Pantaleon v.

American Express

 A person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for
the resulting injury.

 “The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he
is not negligent in doing so.”

 Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria; Words and Phrases; There is a material distinction
between damages and injury—injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right while damage is
the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; There can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.

Mendoza v. Sps. Gomez

 Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.

 Vicarious Liability; vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action under said article is the direct and
primary negligence of the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of his employee.

 With the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article
2180 of the Civil Code — that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or
that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage — are no
longer available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.

 Unjust Enrichment; Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner
of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver; and
under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the
claim.—

Aonuevo v. CA

 Torts; Negligence; Extraordinary Diligence; Motor Vehicles; An automobile driver must at all
times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised
under the circumstances.

 While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a
bicycle, it is obvious, for reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles,
that more is required from the former to fully discharge the duty than from the latter.
  Contributory Negligence; To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a
causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding
injury.

Ramos v. COL realty Corporation

 If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his
superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming of course
that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is
made; The act of crossing an avenue which is prohibited by law constitutes negligence.

 Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.

PNR v. Vizcara

 Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by

considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

 A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated “Stop, Look and Listen”
signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company
to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be
an indication of negligence.

 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to
conform for his own protection.

 Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Words and Phrases; The doctrine of last clear chance provides
that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point
of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom

B.F. Metal v. Lomotan

 Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Damages; To justify an award of actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of loss; Credence can be given only to claims which are
duly supported by receipts.

 Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact
and amount of damages.
  Petitioner’s liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the supervision and
selection of its driver; Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon based
on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict.

Lambert v. Heirs of Castillon

 Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.

 Contributory Negligence; The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff

who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must bear the consequences of his own negligence.

 In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the following
factors are considered in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the
number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss
sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life
expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of
Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net
earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of
such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.

 The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the
formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity =
[2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living
expenses)].

Valenzuela v. CA

 Torts; Motor Vehicles; Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses—physiological
“fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by
drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.—One will have to suspend disbelief in order to
give credence to Li’s disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The average
motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling
at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road
conditions on a principal metropolitan throroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have
had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert—as every
driver should be—to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological “fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not
dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li’s failure to react in a manner which
would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the
two factors: 1) that he was driving at a “very fast” speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that
he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working independently would have
diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have slowed
down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes.
  “Emergency Rule,” Explained; An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.—

Ong. v. Metropolitan Water District

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA

 Negligence; Elements of a Quasi-delict.—There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)

damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

 Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those

considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.

 Essence of the Doctrine of “Last Clear Chance.”—Furthermore, under the doctrine of “last
clear chance” (also referred to, at times as “supervening negligence” or as “discovered peril”),
petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where
both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that
of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the
rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

Afialda v. Hisole

 DAMAGES; LIABILITY OF OWNER OF ANIMAL FOR DAMAGE CAUSED TO ITS

CARETAKER.—Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for
injury caused by it to its caretaker.

Picart v. Smith

 NEGLIGENCE; CRITERION FOR DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF NEGLI-GENCE.—The test

for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of
the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on
the actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results,
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive fact in negligence.
  CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS.—Where both parties are
guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable
interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.

 CASE AT BAR.—The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing an automobile ahead he
improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a
few feet away. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter
being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing car. Held: That although the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the defendant was
nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair
opportunity to avoid the accident af ter he realized the situation created by the negligence of
the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff could by no
means then place himself in a position of greater safety.

Bustamante v. CA

 Torts and Damages; Doctrine of last clear chance; The doctrine broadly states that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant
where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence.

 The respondent court adopted the doctrine of “last clear chance.” The doctrine, stated
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even
though a person’s own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results,
the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has
the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

 The doctrine does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations.—In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court citing
the landmark decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled
that the principle of “last clear chance” “in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.

 It cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril and
it cannot be involved as between defendants concurrently negligent.—Fur-thermore, “as
 between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a
test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his
discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently
negligent. As against third persons, a negligently actor cannot defend by pleading that
another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury.”

McKee v. IAC

 Negligence; The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely

separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.—

 In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against
Galang would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
respondents.—What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision
in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private
respondents were not parties therein. It would have been entirely different if the petitioners’
cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case private respondents’
liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang
would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
respondents.

 Under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.— On the basis of the
foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest
that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where
they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril
would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would
be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give
way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have
been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.”

 Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

 Doctrine of last clear chance; The doctrine states that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party.
  Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver’s
negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was in law the
proximate cause of the collision; Employers directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages

Ladeco v. Angala

 Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Motor Vehicles; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Words and Phrases; The
doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss; A U-turn is done at a much
slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead.—Since
both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies. The doctrine of
last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance
to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the
situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much
slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead.
Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the
pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the
brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.