Name Cases

Juan Iñigo S. Miguel People v. Sabilul

People v. Magat
People v. Pangilinan
People v. Espinosa
Bugat-an v. People
Daan v. Sandigan

Angelica Base People v. Villarama

People v. Durango
People v. Gambao

Angeline Wilson People v. Ceredon

Virata v. Sandiganbayan
Enrile v. People

Anna Dela Cruz Lazarte Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

Uy v. CAjkiiiiiiik
Eugenio v. People

Anna Manuel People v. Rondero

Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan
Sasot v. People

Bettina Parado Pecho v. Sandiganbayan

People v. Desuyo
Monteverde v. People

Ezra Ramajo Loney v. People

Cabico v. Dimaculangan-Querijero
Poblete v. Sandiganbayan

Inah Tolentino Valencia v. Sandiganbayan

Tan v. Comelec
People v. Lacson

Janna Salvacion Los Banos v. Pedro

Torres v. Aguinaldo
Ampatuan jr. v. De Lima

Jem Granatin Valerio v. CA

Flores v. Sandiganbayan
Pascua v. CA

Jorelyn Blay Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan

People v. Taruc
Icdang v. Sandiganbayan
Kenneth Lugtu Te v. Breva
Santos v. Pryce Gases Inc
Malaloan v. CA

Redd Lapid People v. Chiu

Sony Computer Entertainment v.
Supergreen
People v. Nunez

Renzo Manahan Tambasen v. People

La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez
Hon Ne Chan v. Honda

Rosh Agapito Vallejo v. CA

Kho v. Makalintal
Uy v. BIR

Timmy Decapia Ogayon v. People

Balayon jr. v. Dinopol
People v. Salaguit

Tine Cruz People v. Dichoso

Lacadin v. Mangino
People v. Policarpio

Toni Bellen People v. Go

People v. Endaya
Quinicot v. People

RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

People v. Sabilul
G.R No. L-3765. June 21,1951
Facts
On September 14, 1949, in the District of Lamitan, City of Basilan, Sabilul, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault and attack Moro Lario by means of a “pira” a Yakan bladed
weapon, thereby inflicting upon the body of said Moro Lario multiple wounds caused
his instant death.
Upon arraignment, and with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Filoteo Dianela Jo who
was appointed counsel de officio for him, Sabilul entered a plea of guilty. Without
taking any evidence and merely on the basis of the statements and contentions
made by the provincial fiscal and counsel de officio, Judge Villalobos convicted
Sabilul of murder.
 The defendant thru his same counsel is appealing from that decision, claiming that
the lower court erred in applying the provisions of Art. 248 instead of Art. 247 of the
RPC which provides for the application of the penalty of destierro. Moreover, the
solicitor general claimed that there is a misunderstanding on the part of the
appellant; and his counsel may have believed that the entry of plea of guilty was
conditioned on the lower penalty.
Issue
Whether or not the accused can enter a conditional plea.
Held
No. According to the Supreme Court, there is a misunderstanding in the entry of the
plea of guilty by the accused as theorized by the Solicitor General. The lower court
shall be careful and must ascertain whether the accused had full knowledge of the
meaning and consequence of entering a guilty plea.

People v. Magat
332 SCRA 517
Facts
Antonio Magat raped his 19 year old daughter, Ann Fideli Limpoco on
September 1, 1996. Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant
pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant’s
mother Ofelia Limpoco Magat and the Public Prosecutor agreed with the plea
bargain.
Issue
Whether or not the plea bargain was proper.
Held
No. The Supreme Court held that the accused-appellant is not the plea bargaining
contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance
where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty
to a lesser offense. In the case at bar, Magat only pleads guilty to a lesser penalty.
Hence, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed.
And this is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged,
accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.

People v. Pangilinan
518 SCRA 358
Facts
Alfredo Trinidad Pangilinan was charged of 2 counts of rape for raping his
daughter on September 1995 and January 1997.
On may 5, 1997, appellant, who was arrested and detained with no bail
recommended, filed a petition for bail.
On June 9, 1999, the trial court, having discovered that appellant had not yet
been arraigned, scheduled his arraignment. On June 17, 1999, appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.
Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it adduced during the hearing for the
petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence the trial court
admitted, the trial court deemed the cases submitted for decision.
With that, Pangilinan assailed his conviction because he was not properly arraigned.
Since he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said
irregularity,he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is
tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation
against him.
Issue
Whether or not the conviction is valid even though there is a problem in the
arraignment.
Held
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the procedural defect was cured when his
counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to
be arraigned. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication
that he was fully aware of the charges against him.

People v. Espinosa
409 SCRA 256
Facts
Cases of estafa were filed before the Sandiganbayan by the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) against respondent Mario K. Espinosa. Later, the OMB moved
to withdraw ex parte the two cases filed against Espinosa and the Sandiganbayan
the same. Thereafter, however, the OMB filed in the same court seven informations
for malversation of Public Funds against Espinosa et al. In his motion to quash the
information, Espinosa argued that Double Jeopardy had already attached. He had
been granted without his express consent. Petitioner countered that the arraignment
for the two previous cases was conditional, made solely to accommodate Espinosa’s
request to travel abroad pending reinvestigation of said earlier case. Ruling in favor
of Espinosa, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the Criminal Cases Nos. 24622 to 24626
for malversation of public funds. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari filed by
the people.
Issue
Whether or not it is a correct conditional plea
Held
No. According to the Supreme Court, the conditional plea does not automatically
waived his right against double jeopardy since it is a constitutional right which should
be waived expressly. The conditions must expressly inform and enlighten the
accused. Otherwise, it shall be deemed as simple and unconditional.

Bugat-an v. People
630 SCRA 537
Facts
Maramara was indicted of Murder for killing Pastor Papauran. He pleaded not
guilty. Before trial, he moved to enter into a plea bargaining with the prosecution and
victim’s next of kin. The Court allowed the motion. He was re-arraigned. He pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, a crime necessarily included in the crime of
murder.
The case arose when Maramara implicated petitioners Bugat-an, Labandero,
and Manatad as co-conspirators through an extrajudicial confession. Thereafter, the
implicated persons were charged with murder. They pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment. The RTC convicted them of the crime of homicide and found
conspiracy among them. The CA affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.
Issue
Whether or not the plea bargaining agreement was invalid.
Held
No. The plea bargaining was validly acted upon despite the fact that all the
proceedings, plea bargaining and conviction, occurred on a single day. Sec. 2, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes plea bargaining for a lesser offense in a
criminal case is explicit on how and when a plea bargain may be allowed.

Daan v. Sandiganbayan
550 SCRA 233

Facts
Joselito Daan was charged with 3 counts of malversation of public funds
involving the sums of P 3, 293.00, P 1,869.00, and P 13,528.00, respectively, which
they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the timebook and payrolls making it
appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal building
hall of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when in truth and
in fact, they did not.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not
guilty and substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed to substitute
their plea of not guilty to a crime of falsification of public document by a public officer
with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a
private individual
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to plea bargain despite the
recommendation by the prosecutor as there is no cogent reason to justify its
approval.
Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the plea bargaining offer.

Held
Yes. According to the Supreme Court, Daan was not an accountable officer as the
nature of his duty as timekeeper does not permit or require possession of local
government funds; where gross inequality will result in a discriminatory dispensation
of justice, the court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.

People vs Villarama
G.R. No. 99287. June 23, 1992

Facts:
Jaime Manuel was charged with the violation of Sec 16, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act), as amended. The penalty would be imprisonment for 6-12 years and a fine
ranging from 6,000 to 12,000 pesos. During the arraignment, the accused entered a
plea of not guilty. The prosecution rested the case. Thereafter, respondent verbally
manifested in open court that he was willing to plea guilty to a lighter offense,
violation of Sec 17 of RA 6425, as amended. The penalty would be imprisonment of
6 months to four years and a fine ranging from 600 to 4,000 pesos to any
pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates
or fails to keep the records required under the act.
The Judge issued an order directing respondent to secure the consent of the
prosecutor which he later on failed to obtain on the following grounds:
(1) That the prosecution has already rested its case;
(2) The possibility of his conviction was high because of strong evidence; and
(3) The valuable time which the court and prosecutor had expended would be put
to waste.
In his reply, respondent argues that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a
specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.

Issue:
WON Respondent is allowed to plea guilty to a lighter offense

Held:
The Court ruled against Respondent.
Though the respondent is correct in stating that the law does not provide a fixed
period within which to an accused in allowed to plead guilty, in this situation, the trial
court and the Office of the Prosecutor has been provided with a yardstick within
which the discretion may be properly exercised. It was already ruled in the case of
People v Kayanan that the rules allow such plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
In the violation of the said crime, only the consent of the Fiscal is needed because
the offended party is the State, and the Fiscal acts in behalf of the State. Thus, the
lack of consent of the Fiscal is a bar to the plea of guilt on a lesser offense.

People v Durango
G.R. Nos. 135438-39. April 5, 2000

Facts:
Respondent was charged for allegedly raping his 12-year old daughter. During the
arraignment, respondent pleaded “not guilty”. However, when the victim was called
to the witness stand, the counsel of the accused declared respondent’s intent to
plead guilty to the offense. This was corroborated by the affirmation of the
respondent when asked.
Thereon, the Judge ordered the respondent to be re-arraigned where he pleaded
guilty. All evidence were accepted and a decision was rendered finding respondent
guilty and sentencing him to death.

Issue:
WON respondent was afforded the rights and proper procedure rightful to him as one
pleading guilty to such crime.

Held: (Doctrines)
When an accused enters such a plea of "guilty," the trial court is mandated to see to
it that the exacting standards laid down by the rules therefor are strictly observed
(Rule 116)
"SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information has been 5led or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in
open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution
may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information. "
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his
plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. "
(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him."
"SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

The records would show that thenceforth defense counsel spoke not one word. Nor
would it appear that the trial court gave defense counsel or the accused any chance
to talk for when the prosecutor ended his direct examination of Noniebeth, the latter
was thereupon simply excused and the court forthwith declared the case submitted
for decision. Thus, said cases were REMANDED to the trial court for further and
appropriate proceedings.

People vs Gambao
G.R. No. 172707. October 1, 2013

Facts:
Respondets herein were charged of kidnapping for ransom. The victim, Chan, was a
fish dealer. 2 persons, pne of whom is Dilangalen, went to Chan to inquire about a
certain passport which was allegedly placed inside the box of fish deliveries.
However, the deliveries were not yet there. The next evening, the respondents
returned to Chan’s home where they were welcomed by her househelp. Thereafter,
they pointed guns to Chan’s son and house companions. They forcedly took Chan
where she was detained and ransom negotiations occurred (with her son, who was
the one who reported the incident to the police). (ransom was set to 400k)
With the assistance of the authorities, the respondents were captured during the
supposed meet-up for the ransom money in Chowking.
During the trial, respondents all pleaded not guilty. However, they changed and
pleaded guilty (thinking that it would mitigate the offense). (Their counsels advised
them on the effet (process) which will take place if they plead guilty)

Issue:
WON the court satisfactorily exercised its duties as to cases when the accused
pleads guilty.

Held:
** People v. Oden, 37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires
Rationale: the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is
in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irreversible.
**Guidelines for searching inquiry
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a
"searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of
the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was
detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress
either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply
because of the judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a
plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently,
an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it
not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain
to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the
court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due
process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details.

(this is the ruling)

The evidence from the records show that these guidelines were not followed. The
questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that
accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is
readily apparent from the records that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his
plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the judge and his
counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by the trial
court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the
penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

People Vs. Cederon

FACTS: Appellant Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for ten (10) counts of
rape, defined and penalized under Article 266(A) and (B) of the Revised Penal Code.
On August 13, 2001, at his arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all ten (10) charges.
However, on September 3, 2001, during the pre-trial conference, his counsel
manifested before the trial court the desire of appellant to change his plea to "guilty"
on all ten (10) counts. Said manifestation was granted and appellant was
re-arraigned.Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued. Teresa Andres-Teresa,
Grade IV teacher of private complainant AAA, and AAA herself took the witness
stand for the prosecution.
No evidence was presented for the defense.

On September 20, 2000, policemen were dispatched to bring appellant to the police
station. There, a confrontation arose between AAA and appellant. Upon seeing
appellant, AAA punched him and said "Hayop ka, baboy, nirape mo ako" ("You
animal, pig, you raped me").
On September 21, 2000, there was a second confrontation.​69 Present were their
mother, their sister DDD, their uncle Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant's wife
Josephine, and AAA's teachers Charito Elesterio, Jerry Roque and Elpidio
Salvatierra. In said confrontation, AAA accused her brother, appellant, of raping her
ten (10) times, while he admitted to having raped her thrice only. Josephine,
appellant's wife, told him to admit so that AAA could forgive him.​70 He then admitted
that he had raped her ten (10) times and asked for forgiveness, beseeching her to
take pity on his family. AAA replied that she could no longer forgive him because her
heart had "already hardened like stone." Appellant cried.

ISSUE: ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF

GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 08-1296; 08-1297; 08-1298; 08-1299; 08-1300; 08-1301;
08-1302; 08-1303 AND 08-1304; CONSIDERING THAT THE SAID INFORMATIONS
FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH WITH PARTICULARITY THE DATES OF
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

HELD: Appellant claims that the trial court based its ruling of conviction on his
"improvident plea of guilt," relying on Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may present evidence in his behalf.​78
He argues that when he was re-arraigned and he pleaded "guilty" to all ten charges
of rape levelled against him, he was not fully apprised of the consequences of his
change of plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." According to him, the trial court did not
inquire as to the voluntariness of his plea and that it failed to explain fully to him that
once convicted, he would be meted the death penalty under R.A. No. 7659. Hence,
he contends, his conviction should be set aside.
We cannot agree.
The rule is where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is
enjoined to observe the following:
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.​79
There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the matter
of a proper "searching inquiry" as required by the aforecited rule. It is incumbent
upon a trial judge to ascertain and be fully convinced that the plea of guilty was
voluntarily made and its consequences fully comprehended by the accused.
VIRATA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: n this case, petitioner Cesar E. A. Virata (Virata, for brevity) is one of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 0035, entitled Republic of the Philippines versus
Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et. al.. The case, which was filed by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic, for brevity) against fifty three persons (53) 1​ including Virata, involves the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by the defendants during the twenty year reign
of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The complaint against the defendants was
amended three times.
On 3 December 1992, a motion to strike out the Limited Bill of Particulars and to
defer the filing of the answer was filed by Virata on the grounds that the Limited Bill
of Particulars avers for the first time new actionable wrongs allegedly committed by
him in various official capacities and that the allegations therein do not indicate that
Virata acted as dummy, nominee or agent but rather as a government officer, acting
as such in his own name. This motion was not acted upon by the Sandiganbayan.
Way back on September 1, 1992, Virata, who was dissatisfied with the
Sandiganbayan Resolution of August 4, 1992, filed a petition for certiorari (G.R. No.
106527) with this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan's denial of his motion for a
bill of particulars as regards the first three charges stated in paragraph 14 b(ii),
paragraph 14g and paragraph 14m of the expanded Second Amended Complaint.
The petition was granted by this Court in our decision promulgated on April 6, 1993.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan Resolution of August 4, 1992 to the extent that it
denied the motion for a bill of particulars with respect to the first three (3) charges
was set aside and the Republic was required by this Court to submit to Virata a bill of
particulars containing the facts prayed for by the latter insofar as to these first three
(3) 'actionable wrongs' are concerned. 4​
On August 20, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a manifestation
and motion dated August 18, 1993 alleging, inter alia, that the OSG and PCGG
agreed that the required bill of particulars would be filed by the PCGG since the latter
is the investigating body which has the complete records of the case, hence, in a
better position to supply the required pleading.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN ADMITTING THE BILL OF PARTICULARS SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC.

HELD: The rule is that a complaint must contain the ultimate facts constituting
plaintiff's cause of action. A cause of action has the following elements, to wit: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 7​ As
long as the complaint contains these three elements, a cause of action exists even
though the allegations therein are vague, and dismissal of the action is not the
proper remedy when the pleading is ambiguous because the defendant may ask for
more particulars. As such, Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides, inter
alia, that a party may move for more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of
any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable
him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such motion
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. Under this Rule, the
remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or matter vaguely or
obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to file a motion, either for a more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars. 8​ An order directing the submission of such
statement or bill, further, is proper where it enables the party movant intelligently to
prepare a responsive pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.

A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document consisting of an

amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and being in the nature of a
​ It is the office of the bill
more specific allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. 10
of particulars to inform the opposite party and the court of the precise nature and
character of the cause of action or defense which the pleader has attempted to set
forth and thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably
to protect him against surprise at the
Trial.

ENRILE VS PEOPLE

FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information​3 for
plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim,
and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion
(motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad
cautelam motion for bail),​4 and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant
of arrest and for dismissal of Information,​5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014,
respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June 20, 2014.

On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused.​6​redarclaw
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing​7 informing him that his
arraignment would be held before the Sandiganbayan’s Third Division on July 11,
2014.

On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars​8 before the
Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment​9
since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH).

On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the
Sandiganbayan’s order and his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing.
Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Enrile’s counsel, argued the motion orally.
Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang
(Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on the motion.

When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Court’s denial
of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars essentially on the following grounds:

(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments
he raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest
and for dismissal of information; and

(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during
trial

ISSUE: Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute the
relevance of the details sought in the motion for bill of particulars. He likewise claims
that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by
the prosecution during the preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that his
motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.

HELD: After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under the
terms outlined below.

A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed

Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.​14 This
right has long been established in English law, and is the same right expressly
guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This right requires that the offense charged be
stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the accused of the crime he is facing in
sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information

An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed

by the prosecutor and filed with the court.​24 The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, specifically require certain
matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to
enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged

An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the
evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be
provided during the trial.​28​redarclaw

Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support.
The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence
by which these material elements are to be established.” It refers to the facts that the
evidence will prove at the trial.​29​redarclaw

Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive
facts on whose existence the cause of action rests;​30 they are also the essential and
determining facts on which the court's conclusion rests and without which the
judgment would lack support in essential particulars.​31​redarclaw

Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate
facts; they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion.​32​They are
facts supporting the existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.

C. Arraignment

The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused
be arraigned so that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what
penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.​37
During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully know the precise
charge that confronts him and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of
his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.

RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH

Pecho v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 111399; November 14, 1994
Facts:
Petitioner, Odon Pecho, a public officer being then the Customs Guard,
Miscellaneous Bonded Warehouse Division, Bureau of Customs, South Harbor,
Manila and one Jose Catre were charged in an information with the violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and found reasonable ground that the
accused are probably guilty thereof. Warrants for the arrest of the accused were
issued. Only the petitioner was brought under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction when
he voluntarily surrendered on 15 March 1991. He posted bail.

After the petitioner had pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 20 March 1991, trial
on the merits as against him ensued. Sandiganbyan found petitioner guilty as
charged.

Issue:
WON the information is invalid for non-compliance with Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court

Held:
NO. The certification of the investigating Prosecutor in the information is sufficient.
His failure to state therein that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence, which the petitioner claims is fatal because it is mandatorily
required by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, is untenable. When the
Prosecutor stated under oath that, inter alia, "a preliminary investigation has been
conducted in this case," he gave the solemn assurance that such preliminary
investigation conformed with the requirements set forth in the said sections.

The rule is also settled that the right to a preliminary investigation may be waived by
the failure to invoke the right prior to or at least at the time of the accused's plea.
Where the accused pleaded to the charge, he is deemed to have foregone the right
of preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may be waived
expressly or by silence.
People v. Desuyo
GR No. 140406; April 17, 2002
Facts:
Maricel Desuyo was sleeping beside her younger sister Aisalyn one late night in
September 1996 when she was awakened by someone caressing her breasts. She
opened her eyes and saw her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, crouching before
her. she begged her father not to touch her, reminding him that she was his
daughter. But he paid no heed; instead, he removed her underwear while
threatening to kill her should she make any noise. He mounted her, forced his penis
into her vagina and gyrated his hips against hers. She wept as she continued to beg
him to desist from his fiendish assault on her virtue. Meanwhile, Maricel did not tell
her mother about the incident; instead, she kept the ignominy and pain to herself.

The accused would repeat his sexual molestation of Maricel almost everyday from
September 1996 to August 1997. His assaults on her virtue were always followed by
threats on her that she would be killed should she report these to her mother.

Maricel, on Aug 18, 1997, bravely narrated to Police Officer Tito Ganggalang and his
wife Riza her sordid tale which was actually a confirmation of what was already
circulating around their neighborhood. She admitted that her father had been
sexually abusing her for close to a year already. Emboldened by the encouragement
she received from sympathetic neighbors, she next confided to Luisa Galit, Maricels
maternal aunt, who could only commiserate with her.

In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the municipal trial court
judge, accused Antonio Desuyo asked forgiveness and promised to leave her alone
should she withdraw the charge she filed against him. Maricel vehemently refused.
As a consequence, an Information was filed against the accused Antonio Desuyo
alias "Tony" for raping his fifteen (15)-year old daughter Maricel.

The accused denied having raped Maricel. Accused avers that the Information for
"multiple rape" filed against him is deficient since by merely stating that the sexual
assaults were repeated "within the month of September 1996 up to August 18,
1997," it failed to state the exact dates when the alleged rapes were committed.

Issue:
WON the Information is deficient for the lack of the dates when the alleged rapes
were committed

Held:
NO. It is settled that the exact date of the commission of rape is not an essential
element thereof and need not be stated in the information. The Court has sustained
the following dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient for purposes of
complying with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to wit: "from November 1990 up
to July 21, 1994," "sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto," "on or about and sometime in the year 1988," "sometime in the
year 1987"[16] and "before and until October 15, 1994." In any event, a review of the
evidence presented by the prosecution more than establishes the guilt of the
accused for the rape of his daughter.

Further, at the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an indictment
that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is
a motion for bill of particulars. The records show that the accused never asked for a
bill of particulars in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date when the alleged
crime was committed or for the quashal of the Information on the ground that it does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form deprives him of the right to object to
evidence which could lawfully be introduced and admitted under an information of
more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite
crime. It is indeed too late in the day for the accused to raise this issue because
objections to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the
first time on appeal.

Monteverde v. People
GR No. 139610; August 12, 2002
Facts:
Aurea Monteverde a public officer, being the Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10,
District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila, liquidated the funds donated/granted by the
PAGCOR submitted Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the amount
of P13,565.00 allegedly issued by Sanford Hardware when in truth and in fact said
sales invoice is falsified and later did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her personal use and
benefit, to the damage of the Government and which crime was committed in relation
to her office.

During her arraignment on April 5, 1993, petitioner, assisted by her counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner of
the crime of estafa, but convicted her of falsification of a commercial document under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
WON accused’s information is defective for charging more than one offense

Held:
NO. Well-known is the principle that an information must charge only one offense,
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. When
more than one offense is charged, the accused may move to quash the information.

However, in the present case, the accused should have objected to the Information
on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein. For her failure to
move to quash the indictments, she is deemed to have waived her right to be tried
for only one crime. Furthermore, she did not object to the submission of evidence
that tended to prove the offenses charged in the Information -- estafa and
falsification. Verily, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information, but the accused fail to object to the defect before trial, the trial court may
convict them of as many offenses as are charged and proven, and impose on them
the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in
each.

On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the argument of petitioner that since she was
acquitted of estafa, she could no longer be convicted of falsification of a commercial
document. Having, in effect, been charged with two distinct crimes, acquittal in one
will not necessarily lead to acquittal in the other. Each crime will be evaluated based
on its own merits, and conviction will depend on the proof of the elements of each
particular offense.

RULE 117: MOTION TO QUASH

LAZARTE JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR NO. 180122
13 MAR 2009

FACTS: In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original
contract for the infrastructure works on the Pahaconoy Sites and Services Project,
Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project was funded by the
World Bank, with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, under the Project Loan
Agreement forged on June 10, 1983 between the Philippine Government and the
IBRD-World Bank. A.C. Cruz commenced the infrastructure works on Aug. 1, 1990.
In April 1991, the complainant Candido M. Fajutag Jr. was designated Project
Engineer of the project. A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the
excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo
Cruz of A.C. Cruz submitted the fourth billing and Report of Physical
Accomplishments on May 6, 1991. Fajutag Jr., however, discovered certain
deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some supporting
documents. The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag
Jr.’s further verification, it was established that there was no actual excavation and
road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz. In a Memorandum dated June 27, 1991,
the Project Office recommended the termination of the infrastructure contract with
A.C. Cruz Construction. The total accomplishment of the contractor was determined
at 40.89%, representing P3,433,713.10 out of the total revised contract amount of
P8,397,225.09. It was recommended that the project be temporarily suspended. The
NHA Manager informed the contractor of the rescission of his contract for the
development of the said project. Despite the notice, the contractor continued working
intermittently with very minimal workforce until such time as the award of remaining
infrastructure works is effected by NHA to another contractor. In March 1992, the
NHA Board of Directors approved the mutual termination of the contract and
awarded the remaining work to Triad Construction and Development Corporation.
Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in under the
inventory report as accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. The
COA, after its special audit investigation, the COA uncovered some anomalies,
among which, are ghost activities. Further, it was found by COA that A.C. Cruz had
been overpaid by as much as P232,628.35, more than the net payment due per the
computation of the unpaid fourth billing. Consequently, petitioner Felicisimo F.
Lazarte, Jr, as manager of the Regional Projects Department, and other NHA
officials were charged with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following grounds: (1) the
facts charged in the information do not constitute and offense; (2) the information
does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them
have been violated by the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution
failed to determine the individual participation of all the accused in the information in
disobedience with the Resolution dated Mar. 27, 2005.

The Sandiganbayan, on Mar. 2, 2007, issued the first assailed resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to quash. The motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s motion to quash

HELD: NO. The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the
facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements
of the crime defined in law. Matters aliunde will not be considered. The Court finds
that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa
and Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project
Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the
performance of their official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped
each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz
Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
The felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public
funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works
on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no
such works were undertaken by said construction company as revealed by the
Special Audit conducted by COA.

UY v. CA
GR NO. 119000
28 JULY 1997

FACTS: Rosa Uy was an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the
husband of the complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During her employment,
she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. On Mar.
15, 1982, a few months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. In the
meantime, she helped her husband manage their lumber business. The two agreed
to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the
expansion of Rosa’s lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various
sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by
Consolacion for the business. However, because of the trust they had for each other,
no receipt was ever issued. Thereafter, a lumber store with warehouse was
constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan. But unfortunately, the friendship between
Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were never
processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of her investment but the
checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Consolacion filed a complaint for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law before the RTC of Manila. On Dec. 10, 1984, and Information for estafa and
several other Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner.
The Manila RTC acquitted petitioner of estafa but convicted her of the charges under
B.P. Blg. 22. The CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the charges under B.P. Blg. 22
against petitioner Rosa Uy
HELD: NO. It is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the
Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also
acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the
essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.
In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in
a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various
charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no
scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had
been acquired. On the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a
resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal
place of business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee
bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited
for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were
issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in
Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire
jurisdiction over the offense.
In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the
violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by
estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner
raised the issue of jurisdiction.
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the
accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charge or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule
it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file
a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of
Section 3 of this Rule.
After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely
questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum before the Regional Trial
Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot
countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. Clearly, from the
abovequoted law, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he
may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections
may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or an appeal.

EUGENIO v. PEOPLE
GR NO. 168163
26 MARCH 2008

FACTS: On NOv. 14, 1995, petitioner Lolita Y. Eugenio went to the house of private
complainant Alfredo Mangali in Tonsuya, Malabon, Metro Manila and introduced
Mangali to Epifania Saquitan, Amalia Ablaza, and another individual. Eugenio
persuaded Mangali to loan P100,000.00 to Saquitan with a parcel of land in Sta.
Ana, Metro Manila as security for the loan. Eugenio assured Mangali that the Sta.
Ana lot was covered TCT No. 171602 issued in Saquitan’s name. Mangali asked
Eugenio to confirm with the Register of Deeds of Manila, to which the latter informed
the former that she saw the original of the TCT on file with the Register of Deeds.
With this assurance, Mangali agreed to extend the loan subject to Saquitan’s
execution of a deed of sale in his favor. Saquitan agreed and after the deed of sale
was signed, Mangali released the loan in two tranches to Saquitan which the latter
promised to pay on Dec. 21, 1995. Subsequently, Eugenio, on behalf of one Lourdes
Ty, sought another P100,000.00 loan from Mangali, payable in January 1996 with a
parcel of land in Quezon City as security. Eugenio represented that that property
was covered by TCT No. 92585 issued in Ty’s name. Mangali agreed to extend the
loan, again subject to the same condition as with Saquitan. After Ty complied,
Mangali released the partial amount of P75,000.00 When the loans lapsed and
remained unpaid, Mangali inquired from the Register of Deeds of Manila and
Quezon City on the status of the two TCTs. He discovered that TCT No. 171602 had
been cancelled on Oct. 5, 1995, while TCT No. 92585 is not registered with the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Mangali filed a complaint with the NBI which
arranged an entrapment operation on Feb. 26, 1996 in Mangali’s house. He
expected to see Eugenio that day since she asked for an additional P33,000.00 loan.
The NBI agents effected the arrest while Eugenio was counting the money.
Petitioner, Ablaza, and two others were charged with Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Documents. The Information was filed with the RTC of Malabon. Petitioner
and Ablaza pleaded not guilty, and upon application, were admitted to bail. Ablaza
soon went into hiding. The trial court found petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The
CA sustained the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE: W/n petitioner can assail the irregularities attending her arrest

HELD: NO. Petitioner contends that her arrest following the NBI entrapment
operation was illegal because it was conducted by a division of the NBI which does
not deal with estafa or fraud and without the participation of the police. Petitioner
also alleges that after she was arrested, she was neither informed of her
constitutional right to counsel nor afforded her right to a phone call. Petitioner
concludes that these irregularities tainted the NBIs entrapment operation, rendering
the same without any probative value in determining whether or not a criminal act
has been committed.
 Respondent does not contest petitioners claim on the alleged irregularities which
attended her arrest. Nevertheless, such irregularities, assuming they did take place,
do not work to nullify petitioner’s conviction as this Court is neither the proper forum,
nor this appeal the correct remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the
arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should
be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioners
failure to timely raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity ​and
resulted in her concomitant submission to the trial courts jurisdiction over her person.
Indeed, not only did petitioner submit to such jurisdiction, she actively invoked it
through her participation during the trial. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim the
contrary.

People vs. Rondero

320 SCRA 383
Facts:
On March, 1994. Mardy Doria noticed that her sister, Mylene, was not around. He
woke his parents to inquire his sister's whereabouts. realizing that she was missing,
his father, Maximo Doria, together with the barangay officers and neighbors
searched the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore, but was not
able to find Mylene. On the way home, Maximo, who was carrying a flashlight, saw
Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well and had an ice pick clenched on his mouth
and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo then informed the baragay officer
what he saw, and they continued their search. When they returned to the school,
they found the lifeless body lying on the cement pavement near the canteen. She
was naked from waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different
parts of her body. Later, 5 policemen conducted a spot investigation, and Maximo
led the policemen to the artesian well where he saw Rondero washing his hands.
The policemen found the well spattered with blood. Maximo then, disclosed what he
saw that night. Subsequently, Rondero was formally charged with the special
complex crime of rape with homicide, where he pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment.
The trial court convicted Rondero for the crime of murder. Rondero then appealed
contending that the arrest made was illegal.
Issue:
Whether or not the illegal warrantless arrest made to Rondero be a ground for
motion to quash.
Held:
No. It might be true that Rondero's warrantless arrest was not lawful. The police
officers who arrested him had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that he was
the perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not based on
a personal knowledge of the police officers indicating facts that he has committed the
gruesome crime but solely on Maximos suspicion that he was involved in the slaying
of Mylene since he was seen washing his bloodied hands in the early morning of
March 26, 1994.Nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity
attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of quashing the
information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits
himself to the court by entering a plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment
and participating in the proceedings.
Finally, we reiterate that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the
whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called to render
judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and
whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not.

Romuladez vs. Sandiganbayan

385 SCRA 436

Facts:
Previous to this case, Benjamin Romualdez filed a petition against Sandiganbayan
and Presidential Commission on Good Government. He assailed the validity of 24
information which the PCGG filed against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 3019, more specifically for failure to file his statements of assets and
liabilities covering the years 1962 to 1985 when he was in the government service.
He argued that PCGG Commissioner Augusto E. Villarin, who conducted the
preliminary investigation, had no authority to do so. On May 1995, the court ruled
that the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG was invalid, and required the
Office of the Ombudsman to conduct proper preliminary investigation.
Sandiganbayan then issued a resolution giving Romualdez 15 days to submit his
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence, it also gave PCGG same period to file
a reply affidavit. Romualdez failed to file the counter-affidavits, for he was in exile
abroad. Upon his return, he voluntarily surrendered to Sandiganbayan and posted
bail bond. Sandiganbayan then gave Special Prosecutor Lucero 10 days to within
which to submit any result of the reinvestigation, wherein a clarificatory hearing was
set. Romualdez, then filed a Motion to Quash the information in the criminal cases
on the ground that the PCGG Commissioner who filed the informations had no
authority to do so. The Motion to Quash was heard by the Sandiganbayan on June
8, 2000, one day before the clarificatory hearing. Without granting the prosecution
time to oppose the motion, the Presiding Justice, in open court, denied the Motion to
Quash and terminated the preliminary investigation being conducted by Prosecutor
Lucero. Furthermore, the Presiding Justice set the arraignment of Romualdez on
June 26, 2000.

Issue
Whether or not the court acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the Motion to Quash the
information.

Held
Yes. Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot
be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information
is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. In fact,
where an information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, it is
subject to quashal. More particularly, the information may be quashed where the
officer who filed it had no authority to do so. At all stages of the proceedings leading
to his trial and conviction, the accused must be charged and tried according to the
procedure prescribed by law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by
the Constitution. In the same way that the reading of the information to the accused
during arraignment is not a useless formality, so is the validity of the information
being read not an idle ceremony.

Sasot vs. People

462 SCRA 138

Facts:
In May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation
pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against Melbarose and
Allandale Sasot for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on
unfair competition. Stated in the report of NBI, it was discovered that Sasot is
engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit NBA
garment products. Hence, it recommended Sasot prosecution for unfair competition.
In July, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez recommended the filing of an
Information against Sasot. Before the arraignment, Sasot filed a Motion to Quash the
information on the following grounds a) that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, and b) the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person
accused. In support of the foregoing, Sasot argue that the fiscal should have
dismissed Weltss (President of NBA Properties, Inc.) complaint because under the
rules, the complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record
appears to be only a fax transmittal. The trial prosecutor Guray, filed his Opposition
to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original copy of the complaint, and
that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it. Prosecutor Guray also
contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the
participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged is a public crime.
The trial court upheld the prosecution's arguments, and denied the motion to quash
filed by Sasot.

Issue:
Whether or not the court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying the Motion to Quash the information.

Held:
No. While Sasot raised in their motion to quash the grounds that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged or the person of the accused, their arguments focused on an
alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal, complainants capacity to sue
and petitioners exculpatory defenses against the crime of unfair competition.

Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in
force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds
for quashing an information, to wit:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted,
or acquitted of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the
complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainants capacity to sue as grounds for
a motion to quash.

Also, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the

respondent, it is accompanied by complainants affidavit and his witnesses and
supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence
or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does
not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does
not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.

More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it
is the latter which principally stands as the injured party. The complainants capacity
to sue in such case becomes immaterial.

||
f||
Loney vs. People:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are
high-ranking officers of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation
engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing
tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. On 24 March 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel's end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In August
1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial
Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violations of Presidential Decree No. 1067
or the Water Code of the Philippines, the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976
("PD 984"), the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), and Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property. Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1)
the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than
one offense for a single act; (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute
legal excuse or justification.

Issue: Whether or not there are grounds to quash the informations

Held: No.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules
prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses,
with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously
invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score
alone, the petition deserves outright denial.

Cabico vs Dimaculangan-Querijero
Complainants are parents of a 17-year old rape victim in a criminal case. They
asserted, in open court, that no settlement would be pursued as they were informed
that the remaining amount for the settlement would not be given to them. The
respondent Judge angrily advised the spouses to return the settlement amount
already given. Also, they asserted that the Clerk of Court ordered them to sign an
Affidavit of Desistance. Subsequently, despite the absence of an affidavit of
desistance, the respondent Judge dismissed the case on the basis of receipt of
settlement money.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Judge is correct

Held: No. This in utter disregard and in gross ignorance of the law for payment of
civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability. The victim's affidavit of desistance
could not have justified the dismissal of the criminal cases. Republic Act No. 8353,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997," has reclassified rape as a crime
against persons. Hence, any public prosecutor, even without the complaint of the
victim or her parents, or guardian, can prosecute the offender.

Poblete vs Sandiganbayan

On September 27, 1999, the officers of Samahan ng Lahing Mandaragat ng

Pulborista, Inc., a non-stock, non-profit, non-government organization based in
Barangay Pulborista, Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite, led a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman against the following municipal officials of Kawit for 1995 to 2001. It
is alleged that the officials caused the registration of foreshore land located in
Barangay Binakayan, Kawit in the name of the Municipality of Kawit and
subsequently sold the same to a corporation, FJI Property Developers, Inc.,
notwithstanding that under Commonwealth Act No. 141, specically, Title III, Chapter
[8], Section 59 in relation to Section 61, the land is inalienable and cannot be
disposed by any mode or transfer, except by lease.
Petitioners moved to quash the information on the grounds that the (1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, and (2) that it contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification.

Issue: Whether or not there are such grounds

Held: No.
Contrary to petitioners' position, the information need not state the manner by which
the injury to the local fisherfolk or the government came about or the extent by which
they exhibited partiality, bad faith or negligence in the enactment of SB Resolution
3-97 authorizing the sale of foreshore land, it being sufficient that the information
alleges that petitioners acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and took
advantage of their public positions by passing SB Resolution No. 3-97 despite the
legal prohibition provided under the law, thereby causing undue injury to the local
fishermen and the government.
Anent the second ground of the Motion to Quash, it is erroneous for petitioners to
argue that the payment of the amount of P123,123,123.00 by FJI Property
Developers, Inc. for the lot in question, which enriched the coffers of the government,
was a legal excuse and justification to free them from criminal liability. For if the
elements of the offense —violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 — are
proven, the proffered excuse is immaterial.

VALENCIA v SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO 141336
29 JUN 2004

FACTS: The petitioners, including Rodolfo G. Valencia, were charged with Violation
of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for giving the accused—Atienza—unwarranted benefit,
privilege, and advantage by entering into a grossly disadvantageous contract of loan,
whereby the sum of P2.5M (PROVINCIAL FUNDS) was given to Atienza to finance
the cost of repair, operation, and maintenance of his vessel. Petitioners filed a
"Motion Seeking an Order to Allow Accused to File with the Ombudsman Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest." This
was followed by a "Motion to Quash" filed by petitioner Valencia on April 14, 1997.
The Sandiganbayan granted petitioners' motion for reinvestigation and directed the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. The petitioners learned
that in the administrative case against them, which involved the same subject matter
as the criminal case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against them after
finding that the contract of loan was entered into in pursuance of the police power of
the local chief executive. Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order and/or Motion to Resolve
Motion to Quash Information. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. The petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari contending that Respondent Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing the
information or in not granting the Motion to Quash information.

ISSUE: W/N THE MOTION TO QUASH SHOULD BE GRANTED—NO

RULING: Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in
a motion to quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such motion only such
facts as are alleged in the information, and those admitted by the prosecutor, should
be taken into account in the resolution thereof. Matters of defense can not be
produced during the hearing of such motions, except where the rules expressly
permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription and former jeopardy. ​As a
general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the
information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter,
should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity
are hypothetically admitted. The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a
motion to quash under this particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated,
if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined in the law. A careful scrutiny of the Information shows that all the above
elements are averred therein. It sufficiently alleges that petitioners are public officials
discharging official or administrative functions who, in evident bad faith and with
manifest partiality, entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the
government with a private person which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and
advantage.

TAN v COMELEC
GR NO. 112093
4 OCT 1994

FACTS: On May 10, 1992, the petitioner, as an incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao
City, was designated by the COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of
Canvassers in the said area for the May 11, 1992, synchronized national and local
elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20 (a) of Republic Act 6646 and
Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the
winning candidate for a Congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao
City. Private respondent Alterado, was a losing candidate for the position as
Congressman to represent the 2nd District of Davao City, filed a number of cases
questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia (winner), was
eventually dismissed, and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of
“unlawful, erroneous, incomplete, and irregular canvass.” Meanwhile the electoral
protest of private respondent Alfredo was dismissed by the HRET. The cases filed in
the HRET and the Office of the Ombudsman was dismissed. What is still pending is
an administrative charge, against the Board of Canvassers and herein petitioner for
“Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence, and Acts Inimical to the
Service”, instituted in the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner—YES

RULING: The COMELEC’s authority under Section 2 (6-8), Article 9 of the

Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters, also
Section 52, Article 7 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be stressed that the
administrative case against petitioner is in relation to the performance of his duties
as an Election canvasser and not as a City Prosecutor. The COMELEC’s mandate
includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate suspension and control over
national and local officials or employees, including members of any national and
local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law
to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. To say that the COMELEC is
without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials
and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would
be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory
power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of the process to the
official or employee concerned.

PEOPLE v LACSON
GR No. 149453
1 APR 2003

FACTS: Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several factual issues
relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed
against the respondent and his co-accused with the said court. In the aforesaid
criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple
murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The Court ruled in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered that (1) the provisional dismissal of the
Criminal Cases were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself
moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses, and (2) although
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given
retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its
application are attendant.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Sec 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the aforementioned criminal cases,
contrary to petitioners averments—NO
2. W/N the time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or
retroactively—NO

RULING:
A. Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the first two conditions for
its applicability is absent, namely:
1. Prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for
provisional dismissal;
2. Offended party notified;
3. Court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally;
4. Public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is
the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done (these are
also conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the 2​nd​ paragraph)

If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused,
the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the
other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent
of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be
revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the
accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or
refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant never filed and denied
unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he
filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. No notice of
motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the
heirs of the victims. An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner
and his other co-accused in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner
did not pray for the dismissal of the case.

B. Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be

applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve
intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so
would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on
March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect
give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had
no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that.
“Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed
for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of
both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit
the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and
adversely affect the administration

LOS BANOS V. PEDRO

FACTS:

Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization
from the COMELEC a day before the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash
after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC granted
the quashal

The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing
Rule 117, Sec. 8 on provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become
permanent.

The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen
the case saying that the provision used applies where both the prosecution and the
accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution
or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a
situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over
the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s arraignment date.

Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s
mandated reopening.

The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for
Reconsideration, his argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of the
quashal order, the CA's decision was reversed.

Petitioner now argues using the same argument of the public prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

RULING:

The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are
two separate concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency
while in Provisional Dismissal, the Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow
that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117
applies.

In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on
the ground that there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro
misappreciated the natures of a motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a
consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should
now be arraigned and stand trial.

TORRES JR. V. SPS AGUINALDO

FACTS:
• Respondent-spouses Aguinaldo filed before the OCP of Manila, a complaint
against petitioner Torres, Jr. for falsification of public document.
• They alleged that titles to their properties covered by TCT were transferred without
their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale5
dated July 21, 1979.
• Torres - denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the
subject properties to him as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute
Sale.
• OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification of public document
filed MTC
• Torres moved for reconsideration - denied.
• On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed and ordered the withdrawal of the
information. • The motion for reconsideration filed by Aguinaldo was denied.
• A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed which the MTC granted
• It should be noted that petitioner has not been arraigned.
• Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari which was
granted - March 22, 2004
• Torres’ motion for reconsideration was denied hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari

ISSUE: Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the
motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by
Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of
Manila; and in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under
Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
HELD:
• NO.Anent the first issue, Torres contends that the order granting the withdrawal of
the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals.
• The contention is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion
to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies.
The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon
reinvestigation.
• On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15)
days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such
order achieves finality. In Bañares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus
putting into place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal.
• In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to
dismiss. Hence, Bañares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a
motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that
the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with
the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case
involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1)
year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; or (b) a case
involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived.
• In sum, prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses,
including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary
of Justice. While his resolution is persuasive, it is not binding on the courts. The trial
court must at all times make its own independent assessment of the merits of each
case.
• Thus, it is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or the trial court, as the
case may be, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whose decision
may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.
• The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion because he based his findings on the lack of probable cause on the 1991
Deed of Sale when what was assailed was the 1979 Deed of Sale.30 It ruled that the
defenses raised by Torres should not have been considered during the preliminary
investigation but should be threshed out only during trial.31 Only the evidence
presented by the complainant should be considered in determining probable cause
or the lack thereof.
• We are not persuaded. The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the
affidavit-complaint and the NBI report32 and disregarding totally the counter-affidavit
and documentary evidence of petitioner.
• The court is inclined to grant the motion of the public prosecutor.
• WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

RULE 119: TRIAL

AMPATUAN JR V. DE LIMA

NATURE:
This is a direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari assailing the the final order
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing
petitioner’s petition for mandamus.​2
FACTS:
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged
196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. One
Kenny Dalandag, was admitted into the Witnes​s Protection Program of the DOJ and
was later on listed as one of the prosecution witness​. On October 14, 2010,
petitioner, through counsel request the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for
murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request twice
more on October 22, 2010​19 and November 2, 2010. But Secretary De Lima denied
petitioner’s request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the
RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another
accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. The RTC in
Manila set a pre-trial conference and issued a pre-trial order. The respondents
questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus.
Petitioner opposed.
On June 27, 2011,​33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No.
10-124777 dismissing the petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag
as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite
his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
HELD:
No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the
Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws
are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is
the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public
prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best
appreciated by the public prosecutors.
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be
resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way
discretion is to be exercised,​48​or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.​49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the
letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way such as
to grant or deny such letter-request.

FALLO:
Petition is denied

Search and Seizure

Receipt of Property Seized

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENNY GO

411 SCRA 81

FACTS: A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appellant Benny
Go in search of evidence (shabu) for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon
entry, they met Benny’s son Jack and restrained him. As the former was the only one
present at the time they then called on two barangay kagawads to act as witnesses
on the said search. They then seized properties and objects even those which were
not included in the warrant. When they were almost finished, Go arrived and was
made to sign the inventory receipt. Based on the evidence taken from the search Go
was charged. Upon hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the
prosecution against Go. However, the two witnesses questioned the validity of some
of the evidence presented such as the inventory receipt as well as the illegal drugs
said to have been seized from the search. RTC Manila convicted Go for violation of
the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether the properties not included in the search warrant may be returned
to Go

HELD: Yes. It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that
the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things
to be seized to only those particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the
same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents,
passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as
seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

PEOPLE v. ENDAYA
731 SCRA 1

FACTS: Respondent Reyman Endaya was convicted of illegal sale and possession
of shabu. Police operatives conducted a surveillance investigation for a week and
finally had a buy-bust operation with a civilian asset acting as a poseur-buyer.
Defense denied all accusations.

ISSUE: Whether Endaya is liable

HELD: Yes. The records show that appellant was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust
operation conducted after a week of surveillance. The police officers comprising the
buy-bust team positively identified appellant as the one who sold the plastic sachet
of shabu to their civilian asset who, in turn, handed the marked money to appellant.
Both the sachet of shabu and the marked money were presented as evidence in
court. Further, the chain of custody was unbroken and the identity of the corpus
delicti was established with moral certainty.

QUINICOT v. PEOPLE
590 SCRA 458
FACTS: In September 2000, two criminal cases were filed against Quinicot for
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, for selling and possession of shabu. A team of
policemen formed a buy-bust team and conducted an operation in a Chinese
restaurant (Chin Loong) at 12:20pm. After the transaction, PO2 Germodo bodily
searched the petitioner and recovered two plastic sachets from the brown belt purse
of the latter, plus the marked money, a disposable lighter, and a tooter. PO1
Marchan issued a receipt for the items. The three sachets were found to contain
shabu. Petitioner alleges that no buy-bust operation occurred and that the evidence
allegedly confiscated was planted evidence. Trial Court found him guilty. CA
affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was liable

HELD: Yes. He had been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller and
possessor can no longer be disputed. In asserting that there was no buy-bust
operation and that he was framed, petitioner asserts that (1) a surveillance was not
conducted… and (5) the receipt of the property seized was signed only by PO1
Marchan without any witnesses. These assertions will not exonerate the petitioner.
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect
the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting
buy-bust operations. A prior surveillance, much less lengthy one, is not necessary,
especially when the police is accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.
When time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior
surveillance. As to the lack of signatures of witnesses in the receipt, the two
witnesses were not required to sign. The two-witness rule applies only to
searches—made under the authority of a search warrant—of a house, room, or any
other premises in the absence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family. In the case at bar, there was no search warrant issued and no house, room or
premises searched.

PEOPLE vs. ROBERT CHIU y WAN and MARK ANTHONY MOLINA y DELA
PEÑA, accused.
[G.R. Nos. 142915-16. February 27, 2004.]
FACTS:
In September 1998, the police conducted surveillance operations on a suspected
shabu dealer, Daniel Henares. During the tactical interrogation conducted by the
policemen, Henares admitted that he acquired the illegal drugs from appellant
Robert Chiu, a resident of No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao,
Q.C. The police officers then decided to conduct a test-buy operation against the
appellant.
On October 26, 1998, Fernandez filed with the RTC of Pasay City an application for
a search warrant for the search of the house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay
Bagong Lipunan (Crame), Cubao, Quezon City, entitled and docketed as People vs.
Robert Chiu, Search Warrant No. 98-0059. On October 26, 1998, Executive Judge
Lilia C. Lopez of the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 109, conducted an inquiry into the
application. Fernandez testified that although the subject of the search and the
objects to be seized were located in Quezon City, the application for the search
warrant was filed in Pasay City because of the possibility that the regulated drug
would be removed therefrom by the appellant. Moreover, there was a need for
confidentiality; if the policemen filed their application in the RTC of Quezon City,
there was a possibility that the information would reach Molina and the appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application for the search warrant should be filed in
Rquezon Cuty or in Pasay
RULING: The contention of the appellant is barren of merit.
Section 1, SC Circular No. 19 dated August 4, 1987, which was in force when the
application for a search warrant was filed, provides viz:
1. All applications for search warrants relating to violations of the Anti-subversion
Act, crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions and violations of ​the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972​, as amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be
taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction
the place to be searched is located.
In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, ​38 we held that a search warrant is merely a
judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main
case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter
contingency, such application for a search warrant may be filed in territorial
jurisdiction other than where the illegal articles sought to be seized are located.
"Urgent" means pressing; calling for immediate attention. The court must take into
account and consider not only the "subject" but the time and place of the
enforcement of the search warrant as well. The determination of the existence of
compelling considerations of urgency, and the subject, time and place necessitating
and justifying the filing of an application for a search warrant with a court other than
the court having territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched and things to be
seized or where the materials are found is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court where the application is filed, subject to review by the appellate court in
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, Fernandez filed the application for a search warrant with the Pasay City
RTC instead of the Quezon City RTC because of the possibility that the shabu would
be removed by the appellant from No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan,
Cubao, Quezon City. Indeed, as shown by the evidence, the appellant had a
residence other than No. 29 North Road where he sold shabu. There was also the
pervading concern of the police officers that if they filed the application in Quezon
City where the appellant plied his illicit activities, it may somehow come to the
knowledge of Molina and the appellant, thus, rendering the enforcement of any
search warrant issued by the court to be a useless effort. We find and so hold that
Judge Lopez did not err in taking cognizance of and granting the questioned
application for a search warrant.
SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. SUPERGREEN,
INCORPORATED, respondent.
[G.R. No. 161823. March 22, 2007.]
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the complaint filed with the NBI by petitioner Sony
Computer Entertainment, Inc., against respondent Supergreen, Incorporated. The
NBI found that respondent engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit
"PlayStation" game software, consoles and accessories in violation of Sony
Computer's intellectual property rights. Thus, NBI applied with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1 for warrants to search respondent's premises in
Parañaque City and Cavite. On April 24, 2001, the RTC of Manila issued Search
Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 covering respondent's premises at Trece-Tanza
Road, Purok 7, Barangay de Ocampo, Trece Martires City, Cavite, and Search
Warrants Nos. 01-1989 to 01-1991 covering respondent's premises at Room 302,
3rd Floor Chateau de Baie Condominium, 149 Roxas Boulevard corner Airport Road,
Parañaque City. The NBI simultaneously served the search warrants on the subject
premises and seized a replicating machine and several units of counterfeit
"PlayStation" consoles, joy pads, housing, labels and game software.
On June 11, 2001, respondent filed a motion to quash Search Warrants Nos.
01-1986 to 01-1988 and/or release of seized properties on the ground that the
search warrant failed to particularly describe the properties to be seized. The trial
court denied the motion for lack of merit.
On August 4, 2001, respondent filed another motion to quash, this time, questioning
the propriety of the venue.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT VENUE IN SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATIONS
INVOLVES TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. || WHETHER OR NOT THE
CORRECTNESS OF VENUE IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT IS
DEEMED WAIVED IF NOT RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT IN ITS MOTION TO
QUASH.
RULING:
In the present case, respondent's premises in Cavite, within the Fourth Judicial
Region, is definitely beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila, in the
National Capital Region. Thus, the RTC of Manila does not have the authority to
issue a search warrant for offenses committed in Cavite. Hence, petitioner's reliance
in Malaloan is misplaced. Malaloan involved a court in the same judicial region
where the crime was committed. The instant case involves a court in another region.
Any other interpretation re-defining territorial jurisdiction would amount to judicial
legislation.
Respondent's imitation of the general appearance of petitioner's goods was done
allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila.
The alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly,
under Section 2 (b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of ​Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court
where any element of the alleged offense was committed, including any of the courts
within the National Capital Region (Metro Manila).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAUL NUÑEZ y REVILLEZA,

appellant.
[G.R. No. 177148. June 30, 2009.]
FACTS: On June 25, 2001, Raul R. Nuñez was formally charged with violation of
Section 16, Article III of ​Rep. Act No. 6425​, as amended for his possession of 233.93
grams of shabu.
At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives
in coordination with the Los Baños Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force
conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuñez based on reports of drug
possession.
Upon arriving at appellant's house, Mundin called on appellant to come out.
Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed Nuñez the warrant. SPO1
Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellant's room in his presence while his
family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1
Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters,
and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady's wallet containing P4,610 inside
appellant's dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric
planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion
that they were acquired in exchange forshabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan
issued a Receipt for Property Seized ​6 and a Certification of Orderly Search which
appellant signed. TSacID
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an irregularity in the seizure of personal property
conducted
RULING:
Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be
seized by the authorities. In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 42 specifically
authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes
things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly
enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would
repel such inference.
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted.
Certainly, the lady's wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric
planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed
by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of
drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own
discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellant's residence they
believed were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense". This is,
in our view, absolutely impermissible.
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be
particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and
only those particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is
not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.
Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should
be restored to appellant.