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Flyrock phenomena and area security in blasting-related

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Article  in  Safety Science · November 2005

DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2005.07.006

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 Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750
www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Flyrock phenomena and area security

in blasting-related accidents
Vladislav Kecojevic *, Mark Radomsky
The College of Earth and Mineral Sciences, Mining Engineering Program, The Pennsylvania State University,
154 Hosler Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA

Received 10 November 2004; accepted 12 July 2005

Abstract

In both the mining and construction industries, blasting is the predominant method for fragmen-
tation of consolidated mineral deposits. The blasting process, however, remains a potential source of
numerous hazards to people and surrounding objects. This paper presents the results of the research
study on flyrock phenomena and blast area security related accidents in surface mining. The study
revealed that a total of 45 fatal and 367 non-fatal accidents in coal, metal and non-metal surface
mines had occurred between 1978 and 1998 where the primary causes were the lack of blast area
security, flyrock, premature blast, and misfires. The lack of blast area security and flyrock accounted
for 281 (68.2%) accidents. Investigations of flyrock accidents have revealed one or more of the fol-
lowing contributing factors: discontinuity in the geology and rock structure, improper blasthole lay-
out and loading, insufficient burden, very high explosive concentration, and inadequate stemming.
The study also shows that accidents due to lack of blast area security are caused by failure to use
appropriate blasting shelter, failure to evacuate humans from the blast area, and inadequate guard-
ing of the access roads leading to the blast area. The research results should have a positive impact
on hazard awareness, prevention, and safe blasting practices in mining and construction industries.
Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Blasting; Fragmentation; Mining; Flyrock and area security; Accidents; Prevention

*
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 814 865 4288; fax: +1 814 865 3248.
E-mail address: vuk2@psu.edu (V. Kecojevic).

0925-7535/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2005.07.006
740 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750

1. Introduction

The main purpose of blasting operations in surface mining is the rock fragmentation,
and is considered to be essential to the success of mining operations. This process provides
appropriate material granulation that will be suitable for excavation and transportation.
According to the US Geological Survey (2000), the US coal, metal and non-metal surface
mining industry uses almost 1.8 billion kilograms of explosives annually. Between 1989
and 1999, surface coal mines have used 16.2 billion kilograms and 3.3 billion kilograms
have been used in non-metal mines and quarries (Kramer, 2000).
The blasting process, however, remains a potential source of numerous hazards. Even
though the mining industry has improved its blasting safety, there are still reports indicat-
ing blasting-related accidents involving both people and various structures. Investigations
carried out by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA, 1994; MSHA,
1999a,b) provide clear evidence regarding the severity of these accidents. Figs. 1 and 2
show the fatal and non-fatal blasting accidents from 1978 to 1998 for coal, metal and
non-metal surface mining (Verakis and Lobb, 2001). A total of 45 fatalities occurred

Fatal Nonfatal
Number of accidents

20

15

10

0
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19

Year

Fig. 1. Number of fatal and non-fatal blasting accidents in coal surface mining.

Fatal Nonfatal
25
Number of accidents

20
15

10
5
0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Year

Fig. 2. Number of fatal and non-fatal blasting accidents in metal and non-metal surface mining.
 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750 741

Miscellaneous
Misfires 4.10%
5.64%
Premature blast Blast area security
16.92% 45.64%

Flyrock
27.69%

Fig. 3. Blasting accident causes in coal surface mining (1978–2001).

during the entire period, an average of 2.14 fatalities per year. Coal mining accounted for
44.68% of the fatalities, while metal and non-metal operations for 55.32%. For the same
period, a total of 367 non-fatal injuries have occurred, an average of 17.47 per year.
Further historical data summarized by Verakis and Lobb (2003) shows that for the per-
iod of 1978–2001, a total of 195 blasting accidents occurred in US surface coal mine oper-
ations. Of the 195 accidents, 89 accidents (45.64%) were directly attributed to lack of blast
area security, 54 accidents (27.69%) to flyrock, 33 (16.92%) to premature blast, and 11
(5.64%) to misfires (Fig. 3).
Since flyrock and a lack of blast area security constitute the majority of all blasting-
related accidents, the cause and control of these hazards and activities are discussed.

2. Flyrock phenomena

Flyrock is defined as the rock propelled beyond the blast area by the force of an explo-
sion (IME, 1997). The uncontrolled material fragments generated by the effects of a blast
are one of the prime causes in blasting-related accidents. When these rock fragments are
thrown beyond the allowable limits they result in human injuries, fatalities and structure
damages. Fig. 4 shows flyrock occurrences during the blasting process.
Previous experimental and theoretical work about flyrock phenomena has been per-
formed by Langefors and Kishlstrom (1963), Ladegaard-Pedersen and Persson (1973),
Lundborg (1974, 1981), Holmeberg and Persson (1976), and Roth (1979). Ladegaard-
Pederson and Persson (1973) have performed experiments in Plexiglas (polymethylmetha-
crylate—PMMA). Their drilling experiment involved a single hole in a block of PMMA,
and variation of the explosive charges by a factor approaching 2. They concluded that as
the charge increases, the fragmentation and the velocity of the broken material increases as
well. They also found that the gaseous venting from the blast penetrated the fracture
planes perpendicular to the hole axis and broke the material up and propelled them. They
also conducted a series of bench blast tests with a single hole in rock boulders. The drill-
hole diameter was 25 mm. After each single hole blast, the distance from the hole and the
angles of the flyrock were determined.
Holmeberg and Persson (1976) studied flyrock in field experiments with high-speed
cameras. They concluded that most of the collar flyrock are thrown in a direction follow-
ing the drillhole axis. Their experiments also confirmed that the scatter of the angle of
throw increases as the unloaded hole length decreases.
742 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750

Fig. 4. Flyrock generation in blasting process (Cameron et al., 2003).

The theory for predicting flyrock from blasting operations in hard rock such as granite
has been developed by Lundborg (1974). The charge hole diameter has been established as
d = k/qv, where k is a constant. To determine the constant k, measurements of the /qv
/qv
were made for different d values. By doing so, the relation 10d ¼ 2600 was obtained where
3 3
q is the density of the rock in kg/m (2600 kg/m is the average density of granite), / is the
fragment size diameter in meters, and v is the fragment velocity in m/s. To investigate the
validity of this equation, and to determine the factor of proportionality, several blasts were
photographed and the flyrock velocities measured. In a number of blasts, the maximum
distance of throw and the diameter of each flyrock fragments were also measured. By using
the previous equation, the maximum throw was calculated as Rmax = 260d2/3, where R is in
meters.
Additional studies on flyrock phenomena can be found in Persson et al. (1984), Baj-
payee et al. (2000), Fletcher and DÕAndrea (1986), Rehak et al. (2001), Shea and Clark
(1998), and Siskind and Kopp (1995). Generally, flyrock is caused by a mismatch of the
explosive energy with the strength of the rock mass surrounding the explosive charge.
Investigations of flyrock accidents have revealed one or more of the following contributing
factors: (i) discontinuity in the geology and rock structure, (ii) improper blasthole layout
and loading, (iii) insufficient burden, (iv) very high explosive concentration, and (v) inad-
equate stemming.

2.1. Geology and rock structure

The rock structure and rock properties may vary considerably from a location to loca-
tion even within the same blast area. Discontinuity in the geology and rock structure
causes a mismatch between the explosive energy and the resistance of the rock. Existence
of fissures, joints, weaknesses, and voids are likely to assist in the creation of flyrock. The
compressive strength, abrasiveness and the rock density also play a very important role in
the blasting process, as does the spatial distribution of rock properties. Base information
(e.g. consolidation, voids, etc.) regarding the rock structure and properties of the material
 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750 743

to be blasted can be routinely obtained from drill hole logs, and must be considered prior
to hole loading. A much more in-depth analysis of geologic characteristics can be achieved
through modeling. Realistic representation of geological domain requires a form of a spa-
tially referenced database that provides means for modeling a 3-D body from all geolog-
ical and geophysical data. Depending upon the rock type, data can be analyzed and
modeled using:

(a) Stratigraphic modeling, where a set of grid surfaces and subsequent intervals repre-
sent a sedimentary deposit; or
(b) Discrete fracture network (DFN) approach and incorporates deterministic, condi-
tioned, and stochastic features; or
(c) Block modeling where each block consists of unique rock strata property
information.

As a result, a 3-D model can be generated providing information and spatial visualiza-
tion of the rock structure as shown in Figs. 5–7. Spatial analysis offers a number of

Fig. 5. Stratigraphic model of sedimentary deposit (Mincom, 2004).

Fig. 6. Block model of rock properties (Surpac, 2004).

744 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750

Fig. 7. Discrete fracture network model (Golder Associates, 2004).

advantages. Rock properties data can be obtained or predicted at each location, and can
be quickly investigated and visualized in 3-D. This would allow quick response to changes
in rock conditions by providing an opportunity for early identification of possible prob-
lems. Secondly, it is very important that the surface rock is inspected for faults and planes
before blasthole charging. Previous excavations can give significant information about the
rock structure. Best-in-class safety performance can be achieved when regular geologic
hazard or exception mapping occurs by trained foremen and/or mine geologists. Incorpo-
rating geologic variability can be routine by including exception mapping into the periodic
stripping plan. Most surface mine operations plan pit sequencing and stripping on a
weekly to a monthly basis.

2.2. Blast hole pattern

Inaccuracies in the design of blasting patterns, including incorrect blasthole angle can
cause large deviations from the planned pattern resulting with flyrock occurrence. Com-
monly, the graphical design of drilling and blasting patterns is performed by using 2-D
computer aided design (CAD) tools, or is generally determined by drill operator experi-
ence. However, 2-D design techniques do not consider spatial characteristics of rock prop-
erties and usually use the average value of a parameter that is of interest. An engineerÕs
ability to analyze interactions among rock properties, geology, and pattern design could
be enhanced considerably using 3-D graphics. Fig. 8 shows an example of pattern design
using state-of-the-art technology such as MineScape (Mincom, 2004). The entire drilling
and blasting domain can be visualized from different angles, thus, forewarning about pos-
sible trouble spots before drilling. More detailed description on 3-D design of drilling and
blasting patterns can be found in Kecojevic et al. (2003), Kecojevic and Wilkinson (2003),
and Wilkinson and Kecojevic (2004).
 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750 745

Fig. 8. 3-D representation of blasting pattern.

2.3. Burden

Insufficient burden is one of the primary causes of flyrock (Fig. 9). Too short a distance
to the bench slope wastes energy, while too great a burden distance causes improper frac-
turing of the rock, creating oversize boulders. Due to irregularity of bench slopes, energy
generated during blasting pose the hazard at the weakest point of the bench. Furthermore,
any deviation during the drilling process can increase or reduce the burden. A common

Fig. 9. Typical blasting hole in surface mining (Fernberg, 2003).

746 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750

Fig. 10. A Global Positioning System (GPS) installed on the drill system (Modular Mining System, 2002).

problem in small mining operations is the lack of knowledge and accurate technology to
identify and recognize the specific anomaly or weakness in the rock structure that leads to
the subsequent flyrock problem. The blaster is aware that flyrock can occur if the hole
deviates from the intended direction and goes to close to the free face.
Until recently, a convenient means of gathering drilling records were not available.
Wireless technology applied at the drilling rig may help to resolve this problem. Drilling
machines can be instrumented with the variety of sensors, from which data can be digitized
and transmitted to any location for analyses. A global positioning system (GPS) installed
on the drill system can provide the precise locations of boreholes drilled (Modular Mining
System, 2002). Each borehole can be surveyed to provide an as-built record of the drilling
accuracy accomplished at each location (Fig. 10). The operator also can provide the on-
the-spot assessment of situations that result in drill downtime, or unusual performance
of the system at the given location. In such an arrangement, the machine location, changes
in geology, unusual rock strata features and machine defects could all be documented at
the same setting.
The Aquila Mining Systems (2004) has developed a production monitoring system, a
material recognition system, and a guidance system for vertical and inclined drilling.
The production monitoring system provides the operator with immediate information
on drilling productivity and performance, while the material recognition system is
equipped with vibration sensors and pattern recognition software to determine hole geo-
logy while drilling. Guidance systems for vertical and inclined drilling enable the operator
to position the blast hole with centimeter accuracy.

2.4. Blasthole loading

Blasthole overloading is one of the frequent causes of flyrock occurrence. Such over-
loading generates excessive release of energy. It appears due to the loss of powder in fis-
sures, joints, voids, and cracks. In order to prevent hole overloading, it is necessary to
load holes as designed using the correct charge weight. Additionally, a blast ratio should
 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750 747

be ensured sufficiently high to eliminate the possibility of excessive charging, and holes
have to be monitored to check the rise of the powder.

2.5. Stemming

Stemming material provides confinement and prevents the escape of high-pressure gases
from the blasting holes. This material must be free from rocks and properly tamped. Inad-
equate stemming results in stemming ejections from the holes resulting with flyrock. In
general, the stemming length should be not less than 25 times the blast hole diameter
(Sheridan, 2002). Konya and Walter (1990) recommend a steaming length of 0.7 times
the burden.

3. Blast area security

The US Code of Federal Regulations—CFR, Title 30 defines ÔBlast AreaÕ as the area in
which concussion (shock wave), flying material, or gases from an explosion may cause in-
jury to persons. Furthermore, the CFR states that the blast area shall be determined by
considering geology or material to be blasted, blasting patterns, blasting experience of
the mine personnel, delay systems, type and amount of explosive material, and type and
amount of stemming.
During the last two decades, lack of securing blast areas caused 45.64% of the fatal and
non-fatal accidents in coal surface mining due to failure to use appropriate blasting shel-
ter, failure to evacuate blast area from humans, and inadequate guarding of the access
roads leading to the blast area. Failure to evacuate humans from blast areas is complicated
by the increase in accessibility to rough terrain brought on by the substantial increase in
use of all terrain vehicles (ATVÕs). Areas inspected to be all-clear can be infiltrated by non-
mining personnel on ATVÕs within seconds. The issue of blast area security can be success-
fully addressed by providing appropriate training and education of personnel involved in
blasting operations to apply the best safety practices, as well as state and government reg-
ulations. Furthermore, the blast area must be inspected to determine distances to nearby
structures, roads, public places, and due consideration must be taken in determining the
degree of protection necessary, including the use of line-of-sight inspection methods to
guard against ATVÕs. It is of primary importance to clear all employees from the blast
area, guards should be posted at the entrance to all access roads leading to the blast area,
and the blaster should communicate to the foreman about the impending blast. The blas-
ter must go outside the blast area or stay inside a blasting shelter, and after receiving the
feedback from the foreman and guards, blast signal needs to be sounded. A detailed study
on safeguarding blast-affected areas is given by DÕAndrea and Bennett (1984).
Furthermore, blasting regulations (30 CFR Part 77.1303) require that ample warning
shall be given before blasts are fired, and all persons shall be cleared and removed from
the blast area unless suitable blasting shelters are provided to protect persons endangered
by concussion or flyrock from blasting.

4. Safety evaluations

The administration of industrial safety rests on the foundation that accident investi-
gation results in the identification of cause followed by the appropriate response or
748 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750

correction in procedure. This approach can be referred as reactive safety, since the safety
response mechanism occurs after an accident. The proactive safety response mechanism
occurs when corrective action is taken after a non-event called a near-miss. A benchmark
safety study done in 1969 involving over 3 billion man-hours revealed for every serious or
disabling or serious injury, 10 minor injuries occur, 30 property damage events occur, and
600 incidents occur with no visible injury or damage (Bird, 1974). The 1-10-30-600
relationships indicate the essential value of proactive safety and the prevention of acci-
dents depends on addressing the near-misses.
Dyno Nobel Corporation, like other large explosive manufacturers, provides product
delivery to the minesite, and in fact into the very drill hole in mining operations. Exposure
of an explosiveÕs manufacturerÕs employees is therefore equal to miners. Dyno Nobel
North America implemented a proactive safety program of which one the main elements
was a near-miss reporting and evaluation procedure for their employees. The results have
been excellent. For example, for the period from 1995 to 1998, lost time injury frequency
rate decreased from 4.44 to 1.11, and lost time injury severity rate decreased from 95 to 29.
The approach of reporting near-misses affected safety performance in a large magnitude.

5. Education and training

Effectively training the workforce in blasting hazard recognition and avoidance, and the
safe use of explosives is an essential activity in reducing blasting incidents. In the United
States, the use of explosives in mining is regulated at both the Federal and statesÕ level. The
federal government and individual state governments maintain and enforce health and
safety, and training standards to help minimize blasting mishaps that endanger life and
property. While each government entity works toward the same goal, the federal govern-
ment and state governments assume somewhat different approaches to achieving the goal.
Under federal training regulations contained in Title 30, CFR, Parts 48 and 46, (US
Department of Labor, 2002) mining companies are required to train miners in the hazards
related to explosives and safe blasting requirements through training curriculum content
presented in either what is known as comprehensive training courses, i.e., new miner, an-
nual refresher, newly-hired experienced, new task training, or hazard training (typically
provided for contactors working on mine sites, or occasional visitors and service workers).
It would be accurate to say that if the mine uses explosives, the miner or contractor will be
instructed at a minimum in blasting hazards and avoidance, and if the miner is assigned to
a blasting crew, in the safe use of explosives. This instruction on the safe use of explosives
would be provided in a task training course or a task training session within a new miner
training course. The federal training regulations, if fully complied with, ensure that all
miners and visitors are, at a minimum, trained in basic blast hazard awareness.
State level involvement in achieving the goal of safe blasting activities typically includes
the establishment and implementation of a program of blastersÕ training, examination, and
certification. The general purposes of these programs are to ensure that ‘‘blasts’’ are de-
signed, supervised, and executed by trained and competent personnel (Alabama Surface
Mining Commission Administrative Code, 2004). As an example of the training curricu-
lum content, PennsylvaniaÕs programs includes, but is not limited to, discussion and
instruction on regulations, scaled distances, blast design, blasting materials, initiation sys-
tems, and record-keeping (Bureau of Mining and Reclamation, 2003). While the particu-
lars of the programs differ by state, applicants to the program must pass a competency
 V. Kecojevic, M. Radomsky / Safety Science 43 (2005) 739–750 749

examination before being awarded a blasterÕs license. The licensed blaster becomes the
‘‘blaster-in-charge’’ for each blast. Such licensing programs attempt to maximize blasting
accident prevention by ensuring that the blast be designed and executed in strict accor-
dance with the statutory rules, and that adequate supervision, monitoring, and control
of all blasting activities be administered by a certified person.

6. Conclusion

The historical trend over the 23-year period is a general decrease in the number of inju-
ries and fatalities from blasting accidents for coal, metal and non-metal operations. Even
though blasting accidents for all types of mining operations have declined, they continue
to occur and cause fatalities and injuries. Mining personnel continue to suffer fatal and
disabling injuries from blasting accidents. An analysis performed shows that the lack of
blast area security and flyrock accounted for 281 (68.2%) accidents during the analyzed
period.
A major challenge facing users of blasting techniques is how to apply the state-of-the-
art technology to assist them in evaluation of the potential to cause harm to workers, and
to develop effective strategies for control and to minimize occupational health hazards
associated with blasting. Training and education of personnel involved in blasting opera-
tions play a critical role in preventing fatalities and injuries, and should be focused on:
codes and standards, workplace responsibility, assessing and developing accident preven-
tion strategies, developing workplace safety procedures, implementing work practices that
meet specified legislation and standards, identifying strategies for monitoring and updat-
ing safety and health information, effective occupational health and safety communica-
tions, and improving occupational health and safety performance.

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