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*5. KEY WO RDS (C.nln u. on .
Action , Ar is to tlean Logic , ax iom , axiomatic set theory , b inocular perc ep tion ,
boundary , Cantors proof , change , classical logic ,complementarity,d ialec ti cs ,
differentiation , dual ity, event , fals ity, fou nda tions of logic , founda tions
of ma thema tics , foundations of philosophy , fo unda tions of phys ics , frame ,
Key Words (Continued)
IB us1RACT (Co.c~~ is — ,.sw.. 1
. ~~ IS onco.. y d td.nII ~ by block niinbss)
~~~
~ Treating an element of a set as a monocularly perceived entity and
acco unting for the Ind iv id ual in tervals of tim e used in the percep tions
involved In a logic statement, the a uthor demons tra tes a s imple me thod for
comprehe1nd ing the iden tity of oppos ites , by means of b inoc u lar percep tion in
a s ingl~ jnonocu1ar frame . He further demonstrates that the present three
laws of logic as written are self—contradictory , hence illogical. By writing ~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
_ _ _
F. 
mn~ ini ~T! —
 ~  ~
.., ~~~ r w ~~~~ ~

SECURITY C LA S S I P I C A T $ O P S OF THIS PAGEOThin bat. t
n i .r
.d)
geome t ry, Godel ’s p roo f , Hege l , He racl itus , identity , identity of opposites ,
laws of logic , local ized even t , log ic, mathematics , m en tal phenomena , mind ,
mono c u lar percep tion , nonobjectivity , nothing , objectivity , observa tion ,
observer , opposi te, paradox , Parmen ides , par t icle , percep tion , philosophy ,
pho ton , pho ton in terac t ion , phys ical phenomena , phys ics , postulate, primitive
observa t ion , probability , quantum , quan tum chan ge , q uan tum mechan ics ,
q uan tum phys ics , se t theory , sioiu].taaeity , spa ce , space time , time, truth ,
two—slit experiment , uncertainty principle , union of opposites , wave .
Abstract (Concluded)
The first three laws are stated to be synthesized from and fitted to
the photon interaction , by p r im itive h um an observa tion —— hence they are
f itted to monoc ular percep tion and apply only away from a boundary. The
fourth law is deliberately fitted to binocular perception and thus only
applies to the boundary and in the absence of the photon interaction . The
two—slit experiment , which contains the heart of q uan tum mechan ics , clearly
demonstrates the logical fitting to the presence or absence of the photon
interaction.
The author refers to his work in applying four—law logic to solve the
problem of the nature of mind and its interaction with matter , and paranorma l
phenomena.
a_ miN i, _ _ _ _ _
an SW jIS
~ ~~
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Unclass if ied
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  ~~~~~  ~~~~~~~  ~~..    . 
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ABSTRACT
[
*5*
/
POSIT POSIT TE
L~~
PS I T E]
_
14
BOUNDARIES A ~
ASSUM(p
NONIDENT ICA L
(a) CLASSICAL LOGIC (b) BOUNDARY IDENTITY OF
OPPOSITES
1. S
. 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
_ _ _ _ _ _
• .
~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Yet in this pa per we pr opos e a path around the “Grea t Dilemma ” that underlies all
our W estern rationality , and we propose a methodology to comprehend the identity of
opposites . Further , we propose a si mple methodolog y to apply the fourth law to solve
present paradoxes . We state at the beginning tha t thi s Is not j ust a mental exercise;
i ndeed , it has direct application for the construction of rea l physica l (and nonphyslcal !)
devices t hat function In ways our present devices do not , Further , we state that t he
methodology offers at least one way to unite physics and meta physics on a single ,
consistent , scientific basis.
******************** *** A
*************************** ****
Aristotle instituted the basic precept that every dcm~ nstrative science mu st start
from ind emonstr at ~ie pr lnc lp l es(l) . Those principles common to all sciences are called
axt om s(2) . “Elsewhere the axioms are characteri zed as the common opinions from which
all demonstration proceed s , and as those thing s which anyone must hold who Is to learn
anythi ng at aLl . “(3) Euclid used a division of postulates (indemonstrable principles
peculiar to the science of geometry) and common notions (the same as Aristotle ’s axioms.)
Whi1e there is still some confusion even today between the terms postulate and axiom_,
an increasing usage is evidenced to limit the term axiom to the axiom s of logic , and the
term postulate to those assumptions or first principles beyond the axioms of logic by
means of which a particular mathematica l or scienti fic discip line Is defined .
However , all our present science , mathematics , logic , and philo sophy are known
to be openended and assump tive. This follows directly from G&iel’s famous proof tha t ,
within any rigidly logi ca l system there are questions (propositions) tha t cannot be proved
or disproved on the basis of the axioms with in tha t system(4) . In other word s , none of
our present sciences are necessarily free from contradiction . In fact , they are not
necessarily even consistent , from recent work on founda tions of axiomati c set theory .
This follows because , assuming that a p articular axiomatic theory T is consistent , and
S is a sentence or formula of T that is not an axiom and Is also independent , the n the
theory T remains consistent whether S or notS is added to it(s) .
In brief 1 these results have proven already tha t there can and do exist many parts
of an axiomatic theory which are subject to lea vi ng the theory consistent even when their
ne~ja tIons are also assumed . Or put a nother way, every theory has “holes ” in it where
the identity of opposites can apply; where S can ho said to be both tru e and false implicitly ,
but either tru e or false explicitly.
Let us turn now to a much simpler discussion of the pi oblem posed by this peculiar
S property that has been proven existable in all theories , and resolve the quandary .
******** ** k *********~
******************* ************
************
***
2.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~
ph ilosoph ica l pr oble ~m s   confronts the n e c e s s i t y for the identity of opposit ive thing s ,
and t h u s accents the vc cin g problem that has confounded philosophers , logicians , and
t h i n k e r s through the centuries . For if one pursues a n y matter to its u l t i m a t e , he will
meet the necessity for the i d e n t i t y of qppos ites at the very bou ndary of the matter bei ng
pursued .
Up to the present , a completely satisfactory answer to Hera clitu s ’s question has
not been discover ed(6) . In the sixth century B . C ., the prevail ing conclusion was tha t
the world is merely the totality of all changes , and stability r e s u l t s from the union of
opposites . Even In Hera clitu s ’s d a y , however , opinion on th e problem of change was
s h ar p l y divided : e .g ., P armentd~ s rega rded change as an il lusion ! He reasoned tha t
w ha t ever Is , is; and whatever is not , is not . Thus whatever changes both is and is
not at the same ti me , which is a contradiction since a thing cannot log i c a l l y be its
opposlte (7) We should note here tha t much of r e a l i t y Is known to violate logic even
though true; i . e . , p ar t s of reality are known to be illoffical (pa radoxica l) . Thus
if opposites can be identica l , this might simply constitute the u ltimate pa radox) .
This led to the a r g u m e n t that change meant creation , the a ppearance of something
new . However , for something tha t did not e x is t before to come into existence implied
the crea tion of something out of nothing , which a g a i n was an intolerable contradiction (8) .
Hegel (9) regarded the “union of opposites ” as a conflict which created a new entity
or new reality . Thus he reasoned tha t one thing (thesis) met its opposite th ing (antithesis)
and from the conflict between them there emerged a third thing (synthesis) . This gave
birth to dialectics , which even toda y is the centra l philosophical theme of dialectica l
materi alism . However , Hegel ’ s dialectics are primarily a restatement of the ancient
“ union of opposites ” or “identity of opposites ” idea of the sixth century B .C .
If the problem were simply something tha t old men with long white beards discussed
because hea t had scxiked their brains , and if it had no further ramifications , then the
problem would not be wor th discu ~ sion. However , the problem of the “accursed necessity
of the i de n t i t y of opposites ” Is directly applica ble to the most fundamental part of
all Western logic , rationa l thought , m a t h e m a t i c s , and science . For the b a s i s of all of
these is Aristotle ’s three laws of logi c , and these laws can be shown to violate themselves
because they involve in the symbo l for their logic operations an identity of oppositives.
Since all logic , science , and mathematics are founded on these three laws , the fact tha t
the laws themselves are selfcontradictory is a matter of the most fundamental importance .
We will c l a r i fy the violation in each of the three laws of Aristotle shortly , and then give
the resolution . But f i r s t we mention a few other b a s i c fundamentals of Western science
tha t are presently founded on illogi ca l b a s e s .
First is the matter of geometry . Geometry is a c t u a l l y the modeling of thing and
extension in terms of nonthing and nothingness. For example , foundations mathematicians
and logiciar s abandoned the attempt to define lines , points , etc after almost a hur dred
yea r strugg le . First they attempted to define a line as len gth , or that which has length ,
or the presence of length . They then defined a point as non length , or that which has no
length , or the absence of length . But then lines cannot be made of points , for if they
were , length and nonlength would be identica l , and presence and absence of length would
be id e n t i ca l . Today they simp ly do not attempt definitions; Instea d they simply state ,
“There Is a class of entities called lines. There is a nother class of entities called
~oInt s . Lines are made of points .” and go on from there .
3.
—   _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~~J1r!P ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~
. . . ... . p . p
~ —
(note that the line and one of its points
cannot be simultaneously observed/percei ved/thoug )
~~
[
COLLECT ALL THE MOST IMMEDIATE PASTI J
AND IT TURNS INTO THE MOST IMMEDIATE .1
FUTURE • BY THE FOURTH LAW OF LOGIC. j ••

.
 _
WHEN IT SHAL L
\• ‘
~~~~~~t HAVE OCCUR R ED,
//
7 IT WI LL THEN BE
“THE PAST ,”
~~~~~
// ~===~~~
~~~~
WHEN IT HAS NOT YET OCCURRED
(PASSED) , IT IS THE “FUTURE . ”
I
~~~
Figure 3. Probability : Modeling the future in terms of the past .
4.
.

Second is the matt es of “ pr obabil1t ~~. ” In the concept f pro~ a b i l ity , one is e s scn t i a l ly
concerned with representin g the most Immediate future in ter ii ~ of the most imm ediate
one wishes to spea k of an event before it h appens . However , the concept
~~~~ I . e . ,
o~ .in “ event ” Is of something which has h ippened , is I n the p a ct , and gone . Thus to
speak of a “fu t ure even t ”  one “wh i ch has not happened ”  is to sp eak of t he fu ture
In ter ms of the past. Again , there Is no accepted logical solution to the dilemma of
;‘r ob ab llity , whi ch today is founded on a totally illogical basis. Most logicians and
fout . iattons mathematicians have also aba ndoned the attempt to resolve the difficulty;
today when a definition of probability is attempted , it is done essentially as a tautology .
Prob abt itty is prob abi lity, any fool knov :s tha t! —
thi s is the statement one is likely
to get In one form or another .
in relativity , the idea of a frame constitutes a logica l contradiction . Rela t i v i ty
establishes that separation (length and time) are variable; further , the only thing which
can be observed is an “event .” Since length and time are not events , they cannot be
observ ed . If length and time are declared observable , then nonevents are observable
and rel ativity violates itself . Yet the concept of an “ ev ent” is one which takes place
in space (length cubed) and time , contains length and time , and Is len gt h and ti me .
In fact , in gener al rela tivi ty , a ll tha t mas s (the presence of thing) is , is a “kink ” or
curvature in spacetime nothi ngness . Further , all of relativity is based on the Idea of
the loc~ lI zç~ d event, and events are observed by only a single observer at a time . Thi s
observer hims elf is localized ; yet the idea of a frame presuppo ses that an inf i n it e number
of “ measurements ” has been made already, and a length established to ea ch and every
“ point ” in the frame , so tha t an Infinity of observations have been made by an infinite
number of observers . The “frame ” is thus a sort of distributed “ transcendent superobserver
and thi s viola tes rela ti vity . Specifically, the idea that a distant point and the observer ’s
point of location can coexist simultaneously in time violates relativity , because time
is convertable to length and vice versa , c  the speed of light  bei ng the conversion
coefficient for “ unaccelerated frames ” . Thus a ny two sepa rated points have a priori
a time sepa ration between them . Rigorously, in relativity there is no such thing as
two sepa rated sp atial points. and the concept of a frame
~~~ c ’ltite simultaneity between
~ ncr’~ y violates thi s character1sti c~
/
x
z/
5.
—  .——— .—— —
I
.— — — 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~

~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _
  

ACTUAL
DISTRIBUTIO1~
¶
(WITHOUT PHOTON
_____________________________—  — INTERACTION )
LECTRON ~~~~~~~~~
I
SOURCE ~ _
— ..
P HOTON ~~
—
SCREEN ~~~

NOTE: 
IF THE ELECTRON IS HIT BY A PHOTON BEFORE IT REACHES
THE TWOSLIT REGION, IT DOES JiQI E X H I B I T THE WAVE
INTERFER ENCE EFFECT, BUT INSTEAD ACTS AS A CLASS ICAL
OBJECT AND GOES THROUGH ONLY ONE SLIT, YIELD ING THE
“ EXPECTED DISTRIBUTION ” PATTERN,
In physics , In Young ’s twoslit experiment one can decide whether the electron
shall be observed as a particle (corpuscle) or as a wave . One can get it to become
totally a particle or totally a wa ve , simply by whether or not the electro n is hit by a
photon before it hits the collecting screen. A lengthy controversy on the “ wave versus
particle” problem was evaded eventually by shaking hands and agreeing to quit fighting !
For the principle of complementarity is merely a statement tha t the determination of
whe. ier an entity is a wave or a particle can yield either result exclusively , but not
both at the same time . The question of what the pa rticle is before it is observed is
ta citly ignored , and indeed usually considered as an “improper question ” these days .
Indeed , the Heisenberg uncertainty principle , sometimes referred to as the indeterm —
inancy principle , is also a statement tha t perception is totally monocular. If one absol
utely determines one of a pair of ca noni ca l variables , then the other is absolutely
undetermined . This translates to the statement that if one is totally perceived , the
other is totally unperceived  so only one of them at a time can be “totally perceived .”
Interestingly enough , one can even paraphrase the uncertainty principle as “It is absolutely
certain that nothing is absolutely certain ,” in which form its direct analogy to the
“conflict of opposites ” involved in the ageold problem of change is revealed .
6. 3
— —
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~
 ~~
 
~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~
     —— 
~~ —  —— 
•
And in loyi c , l oj i c i an s have lon ~j ~ i i i c e despaired over such statements as “It Is
tn .c tha t t h i s statement is f a l s e . ” I ’~ itc I , most logicians today becom e q u it e heated
if such a s t a t e m e n t is even broached ~~ : j problem , t he p r e v a i l i u ~, conclusion (assumption)
ha vi ng been taken t h a t such s t a tem e n t s are not logica l s t a t e men t s , and have no r elevance .
However , it is simply a statement which has in fo lde d both truth and f a l s i t y In the same
enclosure , and identified the two oppositivcs .
So indeed the problem of change , and the problem of the “identity of opposites ” at
the boundary are directly appli cable to science and technology. So let us address the
problem more f u l l y , by a d d r e s s i n g the very basis , the three laws of logic .
1. A ~ A A is identica l to A
Let us now make a fundamenta l correction to Aristotle ’ s three laws o f logic . First ,
there is no independent ex is ten c e to menta l phenomena ; there is a perception operation
i nvolved when we think . There is no independent existence to physica l phenomena ; there
is a perception operation involved when we observe physica l phenomena . Fu rthermore , it
takes a fi nite time interva l (piece of t i m e ) for the perception process to occur . The logic
symbo l for a logic operati on also requires a sepa rate time interval; it represents a series
of sepa rately perceived operations tha t together comprise a decision algorithm . So let
us impose thi s criterion upon logic itself so as to constitute “logica l perception ” or the
“logic of percept ion ” or the “ perception of logic .” We begin with Aristotle ’s third law
of logic , A o r not.’,~ wr i t t e n as the law of the excluded middle , A V K (figure 7).
we i n s i s t there Is no such thing as A per Se , but rather there is a perceived A where A is
the output of the perception process . S i m i l a rly , there is no such th ing as notA per se ,
but rath er there Is a perceived not A where notA is the output of the perception process.
We use a square box symbol as an abbr ev iation for the fact tha t a percept ion has
occurred , and a n y t h i n g w r i t t e n inside the box represents the output of that per ception
oper ation/interva l . We can speak of the box either as menta l perception — a descri ption
of thought  or we can spea k of it as physica l detection — a descri ption of an instrument
at i o n system that detects and measures. (This Is because the box refers to the time
interva l durin g which the process occurs , and both ment ation and physical detection
re quire a time interva l in which to occur) . Since each box represents a process which
re quires a f i n i t e time to occur , we must carefully keep up with and account for the
individua l l i t t l e pieces of time , the delta t ’s .
Applying this to Aristotle’s third law , we ha ve A perceived or outputted in time one ,
and notA outputted in time two . Note that to ascertain that A 1 and notA2 actually
differ requires a series of operations in a separate time interva l , in time three , and
thi s is assumed by the exclusive or symbo l . Looked at in thi s way, Aristotle’s third
law actually is the law of monocularity; It states that only one thing at a time Is
perceived . (Actually we had assumed this when we assumed tha t perception was a
7.
3~ ~~~ J V E ~~j
LAW OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE
~j 1V3E ~ h
5.
6. THE LAW S T AT E S THAT PERCEPTION IS A MONOCULAR PROCESS IN TIME 3.
ONLY ONE— TH ING—AT A—TIME IS PERCEIVED ,
I
7, NOW NOT E THAT SEPARATION OF A AND ~~~
‘
DOES NOT OCCUR IN
~~~
finite process , so it is nice to find that Aristotle ’s third law ju sti fies our assumption ,
once we understand the third law . The exclusive or symbol assumes a third operation in
time three , whereby it is determined tha t perception output one and output two actually
diffe r. But such an operation — a decision algorithm itself requires multiocular
perception (I . e . , collecting two outputs at once) , and tha t in itself is a violation of
Aristot le ’s third law . The third law thus contains its own contradiction , and indeed
8.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ;_
~~~~~ :
.
~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ 

— — 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   — ~~
ea ch of the other two laws also contradicts the third law when one examines them meticul
o u s l y , for each of them in its logic operation symbol implies a binocular perception.
Thus each of Aristotle ’s laws can only be established as true by invoking or involvi ng
an operation which negates the third law , and violates It .
Now let us perforn i a gedanken experiment (thought experiment) to see if we can find
a way to comprehend the identity of A and notA . Here again we start as before , and we
ha ve perceived Al in time interva l one , and not—A 2 in time interva l two. We assume we
are able to figuratively “ pick up ” Ai and not—A2 , so to speak , much like picking up two
playing ca rd s that have previously been chosen. We also assume we can forcibly (or
perhaps j ust slyly) input both of the cards to the perception process simultaneously , and
force the process to process them both at once , without any additiona l opera tions being
allowed to sepa rate them or to process either one sepa rately.
In time three we gathered up wha t had been perception output in time one , A 1, and
wha t had Leen perception output in time two , A 2 , which in time two we do not yet know
is different from A 1, and input them both into the perception process , getting only one
Output  lot us call it B  in time four. By the nature of B in time four , we thus say
in time five that the outputs in times one and two differ or not , In either time one or
time two alone , there is no indication whatsoever of difference or sameness existing
between output one and output two . Likewise , in time three there Is no sepa rate output
one and Output two , hence no indication of the sameness of , or difference between ,
outputs one and two .
So here we have arri ved at the I dentity of opposites . There is no perception of
difference between A 1 and notA 2 in time three if they are both “ shoved through” the
perception process ’s monocular operation simultaneously. Thi s actually constitutes a
fourth law of logic: the law of the boundary , or the boundary identity of exact opposites .
All tha t Is necessary to Identify opposites perceptually Is to lose all perceptual distinction
between them . And tha t is accomplished by multiocular perception , by perceiving the
presence of “both— aton cecompletely—un sepa ra ted , ” hence the absence of either
exclusively present. Each is rionexciusively present , but neither is exclusively present .
If A 1 and A2 are exa ct opposites , then B 4~~~O , and [A11 A~ 3
~~O. We thus have the
solution to the problem of nothing: . Nothing (absence of any presented exclusive thing)
admits of the simultaneou s presence of two or more nonexciusive things , where none can
be singly (exclusively) perceived or detected . Empty nothingness thus is a plenum , not
a void — and as the zen ñi~ ter refers to It , this is the “ void tha t is devoid of void. ”
Almost all the philosophers who have struggled with the problems of being, mind ,
and matter ha ve faced the necessity for the Identity of opposites , but none of them could
understand hbw opposites could be identified . By careful accounting of the sepa rate time
intervals required for finite monocular perceptions , the mecha nism for identifying opposites
is immediately clarified and revealed . The laws of logic are simply laws of the operation
of perception  nothing more , nothing less.

The new system of logic is closed . All present parad oxes  things which are tru e
but which contradict one or more of the first three laws — are resolved by the fourth law ,
which contains the negation of each of the first three laws . The fourth law is In fact the 

law of the pa radox . Note also that the hidden time—three opera tion , which has a ctually
been the application of the fourth law all along , is implied in ea ch of the first three laws .
Identity or nonidentity between timeone and timetwo outputs can only be established in
a time—three operation . The fact tha t either A or not—A exclusively exists can only be
f established by a separa te operation which establishes tha t nothing else is there . If
sepa ration of A 1 an d notA 2 • is absolutely prohibited in time three , then A 1 and not—A2
ca nnot be distingui shed in time three .
9.
 ~~   —    
~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~
TH RCE LAWS FOURTH LAW
I. Al ‘ 3 A~ (exclusive) A1
~3
A2 A A1
~~
A2
2 . A1 3 A 1 = A2
~2 ~
3. A 1 \J3 A2 A i /\3 K2
Figure 8. The fourth law of logic contains the negation of each of the
first thr ee laws .
Since these laws refer to perceptual opera tions , one can th ink of them operationally,
or “ vectorlally ” . To close the vectorial sy stem prescribed by the first three laws , the
oppo site or negation of each of the three vectorial statements must be pre sent; i .e ., thi s
follows simply from the definition of wha t constitutes a “closed system , ” vector ially
speaking . Since the fourth law con tains the negation of ea ch of thc f irst three laws ,
then the fourlaw system is indeed closed , and the logician ’s drea m of a closed metalogic
is realized . Furthermore , anything which contradicts any combination of the first three
laws autom atically is covered by the fourth law , which is the law of the pa radox and the
boundary . Indeed the fourth law is the law of all logica l contr adictj Ons .*
The new logic work s as follows: either the first three laws explicitly apply (sepa r
ation of A and not—A is accomplished),or the fourth law explicitly app lies .(separation of A and
not—A is not permitted and not accomplished) . The fourth law applies only to  and in
fact creates — — a boundary . The first three laws apply only awa y from a bounda ry , and
the fourth law applies only to a boundary .
We may also say that all four laws are always used : When the first three laws are
explicit , the f ourth law Is Implic it; and when the fourth law I s explici t , the first
three
are implici t . 
A
collection of A —
~~~~~
I .
TURN ING ) ~ 1 L
—~ L1 ~
A INTO 1 i• i
~~ ~ ~~
~~~~~~
~~~~~~~ TURN ING
a~ ( I . s . A INTO A
I ‘4— collection of X
(I ~~I ‘
A~ A A~ A
A~ A
Figure 9. Turning a thing into its opposite (applying the fourth
law of logic).
11.
Heraclitus ’s dilemma can now be solved: A thing can indeed both be and not be
at the same time ! I.e ., a thing — say A ——can be implici t (unsepara ted) and not be
explicit (not be separated) at one and the same time , by the fourth law of logic (13) .
We can also resolve the longstanding waveparticle dilemma : In explicit separation
(perception/detection) , a thing is monocular and hence either a particle (L 3) or a
wave (L 2 T) exclusively. Implicitly (nonper ceived , not detected) , a thi ng is unseparated
as exclusive wa ve or exclusive pa r ticle , and so is inclusively both pa rticle and wave
without distinction between the two . Thus the principle of complementa rity only addresses
the case where detection has occurred; it does not address the case where detection has
not occurred . Complementa rity in the twoslit experiment applies only to the fina l
result , not to anything preceding , The output of perception applies only after the
perceptua l operation is completed , not before . And as Wheeler has shown , if we think
of the operations preceding the conclusion of the observa tion as having occurred but
not ha vi ng been observed , then tha t unobserved p ast can be changed , even after it
has “ occurred”! In other words , in the abstract sense observation (completion)
fin alizes “ per ceived/observed reality , ” and until observa tion (completion) occurs ,
complementarit y does not apply , and whether the particle shall evidence (separa te) itself
as a corpuscle or wa ve at the end , remains selectable .
The fourth law of logic applies to every present rationa l science , mathema tics ,
and logic sy stem , and it changes all of them . We simp ly state that it is capable of
resolving every paradox this author is equippe d to examine; hypoth etically at least ,
its application sh ould be capable of resolvi ng every present p aradox .
As a primary example the author has appl ied the fourth law to solve the problem of
mind . It has been pos sible then to model mind and matter and their interaction , and to
m odel a living biosystem . M echanisms for psychokinesis , UFO’ s , ES? , psychotronics ,
radionics , free energy devices , and para norma l phenomena of many types have also been
presented , based on the new fourlaw logic . ( 14)(12)
2 . Ibid.
3. Ibid .
4. Kurt Gódel , “Uber formal unentscheidb are S~ t ze der Pr incipia Mathematica und
verwandtcr Systeme ” (On Formally Indeterminable Propositions of the Principia Mathematica
and Rel ated Systems ) , Mona t shefte ftir Mathemat ik und Phy sik , vol . 38 (1931) .
5 . “Set Theory , ” (specifi cally, “Present Status of Axiomatic Set Theory) , Encyclopaedia
Bri tannica , fi fte enth edition , 1976 , Micropaedia , Vol . 16 , p . 574 . See also “Godel , K urt , ”
Vol. 4 , p. 594 .
6. Hector Hawton , ~ hilosophy for Pleasure , Fawcett World Library , fifth pri nting ,
Ju ne 1970 , pp. 2124 . This book Is highly recommended for the lay reader; while it is
out of print , it can usually be obtained from an agency specializing in out—of—print book s .
It is also a pocketsized paperba ck and quite inexpensive .
12 .
7 . Parmen ides , 504 B C .
8. Hawton , op. cit. , p. 24 . But note that whether or not the making of something out
of nothing is contradictory is itself purely assumptive .
11. A perfect exam ple is Cantor ’s proof that the set of all sets I s not a set,
12 . A model of mind and Its intera ction with matter — one that is consistent with the
present experimenta l ba sis of physics — is contained In Thomas E, Bearden , The
Excalibur BriefinQ, Strawberry Hill Press , distributed by Sta ckpole Book s , 19 79 , in
p ublication .
13. The idea of “notbeing ” can be re garded as a s ta temen t tha t “notbeing is.
. ,, “
wh i ch
is its own self—contradiction .
14. It has been possible to model quantized cha nge itself , and derive a hyperspatial
(hidden variable) amplifi cation theory which potentia lly should allow the direct
engineering
of the virtua l state itself . See T.E . Bearden , Virtual State Engineering and Its
Implications,~ 1978 , Defense Documenta tion Center (in publication)
.
13.
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