BANGSAMORO BASIC LAW

MANILA (2nd UPDATE) - Congress has approved the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law, a measure that
seeks to help end decades of fighting in the south and certified as urgent by President Rodrigo Duterte. A
bicameral conference will need to reconcile the two chambers' versions of the bill before it can be signed
into law by the President. On Wednesday, a total of 227 lawmakers voted for the bill while 11 voted
against it in the lower chamber. Two lawmakers abstained. Meanwhile, Senate early Thursday
unanimously approved the measure on third and final reading. The BBL will install a Bangsamoro political
entity in place of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It is envisioned to grant wider
self-rule to predominantly Muslim provinces and cities. The law is one of the requirements under a
peace agreement that Manila signed with the MILF in 2014 under then-president Benigno "Noynoy"
Aquino III. Duterte had banked on the bill's passage to heal the "historical injustices" suffered by the
Moros. It failed to pass under Aquino after 44 police commandos died in a botched anti-terrorism raid in
the remote town of Mamasapano in January 2015. Troops engaged rebels forces, including the MILF, in
the hunt for Malaysian bomb-maker Marwan, who was killed in the operation.

'A STEP FORWARD'

The passage of the proposed measure in Congress is a welcome development, ARMM Governor Mujiv
Hataman said in a statement. "We have every confidence that the final version of BBL will remain true -
both to the spirit and the letter - of earlier frameworks and agreements with the stakeholders of the
Bangsamoro narrative," he said. Hataman said "BBL should bring forth an institution that is capable of
responding to the challenge of the times and to the aspirations of the Bangsamoro." "The BBL is
envisioned to codify not only a law, but a history of struggle and sacrifice - by countless mujahideen,
their families, and fellow Moros, as well as all of the Filipino people who were unwavering in their hope
and their actions for peace, social justice, inclusiveness, and progress," he added. Hataman, however,
said the proposed measure "will remain a piece of paper if we cease putting in the hard work it takes to
implement the law." "This passage is not the end. Rather it is an encouraging milestone on our journey
to peace, our unfolding story of self-determination...We owe this to those who came before us. Even
more so, we owe this to the coming generations of Moros and our fellow Filipinos," he added. - with
reports from RG Cruz and Zandro Ochona, ABS-CBN News

Three years into his presidency, Rodrigo Duterte signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law, previously known
as the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). It marked a historic step towards the creation of a Muslim-majority
sub-state entity within the Catholic-majority Philippines. It also represented, to this date, Duterte's
biggest legislative achievement. The path ahead, however, remains bumpy and uncertain. Residents of
Muslim-populated regions in Mindanao are yet to approve the creation of a Bangsamoro (nation of
Moros) in a plebiscite later this year. Lurking over the horizon are the dark clouds of tribal-ethnic
divisions, poor basic infrastructure, and an overall climate of insecurity. Yet, to many people and experts,
this is the Philippines' best chance at staunching the wounds of a religious divide, which has haunted the
fertile and beautiful island of Mindanao for centuries.

A personal legacy
As the first Filipino president hailing from Mindanao, Duterte has fulfilled his earlier promise to nudge
the troubled southern island towards peace and prosperity. Ahead of his election as the Philippines'
most powerful man, Duterte billed himself as a unifying force, the first president of the Moro people,
and an unremitting advocate for Mindanao's interests. Against this unique backdrop, Duterte has pushed
for greater autonomy and respect for the Muslim minority in the Philippines, who are among his most
loyal constituents. The final approval of the controversial Bangsamoro law served as a testament to the
political will and enduring popularity of the Filipino president. For years, the proposed creation of a
Bangsamoro faced stiff opposition among the political establishment as well as the wider public,
especially after the Mamasapano massacre in 2015, when rebel groups killed dozens of Filipino Special
Forces during a botched counter-terror operation. Throughout much of his two years in office, Duterte
himself shunned the BBL issue, partly concerned about lack of political support. Back in May, however,
he finally certified the proposed law as an urgent bill, mobilising his allies in both houses of the Congress
to approve it. In his third State of the Nation Address (SONA), Duterte placed the Bangsamoro issue front
and centre. He underscored his "solemn commitment" to ensure his administration "will never deny our
Muslim brothers and sisters the basic legal tools to chart their own destiny within the Constitutional
framework of our country". Describing Mindanao as a land of promise approaching a "crossroads of
history", Duterte implored his countrymen for "loads of understanding and patience to endure and
overcome the birth pangs or pains of the new beginning". There was a sense of urgency. He signed the
Bangsamoro law less than a year after militants affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL, also known as ISIS) group laid a months-long and destructive siege on the Muslim-majority city of
Marawi. Through granting greater political autonomy, Duterte hopes, the government will address the
roots of extremism and terror that have hounded his country. He argued that the Filipino people "owe it
to our fallen soldiers and police officers" during the liberation of Marawi to "put an end to the bloodshed
and seek the path of true peace" for generations to come.

The tough road ahead

The new law provides for the demobilisation of tens of thousands of Moro rebels, as both sides hope to
end a war economy that has ravaged Mindanao. Under a 75-25 wealth-sharing arrangement between
the national government and the proposed Bangsamoro entity, only a quarter of locally-generated taxes
will be remitted back to the national government. The Bangsamoro will also be guaranteed an annual
block grant of up to a five percent share of the entire national revenue, amounting to just over $1bn (P59
billion) annually. The region will also have its own unique domestic legislation, likely a parliament, and a
plethora of distinct administrative systems, including the creation of Islamic law courts. After a decades-
long liberation struggle, led initially by the Tausug-dominated Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
and later the Maguindanao-dominated Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Moros are now the
closest they've been to achieving their long-sought autonomy, though still within the framework of the
Philippine constitution. Yet, the proposed Bangsamoro, a product of a 2014 peace agreement between
the Philippine government and the MILF, has been met with reticence if not derision by some leaders of
the MNLF, who may fear a loss of power and prestige to their rivals under the new regime. After all, the
Bangsamoro will replace the MNLF-led Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a largely
failed earlier experiment at granting autonomy to relatively few Muslim-majority regions. Duterte has
promised to personally mediate among competing ethnic-tribal groups to unify the Moros under the
new political entity. The other challenge is the willingness of more prosperous and diverse provinces,
especially in Cotabato but also in Lanao del Norte and elsewhere, to join the MILF-dominated
Bangsamoro. After all, some Moro warlords and political dynasties may prefer to duke it out under the
established rule of distant "Imperial Manila" rather than a more uncertain one under proximate rivals in
Mindanao.

Surveys also show that the broader Filipino public is largely "neutral" with almost equal numbers of
people expressing support and opposition to the creation of a larger Muslim-majority political entity.
Many Mindanao residents are either sceptical or perplexedabout its implications. There is even a chance
that some critics will question its constitutionality at the Supreme Court on the grounds that this will
undermine the country's internal coherence and territorial integrity. Above all, however, the biggest
challenge is for the MILF and other regional leaders to transition from weary rebels into a competent
and progressive ruling class capable of addressing the most fundamental needs of the Moro peoples.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's
editorial stance.

Froilyn Mendoza, Founder, TLWOI

When the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed
the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro on October 15, 2012, many rejoiced. It seemed that
peace to the four-decade conflict between the Government and MILF had finally been reached. But
peace is not just the absence of war or conflict. For indigenous women like me, peace is about kefiyo
fédéw (peaceful feeling). This can only be attained in the future Bangsamoro if all our basic needs such
as food, shelter, security and recognition are satisfied. We need to be given the fundamental right to our
identity and territory. It is our inherent birthright. It is non-negotiable. I live in the Southern most part
of the Philippines, in the hinterlands of South Upi. It is one of the poorest municipalities in the province
of Maguindanao and is at the heart of the conflict. It is a core territory of the envisioned future
Bangsamoro political entity. I belong to the Téduray tribe, one of the 18 major tribal groupings of Non
Islamized Indigenous Lumad tribes in Mindanao. For the past 20 years I’ve been a grassroots campaigner
and organiser for indigenous women. I am the founder of the Téduray Lambangian Women’s
Organization(TLWOI), a grassroots organization of tribal women in my hometown. Since 1970, more than
10,000 Téduray families have fled Maguindanao. This is partly due to armed confrontations between the
Ilaga (a Christian Militia) and the Moro (Muslim people in Mindanao). In addition, in 1996 the MILF
established a base in our area and declared it a Satellite Camp. In 2000 former President Estrada
declared war against MILF and overran our camp. We had to flee once again, and we still do not have
permanent places to live in. Indigenous people in Philippines have historically been excluded from
participating in governance and the electoral process. However, there is an opportunity for this to
change. The development of the Basic Law of the new region of Bangsamoro has included a process of
consultation with the population of Mindanao. Indigenous women were able to get involved in these
consultations, in part due to a governance project by Conciliation Resources and the British Embassy,
which included capacity building activities that empowered us to participate. Indigenous women have
been actively engaging in the on-going peace negotiations between the GPH-MILF, especially in the
drafting of the new Basic Law. We have been sending organisational statements, attending public
hearings and presenting our position in consultations on the basic law. We have submitted our proposed
provisions for consideration in the drafting of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. This is important as it helps to
challenge the wider public perceptions of indigenous women as housewives who are confined to
household chores. Indigenous women play an important role in our customary traditional governance.
We are responsible for settling conflicts, officiating rituals and acting as midwives when other indigenous
women give birth.

However, despite our important traditional roles, cultures within the indigenous community continue to
harm and disadvantage women. It is not surprising to see young indigenous women forced to marry men
six times their age in arranged marriages. Rape is considered an ordinary case that is confined to the
expertise of the tribal leaders and settled amicably. Even worse, rape victims are sometimes forced to
marry the perpetrator because in our culture, rape is a form of marriage. Cases of incest rape are
common. With the prominence of alcoholism among indigenous peoples, physical and sexual abuse is
increasing. These cases are settled amicably as part of our customary law, and are not known
publically. The tribal structure is a biggest stumbling block to indigenous women’s empowerment. This is
why we need to actively participate in the codification of our customary laws to ensure that the issues
affecting us are considered. This is a chance for indigenous women to interact with governance
structures outside of the tribe. For instance, many indigenous women are victims of discrimination and
violence. However, they cannot talk about the issue openly because there is a tribal culture
of mesala (penalizing) those who expose sensitive issues, like rape. It is forbidden and taboo to talk
about sex. As a result, women who are victims of violence keep silence. Through the consultation, we
were able to request that the Bangsamoro Basic Law to have a provision on this. Without the input of
indigenous women, this issue may have gone unconsidered. We indigenous women are praying that our
proposed provisions will upheld when congress enact the final Bangsamoro Basic Law. In particular we
hope for a specific provision on the protection of the rights of indigenous women. We know the struggle
isn’t over, we only hope that partners and supporters will continue to walk with us in our journey. No
war, no violence against women

RELATIONSHIP OF PHILIPPINES WITH CHINA

The Philippines’ relations with China have recently experienced turbulence, with the occurrence of
various controversies and disputes. The issues behind development projects have cast doubts on the
integrity of Chinese investments and revealed the venality of Philippine institutions. Moreover, the fiery
and contentious maritime row between the two countries has led to the deterioration of bilateral ties.
These long-standing hostilities have brought diplomatic relations to their lowest point since they were
established in June 1975.

However, with the current administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, bilateral relations have taken a
dramatic turn – from a hostile mood to a more amiable outlook. In his state visit to China in October
2016, Duterte declared the Philippines’ “realignment” with China, after five years without any high-level
exchanges between the two governments. Departing from his predecessor’s uncompromising stance,
Duterte opted to downplay security issues in favour of reviving political relations and pursuing economic
ties with China.

During the administration of President Benigno Aquino III (2011–2016), bilateral relations were
dominated by maritime disputes. Since 2012, China has seized and taken effective control of
Scarborough Shoal, which is situated within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The situation
has been further aggravated by unlawful establishment of infrastructures in the area and an illegal
ban on Filipino fishermen’s access to its fishing grounds. Bilateral ties took a downturn when the Aquino
administration filed an arbitration case against China in 2013, under the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS). In 2016, the UN Arbitral Tribunal decided that “the Philippines has exclusive
sovereign rights over the West Philippine Sea (part of the South China Sea) and that China’s ‘nine-dash
line” based on its historic rights is invalid’”.

Given its political and security issues, the Philippines has faced difficulties in its economic relations with
China. At the height of the territorial disputes, it faced stricter implementation of trade rules and
commercial regulations by Chinese authorities. This was evident when China imposed stringent food and
safety standards and requirements in 2012 that led to the ban on banana imports from the Philippines.
The ban was enforced after Chinese quarantine officials discovered mealybugs in several containers of
bananas shipped to China. The decision was widely seen as China’s reprisal against the Philippines at the
height of the disputes in Scarborough Shoal.

However, since assuming the presidency Duterte has adopted a more amiable style of engagement with
China. His accommodating approach has been rewarded by various pledges of loans and investments
that would fund infrastructure development projects in the Philippines. And most importantly, Filipino
fishermen have returned to their normal fishing activities, although still under watch by the Chinese
Coast Guard.

This is especially important given the past controversies regarding Chinese-funded projects in the
country. The North Rail and National Broadband Network were among the projects in the Philippines
that were cancelled due to allegations of corruption and irregularities. Such controversies produced
national embarrassment for the Philippines and created a negative image for China. But with the
Philippines’ membership in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its
participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the country is expected to have more constructive
economic engagement with China. In fact, China remained the Philippines’ biggest source of imports,
with a 20.8 percent share, in January 2017, with payments recorded at $1,552 billion. This reflected an
increase of 26.4 percent from $1,228 billion in January 2016. Meanwhile, revenues from the Philippines’
exports to China reached $501.2 million, generating a total bilateral trade value of $2,053 billion. For the
Philippines, these active bilateral trade and recent regional developments will benefit its domestic
economy while improving diplomatic relations. For China, such initiatives will further elevate its
economic influence in the region while neutralizing its image of bellicosity in asserting its maritime
claims.

The Philippines also gained positive momentum in renewing political and security ties with China.
Despite the favourable arbitration ruling, because of its weak naval capabilities the Philippines cannot
enforce its maritime rights and challenge the Chinese Coast Guard barricading in the Scarborough Shoal.
It was not until Duterte’s state visit to China that Filipino fishermen were able to return to the area and
resume their fishing activities after four years of Chinese prohibition. Moreover, high-level bilateral
dialogue regarding maritime disputes has resumed following Duterte’s participation in the BRI Summit in
Beijing last May.

The warming up of bilateral ties after years of frosty relations can be attributed to Duterte’s pragmatic
policy. Evidently, he departed from the Aquino administration’s defiance against Chinese assertiveness in
the West Philippine Sea. And instead, Duterte opted to cooperate with China in managing tensions in the
area by not taking any military action after the court’s ruling, while amassing various economic
concessions in the process. He considered that focusing more on the trade and economic aspects of the
Philippines’ relations with China would ultimately benefit the Filipino people more than insisting on
national maritime claims that it cannot impose. This may appear to be a very opportunistic economic
tactic, and it may almost seem that the Philippines is forsaking its maritime security; but Duterte’s
foreign policy adjustments have a logical basis that reflects his calculating and business-like approach.

Moreover, the Duterte administration highlights an “independent foreign policy” that seeks to move the
Philippines away from its dependence on the United States. While the United States is its long-standing
ally, the Philippines under Duterte is pushing to deepen relations with other, equally important partners
such as Japan. It also seeks to strengthen relations with non-democratic countries that hold divergent
political values, such as Russia. Although the Philippines is a long-standing democracy, its increasing
interaction with Russia reflects Duterte’s pragmatic foreign policy and accommodating posture, which
emphasizes concrete bilateral dealings rather than ideological engagements. The Philippines also strives
to steer clear of big power rivalries and seeks to cooperate with various countries that will potentially
bring in economic benefits, regardless of any looming political issues.

While the Chinese government has welcomed this positive breakthrough in bilateral relations, public
opinion in the Philippines is divided on whether or not this was a sound move by the Duterte
administration. But the general perception is that Duterte’s accommodating policy towards China has
temporarily de-escalated maritime tensions and enhanced trade ties. As a small power, the Philippines
considers this a welcome step towards a more peaceful neighbourhood for its economic development.

In the long term, it is imperative that the Philippines be accommodating yet vigilant in its relations with
China under its still-ambiguous, yet-to-be-operationalized “independent foreign policy”. Given the shift
in its foreign policy, the challenge for the Philippines under Duterte is to be consistently cautious in its
policy implementation. Foreign policy must be supervised by established institutions in order to put a
check on decisions based on personal impulses, which have been the trademark of the Duterte
administration so far.

Andrea Chloe Wong is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Canterbury in
Christchurch, New Zealand. She is also a non-resident WSD Handa Fellow of the Pacific Forum CSIS. She
previously served as a Senior Foreign Affairs Research Specialist at the Center for International Relations
and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines.

The China-Philippines relationship has completely thawed,becoming as warm as Manila’s weather,

according to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.

Li paid an official visit to the Philippines from November 15 to 16, after the country concluded its hosting
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Manila. Li was the first Chinese premier
in ten years to visit the Philippines. As The Diplomat reported earlier, China’s foreign ministry attached
great important to Li’s visit, issuing a round of publicity ahead of the trip and praising the warming
relationship on multiple occasions.

On November 15, Li and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte co-hosted a press conference after
their meeting at Malacañang Palace.
According to China’s state news agency Xinhua as well as the Philippines’ The Philippine Star, Li told the
press:

Winter has come to the Northern Hemisphere but the temperature in Manila is still running pretty high. I
think that somewhat reflects the temperature of Philippine-China relations, which is also going pretty
high on the basis of the positive improvement of the relations between the two countries. We hope that
we will continue to work together to strengthen this positive momentum and work together for the time
that we may have lost.

China and the Philippines also issued a joint statement on November 16. According to the statement,
both sides recognize that the bilateral relations have “achieved positive turnaround” and agree to
“advance Philippines-China relations in a sustained and pragmatic manner.”

Regarding the South China Sea dispute — the problem that has seriously undermined mutual relations in
the past — there are three lengthy paragraphs in the statement related to the issue. “Both sides affirm
that contentious maritime issues are not the sum total of the Philippines-China bilateral relationship,”
the statement said.

Both sides agreed to strengthen maritime cooperation in areas such as marine environmental protection,
disaster risk reduction, and possible cooperation in marine scientific research, subject to further
consultations. Both countries may also “explore means to cooperate” in other possible maritime
activities, including maritime oil and gas exploration and exploitation.

Notably, both countries also “reaffirm the importance of maintaining and promoting regional peace and
stability, freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea, as well as freedom of
commerce and other peaceful uses.”

The joint statement is a far cry from the tense standoff between China and the Philippines over the
South China Sea under the previous Philippine president. Notably, former President Benigno Aquino III’s
administration filed an international arbitration case against China’s claims and behavior in the South
China Sea, despite Beijing’s vehement protests. Duterte, however, has taken a more low-key stance on
the disputes in the hopes of securing financial gains for his country.

We saw the results during Li’s visit, when China signed 14 agreements with the Philippines, furthering
the economic side of the relationship.

For example, China will provide a RMB150 million ($23 million) grant to help with reconstruction in
battle-ravaged Marawi City. The Export-Import Bank of China has also signed a $307.41 million financing
agreement with the Philippines for the construction of the Kaliwa Dam-New Centennial Water Source
project and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Facility.

Ahead of Li’s trip to Manila, Li published a signed article in the Philippines’ newspapers, expressing
China’s strong intention to renew friendship with the nation. In the article, Li highly praised Duterte for
making “the right decision to improve and develop relations with China” since Duterte took office.

“The China-Philippines relationship is now seeing a rainbow after the storm and showing a good
momentum across the board,” the article said.

EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING

Hundreds of suspected drug dealers have been killed since the Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte
took office just one month ago. Six were assassinated in a single night in Manila. Dozens of similar killings
have taken place almost daily in the Philippines, but with drugs and crime so deep-rooted, there is barely
any public outrage. Some 316 suspected drug dealers were killed from July 1-27, 195 of which were
vigilante killings, according to police, for being suspected of using or dealing drugs, as a direct result of
President Duterte’s campaign to eradicate crime within six months. Human rights groups estimate the
body count to be at least double the official number.

President Rodrigo Duterte acknowledged the occurrence of extrajudicial killings linked with his war on
drugs and today, Thursday, August 4,during an environment summit in Davao City, he said he intends to
investigate them. A vast majority of countries - including the EU - took a clear stand against the death
penalty for drug crimes at UNGASS in New York this April, and civil society was united in its demand that
the death penalty be abolished. Civil society groups from across the globe have called on UN drug
control authorities to urge an immediate stop to the extrajudicial killings of suspected drug offenders in
the Philippines. Yesterday, UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime issued a
Statementcondemning the 100s of extra-judicial killings of suspected drug dealers and users in the

On October 12, 2016, Senator Leila De Lima filed Senate Bill 1197 also known as the Anti-Extrajudicial
Killing Act of 2016. This bill was in response to the spate of killing that have occurred following the
installation of Rodrigo Duterte as President. These are suspected to be extrajudicial killings and that
President Duterte tacitly condones or sanctions them. The bill is supposed to strengthen the Philippine
National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) in investigating said killings. The idea is for all three organizations to cooperate; the CHR can and
will have the authority to investigate such cases and make inquiries. Under normal circumstances, the
PNP or NBI usually handles the investigation but under this bill, it gives the CHR move authority to get
involved. This means that the PNP and NBI must cooperate with the CHR, especially if they need
information.

In addition, the bill calls for PNP officers to announce their presence when conducting police operations
such as arrests, raids and searches. They are urged to refrain from using deadly force, not even give
warning shots; if possible, they are asked to use non-lethal weapons when arresting a resisting suspect.
It can be inferred that the senator thinks the police tend to kill suspects, especially those surrendering;
they then make it appear the suspects were resisting arrest. She suspects this is as an EJK.

As soon as it was filed, the Senate Bill 1197 came under fire from her critics. One of the critics is Senator
Panfilo Lacson who found some provisions unrealistic and absurd. As a veteran police officer and former
head of the PNP, Senator Lacson knew where he was coming from. Regarding the need to for the police
announce themselves, this will tip off the suspect and he will either flee to elude arrest; or he will fight it
out and probably prepare himself such as barricading himself and possibly take hostages.

From a tactical viewpoint, the element of surprised is preferred during police operations. It will not give
the suspect a chance to flee or put up a fight. This proposed policy will defeat or negate the effectiveness
of police operations and put police officers at a disadvantage, if not at risk. In the latter scenario
mentioned above, they might be involved in a standoff that may not only take long to resolve, but could
result in a disaster if not resolved properly. There is a chance innocent bystanders and hostages could be
killed or wounded if it comes down to it. The police would prefer to carry out an operation quickly and
very efficiently and hopefully, no shots will be fired.
With regard to using force to subdue a suspect, critics of the Senate Bill 1197 found this unreasonable as
well. It takes away the ability of the police officer to defend himself if a suspect fights back resisting
arrest. There have been several instances police officers have been killed in the line of duty for this
reason. Many think Senator De Lima assumes that the police have a tendency to kill a suspect which they
then justify as “resisting arrest;” the suspect tried to take the gun of an arresting officer prompting them
to shoot the suspect.

President Duterte assured the members of the PNP they would be justified in doing so provided it is in
the course of their duty AND when their lives are at risk if the suspect puts up a fight. In this regard, he is
prepared to defend them against any charge of human rights violations. It also goes without saying he
will not tolerate the use of “excessive force” but he will leave it to the proper authorities to investigate
that matter to either clear or charge the police officer of wrongdoing.

However, in fairness to Senator De Lima, one point that does make sense is the use of non-lethal devices
to subdue a suspect as an alternative to shooting them. Although police officers are also equipped with
batons and tear gas (spray form), this would be a good idea to issue Tazer guns to police officers like the
ones used by their foreign counterparts. This would be ideal if the suspect is not armed and dangerous
(such as emotionally disturbed individuals) or in situations that do not require the use of deadly force.

Nevertheless, Senate Bill 1197 will not likely pass given the author whom many sense is using it to
undermine the Duterte Administration’s campaign against crime and illegal drugs. Another thing to take
into consideration is the timing. Senator De Lima once started a hearing to investigate EJK and was
eventually removed from the chairmanship for showing bias. Many also sense an ulterior motive and this
recent bill filed is related to that motive. The CHR’s credibility is questionable because it is headed by
someone associated with the past administration and is seen as another saboteur in the administration’s
anti-crime campaign. From the provisions, it seeks to put roadblocks and appears to undermine the
ability of the PNP to carry out its duty to bring criminals to justice; because the bill is seen as favoring the
suspects in the guise of protecting their rights.

All in all, Senate Bill 1197 is doomed to fail for the above reasons and the reasons for defeating it are
more sensible than what the bill entails. Needless to say, it is an exercise in futility on the part of the bill’s
author.

Paris-Geneva, September 8, 2017 - Authorities in the Philippines must ensure greater protection of
human rights defenders amid a recent surge of killings and attacks against them, the Observatory for the
Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT) said today.

In recent days, at least four representatives from different communities, - peasant and small-scale miner
groups - have been shot dead. More than 50 human rights defenders - mostly peasants or indigenous
persons - have been killed since President Duterte assumed office in June 2016, according to human
rights NGO Karapatan (a member of OMCT’s SOS-Torture Network). Karapatan has documented the
killing of more than 660 human rights defenders in the last 16 years in the Philippines.

“While human rights defenders in the Philippines have been traditionally vulnerable to killings, threats,
and attacks [1], President Duterte’s anti-human rights rhetoric and blatant disregard for human life have
created a more hostile environment for defenders”, said FIDH President Dimitris Christopoulos.
President Duterte has repeatedly threatened to kill human rights defenders. The latest such instance was
on August 16, when he suggested that human rights activists were “obstructing justice” and urged police
to “shoot them”.

“President Duterte’s Government, like any other Philippine Government, has a legal obligation to protect
human rights and human rights defenders. His discourse that literally encourages violence against
defenders - the very people who stand up for human rights, social justice, and an inclusive society - must
stop”, said OMCT Secretary General Gerald Staberock.

On August 23, 2017, Mr. Roger Timboco, a member of the peasant group KAMMAO (Kahugpungan sa
mga Maguuma sa Maco ComVal), was shot dead in Mawab, Compostela Valley. Four days later, a
member of “Abante”, a local organisation of small-scale miners, Mr. Lomer Gerodias, was shot dead in
Maragusan, also in Compostela Valley. Both killings were believed to have been carried out by Philippine
soldiers. Two others, Mr. Jezreel Arrabis and his wife Ms. Dalia Arrabis, both members of the Farmers
Association in Davao City (FADC), were gunned down in Davao City on September 2, 2017.

In addition to extrajudicial killings, human rights defenders operating in the Philippines continue to be
the target of harassment, death threats, and verbal abuse. On August 22, police raided the houses of
peasant activists Mr. Rolando Gumban, his son Jeremy Gumban, and son-in-law Jun Roy Diane - all
members of farmers group Pamanggas-KMP, which works to promote land rights in Sitio Lubigan,
Barangay Pananawan, Masbate Province. Police arrested the three and detained them at Sara police
station, Iloilo Province. The charges against them are still unknown. In July and August, several members
of Karapatan, including Secretary Generals Ms. Cristina Palabay and Mr. Reylan Vergara, received death
threats. On August 20, 2017, Dr. Darby Santiago, Chairperson of the Health Alliance for Democracy
(HEAD) - a member organisation of Karapatan, also received death threats.

A fact-finding mission to the Philippines, carried out by the Observatory from August 7 to 16, 2017,
observed an increasingly hostile environment for human rights defenders in the country. Interlocutors
reported having experienced increased difficulties in carrying out their human rights activities under
President Duterte, particularly in relation to investigations surrounding extrajudicial killings allegedly
committed by police and vigilantes as part of Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’.

House Bill 1617, which is currently under consideration before the House of Representatives and aims at
strengthening the protection of human rights defenders, could help improve the situation for defenders.
The draft legislation reaffirms the rights of human rights defenders when carrying out their peaceful and
legitimate activities. It also imposes an obligation on the Government to take all precautionary measures
to ensure the protection of human rights defenders against any violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or
de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of their
legitimate activities.

The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (the Observatory) was created in 1997 by
FIDH and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT). The objective of this programme is to prevent
or remedy situations of repression against human rights defenders. FIDH and OMCT are both members
of ProtectDefenders.eu, the European Union Human Rights Defenders Mechanism implemented by
international civil society.