A.C. No.

10681 February 3, 2015 On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants’ letter-complaint15 charging respondent
with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from clients unless the
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants, latter’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.16
vs.
ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent. In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was the real
debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he was engaged for
DECISION that specific purpose.19

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants Spouses Henry A.
Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer
A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from 19972 until August 2008,3 respondent served as their
retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on various
legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business,
however, failed to materialize.4
Aware of the fact that complainantshad money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, on March 23,
2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with interest, five (5) days
thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who, believing that respondent would be soon returning the money,
agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank checks5 in respondent’s
name:6
In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that they extended the loan to respondent alone, as evidenced by the
checks issued in the latter’s name. They categorically denied knowing Nault and pointed out that it defies common
sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 to a person they do not even know.
Complainants also submitted a copy of the Answer to Third Party Complaint21 which Nault filed as third-party
defendant in a related collection case instituted by the complainants against respondent. 22 In said pleading, Nault
explicitly denied knowing complainants and alleged thatit was respondent who incurred the subject loan from them. 23
On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-2883.25 In the course of the proceedings,
respondent failed to appear during the scheduled mandatory conferences.26 Hence, the same were terminated and the
parties were directed to submit their respective position papers.27 Respondent, however, did not submit any.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), issued
his Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not
borrow money from his clients unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice; (b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.29

Check No. Date Amount Payee The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondent’s name and that he personally
0000561925 03-23-06 ₱750,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa received and encashed them. Annex "E"30 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of
the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of five
0000561926 03-23-06 ₱850,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa percent (5%), within five (5) days.31
0000561927 03-23-06 ₱900,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
Total: ₱2,500,000.00 On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be implausible. The Investigating
Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was not the one who obtained the loan, he would have
responded to complainants’ demand letter; however, he did not.32 He also observed that the acknowledgment33Nault
Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of the checks; and (b) an allegedly signed appeared to have been prepared by respondent himself.34 Finally, the Investigating Commissioner
acknowledgment that he received the originals of the checksand that he agreed to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus cited Nault’s Answer tothe Third Party Complaint which categorically states that he does not even know the
monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5) days.7 In the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained the loan from them.35
were personally encashed by respondent.8
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of the legal
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay complainants. Thus, in profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the
April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but respondent merely made repeated promises to pay soon. On mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD.36 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
July 7, 2008,Blesilda sent a demand letter9 to respondent, which the latter did not heed.10 On August 4, 2008, recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the ₱2,500,000.00 to complainants, with
complainants, through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand letter 11 to stipulated interest.37
respondent.12 In his Reply,13 the latter denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead, respondent
claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the real debtor. Complainants brought
the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties, Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and rule, the
however, failed to reach a settlement.14 IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XX-
2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced the penalty against the respondent to indefinite suspension from the
practice of law and ordered the return of the ₱2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal interest, instead of
stipulated interest.
Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however, denied in Resolution
No. XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive to return the amount
of ₱2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.
I.
Respondent’s receipt of the ₱2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by substantial evidence. As the
records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3) EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to
₱2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.41 Also, Annex "E"42 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent
acknowledged receipt of the checks and agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus the pro-rated interest of five
percent (5%) per month within five (5) days.43 The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that respondent personally
encashed the checks on the day they were issued.44 With respondent’s direct transactional involvement and the actual
benefit he derived therefrom, absent too any credible indication tothe contrary, the Court is thus convinced that
respondent was indeedthe one who borrowed the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had
failed to return, despite their insistent pleas.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent submitted a document
purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants, Nault, in his Answer to Third Party
Complaint, categorically denied knowing the complainants and incurring the same obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a ₱2,500,000.00 loan
without any collateral or security to a person they do not even know. On the other hand, complainants were able to
submit documents showing respondent’s receipt of the checks and their encashment, as well as his agreement to return
the ₱2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction was entered into during the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants,45 allowing the former to wield a greater
influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence inherently imbued in such relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless the
client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client."
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust
and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his
influence over his client.46 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty. Lozada48 (Frias) the Court categorically declared that a
lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case and by independent advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical.1âwphi1 It comes within those acts
considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability
to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the
lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent,
complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest within five (5) days.
However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to
this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads: CANON 7 - A
LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.Thus, he should be equally held administratively liable on this score.
That being said, the Court turns tothe proper penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the IBP’s return directive.
II.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.50
In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after borrowing ₱900,000.00 from
her client, refusing to pay the same despite court order, and representing conflicting interests. 51 Considering the greater
amount involved in this case and respondent's continuous refusal to pay his deQt, the Court deems it apt to suspend
him from the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the IBP's recommendation to suspend him indefinitely.
The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution insofar as it orders respondent to return to
complainants the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 and the legal interest thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar.52 In such cases, the Court's only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability; it should
not involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement. In this case, respondent received the ₱2,500,000.00 as a loan from All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
complainants and not in consideration of his professional services. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of the
aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained. SO ORDERED.3

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon 16 Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision. During the implementation of said
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already collected the total amount of ₱95,000.00 from
period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a commission of the same or spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount in the following manner:
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately executory upon receipt.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose
the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all the courts. 0210512004 7802 ₱20,000.00 Attorney's fees
02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
SO ORDERED. 0212612004 7848 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
03/12/2004 7894 20,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014
0410212004 7932 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, 0410612004 7941 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
vs. 04/13/2004 7944 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
04/16/2004 7954 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
0413012004 7977 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
RESOLUTION

Total Amount: ₱95,000.00

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct1 filed with this Court on September 18, 2006 by
complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case 2 he filed against Ester Lopez
and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester Lopez and Teodoro
Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of the following, to wit:
1. Backwages ........................... ₱146,726.67
2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46
4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Fom Hw1dred Ninety One Pesos & 64/100 (Pl89,491.60)
[sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office, wjthin ten (10) days from receipt hereof
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is authorized to receive
payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently, complainant made several verbal demands
to the respondent to remit to him the amount of ₱95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of ₱20,000.00. But respondent
did not budge. Thus, complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa,
Bacolod City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a conference before the barangay to resolve the
issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on installments, but denies that
he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney's fees
equivalent to 25o/o of the total monetary award, on top of the attorney's fees that may be awarded by the labor
tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of
₱189,491.60, the sum of ₱17,226.57 representing respondent's professional fees has to be deducted, leaving a balance
of ₱172,275.13.6 Then from said amount, complainant proposed that he will get ₱100,000.00 and the balance of
₱72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and reimbursement for all
expenses he incurred while handling the case. However, after receiving the amount of ₱95,000.00 and deducting
therefrom the amounts of ₱20,000.007 attorney's fees, ₱17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and ₱2,000.00 paid to
the sheriff, what was left to respondent was only ₱56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below the
promised 25o/o attorney's fees and refund of expenses in the total amount of ₱72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater than what he expects to receive.
He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from spouses Lopez the sum of ₱93,491.60. Adding the Pl
7,000.00 respondent previously remitted to complainant, the latter will get a total amount of ₱110,491.60. This
amount, according to respondent, exceeds the amount of ₱100,000.00 complainant agreed to and expected to receive.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation9 with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty of two (2) years
suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution all the amounts in his possession which are due to
complainant, less his rightful attorney's fees.10 On October 28, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution
No. XX-2011-139,11 which approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending
respondent from the practice of law for two years, but with the modification that respondent should restitute the sum
of ₱85,500.0012 to the complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly
account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement and return the same upon
demand.
The Court's Ruling
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the
moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship."13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." Rule
16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds xx x of his client when due or upon
demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004 received payments for
attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite
the number of times over close to three months he had been receiving payment, respondent neither informed the
complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued
and being implemented when complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given respondent the total
amount of ₱95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said amount, which he merely
received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Complainant brought the matter before the barangay, but
respondent simply ignored the same. Such failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an
accounting and return the money after demand raises the presumption that he converted it to his own use.14 His
unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him.15
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to receive payment. He implies that he is
also authorized to apply the sum of money he received from spouses Lopez to his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the case, in the total amount of ₱72,275.13. However, after deducting
from the amount of ₱95,000.00 the amounts of ₱20,000.00, ₱17,000.00, and ₱2,000.00, what was left to respondent,
to his dismay was only ₱56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other than his self-serving
statements, there is nothing in the records which would support respondent's claim that he was authorized to receive
the payments. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorney's fees and reimburse
him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the case. Respondent did not present any document,
retainer's agreement, or itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim.1âwphi1 In any
event, even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from his
duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his professional employment. "The
fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money
or property collected or received for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the
property and money he has collected for his client."16 "The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the
money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting."17Moreover, a lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere
fact alone that the client owes him attorney's fees."18
In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand violated
the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action."19
The Penalty
"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to account for and to
return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from the practice of law for two years." 20Thus, the
IBP Board of Governors did not err in recommending the imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is
respondent's first offense and he is already a nonagenarian,21 the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial
discretion, finds that a penalty of one year suspension is sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one
(1) year upon the finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall
be dealt with more severly.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this Resolution, the net amount of
₱85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Resolution until the full amount is returned.
Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Sanicas' record as a
member of the Bar.
MARITES E. FREEMAN- versus -ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES,
Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman, seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal
services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased husband. Complainant also seeks
recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance proceeds, which was remitted to the latter,
with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages.
In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated April 7, 2000, filed on May 10, 2000, complainant alleged that her husband
Robert Keith Freeman, a British national, died in London on October 18, 1998. She and her son, Frank Lawrence
applied for visas, to enable them to attend the wake and funeral, but their visa applications were denied. Complainant Leigh, an Officer of H.M. Coroner's Court, London, informing her about the arrangements for the funeral and that

engaged the services of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she would help her secure the visas and obtain the her late husband was covered by three insurance policies, to wit: Nationwide Building Society (Account Number

death benefits and other insurance claims due her. Respondent told complainant that she had to personally go to 0231/471 833 630), Lincoln Assurance Company (British National Life Policy No. PP/85/00137851), and Scottish

London to facilitate the processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all expenses for the trip. On Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512).[8] Respondent offered to help and assured her that representations with the

December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the amount of P50,000.00. As acknowledgment for the receipt of P47,500.00 insurance companies had earlier been made, so that the latter would be receiving the insurance proceeds soon.

for service charge, tax, and one round trip ticket to London, respondent gave her a Cash/Check Voucher, [2] issued by

Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right margin thereof, the notations in the amount of P50,000.00 and the date 12-5- According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix her signature in a Special Power of Attorney

98 were written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998, she acceded into giving respondent the amount (SPA),[9] dated November 6, 1998 [first SPA], which would authorize the respondent to follow-up the insurance

of P20,000.00 for legal costs in securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary Receipt[3] bearing said date, issued by claims. However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA] she signed was not notarized, but another SPA,[10] dated April

Z.P. Reyes Law Office (respondent's law firm). On December 18, 1998, she went to see respondent to follow-up the 6, 1999, was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her signature therein was forged. Later, she came

visa applications, but the latter asked for the additional amount of P10,000.00 for travel expenses, per Temporary across a similar copy of the SPA,[11] dated April 6, 1999, also notarized on April 30, 1999 [third SPA], but this time,

Receipt[4] bearing said date, issued by respondents law firm. After several phone calls inquiring about the status of the additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses. She said that without her knowledge and consent, respondent

visa applications, respondent told her, Mahirap gapangin ang pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted at banned ka sa Embassy. (It is used the third SPA, notarized on April 30, 1999, in her correspondence with the insurance companies in London.

difficult to railroad the process of securing visa, because you are blacklisted and banned by the Embassy). Sometime in

February 1999, respondent told her that to lift the travel ban on her, she should shell out P18,000.00 as panlagay or Complainant discovered that in an undated letter,[12] addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of Scottish Equitable PLC

grease money to bribe some staff of the British Embassy. After a week, respondent informed her that the ban was (Policy No. 2779512), respondent made representations that her husband left no will and that she had no verified

lifted, but the visas would be issued on a later date, as she had convinced the British Embassy to issue resident visas information as to the total value of her husband's estate and the existence of any property in London that would be
instead of tourist visas. Respondent told her that to expedite the release of the resident visas, she should again subjected to Grant of Representation. Said letter requested that complainant be advised on the value for probate in the

give P20,000.00 and a bottle of wine, worth P5,000.00, as grease money to bribe the British Embassy personnel. After amount of 5231.35 and the procedure for its entitlement. Respondent added therein that As to the matter of the

several weeks, respondent told her that the period for visa applications had lapsed, and that another amount installments due, as guaranteed by Mr. Freeman's policy, Mrs. Freeman requests that the remittance be sent directly to

of P18,000.00 was needed to reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked for P30,000.00 as legal costs, per Temporary Account No. 0148-27377-7 Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, with business address at Malakas St. Barangay Central

Receipt,[5] dated April 19, 1999, to be used for booking the former's flight to London, and P39,000.00 for legal costs, District, Quezon City, Philippines under the account name:Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account

per Temporary Receipt[6] dated May 13, 1999, to cover the expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary receipts until further notice.

were issued by respondents law firm.

Subsequently, in a letter[13] dated July 29, 1999, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln Financial Group

Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came out. Instead, she received a picture (PP/8500137851), respondent, declaring that she is the Counsel/Authorized Representative [of the complainant], per
of her husband's burial, sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of the deceased. She later learned that respondent left for SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999], replied that she had appended the documents required (i.e.,

London alone, without informing her about it. Respondent explained that she needed to go to London to follow-up marriage certificate and birth certificate), in her previous letter,[14] dated April 20, 1999, to the said insurance company;

the insurance claims, and warned her not to communicate with Grist who allegedly pocketed the proceeds of her that pursuant to an SPA[15] executed in her favor, all communications pertaining to complainant should be forwarded

husband's insurance policy. She told respondent that she received a letter[7] dated March 9, 1999 from one Martin to her law firm; that she sought clarification on whether complainant is entitled to death benefits under the policy and,
if so, the amount due and the requirements to be complied with; and that in the absence of a Grant of Probate (i.e., the

deceased having left no will), she enclosed an alternative document [referring to the Extrajudicial Settlement [16] dated As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she met with complainant, she asked her why she had not left

June 1, 1999, notarized by respondent] in support of the claim of the surviving spouse (Mrs. Freeman) and their sole for London, and the latter replied that her contacts with the embassy had duped her. She explained to complainant

child (Frank Lawrence Freeman). In the same letter, respondent reiterated that complainant requests that any amount that she could refer her to a travel consultant who would handle the visa arrangements for a fee, to which the latter

of monies due or benefits accruing, be directly deposited to Account No. 0148-27377-7 at Far East Bank, Diliman agreed.She stated that when complainant acceded to such arrangement, she accompanied her, in December 1999, to a

Branch, Malakas St., Quezon City, Philippines under Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until travel consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours, who found out that complainant's previous visa applications had been

further notice. denied four times, on the ground of falsity of information. Thereafter, complainant was able to secure a visa through

the help of the travel consultant, who charged her a professional fee of P50,000.00. She added that she had no

Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand upon the respondent to return her passport and participation in the foregoing transactions, other than referring complainant to the said travel consultant.

the total amount of P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing of the visa applications. Not heeding her demand, With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent denied knowledge about the existence of the same, and

respondent asked her to attend a meeting with the Consul of the British Embassy, purportedly to discuss about the declared that the SPA,[20] dated April 6, 1999, which was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], was her basis for

visa applications, but she purposely did not show up as she got disgusted with the turn of events. On the supposed communications with the insurance companies in London. She stated that in her absence, complainant, through wily

rescheduled appointment with the British Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to Airtech Travel and Tours, and representations, was able to obtain the case folder from Leah Buama, her office secretary, and never returned the

introduced her to one Dr. Sonny Marquez, the travel agency's owner, who assured her that he would help her secure same, despite repeated demands. She said that she was unaware of the loss of the case folder as she then had no

the visas within a week. Marquez made her sign an application for visa and demanded the amount of P3,000.00. After immediate need of it. She also said that her secretary failed to immediately report about the missing case folder prior to

a week, she talked to one Marinez Patao, the office secretary of respondent's law firm, who advised her to ask taking a leave of absence, so as to attend to the financial obligations brought about by her mother's lingering ailment

respondent to return the total amount of P200,000.00. and consequent death.[21] Despite repeated requests, complainant failed to return the case folder and, thus, the law firm
In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer[17] dated June 20, 2000, respondent countered that in 1998, complainant, was prevented from pursuing the complainant's insurance claims. She maintained that through complainant's own

accompanied by former Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner Josefina Bauzon and another woman criminal acts and machinations, her law office was prevented from effectively pursuing her claims. Between January to

whose identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice regarding the inheritance of her deceased husband, a British February 2000, she sent complainant a billing statement which indicated the expenses incurred[22] by the law firm, as of

national.[18] She told complainant to submit proof of her marriage to the deceased, birth certificate of their son, and July 1999; however, instead of settling the amount, the latter filed a malicious suit against her to evade payment of her

other documents to support her claim for the insurance proceeds. She averred that before she accepted the case, she obligations.

explained to complainant that she would be charging the following amounts: acceptance fee of P50,000.00, P20,000.00

for initial expenses, and additional amount of P50,000.00 on a contingent basis. She said complainant agreed to these

rates and, in fact, readily paid her the said amounts. With an SPA,[19]dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30,

1999 [second SPA], having been executed in her favor, she made preliminary communications with the insurance On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate Resolution with
companies in London regarding complainant's claims. Having received communications from said insurance Comments on Respondent's Answer, alleging, among others, that upon seeing the letter[23] dated March 9, 1999 of the

companies, she stated that complainant offered, which she accepted, to shoulder her plane ticket and the hotel Coroner's Court, respondent began to show interest and volunteered to arrange for the insurance claims; that no

accommodation, so that she can personally attend to the matter. She left for London in May 1999 and, upon her acceptance fee was agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier mentioned represented the legal fees and

return, she updated the complainant about the status of her claims. expenses to be incurred attendant to the London trip; that the parties verbally agreed to a 20% contingent fee out of
the total amount to be recovered; that she obtained the visas with the assistance of a travel consultant recommended In the Report and Recommendation[31] dated August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of

by respondent; that upon return from abroad, respondent never informed her about the arrangements with the the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent to have betrayed the trust

insurance companies in London that remittances would be made directly to the respondent's personal account at Far of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her dealings and appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds

East Bank; that the reason why respondent went to London was primarily to attend the International Law Conference, intended for complainant. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that despite receipt of the approximate

not solely for her insurance claims, which explained why the receipt for the P50,000.00, which she gave, bore the amount of P200,000.00, respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that through deceitful

letterhead of Broadway Travel, Inc. (in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she merely made a handwritten marginal means, she was able to appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of complainant's husband.

note regarding the receipt of the amount of P50,000.00; that with the use of an SPA [referring to the second SPA] in Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law

favor of the respondent, bearing her forged signature, the amount of 10,546.7 [should be 10,960.63],[24] or approximately for the maximum period allowed under the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to complainant the amounts she

equivalent to P700,000.00, was remitted to the personal bank account of respondent, but the same was never turned received from the London insurance companies.

over to her, nor was she ever informed about it; and that she clarified that she never executed any SPA that would

authorize respondent to receive any money or check due her, but that the only SPA [first SPA] she executed was for On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003-166,[32] adopted and approved the

the purpose of representing her in court proceedings. recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification that respondent be disbarred.

The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant had sufficiently

Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint[25] for malicious mischief, under Article 327 of the Revised Penal substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance proceeds of the

Code, against complainant and one Pacita Mamaril (a former client of respondent), for allegedly barging into the law complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be

office of the former and, with the use of a pair of scissors, cut-off the cords of two office computer keyboards and the disbarred.

line connections for the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and electric fan, resulting in damage to office equipment in The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the
an estimated amount of P200,000.00. In the Resolution,[26] dated July 31, 2000, the Assistant City Prosecutor of administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to

Quezon City recommended that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The case was subsequently remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to

dismissed due to lack of evidence and for failure of respondent to appear during the preliminary investigation of the continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. [33]

case.[27]

A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does not involve a

Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being

against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a

Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by respondent, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, in the prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real

Resolution[28]dated October 21, 2002, recommended that the information, dated February 8, 2002, for estafa be question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
withdrawn, and that the case be dismissed, for insufficiency of evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant City exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an

Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information.[29] Consequently, in the Order[30] dated November 27, 2002, the officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest

trial court granted the withdrawal of the information, and dismissed the case. administration of justice, by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no

longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.[34]
 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to

Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the respondent's administrative the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the

liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral and exemplary damages as prayed for by intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.[39] In the present case, the cash/check

the complainant, which may very well be the subject of a separate civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's voucher and the temporary receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead of her law firm, Z.P. Reyes Law Office,

wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular courts. indubitably showed that she received the total amount of P167,000.00[40] from the complainant, in connection with the

handling of the latter's case. Respondent admitted having received money from the complainant, but claimed that the

In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her in securing visa total amount of P120,000.00[41] she received was in accordance with their agreement. Nowhere was it shown that

applications and claiming the insurance proceeds of her deceased husband. There are conflicting allegations as to the respondent rendered an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses incurred. This leaves a

scope of authority of respondent to represent the complainant. A perusal of the [first] SPA,[35] dated November 6, quandary as to the discrepancy in the actual amount that respondent should receive, supposedly pursuant to an

1998, which was not notarized, showed that complainant merely authorized respondent to represent her and her son, agreement of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as there was absence of a formal contract of legal services.

in order to protect their rights and interests, in the extrajudicial and/or judicial proceeding and the possibility of any Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave P50,000.00 to the respondent for the purpose of assisting her in

amicable settlement, relating to the estate of her deceased husband, both in the Philippines and United Kingdom.The claiming the insurance proceeds; however, per Application for United Kingdom Entry Clearance,[42] dated December

[second] SPA,[36] dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's primary purpose in traveling to London was to attend the International Law

complainant, in addition to the foregoing representations, authorized respondent to appear and represent the Conference in Russell Square, London. It is appalling that respondent had the gall to take advantage of the

complainant, in connection with her insurance claims, and to receive monies and/or encash treasury warrants, checks benevolence of the complainant, then grieving for the loss of her husband, and mislead her into believing that she

arising from said claims, deposit the same, and dispose of such funds as may be necessary for the successful pursuit of needed to go to London to assist in recovering the proceeds of the insurance policies. Worse, respondent even

the claims. The [third] SPA,[37] also dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving grease money
signature of complainant, but additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses, was a faithful reproduction of the or lagay, in the total amount of P43,000.00,[43] to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in

second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations. The three SPAs, attached to the pleadings of the parties and made the normal course of conducting official business transactions, as a means to expedite the visa applications. This runs

integral parts of the records of the case, were not certified true copies and no proof was adduced to verify their afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall

genuineness and authenticity. Complainant repudiates the representation of respondent in her behalf with regard to the not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

insurance claims; however, the admission of respondent herself, as lawyer, that she received payment from

complainant, her client, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a lawyer-client relationship.[38] More importantly, apart from her bare denials that no remittance was made to her personal bank account, as shown by

the monthly transaction report (covering January to December for the years 2000-2001),[44] respondent never

Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of her authority to represent the complainant in attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a satisfactory explanation, as to why she failed to render an accounting,

pursuing the insurance claims, she should never deviate from the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of on the proceeds of the insurance policies that should rightfully belong to the complainant vis--vis the correspondence
Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that by the insurance companies based in London, pertaining to the remittance of the following amounts to the

may come into his possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property respondent's personal bank account, to wit: Per letter[45] dated November 23, 2000, from one Rupesh Majithia,

collected or received for or from the client, and Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and Administrator, Customer Services Department of Lincoln Financial Group, addressed to complainant, stating, among

property of a client when due or upon demand. others, that An amount of 10,489.57 was paid out under the Power of Attorney on 27th September 2000), and per
letter,[46] dated April 28, 2000, from one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of the Eagle Star Life possession of the lawyer, should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be

Assurance Company Limited, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of the Lincoln Financial Group, The Quays, stating, commingled with his own or be used by him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or

among others, that I can confirm that a death claim was made on the policy on 13 October 1999 when an amount property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his

of 471.06 was sent by International Moneymover to the client's legal representative, ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general

City, Philippines. Clearly, there is no doubt that the amounts of 10,489.57 and 471.06 were remitted to respondent morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves

through other means of international transactions, such as the International Moneymover, which explains why no punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and

direct remittance from the insurance companies in London could be traced to the personal bank account of are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be

respondent, per monthly transaction report, covering January to December for the years 2000-2001. disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.[51] Indeed, lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in

which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.[52]

In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to practice their profession for breach of trust and

confidence pertaining to their clients' moneys and properties. InManzano v. Soriano,[53] therein respondent, found guilty

A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the of grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to his client) and malpractice, represented therein

law applicable to each case.[47] Section 5, in relation to Sections 1[48] and 2,[49] Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in complainant in a collection suit, but failed to turn over the amount of P50,000.00 as stipulated in their agreement and,

administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or to conceal the misdeed, executed a simulated deed of sale, with himself as the vendor and, at the same time, the notary

preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a public. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,[54] therein respondent, found guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct,

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the dismissal received the check corresponding to his client's insurance claim, falsified the check and made it payable to himself,

of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, encashed the same, and appropriated the proceeds.
as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. Respondent's defense

that the criminal complaint for estafa against her was already dismissed is of no consequence. An administrative case Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job

can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from

evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.[55]Respondent's

prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed. More so, in the present repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent

administrative case, wherein the ground for the dismissal of the criminal case was because the trial court granted the of milking complainant's finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that should

prosecution's motion to withdraw the information and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of

honesty and integrity required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of

In Velez v. De Vera,[50] the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being exercising the noble legal profession.
such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary

nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Canon of Professional Ethics provides that the lawyer should WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct and DISBARRED from the

refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence practice of law. Let her name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory.

reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client, or other trust property coming into the
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the personal file of the respondent.
Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E. Freeman the proceeds of the insurance policies
remitted to her by Lincoln Financial Group, in the amount of 10,489.57, and Eagle Star Life Assurance Company
Limited, 471.06, or in the total amount of 10,960.63, which is approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, pursuant to
the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the subject transaction.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA T. BAYONLA-versus-ATTY. PURITA A. REYESRule 16.03 - A lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for
his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
- Code of Professional Responsibility.
This canon of professional responsibility is at the center of this administrative complaint for disbarment for
gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust filed against Atty. Purita A. Reyes by Teresita T. Bayonla, her
client.[1]
Antecedents
Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned a parcel of land situated in Butuan City in
their lifetimes. They died without leaving a will. Their land was thereafter expropriated in connection with the
construction of the Bancasi Airport. An expropriation compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to
their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle, Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the compulsory heirs of Paz, being, respectively,
Pazs granddaughter and son.[2]
On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of
trust. Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993, she and Alfredo had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to
collect their share in the expropriation compensation from the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro
City,[3]agreeing to her attorneys fees of 10% of whatever amount would be collected; that in November 1993, Atty.
Reyes had collected P1 million from the ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would
be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had failed to deliver the balance
of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands; that on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had collected the amount of P121,119.11
from the ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would be P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes
had handed her only P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be
disbarred for depriving her of her just share.[4]
In her comment dated February 10, 1998,[5] Atty. Reyes admitted that Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged her
legal services for the purpose of collecting their share in the expropriation compensation; that as consideration for her
services, Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her; that she had given to Bayonla more than
what had been due to her; that Alfredo had received from the ATO the check for the second release corresponding to
the share of both Bayonla and Alfredo; that Alfredo had gotten more than Bayonla out of the second release; that on
June 5, 1995 she had received out of the second release by the ATO only her 40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and
Alfredo had agreed to bear the expenses for the collection of their share; that she had incurred travel and other
expenses in collecting such share; and that she should be absolved from liability arising from the complaint.
On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.[6]
On April 20, 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro (Commissioner Navarro) rendered a
report,[7] whereby she found and recommended against Atty. Reyes as follows:
In so far as this case of disbarment is concerned, the issue hinges only on the
complainants position; one of the heirs of Paz Durban whose legal services of the respondent was
not revoked.
The parties were required to submit documents relative to their respective defenses (sic)
specially the actual amounts released by ATO, actual amount due to the complainant as her share,
the remittances made by the respondent to the complainant of her share and receipts to prove the
same.
 Unfortunately, only the respondent filed an answer without the necessary documents
required of them and attached only a xerox copy of the computation made by Atty. Ismael Laya On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of Commissioner Navarro
for the heir of Pedro Durban which had already been previously attached to the records of this
case. through Resolution No. XIII-99-165.[8]

In the said computation it appears that for the release on February 17, 1993, the heirs of
Durban received P84,852.00 and for the second release each of them as well as the complainant Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on September 27, 1999 the IBP Board of Governors denied her
was entitled P121,119.11. It could be inferred from here that complainant was supposed to
received (sic) P205,971.11 as her share. motion for reconsideration through Resolution No. XIV-99-117.[9]

Inasmuch as the attorneys fees of 40% was (sic) supported by evidence instead of (sic)
complainants allegation of ten [10%] percent; then respondent was entitled to P82,388.45 as
Atty. Reyes then filed a motion for reinvestigation. However, through its Resolution No. XV-2001-111
attorneys fees; leaving a balance of P123,582.66 due to the complainant.
adopted on July 28, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reinvestigation for lack of jurisdiction,
Respondents allegation that she gave more than what was alleged by the complainant is
untenable for she did not submit evidence to prove the same, therefore, as it is complainants stating that the matter had already been endorsed to the Court.[10]
allegation that she received only P79,000.00 for her share as a whole shall be considered for the
moment until such time that proofs to the contrary shall have been submitted.

Considering that complainant was supposed to receive the amount due her which On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP Board of Governors to report on whether Atty. Reyes had
was P123,582.66 and actually received only P79,000.00; then respondent still has to remit to already accounted for and remitted the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.[11]
complainant the amount of P44,582.66.

From the records of this case respondent alleged that she only collected the 40%
attorneys fees for the second release whereby Alfredo Tabada the other heir of Paz Durban On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors informed the Court that per the manifestation of
received the check from ATO and got a large part of the same. Respondent did not mention how
much she got as attorneys fees against complainants share but on the whole amounting Bayonlas counsel Atty. Reyes had not yet rendered an accounting and had not yet remitted the amount of P44,582.66
to P496,895.00 which is unfair to the complainant.
to Bayonla.[12]
As counsel for the heirs of Paz Durban, complainant herein should have been advised by
the respondent and given a breakdown of whatever amount was received or came to her
knowledge as complainants counsel. Short of the foregoing, respondent violated Rule 16.01 Through her manifestation dated September 4, 2002 to the Court,[13] Atty. Reyes posed some queries, as
Canon 16 Chapter III of the Code of Professional Responsibility; to wit:
follows: (a) whether she could be compelled to pay the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla even if the latters claims had
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. been based on perjured statements; (b) whether the payment of the amount would operate to dismiss the estafa case

previously filed by Bayonla against her for allegedly failing to deliver the balance of Bayonlas share; and (c) whether she
Respondent was given a chance to rectify whatever errors or misgivings (sic) she had done
for her client but she unfortunately failed to do so and did not comply with the Order dated could deposit the amount of P44,582.66 with either the IBP Board of Governors or the Court.
October 29, 1998.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the
respondent be required to render an accounting or inventory duly confirmed by the complainant Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that the IBP Board of Governors did not accord to her the right
of all the collected shares due the complainant and remit to the latter the said amount
to confront Bayonla during the investigation conducted by the IBP Board of Governors; that Bayonlas counsel had
of P44.582.66;
induced Bayonla to file the estafa charge against her; and that this had prompted her to initiate a disbarment complaint
Until such time that respondent had complied with the aforementioned, she is suspended
from the practice of her legal profession. against Bayonlas counsel.[14]

Respectfully submitted.
On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the final resolution of this

case.[15] The recommendation was noted by the Court on June 29, 2010.[16]

Issue
Whether or not the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors were proper.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, which were supported by the records, but we
modify the sanctions to be imposed on Atty. Reyes.
I
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of her client that may come into her possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 demands that
the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over
the funds, or the lawyers option to apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the client.
The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a lawyer and her client is highly
fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. There is no question that the money or
property received by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter.[17] Conformably with these canons of
professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money
she has collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected
by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.[18]
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the amount of P84,852.00 out of the first
release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the second release. Her total share from the two releases
was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled to P82,388.44 as attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of Bayonlas
share, the net share of Bayonla was P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her only P79,000.00,[19] which
was short by P44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and despite the orders from the IBP Board of Governors for
her to remit the shortage,[20] Atty. Reyes refused to do so.
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated canons.
The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to be
immediately turned over to the client.[21] The unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client warrants the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer.[22] Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately account for
and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit, for it signified that she had converted the money to her own use, in
violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted gross misconduct for which the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law became justified pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or
other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney
is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. (As amended by SC
Resolution dated February 13, 1992.)
II
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle
to administrative proceeding against respondent
 The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes against Bayonla and of the estafa charge by Bayonla against
Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty of Atty. Reyes to render an accounting and to remit the amount due to
Bayonla. Nor did the pendency of such cases inhibit this administrative matter from proceeding on its due course. It is
indisputable that the pendency of any criminal charges between the lawyer and her client does not negate the
administrative proceedings against the lawyer. We explained why in Suzuki v. Tiamson,[23] to wit:
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and
vice versa. In this light, we refer to this Courts ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona, citing In re Almacen,
where it was held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination of respondents
administrative liability and our findings herein should not in any way be treated as having
any material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other. [emphasis supplied]
Relevantly, we have also emphasized in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza [24] that
xxx a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability
in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent
will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither
will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.
It serves well to mention, lastly, that the simultaneous pendency of an administrative case and a judicial
proceeding related to the cause of the administrative case, even if the charges and the evidence to be adduced in such
cases are similar, does not result into or occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or deprivation of due process to the
parties in either of the cases.[25]
III
No denial of due process to respondent
Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her right to due process because the IBP Board of Governors did
not permit her to personally confront the complainant.
We do not consider Atty. Reyess contention valid. She was accorded full due process, for she in fact
participated in all stages of the proceedings.
It is true that a lawyer shall not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law until she has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against her, to produce witnesses in her behalf, and to be
heard by herself or counsel.[26] Contrary to Atty. Reyes insistence, however, the IBP Board of Governors was under no
legal obligation to conduct a trial-type proceeding at which she could have personally confronted Bayonla. In other
words, the lack of such proceeding neither diminished her right to due process nor deprived her of the right. A formal
investigation entailing notice and hearing is required in administrative proceedings for disbarment, but the imperative
need of notice and hearing does not always mean the holding of an adversarial trial-type proceeding. Due process is
still satisfied when the parties are afforded the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support
of their respective sides.[27] As the Court said in Samalio v. Court of Appeals:[28]
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be
met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process
for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the
place of their direct testimony.
In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings which he filed with the
Board of Discipline of the BID when he filed his answer and two motions to dismiss, as well as
other motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative
proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to the
CSC by way of appeal.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to
explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
 complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who had failed to immediately account for and to return P300,000.00 received from a client for the purpose of depositing it
has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. [bold emphasis
supplied] in court, after the lawyer had been found not to have deposited the money in court.

Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had striking resemblance with the sins thus sanctioned in the
Nevertheless, the IBP Board of Governors actually conducted a formal investigation of the complaint
aforementioned precedents, the proper penalty for her is suspension from the practice of law for two years, with
against Atty. Reyes upon the directive of the Court. In her formal investigation of the complaint, Commissioner
warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely.
Navarro allowed both parties to submit their respective proofs on the actual amounts released by the ATO, the

amounts due to Bayonla as her share, Atty. Reyes corresponding contingent fees, the remittances by Atty. Reyes to
Atty. Reyes is further obliged to pay to Bayonla the amount of P44,582.67, which the IBP Board of
Bayonla, and the receipts showing such remittances.[29] In due course, Atty. Reyes submitted her written answer,
Governors found to be still unpaid, by way of restitution. Although the Court renders this decision in an
attaching to the answer the documents supporting her defenses.[30] Commissioner Navarro took all of Atty. Reyes
administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Courts
submissions into good and proper account, as borne out by her report.[31] And even after the IBP Board of Governors
silence about the respondent lawyers legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable.
had adopted Commissioner Navarros report (and its recommendation), Atty. Reyes was still afforded the fair
No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the clients funds or property should be required to still litigate in
opportunity to challenge the adverse findings by filing her motion for reconsideration, although such motion was
another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondents liability. That has
ultimately resolved against her.[32]
been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited
IV cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, and Small v. Banares, supra.
Sanction

In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of 12% per annum reckoned from June 22, 1997, the date when
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to account
she was formally charged with disbarment. This rate of interest was prescribed by the Court in Almendarez, Jr. v.
for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from the practice of law for two years.
Langit and Small v. Banares.
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit,[33] the lawyer who withdrew the rentals pertaining to his client totaling P255,000.00 without

the knowledge of the client and who ignored the demand of the client to account for and to return the amount was
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ATTY. PURITA A. REYES guilty of
suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[34] the lawyer received P155,000.00 from the
violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the
adversary of his clients as partial payment of a final and executory decision in favor of the clients pursuant to a secret
practice of law for a period of two years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with warning that a similar offense by
arrangement between the lawyer and the adversary, and deposited the amount to the lawyers personal bank account
her will be dealt with more severely.
without the knowledge of the clients; the lawyer thereafter refused to surrender the money to his clients. The

suspension of the lawyer for two years from the practice of law was ordered by the Court. In Small v. Banares,[35] a
The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to complainant Teresita T. Bayonla within 30 days from receipt of
similar penalty of suspension for a period of two years from the practice of law was imposed on a lawyer who had
this Decision the amount of P44,582.67, with interest of 12% per annum from June 22, 1997, and to render unto the
failed to file a case for the purpose of which he had received an amount of P80,000.00, and to return the amount upon
complainant a complete written accounting and inventory of: - (a) the amounts she had collected from the Air
demand. In Barcenas v. Alvero,[36] the Court suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law a lawyer who
Transportation Office as expropriation compensation; (b) the total amount due to the complainant; (c) the total

amount she had actually remitted to the complainant; and (d) the amount she had deducted as her contingent fee vis--
vis the complainant.
Within the same period of compliance, Atty. Reyes shall submit to the Court, through the Office of the Bar
Confidant, authentic written proof that her accounting, inventory, and payment were furnished to and received by the
complainant in due course.
This Decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings against Atty. Reyes.
Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a
copy of it to be included in Atty. Reyes file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10568 January 13, 2015
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2753]
MARILEN G. SOLIMAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint1 filed by Marilen G. Soliman (Soliman) against Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy (Atty.
Amboy) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In her complaint, Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy on May 27, 2007 in connection with a
partition case. In accordance with the Retainer Agreement between the parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy
₱50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latter’s engagement, Soliman paid her ₱25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy
advised Soliman to no longer institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were amenable to the
partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to the said property from the coowners
to the individual owners; the ₱25,000.00 already paid to her was then treated as payment for her professional services. 2
In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy ₱16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax. In the second quarter of
2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay in the issuance of the titles to the property because of the
failure of the other co-owners to submit certain documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that someone from the
Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of ₱80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty.
Amboy told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the amount to ₱50,000.00.3
Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount of ₱8,900.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as payment for the real
property tax for the year 2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount of ₱50,000.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank
account as payment for the latter’s contact in the RD.4
On October 16, 2009, Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property werethen only
awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However, Atty. Amboy failed to deliver the respective certificates of
title of Soliman and her co-owners to the subject property.5 On January 6, 2010, Atty. Amboy’s secretary informed
Soliman that their contact in the RD was asking for an additional ₱10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said
certificates of title. Soliman then refused to further pay the amount being asked by Atty. Amboy’s
secretary.6Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty. Amboy for any update on the release of the said titles, but the latter
was not responding to her queries. On July 7, 2010, Soliman and Atty. Amboy’s secretary went to the office of a
certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the 50,000.00as payment
for the release of the said titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having received any amount to facilitate the release of the titles
and claimed that the reason why the same could not be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file certain
documents.7
Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the pertinent documents she gave to her for the
processing of the titles to the property or give back the ₱50,000.00 that was already paid to her.8
For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but denied having received any
amount from the latter pursuant to the said agreement. She claimed that the retainer agreement was not implemented
since the partition case was not instituted. She claimed that she merely undertook to research, gather and collate all
documents required in the partition and in the transfer of the titles from the co-owners to the individual owners. She
denied having failed to submit the relevant documents to the RD which caused the delay in the processing of the said
titles. She likewise denied having asked Soliman for ₱50,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said titles.9
On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Report and Recommendation, 10 which recommended the suspension
of Atty. Amboy from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Investigating Commissioner opined that Atty. Amboy
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to observe due diligence in dealing with Soliman. It also
opined that she failed to inform the latter of the status of the proceedings for the issuance of the said titles.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,11 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the modification that the period of Atty. Amboy’s
suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to two (2) years and that she was ordered to
return the entire amount she received from Soliman.
Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration12 of the Resolution dated March 20, 2013, but it was denied by the IBP Board
of Governors in its Resolution13 dated March 21, 2014.
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court
affirms the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his clientand that he
should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.14 A lawyer is mandated to serve his client with
competence and diligence;to never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed of the status
of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. 15
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving ₱25,000.00 as payment for her
professional services, failed to submit material documents relative to the issuance of separate certificates of title to the
individual owners of the property. It was her negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of
title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked from Soliman the
amount of ₱50,000.00 to be paid to her "contact" inside the office of the RD in order to facilitate the release of the
said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the payment of ₱50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain
issuance of the said certificates of title. Insteadof procuring the release of the certificates of title as she promised, Atty.
Amboy asked for an additional ₱10,000.00 from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a client.1âwphi1 Atty.
Amboy’s acts undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty.
Amboy bound herself to respectthe law and legal processes.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of ₱50,000.00 which she paid
inorder to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of
Manila, denied having received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman after a demand
therefor was made following her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property of his client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to
a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.16 "A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation
of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment." 17
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
Furthermore, she is ORDERED to return to Marilen G. Soliman the entire amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) she received from the latter, plus legal interest thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution until
fully paid. The respondent is further DIRECTED to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her compliance
within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Ditas Lerios-
Amboy's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED
A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013
VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo (Atty.
Espejo) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation
of lawyer’s oath, docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.
The Facts
Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio (Corazon). Following
the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of money and wanted to borrow two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from her (Victoria). Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the house of
Corazon for a meeting with Atty. Espejo where they discussed the terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was
introduced to her as her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same
meeting, Victoria agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the amount of PhP
250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a
check1dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount
and agreed interest. On due date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for the reason that
she was still waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check. However, after a couple of
months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check was already funded
enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (PhP 50,000)2 representing the interest which accrued due to the late payment of the principal obligation.
Victoria deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo
failed to pay despite Victoria’s repeated demands. Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent,
Victoria decided to deposit to her account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, but without notifying Atty.
Espejo of the fact. However, the said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter
became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a
demand letter dated August 3, 2009.3
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on August 18, 2009 for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the
Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.4
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office which she
personally received and continued to ignore Victoria’s demands. She attended only one (1) scheduled preliminary
investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation.5
In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of two hundred seventy
five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.). However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the said check was again dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds.6 Atty. Espejo did not file any counter-affidavit or pleading to answer the charges against her.
On November 17, 2009, the case was submitted for resolution without Atty. Espejo’s participation. 7Victoria thereafter
filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD, through
Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order8 directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to
Victoria’s administrative complaint failing which would render her in default. The warning, notwithstanding, Atty.
Espejo did not submit any Answer. On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner
Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties to appear for a mandatory conference set on June 2, 2010. The notice stated
that non-appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of her right to participate in further
proceedings.9
At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared.10
Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an Order11 noting Atty. Espejo’s failure to appear during the mandatory
conference and her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared in default. Victoria, on the other
hand, was directed to file her verified position paper, which she filed on June 11, 2010.12
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July 15, 2010, the CBD recommended the suspension of Atty. Espejo
from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.
The CBD reasoned:
The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled
hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his deficiency for his oath of
office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.
Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated demands [she] failed to
comply with her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary investigation and to submit her
counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that
also warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution 14 adopting the Report and Recommendation of
the CBD with the modification lowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo
was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000 within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with
legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s grave misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to complainant the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand (₱250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest
reckoned from the time the demand was made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to Resolution No. XX-
2012-419 along with the records of this case.15
The Court’s Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.1âwphi1 Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining
a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations that she issued unfunded checks to pay her obligation. It has already been
settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned.16
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients.
In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explained that the prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a
lawyer, thus:
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complaint but offered no justifiable reason
for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent just
ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his financial obligations to complainant,
respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong
doing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must be
reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations. 17
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an
attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While
the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non- professional or private capacity,
the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s
professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer.18
In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless checks, which is exactly what Atty. Espejo
committed in this case, manifests a lawyer’s low regard for her commitment to her oath, for which she may be
disciplined. Thus:
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and
good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also
shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest
and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined
her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.
xxxx
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he was convicted in the
criminal case filed against him. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from
the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino having been found
guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only
entrusted to him by the complainant.19
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing
her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This
constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v.
Langit, We held that a lawyer must maintain respect not only for the courts, but also for judicial officers and other duly
constituted authorities, including the IBP:
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to
file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although respondent
did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still,
respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with
conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes.
Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly
constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP
to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon
City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years, as recommended by the IBP,
commensurate under the circumstances. We, however, cannot sustain the IBP’s recommendation ordering Atty.
Espejo to return the money she borrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the
determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action
which the parties may to choose me against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not
involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only
question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the
complainant.22
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years
affective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8826
SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OTILIO SY BONGON, Respondent.
RES0LUTI0N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative Complaint1 dated September 14, 2010 filed by complainant Shirley Olayta-
Camba (complainant) against respondent Atty. Otilio Sy Bongon (respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred and
be directed to return the amount of Pl12,449.55 that he received from the former.
The Facts
In her complaint, complainant alleged that on March 1, 2000, she engaged the services of respondent for the purpose
of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, situated in the
Municipalities of Camalig and Guinobatan, both in the province of Albay. In connection therewith, she claimed to
have given the aggregate amount of Pl 12,499.55 to respondent, broken down as follows: (a) P20,000.00 as partial
payment for legal services; (b) P162.00 as payment for certification fees; (c) PS,000.00 as advance payment for the
reconstitution of titles; (d) 30,000.00 as payment for land taxes and titling of properties; (e) 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
(f) 19,337.55 as payment for documentary stamps on the estate of Bernabe Olayta; and (g) 28,000.00 as payment for
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Taxes. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to update complainant regarding
the status of the matters referred to him. Thus, complainant terminated her engagement with respondent and
demanded for the return of 112,499.55, but to no avail.2 Hence, she filed the instant complaint before the Court.
In his defense,3 respondent asserts, inter alia, that he only received 55,000.00 and that the rest of the money was
received by a certain Rowena Delos Reyes-Kelly who was not an employee of his law firm.4 Further, respondent
averred that he had already offered to return the amount of 30,000.00 to complainant, claiming that he already earned
the fees for legal services in the amount of 20,000.00 for having studied the matter entrusted to him and drafted the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition (Deed) that underwent several revisions.5
The Court, in a Resolution6 dated August 15, 2011, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation7 dated April 17, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty
of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, accordingly,
recommended that he be: (a) meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months; and (b) directed to return the amount of 55,000.00 to complainant.8
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed engaged respondent’s services for the purpose of
reconstituting four (4) titles as well as preparing the Deed, and that the latter received legal fees in connection
therewith. Despite this, respondent did not perform his undertaking in accordance with the engagement and likewise
failed to return complainant’s money despite demands. The foregoing acts were deemed to be in violation of the
lawyer’s oath, as well as the CPR, thus, rendering respondent administratively liable for the same. However, in view of
respondent’s old age, his condition of having undergone a triple heart bypass surgery, and considering that this is his
first offense, the Investigating Commissioner opted to mitigate the administrative penalties imposed upon
respondent.9
In a Resolution10 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months. On motion for reconsideration11 of respondent, his period of suspension was further
decreased to one (1) month in a Resolution12 dated May 3, 2014. To date, respondent has not filed a petition for
review before the Court.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts
complained of.1âwphi1
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon
him.13 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence
for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, 14 which reads:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
xxxx
As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, complainant engaged the services of respondent for
the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, as well as
preparing the Deed, and in connection therewith, allegedly gave various amounts to respondent, of which the latter
admitted the receipt of only 55,000.00. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and
offered the excuse that the reconstitution of the titles and the preparation of the Deed were delayed due to the Deed’s
several revisions; and that Bernabe Olayta’s surviving heirs were living in different places, making it difficult to secure
their presence, much less obtain their signatures to the said Deed.15
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the
amount of 55,000.00 that he personally received from complainant despite repeated demands, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
xxxx
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if not used
accordingly, the money must be returned immediately to the client. 16 As such, a lawyer’s failure to return the money to
his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity,17 as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in such matters of professional employment18 and, hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty to be imposed
on him.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to
return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,19 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year
for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money
given to him by the latter.20 Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino,21 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed
to render any legal service to his client as well as to return the money he received for such purpose.22 These
pronouncements notwithstanding, there have been instances where the Court tempered the penalty imposed upon a
lawyer due to humanitarian and equitable considerations.23 In view of the foregoing, and taking into consideration
respondent’s advanced age, medical condition, and the fact that this is his first offense, the Court finds it appropriate
to sustain the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Otilio Sy Bongon is found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon
16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Shirley Olayta-Camba the amount of 55,000.00 he
received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Resolution. Failure to comply with the
foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to respondent's personal
record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11822
VICKA MARIE D. ISALOS, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Vicka Marie D. Isalos
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal (respondent) for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules
16.01, 16.02, and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) arising from respondent's alleged
failure to account for the money entrusted to her.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that she is the Director and Treasurer of C Five Holdings, Management & Consultancy, Inc. (C
Five), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office in Libis,
Quezon City. Respondent was C Five's Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel who handled its incorporation and
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission'(SEC).2
Sometime in July 2011, when C Five was exploring investment options, respondent recommended the purchase of a
resort in Laguna, with the assurances that the title covering the property was "clean" and the taxes were fully paid.
Relying on respondent's recommendation, C Five agreed to acquire the property and completed the payment of the
purchase price.3
Respondent volunteered and was entrusted to facilitate the transfer and registration of the title of the property in C
Five's name. On September 5, 2011, complainant personally handed the sum of ₱l,200,000.00 to respondent at her
office in Makati City, as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 10384 of even date. The said amount was intended to cover
the expenses for the documentation, preparation, and notarization of the Final Deed of Sale, as well as payment of
capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and other fees relative to the sale and transfer of the property. 5
More than a year thereafter, however, no title was transferred in C Five's name. It was then discovered that the title
covering the property is a Free Patent6 issued on August 13, 2009, rendering any sale, assignment, or transfer thereof
within a period of five (5) years from issuance of the title null and void. Thus, formal demand 7 was made upon
respondent to return the ₱l,200,000.00 entrusted to her for the expenses which remained unheeded, prompting C Five
to file a criminal complaint for Estafa before the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, i.e., NPS No. XV-05-INV-13D-
1253,8 as well as the present case for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, i.e., CBD Case No. 14-
4321.
In defense,9 respondent claimed that she paid the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) registration, Mayor's Permit,
business licenses, documentation, and other expenses using the money entrusted to her by complainant,10 as itemized
in a Statement of Expenses11 that she had prepared, and that she was ready to turn over the balance in the amount of
₱885,068.00. However, C Five refused to receive the said amount, insisting that the entire ₱l,200,000.00 should be
returned.12 Moreover, she pointed out that the criminal case for Estafa filed against her by C Five had already been
dismissed 13 for lack of probable cause.14 As such, she prayed that the disbarment case against her be likewise
dismissed for lack of merit.15
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After due proceedings, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (CBD-IBP) issued a Report and
Recommendation16 dated June 29, 2015, finding respondent administratively liable and thereby, recommending her
suspension from the legal profession for a period of three (3) years.17 The CBD-IBP found that respondent actually
received the amount of ₱l,200,000.00 from complainant, which amount was intended to cover the expenses and
payment of taxes for the sale and transfer of the property to C Five's name. Likewise, it was undisputed that despite
demands from the company to return the said amount, respondent failed to do so. Worse, she offered a Statement of
Expenses with "feigned expenditures" in an attempt to prove that a portion of the money had already been spent.
Thus, the CBDIBP concluded that there was dishonesty on the part of respondent and accordingly, recommended the
penalty of suspension.18
In a Resolution19 dated June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modificationthe
CBD-IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June 29, 2015, meting upon respondent the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year and directing the return of the amount of ₱l,200,000.00 to complainant.
In respondent's motion for reconsideration,20 she maintained that there was no intention on her part to retain the
money and that she was willing to return the amount of ₱885,068.00, as shown in her Statement of Expenses, which
she claimed was accompanied by corresponding receipts. Moreover, she averred that on September 30, 2015, in order
to buy peace, she delivered the amount of ₱l,200,000.00 to Atty. Anselmo Sinjian III, counsel for complainant,21 as
evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt22 of even date. As a consequence, complainant filed a Withdrawal of
Complaint for Disbarment23 before the IBP.
In a Resolution24 dated January 26, 2017, the IBP denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious review of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and conclusions of the IBP that
respondent should be held administratively liable in this case.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who possess and continue to possess the
legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. 25"Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in
their private capacity."26
The CPR, particularly Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, provides:
CANON 16 - A LA WYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for
the purpose, should be immediately returned.27 A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.28
In this case, it is indubitable that respondent received the amount of ₱l,200,000.00 from complainant to be used to
cover the expenses for the transfer of title of the subject property under C Five's name. Respondent admitted having
received the same, but claimed that she had spent a portion of it for various expenses, such as documentation, permits,
and licenses, among others, as evidenced by the Statement of Expenses with attached receipts. However, it has been
established that the registration of the property in C Five's name could not have materialized, as the subject property
was covered by a Free Patent issued on August 13, 2009 which, consequently, bars it from being sold, assigned, or
transferred within a period of five (5) years therefrom. Thus, and as the CBD-IBP had aptly opined,29 there was no
longer any reason for respondent to retain the money. Furthermore, the expenditures enumerated in the Statement of
Expenses, except for the documentation and notarization fees for which no receipts were attached, do not relate to the
purposes for which the money was given, i.e., the documentation and registration of the subject property. As such,
even if official receipts had been duly attached for the other purposes - which, the Court notes, respondent failed to do
despite the opportunity given - the expenditures are not legitimate ones. Hence, the Court finds respondent to have
violated the above-cited rules, to the detriment and prejudice of complainant.
Respondent's assertion that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed, in view of the return of the full amount
to complainant and the latter's withdrawal of the complaint against her is specious. Such are not ample grounds to
completely exonerate the administrative liability of respondent. It is settled that a case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant,30 the latter not being a direct party to the
case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.31 A proceeding for suspension or disbarment
is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent-lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of
the court. "The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct x
x x has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice."32 The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.33
With regard to the proper penalty to be meted upon respondent, the Court has, in several similar cases, imposed the
penalty of suspension for two (2) years against erring lawyers. In Jinan v. Jiz,34 the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal services, which he never
performed. Similarly, in Agot v. Rivera,35 the Court suspended respondent for the same period for his failure to handle
the legal matter entrusted to him and to return the legal fees in connection therewith, among others. Considering,
however, the return of the full amount of ₱l,200,000.00 to C Five, respondent is instead meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal is found guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
The suspension in the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt by respondent. Respondent
is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that her suspension has started, copy furnished all
courts and quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in respondent's personal
records as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
[ A.C. No. 10684, January 24, 2018 ]
ILUMINADA D. YUZON, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This administrative case arose from a Complaint[1] filed by Iluminada Yuzon Vda. de Rodriguez (Iluminada) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking to disbar Atty. Arnulfo M.
Agleron (Atty. Agleron), for misappropriating the amount of P582,000.00 which the respondent lawyer received in trust
from the complainant.
Complainant's Position
Iluminada alleged that sometime on December 23, 2008, she gave Atty. Agleron the amount of Php400,000.00, and on
January 12, 2009, the amount of P600,000.00 in Managers Check, or the total amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) meant for the purchase of a house and a lot of one Alexander Tenebroso (Alexander), situated at Mati,
Davao Oriental. However, since the intended purchase did not materialize, Iluminada demanded the return of the
aforesaid amounts that she entrusted to Atty. Agleron, which the latter failed to return. On February 24, 2009,
Iluminada, through her lawyer Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (Atty. Vivencio), through a letter, demanded the return of the
amount of P750,000.00. On March 2, 2009, Atty. Agleron replied through a letter and explained that he already
returned the amount of P418,000.00, and that the remaining balance is only P582,000.00 which shall be paid upon
payment of his client who borrowed the said amount for his emergency operation after an accident which took place
on January 13, 2009.
Iluminada also alleged that she filed an Estafa case under Article 315, paragraph 1(B) of the Revised Penal Code
against Atty. Agleron.
Respondent's Position
Atty. Agleron, among others, claims that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was delivered to him at the
Office of the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Davao City upon the maturity of two (2) postdated checks issued by
Reverend Pastor Apollo Quiboloy(Rev. Quiboloy); that the amount of P600,000.00 was delivered on December 15, 2008,
and the other check which matured on January 15, 2009, in the amount of P400,000.00, were all deposited with the
Philippine National Bank, Mati Branch for safekeeping, while awaiting for the finalization of the transaction with
Alexander regarding the acquisition of the house subject of Civil Case No. 2287-7-2007, then pending in the Municipal
Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental; and that the total amount of P438,000.00 was delivered to herein Iluminada on
different occasions, as per her request, and that the balance of P582,000.00 was never misappropriated and/or
converted to the personal use and benefit of Atty. Agleron as the said amount was borrowed for the emergency
operation of a client who, at that time has nobody to turn to for help. Thus, Atty. Agleron's infraction should not
warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment. Atty. Agleron prayed that, if he be found guilty, the
lesser penalty of fine should be imposed considering he rendered almost fifty (50) years of service in the government,
and he is also an Officer and Member of the IBP, Davao Oriental Chapter.
Report and Recommendation
After the mandatory conference on January 17, 2012 and upon a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented by the
parties in their respective position papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and Recommendation, dated March 30,
2012, finding Atty. Agleron to have violated Section 27,[2] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Agleron administratively liable and recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. This ruling is based on Atty. Agleron's admission that he is still in
possession of the amount of P582,000.00.
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner is convinced that Atty. Agleron is guilty of Gross Misconduct under Section 27,
Rule 138 for violating his duty to his client by converting and using his client's money. Accordingly, the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law in any court was imposed on Atty. Agleron. The various mitigating
factors: that Atty. Agleron has been a Member and Officer of the IBP Davao Oriental Chapter; that he has been in the
practice of law, as Assistant and later on as Provincial Fiscal; and, that he was able to retire from the government
service for a span of almost fifty (50) years sans any disciplinary records were taken into consideration. The
Commissioner also recommended the return to Iluminada of the amount of P582,000.00 with legal interest of twelve
percent (12%) from May 5, 2010, with warning that a repetition of similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In a Resolution[3] dated August 31, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation. Atty. Agleron moved for reconsideration,[4] whereas Iluminada moved for a partial
reconsideration[5] explaining that the penalty meted on Atty. Agleron dilutes the very essence of the offense charged.
However, both were denied by the IBP Board of Governors through a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-
329[6] dated May 4, 2014.
Atty. Agleron filed with this Court an Urgent Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension dated
August 31, 2013,[7] and affirmed by Resolution No. XXI-2014-329[8] dated May 4, 2014, of the IBP Board of
Governors. Thus, this Court issued a Resolution[9]dated January 18, 2016 referring to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) Atty. Agleron's Urgent Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension.
The Obc's Report and Recommendation
The OBC recommended that the merit of this case be finally resolved by this Court for the proper determination of
the order of suspension imposed on Atty. Agleron. The OBC further recommended that Atty. Agleron's Urgent
Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension issued by the IBP on August 31, 2013, be denied.
The Issue before the Court
The basic issue, in this case, is the effectivity of the order of suspension imposed on Atty. Agleron.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP.
Here, there is no question as to whether or not the respondent lawyer misappropriated the amount of money the
complainant entrusted to him, since Atty. Agleron already admitted the same, in clear violation of his fiduciary duty to
his client. Jurisprudence is instructive that a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the monies he/she holds for
his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has appropriated the said monies for his/her own use, to the
prejudice and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client.[10]
Proceeding from the premise that indeed Atty. Agleron merely wanted to help another client who is going through
financial woes, he, nevertheless, acted in disregard of his duty as a lawyer with respect to Iluminada. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics.[11]
It is of no moment as well that Atty. Agleron's property has been subjected to a levy;[12] thus, his claim in his Urgent
Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension[13] that with such levy he has even overpaid Iluminada,
considering that the total value of his property is P2,912,000.00 is bereft of merit. Levy is defined as the act or acts by
which an officer of the law and court sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of the loser's (judgment debtor's)
property for the purpose of eventually conducting an execution sale to the end that the writ of execution may be
satisfied, and the judgment debt, paid.[14] Thus, there must be an execution sale first before he can claim that he already
complied with his legal obligation.
Further, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to return upon demand the amount Iluminada entrusted to him, viz.:
CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONIES AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x[15]
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and
good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money
or property collected or received for or from his client.[16] Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for
his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.[17]
As to the issue on when is the effectivity of the order of suspension, the OBC aptly explained in its Report and
Recommendation dated February 16, 2016, that the Court merely noted the IBP's Notice of Resolution which
suspended Atty. Agleron from the practice of law and that such act does not imply the approval of the same. Here,
this Court is yet to finally resolve first the merit of this administrative case. Thus, the effectivity of the order of
suspension has not actually commenced and it is erroneous on Atty. Agleron's part to claim in his Motion [18] dated
August 6, 2015, that he has already served the one (1) year suspension from the date of the issuance of the IBP Notice
of Resolution on August 31, 2013, to August 31, 2014, is bereft of merit.
Jurisprudence is instructive that as guardian of the legal profession, this Court has the ultimate disciplinary power over
members of the Bar to ensure that the highest standards of competence, honesty and fair dealing are
maintained.[19] Verily, this Court has the final say on imposition of sanctions to be imposed on errant members of both
bench and bar, this Court has the prerogative of making its own findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof
rather than that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an administrative complaint has been referred to for
investigation and report.[20]
Section 12 of Rule 139-B reads:
Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.—
xxxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron is hereby held GUILTY of Gross Misconduct in violation of
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Respondent is
also ORDERED to PAY complainant the amount of Five Hundred Eighty-Two Thousand Pesos (P582,000.00), with
twelve percent (12%) interest from the date of demand until June 30, 2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1,
2013 until full payment.[21]
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
REMIGIO P. SEGOVIA, JR- versus - ATTY. ROLANDO s.
JAVIER
This case stemmed from a letter-complaint1 filed by complainants
Remigio P. Segovia, Jr., Francisco Rizabal, Pablito Rizabal, Marcial Rizabal
 Romines, Pelagic Rizabal Aryap and Renato Rizabal with the Integrated Bar of the· ·.J-h.is rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the
Philippines (IBP) against respondent Atty. Rolando S. Javier, for allegedly abandoning them client is considered per se a violation. Also, a lawyer who received
by failing to file the case on their behalf after collecting the amount of P57,000.00 for
litigation fees. ·. money to handle a client's case but rendered no service at all shall be subject
to disciplinary measure.
Complainants alleged that they engaged the services of respondent as their counsel in a case involving ·.
falsification of documents and recovery of property. During the existence of attorney-client relationship, ·. Unfortunately for the Respondent, he failed to submit his Answer and his
respondent asked the complainants the amount of P30,000.00 as filing fee, which they have dutifully paid. Position Paper. He, as well, failed to attend the mandatory conference, hence, the
Complainants discovered that respondent also demanded from one Riza Rizabal Tesalona the amount of undersigned has no means of knowing his contentions and had to rely on the allegations
P27,000.00 in connection with the case. Whenever they followed-up on the case, they always received a in the Complaint.
response from respondent to not worry as he would file the case within theweek, and an assurance ·.
thatwillthe case be resolved in their favor. However, respondent never filed the case.2 ·. RECOMMENDATION
·.
On May 8, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline ( CBD), through IBP C~mmissioner Oliver
A. Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero ), issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference3 directing the parties to
·. Foregoing premises considered, the undersigned believes and so holds that the
appear before the commission, and to submit their respective Mandatory Conference Brief. Both parties instant complaint is with merit. Accordingly, he recommends that the Respondent be
did not appear. SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year.6
·.
In an Order4 dated July 6, 2012, Commissioner Cachapero directed theparties to file their ·.
respective verified position paper, however, both parties to failed file their position papers. ·. The Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Commissioner in
·. Resolution No. XX-2013-304, to wit:
On November 14, 2012, Commissioner Cachapero ·.
submitted his ·.
·. RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
Report,5 a portion of which reads: ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
DISCUSSION "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule 18 .03 of the
The disquisition is brief and concise. Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rolando S. Javier is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice oflaw for one (1) year. 7
Lawyers have always been reminded that their relationship with their clients ·.
must be characterized by trust which exemplifies fiduciary relationship absence of The Court's Ruling
which the legal profession's image to the public would be debased. In this connection, ·. We adopt the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.
best efforts must be exerted by the attorney to protect his client's interest and he must ·.
account for any fund received by him from his client. ·. A license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee
possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to manage their cases. When a lawyer accepts a
In the instant case, Respondent had clearly breached the trust reposed in case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning,
him by his client after accepting the case and collecting the filing fees and yet failed in skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the
his duty to file the case for his clients despite demands from the latter. These practices prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
by lawyers degrade the legal profession and the administration of justice and breed diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.8
delinquent lawyers. Such practices should not be tolerated since it could easily be done ·.
especially against indigent and marginalized clients. ·.
·. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his
retainer until his effective release from
·. the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. During that
Under Rule J8. 03 of the Code of Professional Re.sponsibilily, a lawyer has the
period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's interests
bounden duty of not neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in may require.9 In other words, acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney..;client
connection therewith shall render him liable. The Supreme Court, and this relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. 10
Commission, have consistently held, in construing ·.
·. The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states:
·.
·. CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.
·. xx xx
·. RULE 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. x x x
·. CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
·. xx xx
·. RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
·.
·. In the instant case, it was undisputed that respondent failed to file the case of falsification
of public documents and recovery of property in favor of complainants despite receiving the money
in connection with. the said case. Respondent's inaction despite repeated follow-ups and his promise
that
·. the
·. case will favorberesolved in complainants' demonstrated his cavalier attitude and appalling
indifference to his clients' cause.
·.
·. When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money. was spent for the intended
purpose. Conversely, ifthe lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must
immediately return the money to the client. 11
We note that while complainants allege that respondent specifically received P57,000.00
for filing fees, only the amount of P30,000.00 was suppmied by evidence. Since respondent failed to
render any legal service to complainants for failing to file the said case, he should have promptly(I
accounted for and returned the money to use the same for the intended purpose is conduct
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety and a violation of the trust reposed on him. His
unjustified withholding of money belonging to the complainants warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.
Moreover, respondent's violations were aggravated by his failure to comply with the
CBD's directives for him to fil.e his pleadings and to attend the hearing, which demonstrated not
only his irresponsibility but also his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct
was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected
to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court. As a member of the
bar, he ought to have known that the orders of the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers were not mere requests but directives which should have been
complied with promptly and completely. 12
This Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent was held liable for similar
infractions. He was found in both cases to have unlawfully withheld and misappropriated money. In
Igual v. Javier, 13 the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one month
and ordered him to restitute the amount of P7,000.00 to Igual upon finding that respondent had
unjustifiably refused to return Igual's money upon demand. Furthermore, his absence of integrity was
highlighted by his "half-baked excuses, hoary pretenses and blatant lies in his testimony before the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline." InAdrimisin v. Javier, 14 the Court found that respondent
unjustifiably refused to return the amount of PS00.00 he received in 1983 despite his failure to
immediately secure a bail bond in favor of Adrimisin's son-in-law. In that case, respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six ( 6) months.
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer requires sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts. In similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients' affairs and, at the same
totime, failed return the latter's money and/or property despite demand, the Court meted out the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 15 In Andrada v. Atty. Cera, 16 the Court suspended
Cera from the practice of law for one ( 1) year for failing to exert
any effort on his client's case and completely reneging on the obligations due
his client. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Atly. Lawsin, 17 the Court suspended Lawsin for a similar period for his failure to
perform his unde1iaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to
him by the latter. Likewise, in Maglente v. Atty. Agcaoili, Jr., 18 the same penalty was imposed on the
respondent who failed to render any legal service to his client as well as to return the money he received for
such purpose and offered the flimsy excuse thatmoneythehe received was not enough to fully pay thefiling
fees.
From the foregoing, the Comi finds a one-year suspension from the practice of law appropriate as
penalty for respondent's misconduct.
While the Comi has previously held that disciplinary proceedings shoulc'·only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this
rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature
- for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement, such as the acceptance fee.
19 And considering fmiher that respondent's receipt of the !!30,000.00 remains undisputed, the Court finds
the return of the same to the complainants, plus legal interest with the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from September 10, 2007 until June 30, 2013, then six percent (6%) interest per annum from July 1, 2013 until
fully paid, to be in order.
WHEREl8'0RE, the Comi finds respondent Atty. Rolando S. Javier GUILTY of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
one ( 1) year effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision. He is STERNLY WAl~~ED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to
RETURN to complainants the amount of 1!30,000.00 with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12o/o) per
annum from September 10, 2007 until June 30, 2013, then six percent (6o/o) interest per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid. Respondent shall submit to the Court proof of restitution within ten ( 10) days from
payment.
Let all the comis, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and the
Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision
·. and be it entered into respondent's personal record.
·.