MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al.

, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy.
In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port
of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.”
On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013
after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles
east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports
of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
2.Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3.Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:
First issue: YES.
Petitioners have legal standing
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than
just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this
Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement
of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.
Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of

the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The
alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the
TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US
itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules
and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s
internal waters and the territorial sea.
 In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue
to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which
is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for
non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into
our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation
in which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter
of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered
on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers
the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has
nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal
State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international
responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and
trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital
marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its
warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive
for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment
as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention,
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond
dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea , the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages
caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-
commercial purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for
the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or
that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an
environmental law.
MARICRIS D. DOLOT v. RAMON PAJE, GR No. 199199, 2013-08-27
Facts:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the
Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a
petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney's fees with the
RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.
The petition contained the following pertinent allegations... iron ore mining operations being conducted
by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of
Matnog, to no avail;
Matnog... need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality...
susceptible to flooding and landslides... confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard,
liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard... fter investigation... did not
have the required... permit to operate... issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they
did not have authority to issue... representatives
DENR... did not do anything... violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076
R.A. No. 7942
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated
environmental court.[8] In the Order[9] dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration... the RTC[11] further ruled that: (1) there was... no final
court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as
the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their... administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to
attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency,
as required by the rules.
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues:
whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.
The other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court
decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly... failed to act on; (2) the case was
prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach
judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling:
The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself
within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.
By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction
over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in... the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.
he petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law."[33] The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation... or a right therein.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial
affidavits.
the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn
certification of... non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial
affidavits, albeit not prohibited
Principles:
"courts are not... enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need
to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to an opportunity to be... heard."
SEGOVIA v. CCC
Victoria Segovia, et al. Vs. The Climate Change Commission, represented by its Chairman, His Excellency Benigno
S. Aquino, et al.
G.R. No. 211010
March 7, 2017

FACTS:

To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This
body was reorganized through EO 774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as
members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing
Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:

Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The new
paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must
have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation
system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train). In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC
(as lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable
Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned, thus:
SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF - In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate and
pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines. Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the
following functions:

(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the movement of
men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this
purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling,
and the man-powered mini-train).

Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change Commission which
absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the government which shall be
tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate
change.[7] Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing
Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the said letter-foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government
fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%).Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition. The
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in tum represent
"Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe ,
convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the
extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by
environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as
to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.

[9] These identified violations include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust" as provided under
Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance in the midst of acute public want under
Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty
percent (50%); (b) DOTC and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's
failure to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads and parking lots to sustainable urban farming as
mandated by Section 12(b)[11] of EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to
guide them on the Road Sharing Principle under Section 9(g)[12] of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air
pollutant emissions; and lastly, (f) DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for purposes stated in Section
9(e)[13] of EO 774.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances
resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violatio n of the petitioners'
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of
life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due process of law.[15] They also decry the
"unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are
discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and
while large budgets are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for
sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.
[16] Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the outright dismissal of
the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The respondents denied
the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that they have taken and continue to take measures to improve
the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve the environment condition - through projects and programs
such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport
System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-
Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually and
jointly implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of motorized
vehicles on the environment.Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact
of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on
Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions, greenhouse
gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the transport sector. In response, petitioner
filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the Petition.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;

2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; and
3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED. Procedural

Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), respondents argue that the
petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather
amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury.Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as
citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in
Oposa v. Factoran;and that, in any event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside
in its discretion.

The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the
filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws.This has been
confinned by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift, and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines).However, it bears noting that there is a difference
between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the
inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ;and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
Requisites for issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus The petitioners failed to establish the
requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

-there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
-the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and
-the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

----The writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for

continuing mandamus as follows: RULES 8 : WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS SECTION 1. Petition for
continuing mandamus. -
--When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the
--person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is
fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the
duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.
–The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be
entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule
of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated a principle. It cannot be considered an
absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this
principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that
are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary,and the official can only be directed by mandamus
to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the
terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act
involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or
the other.
This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the respondents to act one way
to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and
bicycling, and the other to Filipino - made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances
that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good intentions notwithstanding, the
petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion with their own through this petition for the
issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that
specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the
respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to
improve air quality. .