Japanese ‘Invasion’ of Australia in

1942:

Figure 1: Australian propaganda poster depicting a
Japanese soldier aiming his weapon at Darwin referencing

the possibility of an invasion

A Real or Exaggerated Threat?

James Doolan

La Trobe University

1
Introduction

In the context of Australian history, the perceived Japanese invasion of Australia in 1942 was
significant, as it created a strong belief amongst some members of society that a war on the
home front was seemingly imminent. The possibility of external occupation became extremely
real following the Japanese territorial advances in the Pacific, the bombing of Darwin in
February 1942 and the entrance of naval submarines into Sydney during May 1942. Australian
reactions and responses to these events were laden with fear and paranoia. Arguably, the
Australians’ military efforts in the Battle of the Coral Sea as well as the Battle of the Kokoda
Trail were highly influential in preventing any substantial efforts made by the Japanese to
attempt to gain complete control of Australia. In exploring historical literature of more recent
time and of the past debating the proposed invasion, it is clear that the Japanese forces were
never a realistic threat. In considering Australia’s circumstances in 1942, however, it is
reasonable to hold the belief that the chaos and panic that became prevalent throughout the
nation was not misplaced. Having the ability to learn about the past in the present, I question
whether it has allowed us to develop and foster knowledge of the attitudes and beliefs of a
particular period of time, and if so, is there anything that we as a society need to consider in
understanding and evaluating potential differences. In the historical context of Australia in
1942, I believe that establishing a grasp of these past views and values is purposeful in
understanding how and why they are formed, and in analysing the changes that have occurred
since that period of time.


Japanese Expansion in 1942: Growing Belief of Imminent Invasion

In early 1942, the Japanese army and naval forces had
made strong advances in South East Asia and the Pacific
region. They had secured the Philippines, Malaya, the
Netherlands as well possessing influence in New Guinea
and Burma, and on 15 February 1942, established control
of Singapore. The map displayed in figure 4 highlights the
rapid and successful advances of the Japanese in the
Pacific. The loss of Singapore from Australia’s
perspective was particularly significant, as Australia’s
Prime Minister John Curtin argued, “the fall of Singapore
opens the battle for Australia”.1 Brown (1977) also
indicated the impact of the fall of Singapore, suggesting
“that base was widely thought to be a strong point against
which the enemy would break, and there was actually a
division of Australian troops there when the island fell”.2
The battle for Australia appeared to have begun on 19
February 1942 shortly after the occupation of Singapore, as
Japan made their first attack on Australia bombing Darwin,
where 243 people were killed and 30 allied aircraft were
destroyed.3 Figure 3 pictured below provides an example
of the scale of impact the bombings had on Darwin. This
Figure 2: Sunken Japanese
was followed by another attack in the months proceeding
submarine being retrieved
on the night of 31 May 1942 when the Japanese initiated a
from the attack in Sydney
submarine raid on Sydney Harbour.4 These were crucial
Harbour during May 1942
events that sent a message to the Australian populace; war
on the home front was seemingly real and unavoidable, and
defence measures would need to be implemented to
prevent it.5 Considering the rapid and successful
movement of the Japanese troops towards Australia, and

2
the threatening attacks on their home front, it exacerbated
the sense of exposure and vulnerability throughout the
nation. During the time when Japan launched their attacks
on Australia, Dean (2012) asserted, “most of Australia’s
full time soldiers were serving overseas”.6 In addition,
Dean also contended, “Australia achieved their security
through their membership of the British Empire”7, which
made Australia aware of their isolation as British forces
were engaged in the European conflict of the Second
World War.8 Australia being unable to rely upon
reinforcements and support from their allies further
demonstrated their exposure to external threats, and were
prompted to utilise the defence of the part time militia,
who were poorly trained and equipped.9 Furthermore, the
nation’s defences also lacked a strong air force and navy,
and did not have access to a satisfactory amount of tanks or
modern artillery.10 Japan’s attacks on Australia in 1942
scarred the population and ingrained into society a strong
sense of vulnerability and exposure. These adopted Figure 3: Damage caused by
feelings and beliefs that impending war in Australia was bombs in Darwin in 1942
going to ensue created a major shift in the attitudes, ideas
and views contributing to significant change in society.

Figure 4: Map showing Japanese territorial gains by
1942

3
Attitudes Towards Invasion

Throughout the past, Australia has had the tendency to resort to
fear and insecurity at the possibility of external threats invading.
Brown (1977) proposes, “Australia has exhibited a quite
remarkable sensitivity to “external threats” to her security and
territorial integrity”.11 In the context of Australia in 1942, the
concept of a foreign invasion at the hands of the Japanese
reignited attitudes of paranoia and fear, emotions that had been
prevalent and often exaggerated throughout the past in the strong
belief that internal security was in peril, even when there was no
evidence to suggest this. The Australian newspapers, as pictured
in figure 5, were particularly influential in generating panic
throughout the public, indicating, “The invasion of Australia was
now imminent”12 and “Australia is in imminent peril but there is
little we can do”13 The media reporting in response to
the Japanese threat conveyed a clear and strong
message to the general population that danger was
unavoidable as a result of Australian troops and ally
engagement in the Second World War, effective in
sparking terror amongst the people. The Australian
Government was also responsible for contributing to
the social hysteria that became so prevalent throughout
the nation. In Parliament, intensive debate and
questioning was sparked, with members devising
possible solutions to the Japanese threat, and the
measures that needed to be taken to ensure that
Australia was safe.14 The Government’s fear was
demonstrated through the proposal of the “Brisbane
Line”, a plan, according to Hasluck (1970), “for the
abandonment of an important section of northern
Australia without firing a single shot”.15 Despite the
plan being rejected by the Curtin Government, it
generated public controversy and wide disapproval,
and further ignited the sense of paranoia in the belief
that an invasion was imminent. In addition,
propaganda was created, reflective of the widespread Figure 5: Newspaper article
social anxiety prevalent throughout society. The suggesting Japanese invasion
propaganda utilised by the Government portrayed messages that of Australia was imminent
highlighted Australia’s limited defence resources and the need to
defend the homeland in order to ensure safety and security from
the Japanese. The propaganda poster titled ‘Aust’ Scrap Iron’
shown in figure 6 conveys what was believed to be the looming
invasion by the Japanese, and emphasises the feelings of
vulnerability and isolation. Grose (2009) suggests that
Australians took extreme measures in attempting to protect
themselves and “ran away because they didn’t know what else to
do”.16 This was particularly relevant in Queensland and Darwin
where it was considered an invasion would be launched.
Voluntary civil defence measures became highly popular as states
and communities of people created an organised structure that
outlined emergency safety initiatives, and prepared sandbags,
concrete shelters, trenches and equipment.17 This demonstrates
that the Australian people reacted to the Japanese threat through

4
fear and paranoia that created the desire for civil defence and
national unity to effectively assist in the war effort.

Figure 6: Australian propaganda portraying Japan as a

threat to the safety of the nation

While hysteria and panic was prevalent amongst the population towards the supposed invasion
of the Japanese, it is also important to consider however, that there were others who adopted
the attitude the invasion was not realistic. There were members of the media who understood
the unlikely nature of an invasion, asserting as shown in figure 7, “To invade Australia the
Japanese must be able to land adequate rations, water, munitions and reinforcements for a long
campaign”.18 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also supported the idea that an
invasion was remote, as “a mass invasion of Australia would be a most hazardous and
unprofitable operation for Japan”.19 This was believed as if the Japanese were to move troops
from countries they had recently conquered, that would loosen their hold on those positions
and unravel their territorial gains thus far.




Figure 7:
Newspaper
article
suggesting a
Japanese
invasion of
Australia was
unlikely

5
The Historical Evidence: No Real Threat

In looking back at the past with the historical literature available, it is clear that the Japanese
did not intend to overtake Australia. According to Stanley (2007), “the evidence shows
without doubt that while the Japanese High Command considered an invasion, it decided
against one”.20 A significant contribution to this decision resulted from the opposed views
between the Japanese Navy and Army in relation to the desired plan for Australia. The Navy
firmly believed and supported the notion of seeking swift victories and maintaining an
offensive approach to the war, and to continue this by invading Australia.21 In contrast, the
Army opposed an invasion contending that it would be an audacious decision, as they lacked
the sufficient military resources to further advance south, and should rather focus on
consolidating the recently occupied positions.22 The alternative approach adopted by both the
Navy and Army was to remove the lines of Australia’s communication with the United States
by capturing Fiji, the Samoan Islands and New Caledonia as well as tightening their grip on the
Pacific.23 Japan viewed Australia as a key location particularly the northern part of Australia,
to hold enemy forces for a potential counter offensive, and in isolating them aimed to achieve
the outcome. Dean (2012) suggested “that Australia would withdraw from the war and
become neutral”.24 While it is understandable that Australians in 1942 had reason to have fear
and insecurity surrounding the Japanese threat, in the present day there is solid historical
evidence to indicate that there were no plans to invade Australia in 1942, the discussion and
promotion of the idea that Japan intended to invade Australia is flawed.

The Battles: Australia Fights Back

‘The Battle of Australia’ in 1942 consisted of a series of battles
that were pivotal in preventing the potential of a Japanese
invasion, and had a long-term effect on the nation.25 The Battle
of the Coral Sea, which took place from 7-9 May1942, was an
imperative event that provided the allies with the ability to build
up their reinforcements in New Guinea.26 According to Prime
Minister John Curtin, “Had the outcome of the Coral Sea been
adverse who could give guarantees as to the consequences for
Australia?”27 Dean (2012), reasserted this importance as “if the
invasion fleet had not been halted by the Coral Sea battle, Port
Moresby would have been taken and from there the Japanese air
forces would have been able to attack northern Queensland”.28
Furthermore, the battle of the Kokoda Trail, which occurred
from July 1942-January 1943, was also considered to be a
comprehensive event that to an extent saved Australia. The
victories that took place at Milne Bay and in the Owen Stanleys
were according to the Department of the Parliamentary Library
(1992), “the first time on land allied forces, mainly Australian
soldiers, fighting in extremely harsh terrain, had defeated their
formidable foe”.29 Importantly for the Australian forces, it
resulted in the Japanese retreatment from Papua New Guinea
(as pictured in figure 9), further stabilising their presence in the
Pacific. Thus, these vital battles in 1942 were able to shift the
power from the Japanese forces to the allies in the Pacific, as Figure 8: HMAS attacked during
according to Dean (2012) if they were defeated “the war would the Battle of the Coral Sea
have taken a different course”.30

6

Figure 9: Australian flag is raised as allies retake Kokoda




Conclusion

The historical evidence that is offered to the public today convincingly portrays that the
Japanese invasion of Australia was never a legitimate threat in 1942. According to Stanley
(2007), “History is not just about the evidence of what happened in the past… It is also about
how we shape an understanding of the past to satisfy our personal needs”.31 I agree with this
argument, particularly in relation to the perceived Japanese invasion of Australia in 1942. In
the present day, there have been highly significant shifts and changes in society that influence
our way of life, and the personal attitudes that we adopt. In order to understand the panic,
hysteria and paranoia that was prevalent in Australia during 1942, examining, analysing and
interpreting the historical literature offered surrounding this needs to be emphasised to shape a
clear and accurate understanding of how and why values and beliefs of the past were existent.
Therefore, in establishing a grasp of this, while the fear that existed in 1942 throughout the
nation was understandable, this belief was exaggerated considering the reasons that would
suggest an invasion was not realistic.

7
Bibliography


Primary Sources:

‘A Hazardous and Unprofitable Operation’, Singleton Argus, Jul. 1942, 2, in Trove [online
database], accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

‘The Battle for Australia’, Age, 17 Feb. 1942, 2, in Trove [online database], accessed 8 Oct.
2018.

‘Cannot Write off Australia as America’s Business’, Singleton Argus, 20 May 1942, 3, in
Trove [online database], accessed 6 Oct. 2018.

‘Japanese Invasion of Australia Regarded as Remote’, Daily Mercury, 15 Dec. 1941, 5, in

Trove [online database], accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

‘Threatened Japanese Invasion of Australia’, Singleton Argus, 18 Mar. 1942, 2, in Trove

[online database], accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

‘US. And Japanese Fleet’, Townsville Daily Bulletin, 19 May 1942, 2, in Trove [online
database], accessed 6 Oct. 2018.

Secondary Sources:

Brown, Gary, ‘Attitudes to an Australian Invasion in 1942’, Royal United Services Institute,
122/1 (1977), 27-31.

Dean, Peter, Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 2013).

Department of the Parliamentary Library, Invasion 1942? Australia and the Japanese Threat
(1992),
<https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp06.pdf >, 11, accessed 8 Oct.
2018.

Grose, Peter, Awkward Truth the Bombing of Darwin (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2009).

Hasluck, Paul, The government and the people 1942-1945 (Canberra: Australian War
Memorial, 1970).

Horner, David, ‘Defending Australia in 1942’, War and Society, 11/1 (1993), 1-20.

Stanley, Peter, What is the Battle for Australia? Australian Army Journal, 4/2 (2007), 17-34.

Yenne, Bill, The Imperial Japanese Army: The Invincible Years 1941-42 (Sydney: Bloomsbury
Publishing, 2014).

8
Images:

Figure 1: Mahony, Will, Strong bow, drawing for cartoon in ‘The Daily Telegraph’ [image],
(c. 1942)
< https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C374477>, accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

Figure 2: Department of Information, Japanese midget submarine NO. 21 being raised by the
bows from the Harbour by a floating crane during a salvage operation [image], (10 June
1942)
<https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C255995>, accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

Figure 3: Unknown, Australian troops inspect bomb damage caused by Japanese air raids
[image], (Feb 1942)
< https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C331994>, accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

Figure 4: The National WWII Museum, The Pacific Strategy 1941-1944 [image], (10 Jul.
2017)
<https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/pacific-strategy-1941-1944>, accessed 8
Oct. 2018.

Figure 5: ‘Threatened Japanese Invasion of Australia’, Singleton Argus, 18 Mar. 1942, 2, in
Trove [online database], accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

Figure 6: Mahony, Will, Not for home use [image], (c. 1942)
<https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1283119>, accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

Figure 7: ‘Japanese Invasion of Australia Regarded as Remote’, Daily Mercury, 15 Dec. 1941,
5, in Trove [online database], accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

Figure 8: Unknown, HMAS Under Attack During the Battle of the Coral Sea [image], (7 May
1942)
<https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C14296>, accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

Figure 9: McNeil, John, Earl., Allies Retake Kokoda [image], (14 Nov. 1942)
<https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C33002>, accessed 8 Oct. 2018.

9
Endnotes

1
‘The Battle for Australia’, Age, 17 Feb. 1942, 2, in Trove [online database], accessed 8 Oct.
2018.
2
Gary Brown, ‘Attitudes to an Australian Invasion in 1942’, Royal United Services Institute,
122/1 (1977), 27.
3
Bill Yenne, The Imperial Japanese Army: The Invincible Years 1941-42 (Sydney:
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 264.
4
David Horner, ‘Defending Australia in 1942’, War and Society, 11/1 (1993), 1.
5
‘Cannot Write off Australia as America’s Business’, Singleton Argus, 20 May 1942, 3, in
Trove [online database], accessed 6 Oct. 2018.
6
Peter Dean, Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 15.
7
Ibid, 12.
8
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Invasion 1942? Australia and the Japanese Threat
(1992),
<https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp06.pdf >, 1, accessed 8 Oct. 2018.
9
Peter Dean, Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 15.
10
Ibid, 15.
11
Gary Brown, ‘Attitudes to an Australian Invasion in 1942’, Royal United Services Institute,
122/1 (1977), 27.
12
‘US. And Japanese Fleet’, Townsville Daily Bulletin, 19 May 1942, 2, in Trove [online
database], accessed 6 Oct. 2018.
13
‘Threatened Japanese Invasion of Australia’, Singleton Argus, 18 Mar. 1942, 2, in Trove
[online database], retrieved 8 Oct. 2018.
14
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Invasion 1942? Australia and the Japanese Threat
(1992),
<https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp06.pdf >, 2, accessed 8 Oct. 2018.
15
Paul Hasluck, The government and the people 1942-1945, (Canberra: Australian War
Memorial, 1970), 711.
16
Peter Grose, Awkward Truth the Bombing of Darwin (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2009), 10.
17
Paul Hasluck, The government and the people 1942-1945, (Canberra: Australian War
Memorial, 1970), 667.
18
‘Japanese Invasion of Australia Regarded as Remote’, Daily Mercury, 15 Dec. 1941, 5, in
Trove [online database], accessed 8 Oct. 2018.
19
‘A Hazardous and Unprofitable Operation’, Singleton Argus, Jul. 1942, 2, in Trove [online
database], accessed 8 Oct. 2018.
20
Peter Stanley, What is the Battle for Australia? Australian Army Journal, 4/2 (2007), 29.
21
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Invasion 1942? Australia and the Japanese Threat
(1992),
<https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp06.pdf >, 4-5, accessed 8 Oct.
2018.
22
Ibid, 6.
23
Ibid, 7.
24
Peter Dean, Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 20.
25
Ibid, 21.
26
Ibid, 22.
27
Paul Hasluck, The government and the people 1942-1945 (Canberra: Australian War
Memorial, 1970), 168.
28
Peter Dean, Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 22.

10

29
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Invasion 1942? Australia and the Japanese Threat
(1992),
<https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp06.pdf >, 11, accessed 8 Oct.
2018.
30
Peter Dean, Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 22.
31
Peter Stanley, What is the Battle for Australia? Australian Army Journal, 4/2 (2007), 22.

11