Barredo questioned Mr. Carmona’s appearance
unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer CANNOT be left
during the hearing because the latter was not
to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule must
accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer.
be strictly construed because public policy demands
that legal work should be entrusted only to those who

MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS 6

 possess tested legal qualifications, are sworn to observe
the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject
to judicial control.
 The rule is diffe rent when the law student appears
before an inferior court where the issues are relatively
simple. In this case a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without a supervising lawyer
pursuant to Section 34 Rule 138.
Romulo Cantimbuhan, M alana, Lucila vs.
Judge Cruz & Fiscal Quilatan
Facts:
Petitioner Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal
complaints against two police officers for less serious physical
injuries in the municipal court of Paranaque.
Petitioners Malana and Lucila, were the senior law
students of the UP, assisting the needy clients in the office of
legal aid. They filed their separate appearances as friends of
complainant petitioner Cantimbuhan which was opposed by
Fiscal Quilatan and sustained by Judge Cruz and disallowed
the appearances if petitioner Malana and Lucila , as private
prosecutors in said criminal cases. The motion for
reconsideration of the petitioners was also denied.
It was contended by the respondents that pursuant to
Sec. 4 and 15 of Rule 110 of ROC, the fiscal is empowered to
determine who shall be the private prosecutor and the exercise
of the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and
control of the fiscal and that his appearance requires the prior
approval of the fi scal.
The basis of the petitioner on the other hand is section
34 of Rule 138 of the ROC which provides that in the court of
the justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
Issue:
W/N Malana and Lucila are allowed to appear as friends
of party litigant Cantimbuhan.
Held:
Yes, there is merit in the petition.
The court held that pursuant to Sec. 34 Rule 138 ROC
in a municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in
person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for that
purpose.
In the case of Laput vs. Bernade, a law student was
allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the
Manila Municipal Court, who was charged for damages to
properly through reckless imprudence.
Further, the court held that the permission of the fiscal
is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutors because the law does not impose this condition.
What the fiscal can do if he wants to handle the case personally
is to disallow the private prosecutor’s participate, whether he
be a lawyer or not. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the
active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just
manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its
approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his
supervision and control. Furthermore, the court held that if a
non-lawyer can appear as defense council or as friend of the
accused in a case before the MTC, with more reason that he
allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision
and control of their fiscal.
Wherefore, the orders issued by the respondent Judge
disallowing the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila
were set aside and Judge Cruz was ordered to allow the
7
appearance and intervention of Malana and Lucila as friends of
Cantimbuhan.
SECTION 4 and 15 OF RULE 110 RULES OF COURT
Section 4.
Information defined. — An information is an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court.
Section 15.
Place where action is to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or
other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other
vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its
departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the
course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality
or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage,
subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but
punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed.
In relation to:
Revised Penal Code
Article 2.
Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties
and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code
shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone,
but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction
into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned
in the presiding numbe r;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit
an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security
and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of
this Code.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISM AEL G. KHAN JR. vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIM BILLO
FACTS:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement
that appeared in the issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist
532-4333/521-2667."Further research by the Office of the
Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were published in the issues of the
Manila Bulletin and issue of The Phili ppine Star.
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed
an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines finding respondent guilty
of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
8
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year
with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Simbillo committed an act in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is
not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a
business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients
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There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. What adds to the gravity of
respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of M arriage Specialist," he wittingly or
unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but
also the sanctity of an institution still conside red sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time
of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might
have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Therefore, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY
of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
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which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
LINSANGAN VS ATTY. TOLENTINO
Facts:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of
the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. Complainant alleged
that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance and
expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text
messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented
the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations
with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached
respondents calling card. Respondent, in his defense, denied
knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation
of the said calling card. The complaint was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is guilty of solicitation of clients
and encroachment of professional services.
Held:
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
Yes. Atty. Tolentino is suspended from practicing law for one
year for violating Rule 1.03, 2.03, 8.02, 16.04 and Canon 3 of
Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3 of the CPR, it provides that:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS
LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTI VE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of
law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR
PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGN ED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03
of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY
CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
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 ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR
DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty.
Complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano
and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals
suits. Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in
his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result. With regard
to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the
rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in
his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals.
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his
office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep
into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under
Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
Court of Appeals, Second District, Division 3, California.
Ralph J. GEFFEN, Plaintiff Cross-Defendant and
Appellant, v. Russell J. M OSS, Defendant Cross-
Complainant and Respondent.
Civ. 46079.
Decided: November 24, 1975
FACTS: Ralph J. Geffen appeals from a judgment entered in
favor of Russell J. Moss in an action for damages for breach of
contract. It appears without conflict that, because of an
appointment as a United States magistrate precluding him
from continuing the private practice of law, attorney Geffen
entered into a written agreement with attorney Moss whereby
Geffen agreed to sell and Moss to buy ‘the physical assets, files
and work in process' of Geffen's law practice. The total
purchase price was $27,500. Fifteen thousand dollars was paid
in accordance with the terms of the contract. The action seeks
to recover an unpaid balance of $12,500 plus attorney's fees
and costs.
The pertinent provisions of the contract are as follows:
The purchase shall include:
A. Entire law library, excepting not to exceed ten (10) books to
be agreed upon between the parties, and Martindale -Hubbell
(1969);
B. Any and all furniture, fixtures, furnishings and equipment,
excepting not to exceed six (6) items of decor (not major items)
selected by Geffen; and
C. Subje ct to approval thereof by the respective clients, all
cases and legal matters now pending in the above law practice
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except personal injury or wrongful death cases and the
following legal matters:
Geffen will sublet to Moss, at the same rental (Three Hundre d
Dollars ($300.00) per month (and upon the same terms and
conditions as are provided in the Master Lease held by him,
Suite 7 (six (6) rooms) now occupied by Geffen at 11850 East
Firestone Boulevard, Norwalk, California, for a term of three (3)
years. Upon full payment of the purchase price, Geffen will
assign to Moss said Master Lease and will assist in procuring a
further lease in Moss' name alone as lessee thereafter upon
request of Moss.
Geffen expresses an intention to exert his influence for the
continued welfare of the practice and to encourage
present and former clients to utilize the legal services of
the office in the future.
Of the total purchase price, Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($15,000.00) is attributable to the fair value of physical assets
sold.'
The trial court found, among others, that the plaintiff's attempt
to sell the expectation of future patronage of his former and
current clients and to encourage them to patronize the
defendant, and the defendant's attempt to purchase the future
patronage of the plaintiff's former and current clients and the
recommendation of himself by the plaintiff to those former and
current clients constitutes an attempt to buy and sell the good
will of a law practice, and such sale or attempted sale of the
good will of the law practice is contrary to public policy and
against the spirit and intent of Rules 2 and 3 of Section 6076
of the Business and Professions Code, ‘The State Bar Act’ and
of the ABA Canons of Ethics No. 4, EC 4—6, prohibiting the
sale of a law practice as a going business.
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of the contract which
states that Geffen expresses an intention to exert his influence
for the continued welfare of the practice and to encourage
present and former clients to utilize the legal services of the
office in the future is contrary to public policy and
unenforceable.
HELD: YES. Noting that the fair value of the physical assets,
defined as library, furniture, fixtures, furnishings and
equipment is established in the contract to be $15,000 and that
all fees earned for work done by Moss or collected for work in
progress belong to Moss, we immediately wonder what the
additional consideration, payable in monthly installments
totaling $12,500 covers. It does not appear to be for assignment
of the lease since that act is contingent upon and to be made
after full payment of the total purchase price of $27,500. What
else was being sold for the $12,500 now being sought by Geffen
in this action?
No attack is made upon the sufficiency of the e vidence to
support the finding that the parties ‘considered the expectation
of future business from present and former clients as a
principal motivating factor in this sale transaction’ and that
without that expectation the value of the law office would not
exceed $15,000.
Noting, as found by the trial court, that two able experienced
attorneys drew the agreement to sell only insofar as this could
be accomplished ‘within the limits and confines of the canons
of ethics,’ they themselves acknowledge some applicable
limitation on the scope of the sale. We agree that, insofar as the
parties purport to sell the physical assets and to assign the
leasehold and dispose of pending office matters, the agreement
does not violate public policy as expressed in the canons of legal
ethics. However, it appears obvious to us that both parties,
recognizing a limitation against the sale of good will,
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nevertheless attempted to avoid a proscription against such by Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 682, 289 P. 818.) Thus, our research has
deliberately failing to mention good will as such in the brought to light no case in this jurisdiction in whi ch an
agreement. We cannot say that the trial court's resolution of allowance was made to a partner for goodwill upon the
the matter was unreasonable. The attempted sale of the dissolution of a partnership created for the practice of law.’ The
expectation of future patronage by former and current clients judgment is modified by striking therefrom that portion
of a law office coupled with an agreement to encourage said awarding defendant attorney's fees. In all other respects the
clients to continue to patronize the purchaser of the physical judgment is affirmed.
assets of the office, under the facts of this case, may well be
said to constitute an attempt to buy and sell the good will of a
law practice as a going business, contrary to public policy, and
that the portion of the agreement purporting to so do is invalid
and unenforceable.

The following language found in Linnick v. State Bar, 62 Cal.2d

17, 21, 41 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3, 396 P.2d 33, 35, although involving
the activities of a lay person and an attorney, indicates the
existence of applicable e thical considerations:

‘Rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, however, prohibits

an attorney from remunerating another for either ‘soliciting’ or
‘obtaining’ employment for him. Whether or not a lay
intermediary solicits the business referred, he may not keep the
best interests of the clients paramount when he profits from his
referrals. He is likely to refer claimants, not to the most
competent attorney, but to the one who is compensating him.
(See Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 504, 521, 523, 225 P.2d
508 (concurring opinion by Traynor, J.);

‘The nature of a professional partnership for the practice of law,

the reputation of which depends on the skill, training and
experience of each individual member, and the personal and
confidential relationship existing between each such member
and the client, places such a partnership in a class apart from
other business and professional partnerships. The legal
profession stands in a peculiar relation to the public and the
relationship existing between the members of the profession
and those who seek its services cannot be likened to the
relationship of a merchant to his customer. (Barton v. State

MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS 13