Teodosio Lansang vs Garcia (G.R. No.

L-33964)

FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of
8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos
urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were
invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the
validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional

HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case
where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground
could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter,
including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after
satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to
overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Aquino v. Enrile

FACTS:

The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the
military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General
Order No.2 of the President “for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy
to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force…” General
Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of
Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law
subject to judicial inquiry?; and

2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance with the declaration of martial law?

HELD:

5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices
held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and
academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety
against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence.
The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons
referred to in this case.

Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in
Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search
warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant
of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others
was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility
only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.

HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the
Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to
suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again
reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president.
It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry
with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to
be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the
rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012

I. THE FACTS

On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage,
President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On
December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action.
But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963,
lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

II. THE ISSUES

Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
render the issues moot and academic?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and
ACADEMIC.]
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
rendered the issues moot and academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be
cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the
Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review
and validate or invalidate the same.

xxx xxx xxx

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not
only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on
the ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the
hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in
fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot
and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.

Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The
military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The
President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the
period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had
been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President
intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In
her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and
amply armed government presence.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned
without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.

Dissent of J. Carpio

Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City that no probable cause exist that the accused before it committed rebellion in
Maguindanao since the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime. But the Court cannot
use such finding as basis for striking down the President’s proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the
Court did not delegate and could not delegate to the RTC of Quezon City its power to determine the
factual basis for the presidential proclamation and suspension. Secondly, there is no showing that the
RTC of Quezon City passed upon the same evidence that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, had in her possession when she issued the proclamation and suspension.
Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos & Mariano Ocampo III

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was
found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In
not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he
can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.

ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.

HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any
valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
It is a considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.